S/PV.216 Security Council

I understand that the representative of the Republic of Indonesia wishes to raise a point of order. Mr. PALAR (Republic of Indonesia) : I wish to ask for information. I want to ask the representative of the Netherlands one simple and direct question. Has the Netherlands Government abrogated the Linggadjati Agreement or has it not? I want a clear, unequivocal answer about the Linggadjati Agreement. I repeat the word "Agreement"; I am not speaking of what Mr. van Kleffens has termed the Linggadjati programme, which is no more than the Netherlands unilateral interpretation ,Df the Linggadjati , Agreement.

Is the representative of the Netherlands prepared to answer now? Mr. VAN KI..EFFENS (Netherlands) : I can only say that I used the words which were conveyed to me by my Government. My Government used the term "Linggadjati programme". As I understand it, this term includes all those main principles which were at the basis of the Linggadjati Agreement. Whether there is abrogation or not, I do not know, but I shall be glad to ask what are the views of the Government at The Hague in this matter. As I understand it, the phrase was used simply in order to make matters as easy as possible; not to be bound, perhaps, by any precise text, but to continue working for a settlement on the broad lines which constituted the programme of L;nggadjati. The intention was not to be bound by rigid formulae if, during the period of time the Committee of Good Offices was at work, it was found expedient to change this or that without doing violence to the general conciliatory spirit of the Agrement. Mr. KATz-SUCHY (Poland): Since a question was raised, may I raise another question? The representative of the Netherlands may ask for information on this question when he asks for an opinion on the question raised by the representative of Indonesia. My question is similar to the one raised by the representative of Indonesia. Could the representative of the Netherlands find out whether my information is correct that on the night of 20 July the Lieutenant Governor-General, Mr. van Mook, and his representatives declared to the delegation of the Le PRESIDENT (trad-uit de l'anglais): La parole est au representant de la Republique d'Indonesie pour une motion d'ordre. M. PALAR (Republique d'Indonesie) (traduit de l'anglais) : C'est un renseignement que je voudrais demander. J'ai une question simple et directe a poser au representant des Pays-Bas. Le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas a-t-il oui ou non abroge I'Accord de Linggadjati? Je demande une reponse cIaire et categorique au sujet de cet Accord. Je dis bien "Accord"; je ne parte pas en effet de ce que M. van Kleffens a appele le programme de Linggadjati qui n'est autre chose que l'interpretation unilatl~rale que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas a donnee de cet Accord. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le representant des Pays-Bas est-il dispose a repondre immediatement? M. VAN KLEFFENS (Pays-Bas) (traduit de l'anglais): Tout ce que je puis dire, c'est que je me suis servi des termes qui m'ont ete communiques par mon Gouvernement. Mon Gouvernement a employe l'expression "programme de Linggadjati"; dans le sens ou je la comprends, elle renferme tous les principes sur lesquels est fonde I'Accord de Linggadjati. Je ne saurais dire s'il y a eu· abrogation ou non, mais je suis tout dispose a demander au Gouvernement de La Haye queUes sont ses vues sur ce point. Je crois que l'on s'est servi de cette expression simplement afin de faciliter les negociations dans toute la mesure du possible et de ne pas etre lie par un texte precis, mais de continuer a rechercher les bases d'un accord etabli sur les principes generaux du programme de Linggadjati. On s'en est servi pour eviter de se trouver lie par des formules rigides au cas ou, pendant la duree des travaux de la Commission de bons offices, il deviendrait opportun de modifier certains points de detail tout en se conformant a l'esprit de conciliation dans lequel l'Accord est con<;u. M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais): Puisqu'une question a ete posee, puis-je en poser une autre? Le representant des Pays- Bas pourra egalement demander des renseignements a propos de cette question lorsqu'il demandera l.Jne opinion sur la question que vient de poser le representant de I'Indonesie. Ma question est en effet analogue a cette derniere. Le representant des Pays-Bas pourrait-il verifier s'il est exact, comme l'indiquent les renseignements que je possede, que le 20 juillet au soir, le Lieutenant Gouverneur general van Mock et

Unless the representative of the Netherlands can answer that question categorically at once, I am sure that, in consulting . his Government, as he has undertaken to do, he will bear in mind the question put by the representative of Poland. Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherland,;): That appears to me to be the best procedure. Mr. TSIANG (China): In a previous statement before the Council, at the two hundred and eleventh meeting\ I indicated the attitude of my delegation to the USSR and Australian draft resolutions. I do not need, today, to repeat what I said on a previous occasion, except to remove what I regard as a misunderstanding on the part of the representative of the USSR. In the last statement by the USSR representative, at the two hundred and thirteenth meeting, he said that I had set a multitude of conditions for supporting his draft resolution. I did name a numbff of conditions, but I meant to say that if anyone of those conditions were fulfilled, I should support the USSR proposal. I did not mean to say that all those conditions should be met. The conditions which I stated then were: l. that there should be an