S/PV.2103 Security Council

Monday, Dec. 4, 1978 — Session 33, Meeting 2103 — New York — UN Document ↗ OCR ✓ 4 unattributed speechs
This meeting at a glance
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Southern Africa and apartheid UN procedural rules Security Council deliberations Diplomatic expressions and remarks War and military aggression

The President unattributed #134535
1 should also like to inform members of the Council that 1 have received a letter dated 4 December from the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia which reads as follows: Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2103) “The Security Council is now considering the question of Namibia. 1 wish to convey to you the desire of the United Nations Council for Namibia to participate in this debate, without the right to vote. For this purpose the Council for Namibia Will be represented by a delegation headed by myself, as President of the CounciI, and including the three Vice-Presidents of the Council, Mr. R. Jaipal (India), Mr. F. Cuevas Cancino (Mexico) and Mr. F. K. Bouayad-Agha (Algeria).” 1. Adoption of the agenda 2. The situation in Namibia: Letter dated 1 December 1978 from the Chargé d’Affaires a-i. of the Permanent Mission of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12945) The meeting was called to order at 4 p.m. 4. On previous occasions the Council has extended invitations to representatives of other United Nations bodies in connexion with the consideration of matters on its agenda. In accordance with past practice, 1 propose that the Council should extend an invitation, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure;to the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the delegation of the Council. Expression of thanks to the retiring President
The President on behalf of members of the Council to Mr unattributed #134536
It is my very pleasant duty, as this is the first meeting of the Security Council for the month of December, to express appreciation on behalf of the members of the Council to Mr. Léon N’Dong, representative of Gabon for his services as President of the Council for the munth of November. On behalf of the members of the Council, 1 pay a tribute to him for the admirable manner in which, with great diplomatie skill, tact and courtesy, he presided over the Council’s work last month. At the invitation of the President, Miss Konie (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.
The President unattributed #134538
I wish to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 4 December from the representatives of Gabon, Mauritius and Nigeria which reads as follows: Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adop ted. ‘<We, the undersigned members of the Security Council, have the honour to request that the Council should extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Theo-Ben Gurirab, Permanent Cbscrvcr of the South West Africa People’s Organization to the United Nations, when it takes up the question of the situation in Namibia.” [S/12952.] The situation in Namibia: Letter dated 1 December 1978 from the Chargé D’Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12945)
The President unattributed #134541
1 wish to inform members of the Council that 1 have received letters from the representatives of the Congo and Angola in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with If I hear no objection, 1 shall take it that the Council agrees to the request. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Gurirab (Permanent Observer of the South West Aftica hple's Ofganization) took a place at the Council table. 7. I should like to draw the attention of members of the Council to the following reports of the Secretary-General which are before the Council: document S/l2938, which contains the report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 439 (1978) and document S/I2950, containing the supplementary report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to the same resolution. Members of the Council also have before them a letter dated 4 December from the representative of Angola to the President of the Council [S/129.53/. 8. The first speaker is the representative of the Congo, who wishes to make a statement in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of African States at the United Nations for the month of December. 1 invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement. 9. Mt. GAYAMA (Congo) (interpretation from French): On behalf of the African Group, 1 should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your accession to the presidency of the Security Council for this month. In your eminent person, it is also your great country, the Federal Republic of Germany , that is being honoured. We regard it, too, as a happy symbol because of the close Iinks between your country and Africa in a wide variety of fields, and also because of the active part your Government has taken, within the group of tïve Western Powers, in the recent evolution of events in Namibia. 