S/PV.201 Security Council

First of all, I wish to thank my predecessor, the representative of Syria, for his very able presidency during the month of August. I think we made certain progress in August. We worked very_ hard. Of course, some questions still remain to be solved. 355. Adoption of the agenda 356. Continuation of the discussion of the Egyptian question At the invitation of the President, Mahmoud Fahmy Nokrashy Pasha, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, took his seat at the Council table. The PRESIDENT: I wish to remind the Council PROCES-VERBAUX OFFRCIELS DEUX-CENT-UNIEME SEANCE Tenue aLake Success, New-York, le mercredi 10 septembre 1947, a15 heures. President: M. A. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques). 354. Allocution du nouveau p~.esident 355. Adoption de l'ordre du jour L'ordre du jour est adopte. 356. 'Suite de la discussion sur la question egyptienne Su.r l'invitation du President, Mahmoud Fahmy N okrachy Pacha, Premier Ministre et Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres d'Egypte, prend place a la table du Conseil. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je vou- 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de secu- rite, Deuxieme Annee, No 59. ((Recommande auxparties ((a) De reprendre ,}-;s negociations, et ((b) De tenir le Conseil de securite au courant du progres de ces negociations et de lui faire rapport a ce sujet le plus tot possible avant le ler janvier 1948." En deposant cette resolution, j'ai pleinement conscience du fait que, vraisemblablement, elle n'aura I'approbation d'aucune des deux parties au differend. Je suppose qu'a Londres on me traitera de pro-egyptien, tandis qu'au Caire je passer;!.i pour pro-britannique. . Je pretends cependant que cette resolution est equitable; elle est soumise par" une delegation dont le Gouvernement entretient des relations amicales avec l'une et l'autre partie. Le seul desir qui inspire cette resolution est celui cl'aider ces deux pays a ctre amis et mcme, je l'espere, meilleurs amis qu'ils ne 1'0nt jamais ete. Sur le fond mcme de la resolution, je crois inutile de m'expliquer longuement. En des oc- casions precedentes, j'ai fait connaitre exactement le point de vue de ma delegation. Je voudrais ajouter que cette resolution ne pretend pas de- terminer en quoi les parties au differend peuvent ctre tenues responsables de ce qui s'est produit ~eing pro-Egyptian, while in Cairo r shall be denounced as being pro-Bdtish. r daim, however, that this resolution is a fair one, submitted by a delegation whose Government is friendly to both parties. The only wish behind the resolution is to help th~ two countries to be friends and, I hope, to be better friends than ever before. On the substance 'of the resolution itself, r think it is unnecessary to speak at length. On previous occasions r have made clear my delegation's point- of view. r should like to say that this resolution does not pretend to assign responsibility or blame for what has happened in the past. It does not violate, but on the contrary, is in conformity with, 1 Voir les Prod$-verbau~ officiels du Conseil de secu- rite, Deuxieme Annee, No 80. I hope that the two parties will appreciate the difficulties involved in framing such a resolution. The mere fact that the representative of the United Kingdom and the Prime Minister of Egypt may not like the resolution demonstrates that it is, on the whole, fair. This resolution does not go into the question of how these difficulties shall be solved. It recom- mends direct negotiation. However, in the pre- amble, it does say that the desire of the Egyptian Government for the evacuation of United Kingdom forces is natural and reasonable. I would make bold to say that in that paragraph we have said no more than the action of the Government of the United Kingdom itself justifie3 our saying. In early negotiations, agreement was reached providing for evacuation. In spite of the fact that the draft protocoll was not ratified, the United Kingdom Government hils gone ahead and withdrawn some of its forces from certain parts of Egypt. In the course of the discussion here, the repre- sentative of the United Kingdom has assured us again and again that in the past, as well as in the present, it was not, and is not, the intention of the Government of the United Kingdom to use armed force in Egypt for any purpose other than those provided for in the Treaty of 19362-in other words, that force has not been used, and is not being used, as pressure for achieving other objects. In these paragraphs I feel that the Council states the principles for which it stands, and which are also in conformity with the real, fundamental policy of the Government of the United Kingdom. I only make this plea: that for the future of that part of the world and for the future of this Coun- cil, the members will see fit to lend their support to this resolution.

I ask the members of the Council to express their opinion on this new proposal submitted by the Chinese representa.tive. I hope that the text of it is at the disposal of all the members of the Council. As no one has asked for permission to speak, I should like to ask the Prime Minister of Egypt whether he wishes to express his opinion on this subject. NOKRASHY Pasha (Egypt) : No one questions the sincerity of the representative of China in doing his best to find a solution to this problem. From the very beginning he has expressed a genlline sympathy for the claims of Egypt. NOKRACHY Pacha (Egypte) (traduit de l'anglais): Nul ne met en doute la sincerite des efforts faits par le representant de la Chine pour aboutir a une solution. Des le debut, il a exprime une sympathie sincere pour les revendications de l'Egypte. Je dois nearimoins faire observer que je ne con<;ois pas la possibiIite de negociations fructueuses avec le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni Nevertheless, I should like to make it clear that so long as United Kingdom armed forces continue to be stationed in Egyptian territory, I can see no 1 See Papers regarding the Negotiations for a Revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, United Kingdom Command Paper 7179, Part I, Annex 3, Draft Evacuation Protocol. 1 Voir "Papers regarding the Negotiations for a Revisi01~ of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, United Kingdom Command Paper 7179", Premiere Partie Annexe 3 Projet de Protocole relatif 11 I'evacuation. ' , 2Voir le Traite d'alliance entre le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et·d'Irlande du Nord et I'Egypte, signe 11 Londres le 26 aout 1936. Societe des Nations, Recueil des TraiMs, volume 173, No 4031, pages 401 11 424. ' 2 See Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland and Egypt, signed at London, 26 August 1936. League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 173, No. 4031, pp. 401-424. I have repeatedly asked thf:: United Kingdom to withdraw its troops, but the United Kingdom. has not complied with those requests. Instead, Sir Alexander Cadogan has told the Security Council that the United Kingdom will not comply with those requests. Why? I can only conclude that its purpose in stationing its forces in our territory is to exert pressure upon us at present and in the future. It was only after a failure to rectify our position through negotiations that we came to the Security Council to claim our sovereign equality and to ask the Council to relieve us of the pressure under which we live. The United Kingdom will not evacuate its forces of its own accord, and unless we are relieved of this pressure, no negotiations will be successful.