international control in the disturbed areas to safeguard life and property; 2. that the two parties should arrive at some co-operative scheme for safeguarding Ffe and property; 3. that our Committee of Good Offices should certify that the withdrawal of troops would not lead to a worsening of conditions; 4. that the consuls should certify that the withdrawal of troops would not be followed by a worsening of conditions. I wish to state clearly that if anyone of those conditions were met, I should support the USSR resolution. I did not expect that all of those conditions could or should be met. That still remains the attitude of my delegation with regard to the USSR and Australian draft resolutions. Since I spoke last, we have been seized of the consular report, a United States draft resolution and a Polish draft resolution. It is in regard to these matters which have arisen. since I spoke that I wish to direct my remarks. I read the consular report with deep interest. It has convinced me that I began my consideration of the Indonesian question with an over-simplified picture of the problems involved. The facts of the situation in Indonesia are much more complicated catt~gorique, je suis certain que, lorsqu'il consultera son Gouvernement, comme it s'y est engage, il tiendra compte de la question posee par le representant de Pologne. M. VAN KLEFFENS (Pays-Bas) (traduit de l'anglais): Cela me semble, en effet, la meilleure manihe de proceder. IvL TSIANG (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): Dans une declaration que j'ai faite devant le Conseil, lors de la deux-cent-onzieme seance!, j'ai indique l'attitude de ma delegation a. regard des projets de resolutions soumis par les representants de l'URSS et de l'Australie. Je ne repeterai aujourd'hui mes explications anterieures que pour rectifier ce qui me parait etre une erreur d'interpretation de la part du representant de l'URSS. Dans sa derniere declaration faite a. III deuxcent-treizieme seance du Conseil, le represeiltd.nt de l'URSS a dit que j'avais subordonne mon assentiment eventuel a. sa resolution a. une multitude de conditions. J'ai effectivement enumere un certain nombre de conditions; toutefois, il suffisait, dans ma pensee, que l'une de ces conditions flit remplie pour que je donne mon appui a. la proposition de l'URSS. Je n'avais nullement l'intention de pretendre qu'elles devaient toutes etre remplies. Voici les conditions que j'avais formulees alors : 1. I'existence d'un systeme de controle international dans les regions troublees, en VUe de proteger les vies humaines et les biens; 2. l'elaboration par les deux parties en cause d'un programme leur permettant de cooperer a. la protection des vies humaines et des biens; 3. une assurance donnee par la Commission de bons offices que le retrait des troupes n'amenerait pas une aggravation de la situation; 4. enfin, l'assuranee donnee par les consuls que le retmit des troupes ne serait pas suivi d'une aggravation de la situation. Je voudrais qu'il fi'tt nettement entendu que, clans le cas 011 rune quelconque de ces conditions serait remplie, je donnerais mon appui a. la resolution de I'URSS. Je ne m'attendais pas a. ce qu'il fut possible ou obligatoire que toutes ces conditions fussent remplies. L'attitude de ma delegation est demeuree ce qu'elle etait a. regard des projets de resolutions soumis par les representants de l'URSS et de l'Australie. Depuis la derniere fois que j'ai pris la parole, nous avons re<.;u le rapport des consuls et nous avons ete saisis d'un projet de resolution soumis par les Etats-Unis ainsi que d'un autre projet de resolution soumis par la Pologne. C'est au sujet des faits nouveaux qui sont intervenus depu· ma declaration que je voudrais formuler quelques remarques. rai lu l~ rapport des consuls avec grand interet. J'en ai retire la conviction que j'avais aborde la question indone- . The violations, which have been large in number, have been due to the fact that there have been differences of interpretation and that the two parties did not try to make arrangements for truce agreements. Some of the violations have been due to humanitarian reasons, and other violations were of a wilful order and were not justifiable on any grounds. After reading the consular report, I can see that all these types of violation took place. I also get the impression that both parties have been guilty, but on the whole I have come to the conclusion that the Indonesian authorities have been more faithful in the observance of the Security Council's resolution than have the Netherlands authorities. On the other hand, the consular report establishes the good discipline of the Netherlands army. In that respect the report agrees with my private information. I regret, therefore, to have heard the Polish representative make such a violent attack on the character of the Netherlands army. I cannot help feeling that such unjustified attacks on the character of the Netherlands army might lead people to feel that the Security Council is not fair and impartial in dealing with such questions~ Another impression which I have gained from the consular report is that, as regards the future, we need not be too pessimistic. Personally I am not pessimistic either with regard to the shortterm problem of the c-ease-fire or the long-term problem of a political settlement. I certainly am not defeatist in either respect. , With regard to the short-term problem, I observe that on a number of points arrangements and agreements might be promoted. The consuls took tentative, soundings on a number of problems, such as a negotiated demarcation line; lines of communication and supplies which would be agreed upon between the parties; and the disuse of certain types of weapons. The replies which the Commission received lead me to think