10. For ail those reasons and doubtless also for other historical reasons which are decisive for understanding the question under review-because that Territory was entrusted by the Berlin Conference of 1885 to direct administration by Germany and later placed under an International Mandate-we believe that you are particularly qualifred to guide the work of the Council to a successful conclusion. 11. We also congratulate most warmly your predecessor, Mr. N’Dong, the representative of Gabon, who is one of us and who, in that capacity and because of his personal qualities, guided the work of the Council with ski11 and effectiveness. 12. In disregard of resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978), South Africa today intends to organize elections in Namibia which the international community did not wish or propose and whose purpose is nothing less than to maintain that Territory within the movement of the apartheid system, which is a crime against mankind, and to ensure that the people of southern Africa will be kept in perpetual subjection. 13. Given that profound expression of scorn, two attitudes are possible. The United Nations cari either behave 14. It is clear from the Secretary-General’s report that South Africa intends to follow a course totally opposite to that set by the United Nations, in particular in resolution 435 (1978). The Western proposals, which Pretoria has hastened to recognize since April of this year, are thus rejected in spirit and in form, which, furthcrmore, was clear from the famous joint statement published following tbe talks between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the five Western Powers and the Government of South Africa (S/12900, annex II]. 15. The veil bas now been torn from this cruel game which is being played with the fate of millions of mer-r, women and children in that part of Africa. If, indeed, as the report of the Secretary-General indicates, Pretoria arrogates to itself the right to continue to be the regent of Namibia and to speak for it at the United Nations, we are cntitled to ask why those elections, without any democratic foundation, are needed. Nor do we understand the relationship which the Pretoria Government establishes between its nonacceptance of resolution 435 (1978) and the commitment it makes to seek acceptance by the famous other parties concerned, namely, its puppets. 16. South Africa still resolutely chooses confrontation both with the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), the sole authentic representative organization of the Namibian people, and with the entire international community through the United Nations when it haughtily refuses, on the one hand, to allow the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to be established in Namibia and, on the other, to respect the timetable for the withdrawal of its troops SO as to make possible UNTAG’s establishment and the organization of free and democratic .elections under United Nations supervision. 17. We see this as an attitude of provocation which is being presented as for the benefit of the maintenance of peace end security in Africa and in the world. But it is for the members of the Council, and in particular the permanent members of the Western bloc, authors of the plan which bears their names, to pronounce themselves on such enigmas which seriously diminish the credibility of the United Nations. Since the last series of meetings of the Council, the conduct of the tïve Western Powers has been bizarre. This deliberately enigmatic behaviour is a betrayal of the confidence which the African countries, on their insistence, have placed in them as regards trying to put an end to one of the most unbearable aberrations in the fistory of our contemporary world. Indeed, international opinion is still puzzled by this disturbing contrast between the feverish activity of a few months ago and this unparalleled passiveness in the face of the disdainful attitude of South Africa. 19. Since the beginning of the negotiations between the Western Powers and the South Africans, most African countries bave maintained their reservations. It was obviously too good to be true that suddenly the beast was transformed into an ange1 of peace and had become a spokesman surrounded by respect and consideration. What the history of recent years had shown to be the true nature of the South African régime was as though forgotten, even obliterated. The Western Powers have even, to some extent, persuaded the United Nations to go back on one of its most important decisions, that revoking South Africa’s Mandate over Namibia and placing the Territory under the direct responsibility of the United Nations. That was the reason for the establishment of the United Nations Council for Namibia. 