S/PV.202 Security Council

I invite the members of the Security Council, as wen as·representatives of the countries involved in the dispute, to express their opinions on the questions raised by the United States representative. M. VILFAN (Yougoslavie) (traduit de l'anglais) : La question inscrite al'ordre du jour de la presente seance du Conseil de securite est d'une grande importance pour la delegation yougoslave. Nous considerons que cette question ne concerne pas seulement la procedure et qu'il n'est pas possible de la discuter du point de vue de la procedure sans porter une atteinte grave au role du Conseil de securite et sans compromettre sa tache qui consiste a preserver la paix et la securite internationales. Pour cette raison, la delegation yougoslave estin1e necessaire de faire connmtre sa maniere de voir sur le danger que presente la solution proposee. La delegation des Etats-Unio; suggere que la question grecque soit soumise al'Assemblee generale afin que celle-ci puisse faire au Conseil de securite des recommandations sur le probleme grec. La delegation yougoslave estime que le Conseil de securite devrait repousser cette proposition dans I'interet de la paix et de la securite internationales. Cela ne veut evidemment pas dire que la delegation yougoslave desire eviter que l'Assemblee generale discute la question. Nous avons deja declare que nous ne voyons pas cl'objection a ce que le probleme grec soit diseute par l'Assemblee generale. UD.e teIle discussion permettra au con- Mr. VILFAN (Yugoslavia): The question put on the agenda of today's meeting of the Security Council is of great importance to the Yugoslav delegation. We consider tbat this question is not only a question of procedure and that it is not possible to discuss it from the point of view of procedure without gravely prejudicing the role of the Security Council and compromising its task of preserving peace and international security. For this reason the Yugoslav delegation deems it necessary to state its view with regard to the danger which the proposed solution engenders. The United States delegation proposes that the Greek question be submitted to the General Assembly, so that the latter may make its recommendations to the Security Council with regard to the Greek problem. The Yugoslav delegation considers that the Security Council should reject this proposal in the interest of international peace and security. This of course does not mean that the Yugoslav delegation wants to avoid discussion of this question in the General Assembly. We have already declared that we have no objection to a discussion of the Greek problem in the General Assembly. On the contrary, such a discussion will enable the The Yugoslav delegation is of the opinion that the Greek question is of such great importance and represents such a great danger to international peace and security that it should remain on the agenda of the Security Council, and be. considered by the Council until the latter agrees to take meas- Ures which would result in the re-establishment of Greek independence. There is no doubt that recent events in Greece have thrown a new light on the essence of the Greek question. We have in mind the events which took place in Greece after 19 August, t.~at is, after the day when the Security Council last considered the Greek problem. We have in mind the Greek Government crisis, its development and its solution. First of all, all news and comments in connexion with this crisis confirm the basic thesis defended by the Yugoslav delegation as regards the Greek question, that is, that the presence of foreign troops in Greece represents a flagrant interference in the internal affairs of that country; that the anti-national regimes are backed by these foreign troops; that these regimes have been imposed upon the Greek people by terror; that these regimes are in fact to~ls in foreign hands; and that on account of all thIS, it is impossible to refer to Greece as to an independent country. I think it will be sufficient to quote briefly a few opinions expressed by the American Press with regard to the former Government.in Greece. T~e American Press was forced to admIt that the MaXImos Government was a "weak, corrupt, inefficient Government". It was forced to write about the failure of this.Government "to unite the country and combat the guerrillas successfully", to write ~at Maximos "conducted a government of revenge, mefficiency and division and brought it to a condition of final helplessness". I have taken these quotations from the New York Times. I repeat events have confirmed the thesis defended by 'the Yugoslav delegation from the very beginning, and this confirmation c~e from those quarters which have so far been trymg to deny our statements. But these last events have simultaneously shown the great danger which foreign interventiClfi in the internal affairs of Greece represents for international peace and security. There is no doubt that the last Greek crisis was caused by the pressure of the United States. There is no doubt that the crisis of the Greek Government has been resolved under the direct and decisive participation of the United States representatives in Greece, that the new Government is the result of the dictate of the United States and that its aim is to carry out the policy laid down by the United States. For all who have followed the last Greek crisis, it must be clear that the presence of foreign troops in La delegation yougoslave considere que la question grecque presente une si grande importance et constitue un si grand danger pour la paix et la securite internationaleB qu'elle doit etre maintenue a l'ordre du jour du Conseil de securite et etre etudiee par le Conseil jusqu'a ce que celui-ci decide de prendre des mesures en vue du retablissernent de l'independance grecque. Il n'est pas douteux que les recents evenements de Grece ont jete une lumiere nouvelle sur la nature de la questiorl grecque. Nous pensons aux evenements qui se sont produits en Grece apres le 10 aout, c'est-a-dire apres la date a laquelle le,ConsdI de securite a, pour la derniere fois, examine le probleme grec. Nous pensons a la crise gouvernementale grecque, a son evolution et a sa solution. Avant tout, toutes les nouvelles et tous les commentaires relatifs a cette crise confirment la these fondamentale defendue par la delegation yougoslave au sujet de la question grccque, c'est;-a-dire, la these se10n laquelle la presence de troupes etrangeres en Gl'ece constitue une ingerence flagrante dans les aft'aires interieures de ce pays. Les gouvernements anti-nationaux sont soutenus par ces troupes etrangeres. Ces gouvernements ont ete imposes au peuple grec par la terreur. Ces gouvernements, sont, en fait, des ~nstruments entre des mains etrangeres. Et en raison de tous ces faits, il est impossible de parler de la Grece comme d'un pays independant. Je pense qu'il suffira de citer brievement quelques opinions exprimees par la presse americaine au sujet de l'ar.cien gouvernement grec. La presse americaine a ete obligee d'admettre que le gouvernement Ma.~..imos etait "un gouvernement faible, corrompu, incapable d'action". EIle a e+e obligee d'ecrire, a propos de l'echec des efforts de ce gouvernement pour "un:i.r le pays et combattre avec succes les guerillas", que Maximos "dirigeait un gouvernement incapable et sans unite, ne visant qu'a la vengeance, et l'a conduit a une impuissance definitive". ]'ai recueilli ces citations dans le «New York Times". Je le repete, les evenements ont confirme la these soutenue des le debut par la delegation yougoslave, et cette confirmation est venue des milieux memes qui Ol1t essaye jusqu'ici de nier l'exactitude de nos affirmations. Mais ces derniers evenements ont montre en meme temps le grand danger que constitue pour la paix et la securite internationales l'ingerence etrangere dans les affaires interieures grecques. Il n'est pas douteux que la derniere ..:rise grecque a ete causee par la pression des Etats-Unis. Il est certain que la crise a ete decidee avec la grecql1e a ete causee par la pression des Etats-Unis. Il est certain que la erise a ete decidee avec la participation directe et decisive des representants des Etats-Unis en Grece, que le nouveau Gouveinement grec a ete constitue sur les instructions formeHes des Etats-Unis et que son but est d'appliquer la politique fixee par les Etats-Unis. Pour tous ceux The crisis of the Greek Government was caused on the initiative and suggestion of the American Embassy in Athens. Throughout the duration of the crisis United States representatives in Greece, namely the Ambassador, Mr. McVeigh, and the Chief of the Economic Mission to Greece, Mr. Dwight Griswold, were receiving the visits of Greek politicians, were visiting the same politicians themselves, conditioning the giving of further American aid on the acceptance of a certain solution of the Greek crisis. In describing the relations between the American representatives and Greek politicians the American Press used, for instance (and I am quoting the New York Times again) , the followi:n:,~ words: "For an hour and three quarters the Ambassador lectured the Greek leaders"; thus depicting exactly the degree of dependence upon the United States of those men who are supposed to be the independent leaders of an independent country. The crisis of the Greek Government was finally solved only after t.l}e arrival of a b19h nfficial of the State Department, Mr. Loy Henderson, whose task, according to Press reports, consisted in reaching a solution which would best correspon to the needs of American policy. Therefore, the result itself, the formation of the new Sophoulis Government, cannot be explained otherwise than as a consequence of the direct intervention of the UrJted States Government. Otherwise it would be impossible to explain the fact that Mr. Sophoulis was ready to accept the post of Prime Minister in a Government in which Mr. Tsaldaris holds the key positions and plays a decisive role-the same Mr. Tsaldaris to whom Mr. Sophoulis referred during the crisis as the man 'o/ho bore the greatest responsibility for the work of the former Government. The new Government, too, will be forced to work according to the directions of the American Government because, as it is pointed out by the American Press, "without American aid the Greek State will collapse". In fact, this means that aid is being vven to the anti-national regime in its struggle against the Greek people themselves. It goes without saying that the fact that a country which is a Member of the United Nations h38 become so completely dependent must cause great concern to every Member of the United Nations. This represents the violation of one of the basic principles of the Charter: respect for the sovereignty and independence of the Members of the United Nations. Such a policy is undermining the foundc:tic;lns of ~e United Nations Organization, and ~his IS suffiCIent reason for the Security Council to gIve consideration to this question and decide what measures should be taken in order to re-establish the independence of Greece. 11 va sans dire que le fait qu'un pays qui est Membre des Nations Unies soit tomb€- dans un etat d'aussi complete dependance doit preoccuper serieusement tous les Membres des Nations Unies. Ce1.a constitue une violation de l'un des principes fondamentaux de la Charte: le respect de la souverainete et de l'independance des Membres des Nations Unies. Une telle politique sape les fondations de I'Organisation des Nations Unies et cela constitue une raison suffisante pour que le Conseil de securite examine cette question et decide des mesures qui doivent etre prise:> afin de ret'3.blir I'independance grecque. Yet the Yugoslav delegation is of the opinion that the Gove1'IlL-:t.ent crisis iD. Greece and the participation of the United States Government in it cannot be considered separately from the recent development of the Greek question. Stepping into the boots of Great Britain, the United States of America is creating in Greece, with the help of En outre, la delegation yougoslave estime que la crise gouvernementale grecque et la part qu'y a prise le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis ne peuvent etre separes de l'evolution recente de la question grecque. Les Etats-Unis d'Amerique, chaussant les bottes de la Grande-Bretagne, sont en train de creer en Grece, avec I'aide des Gouvernements The purpose of creating a so-called coalition Government was to impress world public opinion that the aid of the United States of America is being given in the interest of the Greek people. But the role played by the United States Government in the Greek crisis meanG also something else. Everybody is acquainted with the efforts of the present Greek regime to hide its character of a minority Government imposed upon the people, which is spreading terror and causing civil war, by advancing false accusations against the northern neighbouring countries, accusing them of helping the civilwar in Greece. The American Government has adopted and defended this thesis as its own. Now, having started to dismiss and appoint Greek Governments and having taken into its hands the conduct of all Greek policy, it is forced to go further and further. Therefore, the Government of the United States is obliged to find excuses for its policy in Greece, advancing further grave accusations and speaking of a so-called aggression on the part of the northern neighbours of Greece. . Consequently American interference in Greek internal affairs and the gradual abolition of the independence of Greece, as shown by the recent Greek crisis, represent a direct danger for international peace and security and, therefore require that action be taken by the Security COlmcil. For this reason the Yugoslav delegation thinks the question must and can be solved only by th.: Security Council, and that is why the Yugoslav deleg~tion considers that this question should remain on the agenda of the Security Council. Mr. EVATT (Australia) : The question before the Council is a perfectly simple one. It has nothing to do with the merits or demerit8 of the Greek dispute. It is quite irrelevant for any of us to endeavour to blame <:ither Greece on the one hand, or Albania or Yugoslavia or Bulgaria on the other. That is the Greek question. What is before us is not the Greek question, but how the Greek question should be dealt with by the Assembly. The United States representative, in a speech of studious moderation and care, has pointed that out. He has told us that already, under Article 11, this question has been properly brought before the Assembly by a Member of the United Nations, namely, the United States. The question is there, and under the Charter the merits and demerits of the cases put forward by the parties to the dispute can be discussed. It is all open to the Assembly. The Assembly can discuss that matter with perfect freedom. There is, however, one limitation upon the powers of the Assembly, which exists by reason of Arti- M. EVATT (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais) : La question dont discute le Conseil est parfaitement simple. EIle est sans rapport avec le fond meme du differend grec. II n'y a lieu, pour aucun d'entre nous, d'essayer de donner tort soit a la Grece d'une part, soit a I'Albanie, a la Y:mgoslavie ou a la Bulgarie, d'autre part. Cela constitue la question grecque. Ce que nous examinons ce n'est pas laquestion grecque, mais la maniere dont dIe doit etre traitee par I'Assemblee. Le representant des Etats-Unis 1'a signale dans un discours d'une moderation et d'une prudence voulues. 11 nous a dit que cette question avait deja, en vertu de 1'Article 11, ete portee devant 1'Assemblee dans la forme requise, par un Membre des Nations Unies, a savoir par les Etats-Unis. VAssemblee est saisie de la question et, en vertu de la Charte, le pour et le contre des theses soutenues par les parties au differend peuvent etre discutes. V Assemblee est libre de le faire. EIle peut discuter de la question avec une liberte entiere. ~ suppose is the simplest and most business-like thing in the circumstances: namely, under Article 12, to request the General Assembly, if it so chooses, to make a :recommendation on the matter. Under Article 11, that recol!h"Ilendatio!J need not be made to the Security Council; it m...y be made to the State or States concerned, and that is the whole position. It is ~urely a question of procedure. I regret very much that the representative of Yugoslavia has introduced into this question, which is essentially one of bus:in.ess-like and orderly procedure, the merits and demerits of the parties to the dispute. He has a'ctacked Greece and he has attacked the United States. He must know perfectly well that it has nothing to do with the matter before us, because he showed :an astuteness in his observations which indicated that this is not the occasion in which the merits of the dispute can be debated. In my opinion-I say it with all respect to him.-that he does the cause of his country no good when he seeks to take advantage of this forum in ordcr to press matters which win be very relevant when the Assembly is dealing with the dispute. That brings me to the proposal itself. 'The proposal is properly worded and properly drafted, and makes the request in accordance with Article 12. All it does in effect is free :he hands of the Assembly, enabling the Assembly, if it so chooses, to make a recommendation. What coulci be fairer? What could be more just, if we are to do something to settle th,is dispute with relation to these four countries? On aurait pu adopter une autre methode, qui aurait consiste a retirer completement la question grecque de l'ordre du jour du Conseil de securite, mais, ainsi que l'a signale M. Johnson, il aurait pu en resulter que le Groupe subsidiaire institue par le Conseil de securite aSalonique doive suspendre son activite. Le representant des Etats-Unis est venu franchement devant le Con.seil de securite et lui a propose de donner toute liberte a l'AssembIe~ de lui faisser entendre loyalement les parties au diffel'end. En notre qualite de membres du Conseil de securite, voyons si la Grande AssembIee de toutes les Nations Unies, qui se reunit demain, peut trouver une solution ace differend. Elle peut l'examiner sans que cette proposition soit adoptee; je suppose en effet qu'elle peut adopter des resol".uons et distribuer aux parties la louange et le blame. Tout cc que fait la presente proposition, c'est de permettre al'Assemblee d'aller plus loin et de faire, si elle le juge utile, une recommandation votee a la majorite requise, et de la transmettre au Conseil de securite ou aux parties interessees. Another method which might have been adopted is that of removing the Greek question from the agenda of the Security Council altogether; but as Mr. Johnson has pointed out, the result of that might be that the Subsidiary Group set up by the Security Council at Salonika would not function for the time being. Coming frankly to the Security Council, the United States representative has proposed to free the hands of the Assembly, to let it hear the parties to the dispute fairly. Let us, as the Security Council, see whether the great forum of all the United Nations which is meeting tomorrow cannot get some solution to this dispute. It can debate it without this proposal b::ing carried; I suppose it can adopt resolutions and apportion praise or blame amongst the parties. All that this proposal does is enable the Assembly to go further and make a recommendation, if it so chooses, by the appropriate majority of the Assembly, and submit this recommendation to the Security Council or to the parties concerned. Le representant de la Yougoslavie a insiste, a juste titre, sur les attributions du Conseil de securite en ce qui concerne la securite, mais, si l'on adoptait la proposition des Etats-Unis, le Conseil conserverait, a mon avis, le differend a son ordre The Yugoslav representative rightly emphasized the function of the Security Council in relation to s~curity, but the effect of fldopting this proposal of the United States, in my opinion, would be that the Security Council would still retain the dispute Je regrette infiniment que le representant de la f ougoslavie ait introduit danseette question, qui est essentiellement lme question de procedure pratiqlie et de methode, des considerations sur les torts des parties au cillferend. Il a attaquc la Grece et i1 a attaque les Etats-Unis. II doit parfaitement savoir que ce1a n'a aucun rapport avec la question qlle nous discutons, car I'habilete dont il a fait preuve pour presenter ses observations, montre qu'a. son sens meme ce·n'est pas le moment de discuter le fond meme du differend. A mon se:.s, et je le ells avec tout le respect que je lui dois, il ne sert guere la cause de son pays lorsqu'il cherche a utiliser cette enceinte pour faire valoir des arguments qu'it aura' l'occasion r.!'exposer a bon escient Jorsque l'AssembIee examiner~ le differend. Cda m'amene a la proposition elle-meme. La proposition est libellee comme il convient, redigee d'une maniere appropriee et elle presente la demanC:e d'une maniere conforme al'Article 12. EIle se borne, en effet, a dormer a l'Ac;sembIee tQute liberte et alui permettre de faire une recommendat~on si elle le juge utile. Que peut-il y avoir de plus loyal? Que peut-il y avoir de plus juste si l'on doit faire quelque chose pour regIer le differend qui divise ces quatre pays? I submit that there is no reason why this proposal should not be adopted. It is purely procedural, freeing the hands of the Assembly; it is a reasonable and proper matter to bring before us. I have not entered into the merits of this dispute one way or another. I have said nothing in criticism of Yugoslavia in connexion with the dispute itself. If we were to enter into a debate on the merits of the Greek question, another session of the Assembly would come round next year before we had finished. Therefore, I support the proposal of the United States delegation. Mr. KYROU (Greece): I have nothing to say after the wise statement by th~ Foreign Minister of Australia. I would only like to remind the Yugoslav representative of Professor Einstein's theory of relativity. Mr. Vilfan's idea of the independence of democracy certainly is not shared by other countries. I would even humbly suggest that perhaps his ideas are quite contrary to what other people think. Mr. DE SOUZA GOMEZ (Brazil) (translated from French): I should like to explain my delegation's point of view on the question under discussion. The Brazilian delegation will vote for the United States resolution to request the General Assembly, in accordance with Article 12 of the Charter, to consider the dispute between Greece on the one hand, and Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on the other. For reasons known to each of us, the Council has reached a deadlock as a result of the procedure it had to follow in the voting on the Greek question. In the present situation, within the limits of the powers conferred on it by the Charter, the Security Council has no othei' means of solving this problem which is so important and has so detracted from the prestige of the Council itself. . The Brazilian delegation recognizes the importance of finding a solution compatible with the purpos.es and. principles of the United. ~ati?ns, a~d while aI1XlOUS to uphold the Council's prunacy ID the solution of disputes referred to it, is prepared to support the request for a recommendation by the General Assembly. Nevertheless, this attitude does not in the least imply acceptance of a precedent which might be detrimental to the· Security Council's prestige. It is explained, on the one hand, by the exceptional circumstan~es in which the Security Council finds itself as a result of its action being blocked under Article 27 and on the other hand, by the proximity of the next session of the General Assembly. Il me semble qu'il n'y a aucune raison de ne pas adopter cette proposition. EIle concerne uniquement la procedure, elle donnc toute liberte a. I'Assemblee, c'est une question raisonnable et digne de nous etre soumise. Je n'ai aborde, en auc.me fa~on, le fond °du di£ferend. Je n'ai rien dit qui constitue une critique a. l'egard de la Yougoslavie en ce qui concerne le differend lui-meme. Si nollS devions engager une discussion sur le fond de la question grecque, une autre session de l'Assemblee se reunirait l'annee prochaine avant que nous en ayons fini. J'appuie done la proposition de la delegation des Etats-Unis. M. KYROU (Grece) (traduit de l'anglais): Je n'ai rien a. ajouter a. la pertinente declaration du Miinistre des Affaires etrangeres d'Australie. Je voudrais simplement rappeler au representant de la Yougoslavie la theorie du professeur Einstein sur la relativite. L'idee que M. Vilfan se fait de l'independance cl'un etat democratique n'est certainement pas partagee par les autres pays. Je voudrais suggerer humblement que peut-etre cette idee est tout-a.