S/PV.217 Security Council

We shall 'adjourn at this time and meet again at 3 p.m. today. TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH MEETING' Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Friday.. 31 October'1947, at 3 p.m: President: Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom). Present: The representatives of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil,· China, Colombia, France, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 403. Continuation of the discussion on the Indonesian question

Towards the end of this morning's discussion, at the two hundred and sixteenth meeting, the representative of the USSR put a question to me as to when and how we should discuss the letter from the representative of the Republic of Indonesia which was received yesterday and circulated this morningas document S/590. My answer is that it is, of course, open to any repr~sentative in the course of discussion to refer to that letter and the proposal made therein. In the general discussion which is now drawing to a close, or subsequently, if any discussion arises on parti,cular resolutions, any representative may, of course, refer to that letter in so far as it may bear upon any of the resolutions under discussion. an international commission composed of representatives of the Security Council to obserVe and investigate conditions in· and to supervise territories which ;ire handed back to Republican control after ·withdrawal of Netherlands forces. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia believes that this provides the .only method of restoring these territories to their· former status 3.'1d of guaranteeing peace and security in them." Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Nous allons lever la seance maintenant et nous nous reunirons de. nouveau aujourd'hui a 15 heures. La seance est levee a13 h. 20. DEUX-CENT-DIX-SEPTIEME SEANCE Tenue a Flushing Meadow, New-York, le vendredi 31 octobre 1947, a15 heures. President: Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni). . Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, France, Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. 403. Suite de la discussion sur la qv.estion indoliesienne Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Vers la fin de la discussion de ce matin, a la deux-cent- seizieme seance, le r~presentant de I'URSS m'a demande a quel moment et dans quelles condi- tions notts discuterions la lettre dtt representant de la Republique d'Indonesie que nous avons rel;ue hier et qui a ete distribuee ce matin en tant que document S/590. Je repondrai qu'il est naturelIement loisible atout representant de men- tionner cette lettre et la proposition qu'elle con- tient au cours de la discussion. Tout representant est libre de se re£erer a cette communication au caurs de la discussion generale, qui touche main- tenant a sa fin, ou ulterieurement, si l'on dis- cute certaines resolutions, dans la mesure ou il y aura un rapport entre cette lettre et l'une qpelconque des resolutions soumises a la discus- SIOn. a nommer une commission intemationale composee de representants du Conseil de securite, qui exercerait des fonctions d'observation, d'cnquete et de controle dans les territoiresqui seront rendus aux Republicains apres le retrait des forces neerlandaises. Le Gouvernement de la. Republique d'Indonesie estiitfe que c'est la le seul moyen permettant de rendre aces territoires leur ancien statut et· de leur assurer la paix et la securite." Le PRESIDENT. (traduit de l'anglais): Je ne suis pas certain d'avoir bien compris. Le repre- sentant des Pays-Bas n'a-t-il pas rel$u copie de cette lettre?

I am not quite clear about this. Has the representative of the Netherlands not received a copy of this letter? Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands) : Some kind spirit gave me a typewritten copy. I do not know where it came from. It was not on the yellow paper of the Secretariat. This paper is being handed to me at this moment. I do not want to stand on a mere technicality. I refer to the substance, and that is the object of my remarks. M. VAN KLEFFENS (Pays-Bas) (traduit de l'anglais): Dne personne certainement hien intentionnee m'a remis 11Ile copie dactylographiee. Je ne sais pas d'o)! cile venait; cile n'etait pas tapee sur le papier jaune utilise par. le Secretariat. Quant au document lui-meme, on vient de me le remettre a l'instant. Je ne tiens pas a insister sur une question de detail. C'est le fond du probleme qui m'interesse et qui a fait l'objet de ma remarque. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de ['anglais): Il est certain que le document aurait dl1 etre distribue a tous ceux qui sont assis autour de cette table, meme s'iIs ne sont pas membres du Conseil de securite. J'espere que tout le monde en a maintenant re<;u un exemplaire et il est natureUement loisible a chacun de mentionner le contenu de cette lettre et les propositions qu'eUe formule, et ce a propos de chacun des projets de resolution au fll!.' et a. mesure qu'ils seront discutes.

The document should, of course, have been distributed to those around the table here who are not ordinarily members of the Council. I hope they have now all received a copy and, of course, it will be open to them, if there is discussion on any of the resolutions, to refer to the contents of that letter and the proposals made therein, in relation to any of the resolutions, as they come under discussion. M. MUNIZ (Bresi!) (traduit de l'anglais) : Au cours de ma derniere intervention dans cette discussion, a la deux-cent-dixieme seance! j'ai attire l'attention du Conseil sur l'avantage qu'il y aurait a recourir a. la Commission de bons offices pour donner effet a l'ordre d~ cesser le feu. J'ai declare de plus que nous devrions demander aux attaches militaires a. Batavia d'aider la Commission a controler l'execution de l'ordre de cesser le feu. II m'a toujours semble qu'en agissant autrement nous ferions preuve d'un manque total de realisme. J'estime qu'il est impraticable; sinon nuisible, d'essayerde regler la question ici sans Mr. MUNIZ (Brazil): In my last intervention in this debate, at the two hundred and tenth meeting of the Council!, I called the attention of the Council to the advantage of utilizing the services of the Committee of Good Offices to give effect to the cease-fire order. I further stated that we ought to ask the military attaches in Batavia to assist the Committee in supervising the implementation of the cease-fire order. It has always seemed to me that we should be adopting a completely unrealistic attitude.if we did otherwise. I hold it to be impracticable, if not harmful, to try to settle that 'question here, without any direct contact with the situation as it has developed in Indonesi4. Any directive we may give to the parties concerned cannot have a full effect if it is not properly acted upon by some organ on the spot. ~ucun contact direct avec la situation telle qu'elle a evolue en Indonesie. Aucune des directives que nous donnerions aux parties interessees ne peut aboutir au m'aximum de resultat si cUe ti'est pas appliquee par un organe se otrouvant sur place. Apres la lecture du rapport des consuls, qui m'a semble une appreciation objective et realiste de la situation, je suis convaincu de l'opportunite des remarques que je viens de formuler. Si les membres du Conseil veulent bien se reporter all paragraphe 9 du .Chapitre Il du rapport de la Commission consulaire a Batavia, ou le probleme central de cette situation nous apparait dans toute ·sa signification, ils y trouveront le. passage suivant: "Les deux cotes admettent qu'un ordre de cesser le feu doit normalement etre suivi par un contact entre les deux parties, destine a regler ks details d'une observation satisfai- After having read the report of the consuls, which