20. Those inglorious compromises by the Organization were only justifïed by the guarantee that seemed to be offered by the commitment of the Powers allied with South Africa finally to exert on their protégé the pressures which the international community had a11 the time called for SO as to make the South African régime comply with the requirements of the prcsent-day world and particularly with the terms of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 21. The present situation, which they now pretend to deplore by criticizing South African treachery, was to be expected, the more SO since countries as expert in diplomacy as the Western Powers must surely have realized that no advantage could be gained by negotiating frorn a position of weakness with a Government with neither faith nor law. The Western Powers, for reasons which still remain obscure, deliberately placed themselves in the position of supplicants of South Africa. They beseeched South Africa to grant a little peace, a little democracy, a little freedom, a little independence, and no more. Knowing how thoroughly those concepts of peace, democracy and freedom had been disregarcled by a11 the colonial and imperialist Powers, it was more than certain that one could expect the same disregard. 22. Furthermore, colonialism and neo-colonialism are not SO different, that one could imagine that South Africa would not, logically, impose its own concept of the organization of society. 23. It Will be objected-and some have done SO covertlythat the Africans lack realism, that they go to extremes, that they do not take into account the interest of the populations living inside Namibia, and SO on. Actually, it must be admitted that there has been bad faith, even hypocrisy and too short a memory on the part of those who find that we are too demanding. 24. First of alI, we wonder which of the societies or civihzations represented here would simply fold their arms 25. As regards Africa, it is no secret to anyone that the struggle against the minority Powers in southern Africa has never SO blinded us that we have neglected the smallest opportunity that might offer prospects of peace and freedom for the peoples of that region. The struggle is not only one of arms, it is also ùiplomatic. 1 shah confine myself to the declarations of the heads of States members of the Organization of African Unity at Dar es Salaam in 1964 and at Mogadiscio in 1974 and, of course, to the Lusaka Declaration of 1970, which was aIso adopted by the United Nations. While the African States reaffrrmed therein their determination to free their continent from the yoke of its oppressors, they also made it clear that they were prepared at any time to sit at a negotiating table with their enemy, South Africa, in order to find a peaceful solution, should that prove possible. 26. The behaviour of the liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity has always been inspired by this African line of conduct. Thus SWAPO, in the most significant moments in the history of Namibia, has always maintained the show of dignity and of responsibility which characterizes it. 27. The role and place of SWAPO in the liberation process of Namibia are distorted nowadays by South African propagande, supported in this by those who have never agreed to recognize SWAPO as the only genuine representative of the Namibian people. It is difficult to fault SWAPO on this matter. Everyone knows that SWAPO itself, the only movement which correctly reflects in political terms the purpose of the aspirations of the Namibian people, is also the only one to draw the inference from the oppression in which South Africa wished to maintain its country: armed struggle of national liberation with a11 that it implies in terms of sacrifice, devotion and organization, ail these placed in the service of the people of Namibia as a whole. 28. This is not the case of other tiny groups hastily converted by the grace of Pretoria and of certain countries into “political forces”. It has nevertheless been recognized that, without the decisive action of SWAPO, there would today have been not the slightest commotion on the question of Namibia. Above ail, South Africa would not even deign to speak, albeit in negative terms, of the possibihty of self-determination for that Territory. 29. In so doing, South Africa is not mistaken; it has seen and continues to see in SWAPO the only force capable of constituting itself into an alternative to its authority based on gp&kl and neo-coloniahsm. In the political shortsightedness which characterizes the powers of domination, South Afnca and no doubt the Western Powers tried to 30. WC must adcl thni this net of diplotnutiç hz1 faitIl, of which there are fcw cxatnplcs in history. except in sinistct C:ISCS as in Munich which WC rccullcd lucre carlier, has hecn carried ollt CleSpitC the rilCt that S0lltll AfriCil IütltlCtlCll 0 barbarous aggrcssion ügainst SWAPL) culminating in t Ix massacre at Kassinga lnst Junc. This was to lx thc finnI solution of the probletn of SWAPO, but I’retori:i only succeedcd in confirming tlic supcriority of that niovctnent over a11 the tribal groups which hnd set: thcmselvcs up as political forces at the Turnhallc meeting. 31. These comtnenl;s should leave no room for tnisunderstanding regnrclitig tlte Wiiy ii1 wliicli we slttrultl rtow consider this situation. Indeed, it now appears clcarly to us that South Africa not content with its plan of crca ting buffer Stütes in tlte soutlicrn part of ottr contittcnt, is making cvery effort tu aggravate an alreatly tcnse situ:1tion, and thercby to maintnin hcgcmony in thc rcgion. Tlius, Pretoria intends to stick to jts odjous policy of u/x~lt~$~l and ensure tlxrt it Will Inst forcvcr. 