S/PV.2064 Security Council

Sir, it is a cause of great Ptisfaction to us to take part in this debate while an cnlincnt and experienced diplomat like you is presiding Over our deliberations. The delegation of Kuwait would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency Of the Council for the month of March. You have already displayed a lot of positive qualities that will contribute cnorrr~Ously to the work of the Council under your QPthcy. We wis]l you good luck and success. 2l. 1 should like also to congratulate the outgoing president, Ambassador Troyanovsky of the USSR, on the mnner in which he conducted the proceedings of the Council last montll. ‘!* The Security c ouncil has been seized of the problem Of Southern Rhodesia for more than a decade. Its record on IL!. “Q Particular issue is on the whole, satisfactory. It already ’ dccided in 196s j dcnce ;, I tha; the unilateral declaration of indepenan S&it&.and therefore, his re’gimc-had no , legal validity. ConsequentI; the Council imposed sanctions O1( the illegal regime as a minifestation of its opposition t0 the , unilateral declaration of independence. It is true that there are so me loopholes in the sanctions that have, in fact, * er’ab’ed the Smittl r~grlle to survive, but if universally aFp’icd the sanctions can be more effectiv?. to the authority of the illegal minority ndmirlistrstion. 24. The press is rife with reports concerning the security situation in Rhodesia, as nationalists are hittirlg targets within a few miles of the capital. There are also reports of whites continuing to leave the country and of how the economy is nearing the point of collapse. 2.5. The fact that Smith has been talking about majority rule is due to the armed struggle carried out by the liberation forces and, to some measure, to the sanctions imposed by the international community. A rCgirne which is totally wedded to racism and the maintenance of privileges fw’r the few cannot overnight believe in equality and democratic rule. Smith is, at the moment, in a rut, and nothing on earth will extricate him From his rutted road of segregation. That is why the deal his re’girne is trying to sell is not a genuine change of heart but merely a change of tactic. 26. This sudden romance of the illegal re’gime-and Mr. Smith, in particular-with majority rule gives rise to suspicion. It also does not cut much ice in terms of logic. It is obvious that the illegal re’gime is desperate. This deal is a desperate attempt to secure legitimacy and, subsequently, the lifting of sanctions. It therefore has masterminded the so-called internal settlement, which is a far cry from a genuine deal that would put an end to the bloody hostilities. Hence it can be seen thar the internal settlement is the last card in Mr. Smith’s hand for pulling his chestnuts out of the fire. 27. The Council is meeting at a critical moment in the history of the people of Zimbabwe and of Africa in general. The prime responsibi.lity of the Council is not to let Ian Smith go Scot-free with the spoils of the deal he has struck with other African leaders. First and .forzruost for the Council, is the continued maintenance of s;mztions without relaxation. After all, the illegal rCgime has f-ixed its sights so high as to expect gradual relaxation in the’application of sanctions. This expectation should be nipped in the bud. ” *’ 28. Likewise, the Council cannot abnndou thr ~e”plc of Zimbabwe in this time of crisis. An imperative step is the condemnation of the internal settlement and the rejection of its provisions. The Council long ago determined that the situation in Rhodesia constituted a threat to irtt~rnational peace and security. The nature of the Smith r&me remains today what it has been for more than a de:csde, that ofan illegal usurper contravening the righht to self-determination of the people of Zimbabwe. The passage of time has not altered its nature; neither has the fact that it has inched its way along for the past 13 years in a curious battIc for survival. 29. The truth of the matter is that the i1lcg.d rggirtle is INI more legal today than it was 13 years ago. Conscquen tly, all its actions are illegal and any internal settlernctlL CWlClLld~d by it is also tailltcd with illegality. Tl~e &j&t elf th:lt set[lcrlle,lt is EL) gi\!: tile illcgll Ggirilr d !,r<.~!‘I1~!; ,~lv:Il 111J 32. The question of Southern Rhodesia is a colonial issue and should be dealt with in accordance with the principle of self-determination exercised under the supervision of an impartial body. The deal which Smith is trying to sell to the world is illegal. The white minority-which is no more than 4 per cent of the population-would continue to pull the strings of power for many years to come. A deal which does not ensure the emergence of a genuinely independent Zimbabwe on the basis of universal adult suffrage under the supervision of ali impartial body would be no different from the pIesent arrangement. 33. According to press reports, the main pillars of the internal settlement concocted by Smith are power for the whites in Parliament out of proportion to their numbers, their continued tenure of the top echelons of the civil service and the armed forces, and their domination of the economy. If this is not a deal devised to perpetuate privileges under the guise of a settlement, what is it then? i 34. It is a deal that will divide the country befween a prestigious minority and a deprived majority. It will provide a fa$ade of unity behind which the while elite will enjoy plain sailing while the majority struggle to eke 0Ut a mere living. This is to all intents and purposes an attempt to legitimize subjugation. Ian Smith is aware of the fact that a genuine settlcmcnt would sweep him and his lieutenants out of power. In the circumstances, the internal settlement is netting hut chains of steel with which to shackJe the people of Zimhahwe and make the day of their liberation more remote. 35. The situatkw in FUmdesia is a threat to world peace and security. In view of the unusual circumstances prevailing in that hapless and uduckp country, the presence of a United h’:llions force to maintain law and order and to 36. The leaders of the Patriotic Front have made their position very clear. These leaders not only oppose the internal settlement, which they have described as “the greatest sell-out in the history of Africa”; they have aJsO proclaimed their intention to prevent by force its app&. calion. Therefore, the deal wiIf not achieve the very objective it purports to secure, that is, a cease-fire. On the contrary, instead of a decline in hostilities, the world wil] witness an escalation, and the bloodshed will not be confined to Rhodesia but will spread to the territories of neighbouring States. There have, in fact, been a series of raids into neighbouring countries by Smith’s forces, and some of them have been discussed by the Council. Rut the world will see more of those bloody raids that reflect Smith’s problems. In these circumstances, the stability of the neighbouring States is endangered, for who can guar. antee that those raids will not be so extensive as to trigger a conflagration between the illegal re’gime in Rhodesia and the invaded country? And hcrc the Council cannot shun its responsibility. These are but a few examples of the complexity of the situation prevailing in Rhodesia. 37. The United Kingdom remains the Je jlrre Power responsible for Southern Rhodesia. The Council cannot accept a cosmetic transfer of power in which the admin. istering Power does not effectively discharge its responsibility in accordance with past decisions of the Council. 