S/PV.211 Security Council

Iteannot be known when the report will arrive, but I think it will be in a comparatively few days. . . When we adjourned the consideration of this question at our last meeting,l there were before the Council three draft resolutions: one proposed by the delegation of the USSR,2 one by the delegation of Australia,l and one which I ventured to submit myself.1 The discussion on those resolutions was not finished. I hl;l.ve three speakers already on my list, and I shall call upon them in the proper order. ' ~ PRisIDENT(traduit de l'anglais): It n'est pas possible de savoir quand le rapport arrivera, mais je pense qu'il sera la. clans quelques jour~. Lorsque nous avons ajourne la discussion de la question, au cours de la derniere seance\ nous etions saisis de trois projets de resohltions: un qui emanait de la delegation de I'URSS2, un a:u~ tre de la delegation de l'Australie\ et un troisieme que j'avais pris la liberte de presenter moi-meme1 • La discussion de ces' resolutions n'etait pas terminee. Trois orateurs sont deja. inserits, et je leur donnerai la parole dans l'erdre ou ils l'ont demandee. J'inviterai cependant le Conseil aeXaminer, une fois de plus, si nous agirions judicieusement, en l'occurrence en mettant maintenant aiIx voix des resolutions prescrivant upe action ou des mesures cIevant avoir pour scene une region si lointaine alors que nous ne disposons que de si peu 'de renseignements detailles. ~ telegramme qui resume ce que 1'0n appelle le rapport complet ajoute certainement quelque chose a. ce que nous connaissions auparavant, mais il ne constitue toujours qu'un resume. Ce n'est pas, a. mon avis, un document de nature a permettre une discussion approfondie, et 's'it y a que1que possibilite de recevoir des renseignements plus detailles d'ici une semaine ou a. .peu pres, je, me demande si nous n'aurions pas avantage a. attendre. I would ask the Council, however, to consider once again whether v.re should -be, well advised, here to proceed now to vote on resolutions prescribing action or measures to be taken in so dis- 'tant a theatre with so very litt1e detailed information at our disposal. This telegraphic summary of the so-called complete report certainly adds alittle to what we had before, but it is still merely a summary. It is not a document, I think, on which detailed discussion could take place, and if there is any possibility of our receiving more· detailed information in the course of a week or so, r wonder whether we should not be well ad- . vised to wait. It seems to me difficult to take decisions in I1 me semble diffic'ile de prendre, d'id, des decisions sur ce qu~i1 convient de faire en presence d'une situation tres confuse existant a. des 1l1i1liersde kilometres de distance. Je sms, bien entendu, a. la disposition ou Consl1i1, et si, malgre ce que je viens de dire, il estime qu'il est judicieux de' prendre des decisions sur lesdites resolutions, en s'appuyant sur les renseignements tres restreints dont it dispose, a110ns de l'avant et pas~ sons au vote. ~his room about what is to be done in a very confused situation, so many thousands of miles removed from where we are. I am, of course, in the hands of the Council, and if the members still think we should be well advised on the very restricted information before us, to proceed to decide on these resolutions, we must go ahead and vote. "5. The population suffered considerably even before the police action from banditry and the scorched-earth policy. This was intensified during and after the 'police action. The Chinese were a special target. . "5. Mime avant les op~rations de police, la population a soiIffert considerablement de ces actes de banditisme et de la politique de destruction systematique,. Vne recrudescence de ces faits s'est produite tant au cours des operations de police qu'apres ce1les-ci. La population chinoise a ete specialement visee.. "6. L'administration et la culture se poursuivent dans des conditions critiques tant dans le territoire occupe par les Hollandais que dans celui qui est aux mains des Republicains. Dans le territoire occupe par les Hollandais regne, pour le moment, une grande crainte des actes de banditisme, et pour l'avenil' on redoute des represajlles de la part d.:s Republicains. Dans le territoire qui est aux mains des Republicains, la penurie sevit partout par suite de la cessation du commerce normal d'importation et d'exportation; la situation alimentaire est pour le moment satisfaisante dans la plupart des districts, mais eUe peut devenir mauvaise en quelques mois. "7. Chez les' Indonesiens, la c1asse influ~nte qui ne· compte pas plus de 5 pour cent de la population est presque entierement .nationaliste et vise a l'independance sous Hne forme que1c(, que, bien qu'e11e n'appuie pas necessairernent le regime republicain actue1. On ne comitate que peu de hainea l'egard des HoUandais dont le concours pour I'administration du' pays est considere. comme indispensable." 'Voir les Proces-verbaux oj}iciels uu COl/sdI de SCcfil'ite, Deuxieme Annee, No 96. "6. Administration and cultivation are proceeding u11!ier emergency conditions in both Netherlands and Republicanheld territory, In the former there is considerable fear of banditry in the meantime and Republican reprisals in the future. In the latter there are widespread shortages due to the cessation of normal export and import trade. In Republican areas the food situation in most districts is good at present but may deteriorate in a few months time. "7. The influential class of Indonesians, who number not mo~e th!ln 5 per cent of the population, are practically all natlonaltsts and seek some form of.independence, although ~ot neces~ari1y supporting the present Republic. There is h~t1e hatred of the Netherlands, whose assistance in runnmg the Country is recognized as essential." • M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de l'an- glais) : Tout d'abord, je ,desire formuler quelques observations au sujet des declarations du Presi- dent relatives cl. l'ajournement du debat. Je dois declarer, au nom de ma delegation, que nous nous montrerons fermement opposes cl. tout retard que 110US verrions apporter cl. la discussion de cette question. Voila plusieurs semaines que cette dis- cussion est differee, et je crois que c'est ce retard' qui a aggrave la situati,On militaiJ;e et fait que la solution est aujourd'hui bien plus difficile que ja- mais cl. trouver.' , , Nous attendons depuis plusieurs st:maines le rapport consulaire. Nous avons relSu un premier rapport, provisoire, qui est loin d'etre satisfaisant, encore qu'il soit facile, meme sur ses donnees, de tirer certaines concl~sions. Nous avons aujour- d'hui un autre rapport. Ce n'est qu'un telegrall1- me, mais je crois qu'il autorise pleinement une p'rompte ded.sion en ce qui concerne les resolu- tions soumises au Conseil. • Lorsque j'ai demande cl. prendre la parole, au I cours de la derniere seance, mon intention etait de commencer par formuler des observations sur la resolution presentee au Conseil par le repre- sentant du Royaume-Uni et amendee par le repre- sentant de la Belgique. Je ne m'attendais pas a ce que ce rapport consulaire nons parvienne au- jourd'hui; autrement, je me serais reserve le droit de' prendre la parole ulterieurement, afin de faire entrer pleinement en ligne de compte les infor- . mations fournies par ce rapport. . Jeregrette d'avoir cl. constater que le projet de resolution presente par la delegation du Royaume- Uni satisfait entierement aux desiderata exprill1cs devant le Conseil par le representant des Pays! Bas. A plusieurs reprises, lors de la discussion du probleme indonesien, le representant des Pays- Bas a declare qu'il etait du devoir du Conseil d'ai- der son pays cl. retablir l'ordre en Indonesie. Au cours d'une de ses interventions, ,il a attire notre attention sur le fait que, seule, l'intervention etran- gere-il entendait probablement 'par la l'interven- tion du Conseil de securite-avait cOlTIplique (la situation et !'I.ccru l'opposition offerte par les forces indonesiennes. . En fait, il a 'demande que nous cooperions avec les forces armees du Gouvernerhent neerlanaais dans leurs operations contre 11Indonesie. La're- solution en question repond, cl. mon avis, dans une large mesure a cette demande. Elle propose, tout d'abord, d'etablir t1l1e ligne de demarcation deli- mitant le territoire occupe par ~es HolJandais et de le laisser sous le controle c1u Gouvernement des Indes neerlandaises. I1 me semble que la ques: tion' de cette ligne de demarcation, ainsi qu'une proposition plus ou moins analogue, a longtemps fait obstacle, au cours des hostilites en 1946, a- la conclusion d'un traite entre le Gou'vernement des Pays-Bas et le Gouverl,1ement de la'Republi- que d'Indonesie., . According to the first preliminary. report of D'apres le premi~r rapport provisoire de la the Consular Commission,' the Netherlands for- Commission cons1,1lairc, les forces armees neer- ces have pro<;:eeded in spearhe..ds, leaving large landaises ont effectue des avances en pointc qui areas under the complete control of the Indo- laissaient