I should like to ask the representative of the United Kingdom whether he wishes to express his views with regard to this new proposal. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : I am quite willing to comply with the President's request. Since the Security Council ran into difficulties on 29 Augustl,various representatives, inspired by a desire to help the Council out of its difficulty, h9.ve devised various formulae. Some of the representatives have been good enough to show me their formulae. I am afraid I found all of them unsatisfactory because of one defect common to all, which I hope to explain in a moment. I recognize the excellent intentions of the representative of China. I know how hard and how honestly he has worked to reach a satisfactory solution. He spoke of the difficulties of succeeding. I am fully aware of those, too, and I know that he has done his very best to overcome those difficulties. It may be that in the opinion of some of the members of the Council he has succeeded. Since I am asked my OpInIOn, I am afraid I must say that this text which he has submitted is still tainted by the same defect. I do not wish to waste' the time of the Council, but may I recall the origin and the history of this case? My Government, as is known, agreed to enter into negotiations for the revision of the Treaty of 1936 even before it was bound to do so under the terms of that Treaty. At one point we had reached agreement on the three subjects of evacuation, the treaty of mutual defense, and the Sudan. There werei three documents on which we h~.d agreed. Thereafter, the negotiations broke down, not, in our opinion, because of any fault of ours, but because of the unilateral interpretatien by the Egyptian A maintes reprises, j'ai demande au Royaume- Uni de retirer ses troupes; le Royaume-Uni n'a pas donne suite cl. ces rt.:quetes. Bien au contraire, Sir Alexander Cadogan a declare ici au Conseil de securite que le Royaume-Uni n'y accederait pas. Pourquoi? Je ne peux que penser que l'intention' qui a preside cl. l'etablissement de ces troupes sur notre territoire est d'exercer une pres- SiOll sur nous cl. present et dans l'avenir. Ce n'est qu'apres avoir echoue dans nos efforts pour retablir notre situation, par voie de negociation, que nous nous sommes adresses au Conseil de securite pour reven.diquer l'egalite des droits de souverainete et 1ui demander de nou& delivrer de la pression sous 1aquelle nous 'livons. Le Royaume- Uni ne retirera pas ses troupes de son plein gre et, cl. moins que nous ne' soyons soulages de cette .pression, aucune negociation ne pourra etre menee' cl. bonnefin.' Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Je voudrais demander au representant du Royaume-Uni s'il desire donner son avis sur cette nouve1!e proposition? Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je suis tout dispose cl. repondre cl. la demande du President. Depuis que le Conseil de securite s'est trouve dans l'embarras, le 29 aoutl, divers representants, mus par le desir de le tirer d'affaire, ont imagine differentes formules. Certains ont ete assp.z bons pour me montrer leurs formules. J'avoue que je les ai toutes trouv'~es peu satisfaisantes en raison d'un defaut qui leur est commun et sur lequel j'espere m'expliquer dans un moment. . Je me rends compte des excellentes intentions du r~presentant de la Chine; je connais le zele et la loyaute dont it a fait preuve d1.ms la recherche d'une solution satisfaisante. Il a parle des difficultt~s qu'il a rencontrees; j'en ai pleinement conscience moi aussi, et je sais qu'il a fait de son mieux pour les surmonter. Certain" membres du Conseil estimeront, peut-etre, qu'il y est parvenu. Puisqu'on me demande mon avis, j'avoue devoir dire que le texte soumisl est entache d.ll meme defaut que les textes anterieurs. Je n'a:' pas l'intention d'abuser des instants du Co:aseil, mais qu'il me soit permis de rappe1er .l'origine et I'historique de cette affaire. Mon Gouvernement, on le sait, a accepte d'entreprendre des negociations pour la revision du Traite de 1936, avant Ii.eme d'y etre tenu par les termes de ce Traite. A un certain stade de ces negociations, nous etions d'accord sur l'ensemble des trois sujets: l'evacuation, 1-= traite de defense mutuP.11e et le Soudan. Il y avait trois documents sur lesquels nous nous etions mis d'accord. .Apres quoi les negociations ont ete rompues, cl. notre avis, non pas par une faute de notre part, mais par suite de l'interpretation uni- Then the Egyptian Government bt:Ought the matter before the Security Council. After the discussion had proceeded for a little while and statements on both sides had been heard, it seemed to be the wish of a substantial majority of the members of the Council to recommend th1'l.t the parties should, u.nder Article 33 of the Charter, resume negotiations in the hope of reaching a satisfactory , solution, and to request them to keep the Council informed of those negotiations. If a resolution with that purpose had been adopted, the effect, in my view, would h.·we been that the Council would have given that procedure the chance to succeed, and would have waited to see whether negotiations or any othel' peaceful means of settlement of the parties' own choice could produce a satisfactory result. As I understand the Charter, it would he only when the Council though those me,(l1S had been proved inadequate or ha.d been unduly delayed or protra:ted, that it would, under Article 36 and in the words of that Article, "recolllmen . appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment". If the Council contemplated recommending the resumption of negotiation<., the intention-at least according to my understanding of it-presumably would be that those negotiations should cover the same field as those which had already so nearly succeeded. The position that has gradually grown up since the presentation of certain resolutions is that various suggestions have been made, various texts have been propounded, which attempt to alter or restrict the field of the negotiations or to assign priorities to certain parts of it. That, it seems to me, would amount to dealing with the merits of the case under Article 36. The Council appears to be attempting to work under two Articles at the same time, and I do not think that can produce a good result. I should have thought that the Council ought either to find that the possibilities of Article 33 had not been exhausted and give them a chance of being tried out further for a while, or it should proceed to deal with the case itself under Article 36. I do not know whether the Council is prepared to do that, but I do not see how we can work under both Articles at the same time. My Government is quite prepared to accept a recommendation such as was originally contemplated, and even put to the vote2, under Article 33. But we would find difficulty in accepting any of the variants, the effect of which would be, I believe, to shift the Council from the sphere of Article 33 of the Charter to that of Article 36. I do not know whether that· was the Council's intention. The present draft put before us at this meeting suffers, it seems to me, from that defect. It does not simp:y call uppn the parties to resume the negotiations which had been initiated and carried 1 See Papers regarding the Negotiations for a Revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, United Kingdom Command Paper 7179, Part I, Annex 2, Draft Sudan Protocol. Si une resolution avait ete adoptee en ce sens, il en eut resulte,a mon avis, que le Conseil aurait donne quelque chance de succes a cette procedure. Il eut alors attendu de voiJ; si des negociations, ou tout autre moyen de reglement pacifique choisi par les parties, pouvaient aboutir a un resultat satisfaisant. Au sens de la Charte, telle que je la comprends, c'est seulement lorsque le Conseil aurait juge que ces moyens s'etaient averes insuffisants ou que les negociations trainaient indument en longueur, qu'il aurait - en vertu de l'Article 36 et d'apres les termes memes de cet Article - "recommande les procedures ou me·· thodes d'ajustement appropriees". Si le Conseil envisageait de recommander la reprise des negociations, son intention, a ce que je comprends du moins, serait sans doute que ces negociations aient le meme objet que celles qui avaient deja ete si pres de i"eussir. Or, il s'est avere, au fur et a mesure de la presentation de certaines resolutions, que les diverses propositions formulees et les differents textes presentes, tendent a modifier ou restreindre le champ des llegociations ou a attribuer la priorite a certains de leurs aspects. Ceci, a mon avis, revient a appliquer a 1'affaire les dispositions de l'Article 36. Il semble que le Conseil essaie d'agir en vertu de deux articles a la fois et je ne .crois pas que cela puisse produire de 'bons resultats. J'aurais pense que le Conseil devrait, soit considerer' que les possibilites de l'Article 33 n'ont pas ete epuisees et tenter d'appliquer les dispositions de cet Article pendant quelque temps enco:~, soit s'atta:quer au fond meme de l'affaire, en application de 1'Article 36. Je ne sais pas si le Conseil est. dispose a' le faire, mais je ne vois pas comment n0"4s pourrions simultanement agir en vertu de deux Articles differents. . Mon Gouvernement est tout a fait dispose a accepter une recommandation du meme ordre que celle qui avait ete envisagee et meme mise aux voix2, au titre de i'Article 33. Mais nous estimerions difficile d'accepter 1'une quelconque des variantes, qui, je crois, aurait pour effet d'amener le Conseil a agir en vertu de l'Article 36 de la Charte, et non plus de l'A!ticle 33. Je ne sais pas si c'est bien la 1'intention du Consei!. . Le projet qui nous a ete soumis au cours de la presente seance souffre, me semble-t-il, de ce defaut. Il n'invite pas simplement les parties a reprendre les negociations qui avaient ete engagees 1 Yoir "Papers regarding the Negotiations for a Revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, United Kingdom Command Paper 7179", Premiere Partie, Annexe 2, Projet de Protocole relatif au Soudan. 2Yoir les Proces-verbau% officiels dlt Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee, No. 86, 198eme seance. ' The next point is that it is only after evacuation begins, apparently, that the parties are asked to resume negotiations on the other matters. J am not quite sure-and it is this point which I find impossible to accept-that the various areas of the dispute should be dealt with separately and according to a certain priority. In my opening statement to the Councill , I think I made ft clear that we wished to deal, as we had done in the original negotiations, with the entire area of' the dispute as a whole. That is still the position of my Government, and I am afraid, therefore, that I must warn the Council that if this text is put to the vote in its present form, my Government will not consider it acceptable. Of course, I do not have a vote2, but I think the various members of the Council have already said that they wish to know the views of the parties to the dispute, and some have said that they would wish to vote only for a resolutiop which they had ascertained was acceptable to'both sides. May I add one word more. The Egyptian Prime Minister spoke of the position of inequality in which the Egyptian Government found itself because of the pi'esence of United Kingdom troops in Egypt. He spoke of the pressure which my Government would be able to exert thrqugh the presence of those troops. While denying that this has been done in recent years, may I point out that, if the Security Council were now to invite the parties to resume negotiations and to report on those negotiations to the Council, there really could not be any question of our exerting pr~ssure. Even if we· really wanted to do so through the presence of our troops, it would be possible for Egypt immediateLy to draw the attention of the Security Council to any irregularity of that kind and to appeal against it. I think myself that a simple invitation to the parties to resume negotiations under the aegis of the Security Council, as it were, should certainly lead to the possibility of arriving at a happy result. . Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): I wish to comment on the last statement made, by Sir Alexander Cadogan. Le projet prevoit ensuite, semble,t-il, que c'est seulement apres le commencement de l'evacuation que les parties seront invitees a reprendre les negociations sur les autres questions. Je ne suis pas sur de bien comprendre, mais je trouve impossible cl'accepter le fait que les differents points en litige doivent etre traites separement et suivant un certain ordre de priorite. DanslaOeclaration generale CJ,ue j'ai faite au ConseiF, je me suis efforce de preciser que nous desirions traiter, comme nous l'avions fa~t dans les negociations anterieures, de l'ensemble. de tous les aspects des questions en litige. L'cLttitude de mon Gouvernement rest~ toujours la meme; je dois, a mon grand regret, avertir le Conseil que si le te.xte actuel est mis aux voix te! qu'il est, mon Gouvernement ne saurait le considerer comme acceptable. Bien entendu, je n'ai pas le droit de vote2, mais je crois que les differents membres du Conseil ont deja dit qu'ils desirent connaitre les avis des interesesses, et certains d'entre eux ont declare qu'ils desiraient ne voter que pour une resolution qui serait acceptable aux deux parties. Puis-je ajouter un mot encore. Le Premier Ministre d'Egypte a parle de la situation d'infedorite dans laquelle se trouvait le Gouvernement egyptien par suite de la presence de troupes du Royaume-Uni en Egypte. It a parte de la pressbn que mon Gouvernement serait en mesure d'ex~rcer par la presence de ses troupes. Tout en niant que semblable pression ait ete exercee au cours des dernieres annees, puis-je me permettre de faire observer que, si, le Conseit de securite invitait aujourd'hui les parties a reprendre leurs negociations et a le tenir au courant de ces negociations, .it ne pourrait vraiment pas etre question d'exercer une pression. Meme si nous desirions faire pression en profitant de la presence de nos troupes, l'Egypte pourrait, instantanement, attirer l'attention du Conseil de securite sur l'irregularite de notre action et protester a ce sujet. Je crois, pour ma part, qu'une simple invitation a reprendre les negociations, en quelque sorte sous les auspices du Conseil de securite, pourrait certainement avoir des chances d'aboutir a un heureux resultat. M. EL-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais dire quelques mots des dernieres declarations de Sir Alexander Cadogan. 1 Voir les Proces-verba~ officiels du Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee, No 70, 176eme seance. 2 Voir le paragraphe 3 de l'Article 27 de la Charte des Nations Unies. The second point which I wish to mention concerns the matter of pressure. The continuous presence of foreign troops may be used as a means of pressure to influence the negotiations on other points at issue. I can readily believe the statement of the Uniter' Kingdom representative, that ~lOw that this matter has reached its present stage and is to be dealt with under the aegis of the Security Council, the Government of the United Kingdom certainly would not use its armed forces in Egypt to press or compel the Egyptian Governm~nt to accept the United Kingdom Government's point of view or its demands. That is quite certain. But Sir Alexander Cadogan has just said that al~ the issues in dispute should be taken up together under one heading and dealt with jointly. Well, that means pressure, or if it is not so called, the influence of the pressure of troops may be understood as the use of pressure. For instance, it will be said: "Suppose we accept this resolution. It would have to be implemented by botli parties. How would it be implemented?" Let us examine the situation and view it as it may possibly appear in the future. The parties would flroceed to negotiate or enter into direct contact, a'5 is recommended. They would then begin talks on the matter. They would speak of the evacuation first of all, because this is the urgent poin: which is hinted at in this resolution and to which there must be a prompt solution. The Egyptian Government would ask the Government of the United Kingdom about the withdrawal of its troops. The United Kingdom Government would say, "Let us look at the other issues in the dispute. What are yOll going to do about them? What are you going to do with the Sudan, with the friendly relations between us, and with other rent~, et l'une est plas urgente que l'autre. La question la plus urgente, c'est la presence de troupes etrangeres sur le territoire d'un Etat Membre. Sur ce point, je crois que le Conseil de securite a estime que l'affaire exigeait une solution rapide, tandis que l'autre elemelit du differend pourrait, en vertu de l'A.rticle 33 de la Charte, etre regIe par voie de negociation. Une "methode d'ajustemenf' pourrait etre prevue pour la question urgente, en vertu du parag.-aphe premier de l'Article 36lUi dispose que "le Conseil de securite peut, it tout moment de l'evolution d'un differend de la nature mentionnee a l'Article 33 ou d'une situation analogue, recommander les procedures DU methodes d'ajustement appropriees". La methode d'ajustement, pOilr cette premiere questicn, c'est qu'il faudrait prendre des mesures rapides pour achever le -retrait des troupes britanniques. C'est ce a quoi fait allusion la resolution pn~sentee par la delegation de la Chine. Je ne erois done pas qu'il y ait une difficulte fluelconque a. concilier l'attitude du Conseil de seeurite lorsqu'il traite d'une partie du dlfferend en vertu de l'Article 33 et lorsqu'il applique a l'autre partie les dispositions prevues au paragraphe premier de l'Article 36. Le second point que je desire abordcr a trait cl la question de la pression. La presence continue de troupes etrangeres peut etre employee eomme moyen de pression pour influencer bs negociations sur d'autres points en litige. Je cmis msement que, comme l'a dit le representant du Royaume-Uni, au point OU en est la question et du fait qu'elle doit etre reglee sous les auspices du Conseil de securite, le Gouvernement du Royaume- Uni n'emploierait certainement pas ses troupes en Egypte pour faire pression sur le Gouvernement egyptien, ou pour le forcer a accepter le point de vue du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni ou ses exigences. C'est bien evident. Mais Sir Alexander Cadogan vient de dire que tous les elements du differend devraient etre examines ensemble, groupes sous une seule rubrique et traites conjoilltement. Eh bien I voila. un exemple de pression ou bien, si on ne l'appelle pas ainsi, l'influence exercee par la presence des troupes peut etre consideree comme un moyen depression. Ou peut se dire, par exemple: "Suppos'ons que la resolution soit acceptee. Il faudrait qu'elle fUt appliquee par les deux parties. Comment serait-eIle appliquee?" Examinons la situation et envisageons-la telle qu'elle peut apparaitre dans l'avenir. Les parties negocieraient ou plutot se mettraient en contact direct, comme eUes y sont invitees. Elles engogeraient des canversations sur la question. Elles parleraient, en premier lieu, de la question de l'evaeuation qui est I'pffaire urgente cl laquelle fait allusion la resolution qui nous est soumise et pour laquelle une solution rapide est necessaire. Le Gouvernement egyptien demanderait au Gouvernement dn Royaume-Uni le retrait de ses troupes. Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni dirait: "Examinons les autres elements du differend. Qu'entendez-yous faire cl leur sujet? Qu'entendezvous faire au sujet du Soudan? Comment envisagez- On the matter of negotiation, I have been of the opinion that there is no need for negotiation in regard to the evacnation or withdrawal of United Kingdom troops. That is a unilateral action. The Government of the United Kingdom is free. to withdraw its troops, and I am sure that the Egyptians would not put any obstacles in the way of withdrawal. Quite the contrary! They would help it. I wonder if the Government of the United Kingdom would make the friendly gesture of telling the Security Council: "We do not intend to maintain our forces in the vicinity forever. \fVe wish to withdraw them, and we will withdraw them. We know that it is the desire of the Security Council and of the General Assembly that under the Charter such practice should not continue. The presence of troops in Egypt is no longer necessary, as has been previously explained, so we are going to withdraw them and resume negotiation on all other issues." I think that would be a very good step for the United'Kingdom to take. It would serve to hasten greatly a solution of the dispute, and it would not cost .the United Kingdom Govef11ment anything. The United Kingdom has agreed in the past to withdraw, and now there is no profit for it in keeping such a small force near the Suez Canal simply to tease and vex the Egyptians without any 'result either for itself or for the Egyptian Government. It would be.a very wise and liberal move on the part of the United Kingdom to tell the Security Council that it agrees to withdraw its troops without waiting for a recommendation or an invitation to that effect from the Council. Let it be a spontaneous act, ;md one which would be appreciated not only by the Egyptians but by all the people in the Near East and by the world in general. It would be considered a very good step; it would be liberal and correct. Negotiations could be resumed, after this withdrawal had been effected, without having been ordered or recommended by the Security Council, The Government of the United Kingdom would gain prestige by taking this step of its own accord. Everyone would be thanHul for it. After that, if the Egyptian GovernmerJt were invited to particinate in further negotiations on the other issues of the dispute, very good results would be assured, and there would be hope that the matter would be settled in a friendly way. All relations between the United Kingdom and Egypt would be resumed. and their friendship would be consolidated. I knew that the G:>V..:rnment of the United Kingdom is eager and anxious to. establish friendship with Egypt: this is the way to establish such a friend- Il serait sage et genereux, de la part du Royaume- Uni, de dire au Conseil de securite qu'il accepte de retirer ses troupes sans attendre une recommandation ou une invitation a cet effet. I1 faut que se soit un acte spontane - acte spontane qu'apprecieraient non seulement les Egyptiens mais tous les peuples du Proche Orient et I'ensemble du monde. Cette decision genereuse et juste serait consideree comme nne excellente mesure. , Apres le rappel des troupes, les negociations pourraient etre reprises sans que le Co~seil de securite donne d'ordre ou fasse de recommandation it cet effet. Le prestige du Gouvernement du Royaume- Uni sortiraitgrandi de cette decision prise spontane- >ti1ent. Tous lui en seraient reconnaissants. Apres quoi, si le Gouvernement egyptien etait invite a faciliter les negoriations sur les autres elements du differend, il se sentirait certain d'un h~ureux reglement et l'on aurait l'espoir que les questions se regleraient dans un esprit amical. Les relations seraient reprises, dans tous les domaines, entre le Roya,ume-Uni et l'Egypte, et leur amitie s'en trouverait consolidee. Je sais que le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a it (:oeur d'<~tablir des 'liens d'amitie solides avec I'Egypte; voila la fa<;on de I shall cite as an example an event which occurred last year in London in connexion with the Syrian-Lebanese caseI. There the Security Council failed to agree on a resolution on the subject; but Mr. Bevin and Mr. Bidault were so good and liberal as to-announce formally and officially to the Security Council that aW-'Jugh the Council could not pass a resolution on tne subject, they were ready to comply with the desire of the Council and withdraw their forces from Syria and Lebanon as soon as practicable. Actually, within one month after that declaration had been made by Mr. Bevin in the Security Council, all United Kingdom and French troops were withdrawn from Syria. The troops were withdrawn from Lebanon a few months later, and the matter was concluded in that way. Those declarations by both the great Powers were greatly appreciated in the Near East and in all the world at that time. I believe that is a very good example and a stimulus to friendship and sincerity. We hope that the matter under discussion today will be dealt with in the same way. There is no harm in withdrawing the forces. The presence of the small force in Egyptian territory is .no longer necessary. The United Kingdom itself knows this. It is not necessary to settle all the other matters before evacuation is effected. It can thus be said that the presence of foreign troops in Egypt is a threat and a menace which makes it possible for the United Kingdom to say: "If you do not agree to this point or that, our forces remain." This possibility is what the Egyptians fear and wish to eliminate.

