S/PV.21 Security Council

1 suggest that tlrls might he a convenient moment to suspend the,sitting. 1 would suggest that we resume our proceedings at 4p.m. If there is no disagreement with 'that, tllen it is adopted. . The meeting rose al 1.JO p.m. TWISNTY-FIRST MEETING HeM at Churck House, Westminster: L01~don, on Friday, 15 February 1946, al4p.m. President:Mr. N.J. O. MAKIN (Australia). Present: The repl'esentative:s of the following countries: Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, The ~ESIDENT: 1 call upon the representa- tive of Lebanon, who, 1 understand, wishes to make a rejoinder. . Mr. FRANGŒ (Lebanon) (tratlSlated trom French): 1 do not like to leave the members of the Security Council under the impression of the very cloquent speech made by the representative of France. In reality the issue does not lie be- tween an always generousFrance and always discontented Lebanese and Syrians. 1 think it would be well if, in the interests of truth, 1 added a few shadows to the somewhat idyIlic picture which the representative of France painted this morning. 1 shall relate the facts chronologic:illy. This morning Mr. Bidault reminded ûs that, without waiting for the end of the war and while things were still very difficult, General de Gaulle's Govetnment proclaimed the indepen- dence of Syria and of Lebanon in June 1941" even before French and British troops had en- tered those countries. The fact is that in June 1941, when the AIlied High Command decided to undertake the campaign in Syria and Leba- non, in order to drive out of these territories the Vichy authorities and the Germans who were beginning to make use of the aerci:lromes, that Command had only small forces at itsdisposal. 1 think it may nowbe said that there were alto-.. gether about 12,000 British troops and between 2,500 and 3,000 Free French troops. In order to undertake this. campaig-ll and bring it to a successful conclusion, the AIlied ffigh Command needed the support of the Lebanese and Syrian populations. In order to obtain this support, the British and French Govemments realized that the rightful aspirations of the twocountries had to be satisfied. This point is broughtout very clearly in the declaration. made by the British representative, Sir Miles Lampson, for there were two declara- tions, one French and one British. Speaking on behalf of the British Government, Sir Miles Lampson said,on 8 June: "1 amalso authorized to assure you that if you help the Allies and join your forces to theirs, His Majesty's Government in the United King- dom will offer you all the benefits enjoyed by the free countries associated with them." On the· same day General Catroux, speaking on the Jerusalem wireless, said: • See Official Record~ of thtlS.curity Council, First .' Year,First Series, Supplément No. l, Annex 9. . Thus, the recognition of Syria's and Leba- non's. independence was not a pure gesture of benevolence but an act of justice as well as being vital for the war effort. ' But immediately after this recognition of in- dependence, and after these much-quoted proc- lamations of which Mr. Bidault spoke this morn- ing, difficulties arose between us. We asked that our independenceshould become a fact, but objections were raised to our request on mili- tary, politicaI and generaI grounds. Our difficul- ties bega.'l well before 1943,; the events of 1943 were merely the logical outcome or culmination of these difficulties, which had their origin, 1 repeat, in the fact that, while we were asking for real independence, we were being put off with mere proclamations. requête. demandions fective nous tions. 1 note that one of the arguments put forward this morning was Mr. Bidault's remark that Syria and Lebanon wished to be the fust to be rid of foreign troops stationed in their territory at a time when the war period was not yet over and when troops of all nationalities necessarily remained stationed in the territories of belliger- ent countries, which accèpted such ,a burden without demur. 1 note too that Mr. Bidault seemed to be surprised at this. , matin, et être stationnées période terme demeurent, sur-le tent tations. preuve ,gner le justifiée délégation soutenir l'Allemagne le présence alliés, Grèce, motifs ,de sur d'autre munication sont It seems to me that there ïs no 'need ta stress th~ point' that the' presence of foreign troops on the territory of a sovereign Allied country can be justified only by military necessity. The French delegation cannot seriously argue that operations against Germanyand Japan have not reached their conclusion. It has also been said in thisCouncil that there were reasons which might justify the presence of troops on the territory of Allied sovereign States. In speaking of Greece, Mr. Vyshinsky said that ~he~e were. two types of reasons which might Justify the presence of certain troops: the fust, to fight in that territory and help to drive the ,invader from it; and the second, to protect the means of communication of troops which were sa fighting and engaged in driving out the in~ , vader. 