de vastes secteurs sous l'autorite abso- nesian Government or of the Indonesian army. It lue du Gouvernement indonesien ou de ses fotces was the contention of the Government of the armees. Le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas soutient ' Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): First of all, I wish to comment 011 the President's last remarks -with respect to adjournment. I must state on be- half of my delegation that we shall be very strong- ly opposed to any delay in discussing this ques- tion: We have been delaying the question, for several weeks, and I believe it is that delay in the Council which has' aggravaled the military situation and made the solution more difficult than it ever was before. We have been waiting for several weeks for the consular report. We received the first pre- liminary report, which was very far from satis- factory, although even on the basis of that in- terim report.certain conclusions were easy to draw. Today, we have another report. Although w~ know it only in telegraphic form, I still believe that its content fully justifies a speedy decision on the resolutions before the Council. When I asked to .speak at the last meeting, I intendei:l, first ,of all, to comment on the resolu- jtion which was submitted here by the represen- tative of the United Kingdom and amended by the representative of Belgium. I did not expect that consular report to reach us today; otherwise I should have reserved the right to speak at a later stage so as to cover fully the information supplied by the said report" Lregret to have to state that, the draft resolu- tion submitted by the del~gation of the United Kingdom completely meets the demands which have been laid before this Council, by the repre- sentative of the Netherlands. On several occasions, in discussing the Indonesian problem here,' t\1e representative of the Netherlands mentioned that it was the duty of the Council to help his country to restore o~der in Indonesia. On one oCq1.sion, he drew our attention to the,fact that it was only .foreign intervention-by which he probably meant the intervention of the Security Council-that has made the situation more difficult and in- creased the opposition of t!;le Jndonesian forces.' H;e asked, in effect, for collaboration with the forces of the' Netherlands Government in its op- erations against .Indonesia. I b~lieve that to a great extent this resolution meets his request. It proposes, first of all, that a demarcation line should be drawn marking off the territory under Netherlands occupation and leaving it under, the control of the Netherlands East Indies Govern- ment. I understand that the question of a line of demarcation and a somewhat similar proposal were for a long time hindering the conclusion of the treaty between the Government of the Neth- erlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia during the hostilities in 1946. When the Indonesian Rept,lblic approached the Council, asking that steps should be taken in connexion with the hostilities, it was convinced that.action would be taken by the Council in ac- cordance with the rules and the spirit of the Charter. I imagine that the Government and the people of Indonesia are thoroughly disappointed by the fact that, although many weeks have passed since the opening of hostilities, the Security Council has taken no effective action. If this reso- lution were adopted we should be proceeding in a decidedly backward direction. It would be tanta- 1110untto ordering the Indonesian Republic to surrender to Netherlands control the greater part 01 its territory, which has been occupied by 1'{etherlands forces. It would represent de facto or, indeed, even de jure recognition of the con- trol which the Netherlands has achieved by con- quest. 'Whatever amendments may be made, or what- ever drafting changes may be introduced, they cannot change the spirit of this resolution which is, I feel certain, contrary to the real intentions of the United Kingdom delegation. However much we may be impressed by the gener~sity-of this resolution in giving so large a slice of In- donesia over to the control of the Netherlands Quels que soient les amendements que l'on puisse apporter a cette resolution ou les modifica- tions de forme qu'elle puisse subir, on ne saurait en changer l'esprit qui, fen suis certain, est contraire aux intentions reelles de la delegation du Royaume-Uni. Si frappee que soit la dele- gation de ,la Pologne par la generosite de cette resolution qui place une si grande partie du ter- ritoire indonesien sous l'autorite du Gouverne- ment des Pays-Bas, eUe n'en votera pas moins contre .elle. The 'Council also has before it' a resolution Le Conseil est egalement saisi d'une resolution from the USSR delegation, and another intro- de la delegation de l'URSS ainsi que d'une autre duced at a later stage by the Australian delega- qu'a presentee ulterieuremcnt la deleg~fion de tion. I do not intend to comment upon the Aus- l'Australie. Je ne me propose pas, au stade ac- tralian proposal at the present stage oJ the de- tuel des debats, de formuler des observations sur bate. I believe that the attention of the Council la proposition de l'Australie. J'estime que le should be concentrated mainly on the draft reso- Conseil doit se consacrer principalement a l'exa- Gove~nment, the Polish delegation will have to vote against it. l~tion submitted on 3 October by the representa- men du projet de resolution. presente le 3 octobre hve of the USSR, which calls for the immediate par le representant de l'URSS, tendant au re- withdrawal of troops to the positions occupied trait immediat des troupes sur les positions before the outbreak of hostilities. qu'elles occupaient avant le debut des hostilites. If any member of this Council was in doubt Si quelques membres du Conseil de securite ~s to the necessity fora step such as is proposed eprouvaient encore quelques dontes sur la .neces- 111 the USSR resolution; the new report from the site d'une telle mesure conformement a la reso- Consular Commission in Batavia must remove his lution de I'URSS, le nouveau rapport de la Com- do~bts. The report is a summary of-the main mission consulaire de Batavia devrait les dissiper. POInts of a: complete report which has been unani- Ce document est un resume des principauxpoints lUously agreed upon. I am very much impressed d'un rapport complet qui a ete adopte a l'unani- by that unanimous decision. We had certain mite. Je suis tres frappe de cette unanimite. Nous dOUbts as to ~whether the Commission would be n'etions pas surs que cette Commission put la unanimous, since we knew that three of its five realiser, car nous savions que sur les cinq l11em- members represented Governments which, be- bres, trois representaient des Gouvernements qui, fore t~is Council, had denied «the right of the In- devant ce Conseil, avaient refuse ala Republi- donestan Republic to be represented here and que d'Indonesie le droit d'etre representee id, had supported the military action by the Govern- appuye les operations militaires dl1 Gouvernement ~ent of the Netherlands,' calling it a "police ac- des Pays-Bas qu'ils avaient ql1alifiees d' "opera- tion", and recognized the sovereignty of the Neth- tions de police", et reconnu la souver~inete du Elands Government in the territory concerned. Gouvernement neerlandais sur le territoire en ~1=~~:~~:0i1of the consu!~~_,~~~~ d~~._, :U:,:~.::.~~~.::.~~;~~:i~~~:,'a pas em- I do not know whether this paragr:;ph 7 to which I have referred is a conclusion based on the preceding points. If so, it is in complete con·· tradiction to every other. point of the report and to the aims of the Commission, which was to be animpartial body of observers with a specific task to fulfil. The paragraph reads ~ - "The -influential class of Indonesians, who number not more than 5 per cent of the popu- lation, are practically all nationalists and seek some forIr\ of independence, although not neces- sarily supporting the present Republic. There is little hatred of the Netherlands, whose assist- ance in running the country is recognized as essentiaI." We did not ask the Commission for any opin- ion as to the political situation in Indonesia and the relations of the various political forces in In- donesia. That part of the report is therefore com- pletely out of order and in the opinion of my delegation it would justify action o,n the part- of this Council to recall the Commission immediate- ly. I do not know what measures the Commission took to ascertain these facts. Did it hold some kind of plebiscite to discover -that only 5 per cent of the population are nationalists; m" what is the basis- for this e,xact figure? Why not 70 per cent, or even 6;4 per cent? Five per cent is such a very exact figure, after only a few weeks of observing the territory. I believe that the Security Council should im- mediately inform the Con,sular Commission of its opinion as regards paragraph 7. With the President's permission, I shall now return to the other para~raphs. Paragraph 1 states: "Cease-fire orders were duly given but there was no confidence