As there are no further speakers on this resolution, I shall speak briefly as the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I have compared the text of the Chinese resoluti<?n with the ?~her resolu~ions, and particularly WIth the BrazIlIan resolutIon. I find there. is a difference between the Chinese and Colombian resolutions, but there is practically no difference between the Chinese and Brazilian resolutions. The main purpose of both of those resolutions is to suggest the continuation of direct negotiations between the two parties involved in the dispute. However, we must not overlook the fact that such ne.gotiations have already taken place and have fa.lled. They did not produce any positive r~sults toward the solution of this important question. As a result of this failure the Government of Egypt appealed to the Security Cour..cil. I have already expressed the opinion of the USSR delegation on the substance of the question under consideration2, as well as on both resolut~O?S on which we.acted before, namely, the BrazIhan and ColombIan resolutions. My delegation 1 Voir les Proces-'lJerbauz officiels du Conseil de securfte, Premiere Annee, Premiere Serie, No 1, 20eme' seance. ' Colonel HODGSON (Australia): I am sure we are all actuated by the same aspirations as the representative of China in endeavouring to reach a just and impartial decision. As far as my delegation is concerned, we always endeavour to reach a just and impartial decision in the light of evidence before this Council. It seems to us rather wrong in principle that the Security Council should try to reach a decision which satisfies both parties. I can recall that in this case one representative even suggested that he would vote for one resolution if it were acceptable to both parties. In the remarks just made by the President, he has indicated that in this case the Security Council could adopt more appropriate measures. My delegation would like to know what those measures are as they have not been indicated with any precision. The President has not submitted any resolution. It is clear that the whole of this dispute revolves around the validity of the Treaty of 1936. One party says that the Treaty has outlived its usefulness and ·is not in confomity with the principles of the Charter; the other party says that the Treaty is valid and is in no way inconsistent with the letter or spirit of the Charter. That seems to be the issue which most of us apparently are avoiding. We seem to be searching for a compromise which is going to suit everybody, and, as we have already heard this afterno.on, this latest attempt is satisfactory to neither party.. When I look at this latest draft resolution. before us, there are three points upon which I should like to comment and which, from the point of view of my delegation, are not very satisfactory. The preamble speaks of H ••• the re-establishment of direct contact between the parties . . ." On the point of evacuation, I would assume that, l'inten~t des parties elles-memes que dads ce1ui des Nations Unies en general. Le Conseil de securite dispose de moyens plus efficaces qui produiraient vraiment des effets positifs. Malheureusement, je remarque que certains des Etats representes au Conseil de securite ne jugent pas qu'il convienne de donner suite aux justes et legitimes revendications du Gouvernement egyptien. Je me bornerai a. cette courte declaration qui confirme ce que j'avais deja. dit sur le meme sujet au cours de seances anterieures du Conseil de securite. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Nous sommes tous animes, j'en suis sur, des memes desirs que le representant de la Chine, et !ious nous effon;ons d'aboutir a une decision equitable et impartiale. Ma delegation, pour sa part, dirige toujours ses efforts vers ce but. en tenant compte des preuves fournies au Consei!. Le Conseil de securite aurait tort, me semble-til, de rechercher une decision satisfaisante pour les deux parties. Je crois me rappeler qu'un representant est alle jusqu'a. dire qu'il voterait en faveur de toute resolution acceptable pour les deux parties. Dans les remarques qu'il vient de faire, le President a indique que, dans cette affaire, le Conseil de securite pourrait prendre des mesures plus efficaces. Ma delegation desirerait connaitre ces mesures, etant donne qU'elles n'ont pas ete indiquees avec precision et que le President n'a pas presente de resolution. Il est clair que l'ensemble du differend gravite autour de la validite du Traite de 1936. L'une des parties declare .:J.ue le Traite n'a plus de raison d'etre et qu'il n'est pas conforme aux principes de la Charte; l'autre partie declare que le Traite doit etre respecte et n'est nullement incompatible avec la lettre ou l'esprit de la Charte. Or, c'est la. la question que la plupart d'entre nous semblent eviter d'aborder. Nous paraissons rechercher un compromis qui convienne a. tout le monde et, conune on nous l'a dit cet apres-midi, cet effort ne satisfait per"onne. En considerant le dernier projet de resolutic:m qui nous a ete presente, je tiens a. signaler trois points qui, de l'avis de ma delegation, ne sont pas tres satisfaisants. "Le preambule parle de H ••• retablissement de I rapports directs entre les parties ...". A propos de l'evacuation, je suppose que, les negociations pre- My next observation is this. Every representative around this table spoke in favour of the right of self-determination of the Sudanese; every delegation paid lip-service to this principle and readily quoted from the Charter. Even the USSR and Polish representatives, while having no concrete proposals at this stage with regard to the Sudan, expressed agreement with the principle of selfdetermination. We therefore proposed, as an amendment to the original Brazilian :'iesolution, to add after the words "to resume negotiations", the words "which, in so far as they affect the future of the Sudan, should include consultation with the Sudanese"- that is, consultation regarding the immediate future of the Sudan, which involves the question of the Condominium administration, and regarding the more distant future, which involves their right of self-government. Yet, the extraordinary result-was that only two members of the Council voted for the principle with which they had expressed agreement1• From the point of view of my lJelegation, before we come to a vote, I would request the representative of China to give consideration to the three points I have mentioned; which are the following: in the last clause of the preamble, to use the word "negotiations" instead of "contact"; to add the words "in the settlement of other issues between the two parties"; and to give consideration to the inclusion of the portion relating to the Sudan. As regards the combination of Articles 33 and ~6 of the Charter, to my rrdd that is not very Important. The really operative clauses of this resolution recommend that the parties should resume direct negotiations, and we think that certainly comes under Article 33. The other is just Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America) : As the representative of Australia rightly pointed out, the really operative part cif this resolution is at "the end, where it recommends that the parties should resume negotiations, keep the Security Council informed, and so forth. The importance which may be attached to the preamble lies in the impression the Council may give as to the elements which, in its opinion, the two parties should have under considerationwhen they resume negotiations. The Brazilian resolution, which was voted for by six members of the Council, avoided those definitions and kept to ArtiCle 33, very wisely; I think. It recommended that the two parties to the dispute should resume negotiations, and if those negotiations should fail, should seek a solution of the dispute by other peaceful means of their own choice, and should keep the Security Council informed. If the preamble is to spell out things which, in the opinion of the Council, should be considered, I agree with the representative of Australia that we have to spell them all out. The question of the evacuation of troops is not the only element involved in this situation. It certainly is an extremely important one, and, as I have already stated on behalf of my delegation, it is one on which the United States delegation sympathizes with the Egyptian point of view. We quite understand that Egypt wants foreign troops removed from its territory. That does not mean, however, when we are operating under Article 33, that the Security Council, which is a deliberative political bodyand certainly a conciliatory body under Chapter VI-should attempt to lay down conditions precedent to negotiations. I do not think that is sound. However, looking principally at the operative clauses of this resolution when I first read it and before anyone had spoken, it seemed to me, although I did not like it, that it was not substantially different from the Brazilian resolution, as was pointed out by the President. Now that I have listened, however, to the objections of both the Prime Minister of Egypt and the representative of the United Kingdom, the interpretation given to the resolution by Sir Alexander Cadogan, and also the very precise interpretation given to it by the representative of Syria, it seems to me that there is a difference, and, if these interpretations represent the thought of the representative of China, it would seem as though there were an attempt in this resolution, by curious wording, to avoid the real issue, which is the validity of the Treaty of 1936. Why should we get away from that? If the Prime Minister of Egypt wants us to send this case to the International Court of Justice for determination, we shall do so. But if he does not want that done, then let us stick to simple things that fall properly under Article 33 of the Charter and invite the two parties to the dispute to resume their negotiations, expressing the: hope that these negotiations will lead speedily I submit that the paragraph which I suggested to replace the corresponding one in this present resolution is much fairer and more equitable, if the Council should ipsist on stating the elements ,of this case. I still think that the Brazilian resolution is preferable and does riot prejudice anyone's rights or aspirations.

