S/PV.2096 Security Council

I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Algeria, in which he asks to be invited to participate in the discussion. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite him to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure. Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2096) 1. Adoption of the agenda At the invttation of the President, Mr, Bouayad-&ha (Algeria) took the pluce reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber. 2, The situation in Namibia: (ti) Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) (S/l 2903); (1)) Letter dated 24 October I978 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/ 12906)

In accordance with the decision taken at the 2092nd meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the delegation of the Council to be seated at the Council table. At the invitation of the President, M&s Konir (Frerident of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table. Adoption of the agenda 4 The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Frerzch): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2092nd meeting, 1 invite Mr. Gurirab to take a place at the Council table, The situation in Namibia: /a) Report of tile Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) (S/12903); (b) Letter dated 24 October 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/l 2906) At the ilwitution of the President, Mr. Gurirab (Pesmanent Observer of’ the South !&St Africa People’s Organiznriorl) took a pluce nt the Council tub/e.

?demhers of the Council now have before them the foliowing documents: S/12913, containing the text of a letter dated 2 November from the representative of Czechoslovakia to the President of the Security Council, and S/12914, containing the text of a letter dated 2 November from the reprcsentative of Srj Lanka to the Secretary-General.

111 accordance with the decisions taken at the 2092nd, 2094th and 2095th meetings, 1 invite the representatives of Bangiadesh, Benin, Burundi, Cuba, Egypt, Ghana, GuYma, Mozunbique, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Yugoslavia and Zambh to take the places reserved for them at the side of tht: council chamber. 6. Mr. BlSIlARA (Kuwait): Mr. President, the delegation of Kuwait expresses its sincere congratulations to YOU Un your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month, Kuwait aIld (&bon are fellow membCrS Of &C At the invitntiun of t/w President. Mr. Hrq (Bangladesh), fi[r. /lwngavou (Benin), Mr. Sinlbarzan~8c’ (Burundi), Mc Kerr Kcncri (Cuba), 1I4r. Ah&l Akgtrid (&pt), Ms B~aterz (Ghana), or. Sinclair (Guyanal, Mr. Lob0 (Mozambique), Mr. Buroody [Saudi Arabia), Mr. Hussen (SOlIlUlin), 126: ~onuti~la (Yugoslataiu) and Miss Konie Organczation of Petroleum Exporting Countries and our bilateral rclatjons have grown enormously in the last few years. We pledge our co-operation with you during your presidency. 8. The central issue of Namibia is the principle of self-determination and genuine independence for the Namibian people. All United Nations efforts have revolved around this basic issue. All special meetings and assemblies, international gatherings, private meetings, bilateral and multilateral contacts have been devoted to the attainment of this principle. First and foremost, the struggle of the Namibian people led by the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) has been waged with this goal. The initiative of the Five Western members of the Council is also an attempt to attain Namibian self-determination and independence by peaceful means. The speakers who have so far participated in this debate have defended this principle. We meet here in order to examine ways and means to achieve it. The confrontation between the international community and South Africa on the question of Namibia stems from South Africa’s refusal to accept the application of this principle to Namibia. This cardinal principle enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations is so sacred that it makes it impossible to tolerate the behaviour of South Africa in its defiance of the will of the world as represented in the authority of the General Assembly and the Security Council. 9. There is unanimity on the inalienable right of the Namibian people to self-determination and genuine independence. Yet there are differences on the approach and on the methods to be used to wrest from South Africa this unquestionable right. Self-interest and other considerations are important factors in preventing unanimity in the Council on the future course of action. It seems that we are wedded to the cause of self-determination for the Namibian people but not united on what should be done to confront South Africa’s disdain for this sacred principle. The problem with the Council is that it cannot act decisively unless the majority, including the permanent members, agree on the general guidelines for action. What is important at this stage is how to compel South Africa to accept resolution 435 (1978), based on the proposals of the five Western members of the Council, lo. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait, who spoke at the Council’s meeting on 29 September, after the adoption of resolution 435 (1978), said: “We know that the approval of the report of the Secretary-General is not sufficient to enable him to go ahead with the plan of action just adopted. South Africa, which is illegally in Namibia, has the physical power to Prevent UNTAG f United Nations Transition Assistance Group/ from reaching the Territory or, even if UNTAC is admitted, has the same power to prevent the freedom of movement necessary for the discharge of its functions. !t is therefore important for the success of the plan of action to compel South Africa to co-operate in the present undertaking.” 