by Netherlands or Indo- nesian Repub~ic that the other side would carry them out, and no attempt was made by either side to come to an agreement with the other about means of giving effect to the order." _That paragraph would indicate that the ru- mours circulating previously-to the effect that the report blamed both the Indonesian and the Netherlands forces for the continuation of hos- tilities-were justified. However, paragraph 2 gives a more detailed Furthermore, paragraph 3 states, again: "The rapid Netherlands advance by-passed considerable Republican forces, which remained in their positions in accordance with the Re- publican cease-fire order, while they were sub- ject to mopping-up operations by troops under Netherlands command in accordance with the Netherlands interpretation of the order: The Republican Government directed its forces to defend themselves and to oppose movements within Netherlands-held territory." At the last meeting of the Security ,Council, the representative of Australia, whose military knowledge we all appreciate, pointed out that "mopping-up operations" is a purely military term and can never be applied to any police ac- tion. This paragraph, therefore, is additional proof that it is the Netherlands forces which in ac- cordance with the Netherlands interpretation of the cease-fire order, are attacking-perhaps for mopping-up purposes, though that question is not important in considering the substance of the matter-troops of the Republican Government who defend their positions. le~ troupes du Gouvernement republicain, .qui de- fendent lem's positions. Je crois que les quelques paragraphes du rap- port consulaire dont ie viens de donner lecture suffisent amplement, au point ou nous en som- mes, pour amener a modifier leur attitude les representants qui se montraient peu disposes a. voter en faveur de la ,resolution de l'URSS, crai- gnant qu'elle ne compliquat les choses. Ce serait simplement agir en accord avec l'es- pi-it de la Charte et dans l'interet de la paix et de la securite que de faire effectuer un retrait alL'" troupes en question. Ce retrait constituerait un premier pas, en l'occurrence indispensable, vers l'execution de l'ordre de cesser le feu. Si nous voulons que la Commission de bons 'offices, qui doit se rendre prochainement dans le territoire ou se produisent les troubles, se trouve it meme. d'agir conformement aux intentions du Conseil de securite et dans l'esprit de la Cbart~. nous de- vons ordonner le retrait des troupes en tant que mesure preliminaire. L'arbitrage de ce differend ne pourra reussir que si les deux parties sont placees sur le meme rang. C'est ce qui a ete refuse aux representants de la Republique d'Indonesie Jorsque le Conseil a repousse la premiere proposition1 tendant a. ra- mener les troupes et l'administration neerlan- daises aux lignes qu'elles occupaient avant le de- but des hostilites. . I believe that the few paragraphs which I have quoted from the consular report are quite suffi- cient at the present time to induce those represen- tatives who were reluctant to vote for the USSR resolution because they thought it might compli- cate matters, to change their attitude. ,It would be only in accordance with the spirit of the Charter and in keeping with the interests of peace and security to withdraw these forces. The withdrawal of troops would be a prelimin- ary, and in this situation an unavoidable step to- wards the fulfilment of the cease-fire order. If we- wish to place the Committee of Good Offices, ~hichis due to. proceed to the troubled territory ~n the near future, in such a position as to enable It to act in accordance with the intentions of the Security Council and the spirit of the Charter, w~ must take the preliminary step of ordering a wIthdrawal of troops. The success of arbitration in this matter de- pends on the parties being in an equal position. The representatives of Indonesia were denied th.is equal footing when the £jrst proposal for the W1t~drawal of Netherlands troops and adminis- tratI.o? to the lines held before the beginning of hostilIties was voted down by this Counci1.1 Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- publics) (translated fro'm RUSSia1~) : We have be- fore us today the second report from the Consular Commission at Batavia. Like the first report, it states that the Security Council's decision con- cerning the cessation of military operations in Indonesia is not being carried out. The second report, however, contains certain supplementary details which were not previously available, and to which the Polish representative has rightly drawn our attention. 1\ glance at the first two or three paragraphs of the consuls' report will suffice to justify the definite deduction that the Security Council's de- cision concerning the cessation of military opera- tions in Indonesia has not been carried out, and is still not being carried out. To put it bluntly, that decision is being ignored. For some reason or other certain members of the Council are anxious to avoid using this expression in the dis- cussion of. the situation in Indonesia. However, I prefer to be frank and to say once more that the Netherlands Government is ignoring the Se- curity Council's decision concerning the cessa- tion of military operations in Indonesia. The consuls' report confirms, first, that the Netherlands Government arid the Netherlands high command have put their own interpretation on the Security Council's decision. For example, the Netherlands authorities consider that they, and they alone, may decide how this decision of the Council is to be interpreted and implemented. Having adopted this somewhat strange position, the Netherlands Government and the Nether- lands high command have come to the no less strange and unacceptable conclusion that they are entitled to continue hostilities and to liqui- date the Indonesian tropps still left in areas occupied or surrounded by Netherlands forces. . Secondly, the consuls' report ~learly indicates that the Netherlands uovernment and its high command are interpreting the Security Coun- cil's decision in their' r'n fashion. One need only read ~he fi:r~., second and third paragraphs of the second consular report to draw the ,only possible conclusion from it, namely, that the Netherlands high command is openly and fla- grantly violating our decision, the decision of the Security Council, when it contends that onlv the Netherlands autho:dties can say how the Security Council'~ decision i~ to be understood. I would again draw the Council's attention to the fact that we are seriously damaging the au- thority not only of that organ Q! the UnitedNa- tions, the Security Council, but of the United Nations as a whol~, by being so ~ompletely apa- M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socia- listes sovietiques) (traduit dll russe) : Nous avons it notre disposition. aujourd'hui le deuxieme rap- port de la Commission consulaire a Batavia. De meme que le premier, ce rapport fait ressortir que la decision du Conseil de securite relative it la cessation des operations militaires en Indonesie, n'a pas ete appliquee. Le deuxieme rapport don- ne cependant des details supplementaires dont nous n'avions pas ete ·informes jusqu'a present et sur iesquels le representant de la Pologne vient a juste titre d'attirer notre attention. Il suffit de parcourir les delL" ou trois premiers paragraphes de ce rapport des consuls pour arri- ver a la conclusion tres nette que la decision du Conseil de securite relative a la cessation des operations militaires en Indonesie, n'est pas et n'a jamais ete appliquee. Pour parler franche- ment, on r.\. tient aucun compte de c~tte decision. Pour une raison que!conque, ccrtains represen- tants au Conseil evitent soigneusement d'em- ployer ces termes au cours des debats sur le pro- bleme indonesien, mais pour ma part je pre£ere parler franchement et faire observer une fois de plus que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas ne tient aucun compte de la decision du Conseil de securitc relatIve a la cessation des' hostilites en Indonesle. Le rapport consulaii'e fait ressortir en premier lieu que le Gouvernement et le haut commande- ment neerlandais interpretent a leur fac;on la de- cision du Conseil de securite. Ainsi, les autorites neerlandaises estiment qu'elles seules peuvent de- terminer la maniere dont cette decisiori du Conseil doit etre interpretee et mise a execution. Ayant pris cette attitude assez etrange, le Gouvernernent et le haut commandement neerlandais sont ar- rives a une conclusion tout aussi etrange et inad- missible selon laquelle i1s auraient le droit de continuer les operations militaires.et d'eliminer les troupes indonesiennes restees clans les regions occupees ou encerclees par les troupes neerlan- daises. . - En second lieu, le rapport des consuls fait nette- ment ressortir que le Gouvernement et le haut commandemeJ;1t neerlandais interpretent a leur fac;on la decision du Conseil. It suffit de lire les trois premiers paragraphes de ce deuxieme rap- port pour arriver a la seule conclusion qui s'im- pose, a savoir que