seemed to me an objective and realistic appraisal of the situation, I am convinced of the property of these considerations. If the members will look at chapter Il, paragraph 9 of the report of the Consular Commission at Batavia, where the gist of the situation appears in its full significance, they will see the following: "Both sides admit that a cease-fire order should normally be followed by contact between the two parties in order to arrange details for the satisfactory observance of the If that is the situation as seen by the consular authorities, who have inv~stigated it in all its complexities, it is only too clear that any attempt to bring about the complete cessation of hostilities without using the services of an organ on the spot would be futile. ' Since the cease-fire order had not been entirely complied with, the Security Council proceeded to the examination 'of the severalresolutions dealing'with the ·withdrawal of. troops to a given line, on the assumption that a decision on that subject would eventually bring about thecomplete cessation of hostilities. I believe, however, in the light of the facts. ascertained by the consular authorities, that such a decision .would be doomed to'the same fate as the cease-fire, order. Withdrawal of troops will not be achieved by an orderQf the Council if we do not provide for the supervision of its implementation. It is highly unrealistic to.suppose'that irregular troops will ever comply with such a decision and retreat to a line on which we may agree here. Such'a theoretical approach is, to our mind, the .main objection' to the proposals .. sl1bmitted by the USSR\ Australia2 and Polandll• We now have in Batavia the Committee of Good Offices, and it is for. the Committee to see how the Council's cease-fire order may best be observed, so that the hostilities may cease and the Committee may assist both parties in reaching a~al agreement. I cannot see why we should not use the means available to.us, and the Committ~e is undoubtedly the best means at our. disposal. .I have referred here to the experience we have had in these mat- . ters in' Latin Ainerica in similar cases. We have always had .recourse, with great success, to an organ of mediation to which military authorities were attached. FQr theSe reasons, and because it represents, in our opinion, t.1lebest approach 'to the· solution of. this question, we give our full support to the United States draft resolution\ the maiD. purpose of which is to co-ordinate the efforts of the Committee of Good Offices. and the consular and military authorities in Batavia for the. purpose of establiShing contact with, the parties, bringing about consultation between them and obtaining complete cessation of hostilities as a prerequisite Ior the pacific settlement of the dispute. We cannot share the view that this is not within the competence of the Committee of Good Offices, since its ultimate goal, which is to bring the parties to .a final' agreement, cannot be obtained without first securing complete cessation of.hostilities. Not before this initial step is taken" will the Committee be able to exercise .its essential function, namely, to bring the parties to an 'agreement and a .final settlement of the dispute, Si telle est la situation, vue par les autorites consulaires, qui 1'ont examinee dans tous ses aspects les plus complexes, il est manifeste que tQute tentative pour. aboutir a. la cessation com- 'plete des hostilites' sans avoir recours a. un organe se trouvant sur place serait vaiue. L'ordre de cesser le feu n'ayant pas ete entierement execute, le Conseil de securite a procede a. l'examen des dffferentes resolutions traitant du retrait des troupes sur une ligne determinee, estimant qu'une decision dans ce domaine aurait finalement pour effet la cessation complete des hostilites. Toutefois, a. la lumiere des faits etablis par les autprites consulaires, je crois .qu'une telle decision subirait le meme sort" que l'ordre de cesser le feu. Nous n'obtiendrons pas le retrait'des troupes par un ordre du Conseil si nous ne veil- Ions pas au controle de son execution. C'est n'avo~r aucun sens des realites que de supposer que des troupes irregulieres veuillent , jamais se conformer a. une telle decision et se retirer sur tine ligne. etablie par nous ici. A notre avis,' ce qu'on peut surtout objecter aux propositions de I'URSS1, de l'Australie2 et de la Polognell, c'est d'aborder ainsi la question de fac;on trop theorique. Nous 'avons maintenant a. Batavia la' Commission de bons offices et c'est a. cette Commission qu'il appartieilt de trouver le meilleur moyen de faire observer I'ordre de cesser le feu emis ,par le Conseil de'securite, afin que les hostilites prennent(fih et que la Commission puisse preter son· assistanceaux deux parties· en vue d'un accord definitif. Je ne vais pas pourquoi nous ne pourrions pas utiliser les moy~ns qui sont a. notre disposition et la Commission .est indubitablement le meilleur dont nous disposions: rai mentionne id I'experience que nous avons acquise dans ce domaine, dans des cas analogues, en Amerique latine. Nous avons toujours eu recours; avec succes, a. un organe mediateur auquel etaient attachees des autorites militaires; c'est parce que, a. notre avis, it constitue la'meilleure maniere d'arriver a la solution de cette question, que nous appuyons sans. reserve le projetde resolution des Etats- Unis', qui vise essentiellement a. coordonner les efforts de la Commission .de bons offices et des ~uto~ites consulaires et militair~s a. Batavia pour etabhr le contact avec les parties, amencr des consultations entre eUes et obtenir la cessation complete des hostilites, 'conditions prealables au reglement pacifique du conflit. Nous ne pouvons nous rallier a. l'opinion selon laquelle ceci depasse la competence de. la Comm.ission de bons offices,etant donne que son but ultime, qui est d'amener les parties a un accord definitif,ne peut etre attcint sans que soit assureed'abord la cessation complete des hostilites. Ce n'est qu'apres avoir pris cette premiere mesure que la Commission pourra exercer sa fonction essentielle, qui est d'amener les 'Voir les Proces-verbau% officiels du Conseil de secu- 'rite, Deuxieme Annee, No 93. . • Ibid., Nos 96 et 101. • Ibid., No 101. • Ibid., Nos 99 et 100. Nous esperons bien sincerement que les travaux de la Commission seront couronnes du plus grand succes. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais)·: Je voudrais, en tant que representant du ROYAUME-' tJNI, dire q~elques mots sur cette question et formuler 1.uelques observations· sur les resolutitms somnises au Conseil de securite. I Tout d'abord, je dois dire que c'est avec I, regret que j'ai entendu le representant de l'URSS se plaindre ce matin que le· rapport. de la Commission consulaireetait partial. Mais j'ai ete rassure, dans une certaine mesure, par la pensee que le representant de l'URSS et celui· de 'la Pologne avaient pu, tous deux, choisir uniIateralement dans le rapport de la CoI111ilission consulaire, un certain nombre de passages qui semblaient confirmer leur these; et, en consequence, je n'ai pu m'empecher de penser que le rapport n'est pas aussi partial qu'iIs voudraient nous le fah'e croire. n est ind~niable que ce rapport nous montre que l'ordre de cesser le feu n'a pas ete pleinement execute et cette situation est certainement tout a fait regrettable. Ce qu'il faut faire immediiatement et de toute urgence, est d'essayer de r;nettre fin a l'effusion de sang dans cette malheureuse region. La premiere chose que nous devons tenter d'assurer est l'executior..: effective de l'ordre de cesser le feu. Le fait qu'il n'ait 'pas ete execute semble avoir ete dt1 en partie it la difference entre les interpretations donnees a son sens exact et a son but et, surtout, it la situation extremement confuse qui regne ~ns cette region.