1 think that Mr. Bevin drew the right con- clusion when, in speak.mg about Greece, he said: "If the Greek Govèrnment'decides it does not want us, we are not going to impose our- selves upon it".1 The representative of Brazil put the matter in a more general i,)rm when he said: "This does not·mean that 1 approve the prin- ciple -of foreign troops remaining in any country except in the case of ex-enemy countries."2 1 shall not go at length into' the argument which was also put forward this morning that French diplomats were iustrumental in securing our admission at San Francisco. That is a mat- ter which 1 shallleave to futurehistory; but 1 feel bound to point out that t!W;course did not involve mere representations,. and that the spon- ·sarffig·oPew~"S=th.emselvescould· notha\Tem- vited us if we had not been regarded as inde- pendent sovereign States having the right and the privilege to sign .the U~ted Nations Charter. On~the onéhand, we ful:filledall the· neces- sary conditions; wè had done all in our power to aid the common effort during the war. On the other hand, 1. would ask ~eFrenc!l delegation to draw the logical conclusion from the fact of that admission and to say that, if we were admitted at San Francisco and if we now appearas .Members of the United Nations be- fore this Council,the reason is that we·are sov- ereignindependent States whose sovereignty is in no way circumscribed. We would ask him to deduce from this fa<.1: the ultimate conclusion and to say: "We have not the right to maintain 'troops on the territory of these countries, and we are notentitled·to attach any condition to thewithdrawal of such troops". Wehave heen tcild ·that.the French Govern- IIlent, in agreement with the British Govern- ment, >Fias givenevidence of its good will by rais- ing .the question of evacuation in advance,but that the· solution has not yet been embodied in a definite plan; l reàlly fail to understand tItiS argument.-Why shouId•the.êvacuation offoreigntroops stationed OJl. the territory of independent States, who are, --_. . . '. ·1 Sec page 85. 1 Seepage .166•. The excerpt '{rom Mr. de Freitas- Valle'upeech is as Jollows: ''But, of course, that does notimply the Jlrincipleof admitting foreign ttoops to super:vise theho!dingof ele~tion~,·exceptin .the case of "l:x-enemy coui1:~es.'· ' Nor do we understand how the representa- tive of France, in the statement he made this morning, could employ tenus which are gen:.. eraUy called diplomatic but which l, for my part, consider vague and indefinite. We did not seek explanations of the Agreement of 13 De- cember last, which are fully as obscure· as the text of the Agreeme-,ut itself. 1 think it would have been much more logicàl ta say, purely and simply, "We are going ta withdraw our troops; this withdrawàl will take place on such-and-such a date". ln arder ta ·make the circumstances of thÎs withdrawàl palatable ta us, we are told: "French and British traops spared these coun- tries the horrors of war. Can it now be said that they suddenly endanger peace?" 1 -do not need to retrace historical events which are still present in the minili; of aIl. 1need nôt tell you what it w?,s that saved the Middle East.from war: it was resistance; it·was the vic- tory of El Alamein; it was the common effort of all, in which the French shared, but it was not the presence of the French in Syria and Leba;,. non; Unfortunately, 1 cannot pass over in silence. the matter to which Sir Alexander Cadogan, the ·United ~gdom representative, fèlt he had to refer this mm..ning. He said that the state of affairs in Syria and Lebanon had beccme so . exasperating--I think that was his word-that, at the request of the Syrian and Lebanese·Gov- ernments, the British Arni.y had t6. be m~­ tained, and l might even say reinforced, lest the peace should he even more disturbed than . it was in May 1945. Nordo 1 think that, in justification of the re- fusaI ta withdraw, it can be said that these coun- tries are stillthreatened. First of all, 1 would ask: by whom are we threatened? We ·are sur'" rounde<iby friendly countries with wbom we have signed the pact of.the Arab League, be- tween whoni and ourselves we have banished all grounds for conflict, and to whoIn moreover we !1rebound.by the ·wider and -more comprehen- sive Charter of the United Nations. AlI the countries around us, Irepeat, are friendly to us, and if one day a conflictshould arise in the Middle East, 1 think it is much more likely that these countries would be on ourside than on the other side of the barricade. l thinkthat Syria and Lebanon have not been .in any. greater danger than certain countries ~which wereactually invaded. Greece, ta mention oD1y one, was invaded. In connexion with Greece, willingness has been expressed to·with- draw at any time. No attempt was made to put forwards asa pretext Jor maintaining foreign troops on' Greek territory, the factthat Greece had been invaded andcould therefore still be considered as being in danger.