that some such arrangements might be made. In regard to the long-term problem, the question before the Council is strange in that the two parties to the dispute start with an agreement. I attach the greatest importance to the Linggadjati Agreement. At a previous meeting!, when we received certain documents from the Netherlands Information Bureau, I took occasion to put a question to the representative of the Netherlands. I asked whether the texts were official and whether they were authentic. On that occasion, the President of the Council was good enough to stop the proceedings and request an answer from the representative of the Nether- D'autre part, il ressort du rapport des consuls que l'armee neerlandaise est une armee disciplinee et a cet egard, le rapport concorde avec mes renseignements personnels. It est done regrettable que le representant de la Pologne ait si violemment attaque la conduite de l'armee neerlandaise. Je ne puis m'empecher de penser que de telles attaques injustifiees pourraient amener le public a penser que le Conseil de securite fait preuve d'injustice et d'impartialite lorsqu'il traite des questions qui lui sont soumises. La lecture du rapport des consuls a encore fait naitre en moi la conviction qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'envisager l'avenir avec trop de pessimisme. Personnellement je ne suis pessimiste ni en ce qui concerne le probleme immediat de la cessation des hostilites, ni le probleme plus lointain d'un reglement politique. Dans les deux cas je ne prendrai certainement pas une attitude defaitiste. En ce qui concerne le probleme a court terme, je note bon nombre de points sur lesquels it sera possible d'arriver a des ententes et des accords. Les consuls ont fait des sondages sur la possibilite de resoudre, par voie de negociations, un certain nombre de problemes tels que la fixation d'une ligne de demarcation, l'etablissement de voies de communications, le transport des vivres, ou encore l'interdiction d'employer certaines armes, toutes questions sur lesquelles les reponses enregistrees par la Commission m'autorisent a esperer que l'accord serait possible. Quant au probleme a longue echeance, la question dont le Conseil est saisi me parait etrange, en ce sens que les deux parties au differend prennent comme point de depart un accord, l'Accord de Linggadjati auquel j'atta.- che la plus grande importance. Au cours d'une seance anterieure!, au moment ou nous avons re~u certains documents du Bureau d'information des Pays-Bas, j'ai demande au representant de ce pays si les textes etaient officiels et faisaient foL Le President du Conseil de securite voulut bien alors arreter la discussion pour demander au representant des Pays-Bas I regret to hear this morning that the reply of Mr. van Kleffens was not so categorical. My delegation, however, .attaches the greatest importance to the Linggadjati Agreement, and before we receive here a categorical repudiation of the Linggadjati Agreement, we must assume that it still forms the basis of policy in Indonesia. One of the causes of the trouble in Indonesia has been the differences of interpretation of the Linggadjati Agreement. Fortunately, that Agreement itself provides for arbitration when there are differences of interpretation. With our . Committee of Good Offices on the spot, we might well ask it to offer its services as arbitrator if differences of interpretation should arise. That might facilitate matters. The United States draft resolution seems to meet the situation in Indonesia in a realistic way. The· cease-fire order has not been observed, partly because there have been aifferences of interpretation. That cause is removed in the final paragraph of this resolution. Another cause of the violation of the cease-fire order has been the fact that there has not been a detailed agreement regarding the truce. That cause would be removed if the resolution were adopted. However, in view of the statement made by the representative of the Netherlands, I think the Council might improve the resolution if we introduce certain amendments. I shall now move the following amendments: In. the third paragraph, after the words: "Call upon the parties concerned forthwith to consult with each other", add the phrase "either directly or through the Committee of Good Offices". That addition would make the resolution more suitable and more flexible, and might meet the local conditions better. It is intended as a means of facilitating the strict implementation of the resolution. In the same paragraph, after the final phrase, which begins "pending agreement to cease any activities", add the words "or incitement to activities", that is, activities which contravene the resolution. ~'en attendant la realisation d'un accord, a mettre fin it toutes les activites", ctjouter le membre de phrase suivant: "ou it toute incitation it des activites", c'est-a.-dire les activites en contravention de la resolution. . A la fin de ce meme paragraphe, ajouter le membre de phrase suivant: "et a. prendre des mesures appropriees pour la protection des vies humaines ·t des biens". En ce (1 concerrie le dernier paragraphe, j'ai cru comprendre que si le representant des Pays- Bas en accepte le fond, un peu a. contre-cceur sans doute, il demande une redaction differente, de fa~on a. eviter certaines difficultes que son Gouvernement pourrait rencontrer aupres de l'opinion publique. J'avais songe a. upe formule plus acceptable qui ne, modifierait pas le sens meme du paragraphe. On pourrait supprimer le meinbre de phrase suivant: "qu'elles doivent interpreter sa resolution du ler aout comme interdisant it l'une ou 1'autre partie de recourir" et ajouter le memb~e de phrase suivant a. la fin . At the end of the same paragraph, add the words "and to take appropriate measures