S/PV.210 Security Council

May 1 interrupt the Australian representative for. one moment? Perhaps I drafted the resolution hadly; I did not mean what the Australian representative said. Of course, what 1 meant to say was that, in the first instance, the. Consuls should make suggestions for the tracing of a line, and these suggestions could then be given to the Committee of Good Offices for their approval or recommendation to us. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): The resolution says just the opposite. Be that as it ma-y, . it is clear that while all this is being done, whether the Consuls do it first or the Committee of Good Offices does it first, as I un:lerstand this new resolution, it is going to cause delays. In the meantime, these hostilities are still going on and we are doing nothing. It is our objective to try to stop hostilities and see that the cease-fire order is being observed. The President himself said that he has no idea of what that line was on 1 August. The Security Council has no idea, but we accept the observations of the representative of the Netherlands that the Netherlands army was properly organized and trained, and every· day an operation order goes out to the lowest unit, containing its points of departure and its objectives for the day. The smallest units has to have its diary of the points it has reached. It is a very easy matter for competent neutral military people to indicate generally and even precise- Plus grave ·encore est la consequence suivante. Lorsque 1'0n aura etabli ou recommande cette ligne de demarcation - et nous allons meme supposer que les deux parties la recommandent -l'affaire revient alors devant les cOI:lsuls, et les consuls doivent mettre au point des propositions pratiques en vue d'etablir la ligne qui aura pu etre fixee ou approuvee par l?- Commission des bons offices. Ne doit-on pas en deduire gu'en l'absence de ces renseignements il va s'ecouler des delais considerables? Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Puisje me permettre d'interrompre un instant le representant de TAustraIie? Peut-etre ai-je mal redige le projet de resolution. L'analyse que vient d'el). donner le representant de l'Australie ne correspond pas a mes intentions. Ce que je prevoyais, naturellement, c'est que tout d'abord les consPls devaient presenter des suggestions pour le trace de la ligne de demarcation, et qu'ensuite ces suggestions pourraient etre transmises a la Commission des bons offices pour qu'elle les approuve ou les recommande au Conseil de securite. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): La resolution dit exactement le contraire. Quoiqu'il en soit, il est clair, si je comprends bien cette nouvelle resolution, qu'il s'ecoulera bien du temps avant que la ligne de 'demarcation ne soit fixee, que ce soient les consuls qui agissent en. premier ou la Commission des bons offices. Entre-temps, les hostilites se poursuivent et nOlis ne faisons rien. Notre but est de nous efforcer d'arreter les hostilites, et de veiller a ce que 1'0n· execute 1'0rdre de cesser le feu. Le President a dit lui-meme qu'il n'avait aucune idee des points par ou passait cette ligne au ler aoilt. Le Conseil de securite ne le sait pas davantage; cependant, nous tenons pour fondee la remarque du representant des Pays- Bas, suivant laquelle l'armee neerlandaise est bien organisee et entrainee; ainsi, chaque jour, toute unite, meme au plus bas echelon, re~oit un ordre de manreuvre ou se trouvent indiques ses positions de depart et ses objectifs pour la I journee. La moindre unite doit egaIement rediger' un compte rendu journalier des points qu'elle Our whole object is to get the opposing forces away from. immediate contact. That is why the United Kingdom resolution is ineffective, whereas the .Australian resolution is at least an attempt to do something positive on the part of the Security Council. Nous nous proposons essentiellement d'amener les forces adverses a rompre le contact I'une avec l'autre. C'est pourquoila resolution du Royaume-Uni n'est pas efficace, alors que celle de l'Australie constituerait aumoins un effort constructif de la part du Conseif de securite. Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): I am as anxious as anyone - and above all, so is my Government - that bloodshed should cease. If, therefore, I feel I must dissuade the Council from accepting the Australian draft resolution, that' is done with great regret and in spite of our constant tendency, leaving aside all con- .siderations relating to the Council's jurisdiction, to accede to anything which seems calculated to stop the fighting. M. VAN KLEFFENS (Pays-Bas) (traduit de l'anglais): Aussi vivement que quiconque, je desire -- et par-dessus tout mon Gouvernement desire - que cessent les effusions de sang. Si je m'estime done tenu de dissuader le Conseil d'accepter le projet de resolution de l'Australie je le fais non sans eprouver un vif regret et no~ sans agir a I'encontre de notre tendance constante qui est,laissant de cote toutes les considerations relatives a la competence du Conseil, d'accepter toute proposition qui paralt destinee a arreter les host~tes. First I must ask the question as to whether, barring perhaps Colonel Hodgson, whose military experience is second to none, the members of this Council really feel that they have the necessary military experience and competence to determine whether the idea suggested by the representative of Australia is suitable for application under the very special conditions obtaining in Java and Sumatra. En premie~ lieu, je dois demander si, a l'exception peut-etre du ·colonel Hodgson, dont l'experience militaire est de tout premier ordre, les membres du Conseil de securite se croient l'experience et la cOIDp.etence milit.aires voulues pour decider si la proposition soumise par le representant de I'Australie peut etre appliquee dans les conditions tres speciales qui regnent a Java et a Sumatra. The consuls in Batavia, most of whom have been on the spot for quite some time and know the country, neverthele.ss felt the need, in spite of their local knowledge, for military advisers, who are now in Sumatra and Java. The Security Council has no local knowledge and does not have the benefit of expert advice in this highly technical matter. The conclusion seems to me to be obvious. . Secondly, I must say that I would have less difficulty in understanding the need for. the Australian draft resolution if the report of the consuls were still far off. It is regrettable, no doubt, that it has taken so long to complete, but we 'may now expect it very soon, fortunately. Les consuls de Batavia, dont la plupart sont sur place depuis un certain temps deja et connaissent le pays, ont neanmoins senti la necessite, en depit de leur connaissance des conditions locales, de s'entourer d~experts militaires, experts qui sont maintenant a Sumatra eta Java. Le Conseil de securite ne connalt pas les conditions locales et n'a pas I'avantage de recevoir I'avis d'experts qualifies en cette matihe tres technique. La conclusion qu'on peut en tirer me semble evidente.· . En second lieu, j'avoue que j'eprouverai moins de difficulte a comprendre la necessite du projet de" resolutio~ de l'Australie, s'il nous fallait encore attendre longtemps le rapport des consuls. Sans aucun doute, il est regrettable qu'il ait fallu .tant de temps pour le terminer, mais, fort heureusement, nous pouvons maintenant nous attendre a le recevoir tres bientot. Ce rapport, j'en suis convaincu, sera fonde sur une connaissance approfondie des conditions locales. J'estime done qu'il seniit sage d'en attendre I'arrivee, quelque regrettable que nous apparaisse ce retard. n est un troisieme point que je desire soulever en ce qui concerne la proposition de l'Australie. Comme les membres du Conseil s'en souviennent peut-etre, nous avons deja acquis quelque experience en matiere de retraits simultanes de troupes. Le Conseil a' pu se rendre compte qu'au cours de ces longs debats sur la question indonesienne, j'ai constamment fait preuve d'une. sympathie marquee pour les faits, car j'estime That report will, I trust, be based on detailed local knowledge. It seems to me wise to wait for that report, much as we regret the delay. There is a third point I wish to make in connexion with the Australian proposal. As members of the Council may recall, we already have llad some experience with regard to a mutual withdrawal of troops. The Council may have observed that, throughout these lengthy debates on this Indonesian question, I have consistently shown a fondness for facts and, with all due respect for intellectual con- The Council will remember that on 14 October 1946 a formal truce or armistice was concluded between the Ne~therlands Government and the Government of the Indonesian Repub- ,lic providing for demarcation lines and special mixed committees to work out detailed arrangements. One demilitarized zone was to be established to the southwest of the town of Soerabaya. Notwithstanding arrangements mutually agreed to, and in spite of the continuous consultation between Netherlands and Indonesian authorities in Batavia conducted on the highest level, the situation of the population in and near that zone rapidly became very precarious. On the one h~nd, subordinate Indonesian commanders had the water supply of Soerabaya cut off. This caused great hardship to the population in the tropical climate that prevails in Java. On the other hand, the Indonesians, by