I shall allow myself, in my capacity as representative of the UNITED KING- DOM, to say a few words on this question and to comment on the resolutions which are before the Council. In the first place, I must say I was sorry to he.ar the representative of the. USSR complain thIS morning that the report of .the Consular Commission is one-sided, but I was somewhat comforted by reflecting that he and the representative of Poland had both been able to select unilaterally from the report of the Consular Commission a number of· points which seemed to suit their case; I cannot help thinking, therefore, that the report is not as one-sided as they would have us believe. It is undeniable that this report shows us that the cease-fire order has not been entirely carried. ~ut; and that, of course, is a very bad situation. The immediate' and urgent thing to do is to ~ry to put a stop to bloodshed in this unhappy reglOn. The first thing which we ought to try to ensure is the effective carrying out of the cease-fire order. Failure to carry it out seems to have been due partly to differences of interpretation as to its exact meaning and intention and most of all, of course, to the extremely confused situation which exists. At an earlier stage of our discussion, when there were only two proposals before us, neither of which seemed to me to a:fford an ideal solution, I attempted to make a proposal1 whereby somehow, with the assistance_ of authorities on the spot, that is to say the Committee of Good Offices, it might have been possible to draw a provisional line, as a first step. That was objected to by some representatives, who said that it would be premature and an unjust allocation of territory. I never had the least intention that it should have that meaning. What I meant was this. I do not see, in point of fact, how the Council is going to disentangle the forces unless it draws an arbitrary line in the first place, and then calls upon the forces on one side to go to one side of that line, and upon. the forces on the other side to go to the other side of that line. The first step after that, of course, is to determine when, where an<\ how far the forces . should withdraw. I realize that we could not do that here. We have not the information; we cannot dictate detailed movements. That would have to be left' to the Committee of Good Offices, with the assistance, possibly, of the Consular Commission and any of its military advisers. .Consequently, when at a later stage I saw the draft resolution submitted by. the representative of the United States, the whole tendency of which is to rely on the representatives on the spot, I saw that my draft resolution perhaps no longer had any utility, and I withdrew it. My resolution did ratner definitely lay down one particular proposal, which was the drawing pf a line; but it may be that those on the spot, . who would· know much more than YITe can know about the s!tuation there, may think differently. If the United States resolution were adopted, it would be quite possible for the Committeeof Good Offices to take that line" if they thought it good, or if they did not follow any oth~r effective procedure whic.h recommended itself to them. I do not want to take note of one point which occurred to me the other day. I was very much struck at our two hundred and fifteenth meeting2 by the fact that the representative of Poland, in his speech, which was very long and complete, mad~ no reference whatever to the Committee of Good Offices. The impression which 1 think a listener who followed his case would have obtained was that the Council had done .nothing and had been able to do nothing. That is really not the case. As a result of the aut~e procedure efficace qui lui semblerait conventr. Je tiens a. signaler un fait que j'ai observe. l'autre jour. J'ai ete tres frappe, au cours de notre deux-cent-quinzieme seance2, par le fait que le representant de la Pologne, dans son discours, qui etait tres long et tres complet, n'ait pas fait la moindre allusion a. la Commission de bons offices, Je pense qu'un auditeur qui aurait suivi ce discours en aurait _retire l'impression que le Conseil n'avait rien fait et n'avait pas ete capable de faire quoi que ce £Ut. En realite, il n'en est rien. Un des resultats de la discus- Similarly, there is another proposal, made by the representative of Poland, which goes even further, because it calls for the removal of the Netherlands forces from Indonesia altogether. For the same reason, a fortiori, I could not support this proposal. There is also the proposal made by the representative of Australia, which calls upon the Governments of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to w. thdraw their respective forces at least 5 kilometres behind the positions held at the date of the cease-fire order, 1 August. I cannot believe this is very practicable at the moment, because we can see from the map that there are pockets of Republican forces far behind any line one may choose to draw in the territory held by the Netherlands troops; and, because of such pockets, partial withdrawalin which direction I do not know - would not really alter the situation effectively. d~s positions occupees a la date du ler aoftt, jour ou fut promulgue 1'ordre de cesser le feu. Je ne puis croire que ceci sait faisable a 1'heure actuelle, parce' que la carte 110US montre qu'il existe des 110ts de forces republicaines bien loin derriere toute ligne que 1'on pourrait tracer dans le territoire tenu par les troupes neerlandaises, et qu'a cause de ces 110ts un retrait partiel - quelle qu'en soit la direction - n'aurait pas pour effet de modifier sensiblement la situation. Enfin, nous avons ete saisis d'un projet de resolution des Etats-Unis. Cette resolution me semble acceptable dans i'ensemble. Divers amendements ont ete proposes et nous verrons, au moment ou nous discuterons cette resolution, si nous pouvons nous mettre d'accord sur sa forme definitive. Dans 1'ensemble, cette resolution m'agree, parce qu'elle confie l'execution de 1'ordre de cesser le feu et la recherche d'un reglement a longue echeance a ceux en qui nous avons confiarrce, qui sont sur place, et qui sont en mesure de tenir compte de toutes les conditions politiques existantes et de faire, je 1'espere, des Finally, there