Does the :t:epresentative Qf Syria wish ta make any rejoinder? • Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): 1 agree with my friend, the Chairman of the Lebanese delegatian, in the statemênt he has made. To save tllne. by ..not-repeating the things already said, 1 prefer for the moment to satisfy myself with what he has said. There are other points which 1 prefer to bring up later. Mr. STETTINIUS (United States nf America) : We have now heard the statements of the Syrian and Lebanese representatives concerning the casethey have brought before the Security Council, and the statements of Sir Alexander Cadogan and of Foreign Minister Bidault. The essential point in this case is the request of the Syrian and the Lebanese Governments that the foreign troops ontheir territories should depart at the earliest practicable-date. This ~ase has been brought before ris under Chapter VI of the Charter. Article 33 of that chapter clearly proyideS thatthe p~rties should fust of· all seek a solution by one or another Speaking for the Government of the United States of America, 1 feel that if p-uch negotiations are undertaken it should he clearly understood that the matter remains of continuing concern to the Security Council, which should reserve the right to request information regarding the progress of the negotiations and the results achieved. With regard to the substance of the question that is.before the Council, 1 would like briefly to make cIe?.! the views of my Government. The general policyof the United States is ta support and encourage the rapid withdrawal of foreign JOOpS from the territoryof any Member of the United Nations occupied duringthe war, if the Government of that Member State desires their departure. This general position of my .Government has been made plain on a number of occasions. In comornûty with this general policy, 1 wish to expre,',s the hope of the United States Government Ulat the desires of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments that the foreign troops in their territory should depart at the ~arliest practicàble moment shall he-met by means of cl mutually satisfactory agTeement to that effect. Mr. V~SHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated fram Russian) : NOTE: The following is a translation of a Russian text (Jf Mr. Vyshinsky's statement supplied by the representative of the Soviet Union afterthe meeting. J\fter the discussions ci the Security Council at previous meetings in connexion with the Greek and Indonesian questions, il might have been taken for granted that there would be no difficu1ties in settling such a question as that which has arisen in connexion with the statements of J:he.Lebanese and Syrian Governments. Nevertheless, we have already spent a whole dayexamining these statements, a.nd the impression is created that. attempts are being made in theSecurity Council to find a solution of the problem that wou1d in fact divert us from our real task, and that efforts are being made ta find a solution of the problem contrary, or tending to be contrary, to the considerations of principle that were mentioned in the Security Council when similar C',uestions were being examined. That is why 1 ~eel it is necessary to revert once again to the question of principle;. that is what 1 want to do now. chinsky soviétique et séances pouvait comme. celle tions trouvée clarations l'impression· des tion problèlIle, tion, con.tradiction qui l'examen. quoi de· plus, tion faire. We have heard the explanations of the representative of the French Government and head of the French delegation, .Mr. Bidault, and the explanations of Sir Alexander Cadogan, who Bidault;. çais de It is quite understandable that to such a memoran.ium, in view of the position wmch is expressed in it, the Syrian and Lebanese Governments could give only the answer wmch the}' did give. On 19 May 1945, the Lebanese Government stated that it was unable ta carry on negotiations under the thrcat of armed forces and added that, in the form in wmch it appeared, this memorandum was, in its spirit, suppositions and aspirations, incompatible with the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon. A similar statement was made a day later by the Syrian Government, wmch reacted ta this note in the same way. The Syrian note of 20 May stated that: "In view of these facts the Syrian Government, wmcll has more than once givèn proof of its conciliatory spirit and desire ta solve the problems existing between France and Syrla, considers that the memorandum (this refers to the memorandum of 18 May 1945) by virtue of its spirit and form makes demands that are incompatible with the sovereignty of Syria; and for this reason the Syrian Government is unable to c~ on negotiations with France." vernement breuses df.sir entre mémorandum 18 sa dépendance vernement France des français vernements syrien et libanais ne pouvaient , dérer souveraineté que' ne qui souveraineté et une Gouvernement sécurité que examirler les conditions tian les, quelle That is how the matter stond with regard to the conditions referred to by the French Government in May 1945, conditions wmch the Syrian and Lebanese Governments could not fail to qualify as a violation of the sovereignty of Syria and Lebanon. And, as such, they mU$t he qualified by all who have the right idea of sovereignty and of the violation of sovereignty. Now, when we hllVe heard in the Security Council the statement of the representative of the French Government, Mr..Bidault, who said that the French Government wasprepàred to cûnsider the conditions under wmch it would be possible to. find a way out of L'le existing situation, the question naturally arises as te .:hat conditions Mr. Bidault has in mind and now is referrmg ta, Are they not the conditions wmch were put forward in the note of 18 May 1945; or are they something e1se, and in that case, what exactlyare these conditions? Can the" Security Council be satisfied with a -statement of that kind on the very serious'and împortant, a.nd 1 would say, Very dangerous question whichis now being discussed in the Security Council? The French Government, as Mr. Bidault has saiq, is prepared ta discuss the conditions wmch might solve the problem in question. But he did not say what he had inview. What are these dans d'autres conditions peut-il rations sur la question très sérieuse et tante préoccupe français, les conditions qui permettraient, de rœoudre cette question. par "Of course, the presence of oil in certain re- • 1 gions in.Syria, andin a.Jl)7 ça.s~ the int~rest in .the control of each of the pipe-Unes leading to the Mediterran,ean, and the interest in the oil of Iraq,.including the share belonging to France, which is theonly possession·of the kind we have in t1J.e whole.world,. might exercise an influence on the.position of Great Britain; but other considerations aIso exercise influence on the. leaders of the British Empire. Nobody can regard as a mere ptetext .the uneasiness. which they con-· stantly express in respect of the influenceof the events in Syria and Lebanon on the position of England in other Arab countries of the East." . . Whatconclusio'ris did De Gaulle draw from "this atthetime? Itwould beinteresting, 1 would . "We have the statement of Sir Alexander Cadogan, who said of this Anglo-French Agreement, that, of course, it was not an ideal one. I.think that Sir Alexander is liberal in the case in question. From the point of view of the elementary principles. of international law, this Agreement is simply illegal, simply unfair in régard to the sovereignty of Syria and Lebanon; of course, it is impossibleto speak of any ideal in this case. . accord But, apart from whether this Agreement is an ideal one or not, let us treat it as a facto There is an' agreement known as the Anglo-French Agreement of 13 December 1945. What is the result of this Agreement from the point of view of the lawful demandsof the Syrian· and Leba- 1 must draw particular attention to a subparagraph of this agreement, which concerns the United Nations. 1 do not consider it necessary to examine this Agreement from various standpoints. 1 have already said that, from the point of view of the Soviet delegation, it is not in keeping with the essential demands of respect for the sovereignty of a sovereign State. 1 want to draw attention to that part' of the agreement which concerns the United Nations. 1 want ta draw attention to this as the representanve of a State which is a Member of the United Nations, whose prestige is invcîlved in this agreement. 1 have in view the following sub-paragraph of the Agreement. PIease allow me to quote-it: "The programme of 'evacuation will be drawn up in such a way that it willensure.the maintenance in the Levant of sufficient forces to guaranty security,'until such time as the United Nationshas decided on the organization of collective security in this zone." 1 would like to ask the authors of the Agreement what is meant by the statement that the programme of evacuation will be drawn up in such a·way that.it will. ensure the maintenance in the Levant of sufficient forces to gmixantee security in thatzane? What does it mean except that provision was made beforehanci, by the Agreement of 13 December 1945, that the foreign troops should re. -cain in ~yria and Lebanan even after 13 December 1945 and that they should remain in order "ta guarantee security in that .area"? What does it lllean except that they' would remainthere until the United Nations settles the .. problemsconnected with collective , security in that zone? cI1fiust say that 1 am. unaware, and so, 1 hope, are the other rnembers of the Council, that the United Nations proposed ta·takë any special decisions regardingcollective security in that 2(one. Where did this·idea. com.e from? .Why was refer.. ~l1ce made in thisagreemenito the United Nations whiêh,it 'Wasalleged~wastoJake a decision • reg1J.rding collective secUI:ity in that zone? GenerallY speaIcing, what has thisiodo with~he 1 pass to the next question. According to Sir Alexander Cadogall, British troops appeared in Syria and the Lebanon at a cime when it was necessary to render harmless the Vichy regime entrenched in these countries. Later on, aftel' this task had been accomplished, British troops were compelled to intervene in the conflict between the French troops and the Syrian population. These clashes involved bloodshed, and we have been reminded here that British troops were forced to inte:rvene ta l'estare order. Accordingly, the presence of British forces in Syrîa in May 1945 was brought about, or associated with, disorders which took place in connexion with the presence there of French forces which - had dashed with the Syrian population. Under the circumstances it is not a question of estab- Iishing "collective security in this zone", but of removing from it the collective insecurity created by the presence of foreign troops. It appears from the explanation~ given by Sir Alexander Cadogan and Ml'. Bidault that this danger arose in consequence of the presence of French troops and the infringement of Syrian sovereignty, and that the presence of British troops became neèessary in order to have this danger removed. In other words, if one asks, as did Ml'. Frangie, head of the Lebanese. delegation, against whom it was necessary to maintain troops in Syrla, it will appear that British