S/PV.207 Security Council

I assume that, in accordance with precedent, the Council will wish me to call to the table the representatives of the Governments of India, the Netherlands, the Philippines and the Indonesian Republic. Unless I hear any objection, I shall invite them to take their places at the Council table. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- publics): I wish to raise a point of order. I pro- pose that we should read the text of the docu- "La Commission consulaire a maintenant termine son enquete bien que les rapports de certains observateurs militaires manquent en- core. Nous avons entrepris la redaction du rapport general, qui sera vraisemblablement achevee dans quinze jours". Le second document est une lettre en date du 2 octobre 1947 adressee par M. van Langenhove, representant de la Belgique a l'Organisation des Nations Unies, au Secretaire general. EUe figure au document S/570 et est ainsi con~ue: "Par sa resolution du 25 aoilt 1947, relative a la question de l'Indonesie, le Conseil de seeu· rite se declarait dispose a contribuer au regie- ment de ce differend, a la demande des parties, au moyen d'une commission du Conseil corn- posee de trois membres dont deux seront choisis respectivement par chacune des parties interessees et le troisieme par les deux pre· miers. "Me referant a la declaration que j'ai faite au Conseil de securite le 1er octobre, j'ai l'hon- neur de vous confirmer qu'en acceptant l'invitation du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas a faire partie de cette commission, mon Gau- vernement a designe pour l'y representer M. Paul van Zeeland, Senateur, ancien Premier Ministre." 376. Suite de la discussion de la ques· tion indonesienne Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je pre- sume que, conformement aux precedents, les membres du Conseil desirent que j'invite les representants des Gouvernements de l'Inde, des PaysrBas, des Philippines et de la Republique indonesienne a prendre place parmi nous. S~ personne n'y voit d'objection, je leur demanderal done de venir s'asseoir a la table du Conseil. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques soCi~­ listes sovietiques) (traduit de ['anglais): Je de- sire soulever un point d'ordre. Je propose q~c l'on donne lecture du document que nous~ M. EVATT (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Nous avons soumis cette question au Conseil en raison de sa tres grande urgence. C'est le 1er aout 19471 que le Conseil de securite a donne I'ordre de cesser le feu, et c'est le 25 aout 19472 que le Conseil de securite a, par une resolution, charge ces representants consulaires de veiller a- l'execution de cet ordre et de faire .rapport. Le rapport provisoire est date du 22 septembre. La Commis:;;ion de trois membres composee des re- presentants de l'Australie, de la Belgique et des Etats-Unis d'Amerique est maintenant consti- tuee, en ce sens que I'on a annonce les noms de ses membres; cependant rien n'a ete fait pour leur permettre de commencer leurs travaux. Je me propose, avec la permission du Conseil, de , traiter brievement de ces divers points. Tout d'abord, je partage pleinement l'opinion du President en ce qui concerne le rapport pro- visuire: il est clair que la Commission consu- ,laire n'avait vraiment pas le droit de nous , demander de considerer ce rapport comme confi- dentiel. Ce point se trouve tranche par la decision du President, que nous aVOIlS unanimement approuvee, de ne pas accorder un tel caractere a- ce document. Le rapport etablitbien que I'or- dre de cesser le feu n'a pas ete pleihement observe. Mr. EVATT (Australia): We brought this matter before the Council because it was of very great urgency. The Security Council order to cease fire was given on 1 August 19471 and the resolution of the Security Council appointing these consular representatives to observe and re- port on the carrying out of the cease-fire order was passed on 25 August 19472• The interim report is dated 22 September. The Committee of Three Members, consisting of representatives of Australia, Belgium and the United States is now being constituted in the sense that the nori- nees have been announced, but nothing has been done to get them to work. I propose to discuss those matters briefly if I may. First, the President's own view as to this in- terim report, which I share, makes it clear that the Consular Commission really had no right to ask that this report should be treated as confiden- tial: That point has been dealt with by his ruling, whic~ ~as been unanimously accepted, namely, that It IS not confidential. The report does show that the cease-fire order has not been fully observed. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'qnglais): Le re- presentant de l'Australie desire-t-il qu'on donne lecture du rapport provisoire? I The PRESIDENT: Does the Australian repre- sentative wish to have the interim report read? M. EVATT (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais) : Oui, je considere que telle est la decision du Conseil. Mr. EVATT (Australia): Yes; I take it that that is the decision of the Council. M. SOBOLEV (Secretaire general adjoint, char- ge du Departement q.es affaires du Conseil de securite) (traduit de ['anglais): Le texte du rapport provisoire de la Commission consulaire a- Batavia, qui figure dans le document 8/573, est le suivant: Mr. SOBOLEV (Assistant Secretary-General in ~har?e of Security Council Affairs) : The follow- mg IS the text of the interim report from the Consular Commission at Batavia, which is con- tained in document S/573: "3. We find that the cease-fire order is not fully effective, and that casualties and damage continue and:that this state of affairs is due in the main to the situation described above. So long as this situation continues, it will be impossible to secure anything like complete observance of the tease-fire order. "4. We have so far been unable to discover any practical interim measures which would se~ure a more effective observance of the cease:-~re order or reduce casualties. "5. As the work of the Commission is not yet completed, it is requested that these ad- vance conclusions may be regarded as confi- dential. "6. The Consular Commission hopes to com- plete a written report on or about 30 Septem- ber." . The report is dated 22 September 1947. J take this to mean that the most advanced points of each spearhead were regarded by the Netherlands troops as entitling them to establish aline between the mo~t advanced points of each Bpearhead, and that meClllS that the fighting occurred between and behind the spearheads. If those are the facts, and the consular authori- ties so report, it is my opinion that they are not in accordance with the order of the Security Council, and indeed that is the finding in para- graph 3, where the report reads as folloWs: "We find that the cease-fire order is not !Pl1y effective, and that casualities and damage continue and that this state of affairs is due in the main to the situation described above. So long as this $ituation continues, it will be impossible to secure anything like complete observance of the cease-me :QTder." "Nous constatons que l'ordre de cesser le feu n'est pas $trictement observe, qu'il y a, encore de!!! pertes en vies humaines et des des.. tructions, et que cet etat de choses est dil avant tQut a la situation expo$ee plus haut. Tant que cettesituation exh;tera, il sera impossible de faire respecter strictement l'ordrede fair~ cesser le feu." The Australian Government brought the mat- ter to the Security Council for one reason and one reason only, which was to prevent loss of life and to have ~ dispute settled, not by vlolence or bloodshed, but by cQnciUation. That hllS bf;:en theCOUfSe adopted by the Security Council. The cease-fire order was given, ,and at: thellame time a good offices committee of three Wil$ to be ~ppointed for the purpose of effecting a. conciliation between the parties or of seeing Whether there could be any conciliation. Le Gouvemement de l'Australie n'a ~porte cette question devant le Conseil de securite que pour une seule raison: eviter des pertes en vies humaines et obtenil' que ce differend se regIe non p~r la violence ou les effusions de sang, mais par la conciliation. C'est le point de vue que l~ Conseil de securite aadoptct L'ordre de c~er le fet,! ~ ete donne, et en meme temps, une com- mission de bons offices compo,sCe de trois mem- bres devaitetreconstituee en vue d'amener un~ conciliation entre les parties, Ou du moins .de voir si une telle conciliation pouvaitetre realisee. vye bring this matter to the Security Council Nous saisissOD$ le Conseil de securite de cette affaire parce que npus estimon,s en premier lieu, que ce rapport n'aurait jamais dil etre confiden-, f~eling that, first of all, this report should nev~r ha.v~ been made confidential and should be open to discussipn-and I am glad to notice that the Whole of the Security Council accepts that view- and, secondly~ that the Committee of Three M:embers should commence work immediately, ~... tiel~ et doit pouvoir faire l'objet de discUS$ion~;: - et je me plais aremarquer que taus le& mem- bres du Conseil des,ecurite acceptent ce po1nf de vue -; en second