I should like to ask the Chinese representative whether he wishes to comment on the suggestions made by the representatives of Australia and the United States regarding the text of the resolution. Mr. TSIANG (China): The use of the phrase "re-establishment of direct contact" and the' omission of the last phrase "in the settlement of other disputes" are both deliberate and purposeful. If the representatives of Australia and the United States think the other formula was better, they are, of course, free to move an amendment and the Council can vote on such an amendment. For my part, I could not accept such a change. I say the present wording is deliberate. There are a number of questions involved, two of which have been put before the Council; one is the evacuation of troops, and the other is the future of the Sudan. We know there is another question pending between the two countries, although that question has not been formally presented to the Council for consideration. That is the question of the alliance. Of the three questions, the matter of evacuation is most urgent and psychologically most important, but in the long run the other two questions are really much more important and more difficult of settlement. The evacuation of troops is ef course a very important question, but, as I s 'led the statements made and the information furnished, I could not help coming to the conclusion that the difference of opinion between the two parties on that particular question is, after all, not large. If that minor difference could be disposed of at an early stage or if the settlement of that difference could be accomplished a little more expeditiously, the solution of all the questions could be more easily achieved. It is for that reason that I accept the explanation and the statement made by our colleague from Syria. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America) : In regard to the statement made by the representative of China that he thought we should not complicate the resolution by the addition of the phrase concerning the Sudan, it seems to me that, if he de-. sires simplicity, the thing to do is not to complicate the matter by limiting it to one form of moral directive--which is what is done here-when there are other things to be negoti~ted and to be considered, and other points of difference. I would gladly vote for this resolution if it were a.."l1ended to substitute, instead of the last paragraph of the preamble, the paragraph which the representative of China said at the last meeting that he would accept. In that paragraph, the Council expressed its confidence that the early evacuation of United Kingdom troops from Egypt would take place. We have full sympathy with that aspiration, but it represents only half of the question, and if it is to be included, it seems to me that we should also mention something about the other matters of difference. Why leave it at that, as> if there were nothing else?

The Chinese representative has taken a negative attitude toward certain suggestions niade by the Australian and United States representatives. Colonel HODSON (Australia): In accordance with the view expressed by the representative. of China, I have requested the Secretariat to type a formal amendment to the resolution before us. The amendment is in precisely the terms read out by the representative of the United States, which were very similar to my.own proposal and were in accordance with the verbatim record of what the representative of China said at our last meeting that he was prepared to accept. It is a very short I am not proposing a formal amendment as regards the Sudan. However much my de1eg'd.tion would desire to see that included, it is clear that nobody has spoken in support of it. We received only two other votes the previous time. We 'have to be practical. Therefore, I do not propose to re-submit that same amendment which was previously defeated1. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : I should like to make a small correction in regard to a statement made by the representative of Australia. It was said that I interpreted the words "direct contact" to mean negotiation. As far as I remember, I used the word "talks" when I said the two parties were to re-establish direct contact. I said they would have talks among themselves. I did not use the word "negotiations" in that respect; I do not consider that direct contact means negotiation. It means talks about the evacuation, and the other obstacles would appear, as I explained in my previous statement. . . Colonel HODGSON (Australia): Can one not negotiate by talking? Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : No; negotiations are more official than talks. You know the diplomatic difference between talks 'and negotiations. I made certain distinctions between the evacuation and the other issues of the dispute. I considered that in this d,aft resolution the direct contact would apply only to the evacuation aspect of the question, which would be settled first. I considered that the two categories into which the various aspects of this question fall would be separated from each other and dealt with separately, beginning with the evacuation in the preamble, and continuing in the second paragraph, "Recommends that the parties resume negotiations." I suggest that this paragraph should read, ". . . resume negotiations on the other issues of the dispute," in order to meet the desire of the representatives of the United States and Australia that the other issues of the dispute should be mentioned. The negotiations would concern the other issues in the dispute, and the direct contact would have to do with the evacuation. They would be separated, and, in order to avoid apprehension of pressure or menace owing to the presence of troops, each would be solved independently. , Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : I want to make only a short comment, in the first place, on the first speech made by the representative of Syria. I was glad to note that the represent?-tive o~ .Syria exonerated us of any charge of dtrect mthtary pressure exercised through the presence of our troops-at least I think I am correct in saying that. He went on to say, however- I haven't his exact phrase; if I am wrong he.will correct me-that even though no direct pressure was exercised by the troops, the very presence of That is not a very unusual thing in negotiations even on political and economic matters. Very often one side very urgently desires a particular point that the other side can give, and the other side may withhold it. Even in such a case it might be said that that side was exercising pressure. I think that the argument is not reall~a very good one. I was very glad to note the representative of Syria accepted my statement that we had not exercised and would not· exercise direct military pressure. I hope he recognizes also that any negotiations which took place under any resolution such as that proposed would h~, as it were~ under the eye of the Security Coun ~il. Therefore I do not think we need fear that the Egyptians will beat any undue disadvantage. Later in his speech he made a very eloquent and moving· appeal to my Government to make a gesture, but I must recall -I have already said it-that we have already made a gesture. It has been left to me alone to express any appreciation of that gesture. We made it in spite of the repudiation by the Egyptian Government of the evacuation protocol which had been agreed at one time. We nevertheless proceeded to carry out the terms of that protocol, and with very considerable difficulty we evacuated Cairo and Alexandria punctually by the appointed date. I have not noticed any appreciation of that at all. In fact, I am sorry to say that I think the contrary is the case. Even after that, the Egyptian attacks upon my Government were maintained and indeed' increased. I should like to add a short comment on the Chinese draft resolution which is before us. One or two representatives in the course 'of discussion said, I think, that after all the: operative part, at the end of this resolution, is the same as the Brazilian proposal.' That I do not deny. What I do say is that there has been introduced into the earlier part, the preamble-and that was the fault of various resolutions that preceded it-a number .of considerations which complicate the matter very . considerably. These considerations appear to me to be one-sided. They take account almost solely .of the desire of the Egyptian Government for early and complete evacuation. They deal entirely with the evacuation without reference to other questions which have been brought up. I think the representative of China said there were only two questions that had been brought up at this Council, the evact:1ation and the Sudan, and that we heard nothing'of the mutual defence agreement; but I really think that is not so. All three of these questions have been linked together. Those were the subjects of the negotiations which took place and failed at one time, the resumption of which we are now discussing. I really think all these things are before the Council. Once you start to particularize, as one representative has said, you are bound to run into difficulty. I find these par- I had thought at an earlier stage that, in view of the c:llen-ation made before the Council to the effect that th:Treaty of 1936 was no longer valid, there should ?.lso be included some formula to show that the Council has not accepted that allegation. I think that would help to balance the resolution. Similarly, if the Council is going to work everything into the preamble, I very much regret that the reference to consultation with the Sudan received insufficient support, and I am sorry to hear the represc:ltative of Australia, who was in favour of it, say that in his vie,,; it is perhaps useless to attempt to revive it. In my opinion, either there should be a perfectly simple-by that I mean simply-phrased-and short resolution, such as was proposed by our Brazilian colleague, or, if all the various matters in dispute are to be enumerated, then the enumeration must be complete. Personally, I have great preference for the former procedure. If 'we ever get back to that, I should like to see a simple recommendation by the Council to the parties to