-fait opposee a celle que se font les autres de l'independance des democraties. M. DE SOUZA GOMEZ (Bresil) : Je tiens apreciser le point de vue de ma delegation au sujet de la question que nous discutons. La delegation du Bresil votera en faveur de la resolution des Etats- Unis tendant a demander a. l'Assemblee generale de prendre en consideration le differend existant entre la Grece, d'une part, l'Albanie, la Yougoslavie et la Bulgarie, d'autre part, en application de l'Article 12 de la Charte. . Pour des raisons connues de chacun de nous, le Conseil est arrive a. une impasse, par suite de la procedure qu'il a dfr suivre lors de la mise aux voix de la question grecque. Dans la situation actuelle, dans la limite des pouvoirs que la Charte attribue au Conseil de securite, il ne reste a. cellli-ci aucun moyen pour resoudre c·~tte question qui est de la plus haute importance et a atteint le prestige du Conseilluimeme. La delegation du Bresil considere l'interet qu'il y a a trouver une solution compatible avec les principes et les buts des Nations Uroes et, bien que favorable au maintien de l'autorite primordiale du Conseil dans la solution des differends dont il a ete saisi, dIe est disposee a donner son appui a. la demande d'une recommandation de l'Assemblee gene- ~~ , Cependent, cette attitude n'implique 3.ucunement la reconnaissance d'un precedent, qui pourrait nuire au prestige du Conseil de securite. Elle decoule, d'une part, des circonstances exceptionnelles dans lesquelles se trouve le Conneil de securite; dont l'action a ete entravee par l'application de l'Article 27 et, d'autre part, de la proximite de la prochaine session de l'Assemblee generale. Regardless of whether any representative in the Security Council raises procedural questions or questions of substance, the Cou~cil has the Greek question on its agenda and any member of the Security CoUncil, as well as any representative of the Governments involved in the dispute, may raise, and has full right to raise, any. question of substance concerning the Greek question. Qu'un representant au Conseil de Secmi!e pose ou noa des questions relatives a la procedure, ~u des questions de fond, la probleme grec figure a 1'0rdre du jour, et tout membre du Conseil de securite, de meme que tout representant des gouvernements interesses au differend, pent et a le droit de poser des questions de fond concernant l'affaire grecque. Le representant de la Yougoslavie a tout a fait le droit, s'il le juge utile, de traiter des problemes fondamentaux poses par la question grecque. Je le repete, ce n'est pas un point quelconque de procedure qui figure a l'ordre du jour du Conseil, mais la question grecque, dont le Conseil s'occupe depuis longtemps. Tout membre du Conseil de securite, comme n'importe lequel des autres representants qui siegent ici, a tout a fait le droit de formuler des propositions, qu'elles touchent a la procedure ou au fond de la question. The Yugoslav representative has fuH right to deal with. the substance of thE Greek question, if he considers it appropriate. I repeat, the Council has on its agenda not any procedural question, but the Greek question, with which it has been dealing for a long'period of time. Any member of the Security Council,as well as any other representative seated at this table, has the full right to make proposals, either of a procedural character or relating to the substance of the question. En ma qualite de representant de l'UNION DES REpUBLIQUES SOCIALISTES SOVIETIQUES, je vou,; drais maintenant ajouter quelques mots au sujet du probleme souleve par le representant des Etats- Unis et des proposition!! que ce dernier a soumises a l'examen du Conseil de securite. As the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I now wish to say a few words in connexion with the question which was raised by the United States representative, and in connexion with the proposals he submitted for consideration by the Council. (Parlant en russe): En ma qualite de representant de l'URSS, je regrette naturellement que le Conseil de securite n'ait pu, jusqu'a present, prendre de decision au sujet de la question grecque. Au cours de l'examen de ce probleme, je me suis efforce plusieurs foi8 d'attirer l'attention du Conseil sur le fait que les propositions relatives a la question grccque presentees au Conseil de securite par les Etats-Unis ne pourraient aboutir a une solution susceptible de retablir des relations normales entre la Grece, d'une part, et l'Albanie, la Bulgarie et la Yougoslavie, d'autre part, et de contribuer au maintien de la paix internationale. Ces proposi- .tions des- Etats-Unis contenues, comme le Conseil le sait, dans la premiere resolution des Etats-Unisl, et reprises par la seconde2, ont en realite pour but de cilsculper les vrais responsables de la situation qui regne en Grece et tendent a accuser deS Etats qui n'ont rien a voir avec cette situation. (Speaking in Russian) : As the representative of the USSR I must, of course, express my regret that the Security Council has not yet been able to come to a decision oa the Greek question. During the discussion of the Greek question I have tried, on several occasions,· to draw the Council's attention to the fact that the proposals on the Greek question submitted by the United States representatives in the Security Council do ,not, and cannot, lead to a solution of this question which would reestablish harmonious relations between Greece on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other, and promote the maintenance of international peace. These United States proposals which, as you know, were originally set forth in the first United States resolution,! and subsequently also in the second United States· resolution,2 are in fact designed to absolve those really responsible for the position in Greece, and they seek to accuse States which are in no way connected with the situation which has arisen in that country. All of the United States proposals on the Greek question are wide of the mark. As the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I submitted appropriate proposals and pointed out that responsibility for the position which has arisen in Greece-a position which is indeed grave and must be remedied-also rests upon certain States which have for a long time been intervening in the internal affairs of Greece to the detriment of the Toutes les propositions des Etats-Unis relatives a la question grecque restent a cote du sujet. En soumettant mes propositions en tant que representant de I'URSS, j'ai indique que les responsabilites de la situation qui s'est creee en Grece-situation extremement grave et que l'on devrait redresserincombe egalement a certains Etats qui depuis longtemps interviennent dans les affaires interieureS de la Grece au detriment des interets nationauX du During the discussion of the earlier United States proposals made to the Security Council, I pointed out the real aims of these proposals and whither they would lead. They have nothing in common with either the interests of the Greek people or the maintenance of peace. Had all the United States proposals submitted to date to the Security Council been accepted, they would have worsened and complicated the position, as they would have introduced further elements of suspicion and animosity into the relations between the four Balkan countries. I can only express regret that the majority of the Security Council has not felt able to take an effective decision in the Council. This fact must be noted with regret. But that would not be enough. I wish not only to note this fact, but also to draw the Security Council's attention to the fact that in the new United States proposals, submitted at today's meeting of the Council, we see the same policy as was evident in the first and second Umted States resolutions on the Greek question-a policy aimed at imposing decisions which lay the blame on innocent countries and absolve both the Greek Government (which bears the main responsibility for the present state of affairs in Greece) and the countries which are directly responsible for the situation which has arisen there. That is the essence of these new United States proposals and that is where they lead. As regards the me1:l;1ods, or if you like, the .tacti~s employed by the Umted States representat-~r<':s m the Security Council during the discussion of the Greek question, it must be said t.'1at those methods too are not calculated to ensure that this question will be settled ~n a spirit of co-operation within the framework of the United Nations and in the Security Council. That is cleally not the ~ of th~s type of proposal. Some people have .desc;Ibed thIs x;ew step, which has found expressIOn. m the Umted States resolution, as very clever dIplomacy. I am inclined to think that, far from being clever diplomacy or a clever method, it is, on the contrary, extremely crude diplomacy and a crude method which the United States representatives and Government apparently see fit to employ in the consideration of the Greek question. As the representative of the USSR, I cannot agree with the proposal submitted by the United States representative that the Greek question be withdrawn from t.'he Security Council's agenda. To remove this question from the Security Council's agenda and comply with the demands set out Lors de I'examen des propositions des Etats-Unis qui avaient ete presentees au Conseil de securite, j'avais deja indique que! etait le but qu'elles visaient en realite. Elles n'ont rien a voir avec les interets du peuple grec, ni avec le maintien de la paix. Si toutes les propositions des Etats-Unis presentees au Conseil de securite jusqu'a present etaient adoptees sans exception, elles auraient pour resultat d'aggraver la situation et de la rendre plus compliquee, en introduisant de nouveaux elements de mefiance et d'irritation dans les relations entre les quatre pays balkaniques. Je ne puis que regretter que la majorite du Conseil de securite n'ait pas cru devoir prendre une decision veritable, Il faut le constater avec regret. Mais les regrets ne suffisent pas, et je ne voudrais pas me borner a des constatations. Je voudrais faire observer au Conseil de securite que les nouvelles propositions des Etats-Unis presentees aujourd'hui au Conseil temoignent de cette meme tendance, deja apparente dans les deux premieres resolutions des Etats-Unis, et qui est de nous imposer des resolutions ou I'on accuse des pays innocents, et ou I'on disculpe le Gouvernement grec, pourtant responsable en grande partie de l'etat de choses regnant en Grece, ainsi que les Etats qui portent la responsabilite directe de cette situation. Telle est la nature des nouvel~~s propositions des Etats-Unis et voila ou elles conduisent. En ce qui concerne les methodes ou, si vous preferez, la tactique dont usent les representants des Etats-Unis au Conseil de securite au cours des debats sur la question grecque, il faut dire qu'elle ne sont pas faites pour trouver, dans un esprit de collaboration et dans les cadres de I'Organisation des Nations Unies, et du Conseil de securite, une solution au probleme grec. Ce n'est pas a cela d'ailleur5 qu'on les destine. Certains considerent cette nouvelle demarche, que constitue la resolution des Etats-Unis, comme relevant d'une diplomatie fort habile. Je suis enclin a croire que, loin de temoigner d'une diplomatie ou d'une methode habiles, cette demarche temoigne au contraire d'une diplomatie et d'une methode fort grossieres, que les representants et le Gouvernement des Etats- Dnis croient pouvoir appliquer a l'examen du pro- J:,leme grec. En ma qualite de representant de I'UR.sS, je ne peux accepter la proposition presentee par le delegue des Etats-Unis et qui est de retirer la question grecque de I'ordre du jour du Conseil de securite. Retirer cette question de l'ordre du jour du Conseil et satisfaire les exigences enoncees dans les In the second place, the removal of the Greek question from the Security Council's agenda would mean th'3.t the Security Council is voluntarily abstaining from taking a decision on a matter with which it, as the body entrusted with the primary task of maintaining international peace, should in fact deal. I consider that this is not in the interests of the Security Council, as the body already referred to, or in the interests of the United Nations as a whole. It has been said that, if such a step were taken by the Security Council, it would help to enhance the authority of the General Assembly. I venture to doubt the truth of that assertion. Such a decision would not help to enhance the authority of the General Assembly, and it would at the same time impair the authority of the Security Council. In the third place, we must not overlook the fact that these new United States proposals apparently ~li:1"e the same end in view as the first, and particularly the second, United States resolution. It was clear to everyone that the introduction of the second United States resolution was a senseless step. The United States representatives themselves did not dissemble the fact that they were attempting to obtain votes in the Security Council in order to put themselves in a more favourable position when the General Assembly discussed the GH~ek question. Similarly there can be no doubt that the object of these latest United States proposals is also to secure a certain number of votes in the Security Council in order to create a more favourable atmosphereas the United States representative sees it-when the Greek question is discussed by the General Assembly. But we differ in our views as to what constitutes a more favourable atmosphere for consideration of the Greek question. It is evident that some countries have one view of what constitutes a favourable atmosphere for consideration of the Greek question, while other countries take a different view. That is a point on which we cannot agree. The USSR delegation considers that the proposals put forward ~ ,d the methods employed during the consideration of the Greek question not only do not create a more favourable atmosphere for a solution of the Greek problem, but on the contrary, complicate the position, confuse the whole of this Greek problem and make it even more difficult to settle this matter in the interests both of the countries directly concerned and of the mainte»ance of peace. In view of these considerations, I cannot possibly accept the new United States pr~?osals. As I have already pointed out, inste'ld of 'llaking it easier to find a solution of the Greek problem which would be in our common interests, they only render such a solution more difficult and introduce further complicating elements into the relations between Greece on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other. En second lieu, si le probleme grec etait retire de I'ordre du jour du Conseil, cela.signifierait que le Conseil de securite renonce de son propre gre a regler cette question, alors qu'il est precisement de son devoir de s'en occuper, en tant qu'organe auquel incombe la responsabilite principale du maintien de la paix. Nous estimons que cela ne serait pas conforme aux interets du Conseil de securite, en tant qu'organe charge de ces responsabilites, ni aux interets de I'Organisation des Nations Unies dans son ensemble. ~ On nous dit que cette mesure prise par le Conseil de seeurite contribuerait a consolider I'autorite de l'AssembIee generale. Il est permis de mettre en doute la justesse d'un tel raisonnement. Cette decision ne eontribuerait pas a consolider I'autorite de l'AssembIee, de plus. elle nuirait a l'autorite du Conseil. En troisieme lieu, nous ne devons pas perdre de vue que ces nouvel1es propositions des Etats- Unis semblent tendre aux memes fins que la pre~ miere et surtout la deuxieme resolution des Etats- Unis. Il etait parfaitement clair que la presentation de la deuxieme resolution des Etats-Unis constituait une demarche denuee de tout sens. Les representants des Etats-Unis eux-memes n'ont pas cache qu'ils eherehaient a obtenir a tout prix des voix au Conseil de securite, paree qu'ils voulaient ereer une atmosphere qui leur soit favorabie lors de l'examen du probleme gree a l'Assemblee generale. Il n'y a pas de doute que le but des de~ieres propositions des Etats-Unis est egalement de recueillir un certain nombre de voix au Conseii de securite, ce qui, de I'avis du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, creerait une atmosphere plus favorable lors de l'examen du probleme gree par I'Assemblee.Mais nos avis different quant a ce qui constituerait une atmosphere favorable pour I'examen du probleme grec. II faut croire que les divers Etats ont a ce sujet des opinions divergentes. C'est la un sujet sur lequel nous ne pouvons pas nous mettre d'accord. La delegation de l'URSS est d'avis que ces propositions relatives a la question grecque, ainsi que les methodes que l'on applique a l'examen de cette question, loin de creer une atmosphere favorable, ne font que compliquer la situation et embrouiller le probleme, en en rendant plus difficile une solution qui soit conforme a la fois aux interets des pays directement en cause et aux interets du maintien de la paix. Etant donne ces considerations, je ne puis en aucun cas accepter les nouvelles propositions des Etats-Unis car, au lieu de eontribuer a trouver une solution du probleme grec qui soit conforme a nos interets communs, eUes ne font que rendre cette solution plus difficile et compliquent davantage encore les relations entre la Grece, d'une part, et l'Albanie, la Bulgarie et la Yougoslavie, d'autre part. Mr. JOI-INSON (United States of America) : Mr. President, I should like first to refer to a statement that you made as President of the Security Council which, in my opinion, is not in entire conformity with the facts. It is true that we have the Greek question on the agenda in general terms, and you are quite correct, in the view of my delegation, in ruling that with that item on the agenda any member of the Council or anyone of those non-members of the Council who have been invited to participate in this session would have the right to speak on the substance of the Greek question, if they chose. The Greek question has many facets to it. There are many phases of the Greek question which could properly be called "substance". There are many angles which could be discussed in substance. There are also aspects of it which are procedural. And although the Greek question was put on the agenda in general terms, which technically would open the door to any type of discussion, nevertheless the United States had, within that framework, brought up a very simple question, that of taking tlle necessary steps so that the General Assembly might deal adequately with the question and so that its decision would be a legitimate decision under the authority of the Charter. It therefore seems to me that the representative of Yugoslavia, while entirely within his technical rights, if I may say so, was taking advantage of the occasion to air opinions which he has repeated numberless times already at this Council table, and which had nothing whatsoever to do with the simple proposition of the United States. Now, any delegation is entitled to have any opinion it thinks fit regarding the simple question of requesting the General Assembly to make such recommendations, if any, as it might wish in this case. When such a simple proposition, however, is put up, Mr. President, if I may refer to your last statement made as the representative of tlle Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it seems to me that you are going most unnecessarily out of your way to claim that the only motive of the United States in putting this simple resolution before the Council is to get as many votes as possible for the coming discussion in the General Assembly. What the United States has proposed is a necessary and obvious measure, regardless of what anyone's opinions may be about the substance of the Greek case, so that the Security Council can at least give some evidence of a desire to co-operate with the General Assembly in its discussion of this question. The USSR representative may not like it that the United States has taken' this case before the Assembly, and he will be perfectly free in the Assembly to state his opinion. But I do claim that '_ is a very arbitrary position to say that such a matter is derogatory to the standing of this Council and to its rights in this question. Furthermore, the Council has been prevented by facts with which you are entirely familiar from having any possibility of taking action in this case. The fact that the action was approved and recommended by nine members of the Council and did not meet with the conCUlTence of the USSR delegation is again a matter entirely within the right of the USSR dele- M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je voudrais tout d'abord me referer a une declaration que le President a faite en la quaIite de president du Conseil de securite, declaration qui, amon avis, n'est pas tout afait conforme a la realite. Il est exact que l'ensemble de la question grccque figure a 1'0rdre du jour du Conseil, et, de l'avis de ma delegation le President a tout a fait raison lorsqu'il decide que, du fait que ce probleme figure a l'ordre du jour tout membre du Conseil, comme tout representant d'un Etat non membre du Conseil qui a ete invite a prendre part cl. la presente session, a le droit, s'il le desire, de traiter des questions de fond soulevees par l'affaire grecque. La question grecque se presente sous divers aspects; et nombreux sont ceux que l'on peut considerer comme touchant au fond. Nombreux sont les problemes poses par la question grecque dont on pourrait discuter le fond. RUe comporte egalemel1t des aspects qui concernent la procedure. Bien que la question grecque figure dans son ensemble a 1'0rdre du jour, ce qui, du point de vue technique, laisserait la porte ouverte a toute espece de discussion, les Etats-Unis ont neanmoins, dans ce cadre, choisi un point tres precis: prendre toutes mesures utiles pour que l'Assemblee generale puisse traiter ce probleme comme ill convient et pour qu'elle prenne une decision appropriee en vertu des pouvoirs qui lui sont conferes par la Charte. Il me semble par consequent que le representant de la Yougoslavie, tout en demeurant strictement dans la limite technique de ses droits, s'i! m'est permis de,m'exprimer ainsi, a neanmoins tire le meilIeur parti de I'.occasion qui lui etait donnee pour emettre des opinions qu'il a deja formulees ici nu nombre incalculable de fois, et qui n'ont absolument aucun rapport avec la proposition precise presentee par les Etats-Unis. Sans doute, toute delegation a le droit de se faire l'opinion qu'eUe juge convenable sur la demande tres simple adressee a I'Assemblee generale, asavoir de faire les recommandations qu'elle jugera utiles, le cas echeant, dans les circonstances actuelles. Toutefois, si je puis me referer a ·la derniere declaration que le President a faite en qualite de representant de I'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, iI me semble que, devant une proposition aussi simple, il se donne bien inutilement du mal pour essayer de dcmontrer que les ,Etats-Unis, en soumettant ce projet de resolution au Conseil, ont pour seul objectif de reunir le plus grand nombre de voix possible en vue de la discussion qui aura lieu au sein de l'Assemblee generale. Les Etats-Unis ont propose une mesure dont la necessite est evidente, sans tenir compte des opinions de chacun en ce qui concerne le fond de I'affaire grecque, afin de permettre au Conseil de securite de manifester dans une certaine mesure sa volonte de cooperer avec l'Assemb16e generale ala discussion de ce probleme. Le representant de I'URSS peut ne pas apprecier le fait que les Etats-Unis aient soumis le, cas a l'Assemblce, et il aura toute Iiberte de formuler son opinion devant celle-ci. Mais j'affirme que c'est prendre position de maniere tout arbitraire que de declarer que cettc mesure constitue une atteinte a VOIX. M. LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais) : I'ai etudie avec beaucoup d'attention la proposition qui nous a ete presentee, et je l'envisageais avec un pr6juge favorable, parce que nou-e de16gation dersie vivement nous voir arriver cl resoudre d'une Mr. LANGE (Poland): I have studied the proposal which is before us with great attention, and have approached it with a great amount of sympathy, because our delegation is very anxious that we should arrive at some solution of the Greek question. It is therefore with great regret' that I have to say we cannot favour the adoption of this proposal because it does not seem to us to lead to the result we all desire. Our reasons are only partly connected with the merits of the Greek question. They are also connected with the implications which the adoption of the proposal would have in regard to the functioning of our organization. fa~on quelconque le probleme grec. C'eat done avec le plus grand regret que je me vois force de declarer que nous ne pouvons recommander l'adoption de cette proposition, etant donntS qu'elle ne nous parrot pas conduire au resultat que nous desirons tous. Les motifs qui nous poussent a adopter cette attitude n'ont qU'Ul'). rapport Pa!'tiel avec le fond de la question grecque. Ils ont trait egalement cl 1'incidence eventuelle que risque d'avoir sur le fonctionnement de notre organisation l'adoption de la mesure proposee. The question has been put before the Security Council and, quite unfortunately, the Security Council, after very lengthy debates and several votes, has not been able to reach a positive result. It is proposed, therefore, that the Security Council go to the General Assembly and request the General Assembly to make a recommendation. It seems to me that such action implies a relinquishing by the Security Council of the responsibility which has been imposed on it by the Charter. According to Article 24, the Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and I do not think that this responsibility should be abandoned light-heartedly. Le probleme a ete pose au Conseil de securite et, malheureusement, ce dernier, apres des debats prolonges et de nombreux votes, n'est arrive cl aucun resultat positif. En consequence, on propose que le Conseil de securite s'adresse cl I'Assc-'!lb16e generale et lui demande de formuler des recommandations. Il me semble que ce geste implique, de la