troops were concentrated there to prevent disorders resulting from the presence of French ~oops, whileFrench troops were being kept there because the British troops would not leave. AIl this goes under the name of "respect for .sovereignty." This, indeed, calls for a new dictionary of international law. It seems to me that the explanations we have heard here from Sir Alexander and Ml'. Bidault go to show that in reality the circumstances which afforded justification historically for the presence of British and French troops -in Syria .and Lebanon have passed, thatthe circumstances wmch justified their presence in connexion withthe struggle against German aggression no _longer exist, l:.i1d that the conditions which might. have legalized or justified the presence of Allied foreign forces in an Anied country have now lapsed; they no longer exist. During the discussion. of the Greek question here, it was recognized that Allied troops may remain in an Allied _country only at the invitation of Ule government concerned, or foz: the purpose of safeguarding communications. This' was one of the arguments raised -in opposition to the Soviet demand for the evacuation of British forces from Greece. It was saÎd, "But British troopsare there because the, Greek Government asked forthem." Now, the opposite is being asked .for. Why, then, dothese troops Sir Alexander Cadogan said that "We~ Great Britain and France, or perhaps only Great Britain, must not be held responsible for, peace and arder in Syria and Lebanon." This question calls for à very direct and clear answer. As far as the Soviet Government is concerned, it will readily and immediately release France and ... Great Britain from this responsibility, especially since no one'has ever saddled them with such' responsibility. 1 believe that Syrîa and Lebanon, the countries affected more direcdy than anyone eIse in this matter, will also gladly release them from this responsibility. As sovereign States, they must themselves bear the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in their own countcies, and no one can prevent them from doing sa. Our Organization must help them in this connexion. This follows from Article 2, paragraph 6, of the Charter, which says: . "The Organization shall ensure that States which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these principles sa far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security." If even a non-member must act in .such a manner as ta ensure the implementation of the principles laid down ID this'Article, then these mIes should applyto an even greate:ç extent ta aState which is a Member of the, United Nations. Ta my mind, the question is a very simple one. Since you, Sir Alexander Cadogan, argued in the case of Greece against the legal grounds for demanding the withdrawal of British troops from Greece, whenthe Greek Government itself "Fequested" the retention of these British troops, we believed that" under these circumstances,' British troops should be withdrawn aIl the same since the Greek Government was making a mis.,. .take in this'case.'What ·grounds, then" are tliere now forrefusing ta withdraw British and French troops, ,when two sovereign nations, two Mem- ; ,,,,ners of the United Nations, Syria and Lebanon, ,..~'c'"" ':,'askin the Security Council for the withdrawal 1 of thêse troops from their territories? 't \ The way oufis very simple: nofurther negotiations of any kind. The matterhas reached the Security Council.We have before us aIl th~ elementsfor the consideration of this dispute, because this isa dispute,andthispoint wa,s very aüthorital;ively cleared up yesterday, by Mr. " "Bevin, and, this dispute must be settled on the 'basisof the Char~er. Mr.Bidault says, "Ida not The question brought before the Security Council by the Syrian and Lebanese Govern- ~ents, and the statements made by their representatives and by those of the French and United Kingdom Governments, involve, in the view of the Chinese Government; a very important principle. lt is this: the maintenance of foreign troops in the territory of a frieÎldly sovereign State withoutthe express consent of that State is a prima fade case of limitation of its sovereignty hlcompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and wit}l the recognized principles of. in,ternational law. Such troops should be withdrawn as soon as possible. In the present case, the French and British troops were sent.to Syria and Lebanon for the purpose of prosecutillg the war against the corn'" mon ellemy~ This being the origin of their presence in the Syrian and Lebanese territories, such troopsshould be completelywithdrawn when the necessity arising out. of the war· has passed and the purpose of"their presence has been fulfilled. . The'PRESIDENT: 1 desire to say a few words, in my capacity as the representative of Aus- TRALIA, regarding the matter that is now before the Council. The purposes for which British and French troops originally went ta Syria and Lebanon are ' well known. The Governments of Syria and Lebanon contend, however, that· these purposes have now been carried out, and state categori~ cally that they now wish these troops to be withdrawn. The representative of Syria added that British troops ;would have been withdrawn al~ ready but that bis Government wanted with~ drawal of all foreign troops 'to be simultaneous. There is a clear distinction, therefore, between, this case and the other cases which have come before the SecUrltyCouncil recentIy. In all the other cases, foreign troops were present in a particular country with the'consent of the Government of the country where they were stationed. ln the case of Iran, the provisions of a