is the United States draft resolution. In general I accept that resolution. Various amendments have been suggested and, when we come to its discussion, we shall see whether we can agree on the final form. In general, I like the resolution, because it entrusts the enforcement of the ceas~-fire order and the search for a long-term settlement to those in Whom we have confidence, who are on the spot an~ :vho are able to take into account all existing P~hhcal conditions and to make, I should hope, Wise recon;tmendations. I may say that the amendments whIch have been proposed this morning Mr. LOPEz (Colombia): I have no constructive suggestion to offer at this stage of our discussion, but I have requested to be allowed to say a few words because I should like to make· the position of the Colombian delegation clear as to two rather unimportant points. The first point is why it is that the Colombian delegation has no constructive suggestions to offer, since it was so extremely anxious last week1 that the Council should meet again without delay to to discuss this matter. The second. point is whether or not we have reason to be as pessimistic as some of the members of the Security Council claim us to be in view of our attitude vis-a-vis the different proposals. We were so anxious to have another early meeting because we very earnestly shared the view of the Australian representative, as he expressed it when he first brought this matter to the attention of the Security Council2, that the authority and prestige of the Council would stand or fall accqrding to its ability to take spirited and effective action in the interests of world peace. We feel that three months is a pretty long time to have to spend trying to take spirited and effective action, without actually having succeeded in doing so. If I may borrow an expression from the President, just as he thi~s it. would be most advisable to find ways of disentangling or disengaging the opposing forces in the area where they are fighting, we believe it is extremely important to see whether we can disengage or disentangle ourselves from so many proposals and find some way of taking effective action to stop the fighting in Indonesia. Unfortunately, the first thing which impresses my mind is that we do not seem to be able in any way to stop the fighting in Indonesia. We continue making proposals and amendments and coming back to our original proposals, without making any headway towards our main objective. Coming to this room this afternoon, I find a letter, which has just been circulated, from the representative of the Republic of Indonesia, addressed to the President of the Security Council, calling upon the Council to appoint an "international commission composed of representatives of the Security Council to observe and investigate conditions in and to supervise ter-' ritories" to be handed back to the control of the Republic after the withdrawal of the Netherlands forces. This is practically the point from which we started. We tried to have a com- M. LOPEz (Colombie) (traduit de l'anglais): Je n'ai aucune proposition concrete a presenter ace stade de notre discussion, mais j'ai demande l'autorisation de dire quelques mots parce que j'aimerais precisef l'attitude de la delegation colombienne sur deux points, d'ailleurs peu importants. ' Le premier a trait ala question de savoir pourquoi la delegation colombienne, si desireuse, la semaine derniere1, de voir tenir une nouvelle seance du Conseit a breve echeance pour discuter de ce probleme, n'a aucune proposition concrete a faire. Le second point concerne la question de savoir si la delegation colombienne est fondee a avoir l'attitude pessimiste que lui pretent certains membres du Conseil de securite en raison de sa position a l'egard des diverses propositions. ' Si nous souhaitions si vivement qu'une autre reunion ait lieu a bref delai, c'est que nous partagions sincerement les vues du representant de l'Australie, telles qu'illes a exprimees au momen~ ou it a soumis cette question a l'attention du Conseil de securite pour la premiere fois 2, en declarant que l'autorite et le prestige du ConseiI dependraient de sa capacite d'entreprendre une action rapide et efficace dans l'interet de la paix mondiale.N9us avons l'impression que trois mois represerltent un delai bien long pour essayer, sans succes, d'entreprendre une action rapide et efficace. Pour me servir d'une expression employee par le President, qui pense que le plus indique serait de trouver le moyen de desenchevetrer ou de degager les forces adverses dans la region ou elIes se battent, nous estimons qu'il est extremement important de voir si nous pouvons nous degager ou nous desenchevetrer de tant de propositions et trouver un moyen d'entreprendre une action efficace pour faire cesser les hostilites en Indonesie. Malheureusement, la premiere chose qui me frappe est que nous ne semblions pas capables d'arreter les hostilites en Indonesie de queIque maniere que ce soit. Nous continuons a faire des propositions, a introduire des amendements et a revenir sur nos premieres propositions, sans faire aucun progres vers notre objectif principal. En arrivant dans cette salle cet apres-midi j'ai trouve une lettre, qui vient d'etre distribuee, emanant du representant de la Republique d'Indonesie et adressee au President du Conseil de securite; cette lettre invitait le Conseil a nommer une "commission internationale composee de representants du Conseil de securite et qui exercerait des fonctions d'observation, d'enquete et de controle dans les territoires qui seront rendus aux Republicains apres le retrait des forces neerlandaises". C'est la pratiquement notre point de depart. Nous avons essaye de faire nommer This explains why, last week, my delegation was so anxious to have another meeting. I notice now that we have had not one but several meetings and that we have still made no progress. In fact the proposal of the United States delegation reads, in part, as follows: . "Having taken note that, according to the report [of the Consular Commission], no at- tempt was made by either side to come to an agreement with the other about the means of giving effect to that resolution; "Calls u,pon the parties concerned forthwith to consult with each other as to the means to be