38. The United Nations has a vital role in bringing about a real settIernent in Rhodesia. The participation of all parties concerned in a conference convened by the administering Power with the assistance of the United Nations is a prerequisite for the acltievemcnt of an acceptable settlement. The absence of any party from the negotiations makes it impossible to agree on the essentials for the transitional period. By the same token, the administering Power must do its utmost to ensure tJle involvement of all the parties in such a conference. M’e believe that such a conference would alJay the suspicion that some of the parties already harbour about the future of Rhodesia. In this respect, the role of the Secretary-General is very important. There is no doubt that the jnvolvement of the United Nations would ensure the co-operation and the goodwill of some of the parties that would otherwise feel alienated and left out in the cold. 39. No Member State is interested in a confinuation of the war in Rhodesia for its own sake, but the unmistakable determination of the leaders of the Patriotic Front to continue their struggle makes it amply clear tJ]at, instead of a decrease in the shedding of blood, we shall witness an escalation, and all wilI pay dearly because of a deal that was devised to avert the very bloodshed that it is inviting. 45. This brief recitation of the law is necessary in order to determine the extent to which it has been corrlplied with. Unfortunately, however, the fact is that the illegal Smith regime has not yet been brought to an end by the United Kingdom, by the armed struggle of the freedom fighters, by the sanctions of the United Nations or by the actions of the Organization of African Unity. On the contrary, the threat to international peace and security has increased. Several attempts made by the United Kingdom to negotiate an agreed process for the free exercise of the right of self-determination by the people have so far failed. mplete with conflicting interests. 41. The delegation of Kuwait believes that such a deal slmuld be thwarted. It is an ignoble ploy on the part of the Ulegal regime and nothing but a brazen challenge to the prestige and dignity of the world Organization. 46. The last such effort was the so-called Anglo-American proposals [S/12393], which were taken note of by the %xurity council in its resolution 415 (1977). These proposals were drawn up for the purpose of restoring legabty “after consulting all the parties concerned”. They envisage, infer oliu, the end of the illegal regime, the introduction of a United Nations force and the establishment by the United Kingdom under its authority of a neutral caretaker transitional administration before elections can be held under United Nations supervision and majority rule and genuine independence established in 1978. They also envisaged a supervised cease-fire and the creation of a Zimbabwe National Army based on the liberation forces. The over-all objective of the Anglo-American proposals is to achieve an internationally accepted negotiated settlement. 42. blr. JAIPAL (India): Mr. President, I should like to join the other members of the Council in extending to YOU my delegation’s felicitations on your assuming the presidency of the Co.uncil for this month and to offer you our best wishes for your successful handling of the difficult problems that are before us. Your vast political and diplomatic experience and your formidable skill as a negotiator reassure us that you will safely guide us to fruitful solutions in our collective quest for peace and justice. 43. The item before us is entitled “Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia”. It is clear from the Statements of the preceding speakers that what we are concerned about is the current situation in Southern Rhodesia; a concern that is caused by reports of an internal Wrcement signed by the illegal Smith regime with certain hfrican parties regarding the future political evolution of ht colonial Territory. The details of this so-called internal Weemerit are available to us only through the COUrteSY of the American newspapers, and since no one has denied the report we presume that it is true and we must examine it, therefore, irr the light of established principles and the position of international law. 47, My Prime Minister informed the British Government that those proposals had much to commend them since they sought to end the illegal regime and establish independence on the basis of the principles of universal adult suffrage and a justiciable Bill of Rights safeguarded by an independent judiciary. The crucial element in the whole process is, of course, the nature of the transitional set-up, with the United Kingdom in the role-of guardian, backed by a United Nations force. The Goverirment of India was also of the view that it was necessary to win the confidtnce of au the parties and that no effort should be spared to end the hostilities, We also felt that it was absolutely vital that the F&ode&r forces should be brought under the discipline and control of the restored legal order and that they should be made to adjust to the inevitability of majority rule and accept the spirit and letter of the Anglo-American proposals. 44. At this stage, it is useful to recall the main features of the history of Southern Rhodesia since 1965, when the white mirlority usurped power and unilaterally declared its Independence That act of seizure was condemned by the Security Council as an act of rebellion having no legal validity. Subscquentiy, mandatory sanctiorlS of an eco- 48. Because the Anglo-American proposals had been drawn up after consultations with all the parties concerned, we had nourished the expectation that all the parties would enter into negotiations on the basis of those proposals. However it seems that only the Patriotic Front has agreed to do so.‘Mr. Smith appears to have blown hot and cold and finally withdrawn characteristically to his manoeuvres and notic nature were iInpoSed after it had been deternurled that the situation ul Soutfrern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security. The Council continued lo recognil,e ttle United Kingdom as the legal administering ‘Ower and called upon it to quell the rebellion and take all attempts to present the world with his revised version of his own vision of the future, In obtaining the suPPort of certain African parties, Mr. Smith has done no more than perPetuste the illegal regime on a sc>nit’wh;rt wider h:lsis. other apprupriate and effective mXISUreS to krmhte the ilh$Jl regime The United Kingdom was &O asked to take stePs to allow the people of Southern Rhodesia, to dehutine ttlpir clWfl future ~1 consistency with the oblecessence, it is an extension of illegality and no more acceptable than the illegal Smith rCgime which committed the original sin. Furthermore, under the Salisbury agreement, the white minority would have the veto in the Executive Council, the Council of Ministers and the Legislative Assembly. What could this portend but a transition to prolonged domination by the Smith regime? 50. An i~q~oriant section of the African people represented by the Patriotic Front has denounced this agree- -Acnt, and for good reason, It is surely unreal to equate legality with illegality. The United Nations will accept as legal only a m’ajority government, freely elected on the basis of universal.~adult suffrage, in conditions of peace and under United NatJons supervision. What we are dealing with is a situation tl;dt calls for both decolonization and dcniocratization. Failure to achieve this would surely result in the continuation of hostilities. No settlement can be purely internal in the present situation; it has to take into account the lcgitinlate views and aspirations of all the parties concerned as, otherwise, it cannot be viable or durable. 51. In OUT view the need of the moment is a new approach, a constructive, creative and positive approach, to seek out the elements that are broadly acceptable to all the parties and that conform to the principles and purposes of the eAnglo-Amcrir:m proposals, and thereafter to bujld on them through resumed negotiations the constitutional edifice of African reconciliation, as well as the restoration of legality. 52. I hope that, for the reasons I have outlined, the Security Council will reject the Salisbury agreement as illegal, and lay down instead the basic principles of procedure and la\v for a revival of the negotiations along the right lines; in this task the United Kiilgdom will necessarily have to play the leading role, with the assistance of the Security Council and also of the Organization of Africah Llnity. .4 pcaccful negotiated solution, even though it may”involve some adjuslment of preconceived notions, would be far better, in our view, than a continuation of the armed conflict with all its uncertainty, bloodshed and bitterness. 