treaty applied. As regards Greece and Indonesia,the respective Governments informed the Council that they agreed to the continued p.resence of the foreign troops concerned. Where, however, a sovereign State, wmch is ~., Member of the United Nations, informs the Council" that foreign troops are stationed within its borders without the,consent of the Government of that country, the Copncil is bowid to give close consideration to the matter. , The Anglo~FrenchAgreement of 13 Decembre 1945 states that the French Government will retain forces re-groupedin Lebanon until such time as the United Nations has decided on the organization of collective security in, this zone. Therepresentatives of Syria and Lebanon daixned,ineffect, that two individual, POwers have no right to undertake the responsibility .of guaranteeing security on the territory of another State.. It is clear from the statements whichhave beenimade to theCouncil that there have been negotiations between. the parties ,in an effort ta secure withdrawal by agreement. In my opinion, thesenegotiations should be continued with a view ta, sèC1,uingsuch agreement at the earliest possible daté. This is one of the means of sett1e~ ment recognized by Article 33 of the Charter. The restrainedmanner in whicli the parties havepresented' the facts as' they see them to the Council e~courages me to believe that further negotiations would achiéve results quickly. 1 .' think, therefore, that it wouldbe sufficient if the Mr. RIAz (Egypt) (translated tram French) : In the case before us now, there are two opposing lines of argument. The representatives of the Governments of Syria and Lebanon have based their arguments on a very simple and absolute1y cIear principle, 'a principle which, 1 would say, is crystal clear: they have based it on the principle of the sovereign equality of States, on Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter, which has aIready been quoted and which 1 now quote again because it has certain consequences. It is an immutable principle of our Organization. According to the terros of the Charter, "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovèreign equality of aIl its Members." Notice the words "is based". That is the principle, and we must draw aIl the necessary consequences from it. They are very simple, as simple as the principle itself: every State is answerable for what takes place on its territory, and noState has the right to interfere , in the military or other 8\ffairs of another State. 1 return ta that paragraph of the Charter. If you damage that principle, you are damaging our Organization. If sucll a cIear and weIl-es.- tablished principle is put in doubt, 1 think-I say this ta aIl the representatives here assembled -that it would be better 1:or us to disband this Organization and leave to the five great Powers, the right to do what they think fit for the main-' tenance of peace and security.But since our Organization is based on this principle, we must maintain it at aIl costs. In opposition to tbis very simple argument we have the French argument, which is based not on a text of the Charter ,but on moral, political, historical and, 1 would eveln say, opportunist considerations, wmch may perhaps be valid from the French pOD."1.t of view, but which ought to yield before .the principle which 1 have just recalled. For the French argumen! does not rest on~y iegal hasis; it is no more based on the text of the Charter than on recognized principles of internationallaw. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs has, however, felt obliged to submit to us not a legal argument.but an attempt to base his argument on,logical reasoning. He has told us that there wère certain obligations arisingout ofthe mandate and out of France's presence in these countries, and that his country was therefore obliged ta maintain troops in Syria and Lebanon until it was relieved of that responsibility by the United Nations. 1 think that the French Government itself is not very convinced by this argument, for when it sàys that it has an obligation in these areas, it should respect this obligation -in the case of Syria âs weIl as in that of Lebanon. " There is another argument, that of collective security. There the :French are relying on the Agreement of 13 December 1945 with the British Government. 1 think that so many holes have aIready been picked in that Agreement this afternoon that 1 can confine myself to a very few words about it. Why should France and England ,assume responsibility for collective security? Under what authority do they do so? l shall return to' this point later, for·1 fust wish to dispose of the main arguments put forward by Mr. Bidault this morning. He asked us whether it was contrary to the Charter to lay' this matter before the United Nations. 1 do not think so. But what 1 do consider an infringement of the Charter is to endeavour to usurp the place of the Security Council. There is a very explicit Article in, the Charter, Article 43, which deals with collective security. 1 would ask you to read it attentively. As 1 understand it, it contains ali the essential factors of the problem before us. It says that "Ali Members of the United Na-:- tions, in order ta contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its cali and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities . -. ." Further on, paragraph 3 lays down .,that these agreements shall be negotiatcd "on the initiative' of the Security Council". Sucb. are the texts, which govern collect;~e security in.OUi" OrganizatioIi, and the manner in: wmch it is to be organized. 