part du Conseil de securite, qu'il rejette les respomabilites qui lui ont ete confiees par la Charte. Aux termes de l'Article 24, le Conseil de securite se voit con- .ferer la responsabilite principale du maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales, et je ne pense pas qu'il convienne de rejeter de grote de coeur cette responsabilite. Of course it is quite clear that any delegation has the right to raise the question before the Assembly, and that the Assembly, in accordance with Artic1e 10 of the Charter, has the r . t to discuss the Greek question if it so wishes. Wt: ..:ertainly do not object to that. Il est evident que toute delegation a le droit de porter la question devant l'Assemblee, et que celle-ci, conformement cl l'Article 10 de la Charte, a le droit de discuter la question grecque si elle le desire. Nous ne faisons certainement aucune objection cl cela. Toutefois, on nous propose, me semble-t-il, quelque chose de plus. On nous propose de nous adresser cl l'Assemblee et de lui demander de trouver pour nous une solution que nous avons ete incapables de trouver nous-memes. Je me rends parfaitement compte qu'il pourrait exister certaines situations dans lesquelles il soit permis au Conseil de securite de s'adresser cl 1'AssemblCe et de lui demander de formuler certaines recommandations. Nous nous SOI.lmes trouves il y a quelque temps en presence d'un cas de ce genre. Les membres du However, what is proposed to us, I think, is something more. It is a proposal to go to the Assembly and ask the Assembly to solve for us a question which we have not been able to solve ourselves. I understand fully tllat tllere may be certain situations in which tlle Security Council may appeal to the Assenlbly to make certain recommendations. We had one such case at an earlier stage. The members will remember that it was the Spanish question, where our delegation very strongly supported a resolution which asked the Assembly to Ther~ was, however, a certain difference, becau!!e in the firSt case when we asked the Assembly to make recommendations we specified what recommendations we expected from the Assembly. Consequently, this was not an abdication of our own attempt to find a solution. What we wanted was additional moral and political support for an action as to the course of which we were basically in agreement. These were the special circumstances which then warranted such action. I do not think that the same special circumstances exist in the present case. I think that now the adoption of the resolution proposed will be in.. terpreted universally as an abdication by the Security Council of its primary duty, which is imposed upon the Council by the Charter, and for this reason we find it impossible to support this proposal. I shall even go a step further and also say in advance that, for the same reason, at this stage we should not be able to support a motion to take the Greek question off the agenda. Frankly, we believe that the Security Council has not exhausted all its possibilities of reaching an agreement. There have -been a number of resolutions which have not been adopted. The Polish delegation was, ! think, the only delegation which made an effort to find and assemble the points of general agreement in the Council-and there were such points, substantial ones-and present them in a resolution.S The majority of the Council at that time thought that these points of general agreement were too little too weak to wan"ant the adoption of our resolution and later the Council again reverted to discussio~ of more extreme positions. However, if the Council thought that the effort to reach an agreement which was then made by the Polish delegation ~as not sufficiently worthy of adoption because too little was contained in that agreement, in that case I should say that it would be even more illogical now for us to say that we have reached no afrreement at aU and give up and renounce our r;sponsibility, which is imposed upon us by the Charter. I therefore wish most strongly to urge that, before we decide to undertake a step which may and will be interpreted as the relinquishing of our responsibility, the Council renew its effort to reach : Ibid., First Year, Second Series, No. 21, 79th meeting. Toutefois, ces deux cas sont quelque peu differents parce que dans le cas du probll~me espagnol, lorsque nous avons demande al'Assemblee de formuler des recommandations, nous avons specifie queUes recommandations nous attendions de l'Assemblee. Il n'y avait donc pas dans ce cas abdication de notre part. Ce que nous desirions, c'etait simplement un appui supplementaire, de caractere moral et politique, pour des mesures au developpement desqueUes nous avions, des le depart, donne notre assentiment. TeUes etaient les circonstances particulieres qui, ace moment la, justifiaient notre attitude. Je ne pense pas que des circonstances particulieres identiques existent dans le cas actueI. Je pense que l'adoption, en ce moment, de la resolution proposee serait universelIement interpretee comme un manquement, de hI. part du Conseil de securite, .au principal devoir qui lui est impose par la Charte, et c'est pourquoi nous jug:.:ons impossible d'appuyer cette proposition. J'irai meme plus loin, et je dirai d'avance que, pour la meme raison, nous ne pourrons pas, dans l'etat actue! des choses, appuyer une motion tendant a retirer la question grecque de I'ordre du jour du ConseiI. Franchement, nous croyons que le Conseil de securite n'a pas epuise toutes les possibilites d'arriver a un accord. Un grand nombre de resolutions n'ont pas ete adoptees. La delegation polonaise a ete, il me semble, la seule delegation qui ait fait un effort pour decouvrir et grouper les points sur. lesquels le Conseil etait arrive a un accc;>rd d'ensemble-et il y en avait d'importants-et pour presenter ces points sous forme de resolutionS. La majorite du Conseil a estime a ce moment la que les points sur lesquels on etait arrive aun accord d'ensemble etaient trop secondaires pOUf justifier l'adoption de notre resolution, et plus tard le Conseil a repris la discussion de positions plus extremes. Toutefois, si le Conseil a juge que I'effort realise alars par la delegation polonaise en vue d'aboutir a un accord n'etait pas digne qu'on s'y arretat parce que l'accord ne portait que sur des points trop peu importants, je dois dire qu'il serait encore plus illogique de dire maintenant que nous n'avons abouti a aucun accord, ainsi que d'abandonner et de rejeter les responsabilites qui nous incombent en vertu des dispositions de la Charte. C'est pourquoi je tiens a insister vivement pour que, avant de decider de prendre une mesure qui pourrait etre interpretee comme un abandon de notre part et qui sera certainement interpretee ~ Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de sJ· curite, Premiere Annee, premiere serie, No 2, 45eme et 47eme seances. : Ibid., Premiere Annee, seconde sene, No 21, 7geme seance. a Voir les Proces-verbaux o/ficiels du Conseil de sJ· curite, Deuxieme Annee, No 69, 174eme seance."~ M. MEVORAH (Bulgarie): Le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis constitue un aveu d'impuissance. Cependant, le Conseil de securite pourrait faire un retour glorieux: reprendre la discussion, le rapport en main. L'impuissance qui s'est manifestee, jusqu'a present, provient precisement du refus obstine de la majorite des membres du Conseil de securite d'€:tudier d'une maniere approfondie les constations contenues dans le rapport. Je suis certain que, s'il n'en avait pas ete ainsi, le Conseil serait arrive a une conclusion juste, qu'il aurait admis les faits tels qu'ils sont. Aujourd'hui, les conclusions s'imposeraient d'elles-memes. Mr. MEVORAH (Bulgaria) (translated from French): The United States draft resolution is an avowal of impotence. Nevertheless, the Security Council could make a triumphal return: with the report in hand it could take up the discussion again. The impotence hitherto displayed is due to the obstinate refusal of the majority of the members of the Security Council to give detailed study to the findings of the repcrt. I am sure that, had it been otherwise, the Council would have reached a just conclusion, admitting the facts for what they are. Totiay these conclusions cannot be blinked. Without wishing to repeat what has often been said, I take the opportunity of recalling that the report contains points on which the whole question turns. But they have been ignored in spite of all our efforts to draw the Security Council's attention to them.. It refused to study the report. It merely read the last pages containing the recommendations; the conclusions themselves were not discussed, and I did not hear a single representative raise those questions or give them the attention they deserved. Thus the main point, the situation in "Greece and its causes, was completely ignored. Sans vouloir repeter ce qui a ete exprime maintes fois, je me permets de rappeler qu'il y a, dans le rapport, des points qui constituent vraiment le pivot de toute la question. Or ils ont ete negliges, malgre tous les efforts que nous avons faits pour attirer l'attention du Conseil de securite sur eux. En dIet, le Conseil n'a pas voulu etudier le rapport. On s'est contente de lire les dernieres pages ou se trouvaient les recommendations; les conclusions memes n'ont pas ete discutees et il ne m'a pas ete donne d'entendre un sew representant aborder ces questions et leur accorder l'attention qu'eIles mentent. Ainsi, le point principal, la situation en Grece et ses causes, a ete completement neglige. Quant ~l'X incidents de frontieres-qui ont incite le Conseil de secm:ite a se saisir de la question-ils ont ete laisses de cote par la Commission dIememe, ceIle-ci ayant estime qu'ils ne meritaient pas de faire l'objet d'urie discussion approfondie au sein du Conseil de securite, parce qu'ils n'existent pas on tant qu'eIements politiques. Le Conseil de securite pourrait, d'autre part, reprendre la question en declarant que le rapport a constate que l'enquete n'avait pas prouve I'aide apportee aux partisans par hI. Bulgarie. Je ne voudrais pas abuser des instants des membres du Conseil en repetant ce que j'ai deja dit; mais je tiens a souligner que le rapport n'a pas ete . examine par la majorite du Conseil de securite. Si le Conseil consent a revenir sur la question, je suis certain qu'il sera amene a constater un point capital qui decidera en derniere analyse. Ce point est le suivant: d'une part, il y a, en Grece, une intervention ouverte et massive de l'Angleterre et des Etats-Unis. C'est un fait irrefutable et on peut en connaitre les details quotidiennement. D'autre part, la Bulgarie est accusee d'avoir donne, a des partisans, a un certain moment, une dizaine d'armes. EIle est accusee, egalement, d'avoir admis des refugies a I'interieur de ses frontieres. Or, le Conseil de securite s'est obstinement refuse a examiner le point concernant notre droit de donner refuge a ceux qui le sollicitaient. La juxtaposition de ces deux faits: I'aide apportee en masse par les Etats-Unis et le Royaume- Uni au Gouvernement grec, et celle qui a ete fournie par notre pays, consistant dans le fait cl'avoir accueilli des refugii:::, devrait etre etudiee par le Conseil de securite, et il faudrait accorder a chacun de ces deux elements I'attention qu'il merite. As regards the frontier incidents-which led the Security Council to deal with this question-these were put aside by the Commission itself on the ground that they did not warrant detailed discussion in the Security Council because· they had no existence as political factors. The Security Council could also revert to the question by stating that according to the report it had not been proved that Bulgaria had assisted the guerrillas. I will not take up the Council's time by repeating myself; but I want to stress that the report has not been examined by the majority of the Security Council. If the Council agrees to re-open the question, it will, I am sure, note a most important and, in the final analysis, decisive point, which is the following: on the one hand, there is open and powerful intervention in Greece on the part of England and the United States. That is an irrefutable fact, details of which are available daily. On the other hand, Bulgaria stands accused of having given a dozen weapons to partisans on one occasion. It is also accused of admitting refugees inside its borders. The Security Council, it should be noted, has stubbornly refused to study the question of our right to give refuge to those who asked for it. The two facts-the aid given the Greek Government by the United States and the United Kingdom, and that furnished by my country in having received refugees-should be studied by the Security Council side by side, and each of these two factors should be given the attention it deserves. Mr. VILFAN (Yugoslavia) (translated from French): I think I should clarify somewhat what I have already said in my statement. I find it a little difficult to understand the Australian representative's English and I believe that he has some difficulty in understanding'mine. If I heard correctly, I have the impression that he did not quite understand me. If I heard correctly, he claimed that what I said in my statement 'had no bearing on the item in today's Security Council agenda. The United States representative repeated this assertion, stating that the representative of Yugoslavia had returned with a prepared statement and had repeated opinions frequently heard before which had no bearing on the point under discussion today in the Security Council. I must emphasize again what I thought I had made sufficiently clear in my statement, namely, that we do not object to the Greek question's being discussed by the General Assembly. I think there was no need to make such a pathetic statement as the United States representative made when he said that no power on earth could prevent the General Assembly from discussing the Greek question. I repeat that we have no objections to such a discussion-quite the contrary I said, and I emphasized that our delegation would take advantage of the opportunity to give the largest possible audience the true reasons for the Greek question, to explain the nature of the Greek Government's accusations, and so forth. I hope no one has any doubts on that point. But if the United States proposal has a meaning, the consequence would be that the Security Council would not resume the discussion of the Greek question for at least six weeks. There are optimists who think that the General Assembly will finish towards the first of November; there are, however, pessimists who consider that it will last until 15 December, and perhaps longer. If the United States proposal is adopted, it is clear that the Security Council will not. discuss the Greek question before the end of the General Assembly. If there is any need to apply to someone else for a recommendation, it is obvious that nothing will be done until the reply asked for has been received. That is what I object to. We agree to the General Assembly's discussing the Greek question, but we want the Security CounciJ to discuss it also and to take the decision which is necessary and warranted as quickly as possible. M. VILFAN (Yougoslavie): Je crois qu'il est necessaire que je donne quelques eclaircissements sur ce que j'ai d6jadit dans mon expose. I'ai quelque difficulte a comprendre le representant de l'Australie et je crois qu'il eprouve luimeme une certaine peine a me comprendre. Si je ne me trompe, j'ai l'impression qu'il ne m'a pas bien compris moi-meme. Si je ne me trompe, il a pretendu que ce que j'ai dit dans mon expose n'a am'un rapport avec le point qui est inscrit aujourd'hui a l'ordre du jour du Conseil de securite. Le representant des Etats-Unis a repete cette affirmation disant que le representant de la Yougoslavie est venu de nouveau avec un expose prepare d'avance, et a repete des declarations faites bien souvent et qui n'ont aucun rapport avec le point discute aujourd'hui 'au Conseil de securite. Il me faut souligner encore une fois ce que je crois avoir exprime assez clairement dans mon expose, a savoir que nous ne sonnnes pas opposes a la discussion de la question grecque par l'AssembIee generale. Je crois qu'il n'y avait pas necessite de faire une declaration aussi pathetique que celle du representant des Etats-Unis lorsqu'il adit qu'aueune puissance au monde ne peut empecher l'Assemblee generale de discuter la question grecque. Je repete que nous ne nous opposons pas a cette discussion, au contraire. J'ai dit et souligne que notre delegation profitera de 1'0ccasion pour faire connaitre au· public le plus nombreux possible quelles sont les veritables raisons des difficultes de la question grecque, que! est le caractere des accusations du gouvemement grec, etc. I'espere que personne n'a de doutes sur ce point. Mais si la proposition des Etats-Unis a un sens, sa consequence doit etre que le Conseil de securite ne reprendra pas la discussion de la question grecque avant au moins six semaines. Il y a des optimistes qui croient que l'AssembIee generale se terminera vers le premier novembre; mais il y a des pessimistes qui estiment qu'elle durera jusqu'au 15 decembre et peut-etre plus tard. Il est clair que, si la proposition des Etats-Unis est acceptee, le Conseil de securite ne discutera pas la question grecque avant la fin de l'AssembIee generale. Si 1'0n ressent le besoin de s'adresser a que!qu:'un d'autre pour une recommandation, on ne fera naturellement rien avant d'avoir re~u la reponse que l'on aura sollicitee. C'est acela que nous sommes opposes. Nous acceptons que l'AssembIee generale discute la question grecque, mais nous desirons que le Conseil de securite la discute aussi et que l'on prenne le plus rapidement possible la decision qu'elle necessite et merite. . Nous croyons que, par suite de la situation actuellement creee en Grece, il sera plus facile au Conseil de securite de trouver une solution. I think, however, there is now another possibility. There are some new facts. I have here some cuttings from a New York newspaper on the subject.of the Greek crisis. I could read them to prove the facts which I mentioned in my statement. I am an optimist, because I think that after the recent Greek governmental crisis the members of the Security Council, even those who form the majority, may reconsider their opinion. I can hardly believe that the facts revealed by the last Greek governmental crisis will be contested. The Brazilian representative said that the proposal of the United States representative was justified because the Security Council had reached a deadlock. We can do nothing, he said; the only logical solution is to appeal to the General Assembly. Le representant du Bresil a declare que la proposition du representant des Etats-Unis et'lit fondee parce que le Conseil de securite se trouve dans une impasse. Nous ne pouvons rien faire, a-toil declare, la seule solution logique est, de nous adresser a- I'Assemblee generale. On the contrary, if there is a deadlock and if it is not deliberate, we can find a way out by considering the facts I have mentioned. One can agree with Professor Einstein's theory of relativity, but up to the present this theory has been limited to physics. From the political,standpoint it has always been understood that the presence of foreign troops on a country's territory should be considered as an occupation. Similarly, the fact that a g'Overnment several thousand kilometres away can bring <:J.bout the resignation of another government and form a new one to suit its own needs has always been considered, in political theory, as a violation of that country's independence. The facts are so clear and have been so thoroughly corroborated by recent events, that they afford the Security Council a possibility of escape from the deadlock. The Security Council's duty is to take up the consideration of this question again and to find a just solution, that is to say, a solution Which will restore independence to the Greek people. Les faits sont tellement clairs et ont ete tellement demontres par les derniers evenements qu'ils offrent au Conseil de securite un moyende sortir de l'im- .passe. Le devoir du Conseil de securite est d'examiner a nouveau cette question et de trouver une solution juste, c'est-a-dire une solution qui rendra au peuple grec son independance. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): I have a correction. Both the President and the repr~sentative of Yugoslavia have referred several times to the American resolution as something which would remove this Greek question from the agenda of the Security Council. That is not the case at all. This resolution is designed simply, by h~ving recourse to Article 12 of the Charter, to gIV<: the Assembly the faculty of making recommen- ?atIon~. That.is all. It is n9t a question of removmg this questIon from the agenda of the Council. !h.e Council may discuss the matter concurrently, if It chooses. That is the real mistake which the representative of Yugoslavia has made from the very beginning, and if I interpreted the President's remarks correctly-or if I understood them cor- Mais il me parait y avoir maintenant une autre possibilite. De nouveaux faits existent. J'ai id des coupures d'un journal de New-York au sujet de la crise grecque. Je pourrais en donner lecture pour prouver les faits que j'ai mentionnes dans mon expose. Je fais preuve d'optimisme, car je crois qu'apres cette crise du Gouvernement grec, les membres du Conseil de securite, meme ceux qui font partie de la majorite, pourront reviser leur opinion. Je m'imagine difficilement que des faits, qui ont ete demasques par la derniere crise du Gouvernement grec, puissent etre nies. Au contraire, s'il existe une impasse, et si e11e n'est pas voulue, nous pouvons trouver une issue en prenant en consideration les faits que j'ai mentionnes. On peut etre partisan de la theorie de la relativite de M. Einstein, mais jusqu'apresent cette theorie a ete limitee a la physique. Au point de vue politique, il a toujours ete entendu que la presence de troupes etrangeres sur le territo;re d'un pays doit etre consideree comme une occupation. De meme, le fait qu'un Gouvernement, a une distance de plusieurs milliers de kilometres, puisse faire de- Inissionner un autre Gouvernement et en constituer un nouveau selon ses propres besoins, a toujours ete considere, dans les theories politiques, comme une atteinte al'independance du pays. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'ang1ais) : Je tiens a faire une rectification. Le President et le representant de la Yougoslavie ont plusieurs fois, toux deux, dit de la proposition de resolution des Etats-Unis qu'elle visait afaire retirer la question grecque de 1'0rdre du jour du Conseil de securite. Ceci est tout a fait inexact. Ce projet de resolution vise tout simplement, en appliquant les dispositions de l'Article 12 de la Charte, aaccorder a l'AssembIee le droit de formuler des recommandations. C'est tout. Il n'est pas question de retirer ce point de l'ordre du jour du Conseil. Ce dernier peut, s'il le desire, discuter de cette question en meme temps que l'AssembIee. Voila la veritable erreur qu'a comInise des le debut le representant de la Yougoslavie, et si j'ai correctement The General· Assembly's recommendation would only be of value if the Security Council or the States concerned could follow it, but if we now give the United States resolution the meaning placed on it by the United States representative, the following situation Inight arise: the Security Council could decide one thing and the General Assembly the opposite. What would be the position in that case? I think it is entirely illogical to argue that the Security Council could continue to discuss the Greek question if the General Assembly were asked to make a recommendation. Either we have confidence in ourselves and, in addition, retain a sense of our duty-that is to say that we desire to solve the Greek question, in which case it will be discussed here and we shall not be depenqent upon the General Assembly's recommendation-or we consider that a recommendation from· the General Assembly is necessary-and it has been said today that it is-i., order to emerge from the deadlock. A Security Council discussion has then no meaning. Mr. PARODI (France) (translated from French) : We have reached a point in the discussion where it seems there is a certain misunderstanding and obscurity in the debate. We have received a letter from the United States representative requesting that the Greek question be placed on the agenda of the Security Council in order that, in conformity with Article 12 of the Charter, steps may be taken with a view to enabling t.'J.e General Assembly to make' recommendations in regard to this dispute. The United States representative has not indicated which of the measures provided for in Article 12 could be applied to ensure that the Assembly could make recommendations. These measures are twofold. There are two possibilities: either the Security Council can delete the matter.. from its agenda and the Assembly can then deal with it- , we know that there is already a proposal to that effect-or the Security Council could ask the Assembly to make recommendations and, in this case, if I correctly interpret Article 12, the Security Council would continue to deal with the question parallel with the Assembly. It seemed to me that the arguments set forth principally by the President and by the representative of Yugoslavia and, generally, the arguments directed against the United States resolution, were against deleting the question from the Security Council's agenda, but did not affect the second possibility. This applies, let me say again, if I correctly interpret Article 12, which deals with a request to the General Assembly to make recommendations. The Yugoslav representative went even further, since he told us-and he has La recommandation de l'Assemb16e generale n'aura une valeur que si le Conseil de securite ou les Etats interesses peuvent la suivre, mais si nous donnons maintenant a la resolution des Etats-Unis le sens que lui prete le representant de ce pays, le fait suivant pourra se produire: le Conseil de securite pourra prendre une certaine decision et l'Assemblee generale une decision contraire. QueUe sera la situation dans ce cas? Je crois qu'il est tout a fait illogique de pretendre que le Conseil de securite puisse continuer a discuter la question grecque si l'on demande a l'Assemblee generale de formuler une recommandation. Ou nous avons foi en nous-memes et non seulement cette fai, mais, le sentiment de notre devoir, c'est-a-dire que nous desirons resou.dre !a question grecque; et, dans ce cas, elle sera dlscutee ici et nous ne dependrons pas de la recommandation de l'Assemblee generale. Ou nous estimons qu'une recommandation de I'Assemblee generale est necessaire, et il a ete dit aujourd'hui que cette recommandation est necessaire pour pouvoir sortir de I'impasse. AIors, une discussion par le Conseil de securite n'a pas de sens. M. PARODI (France): Au point de la discussion ou nous sommes parvenus, il semble qu'il y ait un certain malentendu ou une certaine obscurite dans les debats. Nous avons ete saisis d'une lettre du representant des Etats-Unis qui demandait que la question grecque fUt inscrite a I'ordre du jour du Conseil de securite afin que, conformement a l'Article 12 de la Charte, des mesures puissent etre prises en vue de permettre a l'Assemb16e generale de formuler des recommandations au sujet ce ce differend. Le representant des Etats-Unis n'a pas indique de choix entre les mesures prevues par I'Artic1e 12 qui seraient applicables pour arriver aCe que l'Assemblee puisse formuler des recommandations. Ces mesures sont de deux ordres. II y a deux possibili. tes: ou le Conseil de se.curite rave I'affaire de son ordre du jour et, ace moment-la, l'Assemblee peut se saisir de la question,-nous savons que, des maintenant, il y a une proposition dans ce sens-ou bien le Conseil de securite demande a l'AssembIee de formuler des recommandations et, dans ce cas, si j'interprete exactement l'Article 12, le ConseiI de securite reste saisi de la question paralIelement a l'Assemblee. II m'a semble que les arguments presentes id, notamment par le President, et par le representant de la Yougoslavie et, en general, les arguments diriges contre la resolution americaine, valaient contre la mesure qui comporte la radiation de la question de I'ordre du jour du Conseil de securite, mais ql~'iIs ne s'appliquaient pas a la seconde voie poss:1:>le. Ces arguments s'appIiquent, je le repete, si j'interprete bien l'Article 12, qui a trait a la demande a l'AssembIee generale de formuler If I understand correctly, however, there is actually op.e way. of enabling the Assembly to make reconimendations and at the same time not removing the question from the Security Council's agenda -I mean a request under Article 12. Or, si je comprends bien, nous avons precisement un moyen de permettre ala fois a l'Assemblee de faire des recommandations, et au Consei1 de securite de ne pas etre dessaisi de la question: c'est la demande qui est prevue dans l'Article 12. I realize that the Yugoslav representative said just now that in this case, if such a procedure were followed, the actual risk would be that the Security Council would no longer deal with the question and would, purely and simply, wait for the Assembly decision. Je sais bien que le representant de la Yougoslavie a dit tout a I'heure que, dans ce cas, si l'on procedait ainsi, on risquerait en fait que le Conseil de securite ne se saisisse plus de la question, qu'il attende purement et simplement que l'Assemblee se prononce. Sous cette forme, je comprends mieux l'argumentation, mais rien cependant, en droit, ne s'opposerait ace que le Conseil de securite se ressaisisse en effet de la question et, en fait, je crois que rien ne s'y opposerait, s'il apparaissait toutefois un espoir raisonnable d'arriver a un resultat, si des conversations ou des entretiens prealables nous permettaient de penser que l'echec auquelle Conseil de securite a abouti dans l'affaire grecque puisse etre repare, que nous puissions amver aun resultat satisfaisant. Je pense que dans ce cas, tres facilement, le Conseil de securite accepterait de se ressaisir de la question. Mais encore faudrait-il que nous ayons un espoir raisonnable au'en rouvrant le debat nous ne retrouverions pas purement et simplement les argumentations qui ont ete developpees sans :esultat, vous le savez, pendant de tres 10ngues semames. In this form I understand the argument better. There is nothing in law, however, to prevent the Security Council from taking up the matter again, and I think in fact there is nothing to prevent this if there seemed to be a reasonable hope of achieving something, or if preliminary conversations justified the belief that, if the stalemate reached by the Security Council in the Greek question could be lifted, we could reach a satisfactory result. In this case, I think that the Security Council would very easily agree to take up the question again. There should, however, also be a reasonl'j.ble expectation that, when the debate is re-opened, we do not again meet, purely and simply, the arguments which have been elaborated, as you know, without results, for weeks on end. It has just been reiterated that if the Assembly were to deal with the matter parallel with the Security Council, we might end up with contradictory decisions. Personally, I am not impressed by this iatter argument. The Security Council is a United Nations body, and so is the Assembly, and there are sufficiently close bonds, as you know, between these two bodies, primarily because the same persons sit on both; there are, as I say, enough bonds to ensure that their work will be co-ordinated. If it should appear preferable at any moment to revert to the 'Security Council, I am sure that the ' Assembly, even if it were dealin~ with the matter, would agree to defer its own discussion in order to give the Security Council time to reach a result. Once again, however, all this is only possible if there is a serious and reasonable hope that, in reopening the discussion, the Security Council will be able to reach conclusions. Unfortunately, the truth of the matter is that we have to deal with a situation where, after long discussion, we have failed to reach a result. It is, therefore, correct to say, as it has in fact been said, that we have reached a deadlock. The United States resolution has the merit of offering us a means, of escape. It has also been said that it would be an admission of the stalemate reached by the Security Council, and also contrary to its dignity, to refer the matter in this way to the Assembly; but surely the fact that we have failed to oettle the Greek question is a result known to the whole world. It is On vient de repeter al'instant que si l'Assemb16e etait saisie parallelement au Conseil de securite, on risquerait d'aboutir a des decisions contradictoires. Je ne suis pas touche, en ce qui me conceme, par cette derniere forme de l'argumentation. Le Comeil de securite est un organe des Nations Unies, l'Assemblee aussi, et entre ces deux organes il y a des liens suffisamment etroits, que vous connaissez, qui tiennent d'abord a ce que ce sont les memes pe:''Sonnalites qui siegent dans les deux organismes, il y a, dis-je, des liens suffisants pour que la coordination du travail puisse ctre faite. S'il apparaissait aun moment donne qu'il serait preferable de revenir au Conseil de securite, je suis sur que, dans ce cas, l'Assemblee, meme si elle etait saisie, accepterait de retarder sa propre discussion pOUl laisser au Conseil de securite le temps d'abot!- tir a un resultat. Mais tout cela, encore une fois, n'est possible que s'il y a un espoir serieux et raisonnable que la Conseil de securite, en rouvrant la discussion, puisse aboutir a des conclusions. Ce qui est certain, malheureusement, e'est que nous sommes en presence d'une situation qui fait suite a de longs debats dans lesquels nous ne sommes pas arrives a un resultat. On a done le droit de dire, eomme on l'a dit, que nous sommes dans une impasse. La resolution des Etats-UnifJ a l'avantage de nous donner le moyen d'en sortir. On a dit aussi que ee serait reconnaitre l'echee du Conseil de seeurite, et qu'il serait eontraire a sa dignite de passer ainsi la main al'Assemblee; mais, veritablement, que nous n'ayons pas abouti dans l'affaire grecque e'est un resultat que tout le monde eonnait. Il est regrettable, et le fait de demander a In such a delicate question as the Greek issue, if one body - the Security Councilhas failed to achieve anything (which, in fact, is the case), it seems perfectly natural to me that the co-ordination which should prevail between the various United Nations bodies should lead to the Assembly's being asked in its turn to make an effort. Once again, for the reasons given, I find it very natural that the United States resolution should propose the way which remains open to us. . This .course would not prevent the Security Council taking up the matter again if there were a re,asonable hope of reaching a result, and in the meantime it would provide a means of escape from the deaa.:ock in which we find ourselves. In these circumstances I shall persrually support the United States resolution, and I think that, if our colleagues would think it over, they would agree, as I have just said, that there is a certain misunderstanding inherent in the objections raised. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): The United States draft resolution requests that the General Assembly consider the Balkan dispute and make a recommendation. There are two points to be considered. First, the matter of considering the dispute. I understand by thi~ consideration that the General Assembly would study the procedures, decisions, and aspects which were studied and considered by the Security Council. It is not expected that the General Assembly would proceed to study the matter from its beginning and make investigations. Although it is a very broad question, it grows narrower and narrower, and finally results in one little point at the end. This is the point which the Security Council or the author of this proposal YiLCans':"" that is, to tell the General Assembly that the Security Council has been studying this matter for a long time, so many sessions having been held, so many resolutions having been drafted and voted upon and a good majority obtained; but that the unanimity rule intervened and for this reason, no resolution could be adopted. We ask the advice of the General Assembly on this point, and not on any other point. I do not expect that the General Assembly would make recommendations to the parties" b,,:cause no recommendations would be given to the parties as long as the Security Council is seized of this question. The General A :embly would have no relations with the parties, except through the Security Council. If recommendations are to be made directly to the parties, then the whole question should be deleted from the agenda of the Security Council. That is possible if the Gree~ Government would tdl the Security Council that they withdraw their case. 1£ this were done, the matter would no longer remain in the Security Council, and the General Assembly would be free to act as it liked and make Si, dans une question aussi epineuse que l'affaire grecque, l'un des organismes-Ie Conseil de securite -n'a pas pu aboutir, (et en fait, il n'a pas abouti) il me parrot tout naturel que la coordination qui doit s'etablir entre les differentes organes des Nations Unies conduise a demander a l'Assemblee de faire a son tour un effort. Encore une fois, pour ces raisons, je trouve tres nature! que la resolution des Etats-Unis nous propose la voie qui reste ouverte devant nous. Cette voie ne s'oppose pas ace que l'on revienne I devant le ConseiI de securlte s'il y a un espoir raisonnable d'arriver a un resultat, et elle nous donne en attendant, le moyen de sortir de l'impasse ou nous nous trouvons. Dans c~s coDt-l;tions, j'appuierai, en ce 9ui ~e concern(;, la reaolution des Etats-Unis et Je crOIS qJ.1e, si nos collegues voulaient bien y repenser, ils reconnaitraient-ainsi qae je le disais tout a l'heure -que dans les objections soulevees, il y a une part au mains de malentendu. M. EL-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais) : Le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis demande a I'Assemblee generale d'examiner le differend balkanique et de formuler une recommandation a ce sujet. Il s'agit de considerer deux points. Tout d'abord, l'etude du differend; a mon avis, I'Assemblee generale proced("rait ainsi a l'etude des problemes de procedure, des decisions et des aspects de la question qui ont ete deja etudies et examines par le ConseiI de securite. On ne peut supposer que l'AssembIee generale se livrerait a une etude du probleme depuis ses origines et procederait a des enquetes. Bien que ce probleme soit tres vaste, iI se reduit de plus en plus, et aboutit finalement a une question tres 1imitee. Dans la pensee du ConseiI de securite, ou plut5t, dans la pensee de l'auteur de la proposition, iI s'agit de faire savoir a l'Assemblee generale que le Conseil de securite a etudie la probU:me pendant longtemps, qu'il a tenu de nombreuses sessions, redige plusieurs resolutions, exprime par vote son opinion sur ces resolutions et obtenu une forte majorite, mais que la regIe d'unanimite a joue, et que pour cette raison on n'a pu adopter aucune resolution. Nous demandons a l'Assemblee generale de nous donner son avis sur ce point, et non sur allcun autre. Je ne pense pas que l'Assemblee generale ferait des recommandations aux parties interessees, parce qu'il ne saurait etre adresse aucune recommandations aux parties tant que le ConseiI de securite restera saisi. L'Assemblee generale n'entretiendrait aucun rapport avec les parties interessees, si ce n'est par l'intermediaire du ConseiI de securite. Si elle doit adresser directement des recommandations aux parties en cause, iI convient de retirer l'ensemble de la question de l'ordre du jour du Conseil de securite. Cela pourrait se faire si le Gouvernement grec faisait savoir au ConseiI de securite qu'il retirait son instance. S'il en et?,it ainsi, le probU:me ne re1everait plus du ConseiI de securite et des lors, Je ne sais pas quel serait le caractere des recommandations eventuelles que l'Assemblee generale adresserait au Conseil de securite en 1'0ccurrence, si Ce n'est qu'elles porteraient sur la question de la regIe d'unanimite et sur la procedure de vote. Personne ne peut dire que le Conseil de securite n'a pas reussi a trouver une solution au probleme. Le Conseil de securlte a trouve des solutions et formule des resolutions, mais celles-ci n'ont pu etre mises a execution en raison de la,regle d'unanimite. Tout le probleme reside dans la regIe de l'unanimite et lorsqu'on se propose de renvoyer la question a l'Assemblee generale, c'est simplement en vue de Iui rappeler que cette regIe de l'unanimite, qui figure dans la Charte, pourrait etre revisee d'une fa~on ou d'une autre afin de la rendre moins n6£aste qu'elle ne l'est actuellement. L'Assemblee ne peut nous faire d'autres recommandations. Etant donne que j'ai toujours juge qu'il convenait de proceder a une revision de la regIe d'unanimite, je ne m'oppose pas a ce que ce probleme soit renvoye devant l'AssembI6e generale afin d'attirer son attention sur la situation presente. Je ne m'attends pas a ce que l'Assemblee recoII1J;llande quoi que ce soit au Consell de securite, sinon de renouveIer ses efforts en vue de trouver une autre solution susceptible d'etre adoptee par lui. C'est la d'ailleurs exactement ce qu'a deja fait remarquer le representant de la Pologne. Toutefois cette recommandation n'aurait certainement aucur. ::;J.'fet. Ce serait simplement une maniere de passer le temps. I do not know what kind of recommendations would be given by the General Assembly .to the Security Council in this case, except in the matter of the unanimity rule and the voting. No one can say that the Security Council failecl to find a solution for the problem. The Security Council found solutions and made resolutions, but they could not be carried out because of the intervention of the unanimity rule. The whole question lies here in the unanimity rule, and referring this matter to the General Assembly would remind the General Assembly that this unanimity rule, which is ill the Charter, should be reconsidered in some way in order to render it less harmful than it is now. They cannot give us any other recommendation. Inasmuch as I am of the opinion that this unanimity rule should be reconsidered, I do not object to referring this matter to the General Assembly in order to call its attention to this situation. I do, not expect any recommendation from the General Assembly to the Security Council, other than a recommendation that the Security Council renew its efforts in order to find another solution which could be adopted by the Council, just as t4e repre:' sentative of Poland has already stated. However, that would certainly not have any effect. It would simply be passing time. Je ne m'oppose nullement a ce qu'on en fasse I'essai, ni a ce qu'on mette l'Assemblee generale au courant de la situation, sans aller au deIa. Pour cette raison, je n'ai aucune objection a l'adoption de cette resolution, bien q~'elle soit redigee en termes vagues et bien que je n'aie que peu d'espoir de nous voir ainsi obtenir de bons resultats. Mais il s'agit la d'une experience et il n'y a aucun mal ala tenter. I have no objection to this trial's being made, to the General Assembly's being informed of the situation-no more and no less. For this reason I have no objection to the adoption of this resolution in spite of its vagueness and in spite of the small hope I have for a good result. But it is a trial, and there is no harm in trying it. Mr. HEBA (Albania) (translated from French) : The draft resolution submitted by the United States delegation calls for the Greek question to be' referred to the General Assembly in order that the latter, after a s,tudy of the question, may make recommendations. For this purpose, it is proposed that all the records at the Security Council's disposal be sent to the General Assembly. It is therefore on the basis of these records that the question should be studied. M. HEBA (Albanie) : Le projet de resolution depose par la delegation des Etats-Unis demande que la question grecque soit renvoyee a l'Assemblee generale pour que, ,apres examen, celle-ci fasse des recommandations. A cette fin, ilest demande que 1'0n envoie a l'Assemblee generale tous les materiaux dont le Conseil de securite dispose. C'est donc sur la base de ces materiaux que la question doit etre etudiee. Des le debut des discussions et le depot au rapport de la Commissionl, la delegation albanaise, ainsi que les autres delegations, 11 demande que le rapport de la Commission soit etudie' non seulement dans ses conclusions et ses recommandations, mais aussi et surtout dans son contenu. Bien que ce rapportait mnis beaucoup de faits reels qui auraient pu nous eclairer sur la situation qui regne en Grece, il contient des faits suffisamment precis pour nous demontrer que cette situation est due a des Ever since the discussions began and the Commission's report1 was submitted, the Albanian delegation, as well as other delegations, has asked for that report to be studied not only as regards its conclusions and recommendations but also, and above all, as regards its contents. Although the report omits many real facts which might have clarified the Greek situation for us, it contains facts sufficiently precise to show us that the present situation in Greece is due tointemal causes and to the 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee, Supplement special No 2 (document S/360). . British soldiers and United States equipment are helping and supporting the present Greek Government in its job of oppressing the Greek people as well as in pursuing an &ggressive foreign policy towards its neighbours. The attitude of the present Greek Government towards my country is striking evidence of its present policy. The Greek representative stated before this Council that his country W'l.S at war with Albania. These are real facts. The internal situation in Greece has reached this point, and as a result the Greek question has been brought before the Security Council. The United States draft resolution calls for the question to be studied by the General Assembly on the basis of all these facts and documents.' I feel that, if the Security Council made an exhaustive study of the actual contents of the Commission's report, it would find the right and proper way of settling the Greek problem in an equitable manner. I am firmly convinced that the Council would reach such a solution if it studied the problem on the actual lines proposed bv the United States draft resolution, that is to say, on the basis of the documentation at the Security Council's disposal, if it considered all the facts as well as the Commission's report. I fully believe that the Council will be led to a just and equitable solution by studying the facts, the true situation in Greece and its real cause -the interference in Greek affairs of the United States and the United Kingdom. Consequently, I do not consider it necessary to refer the question to the General Assembly even for the reason given by the French representative, namely, that the same persons sit on both bodies. I would most strongly urge that the desired solution be found for this question, because we sincerely hope that a new atmosphere will prevail between Albania and its southern neighbour. I believe very strongly that the Security Council has all the necessary information and authority to reach this just solution. Mr. VILFAN (Yugoslavia) (translated from French): 'I will liInit myself to a few brief remarks. In my opinion there is no Inisunderstanding at all. As I understand the United States. resolution, if it is adopted, the Greek question will remain on the Security Council's agenda while at the same; time it can be included on that of the General Assembly. But one fact remains, and I think I expressly mentioned it in my statement; it is the one which the French representative used as an argument against me: the same countries are represented on the Security Council and in the General Assembly. Le: projet de resolution des Etats-Unis demande que la question soit etudiee par I'Assemblee generale sur la base de tous ces faits et documents. Nous estimons que si le Conseil de securite etudiait completement le contenu meme du rapport de la Com- Inis'3ion, il y trouverait la voie juste et veritable qui permettrait de donner une solution equitable a la question grecque. Nous sommes fermement convaincus que le Conseil aboutira a une telle solution s'il etudie le probleme sur la base meme proposee par le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis, c'est-a-dire d'apres la documentation dont dispose le Conseil de securite, s'il examine tous les faits ainsi que le rapport etabli par la ComInission. Nous sommes persuades que le Conseil s'orientera vers une solution juste et equitable par l'examen des faits, de la situation reelle de la Grece, de sa veritable cause: l'ingerence des Etats-Unis et de la Grande-Bretagne dans les affaires de la Grece. En consequence, nous ne croyons pas necessaire de renvoyer la question devant l'Assemblee generale, meme pour la raison dQnnee par le representant de la France, a savoir que ce sont les memes personnalites qui siegent dans les deux organismes. Nous insistons tres vivement pour que soit trouvee a cette question une solution que nous souhaitons, car nous desirons sincerement qu'une nouvelle atmosphere soit creee entre l'Albanie et sa voisine du Sud. Nous croyons tres fermement que le Conseil de securite a toutes les donnees voulues et l'autorite necessaire pour aboutir a cette solution juste. M. VILFAN (Yougoslavie): Je me bornerai a de breves observations. A mon avis, il n'y a nullement malentendu. J'ai compris la resolution des Etats-Unis de telle maniere que, si elle est adoptee, la question grecque demeurera a l'ordre du jour du Conseil de securite en meme temps qu'elle pOUITa figurer a celui de l'Assemblee generale~ Mais un fait demeure et je crois l'avoir meme mentionne expressem~nt au J' cours de mon expose, c'est celui que le representant de la France a repris comme argument contre moi: les memes pays sont representes au Conseil de securite et a l'AssembIee generale., It is indeed odd to see how insistently people look for the mote in a neighbour's eye and fail to see the beam in their own. This Gospel saying clearly applies to our case. It is no longer a question even of seeing the mote in the neighbour's eye, but of a determination to see in it something which is not there. If the Security Council remains silent in face of the fact that a foreign Government can create and replace governments in another country, what, I wonder, is there left for the Security Council to do? Mr. LANGE (Poland) : For quite some time now I wanted to suggest postponing this discussion until the next meeting. There will be still another question to settle, the Question of whether this is a procedural matter or one of substance.