for safeguarding life and property". With regard to the final paragraph, I understand that while the Netherlands representative accepts - possibly reluctantly - the substance' thereof, he requests a different wording in order to remove certain difficulties which' his Government might find in the face of public opinion. I have thought of a formulation which might meet that difficulty without changing the meaning of the paragraph. I suggest that the phrase "its resolution of 1 August should be interpreted as not permitting" should be deleted, and that the following phrase should be added at the end of the paragraph: "is inconsistent with the spirit lilt b Colonel HODGSON (Australia) We already have an amendment on that point. It was put for,,~ard by the representative of Belgium1 • Mr. TSIANG (China): If the Belgian delegation has proposed that amendment, I shall drop the point. . Finally we have before .us the Polish draft resolution. I cannot support that resolution for the same reasons which I stated in' connexion with the USSR. draft resolution. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from RuSSian): We have already discussed the consuls' interim reports for a considerable time. Finally, after a long period of waiting, we have received the full report of the consuls in Batavia and are able to form our final conclusions on this communi- 'Cation. First of all, it· is necessary to note that the consuls' report makes it possible to draw two important conclusions. In the first place, whenever the Consuls try to express their own opinions and to evaluate the situation in Indonesia, they do so in onesided, biased manner, to the detriment of the Indonesians. For instance, they repeat after the Netherlands Government the fable that the measures which are being taken by the Netherlands Government in Indonesia are police measures. By so'doing they minimize, to a certain e~tent, the significance of ,the mil.itary activities 'lndertaken by the Netherlands Government again:>i. we Indonesian Republic. A number of other statements in the report show that the Consuls have endeavoured to whitewash the Netherlands and hence to blacken the victims of the Netherlands attack, that is to say, to blacken the activities of the ,Indonesians. They also repeat the fables that looting" murder and so on are taking place where there are no Netherlands authorities, although, apart from general statements, we find in the report no facts to warrant SUcll a conclusion. ] The followitig is the text of the amendment submitted by the representative of Belgium to the revised draft resolution' submitted by the representative of the United 5tates: Document 5/592 31 October 1947 [Origi"al text: French] Replace the last paragraph of the United5tates revised draft l'eS':i1ution contained in document 5/588 by the followibg paragraph: "Advises the parties concerned, the Committee of Good Offices and the Consular Commission that its resolution of 1 August 1947 should be interpreted as meaning that any substantial alteration of the territory occupied by the parties on 4 August would be inconsistent therewith." Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Nous avons ~eja. ete saisis d'un amendement a cet eff'et. I1' s'agit de l'amendement propose par le representant de la Belgique1 • M. TSIANG (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): Si la delegation beIge a deja propose un amendement identique, je renonce a ma proposition. En dernier lieu, it yale projet de resolution de la Pologne que je ne puis appuyer pour les raisons que j'ai deja exposees 10rsqu'il s'est agi du projet de resolution de l'URSS. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit dzt russe): Nous avons deja. discute fort longtemps les rapports interimaires des Consuls. Finalement, apres one longue attente, nous avons re<;u le rapport complet des consuls accretlites a. Batavia et nous pouvons formuler les concfusions definitives que cette communication nous inspire. Tout d'abord, it y a lieu de signaler qu'on peut tirer deux conclusions importantes de ce rapport. En premier lieu, la ou les consuls s'eff'orcent d'exprimer leurs propres vues et de porter un 'jugement sur la situation en Indonesie, its le font d'une fa<;on unilaterale et peu objective, au detriment des Indonesiens. Ainsi, ils repetent, apres le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, la fable selon laquelle les mesures prises par ce dernier en Indonesie ne seraient que des mesures de police. De la sorte, ils minimisent, dans one certaine mesure, l'importance de l'action militaire entreprise par Je Gouvernement des Pays-Bas contre la Republique d'Indonesie. Nombre d'autres assertions qui figurent dans ce'rapport montrent que les consuls cherchent a excuser les Neerlandais et a jeter ainsi le discredit sur les victimes de l'agression neerlandaise, c'est-a-dire a. discrediter l'action des Indonesiens. Ils repetent egalement la fable d'apres laquelle despillages, des massacres, et ainsi de suite, se seraient produits dans les regions qui ne sont pas occupees par les autorites neerlandaises; mais a part les declarations d'ordre general qui figurent clans ce rapport, nous n'y trouvons aucun fait qui corrobore cette opinion. ] Void le texte de l'amendement propose par le representantde la Belgique au texte revise du projet de resolution soumis par le representant des Etats-Unis: Document 5/592 31 octobre 1947 [Texte original en fran,ais] Remplacer le dernier paragraphe du texte revise du projet de resolution des Etats-Unis, contenu dans le document 8/588, par le paragraphe suivant: "Fait connaitl'e aux parties interessees, a la Commission de bons offices et ala Commission consulaire que sa resolution du ler aout 1947 devrait s'interpreter comme signifiant que toute modification importante par les parties du territoire qu'elles occupaient au 4 aout 1947 serait incompatible avec cette resolution." The Security. Council must now draw its conclusions regarding the situation which has arisen in Indonesia and of which the consuls have informed us. We have to take a decision in connexion with various proposals submitted to the Council for consideration, among them, the USSR proposal. I have little to add to what I have already said several times in the Security Council. The information received from the consuls fully confirms the fact that the USSR proposal for the withdrawal of the troops of both parties to the positions they occupied before the beginning of military operations is well founded. n.