lieu, que la Commiss.ion- , Frankly, it strikes me as a very serious matter that, in addition to the information which'I can infer from the interim report, according to in- formation reaching me from my own, Govern- ment, there seems to be some idea, at any rate among several of the consuls concerned, that no urgency was to be attached to the matter, and that in the meantime' the situation from the military point of view would deteriorate, in the sense that the cease-fire order would not be ob- served at all. I would therefore propose for the considera- tion of the Security Council a resolution author- izing and directing the Secretariat to act as the convening and organizing body for the Commit- tee of Three and requesting the Committee to proceed to its work with the utniost dispatch. , Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- jniblics) (translated from Russian) ,: I think that the •Security Council cannot ignore the report which. we 'have ,received from the consuls in BataVi~; it cannot ignore it because" notwith- ~anding a~empts by the Governments of c~rtain Stales to belittle its significance,'the Indonesian qU<;:stion is one of t);ie'most important questions with which the Security CouncilliaS ever had to deal. It is all the lp-ore strange thatth~.consuls should .advise US to 'consider their information confidential. Such advice is not in' order and, nat~any, cannot be' accepted, ~hich' is 'why I immediately asked the President that the text of the document which we a,re -about to disl:;uss should be 'read. Can we, after all, really make'a secret of the f~ctreportedto uS by the co~uls, namely, that the Security Counci).!s, decision regarding the ces- sation of hostilities in Indonesia is not being,im- plemented? The constIls decided to keep that fact secret and the Govemmentsof· some countries are re~dy to support such a recommendation. ~:':What was the task assigned to the' consuls? They were to inform the Security Council as to the way in which its decision regarding the ces- sation of hostilities in Indonesia was being carried out. We' have just received a first or, as the con- suls themselves point out, an interim report. C'est pourquoi je propose au Conseil de seeu- rite d'adopter une resolution tendant d'une part a autoriser et inviter le Secretariat a faire fone- tion d'organisme charge de convoquer la Com- mission de trois membres et de preparer l'orga- nisation de ses travaux, et d'autre part a prier la Commission d'entreprendre ses travaux le plus rapidement possible.. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques soda- listes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): A mon avis, le Conseil de securite devrait prendre en consideration la communication que nouS ant fait parvenit les consuls accredites a Batavia; en effet, la question indonesienne est parmi les plus iniportantes dont le Conseil ait jamais en a s'occuper, et cela m<.lgre les tentatives de cer- tains Gouvernements qui cherchent a h mini- miser. 11 n'en est que plus etonnant de'\i ir les consulS nous. recommander de consideret eette communicationcomme confidentielle. Cette re- conunandatlou'-n'est paS justifi~e, et bien enten- du, nous ne pouvons pas la suivre. C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi j'ai demand~ tout a l'heure au Presi- dent de .faire donner lecture du texteque noUS allons discuter~ En efiet,nous est-il possible de dissiinuler"le fait que, tomme nousl'annoncent les :eonsuls, la decision du Conseil de securite relative a. la cessation des hostilites en Indonesie n'est pas appliquee? Les consuls ont decide de tenir.ee fai~ secret, et les Gouvernements de cert~ pays sont prets aappuyercette'recomma':ldatlon: Pourtant, queUe etait la tache confiee aUI consuls? Ils avaient ete charges d'informer; ~e Conseil de securite de la maniere dont la decl- sionreIative ala cessation des hostilites en Indo- ilesie etait appliquee. Nous venons de reeevoir une premiere communication, que les consuls I shall not repeat what I said during the dis- cussion of the Indonesian situation at earlier meetings of the Council. I pointed out then that the Netherlands representative could use such: language only, because he had definite support' in tlie Security Council for the aggressive actions , of the Netherland.s Government. Without such support the Netherland.s representative would certainly not have used such language, and in ' any case, the Netherland.s Government would, not have ignored the Security Council's decisions, particularly the decision regarding the cessation of hostilities in Indonesia, which was the abso- lute minimum. Je ne vais pas repeter ce que j'ai dit au cours des seances anterieures du Conseil consacrees ~ l'examen de la situation en Indonesie. favais indique que si le representant des Pays-Bas nous tenait ce langage, c'etait uniquement parce qH'il avait pu se rendre compte que certains membres du Conseil approuvaient les actes d'agression commis par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas. Sans cet appui, le representant des Pays-Bas n'aurailt pu pader de la sorte et en tout cas, le Gouver- nement des Pays-Bas n'aurait pu agir au mepris des decisions du Conseil de securite et en parti- culier de sa decision relative, a la cessation des hostilites, decision qui constitue vraiment un strict minimum. Les consuls dont le jugement sur la situation en Indonesie n'est pas tout a fait objectif a mon avis - j'en parlerai du reste un peu plus loin, - se voient obliges d'informer le iConseil def securite que la situation, telle qu'elle existe en ce moment, presente un caractere d'urgence. Ils declarent nettement, et je cite le paragraphe pre- .mier de leur rapport: "Etant donne le caractere d'urgence de ce probleme, nous croyons bon de vous communiquer l'essentiel de ces conclusions pour information." Ils rec.onnaissent done que la situation qui existe en L"ldonesie presente un caractere d'urgence, c'est-a-dire qu'elle appelle des mesures d'urgence de la part du Conseil de securite. The consuls, who have not, I think, given an objective picture in every respect of the position , in Indonesia-I propose to enlarge on this-have been forced to draw the Security Council's atten- tion to the fact that the present situation is urgent. They report plainly--I quote paragraph 1: "In view of the urgency of the problem we ' think that these [conclusions] should be trans- ' mitted to you without delay and very concisely for your, advance information." It is thus ad- mitted that the situation in Indonesia is urgent, that is to ,say, that it calls for urgent measures to be taken by the Security Council. c. Again, .paragraph 2 of the consuls' report I Ensuite, il est dit au paragraphe 2 du rapport points out that: "Patrol clashes and sniping re-' des consuls que: "les combats de patrouilles et sult without diminution, notwithstanding the: les coups de feu isoles, ant continue avec1a meme cease~:fire order"; Here the consuls are trying to: intensite malgre l'ordre de cesser le feu." Ainsi minimize to some extent the significance of the; les consuls s'efforcent de minimiser, dans une fact.that military operations have not ceased,~md: certame mesute, le fait que les 'operations mili- they: call these operations "patrol, clashes and; taires n'ont pas cesse, et ils qualifient ces opera- sniping". But it is. not difficult to understand' tions de "combats de patrouilles et de coup de what is really going on in Indonesia if we COIl,- ~ feu !soles." Mais il n'est pas difficile d'entrevoir B.ld~rnot only: the consuls', report, but V:;lrious; c,:e qui, s,e passe eu_realite, en Indonesie, si nous pther, items of information, including reports re- ; ~prenopsen consideration non seulement la com- cently published in the world press and ,those 1 rotinication des consuls, mais aussi certaines au':' published since the Security Council adopted the \tres informations, y coftlpris ceUes qui ant patu decision regarding, the cessation of hostilities in: dernierement dans la .piesse mondiale, et 1'10- ~donesia. , ~ tamment depuis l'adoption,,par le Conseil de 5 securite de la decision relative a la.' cessation deS hostilites en Indonesie.' , , . , Paragraph 3 states : "'We find that the cease-; Par ailleurs, nous lisons au paragraphe 3: "Nous constatons que l'ordre de ,cesser le feu n'est pas strictement observe, qll'il y a encQre des pertes en vies humaines et des destructions, et que cet etat de choses est dii avant tout a la situation exposee plus haut. Tant que cette situa- tion existera, il sera impossible de faire respecter strictement l'ordre de cesser le feu." - Tel est done l'etat de choses qui existe en ce moment en IIidonesie. Les consuls declarent ou- ~e' order is not 'fully effective, and that casual- ti~ arid damage contin'ue, and that this state of ' -affairs is due in the main to the situation des- ~ribed above. So long as this situation continues, It will be impossible to secure anything like com- , plete 'observance of the cease-fire order." Sucha situation in Indonesia could arise only : because the Security Council did not at the time, . that is to say at the beginning of the discussion on the Indonesian situation; accept the proposals put forward· by the USSR representative