employed in order to give effect to the cease-fire resolution ..." It seems to me that we are moving in a vicious circle, the more so since the representative of the Netherlands, at this morning's meeting, again called into question the competence of the Security Council. When we first discussed this matter, my delegation took the position, at the hundred and seventy-second meeting2, that if the Councif had no competence, it should not take this matter in hand; but, as I said at the two hundr~d and eleventh meetingS, if the Council did have competence, it should call upon the parties to comply with its recommendations or decisions. I still believe that is one of the points we have to decide. What is the use of passing new resolutions, if at every other meeting we have the privilege of hearing the representative of the Netherlands Government question the competence of the Security Council in this re- gard? The second point flows logically from the first. I do not believe we are as pessimistic as we appear to be. Quite to the contrary, I have been wondering whether there is not ample reason to be very optimistic about the efforts of the Security Council, and the General As- sembly as well. When we first made our remarks regarding the unsuccessful work of the Security Council, we had not yet added the Indonesian question to our series of failures. Now I believe we can add it to the list. The proposal of the U~SR delegation calling upon the parties to YVlthdraw their troops to their original positions IS now one month old. The original cease-fire order is three months old, and here we are, with- out having definitely established whether we can actually confirm or renew our cease-fire order. I should say, rather, the cease-hostilities order, ~ecause it was not a cease..fire order. As I say, It was a cease-hostilities resolution, the one "Le Conseil de securite, ... "Ayant pris acte de ce que ce rapport [de .la Commission consulaire] signale que les deux parties n'ont fait aucune tentative pour conclure un accord sur les moyens de donner effet a cette resolution; "Invite les parties interessees a se consulter immediatement sur les moyens a utiliser pour donner effet a la resolution concernant la cessation du feu ...". I1 me semble que c'est la un cercle videux, d'autant plus que ce matin le representant des Pays-Bas a mis en doute, une fois de plus, la competence du Conseil de securite. Lorsque nous avons discute cette question pour la premiere fois, ma delegation a declare, a la cent-soixante- douzieme seance2, que si le Conseil n'etait pas competent pour traiter le probleme, it ne devait pas prendre l'affaire en mains; mais, comme je 1'ai fait remarquer a la deux-cent-onzieme seances, si au contraire le Conseil etait compe- tent, il devait demander aux parties de se con- former a ses recommandations ou decisions. Je continue a croire que c'est la un des points au sujet desquels nous devons prendre une deci- sion. A quoi bon adopter de nouvelles resolutions si chaque fois que nous nous reunissons, nous avons le privilege d'entendre le representant du Go!wernement des Pays-Bas mettre en doute la competence du Conseil de securite clans ce do- maine? Le second point decoule logiquement du pre- mier. Je ne crois pas que nous soyons aussi pes- simistes que nous le paraissons. Tout au con- traire, je me demande si nous n'avons pas d'ex- cellentes raisQns d'etre tres optimistes au sujet des efforts tant du Conseil de securite que de l'Assemblee generale. Lorsque nous avons pre- sente pour la premiere fois nos remarques con- cernant le travail infructueux du Conseil de securite, nous n'avions pas encore ajoute la question indonesienne a notre serie d'echecs. Maintenant, je crois que nous pouvons l'ajouter a la liste. La proposition de la delegation de 1'URSS, demandant aux parties de retirer leurs troupes sur leurs premieres positions a ete faite il y a un mois deja. Le premier ordre de ces- ser le feu date d'il y a trois mois et void Oll nous en sommes, sans avoir etabli d'une fa<;~n nette si nous pouvons effectivement confirmer ou renouveler notre ordre de cesser le feu. I1 1 Voir les Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de secu- rite, Deuxieme Annee, No 83. Thus I am afraid we are not getting any- where. I do not know whether or not we are justified in feeling pessimistic about this matter or, as has been implied, whether we should feel optimistic. But I doubt very much that we shall accomplish any result if, as we continue discuss- ing resolutions, we do not come to the heart of the problem, which seems to my delegation to be whether we can expect the Netherlands Govern- ment and the Government of the Indonesian Republic to comply with our resolutions when we ask them to cease hostilities and to act accordingly.

The list of speakers in the general discussion is now exhausted and therefore, in accordance with what was understood at the two hundred and fifteenth meeting2, the general discussion is closed. I do not think that there has been any restraint on freedom of speech, as that discussion has lasted through frequent meetings during the month of October. I therefore find it difficult to believe that there is much that remains to be said that has not already been said at least once. I propose, therefore, to put to the vote now the various draft resolutions, with amendments thereto, that are before the Council. In doing that, I shall feel bound to follow the order of present;J.tion of those resolutions. That is to say, we shall begin with'the draft resolution submitted by the USSR representative. The draft resolution submitted by the USSR representative reads as follows: "The Security Council, "Considers it necessary that the troops of both sides, the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic, should be immediately withdrawn to the positions which they occupied before the beginning of military operations." A vote was taken by show of hands. There were 4 votes in favour, 4 against and 3 abstentions. The draft resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative votes of seven members. Votes for: Australia, Colombia, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Votes against: Belgium, France, United Kingdom, United States of America. Abstentions: Brazil, China, Syria.