le ,haut commandement neer- landais viole grossierement et ouvertement les termes de notredecision, c'est-a-dire la decision dti Conseil de' securite; en diet, le haut com- mandement neerlandais soutient que seules les autorites neerlandaises peuvent interpreter le sel1S de cette decision du Conseil. Je voudrais une fois de plus faire remarquer au Conseil que nous portons gravement atteinte non seulement a l'autorite du Conseil de securite, or"' . gane des Nations Unies, mais egalement a celle ..... de l'Organisation dans son ensemble',~,:uisqu"" Precisely because the Security Council's de- cision concerning the cessation of military opera- tions was not being implemented and was being ignored by the Netherlands Government, the USSR delegation submitted. a proposal, at an earlier Council meeting, suggesting that the troops of both sides should be immediatelv withdrawn to the positions which they occupied before the beginning of military operations. That proposal we based on the consideration that, whichever side it was that blamed the other, there would be no fighting if the troops were withdrawn to their original positions. If they were not in contact, then military operations also would be impos- sible. It would seem clear both from a political point of view and from the .point of view of elementary military science and strategy that such a meas- ure would be effective, since even if it could not solve the questions which require a solution in connexion with the Indonesian situation, it would at least make it possible to put an 'end both to the war and to the military operations in Indonesia. The USSR proposal has already been dis- cussed at previous meetings of the Couricil. I am sorry to have to say that, when this proposal was first submitted, the reaction of the representatives of certain States was on the whole, and for vari- ous reasons, unfavourable. It is clear, therefore, that there are various criteria for determining the practicability or im- practicability of particular proposals. Presumably those who consider the USSR proposal imprac- tical .take this view because it is unacceptable to the Netherlands Government. However, if we are to approach this question from that angle, the most practical preposal obviously would be to leave the whole matter to the decision of. the Netherlands Government, which is exactly what that Government demanded in the Security Coun- cil. Is it not plain that such a conclusion would, in fact, result from a decision of this type? But the Security Council, if it were to follow such a ~ourse, would be admitting its complete inability to take any effective measures in conne:'<:ion with the present events in Indonesia, an admission which to a large extent the Security Council has already made. The Australian representative went even fur- ther and submi~ted a resolution of his own which provides for the withdrawal of the respective for- ces of both sides to a distance of at least 5 kilome- tres behind the positions held by them on 1 Aug- ust last, the date on which the Security Council .adopted its decision concerning the cessation of military operations in Indonesia.1 I must con- fess that the adoption of the Australian repre- sentative's proposal would not avail the Indone- sians, the Security Council, or in fact anyone, with the possible exception of the Netherlands Government, as it would merely be another in- stance of the adoption by the Security Council of an almost useless decision. I stress the words almost useless decision. I recall the Australian representative's first pro- posal, adopted by us some time ago, which asked that the Committee of Good Offices should be re- quested to proceed to exercise its functions with I the utmost dispatch.2 I pointed out at the time that there was no need for the Security Council to adopt such a decision, simply because, as the Committee of Good Offices had been set up, it would have to start work. However, some peo- ple felt a decision should be taken, presumably in order to create an impression, at least on pub- lic opinion. Actually, no such decision was neces- sary to dispatch three members of the Committee to Australia in order to hold their first meeting. If I am not mistaken, they are now supposed to pla~ons a ce point de vue, il est evident que la mesure la plus appropriee serait de soumettre toute cette question a la decision du Gouverne- ment des Pays-Bas; c'est d'ailleurs ce que ce Gouvernement a demande au Conseil de securite. N'est-il pas evident que c'est a cette conclusion que 1'0n aboutit a la suite d'une pareille decision? Mais si- le Conseil se decidait a suivre cette voie, il reconnaitrait par la meme sa propre incapacite a prendre des mesures efficaces en relation avec les evenements d'Indonesie; c'est d'ailleurs ce que le Conseil de securite a deja admis dans une grande mesure. Le representant de l'Australie est alleplus loin; il a presente une resolution qui prevoit le retrait des troupes des deux panics en conflit, cl. une distance de 5 kilometres au moins a l'arriere des positions qu'eUes occupaient le ler aotit der- nier, c'est-a-dire la date a laqueUe le Conseil de securite avait pris sa decision relative a la cessa- tion des hostilites en Indonesie1 • Je dois dire que si eUe etait.adoptee, cette resolution du repre- sentant de l'Australie ne serait d'aucune utilite ni pour les Indonesiens, ni pour le Conseil de secu- rite, ni pour qui que ce soit, si ce n'est pour le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, car elle signifierait que le Conseil a pris, une fois de plus, une deci- sion a peu pres inutile. Je le souligne, ce serait une dedsion a pen pres inutile. Je me souviens de la premiere proposition du representant de l'Australie que nous avons adop- tee il y a ql1elques jours et qui prevoyait que la Commission de bons offices se mettrait immediate- ment au travail2• J'avais indique alors qu'il etait superflu que le Conseil' de securite prenne une decision a cet egard,puisque la. Commission de bons offices, une fois creee, devait de toute fac;on commencer ses travaux. Mais pour certains il f~Uait qu'une decision soit prise, sans doute pour produire une certaine impression, ne ftit-ce que sur l'opinion publique. En realite, aucune reso- lution n'etait necessaire pour que les trois mem- bres du Comite se rendent en Australie et s'y reunissent une premiere fois. Si je ne me trompe, 1 Voir les Proces-'lJerbau~ officiels tlu Conseil de secu- rite, Deuxieme Annee, No 68, 173eme seance. . • Ibid., No 93. I really cannot prove that this resolution is harmful, but it is almost useless since, I repeat, it serves neither the Indonesians, nor the Security Cound nor those who are striving to remedy the situation in Indonesia and to safeguard in a proper manner the interests of the Indonesian people. From a military point of view, too-at least in the opinion of many military experts-- this proposal fails to satisfy even the elementary requirenwnts ne.:essary to prevent the continu- ance of hostilities in Indonesia. A withdrawal of 5 or even 10 kilometres from the front line would not be sufficief to prevent contact, in the military sense of the tt:.. 1, between the opposing forces. In my opinion they could exchange shots across such a line with arrows, or even good boomer- angs, not to mention modern artillery. An even stranger resolution, which is quite unacceptable to the USSR delegation, is that which the United Kingdom representative in- troduced. This resolution envisages the simple measure of drawing a demarcation line in In- donesia. What purpose would such a demarca- tion line serve? Its purpose woul,d be to allow the Netherlands authorities and the Netherlands high command to hold sway unopposed in the areas which their forces managed to seize after the outbreak of hostilities. Presumably it is in- tended that, once a definite demarcation line has been established, all the areas occupied by Neth- erland forces behind the damarcation line will be cleared o( Indonesian troops. , The members may judge for themselves what the purpose of this proposal really is. Would it give even the smallest degree of protection to the interests of the Indonesians, or wouH it merely add grist to the mill of the Nethcrlands authori- ties and high command? To me its purpose is perfectly clear. It is intended-and this is the ob- jective meaning of the proposal-to strengthen even further the position of the Netherlands au- thorities, the NetherIands high command and the Netherlands Government, and to tighten even f~r­ ther the noose which has been fastened round the neck of the Indonesian people. I ~hall conclude by drawing the Council's at- Jet ...,ine en faisant remarquer une fois de plus au L.onseil que la seule mesure efficace se- rait le repli des troupes des deux parties, non pas sur les positions qu'elles occupaient le ler aOl1t, date it laquelle le Conseil avait prissa deci- sion relative a la fin des operations militaires, mais Sl~r les positions que ces troupes occupaient . avant le commencement des hostilites. Si nous continuons a differer l'adoption de eette decision, t~ntion, once