resume negotiations and report to the Council. That would put the negotiations on a different footing from the one they were on before, and I personally should have hoped that in those circumstances they might succeed. collt~gue bresilien,. ou bien, si ou veut enumerer tous les aspects du differend, il faut faire une enumeration complete. Personnellement, je prefere de beaucoup la premiere solutiotf. Si jamais nons y revenions, j'aimerais voir une simple recommandation du Conseil aux parties, les invitant a reprendre les negociations et a en rHerer au Conseil. Ceci mettrait 1es negociations sur un pied different de celui qu'elles avaient auparavant et, personnellement, j'estime que, dans ces circonstances, e1les auraient quelque chance de succes. NOKRAcHy-Pacha (Egypte) (traduit de l'anglais): J'ai' a remercier le representant de la Chine de sa declaration et de l'explication qu'il a donnee, des raisons qui 1'ont amene a formuler la resolution qu'il a soumise au Conseil. Sir Alexander Cadogan a declare qu'il n'y aurait pas de pression, puisque 1'affaire est devant le Conseil. Je n'ai pas exagere en parlant de cette pression; Sir Alexander Cadogan m'en a lui-meme obligeamment fourni la preuve. Je la. trouve dans le compte rendu stenographique de la 17geme seance, au cours de laquelle Sir Alexander Cadogan a declare que "le Gouvernemerit de Sa Majeste n'est pas dispose a abandonner inconditionnellement 1es droits qu'il tient de l'article 8 du Tl'aite de 1936"1. Quels sont ces droits? C'est le droit d'entretenir des forces armees sur le territoire egyptien. Sir Alexander Cadogan a declare, devant ce Conseil, que son Gouverriement n'etait pas dispose a retirer inconditionnellement ses troupes. Est-it etrange que j'aie a prier le Conseil de tenir compte de cette declaration et de tenir compte egalement des raisons qui ont ete exposees par le representant de la Chine? Je crois avoir entendu le representant des Etats- Unis dire qu'il serait plus juste de 1ier les deux questions, comme elles le sont dans l'amendement du representant de l'Australie qui vient d'etre distribue. Au projet original ainsi redige: "Confiant que le retablissement de negociations directes entre les parties aboutira a la rapide evacuation des forces armees britanniques", l'amendement propose d'ajouter "et aussi au reglement des autres elements du differend". Est-il juste, je le demande au Conseil, de placer l'Egypte dans cette situation d'inferiorite -- situa- NOKRASHY Pasha (Egypt): I must thank the representative of China for. his statement and for his explanation of the reasons that actuated him in formulating his resolution as it appears before the Council. . Sir Alexander Cadogan has said that there will be no pressure, since this case is before the Security Council. I have not been exaggerating in referring to this pressure; Sir Alexander Cadogan has kindly provided me with evidence of the pressure. I shall quote from the verbatim record of the 179th meeting, at which Sir Alexander Cadogan said, "It is still the case that His Majesty's Government is not prepared to relinquish its rights under article 8 of the Treaty of 1936 unconditionally."l What are these rights? They consist in the stationing of troops. Sir Alexander Cadogan has declared before this Council that his Government is not prepared to withdraw its troops unconditionally. Is it strange that I must request the Couflcil to take that fact into account and to give the necessary consideration to the reasons which have been expounded by the representative of China? I think I heard the representative of·the United States declare that it would be fairer to put the !wo P?ints together, as they are in the amendment Just Circulated by the representative of Australia. To the original draft, which reads, "Having confidence that the renewal of negotiations between th~ parties will result in the early evacuation of BntIsh troops from Egypt," it has been proposed to add, "and also in'the settlement of the other issues in dispute between the parties." I. ~sk the ~ouncil, is it fair to put Egypt in this pOSItIon of mequality, with one Member having Mr. TSIANG (China): I notice that most speakers have made no criticism of the operative parts of the resolution; the criticisms have come mainly on the preamble. I should like to say a few words about that. Every representative who has spoken has expressed sympathy with Egypt's desire for the evacuation of foreign troops. On that point, if there is difference among us, the difference is merely in the degree of sympathy. Now that sympathy is a very important political factor in the world today. I think, therefore, that if we pass any resolution on this question, some recognition should be given to. that factor. , As an .amendment has been proposed, I submit that, according to our usual procedure, the President will first put the amendment to the vote. However, when the President comes to' the procedure for voting on my resolution, I prefer to have the resolution voted on as a whole. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) : Before the Council proceeds to the vote, I should like to explain the attitude of my delegation towards the new resolution. The Council is today faced with its third resolution on the Egyptian question. My delegation finds, carried over into the Chinese resolution, a feature very similar to one included in the resolution presented here py the Brazilian representative. This feature is a tendency to avoid a decision and to dismiss the case by the adoption of some vague resolution. ' I submit that the main issue of the problem is the withdrawal of United Kingdom troops from Egypt and the Sudan. We believe that unless a resolution takes that problem into consideration, no solution of the dispute can be found. The Council could have acted on the basis of the Charter, and on the basis of the resolution of the General Assembly concerning foreign troopsl without entering into the problem of the validity of the Treaty and regardless of the rights and wrongs of the dispute. As long aS,a resolution does not state the main issue clearly, and does not support the rightful demands of the Egyptian Government and the Egyptian people for the withdrawal of the troops, we believe that there will be no solution of the case. The Australian representative mentioned the problem of the Sudan. In the opinion of the Polish delegation the future of the Sudan and the Su- I See Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the second part of its first session, No. 41 (I), paragraph 7. Le representant de l'Australie a fait allusion au probleme du Soudan. De l'avis de la delegation polonaise, l'avenir du Soudan et du peuple soul Voir les Resolutions adoptees par I'Assembtee generale, pendant la seconde partie de sa premiere session, No 41 (1), paragraphe 7. . The Polish delegation cannot support either the resolution or the amendment. Mr. GoNZALEZ FERNANDEZ (Colombia): My delegation has had the good fortune of being in contact with the Chinese delegation the last few days, and finds that this proposed resolution is a satistactory step for the Security Council to take at the preseilt stage of the situation between the United Kingdom and Egypt: As the Chinese representative has already pointed out, this proposed resolutiol1 recognizes what the Council as a whole has already practically recognized: the rightfulness of the aspirations of the Egyptian Government and the Egyptian people for an early evacuation of United Kingdom forces from Egypt. It recognizes also the fact that the United Kingdom has already recalled a certain number of its troops. It expresses the confidence of the Council that re-establishment of the discussions between the two parties may lead to an early and total evacuation of the troops from Egypt. Comme d'autres orateurs 1'0nt fait observer id, nous regrettons que le projet de resolution ne fasse aucune allusion a la question soudanaise. On se souviendra que dans le projet propose par la delegation de la Colombie, il y avait une allusion precise a cette question. Mais nous n'avons recueilli que les voix du Bresil, de la Syrie et des Etats-Unis. Je crois, par consequent, comme la delegation de l'Australie, qu'il y aurait peu d~in­ teret a soulever la question it nouveau ou a l'iuclure dans la resolution. Toutefois, j'espere que, en prenant des decisions relatives a la question de l'administration mixte du Soudan, les negociateurs, tant anglais qu'egyptiens, tiendront compte de toutes' les declarations faites ici, de maniere a marquer leur respect du droit des peuples a disposer d'eux-memes et de leur droit a un gnuvernement autonome. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'~nglais): Puisqu'aucun membre ne desire la parole, nous allons mettre aux voix la resolution de la Chine. Puisque l'Australie a presente un amendement a cctte resolution, la procedure que nous allons suivre est simple: nous allons, tout d'abord, nous prononcer sur l'amendement a la resolution de la Chine presente par la delegation de l'Australie, puis nous prendrons une decision a l'egard de la fesolution elle-meme. Aucun membre n'ayant demande que chaque paragraphe soit mis aux voix separement, nous emettrons un vote sur la resolution dans son ensemble. Je demande au Secretaire general adiaint de lire d'abord l'ancien texte du dernier paragraphe du preambule de la resolution de la Chine, apres quoi, il lira le nouveau texte de ce parwaphe modifie par l'amendement du representant de l'Australie. . Like some other speakers here today, we regret that no mention has been made in the draft resolution of the Sudanese question. As may be recalled, in the draft proposal presented by the Colombian delegation there was a definite mention of that question. We received only the votes of Brazil, Syria and the United States. We therefore think, as does the Australian delegation, that it would not be of much use to raise the question again or have it included in the resolution. However, we hope that the negotiators of both the United Kingdom and Egypt will take into consideration all the statements made here, so that in taking decisions in connexion with the question of the joint administration of the Sudan-l they will ~ve due regard to the princ;iple of self-determination of peoples and,the right of self-government.