1 can see onJy oneauthority, andthat is the Security Council. AIl auangements must be made on "the initiative" of the Security Council and "on its call", .as the Charter itself says. Iwould therefore put ittothe French and British Governments in the following way: has the Security Council authoriZed .you to act in this way and tospeak of collectivesecurity in a case in which there is only an' agreemént between the two of you?' Even if there were really a threat or danger of war, the Security Council would still be respon- . .mole.···· . l'wouldremind the two Governments which are signatories to that' Agreement of another Article of the Charter, Article 24, paragraph 1 of which states: "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Sect1rity Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of. international peaceandsec1.Îrity ..." Thus an the Members, including the two·Governments which have concIuded tbis Agreement, have c0i;'~crreà on the•.8ecurity Council.the necessal'Y powers for Ïnaintaining peace andsecurÎty. l 'V0uldeven go sa far as ta say· that, •.ifihei'ç' werç ,a, tltteat ,and clangèr to peace, theirduty wouldhave been tu bring such threat or danger to theâttention of theSeçurity Couhcil. . 1 would add one more word. The evacuation of Syria is almost complete, and it seems to me that this is a pracûcal proof that things can'be done quickly. With this hope, and bearing in . mind the lessons of t~e past, 1 think the parties will have no difficulty in reaching agreement and in being good friends in the future. . Ml'. MODZELEWSKI (Poland) (translated fram French) :.The Polish people,whom 1 have the honour to .represent liere, rejoice whenever the family of independent sovereign nations iS increased by the addition of a new Member. It is easy to understand that the tidings that Syria and Lebanon were becoming independent countries weregenùinely welcomed in Poland. This news was all the more pleasing to our ears since it was pmclaîmed by a country to which Poland is linked by tie.s of traditional friendship. Long may they last! It was, 1 think, a just and reasonable gesture redounding not only to the benefit of the peoples of. Syrîa and. Lebanon, but also to thebest interests of the people of France.. But if thisgesture, wbich was made at .; a time when a state of war still existed, could ncitbe given immediate effect, it can and l thin.k must now be carried through to its logical conclusion. 1.agree that we still suffer from the afterrnath ofwar, but 1 think that the Security Council was established for precisely thispurpose: to seek solutions likely to speed the refurn to a normal situation wherever this is necessary. 1 think that ifwe actin this way,we shall be acting in theinterests of aIl the peoples and in the interests of our Organization. Whenever reference is made' in this Council to a situation involv1.:J.g a dispute, we are generally referred to Artide 3-4, which dc::als. with restrict~d sense in wmch fuis text bas been understood which has so far prevented the Security Council from stating its vi.ews clearly on certain questions which have been brought before it. 1 have taken the liberty of bringing this point to the Council's attention today because l am very anxious that it should, this time, give a clear answer to the legally justified request of Syria and Lcbanon. If, nevertheless, the Security Council does not see fit to give such an answer, the Polish delegation will not hesitate to. vote iu snpport of th~ solution asked for by the delegations of Syria and Lebanon, even if my delegation should be in a minority, as has happenedin certaÏ.lî·previüUS cases--for ta he in the minority dces not necessarily mean that on~ is. in the wre'lg. Mr. DE FRElTAS-VALLE (Brazil): 1·beg t~ complete the quotation by the representative of Lebanon of some words 1 pronounced in this Council in a previous debate.1 The principle ta which 1 ,;tated that Brazil was faithful is that no troops should be sent to any coun~, except former enemy countries, ta observe the'regularity of elections.. But another prilldple to which Brazil is faithful is that foreign t'GOpS should be kept in a Member State of the United Nations only by virtue of an agreement and in accord with the GoveI'Ill"'llent of the .country concerned. In the case in question, tl: ~ hope of the Brazilian Government is that negotiations, loyally con· ducted by Syria and Lebanon with France and ' the United Kingdom, will quickly bring a·satisfactory solution. Mr.BIDAULT (FraIlcei (translated trom French): I wish only to say. a few words, but since tw·o qu'estions have.been asked which carry a certajn. moral weight, 1 think 1 ought to ë:'nswer them. >!:zhink it ·w~ my fât'lld the replesentatiV~ of '. Egyptwho questioned wheth~r the French delegatio;n ~', 'iS reaJly cqnvinted of the. soundness of its ownattitude. Iwisll'.to give hirn. the assuranCe, whichhe no doubt' expects, that the ;French~elegation,..of course,·fully.believes in its It app~ars that we have now reached the end of this discussion (1 do not say of this dispute since that ward might lend itself to ~terpre­ tation). The Security Council has. heetrd statements by the Governments of Syrïa and Lebanon and by the French and Blitish Governments. Thus, the Security Council is fvlly informed of the views held by the parties on both sides and of the situation as a whole,'particularly in regard to the instrument on Which Syria and Lebanon are basing their complaints, that is to say the Agreement of 13 December 1945, and t.he interpretation given to that instrument by its signatories. As a reswt of that instrument, a situation came about which my GOVemI.1ent, as it has already stated, i., prepa,œd to examine in conjunction with the Governments of Syria and Lebanon. On the French side, we