12087th meeting, para. 122.1 11, Almost all speakers, including the representative of SWAPO, have called for the invocation of Chapter VI1 of the Charter as a punitive measure to combat the blatant defiance of the Security Council by South Africa. The Government of Kuwait supports this policy. The fear is that South Africa, whose capacity for doing an about-face is unlimited, may partition Namibia because it is confident that the bogus elections to be held in December will produce demands for the partition of the Territory. We voice our fears in the light of the mission of the five Western members of the Council, which brought meagre results that are not commensurate with the efforts and the prestige of the five Foreign Ministers. The danger lies in the fact that South Africa is convinced that its nominees will be put in a position of cle facto power in Namibia before there is any question of elections supervised by the United Nations. This fear is confirmed by the statement of South Africa’s Prime Minister who was quoted in The Guardian of 30 October as saying that the elections sponsored by South Africa are “an internal process to elect leaders” and that “the next step would be to consider ways of achieving international recognition for the new rdgime”. In the light of such a statement one cannot help but endorse the suspicion of the African Group that the Five virtually acquiesced in South Africa’s determination to get its own way in Namibia. 12. There is a great deal of truth in the statements of previous speakers that the inability of the Council to act decisively against South Africa has encouraged the Government of that country to go beyond limits in its defiance of the United Nations. We think there is no extra time left in which the Council may wait for some signs of goodwill from South Africa. South Africa has exhausted all the “time outs” and the end of this unpleasant game is long overdue. There is no doubt that there is a set-back in Namibia and that the hopes aroused by the adoption of resolution 435 (1978) have been shattered. In this atmosphere of uncertainty, fear and disbelief, the Council has to do something. The question that haunts us is what is to be done? One answer is that the struggle of the Namibian people against foreign occupation must be intensified. This does not await the approval of the Council as it is the inherent right of the Namibian people to resist alien domination. Therefore, bilateral assistance to SWAP0 is essential for the intensification of the struggle. 13. The second answer is that the Security Council must play its role in taking measures to assert its authority. We know that the policy of South Africa is not to assist the people of Namibia to achieve self-determination, as its spokesmen allege, but to undermine their right to the application of this principle and to sponsor an obedient bunch of people who are ready to comply with its design for the partition of Namibia or, at best, acquiesce in the bantustanization of the Territory. One may ask what are the measures the Council may contemplate? Admittedly, they are few if there is no agreement among the permanent 14. My delegation is convinced that fair, free and unfettered elections will bring in SWAP0 at the head of the elected government. The question is what can the Council do to bring about fair elections in Namibia? The farcical elections which will take place in December, with the sponsorship of South Africa, should be contained, confronted and rejected. Nothing has exposed the true nature of the internal settlement of Smith in Rhodesia more than the international rejection of it. It will be the height of irresponsibility if we allow the result of this debate to remain inconclusive. We must not forget that it is advisable sometimes to tame the desirable in order to bring it into line with the obtainable. The distance between what we want and what we can obtain is still unbridgeable, although it is true that all of us are in earnest about the achievement of independence for Namibia. 15. My delegation views the present debate with the seriousness it deserves and warrants. It cannot accept an inconclusive debate or a debate that ends in making more remote the attainment of genuine independence by Namibia, On the question of Namibia, the international community has achieved some remarkable success. It would not be forgivable to part company at this crucial hour. 16. In the course of the consultations, negotiations and exchanges of view, the African Group, and especially SWAPO, has shown a sense of realism,, But we must not forget that a continuous display of realism could undermine credibility. We must be careful what we do lest we lose credibility. The crucial issue is how to combine realism with the preservation of that valuable credibility. The demand by SWAP0 that the Deccrnber internal elections should be condemned, rejected and challenged is legitimate and in line with the policy of my Government. This demand is not over-ambitious and no delegation is expected to balk at it. The other demand-that South Africa should implement resolution 435 (1978)-does not constitute a departure from what has been accepted. That resolution was adopted on 29 September in the presence of an unusually distinguished parade of Foreign Ministers. 17. The other point raised in the course of our contacts relates to the situation in Namibia as a threat to international peace and security. To us there is nothing new in this proposition. On numetous occasions the General Assembly has determined that the situation in Namibia constitutes a threat to world peace and security and that therefore the invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter is valid and legitimate. Some of us may disagree, and such disagreement highlights the difference between the voice of 19. On the face of it, this commitment sounds honest and promising but there is no commitment that such internal settlement will be dealt with politically, economically and by other means if, after the elections, South Africa does not agree to elections supervised by the United Nations. The paragraph in question contains an expression of a state of mind about the internal elections but does not promise any action thereafter. It is in many ways reminiscent of the vaguely worded documents of the ambiguous diplomacy pursued in the early years of this century. 20. My delegation is also baffled by paragraph 4 of the same document, which states that South Africa “will thereafter use its best efforts to persuade them seriously to consider ways and means of achieving international recognition through the good offices of the Special Representative and the Administrator-General”. This paragraph confirms the fears of the international community that South Africa is not committed to fair elections in Namibia. It contains a promise to persuade their proteges, but not to compel them. In other words, the veto power will remain in the hands of the elected henchmen of South Africa. What will happen if the henchmen are not persuaded? The Western Powers have not given an answer regarding this possibility. Will the architects of this agreement accept the imposition of punitive measures if such a situation arises? And what will be the situation if South Africa declares that its powers of persuasion have been exhausted to no avail? 