The next draft resolution, in order of priority, is the Australian resolution, which reads as follows: Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): La liste des orateurs pour la discussion generale est rnaintenant epuisee et c'est pourquoi, conformement cl ce qui a ete convenu au cours de notre deuxcent-quinzieme seance2, la discussion generale est close. Je ne pense pas qu.'il y ait eu la moindre restriction cl la liberte de parole, etant donne que cette discussion s'est poursuivie au cours de nombreuses reunions durant le mois d'octobre. C'est pourquoi il rn'est difficile de croire qu'il reste beaucoup a dire qui n'ait pas deja ete dit unc fois au moins. En consequence, je propose de mettre maintenant aux voix les divers projets de resolutions soumis au Conseil en meme temps que les amendements qui s,'y rapportent. En mettant ct's resolutions aux voix, je suivrai l'ordre dans lequel elles ont ete presentees, c'est-a.-dire que nous commencerons par le projet de resolution soumis par le representant de I'URSS. Voici le texte du projet de resolution soumis par le representant de l'URSS: "Le Conseil de sec1~rite, "Estime qu'il est necessaire que les troupes des Pays-Bas et de la Republique d'Indonesie se retirent immediatement sur les positions qu'elles occupaient avant le debut des operations militaires." /1 est procede au vote a main levee. Il y a 4 voiz pour, 4 contre et 3 abstentions. N'ayant pas obtenu le vote alfirmatif de sept membres, le projet de resolution n'est pas adopte. Votent pour: Australie, Colombie, Pologne, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. Votent contre: Belgique, France, Royaume- Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. S'abstiennent: Bresil, Chine, Syrie. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le projet de resolution suivant, dans 1'0rdre de priorite, est le projet de resolution de l'Australie, dont voici les termes: "Calls upon the Governments of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to withdraw their respective forces· at least 5 kilometres behind the positions held at date of cease-fire order of I August." "Invite 1es Gouvernements des Pays-Bas et de la Republique d'Indonesie a retirer leurs forces a 5 kilometres au moins a l'arriere des positions qu'e!1es occupaient le ler aout, date a laqueUe cet ordre fut lance." I think the Australian representative added, in a subsequent proposal!, "and directs the military advisers on the Consular Commission. to supervise .the withdrawal of the respective forces". Je pense que It': representant de l'Australie a ajoute, dans une proposition presentee u1terieurementl: "et donne mission aux conseiIlers militaires de la' Commission consulaire de contro1er le retrait des forces respectives". Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) : I propose the following amendment to the' draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Australia: substitute "25 kilometres" for "5 kilometres". M. GROMYKO' (Union des Republiques socialistes sovitetiques) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je propose 1'amendement suivant au projet de resolution soumis par la delegation de l'Australie : remp1acer "5 kilometres" par "25 kilometres". ~e PRESIDENT (traduit de ['anglais): Le representant de l'URSS propose Un amendement au projet de resolution de 1'Austra1ie, tendant a .remp1acer "5 kilometres" par "25 kilometres". Je pense que cet amendement est si simple que nous n'avons pas besoin d'en distribuer le texte ecrit. Le cq10nel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de Z'anglais): J'aimerais poser une question au representant de 1'URSS, pour que 1'objet de son amendement soit clair. Entend-il par la que les forces devraient etre retirees a une distance d'au moins 25 kilometres ou parle-t-il d'une zone de 25 kilometres? S'il entend par la une zone de 25 kilometres, c'est une zone tres etendue; mais si son amendement tend a la creation d'une zone de 50 kilometres, le contro1e en deviendrait extremement diffici1e.Toutefois, si le representant de 1'URSS parle d'une zone de 25 kilometres, je suis pret a accepter cet amendement.

The USSR representative has proposed an amendment to the Australian draft resolution, substituting 25 kilometres for 5 kilometres. I think that amendm.ent is ,so simple that we need not have it circulated in writing. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): I should like to ask the USSR representative one question in order to make his amendment clear. Does he mean that the forces should be withdrawn at least 25 kilometres, or does he mean a zone of 25 kilometres? If he means a zone of 25 kilometres, that is a very wide zone; but if his amendment is for a zone of 50 kilometres, that would be very, very difficult to police. However, if the USSR representative is referring to a zone of 25 kilometres, r should be prepared to accept that amendment. ]/Ir. GROMYKO (Union. of Soviet Socialist Republics): I do not propose to change the meaning of the Australian draft resolution, but just to change the figures. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit de l'anglais): Je ne propose pas de ·modifier le sens du projet de resolution de l'Australie, mais simp1ement de modifier les chiffres.

May I ask the representative of Australia if he accepts this amendment, or does he wish it voted on? If he accepts it, we shall put the Australian draft resolution, as amended, to the vote. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Puis-je demaJ?der au representant de l'AustraIie s'il accepte cet amendement ou s'il desire qu'il soit mis aux voix? S'il l'accepte, nous mettrons aux voix le projet de resolution de l'Austra1ie te1 qu'il est amende. . Si je puis me permettre une remarque per- If I may add a remark of my' own, it was quite clear to me that all the representative of the USSR proposed was to substitute the figure 25 for the figure 5. r am not quite clear as to what the representative of Australia means by a zone. I must confess to him that r have never quite understood his proposal. Looking at the map, I find that in the very wide and large area now occupied by the Netherlands troops there are indi~ated, by circles, at various places miles apart, pockets of Republican forces; and when the representative of Australia proposes that those forces should be withdrawn - some of them are right in the middle of the territoryat least 5 kilometres, I do not quite know ip. what direction they should go, nor, indeed, how the situation would be'much improved by their sonneUe~ il me semble que tout ce que proposait le representant de l'URSS e~ait de substituer le chiffre. "25" au chiffre "5". Je ne vois pas tres bien ce qu'entend le representant de l'Australie lorsqu'il parle d'une zone. Je dois lui avouer que je n'ai pas bien compris sa proposition. En regardant la carte, je constate que dans la region tres etendue actueUement occupee par 1es troupes neer1andaises, des cercles indiquent, a divers endroits distants 1es uns des autres depItlsieurs miUes, des ilots de forces republicaines, et si le representant de l'Australie .propose que ces forces soient retirees d'au moins 5 kilometres - i1 y en a qui se trouvent au centre de cette region - je ne vois pas tres bien dans queUe direction eUes devraient se However,· would the Australian representative accept the substitution of 25 for 5, as proposed by the representative of the USSR? Colonel HODGSON (Australia) : Yes, I am prepared to accept that amendment. In effect, that will mean 31 miles. That amendment will give greater flexibility to the Australian proposal to carry out a withdrawal from the area where there is contact, which is causing all the difficuJty· at the moment. I think it should overcome some, of the difficulties which the President has just mentioned.

The draft resolution which is now before the Council is the Australian resolution, as amended, which now reads as follows: "The Security Council, "In order to ensure the observance of its cease-fire order, "Calls upon the Governments of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to withdraw their respective forces at least 25 kilometres behind the positions held at date of . cease-fire order of 1 August and directs the military advisers on the Consular CommissiQn to supervise the withdrawal of the respective forces." We shall now take a vote on this draft rt::- solution. . A vot~ was taken by show of hands. There were 5 votes in favour, one against,an.d 5 abstentions. The resolution was not adopted, having failed tb obtain the affirmative votes of .reven members. Votes for: Australia, Colombia, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Votes against: Belgium. Abste.ntions: Brazil, China, France, United Kingdom, United States of America.