more, to the fact that the only effec- !lve measure would be to withdraw the oppos- mg forces, not to the positions occupied by them on .1. August, the date of the Security Council's decl~lon concerning the cessation of military op- eratIOns, but to the positions they occupied before hostilities began. I want to stress that should we . delay further in taking this decision we, the Mr. L6PEZ (Colombia): I. think the suggestion made by the President, that we should wait a little while before taking any action on the three different proposals :we have under consideration, is a wise and very constructive one. These three proposals result from the fact that the cease-fire order has not been complied with, and I am very seriously asking myself whether there would really be very much use in adopting anyone of these three proposals without having a reasonable .assurance that they will be complied .with. These are the very grim facts\ve are fac- ing. The Council adopted on 1 August a resolu- tion calling for the cessation of hostilities; and'at the present time we have a very definite report from the Consular Commission, stating that: "While the Republican Government ordered .its troops to remain in their positions and to cease hostilities, the Netherlands East Indies Government considered it incumbent upon it to proceed with the restoration of law and or- der within the limits of the lines laid down by it." Paragraph 3 of the report goes on to say: "The rapid Netherlands advance by-passed considerable Republican forces, which remained in their positions in accordance with the Re- publican cease-fire order, while they were sub- ject to mopping-up operations by troops under Netherlands command in accordance with the N-etherlands interpretation of the order. The Republican Government directed its forces to defend themseives and to oppose 'movements within Netherlands-held territory. The differ- ent interpretations of the cease-fire order by each side thus made it impossible for the order to be observed." If our orders are not being observed, I submit that the first question we'have to decide is how ~e shall proceed, or what we shall do in order to secure compliance with our orders. Otherwise these orders are perfectly useless and leave the Security Council in what I should call, not a very awkward position, but a very serious posi- tion. What becomes of the prestige and Ruthority -of the Security Council, if it continues to adopt ·decisions one after another which are disobeyed :as fast as they are adopted? What is the use of that? I think the matter is so serious that it is vital to the very life of the Organization, and I believe that we should be well-advised not to adopt any 'more resolutions before we ascertain the possibil- . 1ty of their being put into effect. In the Greek case the will.of the majority was frustrated-lam using the words of our dis- M. L6PEZ (Colombie) (traduit de l'anglais): La suggestion du President d'attendre quelque pett avant de se prononcer sur les trois diverses propositions soumises it notre examen me semble sage et tres constructive. Ce qui motive ces trois propositions, c'est que l'on n'a pas execute 1'0rdre de cesser le feu, et je me demande tres serieuse- ment s'il y a vraiment grand interet it adopter l'une quelconque d'entre elles sans avoir au prea- lable l'assurance qu'on les observera. Tels sont les faits particulierement inquietants devant lesquels nous nom; trouvons. Le ler aolit, le Conseil a .adopte t,ne resolution demandant la cessation des hostilites, et maintenant, un rapport tres precis de la Commission consulaire !lOUS ap- prend le fait suivant: ..Alors que le Gouvernement republicain Cl ordonne it ses troupes de conserver leurs posi- tions et de cesser les hostilites, le Gouverne- ment des lndes neerlandaises a estime ou'il lui incombait d'achever la restauration du droit et de 1'0rdre public a l'arriere des lignes qu'il a tracees." Le paragraphe 3 du rapport se poursuit en ces termes: "Dans leur avance rapide, 'le:; Hollandais ont laisse derriere eux des Hots considerables de forces republicaines; celles-ci ont conserve leurs positions conforme11lent it l'ordre de cesser le feu donne par les Republicains, tout en etant l'objet d'operations de nettoyages effectuees par les troupes placecs sous commandement hollandais confor11lement a l'interpretation que les Hollandais ont donne acet ordre. Le Gott- vernement republicain a ordonne it ses forces de se defendre et de resister aux mouvements de troupes it l'interieur du territoirc occupe par les Hollandais. En consequence, les differentes interpretations donnees de part et d'autre it l'ordre de cesser le feu ont rendu impossible l'execution de cet ordre." Si nos ordres ne sont pas executes, nous de- V'ons, en premier lieu, selon moi, decider des mesures it prendre pour en assurer l'execution; sinon ces ordres sont parfaitement inutiles, et mettent le Conseil de securite dans une situation que je ne qualifierai pas de tres facheuse mais de tres grave. Que deviennent le prestige et l'auto- rite du Conseil de securite, si celui-ci continue it prendre des decisions qui, aussitot adoptees, sont aussitot desobeies? A quoi bon agir ainsi? La question. me parait grave au point de mena- cer la vie me11le de l'Organisation, et je crois que nous serions bien avises de ne pas adopter de noU- velles resolutions avant de nous assurer de la possibilite de les faire respecter. Dans l'affaire grecque, la volonte de la majo- rite a ete mise en echec - j'emploie les termes We now have a similar and equally serious problem. What is to be done when a Member of the Organization, not a permanept member of the Security Council, frustrates the will of the majority by non-compliance with the orders of the Security Council or of the General Assembly? This, I submit, is ...t least as serious as the other case. We have given several cease-fire orders, and we have before us this report, which is not the first and which will probably not' be the last, reading as follows: "Cease-fire orders were duly given but there was no confidence by NetherIandf or Indone- sian Republic that the other side would carry them out, and no attempt was made by either side to come to an agreement with the other about means of giving effect to the order." It would seem to me that the least we can do, perhaps the first thing we should do on this oc- casion, is to call upon the parties to this dispute to enter into contact in order to arrive at the cessation of hostile action of any kind. We have to try to find a better way of getting the two parties to this dispute to inform the Security Council, more definitely than they have so far, whether they intend to comply with the orders or recommendations of the Security Council. Other- wise I believe the impression will continue to grow, with very good reason, that the United Na- tions is becoming increasingly powerless, if on every new occasion we tell the world that we have not succeeded in achieving any positive results, and we simply have to move from one organ of the United Nations to another, in order to keep the same questions moving around from the Se- curity' Council to the General Assembly, or back from the General Assembly to the Security Coun- cil. . That has been the case with the Greek ques- tion and I am afraid it is likely to be the case with the Spanish question, which we are supposed to take up because the recommendations of the Gen- eral Assembly have not been carried into effect. The same thing applies to several other verv im- portant questions and I firmly believe tnat it C'est ce qui s'est passe pour la question grec- que, et j'ai bien peur qu'it en aille de meme pour la question espagnole, que nous sommes censes reprendre parce que les recommandations de l'Assemblee generale n'ont pas ete exccutees. Tel a ete egalement le cas pour plusieurs autres ques- tions tres importantes, et je crois fermement 1£ such a resolution were not to be complied with, the Council could use its time to better ad- vantage in taking up other questions on which there could be more reasonable assurance that positive action would be taken with greater suc- cess. Therefore if the Security Council finds some merit in these remarks, as I very confidently ex- pect it will, I would suggest an amendment to either the USSR proposal. or the Australian pro- posal. This amendment would be to the effect that the Council should call upon the parties to enter into contact in order to arrive at the cessation on both sides of hostile action of any kind, with a vi€ w to getting them-the Governments-to inform b.