~sie et dont il a ete informe par les consuls. Nous devons prendre une decision en ce qui concerne les differentes propositions qui ont ete soumises au Conseil de seeurite et entre autres en ce qui concerne la proposition ·de l'URSS. Je n'ai presque rien a. ajouter a ce que j'ai deja. declare a. plusieurs reprises au Conseil de securite. Les informations que noUs avohs rec;ues des consuls confirment entierement le bien-fonde de la proposition de l'URSS, tendant a. faire retirer les troupes des deux parties sur les posi:- tions qu'eIles occupaient avant l'ouverture des hostilites. Si jusqu'a. present les operations militaires n'ont pas cesse et si les troupes neerlandaises et indonesiennes ont garde le contact dans l'accep-. tion mi1itaire de .ce terme, c'est parce que les The reason why military operations still have not ceased and why Netherlands and Indonesian troops are in contact, in the military sense of that word; is that the Netherlands authorities are. ignoring the Security Council's resolution. It. ~s, there~ore, our task to put an end to this milltary contact and to see that the troops of both parties are withdrawn to the positions they held before the beginning of military operations. autoritt~s neerlandaises ne tiennent aucun compte de la resolution du Conseil de securite. Il faut par conseqttent rompre ce contact militaire et retirer les troupes des deux parties sur les positions qu'elles occupaient avant le debut des operations militaires. . I have already spoken about the other proposals, including those submitted by Australia and the United States, and I shall not repeat myself. But I, cannot help reverting once again to the United States proposal, for the simple reason that it has recently been amended. I must also say a few words about the Chinese amend- ' ment to the United States draft resolution. I must say that the United States proposal, as I have already pointed out, merely misleads the public and creates the, impression that the Security Council. is undertaking some .action with regard to the situation in Indonesia, whereas in fact the Security Council is complying with the wishes of the Netherlands, the United States and certain' other countries which fully support the NetherlandsGovernment in this question, completely ignoring the Charter and its provisions and the situation which has arisen in Indonesia and. simply following the lead of the Netherlands Government in this matter. Let us consider the last paragraph of, the United States draft resolution. It becomes clear even if wee:x:atnine only the last paragraph that my evaluation of that resolution'is ,incontrovertible. This last paragraph states that the Security Council: ((Advises the parties concerned, the Committee of Good Qffices and the Consular Commission that its, resolution of 1 August should , be interpreted as not permitting the use of the armed forces. Of either party by military action to alter substantially" - I repeat this word 'substantially' - "the territory ,under its control on 4 August 1947." The Chinese amendment alters very little in this United States draft resolution. What would happen if this paragraph of the United States resolution were adopted? .The ,Netherlands Gov- . ernment and .the Netherlands military authorities, following what has become their tradition, could say at any time that no substantial and important territorial changes have occurred and that the Netherlands troops are merely "mopping-up" the Indonesians in those territories. The Netherlands authorities consider that advances of hundreds of kilometres, hundreds of miles, are insignificant advances. Apparently they base themselves on the fact that the ·scale of distances' in Indonesia is different from that in the Netherlands. If this scale were applied to the Netherlands, such an advance would probably mean the occupation of the Netherlands - of a considerable part of Netherlands territory or, perhaps, of the whole country. But in Indonesia such advances are considered to be' insignificant, advances which do not substantially alter the ac~epter si Ton veut vr~iment redresser la situation et retablir la, paix dans cette partie du monde. ' J'ai deja eu l'occasion de parler des autres propositions, .Y comprj~ celles de l'Australie et des Etats-Unis et je ne voudrais pas me repeter. Toutefois, je doism'arreter encore une fois a la proposition des Etats-Unis, simplement parce qu'eIIe aete amendee recemment. D'autre part, je voudrais dire quelques mots a propos de I'amendement que la delegation de la Chine a apporte au projet de resolution des Etats-Unis. A mon avis, comme je l'ai deja indique, la proposition des Etats-Unis ne fait qu'egarer l'opinion publique; elle donne l'impression que le Conseil de securite prend des mesures en ce qui concerne la situation en Indonesie, alors qu'en realite if se laisse simplement mener. par les Pays-Bas, par les Etats-Unis et par certains autres pays qui, dans cette affaire, soutiennent a fond le Gouvernement neerlandais, ne tiennent 'compte ni des dispositions de la Charte, ni de la situation en Indonesie et,emboitent