As none of the members wish to speak, we shall act on the Chinese resolution. Since we have now received the Australian amendment to this resolution, the procedure which we shall follow is simple. We shall first dispose of the Australian amendment to the Chinese resolution, and then we shall take a decision on the Chinese resolution itself. Since none of the members has asked that we should vote separately on each paragraph of the Chinese resolution, we shall vote on the' resolution as a whole. The Assistant Sec~etary-General will read first the original text of the last paragraph of the preambl~ to the Chinese resolution, following which he wIll read the new text of this paragraph·'as amended by the representative of Australia. aHaving confidence that the re-establishment of direct contact between the parties wi1l result in early evacuation of remaining British armed forces;" The Australian amendment reads as follows: aHaving confi.dence that the renewal of negotiations between the parties will result in the early evacuation of British troops from Egypt and also in the settlement of the other issues in dispute between the parties ;"

We .shall vote first on the Australian arnenclment. In accordance with Article 27 of the Charter, the United Kingdom representative did not tal?e part in the v.,0ting. . A vote was taken by show of hand:.. There were 4 votes ;.~ favour, none against and 6 abstentions. The amendment was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative vote of seven members. Votes for: Australia Brazil France United States of America Abstentions: Belgium China Colombia Poland Syria Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

We shall now vote on the Chinese resolution as a whole, including the original text of the paragraph to which the Australian amendment was submitted. In accordance with Article 27 of the Charter, the United Kingdom representative did not take part in the voting. A vote was taken by show of hands. There were 2 votes in favour, none against and 8 abstentions. The reso:'zttion was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative votes of seven members. Votes for: China Colombia Abstentions: Australia Belgium Brazil France Poland Syria Union of Soviet jocialist Republics United States of America The PRESIDENT: The Security Council has been unable to adopt any decision on the Egyptian question so far. Since we have no other proposals before us at this meeting, our work today is finished. The only proposal considered today was one submitted by the Chinese representative and an Voici le texte de l'amendement. propose par l'Australie : aAyant confiance que le renouvellement des negociations entre les parties aboutira it une prompte evacuation de I'Egypte par les troupes britanniques, ainsi qu'au reglement des autres elements du differend". Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Nous allons d'abord mettre aux voix l'amendement presente par I'Australie. Conformement a 1'Article 27 de la Charte, le representant du Royaz~me-Uni s'abstient de voter. II est procede au vote a main levee. II y a 4 voLt' pour, zero contre et 6 abstentions. N'ayant pas obt{nu le vote affirmatif de sept membres, 1'amendeuzent 1':.'i..' pas adopte. Votent j'lour: Australie Bresil France Etats Unis d'Ameri1Ue S'abstienr.ent: Belgique Chine Colornbie Pologne Syrie Union des Republique" socialistes sovietiques Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je inets aux voix l'ensemble de la resolution de la Chine, y compris l'ancien texte du paragraphe sur lequel portait l'amendement allstralien. Conformement a l'Article 27 de la Charte, le representant du Royaume-Uni s'abstient de voter. II est procede au vote a main levee. II y a 2 voix pour, zero contre et 8 abstentions. NJayant pas obtenu le vote affirmatif de sept membres, la resolution n'est pas adoptee. Votent pvzw: Chine Colombie S'abstiennent: Australie Belgique Bresil France Pologne Syrie Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques Etats-Unis d'Amerique Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le Conseil de securite n'a pas encore pu arriver a une decision sur la question egyptienne. Puisque le Conseil n'a pas ete saisi d'autres propositions, nos travaux d'aujourd'hui sont termines. La seule prnposition que nOus ayons examinee aujourd'hui Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United :kingdom): I should like to be clear on one point. Is it the President's personal ruling that since the Council has failed to reach a conclusion in this case, the question is automutically retained on the agenda? Is that provided for in any rule of procedure, or, if the Council wishes to retaIn the question on its agenda, is a Council decision required? d~tit de l'anglais): Je voudrais demander des eclaircissements sur un point. Est-ce par une decision personnelle du President que le Conseil, n'ayant pu aboutir a une conclusion dans cette affaire, maintient automa.tiquement la question a I'ordre du jour? Est-ce la une mesure prevue par un reglement interieur quelconque, ou bien faut-it, pour que le ConseiI maintienne la question a l'ordre du jour, qu'it prenne une decision en ce sens? Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Bien entendu, la question reste a l'ordre du jour jusqu'a ce que le ConseiI ait decide de la retirer. M. EL-KHOU1l.I (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je .crois que le moment est venu de repondre a l'appe1 que j'ai deja lance au cours de cette seance. Comme je I'ai dit precedemment, cette affaire ressemble a ce qui s'est passe a Londres l'annee derniere. Le ConseiI de securite n'ayant pu adopter resolution, le Royaume-Uni et la France ont informe le Conseil qu'ils etaient prets, meme en l'absence de toute resolution, a se ranger aux desirs du Conseil. Comme le desir du Conseil est tout a fait clair et comme tous les membres du Conseil souhaitent le retrait des troupes du Royaume-Uni qui se trouvent sur le territoire d'un Etat Membre, j'espere que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste agira en ce sens, meme en l'absence d'une invitation ou d'une recommandation du Conseil de securite a cet effet. Cette decision devrait etre prise spontanement si le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni le veut bien. Si le Royaume-Uni prend cette initiativ-e, j'estime que la question sera resolue sans difficultes. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (tradttit de l'anglais): Je suis convaincu que mon Gouvernement prendra acte des declarations du representant de la Syrie et qu'il etudiera attentivement I'ensemble des debats. Le representant de la Syrie a de nouveau evoque une affaire analogue qui s'est reglee a Londres. Je voudrais signaler que le cas actuel est, sous certains aspects, assez different. Si je me souviens bien., dans le cas de la Syrie et du Liban, ii y avait eu un avis bien net de la majorite requise du Conseil, mais il n'avait pu prendre effet en raison du vote d'un membre permanent du Conseil. Je ne sais pas queUes conclusions tirera mon Gouvernement des discussions qui ont eu lieu id. Je suis convaincu que le representant de la Syrie lui-meme ne s'attend pas a ce que je me prononce des maintenant. Tout ce que je peux dire, c'est que mon Gouvernement a suivi l'affaire de pres. It a tenu compte de tout ce qui a ete dit et de tout ce qui a ete propose. Comme je viens de la rappe1er, il a deja donnc une indication precise, a mon avis, de son desir d'etre aussi raisonnable que possible. It a fait un geste. Je ne crois pas qu'it ait ete tres encourage par le resultat de cette tentative; neanmoins, il y reflechira. It m'est impossible de dire quoi que ce soit en ce qui concerne la ligne de conduite qu'il adaptera ou les decisions qu'it pourra prendre. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Le President a parle d'ajournement.

Naturally, until the Council decides to remove this question from the agenda, it remains on the agenda. Mr. EL-KHOU1l.1 (Syria) : I think this is a good moment for the response to the appeal which I have already made at this meeting. This case resembles the one I mentioned before, which took place in London last yea'" when the Security Council failed to find a resolution which could be adopted. Then, the United Kingdom and France informed the Council that they were ready, even without a resolution, to execute the desire of the Council. As the wish of the Council here has been quite clear, as the withdrawal of United Kingdom troops from the territory of a Member State is desired by everyone in the Council, I hope that His Majesty's Government will take this step even without an invitation or a recommendation to do so from the Security Council. It should be (lQne spontaneously if the United Kingdom wishes to do so. If the United Kingdom begins that action, I think the matter will be solved without difficulty. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom).: I am sure "that my Government will take note of the statement of the representative of Syria and will, of course, study the whole of the discussion which has taken place. The representative d Syria referred again to a similar case which took place in London. I will point out that the present case is, in a sense, rather different. As I remember in the case of Syria and Lebanon, there was a very clearly expressed v.iew of the requisite majority of the Council, but it was prevented from becoming effective by the vote of one permanent member of the Council. I do not know what view my Government will take of the discussions which have taken place here. I am sure the representative of Syria himself would not expect me to make any pronouncement at this moment. I can only say that my Government has be~n following this case closely. It has noted everythmg that has been said and everything that has b~en proposed. As I said just now, it has already given an earnest indication, I think, of its desire to be as reasonable as possible. It has made a gesture. I do not think it could be very much encoura&ed by the result of that effort, but no doubt it wdl r<:flect upon that.- I cannot say anything as to whq.t Its future course or decisions may be. 357. Discussion of agenda items for futur.e meetings Colonel HODGSON (Australia) : On behalf of the Sub-Committee appointed by the Security Council for the consideration of the governorship of Trieste I should like to remark that the Sub-Committee has completed its report..It was signed this afternoon and the Sub-Committee has requested that the report should be transmitted to the President and circulated among the members of the Security Council. In view of the probability that the ratification of the peace treaty with Italy will almost immediately be deposited in Paris, and that that treaty will shortly enter into force, this question assumes a degree of urgency. I would suggest, with respect to this matter, that the President might instruct the Secretariat to place it on the agenda o{the next meeting of the Security Council.