to the effect that both sides should withdraw their forces to the positions which they occupied before IIlilitary operations in Indonesia began.1 It is quite clear to anyone who can reaIIy dis- tinguish between victim and aggressor that the ~t and fundamental step .towards restoring the situation in Indonesia. is that the troops should withdraw to the positions which they occupied before military operatiom; began. It would have been right to ask the side which began military operations and took aggr~ive action to withdraw . its forces. The USSR proposal provided for the withdrawal of the forces not ot one side alone, but of both sides. It would seem that such a proposal could hardly be objected to. Neverthe- less, as the Council knows, it was \lIlfort1,1llately not -adopted. All the members know, as I do, why ; the Council did npt adopt that proposal. Th~ USSR deleg~tion .considers that the Se-: cwity Council must rectify this situation. The; amy way to rectify it is toadopt a resolt.Jtion to the effe<;t th~t the forces of both sides should. ~ withprawn to those po~tions ~hich they' pcct.Jpied before military operations began. Such a meaSure would create favourable conditions for settling various other questions, including those of arbitration and mediation; for these questions the Security Council has set up a so- called special committee, which has apparently not yet started to work. - Accordingly I s1,1bmit for the consideration of the Security Council the following draft resolu- qu~elles occupaient avant que les operations, mil~~ taires soient engagees. Une te1le mesure aUflut pOUT efiet de creer une atmosphere favorabIe au reglement de toute uneserie d'autrc:s q1.lestions, y compris la question de l'arbitrage etcJe IlJ mediation, On sait qt.Je pour regler eeS qu~ tions., le ConseU de sect.Jnte a cree une {:ommis~ sion speciale, qui, a. ce qu'il semble, n'a pas mem~ commence ses travaux. ' C'est pon..quoi je wumetsau Conseil deseeu- rite lep: _:~t. res~1l.itl0n suivant qui figure aU ~dopted such a proposal it would create much - tant cette proposition, le Conseil de securite cree- more favourable conditions for settling the ques- rait une atmosphere plus favorable au reglenient tion. If not, I shall not be surprised to see the de cette question. Dans le cas contraire, je ne Security Council receiving several reports from serais pas etonne que' le Conseil re~oive encore the consuls in Batavia stating that the Council's des consuls accredites a Batavia, plusieurs rap- dt;cision regarding the cessation of hostilities is ports declarant qu'on ne tient aucun compte de being ignored and is not being implemented. la decision du Comeil de securit6; relative a Ta - cessation des hostiIites. We cannot allow the situation to continue un- n est inadmissible que I'on ne remedie pas a rectified and to remain as it is today. . la situation et que celle-ci reste ce qu'elle est aujourd'hui. J'estime que le projet de resolution soumis par le representant de l'Australie n'est pas satis- faisant. Si j'en ai bien compris le sens; cette proposition vise a recommander au Conseil de securite d'adopter une resolution aux tennes de I consider the draft resolution subnlitted by the Australian representative insufficient. If I understand his proposal correctly, its essence is that the Security Council should adopt a resolu- tion to the effect that that Committee established in accordance with another Security Council decision should begin to function quickly. That is _quite a different decision. We must deal at once with the more urgent question which de- mands immediate action on the part of the Se- curity Council. If the Council adopted the reso- IJ!tion which the Australian representative recom- !.fiends, it would mean that it was in fact-evading ! laquelle la Commission qui avait ete creee pat une decision anterieure du ConseiI, serait invitee - a se mettre au travail sans tarder. Ce serait la i une decision qui n'aurait rien de commu~ avec celle· que nous devons prendre. Pour le moment, nous devons nous occuper d'une question plus urgente, qui exige l'action immediate du Conseil , de securite. Si ce dernier adopte une resolution : dans le sens que lui suggere le representant de , l'Australie, cela signifiera en realite qu'il evite ; de se prononcer sur la question qui a ete soulevee ; par les consuls. En dIet, d'une part, il est difficile de s'oppo- ; ser au projet de resolution sounUs par le repre- ; sentant de l'Australie, caT 6videmment la Cam.- : mission creee par le Comeil de secur.ite-devrai~ •se mettre au travail immediatement. Il est du \ reste tout a fait incomprehensible qu'elle ne l'ait : pas fait jusqu'a present. Mais, d'autre part, c~ 1\.- decision on the question raised here by the consuls. On the one hand it is certainly diffic1.ilt to object to the Australian - represeI1tative's draft -ies:olution, as the Committee setup by the Security Council should, of course start work without delay. It is difficult to under.stllnd why it h~ not started, or is· not starting, to work. On the other hand this draft resolution is useless. The public and the world in general are given !he impr~sion that the Security Council is act- mg and doing something, but in fact, if the Council limited itself to such it decision, it would meaIl that it was doing nothing. In actual fact it would not be raising a finger to rectify the situation which has arisen in Indor.lesia. For this reason it would be better to adopt proj~t de resolution ne sert a rien. Si le Conseil : de securite .se bornait a prendre une telle, deci- , sidn, it donnerait a l'opinion publique l'impres- •sion d'agir, aldrs qu'en realite, cela equivaudrait :a ne rien faire. En verite, il n'aurait pas leve le petit doigt pour redresser la sittlatioti ~tii s'est creee en Indonesie. C'est pourquoi iI vaudTait nlieux ne prendre : aucune decision qu'adopter un projet de res-o- · lution tel que celui que recoIt1rtlande- le tc:!pre- : sentant de I'Australie. Cela ne sert a rien. Je : repete qu'!l ~st difficiJIe de s'y opposer, car une · resolution a deja ete adoptee en ce sens; mais cette nouvelle resolution ne servirait absolumerit : a rien, et elle ne sel'Vitait1 eli quelque sone, <[tta- detDurner l'attention de l'dpiniofi. pohlique des- qUelltion:; vrairtlent rrgentes qui se posent a ; propos de la situation en Indonesie et en liaison avec le rapport que nous avOns re~u des- ccJl1SuIs. ~ ~o decision rather than to adopt a draft resolu- tionsuch as the Australian representative recom- me.nds. It is useless. I repeat that it is difficult to object to it, as a similar resolution has already been adopted, but it would be absolutely' useless and in a certain-sense would merely distr~ct pU~Iic attention from the really.urgent questions fuhich _~rise in c~Jllnection ~ith t~e s!tttativn in ~onesla and In, connectIOn wItb L ~{: report Which we have received from the €owmls. In speaking of thl" murders, they lay special stress, for some ~eason or other, on the Chinese. Listening to this report, one has the impression that at the present time in Indonesia, where the Netherlands is waging war againSt the Indone- sian people, Chinese are being killed while Indo- nesians are surviving and suffering no casualties. The logic is rather odd. The consuls' accusation that the Indonesians are pursuing a scorched- earth policy and provoking other disorders is, to say the least of it, unfounded. By this I do not mean to say that all the Indonesians shoUld take part in. a scorched-earth policy and disorders, but we must have a realistic approach to this ques- tion. Indonesia is a \Ulltry which has suffered from aggression. The Indonesians have resisted the'aggressors. In certain places they have prob- ably adopted a scorched-earth policy, whenever such a policy was in the interests of the Indone- sian people and not of the aggressors. To con- demn the Indonesians for that woUld be unjusti- fied; to say the least of it. I should then have to remind the Council that during the war .against HitIerite Germany, the USSR alsc adopted a scorched-ea.'1h policy in those regions whiCh were temporarily under fascist occupation, since that injured. the occupying forces and, as part of the general. plan of campaign against them, served the national interests of the USSR and the interests of the Allies in gener,!?t Accordingly we cannot accept this rather strange argumenta- tion. These theoretical digressions by the consuls are, to say the least of it, out of place, and must be rejected as completely pointless. I hope, however, that the Security Couricil will give serious .consideration to- the question raised -by the consuls' report and will adopt the draft' resolution which I have put forward on behalf of the USSR delegation, the resolution concerning.the wit.hdrawal of"the troops of"both sides.to the positions which they occupied before miltary operations in Indonesia began. Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): The hJ.