21. The present situation is extremely serious, and the approach of the Council should reflect this seriousness. It is shocking that the Council cannot stop the internal elections. It is also distressing for us to realize that some members have acquiesced in the holding of those elections, although they are not committed to the outcome. But the danger is that that outcome will gather sufficient strength to impose a fait accompli. A realistic approach might be to address a serious warning to South Africa expressing the determination of the Council, in the event of South Africa’s failure to comply with resolution 435 (1978) within a given time-frame, collectively to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter. My delegation believes that we have reached the hmit of our patience. There is no time for vacillation. This is the hour of decision. We must make South Africa realize the inevitability of sanctions if it continues to behave in this manner. Once South Africa realizes that it has no 23. Mr.. HULINSKY? (Czechoslovakia) (interpretation porn Russi&): Mr. President, my delegation wishes to express its satisfaction that you, the representative of an African country, are conducting the proceedings of the Security Councilin a month during which we are dealing with questions of such vital importance for your continent, and not for your continent alone. At the same time I should like to take the opportunity to point out that relations between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Republic of Gabon have been friendly ever since your country attained independence in 1960. They have been developing in a mutually advantageous and positive direction since 1976, when our countries established diplomatic relations and exchanged diplomatic representatives. 24. I should also like to thank the representative of France, Ambassador Lcprette, for the skilful and experienced way in which he conducted the proceedings of the Council in October. 25. The many years of discussion of the Namibian question in the Security Council and in other bodies of the United Nations have repeatedly compelled US to reach the same conclusion: Soutrh Africa will never voluntarily agree to a settlement in Namibia in accordance with the numerous decisions of the United Nations calling for the immediate cessation of the illegal occupation of that rich but sorely tried and long-suffering Territory. The tactics of the South African authorities change, but their ultimate goal clearly remains the same: the perpetuation in one form or another of colonial and racist: domination of Namibia. 26” In order to secure that objective, the representatives of the South African authorities have recently even been declaring their alleged readiness to react favourably to a s&tlement in Namibia which would be in line with the just demands of the international community, but the facts, the concrete political administrative measures taken by the SoL;lh African authorities in Namibia, simply demonstrate t.hat the Pretoria regime has never even really considered going along with the serious negotiations with regard to a genuine settlement of the Namibian problem. As we all know, even while the various kinds of diplomatic negotiations recently held were proceeding, South Africa was constantly strengthening its military potential in the Territory, exp<anding its network of military bases, creating various military and paramilitary formations and training detachments of mercenaries, The racists have been stepping up their repression of the Namibian people and its 27. This goal of the racists of South Africa has once again been clearly and visibly demonstrated in the decision ta hold unilateral elections in Namibia in December this year, and, in general, in their attitude towards the basic pro. visions of the report of the Secretary-General contained Ia document S/12827. The implementation of the results of the most recent talks of the five Western countries with South Africa, as submitted to the Council in documeat S/12900, would lead to a situation in which it would be impossible, even formally, to say that the process of a political settlement of the Namibinn problem would be taking place under the control and supervision of the United Nations. The demands of the South Africra authorities, even in the form in which they were accepted by the five Western countries, as set out in documeat S/12902, boil down to this: the process should take place, in actual fact, under the total control of South Africa, while the United Nations would have allotted to it only the role of a passive onlooker. Can anyone therefore be surprised, in view of this situation, that SWAPO, by a telegram from its President dated 23 October [see S/ZZI1.3/, rejected the results of the talks at Pretoria as unacceptable, and asked the Security Council, in ac. cordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, to impose comprehensive, mandatory sanctions against the South African racist rigime. 28. Czechoslovakia supports that position of SWAP0 and also its demands, which enjoy the support of African and a number of other countries. At the moment, the necessary conditions do not exist for the proposed journey of the Special Representative of the IJnited Nations to Namibia. 29. At the present lime it is not sufficient simply to condemn the actions of South Africa or merely to tnakc statements to the effect that its unilateral measures with regard to the elecloral process will be viewed as devoid of juridical validity. The duty of the United Nations, which bears direct responsibility for Namibia until such tirue as the Territory attains genuine self-determination and np tional independence, is to bend every effort to thwart the implementation of the Ireaclwrous plans of tilt: Sdl African r&ime. 30. The road to ensuring a just solution of the Nadiafl problem has been indicated in numerous decisions of tile Organization, as set out in the Declaration on Namibia aad the Programme of Action in Support of Self-DetcrminatiO~l and National Independence for Namibia adopted on 3 May 1978 by the General Assembly at its ninth special session [resolution S-Y/Z/. At this stage of the discussion of this item, we believe it indispensable to focus attention on the fact that the General Assembly stated chat it rejcctcri 31. In accordance with the decisions of the United Nations, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has always favoured, and continues to favour, the immediate exercise by the people of Namibia of its inalienable right to self-determination and independence on the basis of the preservation of the unity and territorial integrity of the country, and we are in favour of the immediate and total withdrawal of the forces and the administration of South Africa and the transfer of power to SWAPO, which has been recognized by the United Nations as the sole legitimate and genuine representative of the people of Namibia. 