32. It is thcrcfore clear thnt Ihere cttn bc no sol11 tien 11) thc Natnibian problcm unlcss n start is amende on thc solution of the Soutlt African problem as such. WC would tlteref«rc advoca te that thc Sccurity Council slioulcl also envisngc tl1c situation from B global standpoint, by rcsorting to tl1e relevant provisions of Chapter VII of tlic Charter. I~ccx1use if therc arc to lx ncgotiations with thc fipcrrtltrf~l régime now sttbjugitting Namibia, D Territory utttlcr Unitcd Nations authority, these negotiations shottld no1 bc cnrricd on from a position of weakncss. Only if Sattlh Afric: is subjcctctl to the rigours of gcnirinc econotnic sanctions, bcginrting witlr :I total embargo on pctrolcuni, :In enihnrgo botti c I’fectivc ;~II~I ni:inil:itary, C:Itl it IX cspcctcd, witlt illly tlcgrcc of ccrtainty, to comply wiLli tlie injunctions of Ll1c international communily :1s slatecl in resolution 385 (1076), 435 (1978) nnrl 430 (1078). 33, Tlle rclcntlcss way in wlticlt South Africa slanrlcrs i1iitl fightki il&titlSt SWAI’O flllly convinccs US, if tllilt wcrc necdctl, that thc course chosen by SWAI’O is ttie only valid otie in tlic prcsent circunistanccs. WC thcrcforc rcitctxtc otit total, moral, political nncl m:tlcrinl conimitriient to SWAPO in its just strugglc for thc tUtill :1nd cffcctivc libcration of tlte Territory of Nnmibia. 34. Thc itltCrtliltioii~~1 conimttnity Will itsclf fintl tllilt SCltlttt AfrjCit ktVCS LIS II0 31Lcrnntivc but flilly to nssociatc tnost tltlmiliilttXl f1utn:a~ hcing Gltltt0t Ile crttshcd hy trrrtttrc nid hrlltn~ity. ~friculls Will, 011 ht2 CWtritry, lx.! CQCII 11101~ iletcrtnincd to hritig down thc usurper trpprcssitig tltctii mi ilic, soi1 of tlteir own couiitry. 36. Miss I\ONIE’ (Prcsitlent of UIC Ilnitctl Nnrituts ~,*clttncil for Ni11t1ibia): Mr. I’rcsident, 1 wouttl csprcss tr) yon tltc sincerc el~prcci:1tion of tltc tlelcgi1tiot1 of 111~ tlttitcJ Ni1ticjtls Couticil for Ntllllit~iil for titis qptxtttiiity 10 nddrcss the Secttrily t’otiiicil during this [?llilSc OI ils Jctibcr:itiorts oit the question of Nttmibii1. 1 ~l~~ttltl like itlst) tu ct)n~\ri\tulitte you on your assunil~tion 01 thc presidatcy of tlic C’r,uneil. 37. ‘I’ttc consitlcratiutt of ttrc rlucsticul of Namitria hy thc Sccurity Cotincil sincc the ildC~ptiOl1 of rcsolutiirn 385 (1476) \V;IS intcndetl ttl cslahlish tl1c frittucwork for Un itlt~rlliltioltall~ ;ICCl!]>tilt)lC St!ttlCtll~tlt of th qursticin Ol Nnmihin tl1rnuglt elcctiuns untlcr tltc supervision ml cotttrt1l of Il~e (lttilcil Nations, Tltcsc inil i;tl rihjcctivrs bave hy ttow ticen uttcrly distorterl. ‘I’hC IllittIOCttVtYS ol’ SOUtlt AfriCil, itt all its CytliCill ;ttId ctxttiiviirl: dcstcrity, rini ilf put ting tltc Uni~ctl N:1ti<)tts it1 tlte position of’ Icgi titnixing tllc powcr 1JilSC wttich Sottth Africa is ;tI Iftis vcry moitlcttt crcalinp in Natnibia for its tribal pulll\cts atttl ttctr-ctllr~ttii11 racist sttpporlcrs of'~~pur'f/r~~irl. 38. Tu judge frotti bis IiltlZSt stand, tlir Strutlr African Prime hlinislcr itl)l3nrcrltly tisstttltcs 111x1 tl1c ovcrwltclnrittg majurity of govcrtinicnt ol’liciuls in the ilttCYlliltit~llill Crltlltnunity suflèr frotn sonle kitrrl OI’ irc11tc mental dcficiency. ‘r0 tleclarc SoULll Ai’ricit’S willittgticss 10 illliA! hy rssolutic,t1 435 (107X) ;titil :tt ttic s:tttic linic! jo~l’ttlly rcfcr tc,~ I1is I’uturc discussions with thc sptirir1us relxxxcntntivcs :1pliointctl through riggcd clcctions LIS it IIi~llttïll ftC\t StCll itr COopcrtttitlg witl1 (Itc Ilnitcd Nations is cynicism hcyond bclicf’. 39. J.kt us ;IhoV1’ illl rcmain rIcar reginliti~~ tl1c olijcclivcs Of ottr rliscttssiotis. ‘I‘ltc l>url~tlsC t~l’otir ccrnsirlcri1li~\tt 01’ Il1C question uf Natnihia 113s bccn tc1 cns11rc tl1at in fair clectiotts ttriclcr tire supervision and cotilrc~l 01‘ tlrc ljnitcd Nations, SWAPO, rccognizecl by thc Orpanization of African Unily ~II~I tltc Ilnilccl Ni1tiotzs ils the SO~C ittld nutlu?nlic represcntativc of thc Namibi;1n pcoplc, Will be abIc to SLOW t0 llte illlcrntltiotrul çonimitt1ity Ilte uvcrwhclniing sul1llot’L wlticl1 it cnjoys nmonRst thc Natuibittn l>et,ple. Srlutl1 Africn, wltilc pïctcticling tlirouglt cIffiCiill tnlks 11, üccept Sucli f:iir clcctions iititlcr Ihc supcrvisiun :1ttd ctnttrol of tl1C Ilt1ilctl Nittions, I1a~ continuously, through st:ttcmcnts issuctl hy ils ICildillg C~~~vcrttniettt officinls, SyStCltl:ttiCillly rcjeçtcil ariy possibility of SWAI)C)‘s bccotning llic forma1 polilical nutl1ority in Namibia tl1rougI1 elcctions. ‘I’lrc enlire process of these lalks aitncd i1t t1tt intcrnutionully :tcceptable SCttlclTlCtl( IlilS tlltlS hcet1 vitintctl from Ilte vcry bcginning 41. The idea that once these elections are completed South Africa Will merrily accept a second round of elections to which it Will gracefully invite the United Nations, thereby fulfilling its responsibilities under resolutiens 385 (1976), 431 (1978),432 (1978), 435 (1978) and 439 (1978), is self-delusion or worse. South Africa’s intentien is to entrench its clique of neo-colonial puppets in power through these rigged elections to ensure indefinitely its ruthless exploitation of the people and resources of Namibia. 