nevq objected ta the examination of this situation or the previously existing .circumstances by the United Natioris. '. Thùs, when the events which certain delegations have seen fit to bring up took place laSt year, the French Government immediately proposed a procedure of international enquiry which it conceived as foreshadowing the procedures set upsince then under the United Nations .Charter. First, the French Government, in a Note dated 6 June, proposed the convening of a conference composed of the five Governments designated as permanent members of the Security Council. Sinee this offer was not accepted, my Government then proposed setting up a commission Gif enquiry consisting of representatives of neutral countfÏes. This second suggestion, which was submitted at San Francisco, was not accepted eiither. But it seems to me that it is difficult at this stage, or for that matter at any otherstage: ~o accuse the French Government of any desire to avoid an international enquiry into the facts of the case~ Ifsl.1ch an enquiry .had been held, .allthe cotnplaints which have been formulated, pa: -larIy by Mr. Vyshinsky, against the French ~, ernment -whichever French Government it may·becould have been reviewed. Mter Iistening to this discussion, the French delegatill.u. is of the opinion that, if the pfQblem is studied with the necessary impartiaIity, it will he found that there is no dispute Iikely ta endanger peace Of, therefore, to justijy any special action on the part of the Security Council. 1 therefore come back to the conclusions which 1 drew tm'! morning, and suggest to the Council that it should rely on the French Government, together with the British Government and in' agreement with the Governments of Syria and Lebanon, to reach a satisfactory solution of the difficulties whic.n have been submitted to the Council. Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): Before being heard, 1 preferred to know what the French representative had to say in reply to the remarks that had been addressed ta him from various quarters. It seems to me that this is a position with regard ta Syria and Lebanon which is not normal. If there are troops of one country in the territory of another country against the latter's express wishes, that is abnormal. In fact dûs is, as 1 think the representative of China has said, a limitation of sovereignty which it is difficult to reconcile withthe terms of the Charter. That presence, of course, may originally have been very well founded,. and, in the case of Syria and Lebanon,. 1 think that there were very good reasons ïn the beginning for the presence of these foreign trOCipS. But these reasons were of no more than temporary vaiidity. This seems to· hl: admitted by France as wellas by Great Blitain. Britainsays: "1 am ready ta withdraw", France seems ta say: "1 'will withdraw, but in myown good time, and 1 ~k you to give ':Ile yourconfidence". 1 èan very weIl understand the impatience of _~yria and Lebanon tosee these foreign ..troops depart, but on the other hand itis less than one year since Germany surrendeœd. That may seem along time to those whûareanxious to be masterintheirown bouse, b~t is it such a longtime? There are still foreign troops ïn manyolands as a result oftbis war; and if, therefore"France says:. "1 'Willwithdraw, butgiveme your confidence," l do not see that we. shQuld refuse Fi'ance thi§ confiden.ce. Of ,course, Francçwili withdraw; 1 believe that we shall see. that atanot distant date.The world wouldnotlmcierstandif France did not Wjthdraw.Mo~()v~r,.-if t!te.French .' .troops----let us~u~~'~hatfllh Câsearose~ woulc:lllotwithdr,aw,{!le C()uncil c:,dM ',hen ,- . . . - ,,1 1 therefore be1ieve t~::";.t the Council should take note of the stat.mlents made by the four parties; express its confidence that, as a result of negotiations or ...1therwise, the foreign troops in Syria and Lebanon will be withdrawn at no (listant date; request the parties to inform the Council when this has been done, in order that the Council may at any tÎme revert to the question; and pass on to the nexi item of the agenda.

1 take it that the representative makes that as a proposition? . Ml'. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): Yeso

1 should like to consult the Council now as to what it wishes to do. rwould point out that three speakers hav~ indicated their desire to address the Council. In these circumstances, 1 would like to know whether the Council feels it would wish to proceed further or whether we should have an adjournment at this stage. It has been proposed that we should adjourn. 1 would like to know whether it should be until 10 o'dock this evening or until tomorrow morning. Ml'. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): There is a Frenô proverb-Mr. Bidault will correct me if 1 am wrong: La nuit porte conseil. 1 suggest ~e make it tomorrow morning.

The Council stands adjourned until 1i o'dock tomorrow morning. TWENTY-SECOND MEETING Heid at Church House, Westminster, London, on Saturday~ 16 February 1946~ at 11 a.m. P1'esident: Ml'. N. J. O. MARIN (Ausiralia). Pres,ent: The representatives of the following "countries: Amtra1ia, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Mexico, N~therlands, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. ,84. Provisional agenda 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. Letter from the Heads of the Lebanese and Syrian delegatiôhs to the Secretary-General dated 4 February 1946 (docqnient S/5).1 ., 3. Report by the Chairman of the Committee of Experts of the Security Council.on the 1 Seè Qfficial Records 01 the Security Council, First Year, Fii'st Series, Supplement No. ·1, Annex 9.