simplement le pas auGouvernement des Pays-Bas. PrenonD le dern~er paragraphe du projet de resolution des Etatsi-Unis. 11 suffit d'examiner ce 'seul paragraphepour reconnaitre le bien-fonde du jugement que j'ai porte su.r cette resolution. En effet, aux ternles de ce· paragraphe, le Conseil de securite: . "Fait connaUre aux parties interessees, a la Commission de bons offices et a la Commission consulaire qu'elles. doivent interpreter sa resolution du' 1er aout comme interdisant a I'une ou l'autre partie de recourir a la force armee dans le cadre d'operations militaires pour modifier substantieUement - je repete le mot substantiellement - le territoire qui etait soumis ' a leur contri>le a la date du lJ. aout . '1947." L"amendement de la Chine ne change que tres peu de chose au texte du projet de resolution des Etats-Unis. Que se produirait-il si ce paragraphe etait adopte? Fideles a ce qui est maintenant leur tradition, le Gouvernement des Pays- Bas et les autorites militaires neerlandaises pourraient declarer a n'importe quel moment que, au point de vue territorial, aucun changement important n'est intervenu et que les forces neerlandaises' ne font que nettoyer certains territoires des elements indonesiens. Les autorites neerlandaises estiment qu'une avance de plusieurs cc.ntaines de kilometres ou de plusieurs centaines de miIIes est sans importance. EIIes,estiment apparemment que les distances en Indonesie ne se me::;urent pas avec les memes unites qu'aux ·Pays-Bas. Mais a l'echelle des Pays-Bas, une telle avance equivaudrait probablement a l'occupation d'une surface considerable du territoire neerlandais et peuf-etre meme du pays tout entier. Et pourtant, 10rsqu'iI s'agit de l'Indonesie, on estime qu'une telle avance est sans4 I do not think it would be an exaggeration to say that the United States draft resolution as a whole, and especially the last paragraph, which I have quoted, is a shameful proposal, which should be rejected most decisively by the Security Council. This is a signal, or as they say in English a "green light" to the Net'terlands troops and to the Netheriands to continue their attack on the Indonesians. This is all the more surprising in that even the N.etherlands representative did not venture to submit such a proposal in the Security Council. Not even the Netherlands representative has submitted such a proposal, although the same idea was implicit in his statements, namely, that the· Netherlands authorities - the Netherlands military command - woUld continue their military operations. The pretext would be, of course, to mop up the Indonesian troops in the areas concerned and to normalize the situation in their own way on the grounds that the Indonesians were incapable of establishing order in those territories. And a proposal which even the Netherl:mds did not venture to make has been submitted to the Council by the representatives of the United States. This is called defence of the interests of small nations, this is called action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations! Of course in such proposals there is no question of the defence of the interests of small nations nor of compliance with the Charter 'of the United Nations. The Chinese amendment alters nothing. The . Chinese representative has endeavoured to tone .down slightly the United States draft resolution, especially the last paragraph, by deleting certain crude'terms and substituting more suitable and diplomatic terms but, as he himself stated, without altering the sense and the significance of the United States resolution. My attitude to the Chinese amendment is, therefore, the same as my attitude to the United States resolution. The representative of China pointed out that, although in his speeches he had laid down many conditions which should precede the adoption of the USSR proposal, he did not mean that all those conditions should necessarily be carried out. It would be enough if one of those con- '!itions were fulfilled (unless I am mistaken he hsted four conditions - actually there were more, if we analyze the Chinese representative's statementbut let us assume that he proposed only four conditions) for him to agree to the USSR proposal .regarding the withdrawal of .. .................-= Some time ago, however, we received a'letter from the Government of the Indonesian Republic1 which reads as follows: "The Republican Government urges the withdrawal .of Netherlands.'troops in RepubHcan territory to ,their' positions'ante helIum. The Republican Government guarantees' safety, peace and order in all areas evacuated by Netherlands troops. 'The Republic of Indonesia thereby acceptssupervision, as well as, co-operation, from the Security Council or any other international body set up for that purpose.''' The Government of the Indonesia!} Republic has given us a guarantee and assures us that it will ensure· order in the ,territories which will . be evacuated by. Netherlands troops after the' withdrawal of those' troops to the positions they occupied before the beginning of military'operations. Thus, although such an as'surance· has been received from the Government of the Indonesian Republic, the, r.epresentative of China nevertheless continues to insist on this condition. In fact, this condition is no longer.a condition; it has been fulfilled by the Government of the Iridonesian Republic. .Of course, the Chines~ representative can say: "What guarantee have we that the Government,of the Indonesian Republic will' really keep its promise?" Such ~ question, however, is out of place and ttnwarranted. In order to find out whether or not the Government of the ,Indonesian Republic will keep its promise, it must be given the opportunity for so doing. The Government of the Indonesian Republic cannot give us practical proof that