- terim report of' Consular- CoIIlIlliss!un is, as itS members rightly say tl:eII1!3e1ves, .concise. But it brings out one point to which I call the attention of the Council. Passing over certain expressions used by the representa.tive of the USSR, which would seem to be slightly intemperate, I woUld recall thac: he again used a term against whi~h the representative of the United States protested' En parIant des assassinats,' ils insistent, on ne sait trap pourquoi, sur les Chinois. A en crorre : ce rapport, on serait tente de croire qu'actuelle- · ment, alors que les rays-Bas font la guerre au peuple indonesien, les Chinois sont assassines en , Indonesie,'tandis .que les Indonesiens, eux, sont : epargnes et ne subissent pas de pertes. C'est la : un l'aisonnement fort etrange. L'accusation for" , muIee par les consuls contre !es Indonesiens et : selon laquelle ceux-ci se Iivreraient a. une poli- : tique de destmctions systematiques et provoque- raient des troubles, est depourvue de tout fonde- · ment. Je ne veux pas dire par la que les Indo- nesiens devraient tous pratiquer la politique de la: terre brwee et provoquer des troubles; mais c'est la. une question que nous devolls envisager , d'un point de vue Tealiste. L'Indonesie a ete vie- !time d'une agression. L('..5 Indonesiens ant pm ; les armes contre l'agresseur. Il se peut qu'ils aient · suivi cette politique de la terre bnlIee la OU cela i pouvait servir les interets du peuple indonesien j et nuire aux envahisseurs. Mais il n'y a pas lieu i de le condamner pour cela; c'est le mains qu'on :puisse dire. Je devrais alors i'appeler auConseil ! que pendant la guerre contre l'AlIemagne hitle·· irienne, I'URSS a ptatique la politique de la terre : bliiIee dans les regions provisoirement occupees par les fascistes, parce que cela nuisait aux occu, , pants et que; dans le cadre de la lutte contre · I'agresseuT, cela servait les interets de I'URSS ; et ceux des Allies en general. C'est pourquoi' nous ne pouvons accepter cette manicre de rai·. sonner, qui nous parait fort etrange. Toutes ces digressions theoriques des consuls sont pour le , moins deplacees et doivent etre rejetees comme absolument inconsistantes. J'espere qu'en fin de compte le Conseil de securite examinera, avec toute l'attention qu'elIe .merite, la question qui se pose a. propos de .ce .rapport des consuls, et qu'il adoptera le proJet , de resolution que je Iui ai soumis au nom de : l'URSS, resolution ~'clative au retrait des trou' · pes des deux parties sur ies positions qu'e~~' , occupaient avant le debut des operations mill· taires en Indonesie. M., VAN KLEFFENS (l'ays-Bas) (traduit ~e l'a~tgLif~' ~ Le rapport provisoire de la Con1DllS- sior;!·;;lu;;I.1);:~::(; est concis, comme les menibres' de ;.~ Commis&ion le notent tres justementeux-' meme..5., II' fait cependant ressortir un point· s~r lequel je desire attirer l'attention' du Conseil. · Sans vouloir relever certaines expressions em- The report of the Consular Commission which is now before us states that the Indonesians stilI practise violence with regard to person and with regard to property. Nowhere in the report, I)f course, is there any suggestion that we take measures of that kind against peaceful citizens. The Commission could do useful work, it seems to me, by calling on the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to put an end to senseless and cruel violence and to the equally senseless destruction of the country's economic assets. Let the Republic at last stop being negative and become positive and constructive. That is all that is needed to restore peace and the possibili- ties ofrehabilitation in a country so greatly im- poverished by four years of Japanese occupation. Le rapport de la Commissionconsulaire dont nous avons ete saisis declare que les Indonesiens commettent encore des acteB de violence t~t ,a 1'egard des personnes qu'a l'egard des biens. Bien entendu, on n'indique nulle part dans le rapport qUej nous agissons de la sorte vis avis de paisibles citoyens. Il me semble' que la Com-- mission pourrait faire reuvre lh~e en demandant au Gouvernement de'la Republique de l'Indo- nesie de mettre fin tant aux actes de violence dont la cruaute se double d'inanite, qu'aux actes de destructions, tout aussi depourvus de sens, commis contre le capital economique du pays. Que la Republique abandonne enfin son atti~ tude negative, et prenne des mesureS 'positives' et constructives. Il n'en faut pas plus pour reta::., blir la paix et donner a ce pays, tenement appau.; vri par quatre ,annees d'oc'cupation japonaise, la possibilite d\~ se relever. Above all, we want the representatives of Aus- tralia, Belgium and the Un:ted States to begin their work at the earliest possible date. That work,dearly, can succeed only if the atmosphere is not rendered unfavourable by further Repub- lican violence and depredations. We are ready to help with all th~ means at our command; and if there is still fighting here and there in Java and Sumatra, it is not because we' want it but because we are forced to resist Republican vio- lence. As soon as that Republican violence stops, the Council will see that the shooting will stop and that the atmosphere will clear. It is in the sel'.se that I have just 'indicated that, leaving aside all questions of jurisdiction of the Council, there is perhaps something-actually it is a great deal-for the Security Council to do. Par dessus tout, nous voulons que les repre-. sentants de l'Australie, de la Belgiqu~ et de~' Etats-Unis se mettent au travail le plus tot pos- sible. De toute evidence, ce travail ne pourra' etre couronnede succes que si les Republicains. ne viennent pas empoisonner 1'atmosphere par de nouvea~ actes de violence et de nouvelles' depredation.s. Nous sommes 1isposes a apporter notre concours avec tous les moyens' dont nous; disposons, et si 1'0n continue a se battre ici et la a Java et ~ Sumatra, ce n'est pas que nous le desirons, mais parce que nous sommes obliges de resister aux actes de violence commis par les ' Republicains. Des que ces actes de violence pren- dront fin, le Conseil constatera que les coups de feu cesseront, et que l'atmosphere s'eclair- cira. C'est a ce propos que je viens de dire, laissant de cote toute discussion quant a la com- petence du Conseil, que le Conseil de securite a peut~etre id quelque contribution a appoI1er - et en realite il en a une' tres grande. ' Concise as the report admittedly is, it is per- haps quite natural that some confusion may be created in, the minds of those who read it and 'who are not acquainted with the circumstances prevailing in Java and Su~atra. The word "spearheads" is used, perhaps a little loosely, be- Etant donne la conclusion reconnue du rap- 'port, il est peut-etre assez nature! qu'JlIle eel!'- taine confusion naisse dans l'esprit de·ceux qui le lisent et qui ne sont iJas familiarises avec la , situation existant a Java et aSumatra. L'expres- sion utiIisee "avances en pointe" ne serre peut- . etre pas d'assez pres la realite, car depuis le , moment ou nous avons effectue notre premiere poussee, qui, elle, meritait ce qualificatif, nous. avons considerablement elargi notre zone d'oc- cupation, de s01te que, dans toutela zone tra-" versee par ces premieres avances en pointe, no~: tenons so~dement les lignes de communications interieures. La superfide des zones completement ~ause; after our first thrust deserving that name, our occupation broadened considerably, so that internal communications in the whole area through which these initial spearheads passed a~e :firmly in our hands. Completely pacified areas increase in extent dr,y by Clay. It is only in lhe ,interstices between all those lines of com- Il1unitatio~ th<::t there ar~ stilI these troops or 1 'libel following: is: the, text< of the cablegram dated 29' SeptemheJ) 194,7: Document. S/568 30 September- 19*7 . [Original text: English] The' following report for your information. Netherlands army occupied, big' towIis and, main com- munication lines b<::tween those towns. Areas surrounding big towns: and adjacllIlt to, main: communication lines still fully under Republican control. In those, areas complete uirlts of Republican army still in continuous contact with geIiei'm headquaitetg. and RepuDlican civil administra- tion. is still, functioning as usual•. As soon as Netlierlands forces have succeeded in occupying few towns and few Diairi roads they start claiming that entire area covered' by: imagjiul.ry· demarcatimr lines: they draw' on' nrap be- comes .terra nederlandica. Subsequently follow ,inevitable mopping-up op!