42, In its f’renzied arrogance, South Africa is beginning its so-called elections today in an atmosphere of terror and is conducting mass arrests of a11 Namibian patriots who see through this sordid manocuvring. 1 am informed that the Soutb African sccurity police bave arrested Daniel Tjongarero, Vice-Chairman of SWAPO, at Windhoek, Mokgenedi Tlbabancllo, Secretary for Information of SWAPO, Lucia Hamutenya, Secretary for Legal Affairs of SWAPO, Axe1 Johannes, Administrative Secretary of SWAPO, John Konyero, senior officia1 of SWAPO Youth League, and Solomon Gamatham, Deputy Secretary for Transport. Thcse Namibian patriots and SWAPO officiais were arrested in the early heurs of 3 December under section 6 of the notorious Terrorism Act. A total of 80 other SWAPO supporters were rounded up and gaoled. SO much for free elections under South African supervision and control. 43. South African objectives in Namibia have ahvays been either the annexation of Namibia or the complete control of the Covernmcnt, people and resources of the Territory through some kind of puppet régime. The history of the issue since thc beginning of the United Nations makes this quite clcar. The carlier attempts of South Africa to annex Namibia failed. Since then it has attempted the fragmentation of the Territory through its homeland policy and the brutal repression of all Namibian patriots who attempted to preserve national integrity and achieve self-determination, freedom and national independence in a united Namibia. For several decades South Africa bas rejected a11 attemPts for a negotialed settlement leading to an independent State of Namibia. The goals of South Africa now arc easy enough to see. The wealth and natural resources of the Territory are immense. its rcserves of diamonds and uranium and many other mine& are irresistible booty for the racists and colonialists at Pretoria and their allies. The preservation of the heinous system of apartheid in South Afrjca depends on many factors, including the presence of a security belt 4.4. This bas been the pattem of South Af&an behaviour with regard to Namibia and the basis of its implacable defiance of the well-considered views of the international community . 45. In 1967 the United Nations created the United Nations Council for Namibia to administer the Territory until independence was achieved. Throughout more than a decade the Council has supported the legitimate struggle of the Namibian people to achieve selfqdetermination, freedorn and national independence in a united Namibia. Thc justice of thc cause of the Namibian people is today recognized by a vast majority of the peoples of the international community. The Council for Namibia bas represented, and Will continue to represent, the legitimate interests of the Namibian people in spite of a11 the temporary setbacks which the United Nations may suffer in imposing the Will of the majority of the international community on the recalcitrant and criminal supporters of apartheid at Pretoria. The Council for Namibia will continue to act in close co-operation with SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, in their struggle until genuine independence is achieved in Namibia. 46. The General Assembly, at its ninth special session, adopted the important Declaration on Namibia and the Programme of Action in Support of Self-Determination and National Independence for Namibia [resolution S-Y/21 in which it defined the principles vital to the accession of Namibia to genuine national independence. The convening of the special session, moreover, constituted a decisive reaffirmation of the determination of the United Nations to compel South Africe to withdraw from Namibia and to create an independent Namibia truly representative of the aspirations of the major@ of its people t0 selfdetermination, freedom and national independence. 47. Since January 1976, the Security Council has seen its efforts to find an internationally acceptable solution for the question of Namibia frequently undermined by the manoeuvrings of South Africa. The unilateral appointment Of the so-called Adminjstrator-General for Namibia was a Clear indication of South African bad faith during the early stages of the talks which called for a United Nations role in the transition to Namibian independence. The unilateral regist+rat,ion of voters in Namibia, accompanied by ail fOm of petty corruption, further underlined the duplicity of the apartlzeid mafia with respect to the officia1 talks promoted by certain Western countries. The aggression against Angola and tbe massacre of Namibian refugees at KaSSin!$ further emphasized the treacherous nature of Afrikaner Cooperation with the United Nations. 