The representative of Poland made a proposal to adjourn the discussion. In accordance with the rules of procedure, we have to take a vote on this proposal first. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): We have no more speakers inscribed. I do not see why we cannot proceed to a vote on this resolution.

I wish to inform the Council that I desire to make some observations as the representative of the Soviet Union. I have no other speakers on my list. I ask the representative of Poland whether his proposal stands or not. If it does stand, then we will take a vote. Mr. LANGE (Poland): If the Council wishes to vote immediately, I have no objection. However, I am under the impression that we shall have quite some discussion, simply on the question of whether this matter' is procedural or not. If the USSR representative starts to speak now it will provoke further discussion, and consequently we may be held up in this meeting for another hour or more. M. LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de l'ang1ais) : Il y a un certain temps deja que je pense aproposer lp, renvoi de la discussion a la prochaine seance. Il y aura d'ailleurs un autre point a resoudre, celui de savoir si cette question ressortit a la procedure ou au fond. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais): Le representant de la Pologne a propose l'ajournement de la discussion. Conformement au reglement interieur, nous devons mettre sa proposition au voix en premier lieu. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'ang1ais): La liste des orateurs est epuisee. 11 me 3emble que nous pouvons proceder maintenant au vote sur la resolution. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais) : Je tiens a faire connmtre au Conseil que j'aurai quelques observations a formuler en tant que representant de l'URSS. Il n'y a plus d'orateur inscrit. Je demande au representant de la Pologne s'il maintient sa proposition, auquel cas nous la mettrons aux voix. M. LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de l'ang1ais) : Je n'ai aucune objection a ce que le Cnoseil vote imm6diatem~nt. J'ai toutefois l'impression que la discussion se prolongera encore un certain temps, ne serait-ce que pour decider s'il s'agit ou non d'une question de procedure. Si le representant de I'URSS prend maintenant la parole, son intervention provoquera de nouveaux d6bats, ce qui aura pour effet de prolonger la seance d'une heure ou plus. . The PRESIDENT: If I understood correctly, the Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je crois representative of Poland does not insist on our takcomprendre que le representant de la Pologne ing a vote on his proposal. n'~ge pas que nous mettions sa proposition aux VOIX. When I spoke as the representative of the USSR, I said that I could nrat accept any proposals which would remove the Greek question from the agenda of the Security Council, fOlmalIy or in fact. The United States draft resolution does not contain any provision which would oblige the Security Council to remove this matter formally from its agenda. But its acceptance would mean .that the Greek question would be removed, in fact, from the Council's agenda. However, this is not the main point of the United States proposal. I agree with the United States representative that there is another main point which constitutes the substance of the United States draft resolution: a request to the General Assembly to consider the Greek question and to make recommendations. I have expressed the opinion of the USSR delegation on both of these questions, the question of removing the Greek question from the agenda of the Security Council, and the question, which constitutes the substance of the United States draft resolution: to request the General Assembly to consider the Greek question and to make recommendations. I have nothinp; to add to what I have already stated. Nobody asks permission to speak, and I think that the Council is ready to take a vote on the United States draft resolution. We shall follow the procedure defined in paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations. I ask die Assistant Secretary-General to read the text of the United States resolution. Mr. SOBOLEV (Assistant Secretary-General in Charge of Security Council Affairs) : "The Security Council, pursuant to Article 12 of the Charter, "(a) Requests the General Assembly to consider the dispute between Greece on the one hand, and Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on the other, and to make any recommendations with regard to that dispute which it deems appropriate under the circumstances; " (b) Instructs the Secretary-General to place all records and documents in the case at the disposal of the General Assembly."

Since no one has requested a separate vote on paragraphs (a) and (b), the resolution will be voted upon as a whole. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): My delegation is obliged to challenge the ruling of the President that our draft resolution concerns a mat- Lorsque j'ai pris la parole en tant que representant de I'URSS, j'ai declare ne pouvoir accepter aucune proposition qui tendrait a retirer, formellement ou en fait, la question grecque de l'ordre du jour du Conseil de securite. Aucune clause du projet de resolution des Etats- Unis n'oblige le Conseil de securite a retirer formellement cette question de son ordre du jour. Mais l'adoption de cette resolution am?merait en fait le Conseil a le faire. Ce n'est toutefois pas la le point essentiel de la resolution des Etats-Unis. Je reconnais avec le representant des Etats-Unis qu'il y a un autre point important qui constitue l'essentiel de la resolution des Etats-Unis: l'invitation faite a I'AssembIee generale d'eturiier la question grecque et de formuler des recommandations. J'ai deja exprime l'opinion de la delegation de I'URSS en ce qui concerne ces deux questions, celle de la suppression de la question grecque de I'ordre du jour du Conseil de securite, et la question essentielle de la resolution des Etats-Unis, a savoir I'invitation faite a I'AssembIee generale d'etudier la question grecque et de formuler des recommandations. Je n'ai rien a ajouter a ce que j'ai deja dit. Aucun membre du Conseil ne demande aprendre la parole, et je crois que nous pouvons mettre aux voix le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis. Nous suivrons la procedure definie au paragraphe 3 de l'Article 27 de la Charte. .le prie le Secretaire general adjoint de donner lecture du projet de resolution des Etats-Unis. M. SOBOLEV (Secretaire general adjoint charge du Departement des Affaires du Conseil de securite) (traduit de l'anglais) : "Le Conseil de securite, en application de l'Article 12 de la Charte, CCa) Invite I'Assemblee generale aexaminer le differend qui oppose la Grece d'une part et l'Albanie, la Yougoslavie et la Bulgarie, d'autre part, et afaire au sujet de ce differend toutes recommandations que les circonstances lui paraitront justifier; I CCb) Prie le Secretaire general de mettre a la disposition de l'Assemblee generale tous les comptes rendus et documents concernant cette affaire". Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Personne n'ayant demande amettre aux voix separement les paragraphes a) et b), nous mettrons aux voix la resolution dans son ensemble. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduitJ de fanglais) : La delegation des Etats-Unis se VOit. . contrainte de s'elever contre la decision du Presi- .

Speaking as the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I cannot accept the interpretation of this question given by the United States representative. The resolution submitted by the United States delegation deals with the substance of the Greek question, especially if one takes into account the implications of this resolution. As President of the Secqrity Council I have to say t..hat whether the question is one of pl'Ocedure or of substance is not subject to the ruling of any President. The Security Council has to take a special decision on this question. At the appropriate moment I shall make an additional explanation on this point. Mr. LANGE (Poland): I am afraiii I rather correctly foresaw this new discussion, and in view of the late hour I request that the meeting be now adjourned.

Since there is a formal proposal to adjourn the meeting I must put it to the vote in conformity with our rules of procedure.

Is the representative of Syria repeating the proposal upon which we have already taken a vote? Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): No. I am proposing that we shouid postpone the voting only, whereas the original proposal was to adjourn the meeting. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de ['anglais): Le representant de la Syrie desire-t-il que nous mettions maintenant aux voix l'ajournement du vote sur le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis? .The PRESIDENT: Does the representative of Syria WISh that we should take a vote now with regard to postponing voting on the United States draft resolution? Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Je ne puis, en ma qualite de representant de I'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, accepter I'interpretation que donne de cette question le representant des Etats-Unis. La resolution presentee par la delegation des Etats-Unis traite du fond de la question grecque, surtout si 1'on tient compte des repercussions qu'elle peut avoir. • En ma qualite de President du Conseil de securite, je dois declarer qu'il n'appartient pas au President de decider qu'une question ressortit a la procedure ou au fond. C'est au Conseil de securite qu'il appartient de prendre une decision speciale en ce qui concerne cette question. En temps voulu, j'expliquerai ce point plus en detail. M. LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais): Il me semble que j'avais vu juste en prevoyant cette nouvelle discussion. Etant donne l'heure tardive, je p,-'opose de lever la seance. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Je suis officiellement saisi d'une motion d'ajournement et je dois la mettre aux voix conformement a notre d:glement interieur. Il est procede au vote amain levee.Il ')I a 3 voix pour. Il n'est pas procede ala contre-/.':reuve. La proposition n'est pas adoptee. Votent pour: Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. M. EL-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais): Nous sommes en presence d'une nouvelle question que nous n'avons pas encore etudiee, celle de savoir s'il s'agit d'une question de fond ou de procedure;' je prefererais que cette question soit mise aux voix au cours d'une prochaine seance pour que nous ayons le temps de 1'etudier. Pour ma part, je ne suis pas en mesure de voter maintenant. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le representant de la Syrie ne repete-t-il pas la proposition que nous venons de mettre aux voix? M. EL-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais) : Non. Je propose seulement que nou,s remettions le vote a plus tard, alors que la proposition originale etait de lever la seance. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): I accept, hoping that the President supports my motion. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): I am not sure whether I a::n speaking to the question as to whether the resolution is one of substance or procedure, or whether I am speaking to the motion .of the representative of the United States that he disagreed with the President's ruling. Not being sure, if I am in order, I shall shortly speak to both. The President, followingthe representative of Australia, used approximately these words: "As President, I rule that the United States proposals are not proposals of a procedural character, but of the substance of the question. Members, as well as any other representatives, have the full right to raise the question of substance of the Greek question if they consider it appropriate." That was a definite ruling, and it was that ruling which was subsequently challenged by the representative of the United St.ates when the President was going to take a vote on the United States resolution under Article 27. But just now, the President said in effect: "I dO°.ot rule whether it is procedural or substance. That is a matter for the Council." So you will see that the President has placed all the members in a considerable state of confusion as to whether he did or did not rule. As to .the question whether it is one of substance or of procedure, I would remind the President that in every case where we deal with the Greek question, we have the one generic term, "the Greek question," and it covers every question coming under that wide term. It goes on our agenda every time. I remember quite well that when we were discussing the question of the composition and terms of reference of the Subsidiary Groupl and also the terms of reference of the original Commission,2 you yourself said that even the Security Council at times must be guided by common sense. And the President ruled rightly that the Council could not discuss everything pertaining to the Greek question. So it was the point of view of my delegation this afternoon that the President, in allowing the discussion, to go, as it did, to the merits of the question, was out of order. The question before us is purely a procedural one, a transfer of a subject from a body which has competence to another body which also has competence-and certain over- M. EL-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais) : J'accepte, esperant que le President soutiendra ma proposition. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je ne sais pas tres bien si mon interven- .tion se rapporte a la question de savoir si nous sommes en presence d'un probleme de fond ou de procedure, ou a la declaration faite par le representant des Etats-Unis lorsqu'il s'est eleve contre la decision du President. C'est pourquoi je parIerai brievement des deux points. Le President, parIant apres le representant de l'Australie, s'est exprime a peu pres en ces termes: "En tant que President, je decide que les propositions des Etats-Unis ne ressortissent pas a la procedure mais au fond. Tout membre du Conseil, ou tout representant d'un Gouvernement invite a participer aux debats, a pleinement le droit de parIer du fond de la question grecque s'il le juge utile". II s'agissait la d'une decision precise et c'est contre cette decision que s'est eleve le representant des Etats-Unis au moment ou le President allait mettre aux voix la resolution des Etats-Unis conformement a I'Article 27. Mais le President vient de dire a peu pres: "Je ne puis decider s'il s'agit la d'une question de procedure. ou d'une question de fond. C'est au Conseil qu'il appartient de decider". Les membres du Conseil ne savent done vraiment plus s'il a pris ou non une decision. Quant a savoir s'il s'agit d'une question de fond ou de procedure, je voudrais rappeler au President que, chaque fois que nous parIons de la question grecque, nous employons I'expression generale "la question grecque". C'est ainsi qu'elle .figure toujours a notre ordre du jour. Je me rappeIIe tres bien que, lorsque nous avons discute la composition et le mandat du Groupe subsidiairel et le mandat de la Commission originale2, il a declare lui-meme que le Conseil de securite pouvait quelquefois se laisser guider par les regles du bon sens, et il a decide, a juste raison, que le Conseil ne pouvait discuter tous les aspects de la question grecque. C'est pourquoi ma delegation estime que le President n'aurait pas dil laisser la discussion s'etendre au fond de la question. Il s'agit d'une question de pure procedure, du transfert d'un probleme d'un organe competent a un autre organe egalement competent, et dont la competence est meme plus etendue. C'est pourquoi j'appuierai la resolu- Mr. ]OHNSON (United States of America): I am willing to agree to the desire expressed by the representative of Syria to defer a vote on the question as to whether or not the President's ruling that it is a substantive proposal is to be sustained. I suggest, however, that we take an immediate vote on the resolution of my delegation and then, after the result of that vote, that the question of thePresident's ruling be deferred until the next meeting. I propose we take a vote now on my resolution.