32. The liberation of Namibia from colonialist, racist occupaticn has become a task which brooks no further delay, and until that task has been carried out and as long as the South African authorities continue to maintain and strengthen their domination in Namibia, all Members of the United Nations must not only abide by the United Nations decisions but also increase their efforts to produce effective measures which will force the racists to bow to the will of the international community. It is our belief that the policy of the racists of South Africa with regard to Namibia, as has repeatedly been stressed in United Nations resolutions, represents a serious threat to peace and security in the southern part of the African continent and beyond it. 33. On the basis of what I have said, my delegation believes that the Security Council must, and speedily, take a decision which would actually and in practice force South Africa finally to bow to the will of the United Nations and the resolutions adopted by its organs,

I wish to express to you, Sir, my sincere congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council. We wish you every success in your difficult task and assure you of our resolute co-operation. The convergence of the national aims of Gabon and Bolivia lies in their similarity of circumstance. As far as personal relations are concerned, my delegation holds you in the highest regard. 35. I must say again that Bolivia is firm and resolute, together with all the dependent peoples of the world, not only because of anti-colonialist and anti-racist principles but because it has itself sufrered from every excess of territorial and economic depredation. As a native people of despoiled Latin America, we Bolivians suffered the most from colonialist and even racist pillaging. 36. I wish also to convey our appreciation of the excellent and intelligent work carried out by Ambassador Leprette, representatjve of that great nation, France, which is so highly regarded by Bolivia. 37. Just when we thought that WC had finally managed to set this long-standing problem of Namibia on the right 38. There is nothing really to add to all that has already been said. This is a subject that has been dealt wilh exhaustively. None the less, it is a problem that is farther than ever from solution, through the historical objective stated in paragraph 2 of resolution 435 (1978), to wit: “the withdrawal of South Africa’s illegal administration from Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations”. 39. In order not to repeat everything that has already been said and heard and end up, perhaps, by confusing the Council, my delegation wishes to mention only two preoccupations. The first relates to the responsibility that we must assume for our own resolutions. The worst kind of negation is that of oneself. We must be consistent with what we have ourselves said. The second relates to the many ways in which the authority of the Security Council is being eroded, 40. We sincerely welcome, as a positive contribution, every effort to achieve peace in different parts of the world, because we are aware that world peace has to be objectively affirmed by regional peace, Therefore, Bolivia is a resolute advocate of the declaration of zones of peace, in the regional sowing of seeds of partial peace, the fruitful harvest of which will be world peace, the aim being the ultimate humanization of our humanity, which is rather doubtful at this stage because of colonialism and racism. My delegation welcomes all initiatives aiming at peace and has supported every effort to foster peace. But it now expresses its disquiet, because those efforts are aimed not only at making a contribution but at frustrating the carrying out by the Security Council of its important responsibilities under the Charter. 41, With these two preoccupations, my delegation believes that we must act in accordance with our ineluctable powers and our important responsibilities to recover the authority that we can lose only at the cost of seriously frustrating the United Nations, the establishment of which Bolivia SUPported and in whose defence Bolivia has always been and will continue to be unswerving. 42. We must be resolutely co&tent with our own resolutions. We must make a final strong appeal for compliance with resolution 435 (1978), and, after a stated period of time, proceed to apply the sanctions provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter. 43. As regards practical action in the search for a specific solution to this problem, the delegation of Bolivia considers that it would not be right for a representative of the United Nations to remain in Namibia because this ~0~1: bc interpreted as an endorsement of unilateral illegal electIons, which violate Security Council decisions, My delegation reiterates that, because of our own decisions and in order to 44. Coming back to the aim, I think it would be appropriate, instead of sending a representative of the Secretary-General, for the Secretary-General himself to go to Namibia to serve notice on the illegal regime of South Africa of its duty to comply with the Security Council’s resolutions in one last attempt at a genuinely democratic 9 solution to the problem of the independence of Namibia, a matter in which we have so long been involved and with such anguish. Once this final measure has been attempted, if there is an equally definite refusal, sanctions should be applied. It could never then be said that the Council had not made every effort, with the fullest consideration and prudence, but with firm authority, to achieve a peaceful solution of the problem. 45. An initiative of this type would help us to achieve the objectives we are seeking. We are ready to embody it in a draft resolution if there is agreement on this, particularly among the countries of the African Group, with which Bolivia wishes to express once again its solidarity.