53. The PRCSIDI:NT: The next speaker is the represenlative of fhc Sudan. I ijivitc him to take a place at the COlJJKil tabtc and t0 Ill:lhc his StatCJllUlt. 54. hlr. hlED:1NI (Sudan): hlr. President, I thank you and, through yot~, 111~ c.tltcr Jiicmhers of the Council for making it possible i$Jr my dclcgarinrl to participate in the delibera- IioJls on the situation in Southern Rhodesia. It is only firtin& that the Cuuncil should now be meeting under the 55. The Council is currently meeting to review the situation in Zimbabwe following the claim by the iIlegal minority racist r8gime that it has reached an internal settlement and the resultant call for an end to the mandatory United Nations sanctions against the Smith rebel rCgime. That would be followed by recognition of the rdgime by the international community. 56. Such a claim leads us to ask whether the conditions which led to the ostracism of the Smith r@me by the international community have now been removed. ,4 cursory glance at the provisions of the so-called internal settlement does not support that contention. The so-called internal setffement does not provide for the removal of Smith’s instruments of domination embodied in the army, the police and the security forces. Indeed, it is under those very security forces that the so-called free elections leading to majority rule would be conducted. Furthermore, the establishment of separate voting rolls for whites and blacks, and the fact that the whites would have virtual veto power in all parliamentary decisions leaves much to be desired. 57. In our view, the so-called internal settlement does not adequately address itself to three main issues, namely, the legitimization of the new rigime by the United Kingdomthe administering Power-the ending of the war with the freedom fighters and the lifting of the mandatory United Nations sanctions. 58. In a genuine settlement it is only the administering Power-the United Kingdom-that could furnish the necessary legal instruments for the independence of Zimbabwe, It is our earnest hope that the United Kingdom will continue to hold that independence can be granted to all citizens of Zimbabwe irrespective of the pigmentation of their skin, With the present “settlement” stiI1 weighted in favour of the white minority, we hoId that the reasons for which the rebel rdgime was denounced by the United Kingdom and isolated by the international community still remain valid today. No stretch of the imagination could make the present internal settlement an improvement on the situation that has obtained in Southern Rhodesia for the last 12 years. 59. As mentioned before, the so-called inlernal settlement does not address itself to the question of fighting in Southern Rhodesia. According to Smith, the ending of the armed conflict would be handled by the so-called new goverJlJI)ent. This is a prescription for the esc~atiorl Of the fighting. Indeed, it is an invitation to what Ambassador Andrew Young has rightly called a “black-on-black civil war”. It is inconceivable that a government which excludes the Patriotic Front, which controls the freedom fighters, could ever end the fighting. We believe that a meaningful way of stopping the fighting would be to involve the Patriotic Front, the only legitimate representative of the I Finally, it is narve for the authors of the bogus &lent to Cd for the liftirlg of the Jnandatory United piqljorl~ sanctions without curing the malady that caused I!ltm to be invoked in the first place. By maintaining the x?A,uf quo, under whatever new guises, the rebel Smith $J’giJne remains a threat to international pace and security ulJ thus deserves continued international isolation. Besides, rho recent attack by the Smith rCgime on the State of &&ia, in which 38 people lost their lives, is a manifestation of its continued arrogance and defiance of inter- ~~~~cIKII legal norms. (rl, We recommend to all members of this august body in prtlcular, and to the rest of the international community b general, that they should denounce the so-called internal gftlcrwnt and recognjze it for the farce that it is. An c~ultable and workable settlement involving all the parties ~wnocrned should be negotiated. The Anglo-American ptoposals, in spite of some shortcomings, are still an adequate basis for such a settlement. $2. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the represntativc of Sierra Leone. I invite her to take a place at the Clcruncil table and to make her statement. &3, Mrs. GBUJAhiA (Sierra Leone): My delegation joins I)w rtprcsentative of the Upper Volta and the Chairman of the African Group for the current month in thanking the ttrmbers of the Council for their quick response to Africa’s call fat these meetings of the Council at this delicate stage of the situation in Southern Rhodesia, in order to focus the ~wki’s attention once again on the grave threat to peace wd security in the southern part of our continent posed by the deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia. Ml We expect the Security Council, as the custodian of \harld peace, to seize this opportunity to take prompt and lOli)st appropriate action to prevent further bloodshed in h part of th e world through concrete measures aimed at %‘ecdhg UP majority rule, independence and the end of the bd hnority rule in SoutJxxrr Rhodesia. Indeed, this krics of meetings of the Council was requested before the ‘test attack on Zambian territory by Ian Smith’s forces. ‘hcJ\ such repeated acts of aggression against neighbouring States by Rhodesia’s rebcI forces are considered in conj~~~~ction with the sham internal settlcrnen t which has just ken reached in &at Territory it cannot be denied that these nlectings of the Council a;e most timely and that its hcisions will be fital tcj international peace and security. f;s* Mr. President with y our wealth of experience and Your distinguished’carcrr, the Council will always be in *oJ. hands when un der your guidance. It is twice blessed “‘3 time in that your leadership of the Council coincides “‘h the &b t a e on the British colony of Southern Rhodasia, a debate which has been prompted by the rebel ?girna’s decision to deceive the world yet again. The ‘gnihKlce of such a CoirlciJence is better seen ii1 th Ii&t Qf Your owfl personal in v 0 lvcrrlcrl[ irl your Government’s tc’cnt effort5 to discllarg: iti respun:iibili[y iJ1 Southem 66. In the latest discussions on the question oE Southern Rhodesia, the Council responded favourably to art invitation to the Secretary-General front you, Sir, as reprrscntative of the United Kingdom, and requested him “to appoint . . . a representative to enter into discussions with the British Resident Commissioner designate and with all the patties concerning the military and associated arrangements that are considered necessary to effect the transition’ to majority rule in Southern Rhodesiu”(r~soluriot! 415 (197711. The operative phrase here is “with all the parties”. The Council also called upon all parties to co-operate with the representative of the Secretary-Central in the conduct of these discussions. We therefore presume that, in keeping with its own mandate in resolution 415 (1977), the Council cannot now be prepared to recognise or even consider any discussions on majority rule or any srttleruent that does not involve all the parties. To take a corttrary decision, the Council will agree, would be bound to have serious implications and consequences for peace, and for the Chatter of the United Nations. Since the resolution wx adopted unanimously, we have no reason to believe that any member of the Council will now retract that pOSitiOJ1 of including all parties in any discussion 011 transition to majority rule under the leadership of the United Kingdon or with its full participation. 