<ration.. rounding off actions, cle~ing up a'ctfunsrlUid so oIi·. Not~ astonislllrig at. all that in such a· way fieree fighting continlies unabated. ~enetration is not occupation. Nor does it confer right t6 penetrators to regard areas between converging lines of' penetration as occupied territory or' even: patrol same. If they do so it is at own- risk and their "patrols" deserve to be referred to as ''bands'' to a far greater degree than tlle rightful occupantg who are merely defending their teriitorY' agamst such aggressive bands even though the latter belong to' regular Netherlands army or are called '''consolidators'' or p-artidpants in the Netherlands "police a'Ctibri~'• Words' do' not make facts and they try by mere state- ments to blind the: world, and to hypnotise it. Econoinic pressure;, intimidation: and physical compul- sion are still being directed against the Republican offi- ciaIk in: the areas occupied: hy the Netherlands forces in: dtd'<Ir to fortle them to' enter the service of ~he Nether- lands Indiell GovernIIient,. apparently in order to show a casual observer that they can run t1].e cOlmtry with the' sO'-cal1ed "constructive elements" and without the' Rep~blie. Pending' the coming talks under auspices: of, ~e Committee of Three. Members~ in .accordan~e w:~th the decision of the Security· Coo:ncil, Mr. van Mook be" , f~ie he: left for' tlle: Netherlands a pfidfi encibutaged the politieal statu:!' quO'. In. addition the Netherlands continues its activity in the political fie~4.by propagatlIig and mak- . mg- prel:iiu'ations for the establishment of a puppet state witli 0"tJiel" quisliiigs"; f<lllo'Wing- the well known divide et n,z,pel'Q policy which. in fact means a continued.effort by the Nether1ands to strangle the Republic politically, and t1lit after tHe' cease-me' order and after the reSillutioii'li of th!f S~curity QounciI. 1'Void le text~· de ce c&blograntme, en date du 29 sep'- tembre 1947~ Document 8/568 30 septembre 1947 [Texte original en anglaisJ Le rapport suivant vous est adresse pour information. L'armee neerlandaise a occupe de grandes villes et les grandesiToies de communication qui les joignent. Les zoneS qui entourent les grandes villes et ceDes qui IO,n- gent les grandes voies de communication sont encore iIitegralement sous' le controle" de la RepubliC/ue. Da'rls ces zones, des unites. au complete de; l'armee tepublic'aine restent en contact permanent avec· le quartier general. et l'administration civile republicaine continue a fonc~' tronnel' nortnalement. Aussitot apres aV-oil" reussi a acou" , per quelques vines et quelques gIJandeg, routes, les Neer~: lalld'ais ont revendique comme terre neerlandaise la tota- lite d'une zone delimitee par des Ilgnes' de demarcatioil' imaginaires qu~ils ont tracees'sur une' carte. Puis out'suivi' les inevitables operations de nettoyage, de resorption de poches, de,liquidation, et ainsi' de' suite. n n'esf paS s'ur'~ pt.enant~. dans C'es conditions, que les combats furieux' continuent sanS' rien. perdre de leur violence. Une penetration n'est pas une occupation. Elle ne donne pas aux envahisseurs le droit de C'onsiderer comme territoire occupe les regions' comprises entre' les lignes' convergentel: de penetration, ni meme d'y fain: des pa- trouilles. S'ils' le font, c'est a leuts propres risques,et leurs "pattouilles" ~leritent bien mieux l'appelIa.tion de ''ban:- des" que les occupants legitimes qui ne font que de,; fendre leur territoire coIitre ces bandes d'agresseurs, meme si elles· appartiennent a' l'armee neerlandaise regu- liere ou si elles sont denommees "troupes d'organisation du terrain" ou troupes "d'operations de police" hollan- daises. Les mots ne creent pall les realites, et ils visent par de simp!es declarations a aveugler le monde et a l'hypno- tiser. La: pres~ion economique" l'intimidanoII' et la' contrafnte materielle continuent a s'exercer contre les fonctionnaires republicaitis des' zones occupees' par le's forces neerlan- daises, afin de les obliger a passet au service du Gen· vel'nement. des. Indes neerlandaises, ce, vraisemblablement pour pouvoir montrer a' reur observateur accidentel qu'ils peuvent admiiiistrer le pays en collabotation a:vec les soi-disant: "elements. construcfifs" et' sans la RepuJ blique. En attendant les pourp'arler.s p..ochains organis€p sous les auspices. ~e la Commissio.n. composee de. trOIS nrembres, coIiformement a' la: declsloll' du Conseil de securite" M ... van Mook, avant de partit pour les Pays- B'liS, a pi'l~'COIiiSe Q prioti le statu quo. En outre, les. p'ays- Bas poursuivent leur activite dans' le dOrila;ine pohfitj~e;. en faisant de- la. propagande- et· eh prepl11'ant.la creatIOn- · d'un Etat fantoche avec de nouveaux quislings suiyant. la politique bien c('jnnue~ ,diviser pour r6gner, poHtlque qui en fait implique la continuation Ijlllr leg. Pays"B~ de' leurs efforts POUl! etouffer politi<11-lemen,t la Repllbhq!lc•. ce, tnalgre'l'ordre donIte de cesget'le fei! et m:aJgrefts resolutions prises par le Conseil de securite. " ,(Signi} A. G.GAJl!l Vic'e'-Presrdeftf,. l1u .COI!'St!t..1 de' t'd. JtJpa'6l;qu~ d'lflr1onlsri ... ,. Let me give the Council an instance.· A person who wanted to travel from Pekalongan to Ba- tavia-this was before the Netherlands police action-had to get his ticket for the train in the following manner. First he had to obtain an application form at the registrar's office, where tie had to pay a modest amount in order to get his application stamped; then another modest amouut, this time to the head of the office who had to be paid. Then he was referred to the local police where again he had to buy the permission of tW(; officiale; before he got their stamps on his application, only to fall into the hands of the military police, where once more he had to pay asum of money before two of the officials could see their way clear to granting him permission to make his trip to Batavia. Altogether he had ingratiate himself with six officials before he could even bUy his ticket, on which the railway clerk in his turn levied an additional charge. It is said that travel broadens the mind, but 1 am afraid that traveling in that fashion is more a process of flattening the purse of the common or poor man for the benefit of the officials. This example can be multiplied, as I shall be only too glad to do if the Council wishes it, and shows what kind of administration Mr. Gani refers to. Je vais mepermettre d'en donner un exemple au Conseil. Une personne desireuse de se rendre de Pekalongan a Batavia _. avant Ies operations de police entrepriSe par les Pays-Bas - devait, pour prendre son billet de chemin de -fer, proce- der de la maniere suivante: Tout d'abord, elle devait se procurer une fonnule de demande au bureau du greffier qui lui faisait payer une mo- clique redevance pour qu'un cachet y £Ut appose; , ensuite illui fallait de nouveau remettre queIque argent, cette fois entre les mains du chef de bureau. Apres eela, eIle devait s'adresset au poste de police locale ou une fois de plus il fallait payer une certaine son1me pour obtenir de deux fonc- tionnaires qu'ils voulussent bien apposer l~ur cachet sur sa demande; sur quoi, on la renvoyait a la police militaire ou eIle devait a nouveau verser de l'argent avant que deux des fonction- naires pussent trouver le moyen de lui accorder la permission d'entreprendre son voyage. Ainsi il lui faIlait se mettre dans les bonnes graces de six fonctionnaires avant meme de pouvoir acheter son 'billet, dont eUe devait bien entendu payer, en sus, le prix a I'employe de chemin de fer. On dit que les voyages forment la jeunesse, mais je crains fort qu'un voyage entrepris de cette maniere soit plutot destine a degarnir la bourse de l'homme du peuple ou de I'homme pauvre, au profit des fonctionnaires. Je pourrais citer bien d'autres exemples .du genre, et serais he~­ reux de le faire si le Conseil le·d€sire, car de tels faits montrent le genre d'administratiQn auquel M. Gani fait allusion. teavh1g aside such points, which are charac- .. Laissant de cote ces details qui sont cara.d:e- ristiques de la maniere dont les autorit€s repu- blicaines essayent cl' j',j'r'e croire au monde qu'il existe dans ces r~ft ."ne administration digne de ce no11'1, je nens essentiellement a souligner . le point suivant. Si seulement ces troupes et bandes republicaines observaient l'ordre de cesser le feu emis par le Conseil, nOU8 n'aurions nul besoin d'avoir reconts it -eel; operations -de net- t~ri$tk tif the way in which the Republican authorities try- to make the· world believe that there is in those regions an adtninistration 'Worthy of that name, my main point is this. If only these Repub'icaIl troops and bands would observe the COUlYcWs request for acegge-fire, there would he 11'0 need fur us to have recourse to those This point being so very important, I shall now, with the permission of the President, give a few illustrations of the spirit in which the Republican Government itself, as distinct from its· troops and armed gangs, complies with the Council's request for a cessation of hostilities. It is good that we should. have facts and not vague talk. I have here a translation made by the Netherlands Indies Government of a docu- ment captured from the Republicans. In this document, issued by the head of a certain mili- tary group called Sector 3 who is at the time head of the Barisan Brani Mati, or suicide corps, the order is given to fight on in order torecon- quer Soerabaja, to start the action on 13 August, well after the Council's request for a cease-fire, at 9.30. hours, as soon as the lamps go out, and to attack at once ala guerilla. .I shall file this document with the Secretariat and also another document, issued on 25 August by the supreme command of the Indonesian army, Soerabaja urba."l district, containing de- tailed instruction to all fighting sections in Soera- baja who were to participate in the fight for the reconquest of Soerabaja on 30 August and for sabotage and attacks on Netherlands positions and property..As the Council 'will recall, the town of Soerabaja was under the control of the Netherlands Government long before