Mr. President, 1 join others before me in congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of this Council for the month of November. It is fitting that an African is in the Chair when the Council is continuing its deliberations on the situation in Namibia. 47. I also extend the gratitude of my delegation to Ambassador Jacques Leprette of France for the exemplary manner in which he conducted the business of the Council during the month of October, when this debate commenced. 48. Permit me to utilize some of the most recent developments concerning Namibia in order to bring into harp focus recent events in the Territory. Until early in 1977 three principal elements or parties were involved in this whole process: first, the international community as represented at the United Nations; secondly, SWAPO, representing the aspirations of the Namibian people; and thirdly, South Africa, the usurpers of the Territory. 49. In 1977 the five Western members of the Security Council came into the picture. We believed that they would use their special relationship with South Africa to facilitate the implementation of resolution 385 (1976) which they had unanimously supported. Even at that stage I was perturbed personally, and my Committee, the Co.nmittee against Apartheid, felt the same way, by the play on words by certain Western delegations, which preferred imprecise language in resolution 385 (1976) like “supervisory control” in place of “supervision and control”. And 1 might remark in passing that even today this aspect of control is being gradually left out of much of the rhetoric by certain of those same delegations. 1 hope this is an oversight. 51. During this process, South Africa threatened to call off the negotiations from time to time. The racists double-talked about “acceptances” and they alleged that SWAP0 wanted power handed over directly to it. This we all know was not a correct reflection of the facts. The level of their genocidal and offensive incursions deep into neighbouring independent territories during the period of negotiations is well documented. They lied that those incursions were a matter of “hot pursuit” into guerrilla camps and bases. We have all the information depicted, in this very building, on film and in photographs, to show that almost invariably they actually massacred hundreds of women and children in refugee camps. All this was obviously in an attempt to derail the process of the transition of Namibia to genuine independence. SWAP0 gallantly stood fast and firm, in the conviction of its responsibilities and obligations to ensure the aspirations and long-term welfare of their people. 52. Let us again recall that the proposals of the West fell short of the letter and spirit of resolution 385 (1976). SWAP0 made concessions on the number of South African troops to be retained in Namibia during the transition period. This went beyond the resolution, which called for the removal of all South African troops. SWAP0 has accepted the presence of the South African paramilitary police force in Namibia, although they are to be monitored by the United Nations. The recent statements of the South Africans and the Western Five are not very succinct and therefore not clear on this point. To crown it all, SWAP0 also agreed to a cease-fire, which I have always described as a surrender, in order to participate in free and fair elections which would also involve all those who had been against them. It accepted in good faith resolution 432 (1978) and, most important, it proved that, given free and fair elections, as the legitimate and authentic representative of the Namibian people, not just because it is so described by the Security Council and the General Assembly but because it is so in fact on the ground, SWAP0 would triumPh. On the other hand, all action to date by South Africa is to block such elections, which they know they will lose, and to do all they can to exclude SWAP0 from those elections. 53 One is forced to ask: what concession has South Africa made in all this process? If my memory sW.W me right, I would say none. Perhaps the only concession was their condescension in sitting and negotiating on the proposals of the Western Five, especially on the eve of the ninth special session of the General Assembly on Namibia, believing that their acceptance of them would pre-empt the 54. The South Africans moved into Kassinga and caused all the bloodshed which we saw on film, again in this building. They hoped that this would be the final straw for 8WAPO and that they would reject the convening of another meeting, thus giving the impression that South Africa had the upper hand. 55. To follow this up, when the Security Councilincluding the Five-accepted the report of the Secretary- General which was to move the process forward to elections, we thought we had seen the light at the end of the tunnel; but in its psychogenically devious approach, South Africa frustrated the process by deliberately disagreeing with the Secretary-General’s implementation of the proposals. Our profound consternation petered out when the five Western members pronounced that the report, based on expert appraisal by the Secretary-General’s team of experts, civilian and military, conformed with the letter and spirit of the proposals of the Five. This made no difference to the scheming South Africans, but we were also glad to learn that, in spite of South Africa’s recalcitrance, the Foreign Ministers had gone to Pretoria to secure acceptance by South Africa of the decision of the international community as reflected in resolution 43.5 (1978). Obviously this was what we thought they had gone to do. The results anticipated were very clear to all of us, The actual outcome fell far short of our reasonable expectations, None of us-and I dare say not even the principal actors among the Five-could have imagined that the Five, represented at the level of Foreign Ministers, would go to Pretoria for any other reason than to secure compliance by South Africa with resolution 435 (1978). It would be rather sadistic if 1 went further and described how they spent the three days in South Africa, waiting in the corridor for Botha to finish his consultations with his surrogates from Namibia, before talking to them at all. The West was comfortably placed for this, with its often-pronounced commitment to solving the problems of southern Africa, and the inherent leverage emanating from the might of the Western Powers; furthermore their honour and prestige were at stake, in particular in salvaging the situation in Rhodesia and in Namibia and, in addition, they had the complete and total support of the international cmmu&y. 56. But as I said earlier, the outcome of the Pretoria meeting was disturbingly hazy and incoherent. In its main thrust and substance, it was contradictory to resolution 435 (1978), for the following reasons. 57. First, the South Africans saw fit to give their own interpretation o$ the United Nations plan. They asserted the primary role of their own police force in the maintenance of law and order during the transitional period. One is confused by the form of words used: nothing is said about supervision and control and the role of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in this sector is rendered subject to contradictions which will he to be cleared up. Clearly the South African police force in 58. The role of monitoring and controlling South African security forces must be a primary responsibility of UNTAG, and the Western Five will no doubt be kind enough at some point to explain to us what the formulation of words used in their joint statement means when it talks about the paramount role of the South African police in civiIian control. 59. Secondly, in the joint statement the Western Five appear to have reneged on their original commitment to the UNTAG figure of 7,500 men-“appear to”, I say. A reduction of the military troop level of 7,500 would be unrealistic, taking the size of Namibia into consideration. Account has already been taken of the 2,600 men to be deployed on logistic duties, thus further depleting the actual number of men available for such vital duties as the all-important role of monitoring the residual South African forces supposedly confined to two locations in northern Namibia. 