67. With direct reference to the so-called internal settlement which has just been signed at Salisbury, my Government finds it quite unacceptable, for.reasons which can be said to have, all at once, a moral, polifical, psychological, legal mnd military basis--depending op one’s particular disposition. i ‘ 68. My Government considers that it is first the responsibility gf the United Kingdom, and not of the minority rebel rt;gime, to hand over power to the Zimb:~hwe nationals. The United KingdOrn, since 1976-and, it would seem from Mr. Smith’s action, until a few weeks ago had assumed full responsibility for Southern Rhodesia and discharged that responsibility with dignity. My Government looked forward to a meaningful conclusion of the United Kingdom’s sacred duty of preparing the people for orderly, immediate and genuine steps to independence, with the United Kingdorn asserting its sovereign authority in Southern Rhodesia once and for all, Instead, the rebel leader is running the show. My Government suppurts whole-heartedly the decision of ttlc Organisation of Xfticun Unity wtlich recogriircs the forces of tllc P4tric’tiC Front, unclt~ I the political leadership of Mr. Nkon10 alld Mr, htugabe, as t/w figlltirlg force which has lately ha~.l:;~cJ Mr. SnliI)l’s arlrly to sucll 311 uncolllf0l t;lhlc ICWI tht it h:lS resulted irl, on ttlr c)rlf tl::lld, fe*;~!ri~tl .111:11:1\.; on 73rlhi;l 69. Thus., while we know for a fact that Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Bishop Muzorewa are Zimbabwean patriots who once enjoyed the support of large sections among the masses, we cannot accept any settlement proposals that do not include the participation of the Patriotic Front leaders; such a settlement, not having included the leaders of Zimbabwe’s fighting force, wouid not be able to stop the war but would only lead to its escalation, resulting in a situation to which my Government does not believe any member of the Council or the United Nations as a whole would want to contribute. 70: +.We see, fhercfore, that, by this move, Smith merely intends to deflect the bullets of the freedom fighters, which at present are aim$d at the minority regime. . . 71. In addition td’&lI that, we take serious note of the fact that the so-called internal settlement in Southern Rhodesia aims at presenting the international community with a fait accompli and seeks to restore a cloak of respectability and legality to the unilateral declaration of independence. A most disquieting factor, also, is that the so-called internal settlement is indeed a test case, bearing in mind that, if Mr. Smith is allowed to get away with this, it could very well constitute a dangerous precedent for South Africa against SWAP0 in Namibia. 72. The Council should not allow itself to be used in the vicious circle of oppression against the people of Zimbabwe, but should legitimately continue to be a partner with the Zimbabwean people in their attempt to liberate themselves from the gods’ mantle of repression, self-love and parricide, of which this so-called settlement is an additional example. 73. Aspects of this so-called internal settlement are revolting to common SCJIS~, to the Zimbabwean people-who crave deliverance from the racist minority rc’gime-and to humanity as a whole, and the settlement should be firmly rejected. We believe that the international community undoubtedly is prepared by now to grapple wit6 the danger of the cynical realism which acceptance of this settlement would mean, seeing that it is only peripheral to the real issue of majority rule and fails to grasp its essence. Yet we look to the Council to take the lead. 74. If WC yield to the temptation of looking d~sely at the settlement, we observe that it allows for the crcafion Of certain fallacious mythologies. What “maintaining the defence forces, the public service, the police force and the prison service free from political interference” sctudly means is that the structures of the so-called security forces and the aggressive army, which over the years has carried out aLercssion in nrighbouring territories and inflicted enormous suffering on the poor, innocent, harmless populatit. n, including wo~ncm and children, would bc preserved in their status q~ro, in spite of the number of black faces in 7.5. My Government and the international comm;nity have enough evidence on which to reject even what may seem like a genuine proposal by the Smith rCgime towards majority rule; it must be rejected on the grounds of his record of recalcitrance and insincerity. The Security Council’s experience of Mr, Smith’s utter disregard of its own decisions is very wide. 76. For more than a decade now, Mr. Smith and his racist r+ime have continued their acts of open rebellion and hi& treason against the British Crown, and have nurtured such acts in recent years with several betrayals of Britain’s trust. You yourself, Mr. President, fell victim to such insincerity when, as Chairman of the Geneva conference, you had enough faith in Mr, Smith to put forward fresh proposals for the transfer of power and your Government’s participation in an interim government, following the collapse of the Geneva conference. Members of the Council will recall that these new proposals were rejected outright, with Mr. Smith saying that he would seek an internal settlement with the Africans in Rhodesia. That was, of course, long after the first attempt at internal settlement, when, thank God, Mr, Nkomo was able to see right through the rebel rCgime’s manoeuvres to stay in power indefinitely and at all costs. Do we want to repeat these experiences? 77. Today the plot thickens, and Mr. Smith’s latest move to confirm to the world that majority rule and indcpcp dence in Zimbabwe are completely subject to his whims and caprices has been to give the boot to the joint Anglo-Amerjcan proposals and to go about his oun business. The Anglo-American proposals were accepted by my Government-despite their faults-as a basis for negotiations towards majority rule andindependence, 78. How can one take this move seriously, especially when one knows that Mr. Smith’s whole political life has been based on a stubborn policy of white supremacy-to the point where he has often said that majority rule wouid no1 come to Rhodesia in his lifetime? It is against this backdrop that the Smith-Muzorewa-Sithole-Chirau agree’ merit should be viewed in order to see that it has no meaning for the struggling masses and for the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe and inust on no account be recW nizrd by the Council. &eSia* A certain Geoffrey TayIor’s account of the Mttjon, as reported i,n The Guardiun of London on 24 bflary of this year, states that parts of Rhodesia are sdy infiltrated by the forces of the Patriotic Front to * point where travel is severely restricted. Further, in that COunt it is stated that the African population in Rhodesia ,,+tical about the settlement, which does not iflclude ,.,ir “external leaders”, whose inclusion they consider to : ,.sn&ia]. The account also says that youths have shown rcir scepticism by joining the Patriotic Front forces in rc;r thousands. Thus the armed struggle has been :ceiented. 87. Lastly, being fully conscious that the task ahead requires leadership, tact and exceptional diplomatic sk.ilI~, we wonder whether the Secretary-General, who in the past has been most generous with his time and energy in the cause of the liberation struggle in Africa, might now be called upon once again to make available his good offices in helping to move things forward from where we left off before Smith’s latest gimmick. . 88. I thank all the members of the Council profoundly for granting my request to be allowed to participate in the debate on a matter of utmost importance to my Covernrnent. I 0. The rebel leader, on the other hand, while talking of wjority rule, is strengthening his military machinery to uppress guerrilla activities with the recruitment of civilians nto the rebel army. That army continues to cross into Eighbouring territories in so-called “hot pursuit”, the i&e’s euphemism for aggression against neighbouring jlatcs, thereby inflicting immense damage on defenceless rsllsges on the pretext that they harbour guerrillas.