The Syrian representative made a proposal to decide not to take a vote today. He agreed to allow the representatives of Australia and the United States to speak. They have already spoken. The Syrian proposal stands. I have to put it to the vote. If I understand correctly, the representative of Syria meant that we should not take a vote today, not only on the text of the United States draft resolution, but on any other question on 'which a vote may be requested in connexion with the consideration of this resolution, including a decision with respect to procedure. I must put to the vote the proposal made by the representative of Syria not to take a vote at this meeting with respect to the United States resolution, as well as on any question on which a vote may be requested by any member of the Security Council. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): I understood from the representative of Syria that he only wanted a postponement of the vote as to whether this question was one of substance or procedure. Now I understand that you, Mr. President, have interpreted this as a proposal not to have a vote on any question. I do not know whether the representative of Syria has confirmed this. There is a proposal that we vote on the United States resolution. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): My intention was, first, that so long as the proposal of the United States delegation was affected by other questions which are complicated and which we have not yet studied, we should certainly not take a vote on the subject today. The questions are so related to each other that it is very hard to separate one from the other and I think for this reason it would be more advisable to postpone the voting on this subject until the next meeting, so that we may have a better understanding of the matter, ,and so that we may know on what we are voting and what our objective is. The reason for this, which I have already explained clearly, is that if this proposal of the United States delegation were put to the vote, and if it received seven vofes, then it would be vetoed according to paragraph 3 of Article 27. No declaration would be made as to whether it was carried or not carried. The two questions are intimately connected; we cannot take the vote on the resolution separately and adjourn and postpone the announcement. And we cannot announce whether the M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amenque) (traduit de l'anglais): Je suis pret a me rendre au desir exprime par le representant de la Syrie. Celui-ci demande l'ajournement du vote sur la question de ~3.voir s'il faut maintenir la decision du President selon laquelle ma proposition traite du fond de la question. Je propose toutefois que nous mettions immediatement aux voix la resolution presentee par ma delegation et qu'apres ce vote nous remettions a la seance suivante la question de la decision du President. J e propose au Conseil de passer au vote sur ma resolution. Le PRE~IDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le representant de la Syrie a propose que nous decidions de ne pas voter aujourd'hui. Il a accepte que les representants de l'Australie et des Etats-Unis prennent la parole. Ils l'ont deja fait. Le Conseil reste saisi de la proposition syrienne. Je dois la mettre aux voix. Si je le comprends bien, le representant de la Syrie nous de~ande de ne voter aujourd'hui ni sur le texte du projet de resolution des Etats-Unis ni sur aucune autre question relative a cette resolution et qui pourrait faire l'objet d'un vote, notamment en ce qui concerne la procedure. Je dois mettre aux voix la proposition du representant de la Syrie visant a ce que le Conseil ne vote, au cours de la presente seance, ni sur la resolution des Etats- Unis, ni sur aucune autre question dont un membre pourrait demander la mise aux voix. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Je crois que le representant de la Syrie demandait seulement l'ajournement du vote sur la question de savoir s'il s'agissait d'un point de fond ou de procedure. Le President estime au contraire que la proposition syrienne vise a ce qu'aucune question ne soit mise aux voix. Je ne sais si le representant de la Syrie a confirme ce point de vue. Nous sommes saisis d'ime proposition tendant a mettre aux voix la resolution des Etats-Unis. , M. EL-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais) : J'ai pense avant tout que nous ne devrions pas passer au vote, tant que la proposition de la delegation des Etats-Unis dependrait d'autres questions compliquees et que nollS n'avons pas encore etudiees. Ces questions sont si etroitement liees qu'il est extremement difficile de les separer les unes des autres; c'est pourquoi je crois qu'il serait preferable de remettre tout vote a la prochaine seance, afin que nous puissions mieux comprendre l'objet de la discussion, que nous sachions sur quoi nous votons et que nous connaissions notre objectif. J'ai deja clairement explique les raisons qui me font penser ainsi: si nous mettions aux voix la proposition des Etats-Unis et si celle-ci recevait 7 voix, elle serait sollinise au veto en application du paragraphe 3 de l'Article 27. On ne declarerait pas qu'elle a ete adoptee ou repoussee. Les deux questions sont intimement liees; nous ne pouvons proceder a un vote distinct sur la resolution et ajourner la proclamation du resultat. Nous ne pouvons annoncer que la resolution a ete adoptee ou repoussee Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): I am not able to follow the reasoning of the representative of Syria in this case. My recollection of the various occasions in the Council when votes have been taken on a proposal and there has been a difference of opinion as to whether the matter was one of substance or procedure, is that the vote was taken. The President would then declare the motion carried or not carried, according to his concept as to whether the matter was substantive or procedural. If the representative of Syria or other members of the Council would like time to reflect on the ruling of the President that this is'a matter of substance, I have no objection whatever to waiting for that. But there is no reason, in my opinion, why a vote should not be taken right now on the United States draft resolution. The President could then pronounce his ruling as to whether it is a matter of substance or procedure, and we could debate whether the Council sustains him on that at the next meeting if the Council so desires. If the Council wishes, however, to defer until the next meeting a vote on the United States resolution itself, without regard to whether it is substantive or procedural, I have nothing to say. I bow to the wiSh of the Council. But in that case I request that the motion of the representative of Syria be voted upon in two parts. One part would be whether or not we vote now on the United State~ resolution, which I respectfully request the Council to do. The second part would be to postpone voting on the procedural aspect. I would vote in the affirmative on that latter point.

The members of the Council heard the proposal made by the Syrian representative, which he has repeated. We have to take a decision on this proposal.' I ask those members of the Council who are in favour of the Syrian proposal to raise ,their hands.

We cannot take a vote on the United States resolution without knowing what we are taking a decision on, whether on a question of substance or on a question of procedure. I have already said that I did not make a ruling qn the question as to whether the United States resolution is one of a 'procedural character or one of substance. I expressed my opinion as the President. , The United States representative and some other representatives did not agree with my opinion. I have already stated that the question as to whether any proposal is one of a procedural character or one of substance is not subject to a ruling of any President of the Security Council. The President can only make a ruling on a point of order. The President cannot decide that the question is one of 'substance or procedure. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je ne puis suivre ici le raisonnement du representant de la Syrie. Autant qu'il m'en souvienne, dans les differents cas OU une proposition a ete mise aux voix par le Conseil et ou les opinions ont ete partagees sur le point de savoir s'il s'agissait d'une question de fond ou de procedure, on a d'abord procede au vote. Le President dedarait alors que la motion etait adoptee ou repoussee, suivant qu'il estiIpait qu'il s'agissait d'une question de fond ou de procedure. Si le representant de la Syrie, ou d'autres membres du Conseil demandent un certain delai pour etudier la decision du President selon laquelle il s'agit ici d'une question de fond, je n'ai aucune objection a ce que ce delai leur soit accorde. Mais il n'y a, a mon avis, aucune raison de ne pas mettre immediatement aux voix le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis. Le President pourrait alors decider s'il s'agit la d'une question de fond ou de procedure et nous pourrions discuter sa decision a notre prochaine seance, si le Conseil le desire. Si toutefois le Conseil prefere remettre a la prochaine seance la mise aux voix de la resolution des Etats-Unis elle-meme, sans s'occuper de savoir si elle interesse le fond ou la procedure, je m'inclinerat Je me plierai aux decisions du Conseil. Mais je demanderai alors la division de la motion du representant de la Syrie. Le Conseil deciderait alors s'il doit mettre aux voix la resolution des Etats-Unis immediatement, ce que je l'invite a faire, et deciderait ensuite s'il y a lieu de remettre le vote sur la question de procedure. Je voterai dans l'affirmative sur ce second point. _ Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Les membres du Conseil ont entendu la proposition presentee par le representant de la Syrie. Nous allons mettre cette proposition aux voix. Je prie les membres du Conseil qui sont en faveur de la proposition syrienne de lever la main. II est procede au vote amain levee. Il y a 3 voix pour. Il n'est pas procede ala contre-epreuve. La proposition n'est pas adoptee. Votent pour: Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Nous ne pouvons mettre aux voix la resolution des Etats- Unis sans savoir si nous allons prendre une decision sur une question de fond ou sur une question de procedure. J'ai deja declare que je n'ai pas decide si la resolution des F.tats-Unis ressortissait au fond ou a la procedure. l'ai parle en tant que President. Le representant des Etats-Unis et plusieurs autres n'~nt pas partage mon point de vue. J'ai declare qu'il n'appartenait pas au President du Conseil de securite de decider qu'une question ressortit au fond ou a la procedure. Le President ne peut decider qu'un point d'ordre. ' Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (translated from French) : I propose that we take a vote inLmediately on the United States draft resolution. I would request you, Mr. President, to be good enough to ask the Council whether, as I have suggested, the draft resolution in question should be voted upon at once. This is my definite motion. M. NISOT (Belgique) : Je propose qu'il soit immediatement procede au vote sur le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis. Je demande au President de bien vouloir consulter le Conseil sur le point de savoir si, conformement a ma proposition, il y a lieu de mettre immediatement aux voix ledit projet de resolution. C'est la une motion ferme que je presente. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): I should like to support that request. I see no reason whatever why the United States resolution, which is simple and clear and is understood by everyone at this table, should not be voted on now. Then, Mr. President, you would declare the result of that vote, whether it is passed or not passed. If it is not passed you would give your reason. If that reason should involve a question of whether or not it is procedural or sub~tantive, that matter could then be put to the vote. That has been the practice in the past, and I see no reason for departing from it now. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je voudrais appuyer cette demande. Je ne vois pas pourquoi nous ne pourrions mettre aux voix immediatement la resolution des Etats- Unis, qui est redigee en termes simples et clairs et dont tous les membres comprennent le sens. Le President proclamerait alors le resultat du vote et declarerait s'il est acquis ou non. Si le vote etait declare non acquis, le President donnerait ses raisons. Si ces raisons devaient mettre en jeu la question de savoir s'il s'agit de fond ou de procedure, ladite question pourrait etre mise aux voix. C'est ainsi que nous avons opere jusqu'a present, et je ne vois aucune raison de changer cette pratique. La discussion que ,nous avons eue n'etait pas necessaire et je crois qu'en tant qu'auteur de la proposition de resolution, ma delegation a le droit de demander qu'elle soit mise aux voix. This discussion has not been necessary, and I think that as the proposer of this resolution my delegation has the right to ask that it be voted on. Le PRESIDENT (traduit. de l'anglais) : La proposition du representant de la Belgique n'a priorite sur aucune autre. Conformement a l'Article 33 du reglement interieur provisoire du Conseil de securite:

The proposal of the Belgian representative does not have precedence over any other proposal. According to rule 33 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, "The following motions shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting: 1. to suspend the meeting; 2. to adjourn the meeting; 3. to adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour; 4. to refer any matter to a committee, to the Secretary-General or to a rapporteur; 5. to postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely; or "Ont priorite, dans I'ordre ou elles figurent cidessous, sur toutes les propositions principales et projets de resolution visant la question en discussion, les propositions tendant: 1. a suspendre la seance; 2. a ajourner la seance; 3. a ajourner la seance a un jour ou a une helire deterpllnes; 4. a renvoyer une question a une commission, au Secretaire general ou a un rapporteur; 5. a remettre la discussion d'une question a un jour determine ou sine die, ou Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (translated from French) : Mr. President, I am sorry that I cannot agree to your interpretation. I would renew the request which I made to you to be good enough to consult the Security Council immediately to tlIld out whether or not the United States draft resolution should be voted upon at once. :The PRESIDENT: I made a ruling on this matter. I consider that a decision on the Belgian proposal, which is to take a decision on the American resolution before taking a decision on whether it is of a procedural character or not, cannot be taken now because it does not have precedence over other proposals. I repeat that this is my ruling. If the majority of the members of the Council do not agree, they may overrule it. Mr. ]OHNSON (United States of America): Mr. President, I very truly do not understand your ruling in this case, for that would mean that the resolution put forw~rd by the representative of Belgium, asking for the opinion of the Council as to whether the United States resolution should be voted on now or not, could not be voted on until the United States resolution had been voted on, which is a palpablE absurdity. It seems to me that the Belgian representative is simply requesting that you invite an opinion of the Council on this matter. I am not argu1ng the substance of the Greek case, which can be argued to the full satisfaction of anyone. What we are discussing now is a procedural matter, and I t.'J.ink I am within my rights in asking that you put the United States resolution to a vote, unless someone in the Council requests a postponement of it. Then we would vote on that request.

I wish to say that I, as President, have made a ruling that we cannot take a decision on the United States resolution before we take a decision on whether this resolution is for procedural purposes or whether it deals with a substantive matter. If the Council does not agree with my interpretation, the Council may overrule it. If the Council overrules me, then the Council may take a decision on the text of the United States resolution: Colonel HODGSON (Australia) : Mr. President, I am speaking to a point of order and also to your ruling. You have just quoted rule 33, indicating the motions which have precedence. This Council can only vote when there is a definite motion or draft resolution before it. There is' no resolution before this Council to the effect that this question is one of substance or one of procedure. Therefore, there can be no· vote on that point at all. M. NISOT (Belgique) : Je regrette, de ne pouvoir me rallier a l'interpretation du President. Je me permets de renouveler la demande que j'ai faite au President de vouloir bien consulter immediatement le Conseil sur le point de savoir s'il y a lieu ou non de passer tout de suite au vote sur le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): J'ai pris une decision a ce sujet. J'estime que nous ne pouvons prendre maintenant une decision sur la proposition de la Belgique qui vise a mettre aux voix la resolution des Etats-Unis avant de decider s'il s'agit ou non d'une question de procedure; nous ne pouvons le faire parce que la proposition de la Belgique n'a pas priorite sur les autres propositions. Je le repete, c'est la ma decision. Si la majorite des membres du Conseil ne la partagent pas, ils peuvent en decider autrement. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je ne comprends vraiment pas la decision du President car elle signifie que l'on ne pourrait mettre aux voix la resolution du representant de la Belgique demandant au Conseil de decider s'il y a lieu ou non de mettre au voix la resolution des Etats-Unis, tant que 1'0n n'aurait pas mis aux voix cette resolution elle-meme. C'est la une absurdite evidente. Il me semble que le representant de la Belgique nous clemande seulement d'inviter le ConseiI a donner son opinion sur cette question. Je ne discute pas le fond de la question grecque,qui pourra etre discute longuement par la suite. Nous examinons en ce moment une question de procedure et je crois ette dans mon droit en demandant au President de mettre aux voix le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis, a moins qu'un membre du Conseil ne demande l'ajournement du vote, auquel cas nous voterions sur cette demande. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): En ma qualite de President, j'ai decide que nous ne pouvions pas nous prononcer sur 'la resolution presentee par les Etats-Unis avant de nous prononcer sur la question de savoir si cette resolution porte sur la procedure ou sur le fond du debat. Si le Conseil ne partage pas ma fagon de voir, il peut 2nnuler ma decision. Si le Conseil annule ma decision, il pourra alors se prononcer sur le texte de !a resolution presentee par les Etats-Unis. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je prends la parole sur une question de reglement et jeveux aussi parler de la decision du President. Le President vient de citer l'Article 33 de notre reglement interieur qui enumere les propositions qui jouisscnt d'une priorite. Le Conseil ne peut proceder aun vote que lorsqu'il est saisi d'une proposition precise ou d'un projet de resolut~on. Or le Conseil n'est saisi d'aucune resolution aux termes de laquelle cette question serait une question de fond ou unequestion de procedure. Par consequent on ne saurait voter sur ce point. M. NrSOT (Belgique): .Te conteste la decision que le President vient de prendre et, pour la troisieme fois, je demande au President de vouloir bien consulter le Conseil sur la proposition beige tendant asavoir s'il ya lieu de proceder immediatement ou non au vote sur la proposition des Etats- Unis. Mr. NrsoT (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. President, I challenge the ruling you have just given, and for the third time I would request you to be good enough to get the Council's opinion on the Belgian proposal to ascertain whether the United States proposal should be voted upon at once or not. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Les membres qui contestent le bien-fonde de ma decision peuvent l'annuler. Jeme suis prononce sur un point et si le Conseil n'accepte pas ma decision, il peut l'annuler. Je vais mettre aux voix ma decision selon laquelle avant de nous prononcer sur la resolution des Etats-Unis nous devons decider si elle porte sur la procedure ou sur le fond de la questio,n.