it will fulfil its assurance and promise unless we give it an opportunity for so doing. At the . present time, it has no opportunity to fulfil its . promise in practice. The Security· Council should give it such an opportunity and return to the question afterwards if it is proved that in these . territories there is no order and so on. I think, therefore, that the Security Council .would make a very gross error if it· adopted the United States resolution on this question. This is one of the worst and, I repeat, one of the most shameful. resolutions ever put forwarp at a.meeting of the Security Council. It is a signal fof the Netherlands to go on strangling the Indonesian Repub~ic, to occupy all its important areas and centres, to bind it hand' and foot and then, having seated the Indonesians at a table for formal negotiations, to impose crippling. conditions on them and thus settle the matter. We cannot enter upon the, path ofcomplidty in such activities. I think the resolution of the Ainsi,malgre les assurances que nous avons rel$ues du Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie, le' r~presentant de la Chine continue a insister sur la condition qu'it avait posee. Mais en realite cette condit\..>n n'en est plus une: ,dIe a deja ete remplie par le Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie. Bien entendu, le representant de la( Chin~ pourrait demander: "OU est la garantie que le Gouvernementde la Republique d'Ihdonesie tiendra effectivement sa promesse?" ¥ais' une teIle question n'est ni opportune, ni legitime. Pour savoir si le Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie tiendra parole, it faut lui fournir I'occasion de la tenir. Sans cela, it ne poutra nous, prouver qu'it tiendra sa promesse et qu'il sera fidele aux assurances qu'il a donnees. En ce moment, it 11'a pas la possibilite de remplir sa promesse. Le Conseit de securite devrait lui en fournir I'occasion; ensuite, it pourrait reprendre l'examen de la question s'il est prouve que dans les territoires dont it s'agit, ne regne pas I'ordre et ainsi de suite. J'estime par' consequent que le Conseit de securite commettrait une erreur des plus grossieres s'il adoptait le .projet de resolution des Etats-Unis sur cette question. Cette resolution est I'unedes plus ne£astes et l'une des plus deshonorantes parmi celles qui aient jamais ete soumises au Conseil de securite. Elle donne carte blanche aux Neerlandais pour continuer a etrangler la Republique d'Indonesie, pOUf en occuper t9utes les regions et tous les centres urbains importants; apres leur avoir, lie pieds et poings, les' Neerlandais pourraient inviter les Indonesiens a de:; negociations de pure forme, en les forl$3nt a accepter les conditions les plus dures pour arriver ainsi a leurs fins. Nous nepouvons nous rendre complices d'ooe telle action. J'estime que si le ConseiI ne veut Pour terminer; je voudrais simplement attirer l'attention du Conseil sur la proposition du representant de la Republique d'Indonesie. Sa lettre2 n'a ete distribuee aux membres du Con- 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseilde securite, Deuxieme Annee, No 101. 2 The following is the text of the letter dated 28 October 1947 from Mr. Thamboe, representative of the Republic of Indonesia, addressed to the President of the Security Council: . Document S/590 29 October 1947 [Original text: English] - The following statement has been forwarded to me DY my Government for transmission to the Security Council of the United Nations: , "The only guarantee for a return to a situation calculated to prcmote that understanding so essential for a peaceful settlement of the Indonesian question isas the Government of the Republic of Indonesia has repeatedly proposed -- the complete withdrawal of Netherlands forces from the territories of the Republic occupied by them after 21 July 1947. "It has been .suggested that Republican -territories evacuated by Netherlands forces would lack security, but the facts of the situation point to the very opposite. These facts are: "(1) It has been clearly established that Indones~ans living in terr~tories forcibly occupied' by Netherllinds forces refuse to accept Netherlands rule; 2 Voici le texte. de la lettre en date du 28 oetobre 1947, adressee au President du Conseii de securite par M. Thamboe, representant de la Republique d'Indonesie: Document 5/590 28 octobre 1947 - '[Texte original en anglais] La ·declaration qui suit m'a ete adressee par mon Gouvernement peur transmission au Conseil desecuritc de I'Organisation des Nations Unies: "L'evacuation complete par les forces neerlandaises des territoires de la Republique qu'elles ont occupes depuis le 21 juillet 1.947, mesure proposee a plusieurs reprises par le Gouvernement d.e la Republique d'Indonesie, peut seule' 'assurer' le retour d'une situation' de nature a dCvelopper la comprehension, si necessaire it un reglement pacifique de la question indonesienne. "On a pretendu que la securite ferait ciHaut dans les territoires republicains evacues par les forces neerlandaises, mais les faits tendent a indiqu:3r tout le' contraire. Ces faits sont les suivants: "1) II a ete clairement demontre que les Indonesiens vivant dans les territoires que les troupes neerlandaises ont occupes par la force serefusent a accepter la domination neerlandaise; . "2) Les fonztionnaires de I'administration republicaine, notamment dans des domaines aussi importants que I'administration civile <et la police, n'acceptent etn'executent que des Qrdres emanant "du Gouvernement republicain; "3) Devant les violations par les troupes neerlandaises de l'ordre de cesser les hostilites, lance par le COl1sdl de securite, les troupes republicaines poursuivront leur resistance; "4) II resSOrt de rapports d'observateurs neutres que les autorites civiles et