The next speaker is the representative of Botswana. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you upon your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. It is pleasing to see you, a representative of a country with which Botswana enjoys very cordial relations, presiding over this very crucial debate. We are confident that your undoubted diplomatic skill and experience will ensure the successful conclusion of this debate, In a real sense, you have special responsibility as representative of the colonial Power in Southern Rhodesia, special responsibility so to pilot the debate that the outcome will be applauded by Africa, by the internationa1 community and, above all, by the people of Zimbabwe. 8 1. In spite of the so-called settlement, laws similar to the emthrid system, like the identity-pass legislation adopted By Parliament in late 1972, still remain in effect. al, The situation thus remains one that threatens internatinal peace and security, notwithstanding the latest agreejncats and settlements, just as it was more than 10 !@an ago. We therefore call upon the Security Council to bke action to contain the situation by further effectively -fa’!hting the illegal regime from the international corn. ty through the application of all the provisions under ter VII of the Charter. 91. This debate is being held in the face of a rapidly deteriorating situation in our region. I am not referring to the atrocities perpetrated against the people of Zimbabwe day in and day out, for with those we’Bre all familiar; nor am I referring to the already well-knowri’attacks against the independent African States of the region. Rather, I am concerned with the latest acts of brutal aggression perpe trated by the illegal minority r6gime on the eve of the convening of the Security Council and again while the Council was in session. r part, Sierra Leone will, in conformity with the of the Organization of African Unity, COntirlUe the armed struggle of the people of Zimbabwe forces of the Patriotic Front as an effective way n% Mr. Smith to abandon his racist policies for uine negotiations aimed at the transfer of power to the z4Rbabwe nationalists. We call upon all freedom-loving “!‘S 10 do the same. t id that, my delegation feels obliged therefore beyond the present debate. Of course, alot i depend on the decisions of the Council and ade in the past few days, those still being those which may be made in the future. While ot pretend to have any spw~ific in our commitment to the promotion of ttlement, suggest some ideas that 92. tin 27 February, the rebel regime’s forces ambushed and killed 15 young Botswana soldiers while they were doing normal patrol duty along our border with the rebel colony. Eight others were critically wounded, and three vehicles in which they travelled were totally wrecked. Two civilians in a neighbouring village were killed also, bringing the total of those killed to 17. 93. Once again, like all previous attacks, this one was perpetrated well inside the country being attacked and without the slightest provocation-a clear violation of our territorial integrity and sovereignty, The relevant details of this attack were circulated in document S/12580 of 1 March 1978. Piists We firmly believe that concrete incentives should und as a demonstration to those who have co-operated ‘e illegal r@-ne in a so-called internal settlement that w* ‘*e Yet possibilities for them to play more productive conshCtive roles in a future independent Zimbabwe. 95. Those attacks have IreJncJldous significance and bear serious implications for our region. Timed to come when they did, they are in fact a challenge to the Security Council and to the international comnlunity. True to fashion, Smith has demonstrated once again that he can ignore the overwhelming wish& of the international cominunity with impunity and arrogance. It is important for the Council to note that this evil man who is masquerading now as a harbi<jer of peace is in fact what he has always been, a man of,. war, an architect of destruction. The international community must take hiJn seriously for what he is and act resolutely to stay his blood-stained hand of destruction. Thus, in this current debate, the Council must aspire to take a unanimous decision which will give no comfort to the rebels at Salisbury. It should vehemently condemn those latest acts of aggression against neighbouring African States. 96. Those attacks should also serve as a warning to those who seek a lasting solution to the J?hodesian problem. It should be ahundantly clear that, so long as Smith stays in power and possesses physical force, that is, the rebel army, not only will he continue to oppress the people of Zimbabwe, hut he will also continue his acts of agression against the neighbouring African States, with grave implications for international peace and security. 97. We appeal once again to the United Kingdom to move wjih speed to decolonize its colony of Southern Rhodesia, because only a genuirle transfer of power from the minority to the majority and the dismantling of the Smith army of repression can end those acts of aggression and the suffering of the people of Zimbabwe. 98. I have dwelt for soJne time on the litest acts of aggression in the context of this debate because essentially these issues are intertwined, linked as they are bY the continued cxistcnce of the belligcrcnt illegal rdgime at Salisbury. 99. If those attacks are aimed at forcing Botswana to abandon its sacred duty to support the lcgitirnnte struggle of ihe people of Zimbabwe, then Smith is deluding himself. Bol:<w;~n~ will continue, along with other African Stales and :I11 fh0.s~ who cherish p?aLe ;Jnd jusiice, lo r;Jli). behind the ~~oplc (lf Zimbabwe :md thciJ liberation 1110vc111c111, the I’;rtric>tic I~orlt. ill their llour uf g~r;ltesl need. 101. MY colleague, the Ambassador of the United Repub. tic of Tanzania, in opening this debate [2061sr nzeeting], pointed to the tragedy of errors committed by the United Kingdom as the colonial Power in Southern Rhodesia, and cited as a case in point a StateIneJlt made in 1965 by the then Prime hlinister, to the effect that Britain would not use force to quell the rebellion even if Smith declared independence unilaterally. As we know, Smith went ahead and nothing was done to him. 102. In fact, those tragic errors are the most persistent and dominant theme of British colonial history in southern Africa. The record of British administration in southern Africa, in the white settler colonies to be precise, is full of such errors whose ultimate result was the emergence and entrenchment of white minority rCgimes in the area, with all the attendant minority privileges. 103. In South Africa, Britain abandoned the black majority to the mercies of the Beers by signing the South Africa Act in 1910, which transferred power from the British Government to the white minority, and expressed the misplaced hope that, in the fullness of time, that minority would voluntarily share power wjth the black majority. We all know the tragedy that decision brought upon the people of South Africa. The problem of aparfhcid is a direct outcome of that tragic error. 104. Taking the example of the South i\frjcan minority, the Rhodesian white minority also demanded and got from Britain, in 1973, a constifution which gave if all power in the colony, again at the expense of the black majority. AU that was left of British influence were certain residual powers which, throughout the long tragic history of Southern Rhodesia, it never effectively used to curb the excesses of t.be white minority. 105. Thus, since 1923, the persistent theme in the 1liSfoV of Southern Rhodesia has been the recession of British influence there and the rise of a series of attempts on the pad of the settlers to sever the umbilical cord with Britain and rule Rhodesia in perpetuity, thus ensuring a raCialI) based society of unequals with the whites colltrn~~il% all h commanding heights of power. 106. The method of achieving this has varied from time lo time in response to various pressures, both internal and external, but the main objective Of the ninoritY lo doJIGnate all the institutions of power in Southern Rhodesia has remained virtually unchanged. NotlJing which has happened so far 1xt.s changed this fact. We cite tlJcsc l~storical facts not tb upen UP the wounds best left ‘O tinle’s healing hand, hut because they have relevaJJce fur this discussion, $nilh’s [T13fllXuVreslog Those who deal with this slippery character ‘are well r;l.iised to be aware of his treacherous manoeuvres. At one I;~,;~, he tried, in vain, to use the traditional chiefs to tliwnrt the legitimate aspirations of the people of linlb;lbwe; now he has resorted to yet another trick-that of using the so-called internal group against the so-called txtcrnal group. TO this end, he is marshalling his propa-. v& machinery to paint what he calls the external group 8% bloudthirsty messengers of doom and the internal group hb ~~sonable men who love peace and harmony. Unforlurl:ltcly, certain sections of the international press and mu3 media are falling for this bait and are joining in the propaganda chorus emanating from Salisbury. This can only k damaging to the cause of the Zimbabwe people. l(JfJ, Smith is trying to drive an irreversible wedge between ~,JIc people of Zimbabwe. The administering Power, the h(ernational community and the people of Zimbabwe must ~tist those dangerous manoeuvres, which can only lead to rtrifc and the prolongation of suffering. 