60. Here again, my delegationhopes that our reading of this is wrong, for it calls into question the earlier acceptance of the Secretary-General’s report by the Security Council, including the Western Five, and the good judgement of General Philipp, all of whom consider this troop level th.e barest minimum. It will also discourage SWAP0 and all those ~110 join SWAP0 to allow South Africa to retain any troops whatsoever in Namibia during the transitional period. Unless the Council intends to assist South Africa in its plans to sabotage one of our objectives, the creation of conditions conducive to free and fair elections, we should reject South Africa’s objections to the size of UNTAG, and South Africa should be clearly so informed. 61. Finally, and most disturbingly, Pretoria has reaffirmed its intention to proceed with internal elections in December without guaranteeing elections supervised by the United Nations next year, In spite of resolution 435 (1978), South Africa merely agreed to make efforts, as many speakers before me have underlined, to “persuade” its surrogates who arc to be elected in the December “elections” to seek internationaI acceptability. Indeed, this is true to the tradition of that country. No one can believe that such leaders will agree to their own self-dissolution four months later in order to facilitate elections supervised and controlled by the United Nations, which they know they will certainly lose. 62. The Western Five cannot now insist, in the terms of their joint statement of 19 October [S/12900, annex Ig, that resolution 435 (1978) is still the vehicle for the genuine independence of Namibia, for in paragraph 4 of &at statement South Africa is allowed to reaffirm its intention to hold internal elections in Namibia. Attempts by the Western Five to balance that paragraph with their own paragraph 5 are superfluous and redundant, since resolution 435 (1978) had already determined that any electoral process outside the United Nations plan would be null and void. Thereby the Western Five have allowed an 63. Having said dl that, it is reasonablc to conclude that the outcome of the démarche with South Africa was basically unsuccessful, even though that u’énrurcfrr in itself was ver-y commendable. It is clear that the interna1 elections arc in contradiction to ail United Nations resolutions relevant thereto, culminating in 43.5 (1978). Such elections, if they took place, would be a travesty of fret and fair elections; they would bc on tribal and racial lines and would seek to consolidate these. South Africa has no good faith to offer, and we must treat with it accordingly. This all accords with the track record of South Africa at home, in particufar during the last few wecks. 1 hope you Will allow me to go into this, Mr. President, although it is not directty relevant, because it illustrates what I described earlier as the psychogenic traurnata with which we are deallng and the.South African mental problem. 64, The intentions of the apartheid rtgimc and its master plan are obvious. Lt has made it clear that it seeks to bantustanizc the wholc of southern Africn under South African domination. A fcw weeks ago that rdgirne staged an election in the South African bantustan of Vendaland. Its puppets were totally routed in thc elections. Thereafter the rt$irne detalned the newlyelected members and stacked the socalled legislative assembly with puppet chiefs who would accept the sharn so-called indepcndencc of Vendaland. Think about this. Think about Namjbîa. 65. A few months ago so-called elections were staged in Soweto. The rbgime detained all the genuine leaders of the peoplc of Soweto before the elections, as it had donc in the Transkei, using the local chiefs there. In spite of nll thcir intimidation, only 6 per cent of the voters went to the polis. The régime then declated the candidates rejected by the people to be the leaders of Soweto. 66. It plans to enact the same farce in Namibia; 1 certainly have no doubt about that. Thc socalled elections in December are rejected by ail the poptdar organizations allowed to speak in Namibia and by ail thc churches. But the South African régime is proceeding with its plans in order to foist the thoroughly discredited Democratic Turnhalle Alliance on the people as the so-callcd leaders of the Territory. 67. We arc not in the least surprised at the manoeuvres of the racist régime, which hopes to scçure h acquie~ence of the Western Powers by raising a scare about communism and by propagatinp the myth that SWAPO is a Marxist organization because it receives support from socialist States, among others. 68. We were not surprised to read the statcment of the racist Prime Minister P. W. Botha at the meeting with the tive Western Ministers, which has been givcn sanction as a document of the Sccurity Councif. That shameful distortion of the facts is ln .document S/l2900. It is very interesting to read that document, and 1 am sure that evcn 69. At this stage, thcrefore, it is logical that certain steps should have to be tnkcn in relation to Namibia. If il were my duty to dictate tbose ternis, 1 would say immcdiately that WC should bring the full wcight of thc provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter to benr on South Africa to get it to bow to the gcneral wish of thc international community and suuthern Africa as a wholc, but ours is a dcmocrntic group and 1 believe that the spcctrum of opinion in the Security Council and in thc United Nations is vcry broad indeed. 1 am certain that in making thcse rccommendations 1 an1 not cornpromising my own position, thc position of niy Çovcrnment or that of Afriça. 70. First, we must condemn thc intcrnal clcctions and, in a vcry clear resolution, call for their rcnunciation by South Africa. Sccondly, thcre rnusl be clcar and uncquivocal acceptancc of rcsolution 435 (1978) by South Africü bcforc any other action is takcn, exccpt that u~dx~ C%apter VII of the Charter, in rcspccl of a thrcnt to thc peacc. Thirdly, thc date for the arriva1 of UNTAG should bc fixed. South Africa bas stalled on this müttcr for over ü month now and no clear solution is in si&t. Thc date uf 29 September, when resolution 435 (1978) wns adopted, ~US, WC undcrstood, D-Day for thc conunenccrnent of the UNTAC; exercise in Namibia. Fourthly, thc date for the clections to bc superviscd m.l coatrollccl by thc Unitcd Nations should be fixed, That is also ovcrdue. 71. WC should bc ablc to consider a dcadline for this exercise by which time South Africu sh«uld givc a full responsc to all thc preceding questions; that pcriod should not exceed two wceks after a relevant resolution bas bcen adoptcd. 72. As 1 have said, this is only a proposa1 that WC might considcr. 17ven though 1 bave nradc the proposa1 and atn convinced that that is what shoultl bc done, 1 am grcatly concerned about it. 73. Many delcgations recommend that the Sccretary- General should undertake the necessary dér~mrcircs during that period. Thnl possibility could he considcrcd, as long as thereufter thc Council does not dump the problcni on the Secretary-General, as it tends to do when it has fXlcd. Should South Africa fail to comply witlr thc propos& outlined, there should bc autornaticnlly a Council mec lin8 to consider the appropriate steps undet Chaptcr VII of the Charter, and that would cal1 for a report by the Sccretary- General on these matters within the two-wcek deadline. 74. The actions of’ Soulh Africa, whether they are its defiance of the United Nations on the Namibian question, its aggression against its neighbours in southcrn Africa, 75. The reason for that is the clear trend we see evolving in Namibia. By now, the Council is only too aware of the implications of attempts to legitimize the internal settlement in Rhodesia. It has rejected that. It should not allow itself to be hoodwinked and led into a position at some future date where it will have no option but to ask for all-party conferences or other palliatives in Namibia similar to those we have seen in Rhodesia. The stage is now clearly set for free, fair, supervised and controlled elections in Namibia. We must not and cannot afford to move backwards. 76. For its part, Nigeria will continue unequivocally to support SWAP0 and to provide it with moral and material assistance to enable it to step up its armed struggle against the illegal administration in Namibia. If the peaceful option fails, we shall pursue the only option left with greater vigour.