48. ‘fhe Security Council is clearly confronkd with a ferocious challenge to its authority. There cari be no hesitation on the means to bring about South African compliance with the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Council must consider apPlYi% a. 60. This rcfercnce tel “Parties concerned” sounds ominous. On thC ont tiand, WC arc told that the racist South African Government Will retain authority in Namibia; on the other hand, there is this dangerous mention of “parties conccrncd”. Which parties’? The puppet groups that Pretoria bas becn patronizing in order to perpetuate its rdc over Namibia? It must ccrtainly refer to them, because the genuine representatives of the people of Namibia have a11 been arrested, at least a11 the leadersl~p that was inside Namibia. We hear disparaging comments from the Western press on elcctions and democracy in third world countrics. We now want to hear from the same sources their comments of “elections” at the point of a gun. GI. Namibia today is an armed camp, and the forced registration of voters, the military build-up on Angola5 borders and the arrest of the genuine representatives of the Namibian peoplc do not exactly make for free and fair elections. 62. As we see it, South Africa bas left for itself a number of options. For example, it bas deliberately not anrwered many of the vital questions raiscd in the Secretary-General% report of 24 November [S/12938/. Further, what is to prevent South Africa from saying that the “parties concerned” do not accept this or that proposal-meaning, of course, that Pretoria does not accept this or that proposaI; what is to prevent South Africa from staging another Kassinga, just as matters appear to movd forward? As it is, the racist General Jennie Geldenhuys, commander of the racist troops in Namibia, is yuoted in today’s reports as saying that the number of incidents involving freedom fighters in October was the highest since May, and one of the highest since April 1966. In actuel terms, we are no further along than we wcre in May this year, when South Africa sabotaged a forward movement by carrying out a murderous assault inside Angola. And what is to prevent South Africa from doing the same again? 63. The decolonization process for Namibia is far from complete. Neither the United Nations nor those Governments which have been involved in the process cari corisider their work done. In fact, it is now more important than ever that the Western Five that have been undertaking negotiations should continue with their task, not onlY of seeking further clarifications from South Africa but also of ensuring that South Africa will honour the outcome of those negotiations. In the same spirit, while we appreciate the work of the Secretary-General, we also aPPea1 to him t” continue negotiations and consultations. 65. We are at a dangerous crossroads in the history of southern Africa. If we do not exercise tare and caution, we could still fail at the final fente. That would be a tragedy not onlY for southern Africa, but for the world. 1 may sound Iike Cassandra, but she was right about the fa11 of Troy. Até a vitbriu final. A luta continua. 64. Mr. McHENRY (United States of America): Mr. President, 1 should like to congratulate you on your assumption of the responsibiiities of the presidency of the Security Council and to pass 011 to your predecessor our congratulations on the job which he performed during his tenure in office. 67. The delegations of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States may wish to take the floor in the Council at a later stage in order to make a fuller statement of our views concerning the current situation in Namibia. However, at this first meeting of the Council on Namibia in December we consider ourselves obliged to emphasize certain themes that are basic to the thinking of our Governments. 68. First, we want to reiterate the statement made by the Foreign Mini&ers of the Five at Pretoria on 19 October that “ . . . they saw no way of reconciling such elections with the proposa1 which they had put forward and which the Security Council had endorsed. Any such unilateral measure in relation to the electoral process will be regarded as nul1 and void.” [S/12900, annex U, para. 5.1 We have repeatedly made clear our concem over these illegal elections. Indeed, the Council will recall that on 13 November, after the adoption of resolution 439 (1978), the representative of Canada, speaking on behalf of the Five, referred to the so-called interna1 elections as follows: “We do not consider them as having any significance. We Will not accord any recognition to the outcome. Those elections cannot be considered free and fair and are irrelevant to the progress of Namibia to an internationally acceptable independence. We share the apprehensions expressecI in this debate, rnost notably bY our Africm colleagues, that this unilateral process might be used to frustrate the implementation of resolution 4% (1970” [2098th meeting, paru. 20.1 69, Secondly, we are deeply concerned bY the actions of the police authorities during the course of this week-end in &t&ing without explanation prominent members of S~A~O who make their homes in and around Windhoek. Those actions have deprived a number of leading members of a particular sector of the spectrum of political opinion witKn Namibia of their basic human liberties of speech, The meeting rose at 5 pm.
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