militaires neerlandaises dans les regions occupees n'ont pas ete eh mesure de maintenir, d'encourager ou de prendre des mesures en vue du bienetre des populations, et qu'elles n'ont pu utiliser les .produits de I'Indonesie dans I'interet de l'economie ,mondiale. Les forces neerlandaises occupent des territoires indonesiens depuis trois mois et demi mais elles n'ont jamais pu, au cours de cette periode, assurer la securitc des populatiol1s ni la protection de leurs biens j "5) Le Gouvernement republicain declare categoriquement que tous les territoires republicains occupes par les Neerlandais depuis le 21 juillet 1947 ont ete, et contimient a etre, des territoires republicains sur lesqueis la souverainete de la Republique d'.Indcnesie a ete c1airement etablie. . "En consequence, le Gouvernement republieain invite le Conseil de securite de l'Organisation des Nations Umes (Suitll a la page .suif/antll) "(2) Personnel of the Republican administrative services - including such important branches as civil affairs aild police - will take. and carry out orders emanating only from the Republican Government; , "(3) Resistance by Republican troops will continue in the face of violations by Netherlands troops of the Security Council's order to cease hostilities; "(4) Reports by neutral observers show that Neth~r­ lands military and civil authorities in the occupied areas have not been able to maintain, promote or introduce measures for the people's welfare, nor have they been able to utilize Indonesian prodJIcts in the interests of world economy. For three and a half months Netherlal,1ds !orces have occupied Indonesian'territory, but in all thiS time they have not been able to provide security for the people there nor protection for their property; "(5) The Republican Government states categorically lthadt alI Republican territorie& occupied by the Netheran s since 21 July 1947 have been and continue to be RRepublican territories over which the sovereiguty of the epublic of Indonesia has been clearly established.

We shall 'adjourn at this time and meet again at 3 p.m. today. TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH MEETING' Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Friday.. 31 October'1947, at 3 p.m: President: Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom). Present: The representatives of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil,· China, Colombia, France, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 403. Continuation of the discussion on the Indonesian question

Towards the end of this morning's discussion, at the two hundred and sixteenth meeting, the representative of the USSR put a question to me as to when and how we should discuss the letter from the representative of the Republic of Indonesia which was received yesterday and circulated this morningas document S/590. My answer is that it is, of course, open to any repr~sentative in the course of discussion to refer to that letter and the proposal made therein. In the general discussion which is now drawing to a close, or subsequently, if any discussion arises on parti,cular resolutions, any representative may, of course, refer to that letter in so far as it may bear upon any of the resolutions under discussion. an international commission composed of representatives of the Security Council to obserVe and investigate conditions in· and to supervise territories which ;ire handed back to Republican control after ·withdrawal of Netherlands forces. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia believes that this provides the .only method of restoring these territories to their· former status 3.'1d of guaranteeing peace and security in them." Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Nous allons lever la seance maintenant et nous nous reunirons de. nouveau aujourd'hui a 15 heures. La seance est levee a13 h. 20. DEUX-CENT-DIX-SEPTIEME SEANCE Tenue a Flushing Meadow, New-York, le vendredi 31 octobre 1947, a15 heures. President: Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni). . Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, France, Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. 403. Suite de la discussion sur la qv.estion indoliesienne Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Vers la fin de la discussion de ce matin, a la deux-cent- seizieme seance, le r~presentant de I'URSS m'a demande a quel moment et dans quelles condi- tions notts discuterions la lettre dtt representant de la Republique d'Indonesie que nous avons rel;ue hier et qui a ete distribuee ce matin en tant que document S/590. Je repondrai qu'il est naturelIement loisible atout representant de men- tionner cette lettre et la proposition qu'elle con- tient au cours de la discussion. Tout representant est libre de se re£erer a cette communication au caurs de la discussion generale, qui touche main- tenant a sa fin, ou ulterieurement, si l'on dis- cute certaines resolutions, dans la mesure ou il y aura un rapport entre cette lettre et l'une qpelconque des resolutions soumises a la discus- SIOn. a nommer une commission intemationale composee de representants du Conseil de securite, qui exercerait des fonctions d'observation, d'cnquete et de controle dans les territoiresqui seront rendus aux Republicains apres le retrait des forces neerlandaises. Le Gouvernement de la. Republique d'Indonesie estiitfe que c'est la le seul moyen permettant de rendre aces territoires leur ancien statut et· de leur assurer la paix et la securite." FRANCE Editions A. Pedone 13. rue Soufflot PARIS. Ve GREECE-GRECE "Eleftheroudakis" Librairie internationale Place de la Constitution ATHENES GUATEMALA Jose Gouhaud Gouhaud &Cia. Ltda. Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. GUATEMALA. 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