As President of the Council, I received the letter from the Sub-Committee five or ten minutes before the commencel)1ent of this meeting. Probably most of the other members of the Council, if not all of them, have received this letter only today. We have not had time to study it. Nevertheless, I have no objection to placing this question on the agenda of one of the meetings of the Security Council. If there is no objection to this procedure, I shall not set a definite date for the meeting of the Council on this question but, as President, I shall notify the members of the Council of the date of our meeting oh the question of the governorship of Trieste. As there is no objection, we shall act in accordance with the statement iT made. I wish to direct the attention of the Council to another matter which, however, I am not going to ask the Council to discuss at this meeting, namely, the situation in Indonesia. The members of the Council are aware of the decision that was adopted by the Council. Thus hr, however, we have not received any information from the consuls who are obliged to report to the Security Council on the situation in Indonesia in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Security Council (document S/513).1 The Council cannot wait indefinitely. We should receive some kind of information; if not complete information, at least partial, in the beginning. I am not going to ask the Council to discuss this .matter at tpis time as it not on the agenda. I merely wish to say that, if we do not receive any information from th,,: consuls in Indonesia in the very near future, then I, as President, shall be obliged to direct the attention of the Council to this fact 357. Discussion des points de l'ordre d~ jour des seances ulterieures Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Au nom du Sous-Comite charge par le Conseil de securite de preparer la nomination du Gouvemeur de Trieste, je desire faire connaitre que le Sous-Comite a termine son rapport. Ce rapport a ete signe, cet apres-midi, et le Sous- Comite a demande qu'il soit transmis au President et communique aux membres du Conseil de securite. Comme il est probable que les ratifications du traite de paix avec l'Italie seront deposees a Paris a tres bref delai et qae le traite entrera en vigueur dans peu de temps, cette question prend une urgence particuliere et je suggere, ace propos, que le President invite le Secretariat it l'inscrire it l'ordre du jour de la prochaine seance du Conseil de securite. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : En qualite de President du Conseil, j'ai rec;;u la lettre du Sous-Comite cinq ou dix minutes avant le commencement de. tte seance. La plupart des autres membres du Conseil, tous peut-etre, n'ont rec;;u cette lettre qu'aujourd'hui. Nous n'avons pas eu le temps de l'etudier. Neanmoins, je ne vois pas d'objections it inscrire cette question a l'ordre du jour de l'une des seances du Conseil de securite. S'il n'y a pas d'opposition it la procedure que je vous propose, je ne fixerai pas de date definitive pour la seance du Conseil ou cette question sera discutee, mais, en tant que President, je' ferai connaitre aux membres du Conseil la date de la reunion qui portera sur la question du Gouverneur de Trieste. Aucune opposition ne s'etant manifestee, nous agirons comme je viens de l'indiquer. Je desire appeler l'attention du Conseil sur une autre question, que je ne demande du reste pas au Conseil de discuter seance tenante, a savoir la situation en Indonesie. Les membres du Conseil connaissent la decision qui a ete adoptee par le Conseil. Jusqu'ici nous n'avons rec;;u aucun renseignement des Consuls qui ont ete invites a faire rapport au Conseil de securite sur la situation en Indonesie, en vertu de la resolution adoptee par le Conseil de securite (document S/513)1. Le Conseil ne peut pas attendre indefiniment; nous devrions recevoir q1.1elques informations, sinon completes, du moins partielles, pour commencer. Je ne demande pas au Conseil de discuter la question en ce .moment, puisqu'elle ne figure pas a l'ordre du jour. Je desire indiquer simplement que, si nous ne recevons, sous peu, des renseignements de la part de ces consuls, je me verrai oblige, en tant que President, d'attirer I'attention

The Council takes note of the statement of the representative of Australia. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French): Further to the statement just made by the representative of Australi?, I should like to say that the Netherlands Government has asked the Belgian Government to represent it, and that the Belgian Government has consented to do so. M. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique): Je voudrais completer la declaration que vient de faire le representant de l'Australie en indiquant que le -Gouvernement neerlandais a fait appel, de son cote, au Governement belge, qui a accepte.

The Council takes note of the statement made by the representative of Belgium. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Le Con- seil prend note de la declaration du representant de l'Australie. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le Con- seil prend note de la declaration que vient de faire le representant de la Belgique. La seance est levee a18 h. 10. FRANCE Editions A. Pedone 13, rue Soufilot PARIS, V· GREECE-GRECE "Eleftheroudakis" Librairie internationale Place de la Constitution ATHENES GUATEMALA Jose Goubaud Goubaud & Cia. Ltda. Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. GUATEMALA HAITI Max Bouchereau Librai:de "A la Caravelle" Boite po~ta1e 111-B PORT-AU·PRINCE ICELAND-ISLANDE Bokaverzlun Sigfusar Eymundsonnar Austurstreti 18 REYKJAVIK INDIA-INDE Oxford Book & Stationery Company Scindia House NEW DELHI IRAN Bongahe Piaderow 731 Shah Avenue TEHERAN IRAQ-IRAK Mackenzie & Mackenzie The Bookshop BAGHDAD LEBANON-LlBAN Librairie universelle BEYROUTH LUXEMBOURG Librairie J. Schummer Place Guillaume LUXEMBOURG NETHERLANDS--PAYS·BAS N. V. Martinus NijhofI Lange Voorhout 9 'S-GRAVENHAGE N~rregade6 K9!BENHAVN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC- REPUBLlQUE DOMINICAINE Libreria Dominicana Calle Mercedes No. 49 Apartado 656 CWDAD TRUJILLO ECUADOR-EQUATEUR Muiioz Hermanos y Cia. Nueve de Octubre 703 Casilla 10-24 GUAYAQUIL EGYPT-EGYPTE Librairie "La Renaissance d'Egypte" 9 Sh. Adly Pasha CAmo ETHiOPIA-ETHIOPIE NEW ZEALAND-· NOUVELL5-ZELANiDE Gordon & Gotch, Ltd. Waring Taylor Street WELLINGTON United Nations Association of New Zealand P. O. 1011, G.P.O. WELLINGTON NICARAGUA Ramiro Ramirez V. Agencia de Publicaciones MANAGUA, D. N. NORWAY-NORVEGE Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag Kr. Augustgt. 7A OSLO PHILIPPINES D. P. Perez Co. 132 Riverside SAN JUAN, RIZAL POLAND-POLOGNE Spotdzielna Wydawnicza "Czytelnik" 38 Poznanska WARSZAWA SWEDEN-SUEDE A.-B. C. E. Fritzes Kungl. Hofbokhandel Fredsgatan 2 STOCKHOLM SWITZERLAND-SUISSE Librairie Payot S. A. LAUSANNE, GENEVE, VEVEY, MONTREUX, NEUCHATEL, BERNE, BASEL Hans Raunhal'dt Kirchgasse 17 ZURICH I SYRIA-SYRIE Librairie universelle DAMAS TURKEY-TURQUIE Librairie Hachette 469 Istiklal Caddesi BEYOGLU-IsTANBUL UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA- UNION SUO.AFRICAINE Central News Agency Commissioner & Rissik Sts. JOHANNESBURG and at CAPETOWN and DURBAN UNITED KINGDOM- ROYAUME·UNI H. M. Stationery Office P. O. Box 569 LONDON, S.E. 1 and at H.M.S.O. Shops in LONDON, EDINBURGH, MANCHESTE CARDIFF, BELFAST, BIRMINGHAM and BRISTOL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA- ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE Internatio~al Documents Service Columbia UnIversity Press 2960 Broadway NEW YORK 27, N. Y. URUGUAY Oficina de Representaci6n de Editoriales Av. 18 de Julio 1333 Esc. 1 MONTEVIDEO VENEZUELA Escritoria Perez Machado Conde a Piiiango 11 CARACAS YUGOSLAVIA-YOUGOSLAVIE Drzavno Preduzece Jugoslovenska Knjiga Moskovska UI. 36 BEOCRAD [49