the Nether- lands police action started and therefore does not lie in territory recently occupied by the Netherlands forces. Another example of the way in which the Republican Government seeks to interpret the request for a cessation df hostilities may be found in a statement made by a certain Raden Mas Soediono Purbo Ad Inoto, head of .the economic section of the region of Pasoeroean, from which it is evident that he received instructions from high Republican officials on or about 10 August to return to that town, which is now under Netherlands control, with the order to his su- perior, the "Regent'; of Pasoeroean, to "promote large-scale looting, robbery, sabota5e, so that the Republican Government will be in a position to state to the world abroad that the Netherlands Indies Government is not capable of maintain- ing peace andord~r in Netherlands occupied territories." This document I shall also hand to the Secretariat. .On previous occasions I already had the oppor- tunity to draw the attention of the Security Council to another point. That is the fact that the Republican Government, or the high com- mand of the Republican troops, continued to incite by radio and by word of mouth to cruelty, sabotage, destruction and subversive action. May I be permitted to give the Security Council a few examples of the continuous stream of the clearest incitement to violence that Republican propaganda is pouring out. I l'attention du Comeil de securite sur cet autre: point: le Gouvernement republicaih ou le haut · wmmaudement des troupes republicaines conti- ; nuent, par la radio~ ou par des declarations ver- : bales, a inciter la population a commettre des ; actes de cruaute, de sabotage et de destruction) · ainsi qu'a se livrer a une action subversive. Qu'il me soit permis de donner au Conseil d~ secu-· ; rite quelques exemples de.ce flot continue! d'in-. discutables appels a la violence que deverse la: propagande. republicaine. La radio de Djokjakarta a diffuse le 8 aoilt · un discours de M. Soetanto ou il etait dit: "Re- Radio Jogjakarta, 8 August, speech of Mr. Soetanto: "Let us now go to the dessas amidst our people who are full of enthusiasm to kill the Dutch. Let us organize·guerilla troops. We rery on everybody being sufficiently capable of exe- cuting these instructions." I gagnons maintenant nos communautes villa- · geoises (dessas) , et retrouvons-nous au milieu de, nos compatriotes, que l'idee de tuer les H611an- · dais remplit d'enthousiaSme. OrganisoIld des. troupes de guerillas; nous comptons sur tous ceux qui sont en mesure d'executer ces iilstruc- tion~." Le 1er aoilt, la radio de Kediri a transmis un discours de M. Moestopo, commandant terri- torial de la region orientale de J ava~ 10nt j'extr~ la declaration suivante: "Nous continuerons a assassiner les Hollandais, nous les assassinerons· : non pas seulement deux, trois ou quatre fois, mais sans arret, voila ce que nous ferons; autrement i1s reviendront." Dans un discours, le Premier Ministre Sjarif- foeddin a declare le 21 aoilt: "Nous avons le droit de proteger notre pays et de le defendre contre tout danger. Ce droit signifie que nous annihilerons l'ennemi et detruil'ons ses biens." Voici comment, le 2 septembre, s'est exprimee la radio de l'Armee de la Jeunesse, plus d'une semaine apres la seconde demande de cesser le· feu: "Dans le discours que nous avons.prononce samedidernier, nous avons souligne une fois de plus que nous ne devrions pas nous en remettre· au Conseil de securite. Nous devons nous battre jusqu'a ce que les Hollandais aient ete chasses du pays/' . Radio Kediri, 1 August, speech of Mr. Moes- topo, territorial commander of East Java: "We shall go on murdering the Dutch-not only two, three or four times, but continuously. Murder them, that is what we shall do, otherwise they will come back." Speech of Prime Minister Sjariffoeddin, 21 August: "We have the right to protect our.coun- try and to safeguard it against any danger. This implies that we shall annihilate the enemy and shall destroy his possessions." The radio of the Youth Army, on 2 September, more than a week after th(: second request for a cease-fire: "In the speech we made on Satur- day evening last, we stressed once again the fact that we should not put our faith in the hands of the Security Council. We must fight on until the Dutch have been driven out of this country." Upon whom, then may I ask, must rest the ultimate responsibility for the disturbances and acts of violence now taking place in Java and Sumatra? Qf course the Republican authorities do not want these activities to become: known to the Consular Commission in Batavia, and there- fore they do not hesitate to resort to any action which might contrihute to hiding the real facts A qui, je le demande, incombe en definitive la responsabilite des troubles et des actes de vio- lence qui se produisent actuellement a Java et a Sumatra? Bien entendu, les autorites republi- caines ne veulent pas que la Commission consu- laire de Batavia prenne connaissance .de cette activite, aussi n'hesitent-elles pas a recourir a toute action susceptible d'aider a dissimuler la realite aux enqueteurs. Dne maniere d'y parve- nir. est d'intimider les personnes qui pourraient desirer donner aux consuls des renseignements s1.!sceptibles de nuire a leur cause. Le Gouveme-· ment des IndesneerIandaises a appris, ~v 20 sep- tembre,· de son commissaire aux affaires civiles administratives pour la regioncorientale de Java, qu'un policier de Malang qui avait amene devant MM. Eatonet Lambert, consuls· d'Australie et du Royaume-Uni, la mere d'un de Ses collegues ~rom its investigations. One way to achieve this IS to ;r.timidate people who might be willing to give adverse information to the consuls. The Netherlands Indies Government was informed diJ. 20 September by· its -comrlnssioner for civil service affairs in East Java that a policeman in ~alang·who'had brought the mother of one of his colleagues, whQ had been kidnapped by the RepOblicans, -before· Mr. Eatonand Mr.. Lam- I charge that this is definitely not true, and I shall now file with the. Secretariat of the Secwjty Council a copy of a report of the Netherlands w~rk:ing co~ttee for evacuations, dated 15 1uly, concerning negotiations with .Republican officials to bring about the evacuation of all hos- tages from Republican territory. Neth~rlands women and even children living in femmes et m.eme d'enfants neerlandais forces de forced cO:!ilcubinage and, for that reason, not vivre en concubinage et qui, pour cette raison, allowed to leave. Several indications have been n'ont pas ete autoris€s a partir. Tout porte.a r-eceived that there are still numerous instances' croire qu'i1 existe encore de nombreux: cas de where innocent people continue to be held as pers()i1Iles innocen:tes retenues prisonnieres pa:r prisoners by irregular bands. of troops and are des bandes armees irregulieres et soumises aun· subjected- to indescribable treatment. traitement d'une cruaute indescriptible. . On(, con£rmanon that these indications are Je peux vous donner id une preuve que cet· only too real may be given here. During the etat de choses n'est malheureusement que trop N~therlandspolice action; a Netherlands officer reel. Au cours des operations de police neerlan- in charge of a patrol received fuformation that ,daises, un offider ala tete d~urte patrouille avait in a village in the neighbourhood of Banjoewangi ! appris que dans un village voisin de Banjoewan- ~ East Java, a number of Europeans were still . gi, situe dans la region Ot;,~l1tale de Java, un alive. Proceeding to this village, he found, hid- certain nombre d'Europeens etaient encore vi- den in a ravine and in a condition approaching vants. n s'y rendit et trouVa caches dans un· starv~tion, fifteen Netherlands nationals, men, : ravin, a demi morts de faim une quinzl'I.ine de women and children. Further information was. sujets neerlandais:hommes, femmes et enfants. received that other, Europeans were living in the D'apres. des renseignements compIen'lentaires,. vicinity, although rumours.had been spread that 'd'autres Europeens vivaient dans le voisinage m?