~" Security Council as to whether they are or are not willing to comply with the recommendations of the Security Council. Before closing, I should like to remind the Council that the Netherlands Government, as far as I remember, has not given the Council definite assurance that it would comply with the cease- fire order. In order to make sure of my memory, I read today what was said in the beginning of our discussion of this question, and in the com- municati<;>n frortt the Netherlands Emba\!isy of 3 August 1947 I find this paragraph: "Having taken into serious consideration the views which led the Security Council to address an appeal to both parties, the Netherlands Gov- ernment has instructed the Lieutenant-Gover- nor-General of the Netherlands Indies to en- tet into contact with the authorities of the Re- public in order to arrive at the cessation on both sides of hostile action of any kind."1 Therefore the words I am suggesting in my amendment are identical with words of the Neth- erlands Government. . I should also li.ke to bring to the atteiltion of the Security Council the fact that, according to this report, and according to the entire process of this case, the parties seem to have had their own interpretations of the order. It would be most useful, I believe, to have that point settled, name- ly, whether th~ orders given by the Security Council are open to various interpretations or whether there is an obvious interpretation. I re- spectfully submit that if the orders are open to Si done, comme je l'espere, et le pense, le Con- seil de securite attache quelque importance aux observations que je viens de formuler; je sug- gererai d'amender soit la proposition de l'URSS, soit celle de l'Australie. Aux termes de cet amendement, le Conseil de securite inviterait les parties a se mettre en rapport en vue de faire cess~r tout acte d'hostilite, quel qu'il soit, de part et d'autre, avec l'idee d'amener les Gouvernements a indiquer au Conseil de securite s'ils entendent ou non se conformer a ses recommandations. Avant de conclure, je voudrais rappeler au Conseil que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas n'a pas, autant que je m'en souvienne, donne au Conseil l'assurance formelle qu!il se conformerait 11. l'ordre de cesser le feu. Pour m'en assurer, j'ai lu aujourd'hui ee que renferment cl. ee sujet tant le debut de nos debats que la communication de I'Ambassade des Pays-Bas, en date du 3 aeut 1947, OU je trouve le paragraphesu;ivant: "Apres avoir examine.serieusement les rues qui ontamene le Conseil de seeurite a adresser un appel aux deux parties, le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas a, demande au Lieutenant gou- vemeur general des .Indes neerlandaises d'en- trer en. contact avec les autorites de la Republi- que en vue de faire cesser tout acte d'hostilite quel qu'il soit, de part et d'autre1." Les mots que je propose d'inchire dans mon amendement sont done les termes memes em- ployes par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas. Je voudrais egalement attirer l'attention du Conseil de seeurite sur le fait qu'a lire ce rapport et a considerer tout le developpement de l'affaire, l~s parties semblent avoir interprete 1'0rdre cha- eune a leur fa<;on. Il me parait extremement utile' de trancher la question suivante: les ordres du Conseil de securite sont-ils susceptibles. de don- tier lieu a diverses interpretations ou a une seule? Si les ordres peuvent donner lieu a diverses in- terpretations, je suggererais respectueusement au In the second report the following passage in paragraph 3 drew my attention: "The different in- terpretations of the cease-fire order by each side thus made it impossible for the order to be ob- served." This is a significant passage which ought to be considered in its tru:: meaning and implica- tion. It seems that the cease-fire order which was issued by the Security Council on I August was not very clear from the practical and military point of view. The Council simply requested the parties to cease fire and nothing else. At that time, the struggle was going on' between the two hostile parties. The armies had penetrated within each other's lines, and in many places the spear- heads were far in. Some of the troops were in a very unfavoura~le position from the point of view of the ground occupied; others were in a good position. To ct"..ase fire and stand where they were, with- out moving backward or forward, without rectify- ing their positions, in order to render them temi.- ble, was not practical. I think that this is the reason why the cease-fire order was not observed exactly, because each party interpreted the order differently. I remember that when this decision was taken in the Security Council, the USSR representa- tive proposed that, along with the cease-fire or- der, the Council should also recommend that the troops should withdraw to their former posi- tions. Tris was not adopted at that time on the pretext that it was premature. We said that we should wait a few days to see what the develop- ment Elf the execution of that order would be; and that perhaps the following week we could discuss the other proposal. Six weeks or more have passed, and the mat- ter has not been taken up or decided in any way. In order that there may be peace between the two parties and that the cease-fire order may be respected and observed, the positions of the hos- tile forces should be fixed at a specified distance from one another. For this reason, I believe that· the proposals which we have before., us today would be of great use if we were to discuss some of them and decide upon some way of having them implemented. I shall discuss the three proposals before us. I shall take the proposal of the United King- ~om !irst. That proposal states that a demarca- tion hne should be drawn to divide the territories controlled by the two parties. This would be a v.ery good procedure, if we could fix a demarca- tion line immediatelv, without delay. However, I believe this is a very difficult task, one that I do not think the Consular Commission would be ~ble to achieve. The drawing of a demarcation hne between forces would require experts on the sJ?ot, wh~ would fix on this hill, or that point, be- hmd 0: m front ,?f th~ respective forces, as points • on whIch to base the hne. I do not think the Con- ItlIL _.""..,.... ~ion. Pour retablir la paix entre lies deux parties. et faire respecter l'ordre de cesser le feu, it fau- drait assigner aux armees adverses des positions situees a une distance precise l'une de l'autre. C'est pourquoi je considere que les propositions clont nous sommes saisis aujour<fhui presente- raient tine grande utilite si nous pouvions en exa- miner quelques-unes et decider des moyens de les mettre a execution. Je voudrais dire quelques mots sur les trois propositions qui nous ont ete presentees. Je com- mencerai par la proposition' du Royaume-Uni qui declare qu'il faudrait tracer une ligne dt~ demarca- tion pour separer les territoires controles par les deux parties. Ce serait une tres bonne procedure si nous pouvions immediatement et sans delai tracer une ligne de demarcation. Toutefois, it s'agit ta, a mon avis, d'une tache tres difficile, d'une tache que, selon moi, la Commission consulaire ne pour- ra pas accomplir. Pour etablir une ligne de de- marcation entre des forces ennemies. it faut dis- poser d'experts sur place, d'experts qui feront passer la ligne par telle ou telle coUine, ou par I pass now to the Australian proposal, which reads as follows: "The Security Cmendl, ) "1n order to ensure the observance of its cease-fire order, '''Calls upon the Governments of the Nether- lands and the Republic of Indonesia to with- draw their respective forces at least 5 kilome- tres behind the positions held at date of cease- fire order of 1 August," This proposal can also be severely criticized. Some detachments may not hav~ advanced at all. They might have been in the same position for a long time. Now we should be asking them to withdraw 5 kilometres from positions which they held even before hostilities' began. Other detach- ments, perhaps, had withdrawn, or were pushed back several kilometres during the struggle, from their original positions. 'Are we now to ask them to withdraw more and more? Others have ad- vanced 20, 30 or even 50 kilometres. We do not know their previous positions and the positions they now hold. Perhaps if we asked them to with- draw 5 kilometres, they would find themselves in the desert without water and camping facilities. Thus this proposal is very vague, and I do not think it can be executed. Perhaps, if the pro- posal that the troops should withdraw 10 kilome- tres were correct from a' military point of view, it might be stated in the proposal that the with- drawal should be established in such a way'as to ensure that there were 10 kilometres between the two forces-on the condition that this were ap- plied to forces which had advanced 10 kilometres - or more. But I do not think it is correct to ask those who did not advance at all to withdraw. Per- haps some forces have already lost' some of their g"clins. 