110, The Security Council, and in particular the United R~durn, the administering Power, should not be tempted 10 repeat the tragic errors of 1910 in South Africa and 1923 in Southern Rhodesia, The United Kingdom has the gppartunity now to reverse the unfortunate chain of events El in motion by the tragic decision of 1923. The United )Ein@lonl should not entertain any settlement which aims at Qittrrnching the white minority. 117. It is likely that the Patriotic Front will continue the war-and they have just told us so--so long as they are not party to any settlement. Under the circumstances, Zimbabwe is likely to be plunged into civil strife, a strife which one shrewd observer aptly referred to as “black-onblack civil war” a strife whose consequences can only be ghastly. In that event, the suffering of the people of Zimbabwe would be prolonged and our region as a who!e would be plunged into a tragic era of yc! more bloodshed. ill+ 1 turn now to the question of finding an acceptable @dQtiated settlement to the problem of Southern bode&. Botswana will always be guided by two broad @“ciPles, namely, the principle of the unquestionable ?Wtability of any solution chosen by the people of Qirlbabwe BS a whole and the principle of democratic “@ritY rule on the basis of one-man one-vote in free and bir elections We would find unacceitable any settlement ‘af’ich did no; meet those two broad principles. . 118. We urge Her Majesty’s Government-the only one which can end the illegal situation in Rliodrsia-and its allies in this exercise to redouble their elforts to find a durable solution to the problem of Zimbabwe. To that end,, the British Government should enter into immediate negotiations with those concerned, for Smith cannot be expected to end the state of illegality because he is himself illegal, Only the British can do that, with the concurrence of the United Nations. ‘I!* Indeed, we believe very strongly that in this whole J”ihabwean prohlcrn the. final arbiter is the people of 7rtnhabwe itself Botswana will go by the freely expressed V’JUubted collective’ will of the people of Zimbabwe as i ‘holct when it is expressed in an atmosphere free from ‘timidation of any sort and inspiring confidence in a @QPlc so 10 ng oppressed by a rigime with no respect ‘liJtsoever for human life and dignity. That is what, under a7ldar .* ‘Jrcumstances we would wish for ourselves, and we “’ thc People of Zihbabwe no less. 119, Until a lasting solution is found, the internJtionai community must rally behind the people of Zimbabwe and their liberation movement, the Patriotic Front. The sanctions against the rebel colony must be intensified and scrupulously observed. r1% B otswana, along with the other front-line States, )c”Pted the Anglo-American p %liv2 ro osds, despite certain p aspects in them as a reasonable basis for further k”tiatiOns between tie administering Power and the Botswana supported those propos:lls 8 judiciously handled and refined further, they of the two principles that I 120. Botswana in its humble way and for its part will continue, to the best of its ability, to rally behind the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle for frec&nl and justice.

The next sp:“kcr is bfr. Kubzrt Mugabe, to whom the Council exirnd4 311 in+it.~li~.~n a[ it< 115. The so-called settlement recently agreed upon between rebel Smith and certain internal eleracnts in Zimbabwe conveniently, as we can see, excludes the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe. There are great dangers in such an arrangement, dangers which are such as to ensure that the people of Zimbabwe will be unlikely to enjoy the peace and tranquillity they so much deserve after so tinny years of whije minority domination and brutal oppression. 116. Can the Patriotic Front be expected to accept that fait accompli in which it played no part? After all, those are the people who have fought far over 10 years now against the rebels at Salisbury. They are the people whose struggle finally forced Smith to go to Geneva to attempt to negotiate with the other parties involved-for what that was worth. It is they, as it were, who have pushed him into a tight corner out of which he is now trying to uriggle. It is they who have demoralized the racist rebels at Srllisbuly, as evidenced by the large exodus of white racists from the country. ,. sC2W'ity Council for permitting us to address you on thjs occasion in the history of our country. 123. Today we appear before this august body to discuss the deteriorating situation in our country. The coincidence of your presidency over this august body and your country’s colonial responsibilities over our country makes this series of meetings of the ,Sccurity Council a special one, particularly considering the fact that you have had the opportunity to direct efforts to find a negotiated settlement to the problem of our country. We hope that your own experience with the Snlith rCgime and its agents will help the Council to find means of averting the catastrophe thal hangs omin&sly over the heads of our people. 124. Despite the”.violence, terror and brutality that we daily experience from the terroristic despotism that is “Rhodesia”, we appear before the Council in a constructive spirit and frame of mind. Yes, wanton mass killings of our people and of the people of the neighbouring peace-loving countries of Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique by the racist Rhodesian rPgime have reached genocidal proportions. Yes, JJJe11 and worJJcn, the young and the aged, in fact whole families within the country are daily being uprooted from their homes and taken to concentration camps, which have neither sufficient food nor sanitation facilities. That barbarous treatment of our people by the racist white minority r@giJne threatens to destroy completely any ch;rr~cc for racial 1JarmonY in our country. Despite the racist rrcklcssw2ss of the Smith I-L:ginle against our poor people, wr c~tntinuc to maintain the progressive position that in %irnhahwe we are not figIJting white people but a racist system whose continued cxistcnce poses a serious threat to Ihe security of Africa as a \vhole. On our part, as leaders of the Patriotic Front of Zinthsbwe, we hove been involved in thjs tough struggle against the evil that is “Rhodesia” for too. long now to respond enlotionnlly to Rhodesian acts of barbarism. After so many ycxs of hard struggle, we have come to appreciate the fact that any struggle whose prjltciples are based on cll~otional responsesFto the evils that it seeks to correct cannot succeed. Hence our position that armed struggle is the only effeclive nJcans of bringing about meanjngful changes is a well-considered position. This is a position that we hold firmly and consistently. 125. Since we first brotlght the colonial problem of Zimbabwe to the attention of the United Nations two decades ago, this proklcrn has continued to exercise the Ininds of the international community. At tlJe beginning of our intcrnnljL)nal c:jmp:ligrJ, p;irticularly before 1965, our cif0rts lo make the i~~~crn:~li0~l:ll community appreciate the gravity of 111~ prc,]llcln p(,scd IJv minority rule in Zimbabwe IVCIT s;thot;lg,ad by the Hritish, \\ho then argued that SoullJcrn Rhodesia was :1 self-governing colony whose dccohnizat;cw fell outsic~c the normal United Nations trtlslccship fi;lnJc of refcrcrKL>. En~ouragrd by this attitude, 126. We wish to stress the fact that the liberatio( movement of Zimbabwe has never questioned the Unite, Kingdom’s constitutional authority over the colony O: Southern Rhodesia. However, it is also true that the Britirl objective of returning the re’gime to legality--particularly when the administering Power begins to act as if it wantec to bring this about through the efforts of the liberatior movement-has flown in the face of the main objective Q the liberation movement: total liberation from minorit) rule. 127. It is against this background that today the Patriotic Front’s interpretation of the results of the so-called internal settlement differs fundamentally from that of the British Government, which seems more interested in returnin! Smith to legality than in removing him. Hence, in 1966, the United Kingdom and the illegal regime held what are known as the Tiger talks near Gibraltar. The British had two objectives in those talks, namely, to get Smith to promise not to declare Rhodesia a republic, and to ask Smith not to impede progress towards majority rule. Tht following year, in 1967, the United Kingdom and the tigime again met in what are called the Fmlcss talks. 