-ny of them had already been murdered by : bien que le bruit courtit que beaucoup d'entre Ipdonesians. .eux avaient ete assassin€s par lea Indoriesiens.. i . The Netherlands patrol, conducting a search' Dne patrouille neerlandaise, effectuant une· in the neighbouring woods, then found a Mrs. battue dans les bois des environs, trouva une cer- van der Linde, who was seriously wounded. . tame Mme van der Linde, grievement blessee; Fr-om her explanations it became clear that her 'De ses explkations, iI apparut que les Indone- husband and five children had been inveigled. siens avaient reussi a' convairtcre son man et Seg by Indonesians into .leaving,their h01:lSe, under •cinq enfants de: quitter leut maison sous pr€texte the pretext that they would be helped to escape. qu'iIs lea aideraient a s~echapper. lIs les avaient Tht;-y were, then taken to a ravine where, in ; alors emmenes dans un ravin Oll malgre les sup- spite of the pleadings. of the pal'ents~ the children : plications des parents, les enfants avaient .etC were brutally slaughtered; After that Mr. van: ;inhuma:inement massacres. Erisuite, lea Indonc- der Linde was' killed wliile his'wife- was beaten ! siens avaient tue M. van del' Linde et'assene a acr.oss the neck and shoulderS with a sharp sa femme des coups si violents sur la nuque et weapon Bd that slle' conapsed and became uncon" les epaules au moyen d'un instrument tranchant, scious.. As, the fiends believed her to be dea(1, qu'elie avait perdu connaissance. La croyant they did not bother any more about her; Mter morte; le! monstres ne 8'etaient plus occup6s tw{),hours she regained consciaUS1iess and dragged d'eIIe; Deux heures plus tard, eIle a.vait r~~" he~lf,t:o Kali Bendo; .' i ~o.er:.d~.re; et' ..etait fralb6e. j..qU'l.KaU How long is all this going to continue? How long will it take before it is dear to the whole world that the Republic~ Government is not, as has been suggested here in the Council, a peace..loving, respDnsible GOvernment, .struggling to win its freedom from :colonial oppression, but, on'the contrary, a typical example of a small group 01 tyrannical men. who have foisted :them- selves, with Japanese assistance,on the Indo.. Combien de temps cettesituation va..t-eIle se prolonger?Combien de temps faudra-t-il pour fairecomprenare au monde que le Gouveme,; mentrepublicain n'est pas, comme on l'.a detlar6 au sem de cc Conseit; un Gouvernement paci~ fiqueet' -respon.sable, qui lutte pour conquerlr sa liberte et echappera l'oppression ,coloniale,' mais qu'll offre au contraire l'e~emple typiquc rl'une tyrannie exercee par un petit groU" d'hommes; cegrQupe -qui s'estimpose au}' Jndo- ntsiens avec l'aide des Japonais, a pour caract6.. ristiqueessentielle de perpetrer des actes ,de \1i~ 'lence sur un peuple innocent, hors d'itatdese defendre, ainsi que de faire sans .Ce5Se preuve de mauvaise fQi en deguisantses veritables· in,. tentions sous de$ paroles trompeuses et des prp.. messes bien vite donnees qu'il ne tiendra jamais. On a de nouveau formule la proposition ten.. dant a ce que nos troupes se teplient sur leul'S positions initiales. Cette proposition prevoit ega; lement que les troupes indonesiennes devront se retirer, mais il s'agit la, me semble-t-il, d'une logique bien singuliere car, ce faisant, celles-ci ne se retireront pas, eUes avanceront. J'ai d~j& eu l'occasion d'expliquer les raisons pour les- quelles toute proposition semblable est, au sens litteral du mot, chargee de dynamite. n~iaIls. They are best character:~ed by their acts of violem;e against innpcent and defenceless r"'''ple and hr the bad ,faith whkhthey have ~".l1onstrated·again and again whilst. camoufiag~ mg their real -intentions with a screen of words and easily given promises which they never fulfil. We have heard again the proposal that our troops Should withdraw to their initial positions. The pr?p0sal is that the Indonesian troops should 'also WIthdraw, but this seems to me inverted l?gic, because what they w~uld do would be sunply to advance. I have lrad occasion before to explain why any such propo:;al is, in the literal sense of the word, charged with dynamite. The Indonesian Republic has given ample notice of'what would happen incase .of the with- drawal of Netherlands troops. In a document whith,we found at Kawali, and 'which was dated 28 August, subsequently to the second request for a cease-fire2, the people are warned not to co-operate with·the Netherlands and are intimi- dated 'by such words as (I quote): "Look at the terrifying corpses of people who fell into our hands.'" Similarly, 'the Jogjakarta radio said on' 9 August, at 9 p.m.: "Brothers in the occupied territories who helped the Dutch in some way or other, I want to remind you that victory will be oum •.' . Some day those people will meet their 'punishment; that' is, capital punishment." , 'Should we'be foolish' enough to withdraw our troops, :residents' of Cl;llnese 'origin would be among 'the worst suffererS. I have here before ~e 'a' nieinorandum' which "I 'shall be glad to present to~e Secretariatfor the Council's record and'mform~tion" It is, a'memoranqum compiled by the Federation 'of Chinese. Associations in p~~ayia,.a:nd outlip~, "acts of.viol~nce and ~um!Urity perpetrated by Indonesian bands against Chinese in Java and Sl1m~tra", It is:;tn ~ppalling :story of extortion." I quote from the tabl~ :bf,'contents: ~" "plundering, demolitienof prop~rty, deprivation ;of freedom, kidnapping, raping,andmassacre". ' And in the summirig-up onFP;age'18; this report'states: "fu: cariying:out tlteiis't'ordied:.earth 'pdlicy;Chinese,;oWned houSes arid';fa'dories were:preferredoojectives".By no Ifi~arufthe orily.Ohes,.aS the J;epJ;es,entative of. t1?-e :US~R' se~nrs to' ~uggest; b~t preferred objectives:. ~''This work .was ,cam.ed' out by a destruction s'q#adi of tIle Indonesian, army it!' lin,e with t4e policy ~nd';<:irders issued by the 'army high com- ifi~llld:~i I am still quoting·the Chinese Associa~ tion: "Looting was cOmnlltted by the troops, as well 'as:'·by, bands 01 .,irreSponsible Indonesians. Murder was largely .committed hy the troops. Because these, 'outrage... were by" no means inci- den~al hut were'a general' phenomenon all over La Republique indonesienne a indique avec assez de clarte ce qui se passerait si les·troupes ,neerlandaises se retiraient. Un document trouve ( a Wawali, qui porte la date du 28 aoilt, et est donc posterieur au deuxieme ordre de cesser le feu2, avise la population de ne pas essayer 'de cooperer avec les Neerlandais et s'efforce de I'in- timider par des paroles telles que celles-ci (je cite textuellement): "Regardez les cadavreshor- ribles de ceux qui sont tombes entre nos mains", De meme, la radio de Djokjakarta declarait le 9 aouta 21 heures: "Freres des territoires occn- 'pes qui avez aide les Neerlandais d'une maniere ou d'UIie autre, je tlens a vaus rappelerqu'un jour nous remporterons la victoire ... Un jour, ceux qui ont aide les NeerlandaiStrouveront lenr cha.timent, c'est-a-dire la peine capitale." Si nous avions l'imprudence de retirer: nos troupes, les habitants, d'origine chinoise en se~ raient les victimes les' plus durement, frappees. J'ai sous les yeux un memorandum que je re- mettrai volontiers au Secretariat pour qu'il figure clans les dossiers du Conseil et serve a edifier ce dernier. Ce memorandum a ete prepare par la Federation des Associations chinoises de Ba- tavia, et souligne les "act~ de violence et de cruapte inhumaine perpetres par les bandes indo- nesiennes entre les Chinois de Java et ·de,Sn~ 'matra". C',estune histoire· horrible d'exactions -' je citela table des matieres:' "pillage, destruc- tions de biens, sequestrations, enlevements, viols 'et maSsacres". Dans' un resume· figunmt a la page 183 du rapport,' on peut lire: "En recourant '~ la politique de la· terrebrilIee, les Indortesienv ontpris comme objec~~ de predilection les m~~ sons et les fabriques qui appartenaient aux Chi~ n01s". Ce n'etaient pas'les seuls objectifs, coniine semble I'inlpliquer le'· representant de I'URSS; mais les objectifs de predilection. ~'Ces operations ont ete executees par un peloton de destruction de I'armee indonesienne conformement ala poli- tique et aux ordres du 'haut commandement de, l'artnee". Je continue a citer' le document de l'Association chinoise: "Les pillages ont ete com- mis par les troupes ains! que par des· ban~es 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil dll seca' riM, Deuxieme Annee, No 68, 173eme seance. 2IbitI., No 84, 195eme seance. , • Il s'agit de la page 18 dtl texte anglais qui n'a pas , ete traduit en fran~ais.,~ - On 27 September the New'York Times con· > tained an editorial discussing the ql.!estion as to whether United States troops should be with- drawn from Korea. ,In that article the following pasSage is to be found, which is the exact counter- part of what I, say with regard to Indonesia at this moment. The Times stated: "Withdrawal of United States troops from Aorea, under the present circumstances, would '. be a greater betrayal of the Korean people than would be any' other action. The' resrilt would not be civil war. It merely would hand over the country to the North Korea Govern- ment and result in a bloody purge of any dissidents in South Korea, as dissidents already have been put aside in North Korea." Dans son numero du 27 septembre, le New York Times, dans un article de fond, diScutait la question de savoir si les troupes des Etats-Unis. seraient retirees de Coree. Dans cet article, on trouve le passage suivant qui fait exactement pendant a ce que je suis en train de dire au sujet de l'Indonesie. Le Times declare done: "Dans les circonstances actuelles, rien ne cons- tituerait une plus grande trahison a l'egard du peuple coreen que le retrait des troupes des Etats-- Unis de son territoi!'e. P?l' la on ne causerait pas la guerre civile, O:l remettrait tout simple- ment le pays entre les m~~ins dt l Gouvernement de la Coree du no.d, et 1.1, s'ens'llvrait, dans la Coree du sud, une epurathm sar.glmte de taUs les dissidents, comme tel a \~te le cas dans la Coree du nord." . C'est exactement ce qui se passerait en lndo- nesie si nous retirions nos troupes des territoires qu'elles occupent actuellement. On ne pourrait rien demander de plus cruel au Conseil que de donner suite a des propositions de eet