I should like to explain that, as representative of the UNITED KINGDOM I abstained because I still do not understand what the effect of the Australian resolution would be. We now come to the United States draft resolution, to which there are certain amendments. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): I reserved my right to speak on this resolution, but now that the USSR and Australian proposals have been defeated, my first observation is this. The question which was put to the representative of the Netherlands this morning was a very pertinent one. It may' be that this afternoon we shall finish this matter for the time being, and we hope for a considerable time. We should like, therefore, to have that reply communicated to the President in writing. Also, that reply will be of the utmost Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Oui, je suis pret a accepter cet amendement. En fait, celi representera 31 mHles. Cet amendement donnera plus de souplesse ala proposition de FAustralie et permettra de faire effeciuer un retrait dans la region ou il y a contact entre les armees, ce qu: cause toutes les difficultes actuelles. Je pense que ced noUs permettra d'ecarter certaines des difficultes que le President vient de mentionner. Le .PRESIDENT (traduit .de l'anglais) : Le projet de resolution qui est maintenant soumis au Conseil est la resolution australienne amendee, dont void le texte actuel: "Afin d'assurer le respect de 1'0rdre de cesser le feu. qu'il a lance, "Invite les Gouvernements des Pays-Bas et de la Republique d'Indonesie a replier leurs forces a 25 kilometres au moins a l'arriere des positions qu'elles· occupaient le 1er aout, date a laquelle cet ordre fut lance, et donne mission aux conseillers militaires de la Com- mission consulaire de controler le retrait des forces respectives." . ( . Nous allons maintenant mettre ce projet de resolution aux voix. . Il est proeMe au vote a main levee. Il y a 5 voix pour, une eontre avee 5 ab$tentions. N'ayant pas obtenu le vote affirmatif de sept membres, le projet de resohttion n'est pas adopte. Votent pour: Australie, Colombie, Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. Vote contre: Belgique. S'abstiennent: Bresil, Chine, France, Royaume- Uni, Etats-Unis d~Amerique. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de 1;anglais): J'aime~ rais dire que je me suis abstenu, en qualite de representant du ROYAUME-UNI parce que je ne comprends toujours pas quelles seraient les con- sequences de la resolution de l'Australie. Nous en arrivons maintenant au projet de resolution des Etats-Unis au sujet duquel on a propose certains amendements. Le colonel HODGSOt-r (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): J'avais reserve mon droit de prendre 'la parole sur ce projet de resolution, mais main- tenant que les propositions de I'URSS et de l'Australie ont ete rejetees, ma premiere obser- vation sera celle-ci: la question posee ce matin au representant des Pays-Bas etait parfaitement pertinente. Il se peut .que cet apres-midi, nous reglions cette question pour un certain temps, et, nous l'esperons, pour longtemps. C'est pourquoi nous aimerions que la reponse a cette questi:.... The second point is this. It was the intention of the Security Council, or at least it was the intention of the Australian delegation, that the Consular Commission, with its military advisers, should continue to observe and report on the cease-fire order. It seems to us that the Com- mission has interpreted that order to mean that it was to submit one report and one report only, and then dissolve. We understand that many of the military observere have left and returned to their own countries. The letter we received this morning from the representative of the Republic of Indonesia also seems to imply that there is no body in existence to observe any of the activities in connexion with the cessation of hostilities. It seems to me that there is extraordinary confusion in the Council about the functions of the Committee of Good' Offices and of the Con- sular Commission. As far as my recollection goes, I think the representative of the USSR was the only one who clearly expressed that difference when, at our two hundred and thirteenth meet- ing2, he indicated that we were proposing to give to the Committee of Good Offices a function which we did not bestow on it nor intend to bestow on it, namely, ?.ny action in connexion with the cease-fire order and the cessation of hostilities. Even this afternoon we have the representa- tive of Brad saying, in effect, that it is for the Committee of Good Offices to see how the cease-fire order should be observed; that it is for the Committee to bring about the cessation of hostilities; that that is the function of the Committee of Good Offices. Well, with all respect, we made it very· clear that the Committee of Good Offices' was to attempt to bring about the settlement of the long-term problem, that is, the problem of peaceful settlement. We appointed the consuls as our instruments - and they still call them- selves, in this report, the Consular Commission of the Security Council- as our agents in con- nexion with the cease-fire order. We still have that confusion in the resolution before us; in othel' words, we are now asking the Committee of Good Offices to take certain action and even to supervise the carrying into effect of the order which we appointed another to supervise. ',See The Political Events in the Republic of lndo- nNesla'ypublished by the Netherlands Information Bureau, ew ork. y ~ SeeNOfficial Rtcords of the Security Council, Second ~.c 1 Voir "The Political Events in the Republic of Indo- nesia", document publie par le Bureau d'information des Pays-Bas a New-York. Right through this report we see that two of the main reasons given for the failure to observe the cease-fire order were that there was on both sides a lack of confidence in the good faith of the other party to the dispute and, secondly, that there was no agreement as to the means by which that order could be enforced and no way whereby contact could be establish'ed. Since then, that is, three months ago, we read !hat bitterness between the parties has increased - and one could reasonably assume that would be so after all this fighting. and bloodshed- and it would now be far more difficult for those two parties to get together. Yet we find that the United States proposal goes back completely to three months ago, ignores all that and simply calls upon the parties to do certain things. We suggest that that is almost useless. Certainly, the amendment Of the representative of China does help by inserting the words "either directly or through the Committee of Good Offices". But again I fail to see. why that duty is given to the Committee of Good Offices and not to the body whose real duty it is, namely, the Consular Commission. In other words, the Committee of Good Offices is being made into an executive body, which was never intended~ Our main objection to this United States draft "resolution relates to the last paragraph. In that respect, we agree largely. with what the. repre- sentative of the USSR said this morning. What does it do? First of all, it says: "to alter sub- stantially the territory". In 'other 'words, it completely ignores