various devices, caused large areas to be inundated, thereby seriously damaging crops, factories and Jiouses, and creating a danger of an outbreak of epidemics. Aside from these acts which the Indonesian administration could not or would not prevent, marauding gangs, as opposed to regular troops, entered the demilitarized zone and made life miserable for the unhappy population. The end was that the zone' to which I referred became an empty waste, and the harmful effect of this well-meant measure made itself felt over a .wide area. I submit that this practical example should serve as an illustration of the difficulties and dangers inherent in a resolution of this kind, couched in very general terms, lacking in precision and giving neither definitions nor implementation clauses, which are very important. In !he case of any withdrawal of troops in these regions, very careful arrangements would have to be made beforehand to ensure at least a reasonable degree of observance. Experience has taught us that such arrangements tend to encourage unlawful elements to practice continued violations detrimental to Netherlands, Indonesian, Chinese and foreign lives and property alike. In view of these facts, I do not believe that the Australian resolution, too simple as it is, can provide a practical solution for the pre- "'ention of further violations of the cease-fire order of the Security C· "'tcil. With regard to the draft the President has submitted in his capacity of representative of the United Kingdom, it seems to me that is based on .pure common sense. The draft is new to me and I have not been able, of course, to ask for instructions from my Gov~rnment on Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): J'avais espere que nous pourrions arriver a une conclusion ce matin, mais, au cours de ces deux dernieres minutes, la liste des orateurs vient de s'allonger de quatre nouveaux noms, et je pense donc que le Conseil sera d'accord avec -moi pour decider que nous ne pouvons pas faire autrement que d'ajoumer nos travaux. Afin de nous permettre de reflechir davantage a la question, je ~oudrais preciser que j'accepte 1'amendement que la delegation belge propose d'apporter a la resolution que j'ai eu 1'honneur de presenter (document S/578). Le texte du second paragraphe propose par le Royaume-Uni sera donc remplace par celui de l'amendement belge. A notre pr<Jchaine seance, nous continuerons la discussion des trois propositions dont le Conseil est actuellement saisi, a savoir celle de -la delegation de 1'Unian des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, celle de la delegation de l'Australie et celle de la delegation du Rovaume- Uni. On me fait savoir que la prochaiIi.e date alaquelle le Conseil peut reprendre la discussion .est mardi prochain a 15 heures.

I had hopes that we might have reached a conclusion this morning, but in the course of the last two mL.'lutes four names have been added to my list of members wishing to speak, and therefore I think the Council will agree with -me that tne only thing to do is to adjourn. In order to facilitate further reflection in this matter I should like to say that I accept the Belgian amendment to the resolution which I had the honour to submit (document S/578). The second paragraph of the United Kingdom proposal will, therefore, read as in the Belgian amendment. ' At our next meeting we shall continue the discussion of the three proposals before the Council from the USSR delegation, the Australian delegation and the United Kingdom delegation. I am informed that the next date on which the Council can resume discussion would be Tuesday next at 3 p.m. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Le Conseil de securite s'est reuni, toute cette semaine, a 10 h. 30 pour la raison, semble-t-il, que plusieurs membres .du Conseil font egalement partie de la Premiere Commission. nest vrai que l'ordre de leurs seances va etre interverti, mais il est egalement vrai que de nombreux membres sont retenus par les travaux de la Commission speciale sur la Palestine; aussi la question se pose-t-elle de savoir si nous devons toujours favoriser un seul groupe. Pourquoi ne pas changer de tour et nous reunir le matin? Colonel HODGSON (Australia): We have had meetings of the Security Council at 10.30 a.m. all this week on the grounds, I understand, that several members are attached to the First Committee. It is true that their meetings are going to be reversed but it is also true that many members have commitment'! in connexion with the ad hoc Committee on the Palestinian question, so that it is just a question of whether we should cater to one side all the time. Why not let us change round at least for next week arid hold our meetings in the morning?