ordre d.ans le cas present, car leur application entra$nerait certainement des pertes considerables et inutiles en 'lies humaines. That is exactly what would happen in Indo- nesia if our troops were withdrawn from. areas they now occupy; To put into effect any such' suggestion in this case, resulting as it would. in considerable and unnecessary loss of human lives., is the most cruel thing that anyone can ask the Council to do. I spoke just now of the Republican broadcasts ' inciting people to violence. Those broadcasts, continued even after the Council, on 26 August, Je viens de vons parler des emissions radiopho.. niques republicaines incitant le peuple a la vio· lence. Ces emissions ont continue apres meme que le Conseil eut, le 26 aout, demande pOUT la seconde fois aux parties de cesser Ies·hostilites. Je vaisdeposer au Secretariat un document con- tenant le texte de cesemissions, et je deniande de nouveau s'il ne serait pas utile que le Conseil insiste pour que prenne fin cette attitude equi- voque .de la' part de gens qui pretendent acc~pter son invitation acesser le feu. '. , .,Au:cours des dernieres annees, le mcndr- vu assez d'atroc~tes. Loin.d~.moi 1'..i.deede1ll~ com- plaire ,dans :~ne eV9c3:~on morbide de faits s~n: sationnels, mais·.ie crois que le Conseil_ devrait avoir dans ses archives une serie.de photographies montrant les atrocites commises par les 'troupes et les bandes armees de la -Republique' 'd'Indo~ 'nesie; je vais done remettre ceS photogtaphies 'au -Secretariat. ~u~d its second appeal for a cessation of hostili- ties. I shall file with the Secretariat an-anthology of such broadcasts" al1d I ask'again whether it would not be useful for the Council to insist that this 'sort of.double talk, on the part of'people who' say that they accept its request for 'a cease-fire, shoiiJd at last come to an end..' '. . ;:.:ne 'world has" seen· eno~g~" .these 'la:si :few. years, of atrocity pictures. Far be it'for me t6 indUlge ill morbid sensationalism. At t' ,,' I;,lme . ?m~, I believe that the Council shouk;'ca," in Its recprds a <:ollection o£ photographs de!,-;,:;.cing : atroc'jties conimitted by troops "al1d bandS of the ~donesian Republic; which' collection I shall; now pres~rit ~o the',Secretariat. ~'. . , 1 have, come to the end, of what I had to say in 'connexion with th'e remarks that have, been made here today. It remains a strange and dis- turbing thing 'to see the Council, which twice refused to hear the democratic States 'of East Indonesiaa,nd .Borneol, treating with great def- J'en arrive, a.)~: fin de la declaration'que .le voulais faire sur les observations qui ont ete formulees ici aujourd'hui. C'est un fait etrange et troublantque devoir le Cdnseil, qui a 'refUse par'deux fois .d'entendre Ies Etats demociatiques de l'Indonesie' orientale et de Borneol, traiter, avec une deference profonde, le Gouvernement autocratique de la Republique d'Indonesie, ou jamais encore il n'y a eu d'elections parlemen. ere~1Ce the autocratically rul~d Republic of Indo- n~la, where hever yet has there been a parlia- mentary election, every single member of the One- word with rega:rd to the draft 1e~olution . Je :v.oudra41 dire quelques mpts au sujet du pro- submitted by the .representative of AUI>tr~a. On jet de resolution soumis par le representant de our part we have no objection, I think, to such • l'Australie. Nous n'avons aucune objection, j~ a resoluuonbeing adopted. I leave it to the peme, a voir cette resolution adoptee, et je laiss~ Council to decide whether any such resolution is au Cr>nseille soin de decider si une resolution dlf really .necessary. ce genre est vraiment necessaire. . I thought that perhaps, bya .simple ruling by : Je croyais quepeut-etre par une simpledeci~ the President, the Secretariat could be requested. .sion du President, le Secretariat pourrait etre to provide the necessary .clerical ~istance~ but,; :invite a foumir le personnel necessaire mais, je ~ 1 say" that i$ entirely a matter for the Council le repete, c'e.st au Oonseilqu'il appartient entie- to decide. : rement de prendre une decision a ce $ujet. The PRESZPENT: The hQur is very late, and Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais): En rai- ' I should like to consult the Council as to what son de l'heure fort tardive, je voudrais demander it thinks it best to do. J would remincl the l'avis du Conseil sur la meilleure procedure a Councj1that we have an obligation not only to suivre. Je voudrais lui rappeler que noUS avons ourselves but to the interpreters and to the Secre- I des obligations non seulement envers nous- tariat as well. . memes, mais egalement envers les interpretes et le Secretariat. I have already on Ill}" list the names of four; speakers who flSked to be heard, and there may . be Qther members of theCouncU, who have not - yet notified me, who will also want to submit their names. I Am afraid, therdore, that it is quite'impossible to expect that we shall arrive at any definite result at any reasonable hour this evening. 1 mould like to .know whether the' Council would agree to adjourn this discussion to the next, earliest possible date. Colonel Hopr;;soN (Austr~a); I agr.ee with the latter pomc.ln oi the PresIdent's .remarks? but I would suggest, for the .consi~ration of the Council, the -advisability of the procedure of taking a vote now, .anticipating that there will be no objection to the Austra1i~ndraft rC$olution in that it is ill no way~ontroversialorlikely to give rise to any arguments. It is a matter of urgency, and the '!lOaner the Secr~tary-General can convene the meeting of U100e three Com- mitteemerribers, the sooner th~ can start wQrk. If th«:reis no objection, I suggest that the Pr-eaident might put the Australian draft re$Olu- tion to the vote and postpone the discussion9n . substance and on the USSR draft l'esolq.tiQll to the earliest possible moment, say tomorrow, 4 OctQber, or Monday morning, 6 October. The P.RESIPENT: I shall agree to that sugges- tion on one condition, which is that there should be lit~rallyno discussion and that 1 may put the draft resolution to the yote immediately. 1£ there i$ any objection or discussion, I propose to adjol,U'll th<:. Council. As there is no objection to proceeding as pro- posed by the reprCl>e.ntative of Australia) I shall ask the Council to vote on the A~st,r1Uian draft Tai deja sur ma liste quatre orateurs m..scrlts, et il est possible que d'autres membres me de- mandent egalement la parole. Je crains done que nous ne puissions ani"er ce soil'., dit mciins a une heure raisonnable, a un resultat defiriitif, Je voudrais savoir si le Conseil ac..cepterait de remettre la discussion a une date aussi l'appro- chee ·que possible. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de 1"anglais); J'approuve les toutes dernieres obser- vations du President, mais je voudrais to!1tefois demander all Conseil s'il ne juge pas opportun de proceder a. un vote maintenant; je presume en effet, que personne n'cleve d'objection contre la resolution australienne, etant donne qu'elle ne peut, en aucune fa!,on, preter a controverse on susciter de discussions. TIs'agit la d'une question urgente, et plus le Secretaire general pourr~ r~unir tot cetteCommission de trois Illembre:;, pll,lS ceUe-ci pourra se mettre vite au travail. Si personnen'a d'objectiona presenter, je pro- pose que le President mette aux voix le projet d~ resolution de l'Australie et remette la discuSllion tant sur le fond de la question que sur le projet de resolution de I'URSS, a la date la plus rap- pro<;hee possi1}le, paT exemple a demain 4 oc- tobr~ ou .a lundi 6 octobre au matin. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'o.ng1ais): J'aceeptt eetteproposition a une condition, c'estqu'eUe ne donne vraiment lieu a aucune discussion et -que je puisse mettre le projet de resolution a<.!X vohc iJrnnediatement. En cas d'objections oude discussions, je me propose de lever la seance. Comme personne ne presente d'objection ala procedure proposee par le representant de l'Aus- tralie, je demanderai au Conseil de voter aur le "<I' he Security Council resolves: "That the Secretary-General be requested to act as .convenor of the Committee of Three and arrange for the organization of its work; and "That the Committee of Three be requested to proceed to exercise its functions with the utmost dispatch." , A vote was taken by show of hands, and the resolution was adopted by 9 votes in favour, with 2 abstentions. Votent pour: Austtalie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, France, Syrie, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. Votes for: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Syria, United Kingdom, United States of America. ,S'abstiennent: Pologne, Union des Republi- ques socialistes sovietiques. Abstentions: Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Repu~lics. The PRESIDENT: I propose now to adjourn the meeting. We shall meet again to consider this question on Tuesday, 7 October 1947, at 10.30 a.m. Le ~RESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je pro- pose au Conseil de lever la seance. La prochaine seance sur la question indonesienne aura lieu le mardi 7 octobre 1947 a 10 h. 30. La seance est levee a19 h. 30.