Those who contest my ruling may overrule me. I made a ruling, and if the Council does not agree with it, it may overrule me. I shall put to the vote my ruling: that before taking a decision on the United States resolution, we have to decide whether or not this resolution deals with procedural or substantive matters. Il est procede au vote amain levee, et la decision est rejetee par 8 voix contre 2, avec une abstention. A vote was taken by show of hands, and the ruling was rejected by 8 votes to 2, with 1 abstention. Votes for: Poland, Unioh of Soviet Socialist Republics. Votent pour: Pologne, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. Votes against: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, France, Syria, United Kingdom, United States of America. Votent contre: Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, France; Syrie, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. S'abstient: Colombie. Abstention: Colombia. Le PRESIDENT (traduit ,de l'anglais): Si la proposition de se prononcer sur le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis est maintenue, le Conseil peut se prononcer sur cette resolution. Avant de faire proceder au vote, je presenterai certaines explications en qualite de President et aussi en qualite de rep~e­ sentant de l'URSS.

If the proposal to take a decision on the United States draft resolution still stands, the Council may take a decision on this resolution. Before taking a vote, I shall make certain explanations as the President and as the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. A San-Francisco, au cours des travaux preparatoires relatifs a la Charte des Nations Unies, une longue discussion s'est engagee, particulierement entre les delegations des Etats-Unis, du Royaume- Uni, de l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques et de la Chine, auxquelles la delegation de la France s'est jointe ulterieurement. Cette. discussion portait sur la procedure a suivre par le . Conseil de securite lorsque se pose la question de savoir si une proposition ressortit a la procedure ou au fond. When the Charter of the United Nations was being prepared at the San Francisco Conference, a great deal of discussion took place, especially among the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China, and later the delegation of France joined us. This discussion related to the procedure which the Security Council must follow when the question arises as to whether a proposal is of a procedural or of a substantive nature. Je n'ai pas l'intention cl'exposer en detail les positions prises al'epoque par les cinq delegations, mais je desire rappeler aux representants des quatre autres delegations qui participerent a cette discussion" aussi bien qu'aux autres qui souhaitent connaitre la position reelle des cinq Gouvernements, qu'ils sont convenus que, lorsque se pose la question de savoir si une certaine pri)Dosition ressortit au fond ou a la procedure, on ne peut decider qu'dle ressortit ala procedure que si les cinq membres perm::ments du Conseil de securite votent en ce sens. Cette decision des cinq Gou~ernements a ete consignee dans une declaration speciale approuvee p9.r les cinq Gouvernements. Je vais vous citer le passage approprie de cette declaration. Le voici: "Cependant, si cette occurrence se produit, la decision sur le point preliminaire", je repete "le point preliminaire de savoir si la question est ou non une question de procedure, doit etre prise par I am not going to speak extensively about the positions taken at that time by the five delegations, but I wish to remind the representatives of the four other delegations which took part in the discussion, as well as all others who wish to 'know the real , situation among the five Governments, that a decision was reached whereby if a question arises as to whether a cer.tain proposal is of a procedural character or a substantive character, the affirmative decision that the proposal is procedural can be taken only when there are concurrent votes of all five permanent members of the Security Council. This agreement among the five Governments was expressed in a special statement approved by all five Governments. I should like to quote the appropriate provision of this statement. It reads: "Should, however, such a matter arise, the decision regarding the preliminary question"-I repeat, "the preliminary question"-"as to whether or not such a The second conclusion is that the affirmative decision on this preliminary question may be taken only when there are the ~oncurrent votes of the permanent members of the Security Council. I have not added anything myself. I have quoted the agreement reached at the San Francisco Conference and stated absolutely obvious rules established by this agreement. I must note with regret that the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, China and Frar..ce acted contrary to this agreement reached at San Francisco by the five Powers. Of course this agreement is not binding upon the other, non-permanent members of the Security Council, but it is binding with respect to the permanent members. They acted contrary to this agreement. Possibly they do not agree with this agreement, but I have heard nothing from the Governments of the United States or the United Kingdom or the other Governments to the effect that they denounce this agreement. They have not negotiated with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on this question; they have not directed any request to the USSR Government on this question. They did not make, thdr pnsition known; they did not keep to the position they took at the San Francisco.Conference. The Security Council as a whole cannot, nor can any member or group of members of the Council, make any agreement invalid by any decisions. This fact relates not only to this agreement but to any agreement concluded between sovereign States. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : Up to now I have not spoken as I did not wish to prolong this discussion, but since the representative of the USSR has just said or implied that I have in some way gone back on the declaration of San Fr'illlcisco, which he read out, I should just like to say one word. I fully accept the principle of tha~ statement which ~vas read to 1.." by the representative of the Soviet Union. He seized, on one word, one adjective, "preliminary," and he tried to interpret that to mean that before one can vote on a resolution or a proposal, one must first vote on whether it is substantive or procedural. I do not remember that that has ever been done in the Council at all. I (;Rn remember, for instance, a case where a difference of opinion of this kind occurred; that is, the Spanish question.2 That question was railled after the 1 See Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Volume 11, page 7i4. La deuxieme conclusion est que le Conseil de securite ne peut se prononce.;- affirmativement sur la question preliminaire, que si ses membres permanents votent en ce sens. Je n'ai rien ajoute. J'ai cite la decision prise a la Conference de San-Francisco et expose les principes absolument evidents que cette decision a etablis. Je dois constater avec regret que le comportement des representants des Etats-Unis, du Royaume-Uni, de la Chine et de la France a ete contraire a la decision prise a San-Francisco par les cinq Puissances. Bien entendu, cette decision ne lie pas les autres membres non permanents du Conseil de ,securite, mais elle lie les membres permanents. IIs se ·ont comportes, dis-je, de fa~on contraire a cette decision. II se peut qU'ils ne l'acceptent pas, mais a ma connaissance, les Gouvemements des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni ou les autr.::s Gouvemements n'ont pas denonce cet accord. Ils n'ont pas engage de negociations avec le Gouvemement de I'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques a ce sujet; iIs n'ont env.:;ye aucune requete a ce Gouvemement a cet effa; ils n'ont pas fait connaltre leur attitude; ils ne se sont p~s 'conformes a la position qu'ils avaient prise a la Conference de San-Francisco. , Le Comeil de, securite, pris en corps, ne peut, pas plus que ne le peuvent un ou plusieurs de ses membres, decider d'annuler un accord. Cette constatation vaut non seulement pour cet accord, mais pour tous les accords conclus entre Etats souverains. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais) : Jusqu'a maintenant, je n'ai pas pris la parole parce que je ne desirais pas prolonger ' le debat, mais comme le representant de l'URSS vient de dire ou de laisser entendre que je suis revenu a certains points de vue sur la declaration de San-Francisco, dont iI. a donne lecture, je voudrais dire un mot. J'accepte entierement le principe de la declaration que·le representant de I'URSS nous a lue. 11 s'est empare d'un mot, d'un adjectif, "preliminaire" et il a essaye de lui faire dire qu'avant de voter. sur une resolution ou une proposition, on devait d'abord mettre aux voix la question de savoir si (fIle portait sur le fond ou sur la procedure. Je n'ai pas souvenir qu'on ait jamais ainsi procede au Conseil. Je peu~ IIle rappeler, par exemple Un cas d'une semblable divergence de vues; je pe~se a la question espagnole2• La question a ete soulevee 1 Voir les Documents de la ConfArence des' Nations Unies sur l'organisation internationale, volume 12 page 5. IVoiI' les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite, :Premiert. Annee, premiere sene, No 2, 4geme seance. .. Mr. PARODI (France) (translated from French) : I should like to add a word in support of the United Kingdom's representive's statement to explain the vote just taken. M. PARODI (France): Je voudrais ajouter un mot a l'appui de la declaration du representant du Royaunie-Uni pour expliquer mon vote de tout a l'heure. The question as to whether a resolution contains a point of substance or of procedure can sometimes be a very delicate problem. It is only after a motion has been voted upon that one can tell if it should be defined whether it is a procedural or a substantive point. To explain: when a resolution is submitted and it is supported by seven members, including the five permanent members, no purpose is served by asking whether it is a procedural matter or a point of substance. It is, therefore, logical to begin by voting on the motion itself and to decide later whether it is a procedural. or substantive matter.. La question de savoir si une resolution contient un point de fond ou un point de procedure peut etre dans certains cas, un probleme tres delicat. Ce n'est que lorsque la motion elle-meme a ete mise aux voix que l'on peut savoir s'il est necessaire d'apprecier s'il s'agit d'une question de procedure ou de fond. Je precise: lorsqu'une resolution est proposee, si elle reunit les suffrages de sept membres, y compris les cinq membres permanents, il devient tout a fait inutile de se demander si elle regarde la procedure ou le fond. Il est done logique de commencer par voter sur la motion eHe-meme et de rechercher ensuite s'il s'agit d'une question de procedure ou de fond. M. NISOT (Belgique): Ce que vient de dire le representant de la France confirme qu'il n'y a aucun obstacle a ce que nous nous conformions a la'decision que vient de prendre le Conseil, asavoir de proceder immediatement au vote sur la proposition des Etats-Unis. Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (translated from French) : What the French representative has just said proves that there is nothing to prevent us from complying with the decision just taken by the Council, namely, to take an immediate vote on the United States proposal. I would ask the President to put this proposal to the vote immediately in conformity with the resolution we have just taken. Je demande au President de bien vouloir mettre cette proposition aux voix immediatement, conformement a la resolution que nous venOllS de prendre. Le PRESIDENT (traditit de l'anglais) :' En qualite de representant de l'URSS, il me faut constater que les representants du Royaume-Uni et de la France n'ont apporte aucune justification de leur attitude, qui est contraixe a la decision prise a la Conference de San-P:rancisco. Le representant du Royaume-Uni a dit qu'il ~'avait connaissance d'aucun precedent, mais je me permettrai de lui rappeler qu'en 1946, nous avons proced6 pour la question espagnole exactement comme je propose que nous le fassions maintenant.

As the USSR representative I must say that nothing which has been said by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France justifies their position, which is contrary to the agreement reached at the San Francisco Conference. The United Kingdom representative said that he knew of no precedents, but I wisli to remind him that we acted in connexion with the Spanish question in 1946 in precisely the way I am proposing. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): I would ask the President if he would have his last statement checked before the next meeting. I think that he will find that I am right and that he is wrong.. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Puis-je demander au President de bien vouloir faire verifier ce qu'il vient de dire avant notre prochaine seance. Je pense qu'il constatera que j'ai raison et qu'il a tort. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Le Conseil va maintenant proceder ,au vote sur le pl'ojet de resolution des Etats-Unis.

The Council will now vote on the United States draft resolution. 11 est pracUe au vote amain levee. Il y a 9 voix pour et 2 contre.·L'une des voix contre etant celle d'un membre permanent dt/. Conseil, la resolution n'est pas adoptee. A vote was taken by show of hands. There were 9 votes in favour and 2 against. The rcsolution was not adopted, one of the votes against being that of a permanl,nt member of the Council. Votes for: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Syria, United Kingdom, United States of America. Votent pour: Australi,e, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, France, Syrie, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. There is disagreement on this question and, naturally, we have to take another decision, which in fact we should have taken before the decision on the United States resolution itself. That is, a decision as to whether the United States resolution deals With, procedure or with substance. Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (translated from French) : I shall limit myself for the moment to saying that I cannot agree with your interpretation of the vote on the resolution which we have just passed. Mr. JOHNSON (United States): As I had occasion to say when this point was raised before, the United States delegation cannot accept the ruling of the President. For reasons already stated, we consider this to be a motion of procedure, and I would ask the President to accept the challenge which my delegation has put forward and to submit the matter again to be voted upon by the Council.

We now have to take a decision on the question as to whether the United States resolution deals with procedure or with substance. The vote is upon the proposal that the question is one of procedure. A vote was taken by show of hands. There were 8 votes in favour, 2 against and 1 abstention. The proposal was not adopted, one of the votes against being that of a permanent member of the Council. Votes for: Australia, Belgium" Brazil, China, Co- Jombia, France, United Kingdom, United States of America. Votes against: Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Abstention: Syria. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): I asked that the voting on this point should be postponed until the next meeting. To explain my abstention I want to say . that I cannot vote on the matter at this meeting.

We disposed of that proposal a long time ago. I consider that the proposal is rejected since one of the permanent members of the Security Council voted against it. I ask the Council to consider my statement as a ruling of the President. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): What the President is in effect relying on is an agreement between the five permanent members at San Francisco that is nowhere in the Charter. It was never put up to the other fifty members. It does not bind this Council. It does not bind the United Nations. I, for one, do not see how it can apply here now. 11 y a desaccord sur cette question et, naturellement, il nous faut prendre une autre decision, qu'en fait nous aurions dfr prendre avant de nous prononcer sur la resolution des Etats-Unis elle-meme. Nous devons decider si la resolution des Etats-Unis porte sur la procedure ou sur le fond. M. NISOT (Belgique) : Je me borne a dire, pour le moment, que je ne puis me rallier a l'interpretation donnee par le President du sens qui s'attache a la resolution que nous venons de prendre. Je fais done ace sujet les plus expresses reserves. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Comme j'ai eu l'occasion de le dire lorsque la question a ete soulevee, la delegation des Etats-Unis ne peut pas accepter la decision du President. Pour les raisons deja indiquees, nous considerons qu'il s'agit ici d'une proposition relative a la procedure et je me permets de demander all' President de tenir compte de l'objection de ma delegation et de soumettre la question au vote du Consei!. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Nous devons maintenant nous prononcer sur la question de savoir si la resolution des Etats-Unis se rapporte a la procedure ou au fond. Nous allons decider s'il s'agit DU non d'une question de procedure. Il est procBde au vote amain levee. Il y a 8 vo;x pour, 2 contre et une abstention. L'une des voix contre hant celle d'un membre permanent du Conseil, la proposition n'est pas adoptee. Votent pour: Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, France, Royaume-Ulli, Etats-Unis d'Amenque. . Votent contre: Pologne, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. S'abstient: Syrie. M. EL-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais): J'avais demande le renvoi, a la prochaine seance, du vote sur cette question. .le desire declarer, pour expiiquer mon abstention, que je ne peux pas voter sur cette question au cours de cette seance. Le P~SIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : 11 y a longtemps que nous avons statue sur votre proposition. Je considere la proposition comme rejetee puisqu'un des membres permanents du Conseil de securite a vote contre. Je prie le Conseil de considerer ma declaration comme une decision presidentielle. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): En fait, le President s'appuie sur un accord conc1u a San-Francisco entre les cinq membres permanents, qui ne se trouve nulle part dans la Charte. 11 n'a jamais ete soumis aux cin:quante autres Membres des Nations Unies. 11 n'oblige pas le Conseil. 11 n'oblige pas les Nations Unies. Pour ma part, je ne vois pas comment il peut s'appliquer id maintenant. M. LANGE (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais): Je partage entierement I'opinion exprimee par le representant de l'Australie et par le President, que cet accord n'engage pas les autres membres du Conseil. Pour cette raison, j'estime que nous ne pouvons l'invoquer Iorsque nous avons a nous prononcer sur la decision presidentieIle. Je pense qu'il n'est pas absolument necessaire de proceder a I'examen de cet accord, parce que la Charte nous foumit une indication tres precise. Nous pouvons lire a l'Article 27 que: Mr. LANGE (Poland): I quite agree with the view of the representative of Australia and the view of the President that this agreement does not bind the other members of the Council. For this reason I think that in deciding on the President's ruling we cannot invoke t.'!}at agreement. I do not think it is absolutely necessary to go into the matter of that agreement because the Charter provides us with a very clear statement. Article 27 of the Charter reads in part as follows: "2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven n..embers. "2. Les decisions du Conseil de securite sur des questions de procedure sont prises par un vote affirmatif de sept membres. "3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members ..." "3. Les decisions du Conseil de securite sur toutes autres questions sont prises par un vote affirmatif de sept de ses membres dans lequel sont comprises les voix de tous les membres permanents ..." Il est evident que la question de savoir s'il s'agit ou non de procedure, n'est pas une question de procedure. En consequence, le paragraphe 3 de I'Article 27 s'applique, et je pense qu'il n'est en aucune Obviously, whether the matter is procedural or not is not a procedural mattn.. Consequently, paragraph 3 of Article 27 applies, and I think there is no need to invoke in any way, or even discuss the agreement among the five permanent members. fa~on necessaire d'invoquer ou meme de discuter l'accord passe entre les cinq membres permanents.

I make the ruling that the last proposal, the proposal to consider the United States resolution to be of a procedural character, was rejected since one of the permanent members of the Security Council voted against it. Until I am overruled, this ruling stands. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je decide que la demiere proposition, a savoir la proposition de considerer que la resolution des Etats-Unis est une proposition de procedure a ete rejetee, puisqu'un des membres permanents du Conseil de securite a vote contre elle. Tant qu'eIle n'a pas ete annulee cette decision subsiste. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): I think there is no doubt that under the existing . agreements and under the Charter the President has been within his technical rights in deciding that this matter was, from his point of view, not a question of procedure. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Je pense qu'aux termes des accords existants et de la Charte, le President est sans aucun doute Teste dans les limites de ses droits stricts en decidant qu'a son avis, il ne s'agissait pas la d'une question de procedure. I must, however, in the name of my Govemment protest against the use by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of its power in this case. What the President has done, in effect, is to frustrate the will of this Council, whieh I think has been freely expressed: that the Assembly be free to make recommendations in this case without prejudice to the issue. I therefore must now propose a simple draft resolution to this effect: Je dois, cependant, protester, au nom de mon Gouvemement contre l'usage que I'Union des Re- .publiques socialistes sovietiques fait de son pouvoir en ce cas. Le President a, en fait, contrecarre la volonte du Conseil-que j'estime avoir ete librement exprimee-que l'AssembICe puisse librement voter des recommandations en cette affaire sans prejuger la solution de la question. Je me tro~ve donc mail'.tenant dans I'obligation de proposer un simple projet de resolution tendant a. cette fin: (a) Resolves that the dispute between Greece on the one hand, and Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on the other, be. taken off the list of matters of which the Council is seized; and "a) Decide que le differend entre la Grece d'une part, l'Albanie, la Yougoslavie et la Bul~ garie d'autre part, soit retire de la liste des ques- tic' <tont le Conseil est saisi; et . (b) Requests that the Secretary-General be lllstructed to place all records and documents in. the case at the disposal of the General As- sembly/' . "b) Demande que le Secretaire general soit prie de mettre a la disposition de l'AssembIee generale tous les comptes rendtis et documents concemant cette affaire". Vo;la. ce que le Conseil doit decider et il n'est pas douteux qu'il s'agira d'un vote sur une question de procedure. De plus, le Conseil note,ra que, ce The Council must do that, and there can be no doubt that that would be a procedural vote. Fur- thermore, the Council will realize that by so. doing I move this resolution and ask that it be voted on at once, if there is no discussion.