1~ both those encounters with the rt!ginJe, the British Govern ment was more interested in returning the rCgime to some form of legality. Therein lies the difference in principle between us and those who have been telling the world that the results of the so-called internal settlement represent “a step in the right direction”. 128. As all the members of the Council know, even those British half-measures to deal with the problem and other subsequent attempts to transfer power to the majority Of he people of Zimbabwe have failed because the Smith rigime would not contemplate any arrangement that sou&t to alter its institutions of power. All these pointless attempts foundered on the same rock: the fOXY and racist Smith. 129. Although the Patriotic Front and the British Govern* JJjent Jmy djsagree on exactly why the Geneva ConfereIJcc failed, there is no blinking the fact that in Geneva Smith’s contempt for Africans was unmistakably clear. After the Geneva fiasco, the British and the .4mericans put together what some people call the Anglo-American Plan fol Zimbabwe. While the Patriotic Front agreed to consider dJl proposals as a basis for negotiations, the Smith rigiJJJc rejected those proposals outright and opted for negotiation! with African elements opposed to the liberation moveJJ~cn( We give [his brief resumi of Smith’s prevarications ant! dcccitfd tactics not because we wint LO express anj preference for the Anglo-American plan over the so-called internal sett]eJ]mlt, but to underline the fact that the Smid’ regime has never conceded the possibility of handing eve’ poster to the Zimbabwean m;ljorilY. f+Jft"& w~ because those are the same forces that have t;Frt the Smith Ggime afloat, in flagrant violation of United k~tioru unctions against that re’gime. At no stage in the birlL,rY of our struggle have those forces given us encourage- #iLIlt, let alone support. 132. in short, the eight-point agreement speaks for itself with respect to how Smith and his puppets have sought to entrench white privilege in our country. If WE consider the fact that the present war in Zimbabwe is the culmination of a crisis built upon institutionalized racial separation, then we can see that the creation of an apuwrtheid franchise cannot solve the prob‘lems of our country. It is’for that reason that the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe has maintained the position that it is fighting for a non-racial society, because we believe that any solution base{ on racial lines is no solution. 1.31, What is the nature of the “settlement” conspiracy of he Slllith rigime’? As can 6e expected from professional rrM9, the “settlement” conspirators have predicated any k’ttlcnvnt of the country’s problems upon the principle that blacks and whites in Zimbabwe shall remain separate ~V,~~\n~\~nities. Hence the whole scheme seeks to devolve r;lucr upon the Zimbabwean community through racial &~nnels. This can be seen from the text of the eight-point ~~~ctwrnnt signed by Ian Smith and the three black puppets, ricrrrly: d 133. We believe that those who have found South Africa’s apprfheid policies morally indefensible and intellectually grotesque cannot characterise Smith’s creation of a constitutional homeland as “a step in the right direction”, because there is no qualitative difference between South Africa’s constitutional homelands and Smith’s constitutional homeland solution to our problem. 1 lrst, on the subject of a bill of rights, there must be a j~ticiable declaration of rights to protect the rights and frt&rn of the individual. This must provide, in particular, $wlection from deprivation of property unless adequate &!:lnpcnsation is promptly paid. This, in truth, as it appears, ii, s hill not of rights but of race. 134. According to the eight-point agrrenlent signed at Salisbury, the so-called internal settlement does not address itself to the transfer of power to the majority with respect to the institutions of power that are the linchpin of the racist colonial system of the Rhodesian minority re’gime. For a Fascist and colonialist re’gjme, those strategic institutions of power, namely, the civil service, the judiciary and the security fo&es, are central to the effectiveness of the tigime. In the so-called “internal” scttlemeot, those institutions will remain as they stand at present. If one accepts the centrality of those institutions for any government to function effectively and if one considers the fact that 100 per cent-of the Rhodesian judiciary is white, 99.9 per cent of its civil service is white, and the whoIe leadership of the security forces is completely white, thcr! OIIC understands the fact that, in terms of real power, this agreement does not settle anything. The agreement does nO;t constitute a settlement because it cannot end the war‘,raging in the country. The situation in Zimbabwe is a war situation. No, D agreement that does not take into account the realities of that war situotidn can produce a settlerncnt. The reality is that only those locked in combat are capable of bringiing about the desired settlement. Similarly, the composition of the future army of Zimbabwe is a matter for those who are in control of the fighting. It is only the liberation forces of the Patriotic Front that can guarantee the irreversibility of the achievement of majority rule and independence. To the masses of Limbabweans who actively support the armed struggle and form its rock base, the agrernlent is a betraya of that struggle. Those masses continue to pay heavily at the hands of Smith’s terroristic assassins who shoot them as “curfew breakers” or summarily execute‘ them for collnbnrsting witI\ freedom figflters. badly, as’ regards the judicature, to make the bill of fights effective there must be an independent judiciary free hll political influence. To ensure a competent bench ihr:r must be high qualifications for the appointment of &J!lgcs, ‘lllird[Y, in connexion with a public services board, to mintain the confidence of the public service and also to @*ilnt&i the confidence of the people in the professional @uttalitY of the public service, the public services board or “‘+;‘alission must be established as an independent body atirk& Composition and functions should be entrenched. F”:lrtlllY, as to the retention of the administration, ir: r’3zr to Provide a smooth transition and to ensure the “‘n’irlutd efficient administration of the country, the civil ?‘irc~ the police the defence forces and prison service khl!J]d & fr : retained in a high state of efficiency and free “I Whal itlterfere~ice. ‘ifthlY~ Pensions represent a most important aspect for ” tctcrrtion of white confidence Pensions payable from ” cQnsolidated revenue fund must be guaranteed and be J’rc’y rencttable outside the country. ,.hSl~ With regard to Pension funds, the rights of employees and other Xieons who a t’klnteed. re members of private pension funds must be SifQ yb in so far as citizenship is concerned, in order to “‘ourage whites to remain provision for dual citizenship !‘I bc retgneda ‘i ‘~%‘lltb, the f a orementioned constitutional provisions ‘“It be entrenched a majority of two-thirds-plus-one of ’ ’ mc”‘bership of & Parliament being required for their 135. We know that the Security Council, as the guardian of interrrativnal peace and security, must nods take a serious view of attempts by the Smith rL;gitliC to concuct a “scttlcn1+:n t” that is boullll to JCLT~ICII L/I:* cr~tfl~~-t. The X’k%e,, t. 136. As we have already noted, the so-called settlement is conceived within the framework of South Africa’s defimtion of African self-determination, as exemplified in the obscene creation of the homelands of the Transkei and Bophuthatswana. In this connexion, members of the Council should take note of the fact that Mr. Smith and Mr. Vorster have designed a common strategy aimed at concocting a similar “settlement” in Zimbabwe and in Namibia. T-his is to say that the agreement between Smith and his b&rck puppets at Salisbury will immediately encourage South Africa to move in the same direction with regard to Namibia. Will members of the Council permit the creation of a belt of puppet rCgimes across southern Africa, whose chief purpose would be to make the world safe for apartheid? 137. We earnestly call upon the ,Security Council in the name of peace and justice to repudiate the so-called Salisbury agrcemcnt and to reaffirm its condemnation and isolation of thr illegal r6girne of Rhodesia. In the meantime, we want to reaffirm our position, namely, that any attempt to find a negotiated settlement to the problem of our country by by-passing the liberation forces of the Patriotic Front, which now controls more than two thirds of the country, will not solve anything. The masses of Zimbabwe are solidly behind us; hence, our capability of sustaining the war despite the Salisbury fraud. 138. I thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Security Council for affording me thJs opportunity to present our case.