'We do not know. Therefore I do not believe that the Australian resolution is' practical, or that it would produce good results. The third resolution was submitted by the USSR. I believe it is a practical resolution, be- cause it calls for a line of demarcation which had been accepted by both sides for a long time. It was by agreement between the two sides that that line was fixed two or more years ago. What is the obstacle or the objection to their withdrawal to their former positions? The only obj~ction which I heard is the one raised by the representative of the Netherlands, namely, that retaHatiolls and atrocities would be committed, and so 011. The'representative of the Netherlands further stated that the Indonesians hold hostages, and that only the presence of Netherlands troops ',,"ould prevent atrocities from being committed. ~(Afin d'assurer le respect de l'ordre de cesser le feu qu'il a lance, "Invite le!? Gouvernements des Pays-Bas et de la Republique d'Indonesie a replier leurs forces a. cinq kilometres au moins a l'arriere ,des positions qu'elles occupaient le ler aoftt, date a laquell~ cet ordre fut lance." Cette proposition p<:ut egalement faire l'objet de critiques severes. It est possible que certains detachel11ents n'aient pas avance ou tout, et se trouvent occuper les memes positions depuis longtemps. Or, nouS leur demanderions de se replier a cinq kilometres it l'arriere des positions qu'ils occupaient avant le debut des hostilites. D'autres detachements se sont pe~t-etre replies ou ont ete refoules, au cours des combats, a plu- sieurs kilometres a l'arriere de leurs positions ini- tiales. AlIons-nous maintenant leur demander de poursuivre leur repli? D'autres detachements ent avance de 20, 30 ou meme 50 kilometres. Nous ignorons les positions qu'ils occupaient an-, terieurement, de meme que leurs positions ac- tuelles. Si nous leur demandons de recnler de 5 kilometres, peut-etrese trouveront-ils dans des endroits dCsertiques sans eau ni possibilites de camper. Cette proposition est donc tres vague, et je ne crois pas qn'on puisse lui donner suite. Si la proposition visant it ce que les troupes se re- plient de 10 kilometres etait applicable du point de vue militaire, on pourrait peut-are declarer clans cette proposition que le repli doit s'effectuer de telIe fa<;on que 10 kilometres separent les deux annees, a condition qu'il s'agisse de forces qui aient avance de 10 ki. )metres ou plus. Mais je ne cl'ois pas qu'il soit juste de demander it celles qui n'ont pas avance du tout de se replier. Il est pos- sible que certains detachements aient deja perdu une partie du terrain gagne. Nous l'ignorons. Par consequent, je ne crois pas que la resolution de l'Australie'soit applicable, ni qu'elle puisse avoir d'heureux resultats. La troisieme resolution a ete soumise par le representant de l'URSS. A mon avis, il est pos- sible de donner suite it cette resolution parce qu'elIe parte d'une ligne de demarcation qui a ete acceptee depuis longtemps par les deux parties., C'est d'un commun accord entre les deux parties que cette ligne a ete etablie il y a deux ans ou plus. Que peut-on objecter a ce que les armees se replient sur les, positions qu'elIes occupaient pre- cedeml11ent? Ut seule'objection que j'ai entendue est celIe qu'a soulevee le representant des Pays- Bas, a savoir qu'i} y aurait des represailles, des atrocites commises, etc. Le representant des Pays-Bas a egalel11ent declare que les Indonesiens ont pris cles otages, et que seule la presence des troupes neerlanclaises les empeche de coml11ettre des atrocites. Nous tenons certaitiement compte de cette qb- jection qui a dti poids. Toutefois, je considere One of the Committees of the General Assem- bly is at present discussing the question' of geno- cide, massacre of peoples, and matters of that nature. It has been declared by the General As- sembly to be an intex:national crime to commit genocide ·or massacre of' peoples.1 I understand that there is persecution of Europeans and Chi- nese in this case. Certainly that should not be al- lowed at all. Such an amnesty, along with the withdrawal of troops to their former positions, might be a good remedy. I do not understand what would be subject to arbitration or conciliation between the parties. I understand that the Government of the. Neth- erlands does not claim any Indonesian territory. There is no territorial dispute between them. The frontiers have been determined for a long time, since the Linggadjati Agreement2 was drawn up and signed by the two parties. The Nethel."- lands Government claims that it entered Indonesia in order to prevent persecution and oppression. Let us try to remedy this persecution in some other way. I suggest that there should be a release of hostages, a general amnesty for all political crimes, with a guarantee against these measures being violated in the future, and that the Neth- erlands Government's troops should be withdrawn to their previous positions; If we were to leave forces of both sides in positions close to one another, always ready to fight, the cease-fire order issued by the Security Council would not be properly appreciated by all the soldiers in the field. Most of the soldiers are ignorant people who have no conception of the nature of the Security Council or the United Nations. They do not appreciate the position.; and when they meet face to face those who yes- terday killed their brothers or fathers or molested them, nobody can prevent them from committing crimes and violating the cease-fire order. I believe, therefore, that if the representative of the USSR would agree to the addition to his proposal of a provision that hostages should be realeased and a general amnesty declared in favour of those who have committed j)olitical crimes, it would afford, a solution to th,e problem and facili- tate the observance of the cease-fire order. t Voir les Doc1l-1IHmts officiels de la dClI.'I:ieme. ses.rion de l'Assemblee gellerale, Resolutions, No 180 (H). 2 Voir "The Political Evellfs ill the Republic of Itldo- lU!sia", publie par le Bureau d'information des Pays-Bas, New-York. J ~ee The Political Events in the Republic of IndolU!si!J, pubbshed by the Netherlands Information Bureau, New York. The first is contained in paragraph 1, which says that the two parties lack confidence in one another. There the responsibility rests with both sides, and one is as much to) blame as the other. Then there is a second cause for the non-ob- servance of the cease-fire order, which is con- tained in paragraph 3 of the consular report, nanlely, the mopping-up operations of the Neth- erlands army. Mopping-tip operations are of a military character and they are conducted, I should say, out of military considerations. As far as the present report allows me to judge, I should cpnsider that there has been, 011 the part of the Netherlands authorities in Indonesia, a violation of our Charter and a violation of our resolution. Finally, there is a third cause, which is con- tained in both paragraphs 2 and 4. Paragraph 2 says, in effect, that in some cases the Netherlands Government authorized its military forces to pro- ceed to restore law and. order. Furthermore, para- graph 4 states: "Apart from actions involving reg- ular forces, a consider~ble amount of banditry, in- cluding murder, arson and looting is still being carried on to some extent by irregular bands." . The facts of brutality and disorder are und~­ niable, but the picture in the ficid is very,very confused. In some cases innocent civilians-Euro- ,peans and Chinese, women and children-were captured by an irregular band. Before informa- tion could reach the outside world, the irregulars just killed them off and that was the end of it. In some cases a number of the yic:t~ms managed to escape. In that ,case they would appeal to the authorities near by, who.sometimes were the In- donesian authorities. When such appeals came before the Indonesian authorities, there were two possibilities open to them. I know of cases where the Indonesian officer, military or civilian, took action ittunediately and rescued the intended vic- tims. In other cases the Indonesian authorities gave no answer and took no action. Either be- cause of a lack of will or because of lack of physi- cal force, the officer involved could not deal with the band which undertook the capturing or the looting. In some cases the intended victim escaped cap- tu:,e and approached the Netherlands authorities. What did the Netherlands authorities do? I have known cases in which the Netherlands military officer said: "I can do nothing for you because, if I send my soldiers to deal with irregular bands, I the Security Council at Lake Success wH~ <~v I ' have violated the cease-fire order." At Ot, • !:r:I:'<; I the officers would tell the victims; "Now .Aea;"e , get me a guarantee that the Security Con-.KH ! will not declare that I have violated the order, &1,0 ; I should be glad to support the USSR resolu- tion if I could get any assurance that the resolu- tion would not be followed by a worsening of con- ditions. I say "worsening 'of conditions". I am a moderate man. I do not expect any improve- ment from that withdrawal alone. If I can be as- sured that the conditions in the troubled area will not be worse after the withdrawal than before it, I shall support this resolution which we are discussing. The suggestion of the representative of Syria, that the resolution should be strengthened by a recommendation to the Indonesian authorities of . an amnesty for the protection pf life and property, a forgoing of reprisals, is a step in the right direction. But after