It seems to me that that question depends entirely upon whether most members of the Council attend the First Committee or the Palestine Committee, and I think we ought to meet the majority. I believe that the majority of members here attend the First Committee meetings regularly, and I think we must so arrange Council meetings as not to clash with the First Committee. Subject to correction, therefore, my proposal stands that we Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): n me semble qu'il s'agit simplement de se demander si lesmembres du Conseil assistent en plus grand nombre aux seances de la Premiere Commission ou a celle de la Commission speciale sur la Palestine, et d'avantager la majorite. Je crois qu'ici la majorite des membres assistent regulierement aux reunions de la Premiere Cominission, et j'estime, qu'il nous faut fixer les seances du Conseil de maniere a ne pas les faire coincider avec celles de la Premiere Commission. Sauf avis contraire, je maintiens donc ma proposition de nous reunir mardi a 15 heures. me~t again on Tuesday at 3 p.m. La seance est levee a13 h. 05. FRANCE Editions A. Pedone 13, rue SoufHot PARIS. Ve GREECE-GRECE "Eleftheroudakis" Librairie internationale Place de la Constitution ATHENES GUATEMALA Jose Goubaud Goubaud & Cia. Ltda. Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. GUATEMALA HAITI Max Bouchereau Librairie "A la Caravelle" Boite postale l11·B PORT-AU-PRINCE ICELAND-ISLANDE Bokaverzlun Sigfusar Eymundsonnar Austurstreti 18 REYKJAVIK INDIA-INDE Oxford Book & Stationely Company Scindia House NEW DELHI IRAN Bongahe Piaderow 731 Shah Avenue TEHERAN IRAQ-IRAK Mackenzie & Mackenzie -The Bookshop BAGHDAD LEBANON-LIBAN Librairie universelle BEYROUTH LUXEMBOURG Librairie J. Schummer Place Guillaume LUXEMBOURG NETHERLAND5-PAYS·BAS N. V. Martinus Nijhoff Lange Voorhout 9 'S·GRAVENHAGE NEW ZEALAND- NOUVELLE·ZELANDE Gordon & Gotch, Ltd. Waring Taylor Street WELLINGTON UrJted Nations Association of New Zealand P. O. 1011, G.P.O. WELLINGTON NICARAGUA Ramiro Ramirez V. Agencia de Publicaciones MANAGUA, D. N. NORWAY.-'NORVEGE Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag Kr. Augustgt. 7A OSLO PHILIPPINES D. P. Perez Co. 132 Riverside SAN JUAN, RIZAL POLAND-POLOGNE Spotdzielna Wydawnicza "Czytelnik" 38 Poznanska WARSZAWA SWEDEN-SUEDE A.-B. C. E. Fritzes Kungl. Hofbokhandel Fredsgatan 2 STOCKHOLM SWITZERLAND-SUISSE Librairie Payot S. A. LAUSANNE, GENEVE, VEVEY, MONTREux, NEUCHATEL, BERNE, BASEL Hans Raunhardt Kirchgasse 17 ZURICH I SYRIA-SYRIE Librairie universelle DAMAS TURKEY-TURQUIE Librairie Hachette 469 Istiklal Caddesi BEYOGLU-!sTANBUL UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA- UNION SUO·AFRICAINE Central News Agency Commissioner & Rissik Sts. JOHANNESBURG and at CAPETOWN and DURBAN UNITED KINGDOM- ROYAUME·UNI H. M. Stationery Office P. o. Box 569 LONDON, S.E. 1 and at H.M.S.O. Shops in LONDON, EDINBURGH, MANCHESTER, CARDIFF, BELFAST, BIRMINGHAM and BRISTOL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA- ETATS·UNIS D'AMERIQUE International Documents Service Columbia University Press 2960 Broadway NEW YORK 27, N. Y. URUGUAY Oficina de Representaci6n de Editoriales Av. 18 de Julio 1333 Esc. 1< MONTEVIDEO VENEZUELA Escritoria Perez Machado Conde a Piiiango 11 CARACAS YUGOSLAVIA_YOUGOSLAVIE Drzavno Preduzece Jugoslovenska Knjiga Moskovska U1. 36 BEOGRAD . [49&1]