The next speaker is the representative of Guyana. 1 invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

It is appropriate for my delegation first of all to extend to you, Mr. President, and through you to the other members of,the Security Council our sincere gratitude at having been accorded this opportunity to participate in the present deliberations. My delegation would also like to extend its congratulations to you on your assumption of this high office and to express its firm hope that under your presidency the Council will adopt such measures as will serve to accelerate the realization of genuine independence and freedom for the people of Namibia, 79. The past 19 months in particular have witnessed a flurry of diplomatic and other activity in relation to southern Africa, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabweactivity occasioned by various and varying motives and Perceptions. Colonialism in its globai context is on the retreat, but the stratagems formulated and initiated in an attempt to thwart the process of decolonization and the onward march to genuine national liberation and indepcn- ,dence are nowhere Inore in evidence than in southern Africa itself. The citadels of racism which yet stand at Pretoria and Salisbury will, however, not survive the course of history, for even they, embattled and increasingly isolated as they are by the ranks of progressive forces the world over, have been forced to respond to tremors that will shake them from their very foundations. 80. Although we have indeed convened here to consider ways and means whereby the Security Council can most 81. When the General Assembly convened in special session in 1967, we agreed upon modalities and mechanisms through which the United Nations could best discharge its responsibilities with regard to Namibia so as to expedite the attainment of genuine independence by the people of that Territory. Today, 11 years after that historic decision, the responsibility and the preoccupation of the United Nations remain the same, and this must be the pre-eminent area of our concern today, that is, to ensure the early independence of Namibia under the auspices of the United Nations. We must not waver in fulfilling that solemn undertaking. Yet the successful exercise of that responsibility by the United Nations was based upon a very important premise: a willingness on the part of the South African rCgime to comply with the prescriptions of the General Assembly and to co-operate in the transfer of the administration of the Territory to the United Nations Council for Namibia, which js the legal Administering Authority of the Territory, until the achievement of genuine independence. 82. During the course of the past 19 months, initiatives have been undertaken both within and without the United Nations jn an effort to expedite the granting of genuine independence to the people of Namibia. Today we are met to consjder the results of some of those initiatives. The record of South Africa’s response is clear and unambiguous, and wel] known to all of us. That response has becrl charactcrized by nothing but defiance and intransigence. There are.few indeed who havb ever believed that thCre Was any genuine willingness on the part of South Africa to co.operatc with the United Nations on Namibia. 83. The Security Council now has at1 OppOrtUnitY ami a solemn obligation to decide that the moment tm come for it to make the fullest use of those measures at its disposal that were designed during the drafting of the Charter to bC employed when the totality of the global community and, indeed, tile Council itself, deerllcd that all 0th’ ~WV~S~I’es had been exhausted. That decision must necessarily bc 84. Most recently, in response to resolution 435 (1978), the South African rkgime has indicated that it will not comply with the provisions of that resolution and that it intends to go ahead-might I say impudently-with its plan for the holding of illegal so-called elections during the month of December of this year, that is, next month, This resolve by the illegal South African rkgirne has been communicated to the Security Council in terms that are clear to us. 85. It was in fact this consistent defiance by the South African rkgime that caused the General Assembly, the Council for Namibia, the non-aligned movement and the Organization of African Unity to call upon the Council to adopt the most rigorous measures against South Africa, including the sanctions provided for under Chapter VII of the Charter, so as to compel South Africa to effect a change in its conduct and comply with the United Nations prescriptions on the situation in Namibia. 86. My delegation in reiterating that call, feels that the Council now has no alternative but to invoke such sanctions. This is a decisive stage, and decisive measures must now be employed. The South African rdgime must not be allowed the opportunity to buy more time for manoeuvring, gimmickry and the formulation of stratagems designed to confound the international community, while it presses ahead with its own pet scheme. The future, indeed the fate, of Namibia and of southern Africa must not be sacrificed on the altar of political expediency. The need for continuous and so-called exhaustive consultations with the South African regime must not be invoked as a tactic to stave off appropriate and timely action by the Council. The adoption of resolution 435 (1978) signalled the cut-off point. We agreed that time had run out for South Africa. The Council cannot now afford to place its credibility further in jeopardy by allowing itself to fall victim once again to the manoeuvrings and the caprice of the South African rggime, which has aheady contributed so much to undermining the authority of this most important organ of the United Nations. 87 There remains one final and important observation. Throughout the period of negotiations, SWAP0 has consistently and steadfastly demonstrated its willingness to negotiate and to make concessions. The compromises to which that valiant organization has agreed cannot be called in question. Jndeed, one is left wondering whether the process of decolonization was intended to be implemented by placing pressure on the people struggling for freedom rather than on the alien occupier. This is but another important consideration that must inform the decision to be taken by the Security Council. 88. SWAPO’s willingness to make concessions and its demonstrated sincerity during the course of the negotiations serve as an indication, among other things, of the