we have received such an assurance from the Indonesian authorities, shall we have achieved our objective? Not at all. I do not in the least doubt the good will of the Indo- nesian authorities; I do not in the least doubt their sincerity. The fact is that what they say in many cases has no effect on the leaders of the bands in the field. Those are the actual conditions. That is not theory; that is not principle. Those are the facts and, if we are to deal with the facts, we must face them. ' Therefore if we could introduce suddenlv some international police force, I certainly shouid sup- port the USSR proposal. If the parties to the dis- pute would agree upon,some common policing ar- rangement, I should also support the USSR resolution. If the Council's Coinmittee of Good Offices would certify to us that this resolution ",:o~ld not be followed by a worsening of con- dItIons, I should support the resolution. If the Consular Commission would certify that this reso- lution would not be followed by a worsening of conditions, I should support the resolution. If any of these conditions were met, I should be glad to support this resolution. At the present time, in view of the facts, I can- not see how any of the conditions can be met. Therefore if the President were to put the USSR resolution to the vote now, I should have to ab- stain. However, if I am given time and can as- certain what would be the probable effects of that resolution, I shall then decide whether or not to St,;:rc ~l it. In l\'.;ard to the Australian resolution, I feel th3:t the criticism of our colleague from Syria is w<:J! founded. Therefore my delegation still feels, as 1 .'htt·d before, that we should not take any ~_.~.''''("..,~_.. ~_. ~"'-' ... I The stand b£ my delcgationhas been ques- tioned. On 11 Octoberl. the representative of the USSR expressed surprise at the fact that, since the Chinese delegation supported the independ- ence movement of Indonesia, we djd not give it stronger support here. Our position is that we support Indonesian independence, but we can- oD,at approve, let alone supporr, the atrocities that have been committed. We do not think that is the proper' road to,,independence. The Council, in my humble opinion, should not overlook tlIe ac- tual conditions in the field, far, less give these atrocities any moral countenance. Hitherto, I have not given the Council the details because I did not wish to prejudice the political prospects of a people whom we regard as our brothers, and also because I believe the Republican leaders are not morally responsible fOT them. What is'the ,outcome? What is the future to ,e? As has been,stated before, the two parties ..ave an agreement, the Linggadjati Agreement, which looks' forward to the establishment of an independ<mt'sovereign Indonesian Republic. Both parties still, abide by the terms of that Agree- ment. If the big political questions were solved, the questions that we have been dealing with here would disappear, and, there would be no reason to allow military consid~rations to lead to any mopping-up operations. Indeed, the, preservation 6f law and orde:r would be the common' wish of both Indonesians and the Netherlands authori- ties and that task would,be accomplished not witl. conflict or, opposition between the parties but with co-operation. ,, Therefore· in looking forward to' the future, I think the primary necessity in the Case of In. donesi~ is 'the solution of the political question, which is the main question. 'There are' other ques- tions, hara~sing, difficult and much to be re- gretted, but I do not believe that we'can tackle them at this stage with any success, in the ab- sence of full, detailed knowledge of local con:" ditioils. Once' we get to work on the big problem and get that settled, it is my belief that these other questions will disappear.

I must consult the members of the Cou":'lcil as to what they wish to do. It is already past 6 p.m. .and a list which had reduced itself to ,the vanishing 'point 'now contains three speakers, one of whom may require a dou ble translation. I do not think we can look forward to reaching any conclusion at a reasonable ' hour this evening Is there any proposal either to adjourn or to prolong ttesitting: in the hope of re.,!-ching a <finr.; conclusion? I 20tH ·~,t !:'h.:: servi,ce of the Council in anything it deddl;t" Mr. LOPEz (Colombia): I propose that we adjourn. fait~ maintenir le droit et l'onlre public seraitle desir commun tanto des 1ndonesiens que des Hollandais et cette tache serait accomplie dans une atmosphere de collaboration et non dans un esprit d'antagonisme ou d'hostilite. Aussi, si nous considerons l'avenir, je crois que, dans le cas 'de l'Indonesie, il faut d'abord resoudre la question politique, qui est la question principale. D'autres probU:mes se posent, pressants, ardus, et bien regrettables, mais je ne pense pas que nouspuissions les aborder en ce moment avec des chances de succes, sans' une connaissance complete et approfondie des conditions locales. Une,fois que nous aurons'commence l'examen du probleme principal, et l'aurons Jregle, alors, comme je le crois, les autres questions cesseront de se poser. Le PRESIDENT (traduit Ode l'anglais); Je youdrais sayoir ce que les membres du c;onseil desirent faire. I! est deja 18 heures passees et la liste d'orateurs, qui etait presque epuisee, comprelld maintenant trois noms; de plu~, l'une des declarations devra peut-etre faire l'objet d'utie traduction en deux langues. Je ne pense pas que nous puissionsesperer arriver a aucune concltipion d'id ce soil', du moins a une heure raisonnable. Quelqu'un propose-t-il soit d'ajourner, soit de' prolonger la seance dans l'espoir d'arriver it une conclusion definitive? Je me tiens cl. la disposition du Conseil, queUe que soit la decision qu'il prendra. M. LOPEZ (Colombie) (traduit de l'anglais): Je propose l'ajournement. ,', M;. DE I:.A TOURNELLE (France): Je ferai rema,rquer que la reunion de la Commission des armements de type cIassique est precisement prevue pour demai!1 apres-midi. \ Mr. DE LA TOURNlj:LLE (France) (translated from French): Ibelieve'there is a meeting of the Commission for Conventional Armamenfs tomorrow afternoon. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Dans ce c<'.s, la prochaine seance du Conseil aura· lieu jeudi 16 octobre a 15 heures. /'

Then the next meeting of the Council will be on Thursday, 16 October, at 3p.m. . The meeting 1'ose at 6.05 p.m. ., La !eance est leveq a18 h. 05. \ .' / FRANCE Editions A. Pedone 13, rue SouHIot PARIS, Ve GREECE-GRECE "Eleftheroudakis" Lihrairie intemationale Place de la Constitution ATHENES GUATEMALA Jose Goubaud Goubaud & Cia. Ltda. Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. GUATEMALA HAITI Max Bouchereau Lihrairie "A la Caravelle" Boite postale l11·B PORT-AU-PRINCE ICELAND-ISLANDE Bokaverzlun Sigfusar Eymundsonnar A:15turstreti 18 REYKJAvut INDIA-INDE Oxford Book & Stationery Company Scmdia House NEW DELHI IRAN Bongahe Piaderow 731 Shah Avenue TEHERAN IRAQ-IRAK Mackenzie & Macken:ue The Bookshop BAGHDAD LEBANON-UBAN Lihr~aie universelle BEYROUTH LUXEMBOURG Librairie J. Schummer Place Guillaume LUXE1UBOURG NETHI:RLAND5-PAYS·IAS N. V. Martinus Nijhofi Lange Voorhout 9 'S·GRAVEl.'tHAGE N~rregade6 KPBENHAVN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC- REPUILlQUE DOMINICAINE tihreria Dominicana Calle Mercedes No. 49 Apartado 656 CWDAD TRUJILLO ECUADOR-EQUATEUR Munoz Hermanos y Cia. Nueve de Octubre 703 Casilla 10·24 GUAYAQUIL EGYPT--EGYPTE Librair.ie "La Renaissance d'Egypte" 9 Bh. Adly Pasha CAmo ETHIOPIA--ETtJ,!IOPIE Agencse ethiopitMe de ptlblicite P. O. BoxS ADD!, ABECt. NEW ZEALAND- NOUVELLE·ZELANDE. Gordon & Gotch, Ltd. Waring Taylor Street WELLINGTON United Nations Association of New Zealand P. O. lCll, G.P.Oo WELtINGTON NICARAGUA Itamiro Hamirez V. Agencia de Publicaciones MANAGUA, D. N. NORWAY-NORVEGE Johan Grundt Tanum Foriag Kr. Augustgt. 7A !)SLO PHILIPPINES D. P. Perez Co. 132 Riverside SAN JUAN, RIZAL POLAND-POLOGNE Spotdzielna Wydawnicza "Czytelnik" 38 Poznanska WARSZAWA SWEDEN.....SUEDE A.-B. C. E. Fritzes Kun31. Hofbokhandel Fredsgatan 2 -STOCKHOLM SWITZERLAND-SUISSE Librairie Payot S. A. LAUSANNE, GENEVE, VEVEY. MONTREUX, NEUCHATEJ.., BERNE, BASEL Hans Raunhudt Kirchgasse 17 ZumcH! SYRIA-SYRIE Lihrairie universelle DAMAS TURKEY-TURQUIE Librairie Hachette 469 Istiklal Caddesi BEYOGLU·IsTANBUL UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA- UNION SUD.AFRICAiNE Central News Agency Commissioner & Rissik Sts. JOHANNESBURG and at CAPETOWN and DURBAN UNITED KINGDOM- ROYAUME.UNI H. M. Stationery Office P. O. Box 569 LONDON, S.E. 1 and at H.M.S.O. Shops in LONDON, EDINBURGH, MANCHESTER, CARDIFF, BELFAST, BmMINGHAM and BRISTOL UNITED StATES OF AMERICA- ETATS·UNIS D'AMERIQUE Intemational Documents Service Columbia University Press 2960 Broadway NEW YORK 27, N. Y. URUGUAY Oficina de Representacion de Editoriales Av. 18 de Julio 1333 Esc. 1 MONTEVIDEO VENEZ~ELA Escritorfa Perez Machado Conde a Piiiango 11 CARACAS YUGOSLAVIA-YOUGOSLAVIE Drzavno Preduzece Jugoslovenska Knjiga Moskovska Ul. 36 BEOGRAD . [49&1)