The next speaker is Mr. Joshua Nkomo, to whom the Council has likewise extended an invitation under rule 39 of the provfsiona.J rules of procedure. I invite Idm to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement. 140. Mr. NKOMO: The case that has been laid before the &Security Council by my colleague, Mr. Mugabe, is the case for the Patriotic Front. What remains for me is to underline what was mentioned in his statement. 141. Jt is important to note that Mr. Smith, in his attempt to thwart the forward movement of the people of Zimbabwe to genuine independcn<e and self-dctcrniination, IMS SOLJ~II~ to ux the rime of our pqJe by using the three puppets. Jlcre J s]lould like to underline our slatement by recalling the nature of the so-called :rgreernent. 142. Jn this so-c:jJled agreement of Salisbury, tJre Smith reginie’s Parliament rem3iilS tlic authority. Jt is only after 143. Jt is pleasing to us that the members of the Count and the representatives of other States Members of Q United Nations who have spoken here have made perfectly clear that they see the so-called agreement ia a same light as we see it, and therefore we hope that TV, administering Power, in this case the United Kingdom, wi realize that this fraudulent attempt by Smith to make second unilateral declaration of independence can no long be called by the BrJtish Government a step in the rig, direction. 144. Jf the British Government believed that their prc pods were a step in the right direction, then the SJ$! proposal cannot be a step in the right direction. &I cannot both be steps in the right direction. Therefore should like to emphasize that we hope that the Britishwi reahze that there can be only one step, and that from nay on, after what has been said in the Council, the British u~J make active moves to bring about a settlement that \viJ]b< internationally recognized. 145. What we see in this so-called settlement is an sttemJ! by Smith to legalize his unilateral declaration of indepcn dence. And, after leg&zing it and getting the Sectnit) Council to lift sanctions, Smith will move fast toa’ar& Mr. Vorster. What we see in it is that, by retaining the fe.:: important elements of State-that is, the army, H+IL~ remains pure white and whitecontrolled, the poljce, whir! remains white and white-controlled, the civil service and ~Jx judiciary-Smith is preparing for a second unilateral ~CC~SI% tion of independence. Once he has been given indew dence legally, Smith will remain with that indepcndcnce fen four to six months while preparing and working cut I confederation with South Africa, and will then conduct I second straightforward coup. 146. What will the international community do? ‘J% United Kingdom will say that this is an internal affair d Zimbabwe, and the world will witness yet allOther lnflr towards consolidating the racists and Fascists in soutJrfl Africa m preparation for their assault on African States.k is a known fact that Mr. Smith and his friend, the Fa& Vorster, are not happy about the independence of Ihi& countries, especially those surrounding South AfrJca.Jt b’ fact that, jf Smjth is allowed to go on with thJs so-talk’ independence, we s,haJJ see danger emanating from southera Africa after South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, assist? by the United Kingdom, have set up puppet rigirncJ! Rhodesia and Namibia and joined with South Africa ’ order to attack Mozambique, Botswana, AngoJa, and ind’ Zambia, and other States not on the Zambezi. This is a design that Vorster and Smith are creating by trying ’ establish puppet rPgirnes in that part of the WorJd. d u:-p,e.urit3tiVe Wh~J, together with the British, would ,;.,..::tj~te with the parties concerned in Southern Rhodesia. irr the Patriotic Front \vcre engaged in those negof’;i:,.zr,s when Ian Smith defied the world community by j -, i,‘b; off fronl what Was rt, >darded as an attempt to solve a +\ &lrrn that has bedevilled the b .1 United Nations and other ar.,:r]J organiLation$. 150. As I have said, these are just my remarks on the statement issued joirrtly with my friend Comrade Mugahe, and we thank the Council for having listened to us. 883, we therefore call upon the Council not to regard vt,st 1arl Smith is doing by attacking Mozambique, p :t~~Vv,rlnr and Z;lmbia just as an attack on those three .+,::rl(ries. It is a preparation for wider aggression against f’ (r~xrrden t Africa. Therefore the situation in Southern $t,\;rh+sia is not just a problem of that colony but a E r&]\rrn that may bring a conflagration not only in Africa f-,d in the whole world.

Mr. Nkomo, I know, would not expect me, in my capacity as representative of the United Kingdom, to agree with everything he said. I can only say that in that capacity I will study with very great care everything that has been said in this chamber this afternoon. I 152. I should like to announce to the Council that during the course of this afternoon’s meeting I received a letter dated 9 March from the representative of Zambia, which will be circulated tomorrow morning as document S/12589. In her letter, the representative of Zambia, upon the instructions of her Government, requests an urgent meeting of the Security Council. I would therefore propose to hold consultations with the Council on this matter tomorrow at 11 am. )$!I2 hty colle:~gue and I are satisfied by what has been s.:i.l here and we believe that after the Council has taken a d:il&>n, which we believe will be aimed at condemning the FW~S at Salisbury-because, as 1 have said, those moves are I !!.~nc;er not only to Southern Rhodesia but to the entire (~~I:~lrntinent ~-the United Kingdom will take heed of that :;. I ]~n and move towards what we agreed in Malta. In “4!:\ WC agreed that we would meet and continue our :. “~~:uwiws for the solution of this problem; but, to our WriGe, the British Foreign Secretary, after Smith had The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.