The United States representative protests. If I follow his example it will lead us too far; we shall renew the discussion on the Greek question and on its substance. As to the new United States draft resolution, as I have already stat~d, as the USSR representative, I cannot agree with a proposal to remove this question from the agenda of the Security Council. I gave the reasons why we consider that such a decision would not be in accordance either with the interests of the Security Council as an organ of the United Nations or with the interests of the General Assembly. My attitude towards such a proposal is definitely negative. I ask the members of the Security Council whether they wish to discuss the new United States resolution. . Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): I should like to know whether the representative of Greece wishes to withdraw his case from the Security Council or not. Mr. KYROU (Greece): The representative of Syria will well understand that it is not a matter on which I can decide, but as far as I know the intention and ideas of my Government, I do not think the Government is quite ready to withdraw its application. • Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America) : In a , certain sense it seems to me to be hardly fair to put that question to the representative of Greece. As a member of the Security Council, I have made a simple motion to drop this matter from the list of those subjects of which the Security Council is seized. The purpose is perfectly simple. It is to give a free hand to the General Assembly to discuss this question and to take any action or make any recommendation within the Charter which the fiftyfive Members of the United Nations may think proper. It'ls a procedural matter, and I ask that it be put to the vote at once. Mr. VILFAN (Yugoslavia) (translated from French): We opposed the first United States proposal and for the same reasons we are against the second United States resolution. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America) : On a point of order: I challenge the right of the representative of Yugoslavia to engage in a discussion as to whether or not a matter has to be retained on the agenda of this Council. It is not within his province. I ask you,· Mr. President, to rule that he withdraw from this discussion at once. Je pre3ente cette resolution et je demande qu'elle soit immediatement mise aux voix s'il n'y a pas de discussion. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le representant des Etats-Unis proteste. Si je suivais son exemple, cela nousentrainerait trop loin, nous reprendrions la discussion sur le fond meme de la question grecque. Pour ce qui est du nouveau projet de resolution des Etats-Unis, comme je I'ai deja dit en qualite de representant de I'URSS, je ne saurais accepter une proposition tendant au retraitde cette question de l'ordre du jour du Conseil de securite. I'ai expose les raisons pour lesquelles nous estimons qu'une telle decision n,e serait conforme ni aux interets du Conseil de securite en sa qualite d'organe des Nations Unies, ni aux interets de l'Assemblee generale. Je suis categoriquement hostile a cette proposition. Je demande aux membres du Conseil de securite s'ils desirent discuter la nouvelle resolution des Etats-Unis. M. EL-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais savoir si le representant de la Grece souhaite ou non dessaisir le Conseil de son affaire. M. KYROU (Grece) (traduit de l'anglais): Le representant de la Syrie comprendra aisement qu'il ne s'agit pas la d'une question que je puisse trancheI', mais pour autant que je connaisse les intentions et les idees de mon Gouvernement, je ne pense pas qu'il soit dispose a retirer sa demande. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): En un sens; il me semble qu'il est peu equitable de poser cette question au representant de la Grece. Comme membre du Conseil de securite, j'ai presente la simple proposition de rayer la question de la lis'ce des affaires dont le Conseil de securite est saisi. Le but de cette·proposition est clair. Il s'agit de laisser a I'AssembIee generale toute liberte pour discuter cette question et prendre les mesures ou faire les recommandations conformes ala Charte que les cinquante-cinq membres des Nations Unies jugeront appropriees. C'est une question de procedure et je pense qu'on peut la mettre immediatement aux voix. M. VILFAN (Yougoslavie) : Nous avons combattu la premiere proposition des Etats-Unis et pour les memes raisons, nous nous elevons contre la deuxieme proposition des Etats-Unis. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je demande la parole sur une question d'ordre. Je conteste le droit du representai1t de la Yougoslavie de participer a un debat portant sur le retrait eventuel d'un point inscrit a1'ordre du jour du Conseil. Il n'a pas qualite pour le faire. Je demande au President de decider qu'il se retire du debat a l'instant.

I cannot accept your challenge. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Je ne peux pas accepter la protestation du representant des Etats-Unis. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni): Le President doit accepter la protestation. Sir Alexander DADOGAN (United Kingdom): You must accept the challenge. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): le ne sais pas ce que dit it: i'~pr~~'::.i'ant de la Yougosiavi~.

I do not know what the representative of Yugoslavia is saying. M. VILFAN (Yougoslavie): le ne repeterai pas les arguments que j'ai donnes contre la premiere resolution des Etats-Unis, mais je voudrais rappeler un fait: II y a quelques semaines seulement, le representant de la Grece a propose au Conseil de securite de traiter le probleme grec comme relevant du Chapitre VII de la Chartel, c'est-a-dire comme une question exclusivement de la competence, du Conseil de securite. Mr. VILFAN (Yugoslavia) (translated from French): I will not repeat the arguments which I adduced against the first United States resolution, but I should like to draw a parallel. Only a few weeks ago the Greek representative suggested to the Security Council that the Greek problem be dealt with under Chapter VII of the Charter/ that is to say, as a question within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security Council. He made this proposal when it was in the interests of his patrons to deal with this question as falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security Council. In reply to the Syrian representative's question, he now states that he considers this' question as having been withdrawn from the Security Council's agenda. I draw this conclusion: the Greek representative is consistent: he serves the interests of his patrons'on this occasion also. When it was in the interests of the patrons of the present Greek regime to have this question dealt with by the Security Council, the Greek representative invoked Chapter VII. Today when his patrons are anxious to refer the question back, to withdraw it from the Security Council's agenda, the Greek representative says he agrees with this idea. Quand les interets de ses protecteurs etaient de traiter cette question comme etant de la competence exclusive du Conseil de securite, il faisait cette proposition. Aujourd'hui, c'est lui qui, repondant a la question du representant de la Syrie, declare qu'il considere cette question comme retiree de l'ordre du jour du Conseil de securite. Je reconnais une chose: le representant de la Grece reste consequent avec lui-meme, cette fois encore il sett les interetsde ses protecteurs. Quand l'interet des protecteurs du regime actue! grec etait que la question soit traitee par le Conseil de securite, le representant de la Grece demandait que la question soit consideree comme relevant du Chapitre VII. Aujourd'hui, lorsque l'interet de ses protecteurs est de renvoyer la question, de la retirer de I'ordre du jour du Conseil de securite, le representant de la Grece declare accepter cette proposition.

When the representative of Yt.:goslavia spoke I did not grasp the full meaning ,of his statement. When it was translated, 1 came to the conclusion that he did not touch on the substance of the question. He made very simple remarks with regard to the United States resolution. What he said does not deal with the substance of the question. The remarks were very simple and brief. I do not see any convincing reasons for the warning of the United States representative on this Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Au moment ou le representant de la Yougoslavie a par!e, je n'ai pas tres bien compris ce qu'il a dit, mais lorsque ses parole ont ete traduites, je SulS arrive a la conclusion qu'iI n'a pas abord6 le fond de la question. Il a presente de tres simples remarques au sujet du projet de resolution des Etats-Unis. Ce qu'il a dit ne' porte pas sur le fond de la question. Je ne vois pas qu'iI y ait de raison convaincante qui justifie la protestation du represent,ant des Etats- Unis sur ce point. Le representant des Etats-Unis aurait raison si le representant de la Yougoslavie avait aborde le fond de la question. Mais it ne I'a pas fait. que~tion. The United States representative would be right if the Yugoslav representative touched on ' the substance of the question. However, he did, not touch on it. Sir AlexanderCADoGAN (United Kingdom): Mr. President, you may be quite right in what you have just said, but there has, as' I have seen, be~n a ?reach of our rules of procedure which I do not thmk should be allowed to pass in silence. Rule 30 states that if a representative raises a point of or- Sir Alexander CAnOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (Iraduit de l'anglais) : Il se peut que la Pdsident ait id raison, mais i1 y a eu, COmme j'ai pu le constater, une infraction a notre reglement interieUl" qu'on ne doit pas, je pense, passer sous silence. L'article 30 dispose que si un representant souleve 1 Voir les Proces-verbau~ officiels du Conseil de sIcuriee, Deuxieme Annee, SupIement No 17, Annexe 42. Voir aussi ibid., No 51. 147eme seance. page 1127.

I could not accept this challenge inasmuch as I did not know what the Yugoslav representative was saying, and translation of his remarks into English proved that he did not touch the question in substance. So I did not have any intention, and do not have any intention, of violating the rules of procedure in any respect, no matter who requests or who may challenge in respect to the President's ruling. I say, I did not have any intention and I do not have such intention; but I could not accept such a challenge without knowing what the Yugoslav representative was saying. Mr. KYROU (Greece): ~ President, you are certainly more able than I to explain to the Yugoslav representative that he put in my mouth quite the contrary of what I have said. Let me nevertheless add that Greece, the people and the Government, have one aim before them: to see the United Nations put an end to the trial they are undergoing. If this is done through one organ or through another, it is quite the saIlJ.e. Mr. JOHNSON (United States of America): 1 want to make just one comment regarding this episode with the representative of Yugoslavia. In my opinion the discussion was on a simple motion of the United States to drop ·the matter from the agenda. That is something which solely concerns the Security Council and in my opinion the Yugoslav representative had no status for speaking when that matter was under discussion. The fact that he did not attempt to debate the motion for dropping the matter from the agenda is beside the point. What he said was totally out of order. He merely had another opportunity to make his bitter remarks about the Governments of Greece and the United States. It was completely irrelevant to the matter that was under discussion.

As no one requests permission to speak, the Council will take a decision on the United States resolution. Since no one requests separate votes on paragraphs (a) and (b), we shall take a vote on the resolution as a whole. I ask the Assistant Secretary~ General to read the text of the United States resolution. Mr. SOBOLEV, Assistant Secretary-General in Charge of Security Council Affairs, then read the text of the United States draft resolution.

I shall now put the United States resolution to the vote. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Je ne pouvais pas accepter cette protestation, puisque je ne savais pas ce que disait le representant de la Yougoslavie, et· la traduction en anglais de ses observations a prouve qu'il n'abordait pas le fond de la question. Ainsi, je n'avais et n'ai pas l'intention de violer le reglement interieur en aucune fa~on, quelle que soit la personne qui demande ou conteste une decision presidentielle. Je dis que je n'avais et n'ai pas ceUe intention, mais je ne pouvais pas accepter une telle protestation sans savoir ce que disait le representant de la Yougoslavie. M. KYROU (Grece) (traduit de l'anglais): Le President est certainement mieux ameme que moi d'expIiquer au representant de la Yougoslavie qu'il m'a prete des paroles tout afait contraires acelles que j'ai prononcees. Neanmoins j'ajoute .que la Grece, le peuple et le Gouvernement de la Greee n'ont qu'un but, voir les Nations Unies mettre fin al'epreuve que nous subissons. Que ce resultat soit obtenu par un organisme ou par un autre, cela nous est tout afait indifferent. M. JOHNSON (Etats-Unis d'At:-lerique) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je me bornerai it une simple remar· que sur cet incident survenu a propos des paroles du representant de la Yougoslavie. A mon avis, le debat portait sur une simple proposition des Etats· Unis visant a rayer l'affaire de l'ordre du jour. C'est une question qui ne concerne que le Conseil de securite et, a mon avis, le representant de la Yougoslavie n'avait pas quaIite pour prendre la parole au cours du debat consacre a cette question. Le fait qu'il n'a pas essaye de discuter la proposition tendant ala rayer de l'ordre du jour, n'a rien a voir a l'affaire. Ce qu'il a dit etait tout a fait hors de pIOpOS. Il a simplement eu une autre occa· sion de proferer des remarques ameres a l'adresse des Gouvernements de la Grece et des Etats-Unis. Ce qu'il a dit n'avait absolunient aucun rapport avec la question debattue. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Comme personne ne demande la parole.• le Conseil va se prononcer sur le projet de resolution des Etats· Unis. La division n'etant pas demandee, je vais mettre aux voix l'ensemble de la resolution. Je prie le Secretaire general adjoint de lire le texte du projet de resolution des Etats-Unis. M. SOBOLEV, Secretaire general adjoint charge du Departement des Affaires du Conseil de· s4- curite, lit le texte du projet de resolution des Etats- Unis. Le PRESIDENT' (traduit de l'anglais): Je vais maintenant mettre aux voix le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis. ..... Votent contre: Pologne, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. Votes against: Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Par 9 voix contre 2, la resolution est adoptee, et la question grecque est en consequence retiree de l'ordre du jour du Conseil de securite. Nous avons termine l'examen du deuxieme point de l'ordre du jour.

Nine in favour, two against; the resolution is 2dopted, and the Greek question is accordingly removed from the agenda of the Security Council. We have exhausted the second question on the agenda.

I hope that the members of the Security COlli"lcil have read the draft notification from the Secretary-General; there being no objection I shall not read the text. There is, however, one correction to be made in the text of this notification. The Greek question, which is number 3 in the first group, should be omitted from the list and included in the second group of questions. The second group, as you see, includes those questions with which the Security Council has ceased to deal. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je pense que les membres du Conseil de securite ont pris connaissance du projet de commul1ication du Secretaire general, et en l'absence d'objection je ne lirai pas le texte. Il y a cependant une correction a apporter au texte de cette communication. Il faudrait retirerdu premier groupe la question grecque qui porte le numero 3 de la liste et la joindre au second groupe de questions. Le second groupe, comme les membres du Conseil peuvent le voir, comprend les questions dont le Conseil de securite a cesse de s'occuper. There being no objection, I shall consider that the Security Council gives its agreement to this draft notification, as amended. En l'absence d'objection, je considererai que le Conseil de securite a accepte ce projet de communication avec l'amendement que je viens d'indiquer: Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Je n'ai qu'une question a poser. Le document S/548 mentiorme le premier rapport de la Commission de l'energie atomique1 comme etant une des affaires dont le Conseil de securite a cesse de s'occuper. Je me demande si c'est tout a fait exact. Nous nous occepons encore de ce rapport, . nous le citons encore et notre deuxieme Idpport2 s'appuie sur lui dans une large mesure. Colonel HODGSON (Australia) ,: There is just this question. Document S/548 mentions the first report of the Atomic Energy Commission1 as being one of those matters with which the Security Council has ceased to deal. I was wondering whether that is q'Jite correct. We are still dealing with that report, we are still quoting that report, and our second report2 is largely based on it. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : En qualite de representant de I'UNION DES REpUBLIQUES 50- CIALISTES SOvrETIQUES, je desire presenter les remarques suivantes. Le Conseil de securite a etudie le premier rapport de la Commission de l'energie atomique. Ill'a renvoye a cette Commission pour qu'elle le remette a l'etude8, mais il n'a pas decide de fa~on precise s'il considerait que le rapport figurait a son ordre du jour.

As the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I would like to make the following remarks. The first report of the Atomic Energy Commission was considered by the Security Council. Then it was sent to the Atomic Energy Commission for further consideration; 8 of course the Security Council did not make any definite decision as to whether it still considered it on the agenda of the Council or not. I would like to hear the opinion of th€ members of the Council as to whether we can accept the suggestion of the Secretary-G,eneral that the Council J'aimerais que les membres du Conseil disent s'ils pensent que nous pouvons accepter la decision du Secretarre general selon laquelle le Conseil a 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels de la Commission de de l'energie atomique, Supplement special, Rapport au Conseil de securite. I Ibid., Deuxieme Annee, Supplement special, Deuxieme ra~port au Conseil de securlte. Voir les Proces-verballx officiels du Conseil de securiM, Deuxieme Ann~e, No 24, 117eme seance. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): The Security Council . is not now seized of the first report of the Atomic Energy Commission. Another new report has been prepared and presented to the Security Council. The Security Council is not even seized of the second report. For this reason, I consider that the draft notification of the Secretary-General is correa. .

There being no objection, the draft n,otification from the Secretary-General, with the amendment which we made in regard to the Greek question, is approved. M. :E:L-KHOURI (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais): Actuellement, le Conseil de securite n'est pas saisi du premier rapport ~e la Commission de l'energie atomique. Un autre rapport, un rapport nouveau" a ete (~labore et presente au Conseil de securite.·. Celui-d n'est meme pas saisi du deuxieme rapport. Aussi .le considere que le projet de communication du Sel:retaire general est exact. Le ?RESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): En l'ab- sence d'objection, le projet de communication du' Secretaire general avec l'amendement que le Con- seil a apporte au sujet de la question grecque, est approuve. FRANCE Editions A. Pedone 13, rue SoufHot PARIS, V· GREECE-GRECE "Eleftheroudakis" Lihrairie internationale Place de la Constitution ATHENES GUATEMALA Jose Goubauu Goubaud & Cia. Ltda. Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. GUATEMALA HAITI Max Bouchereau Librairie "A la Caravelle" Boite postale 11I·B PORT-AU·PRINCE ICELA"'D-ISLANDE Bokaverzlun Sigfusar Eymundsonnar Austurstreti 18 REYKJAVIK INDIA-INDE Oxford Book & Stationery Company Scindia House NEW DELHI IRAN Bongahe Piaderow 731 Shah Avenue TEHERAN IRAQ-IRAK Mackenzie & Mackenzie The Bl>okshop BAGHDAD >, LEBANON-lIBAN Librairie universellQ BEYROUTH LUXEMBOURG Librairie J. Schummer Place Guillaume LUXEMBOURG NETHERLANDS-l'AYS·BAS N. V. Martinus Nijhoff Lange Voorhout 9 'S·GRAVENHAGE NEW ZEALAND- NOUVELLE·ZELANDE Gordon & Gotch, Ltd. Waring Ta-ylor Street WELLINGTO:l DENMARK-~ANEMARI< Einar Munksgaard N9Irregade 6 KjilBENHAVN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC- RI5PUBUQUE DOMINICAINE Lihreria Dominicana Calle Mercedes No. 49 Apartado 656 ClUDAD TRUJILLO ECUADOR-EQUATEUR Mufioz Hermanos y Cia. Nueve de Octubre 703 Casilla 10-24 GUAYAQUIL EGYPT-EGYPTE Librairie "La Renaissance d'Egypte" 9 Sh. Adly Pasha CAmo ETHIOPIA-ETHIOPIE Agence ethiopienne de puhlicite P.O.Box8 ADDls-ABEBA United Nations Association of New Zealand P. O. 1011, C.P.O. WELLINGTON NICARAGUA Ramiro Ramirez V. Agencia de Publicaciones MANAGUA, D. N. NORWAY-NO~·· ,.. Johan Grur,3 Kr. August~ OSLO TURKEY~'URQUIE Librairi.e Hachette 469 Istiklal Caddesi BEYOGJ!.U-IsTANBUL UNION OF SOUTH AFRleA- UNION SUD.AFRICAINE Central News Agency Commissioner & Rissik Sts. JOHANNESBURG and at CAPETOWN and DURBAN UNITED KINGDOM- ROYAUME·UNI H. M. Stationery Office P. O. Box 569 LONDON, S.E. 1 and at H.M.S.O. Shops in LONDON, EDINBURGH, MANCHEST CARDIFF, BELFAST, BIRMINGHAM and BRISTOL IJ:NITED STATES OF AMERICA- I:.ATS·IJNIS D'AMERIQUE International Documents Service Columbia University Press 2960 Broadway NEW YORK 27, N. Y. URUGUAY Ofieina de Representaci6n de Editoriales Av. 18 de Julio 1333 Esc. i MONTEVIDEO VENEZUELA Escritoria Perez Machado Conde a Piiiango 11 CARACAS YUGOSLAVIA-YOUGOSLAVIE Drzavno Preduzece Jugoslovenska Knjiga Moskovska Ul. 36 BiOGRAD [.49