The next speaker is the representative of Algeria. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. President, I would first of alI convey my most sincere congratulations to you in your capacity as President of the Security Council for the month of November and as representative of a brotherly and friendly country whicll, like mine, supports the advancement of the Africa11 peoples, particularly those still subjected to the colonial yoke, racism and the apartheid rkghne. I hope that under your presidency the work of the Council will be productive and successful. 91 My delegation also wishes to congratulate Ambassador Leprette, who conducted the business of the Council during the month of October with great competence, thanks to his personal qualities derived from the ancient diplomatic traditions of France. 92, Throughout this year the situation in the whole of southern Africa has been characterized by a series of events in which acts of aggression have alternated with periods of calm which the racist rbgimcs of the subregion have used to advantage to consolidate their alliance and to engage in a great many manoeuvres of all kinds aimed at delaying the liberation of the peoples. 93. The case of Namibia is a tragic example of the maw variations noted in the consideration of this question by the United Nations. In this connexion, my delegation would like to point out that the time-wasting tactics of Seutll Africa, like the hesitation that has characterized the action of the international community, have unduly prolonged the sufferings of the Namibian people, the victims of daily acts of aggression by one of the most retrogressive regimesof the world. It wishes once again to recall that the Organiza. tion has had full responsibility for and duties vis-&vis tile Namibia people ever since it adopted resolution 2145 (XXI), on 27 October 1966, thereby cornmitt@ itself to lead Namibia to independence in conditions in conformity with the ideals of justice and progress. 94. In the Algerian delegation’s opinion, the present debate in the Security Council must strengthen and confirnl the prime responsibility of the United Nations and be viewed as the consolidation of its efforts to achieve the decolonization of the Territory by the implementation of the internationally acceptable plan, in accordance wit11 resolution 385 (1976) taken as a whole, and resolutions 431 (1978), 432 (1978) and 43.5 (1978), subseque]ltlY adopted. 96, The illegal occupation of Namibia, as well as all the forms of oppression and aggression perpetrated by the illegal Pretoria rdgime, still continues because, unfortunately, this rCgime st,iIl receives from certain Western countries unacknowledged obliging help, if not open support, which has had the effect of delaying specific action by the international community against the South African racists. 97. My country bclievcs that a healthy reaction to the Fascist arrogance of I’rctoria is now more pressing than ever, as is the imposition..--and not merely the contemplation of that imposition--of binding sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. The African Group has had in this connexion an opportunity to prepare a draft resolution, expressing all the apprehensions of the African continent as a whole in the face of the threat which South Africa represents for the indcpcndent African peoples and those still colonized. I should like to ask Mr. Leslie Harriman, the representative of Nigeria, to accept the gratitude of the Algerian de]egation and of the whole African Group for having successful]y organtied a day of commemoration in tribute to the late Frantz Fanon for his contribution to the struggle against racism in South Africa. 98. Thus far all the parties concerned have unequivocally expressed their readiness to see the plan for a peaceful settlement implemented, with the exception of South Africa, which is an illegal occupier seeking to prolong its domination over lhc Namibian people and the exploitation of the natural resources of the Territory. 100. In conclusion, the Algerian delegation wishes to reiterate its total solidarity with SWAPO, the sole genuine representative of the struggling Namibian people, and to assure it of Algeria’s total support until genuine independence in a united Namibia has been attained. 99, My delegation wishes to recall that the organization of elections in Namibia, provided for by the settlement plan in conformity with resolution 43 I (]978), must be undertaken under the supervision and control of the United Nations, That implies both the drawing up of the electoral rolls by the United Nations and the guaranteeing of security and order throughout the period provided for the political “A world divided into compartments, a motionless, Manicheistic world, a world of statues: the statue of the general who carried out the conquest, the statue of the engineer who build the bridge; a world which is sure of itself, which crushes with its stones the backs flayed by whips: this is the colonial world. The native is a being hemmed in; apartheid is simply one form of the division into compn tments of the colonial world.“1 The meeting rose at 6 p.m. 1 New York, Grove Press, Inc., 1966. p. 41.