t:.e fact, as the evidence in- dicates, that there has been a large alteration. There is some. evidence to the effect, as I in- dicated, that there has been an alteration ap to 100 kilometres. To use a homely illustn..tion, 1 can say at lunch time that I had a meal. But if I say that I had a substantial meal, it connotes a very large meal; and a substantial extension of control means a very large extension of control. In. other words, then, the Netherlands Government is really given the authority of the COl1ncil.to " continue its operations, to contin.ue to extend its control, as long as it is not," according to its own interpretation, "substantial" jand one can in- terpret "substantial" in a variety of ways. We therefore propose to amend the last paragraph. We cannot accept the Chinese amend- ment, because the latter simply says that "the use of the armed forces of either party by military action ... is inconsistent with the spirit of the Council resolution of 1 August". Who is gqing to define the spirit· of our resolution? We say straight out, it was not in conformity with it - nothing to do with the spirit. It was not in conformity with our resolution, so why not say so? As the representative of the USSR said, the Chinese amendment does not alter in any way the substance of the United States, text. . / The last point to whic.lt we have objection in the United States draft resolution is· the phrase "by military action". Control can be extended otherwise than by military action, even using "military" in its widest sense. That con- trol can be extended by police action, by ad- ministrative action and. even by naval action. So our amendment is to replace the last para- graph by: "Advises the parties concerned, the Com- mittee of Good Offices and the Consular Com- mission, that. any consolidation, control, or acquisition of territory not occupied on 4 August 1947 would pot be in conformity with. its resolution of 1 August." That i~ a positive statement of fact, a positive statement of the clear intention of the Council; our proposal gives purpose and effect to that intention.• 'The PRESIDENT: I should like to try to deal with one or two of the points raised by the representative· of Australia. He said that it ap- peared that in the rendering of this one report, .the Consular Commission had discharge<l its duties, and that no further duties were ex-' pected of it. I agree that it may appear like i?at. I should reca!!, however, that the resolu- tIOn which the Security Council adopted on 25 August requested the Governments, members of !he Council, who had consular representatives Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): J;aime- rais essayer de traiter un ou deux 'des points sou.,. leves par le representant de l'Australie. Il a declare qu'il semblait qu'en nous remettant son unique rapport la Commission consulaire s'etait acquittee de ses fonctions et qu'on ne s'atten- dait pas a ce qU'elle accomplit d'autres taches que1conques. Je reconnais que les apparencey; peu- vent justifier une telle interpretation. Je rappel- . lerai totitefois que la 'resolution ac!optee ·par. le Conseil de securite a la date du 2Sao'i1t deman- , dait aux Gouvernements membres .du Conseil, qui avaient des repres~ntants consulaires a"Bata- via, de leur donner pour instructions de prepa- rer des rapports d'information sur la situation1• Il me semble que, de toute evidence, nous devrions nous attendre a recevoir des. rapports periodiques jusqu'au mqnient ou la question serait eclaircie. l~ Batavia, to instruct them to prepare informa- bona! reports on the situation1 • I should think, certainly, that until the matter is cleared up, we should expect to have periodic reports. "Fait connatt?"e aux partie~.interessees, a la Commission de bons offices et a la COmmission consulaire, qu'aucun controle ou acquisition de territoires non occupes a la date du· 4 aofrt 1947, ou aucune consolidation de positions sur de teJ.s territoires' ne serait conforme a sa reso- lution du ler aofrt." C'est la un expose net des faits, une decla- ration ouverte des intentions du Conseil; notre proposition definit ces intentions d'une maniere cliire et efficace. If the United States resolution were adopted, the situation would be cleared up to this extent, that this resolution would definitely request the Committee of Good Offices to assist the parties in reaching an agreement on an arrangement which would ensure the observance of the cease- fire resolution and would, request the Consular Commission, with its military advisers, to make its assistance available. The Security Council may think it right, or it may think it wrong, that the Committee of Good Offices should occupy itself with the cease-fire order. I should have thought, myself, that it would, be difficult· for the Committee to make much progress with the other, more important tasks before this first cease-fire operation had been carried' out. I should have thought, myself, that this was a good proposal. I do ~ot really see any objection to it. If it is agreed upon, the Council would, under the penultimate para- graph, from which I quote; request "the Con- sular Commission ... to make its services avail- able to the Committee of Good Offices", and presumably the Committee would forward to us the reports which the Consular Commission would make. \ General ROMULQ (Philippines): I should like Le general ROMULO (Philippines) (tyaduit de to make a very brief intervention' concerning' l'anglais): J'aimerais faire une tres courte ciecla- two aspects of the United States draft resolution ration concernantdeux aspects du texte revise as revised, and in support of the Australian du projet de resolution des 'Etats-Unis et en amendment. raveur de l'amendement propose par l'Australie. Much as we should like to believe that such I an assumption is correct, there is abundant evi- dence, both in the report of the Consular Com- mission ,and in the statements recently made here by the representatives of the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands, that the spirit, which alone would make the projected solution possible, seems to be entirely lacking-. The de- fiant attitude of the Netherlands Government is .. well-known to the Council, while the leaders of ' the Republic of Indonesia have made it very clear that they consider arbitration to be the only answer to the conflict in Indonesia. This being the case, it is difficult to see how the consultations proposed in the United States draft reso 'on inspired through 'the proposal is by the u,-'st of intentions, can produce the desired results. What I wish to point out is that the resolu- tion, however well-meaning it may be, does not meet the whole problem before the Council. That problem is the evident unwillingness of the parties voluntarily to deal directly with each other· concerning the enforcement of the cease- fire order. After listening to the statement made by the Indonesian representative at the Council's two hundred and fourteenth meetingt, in which he pleaded once again for the outright arbitration of the conflict and solemnly pledged his Govern- ment to the faithful observance of any decision which might result from such arbitration; and after considering the report of the Consular Commission, I fcel that the employment of measures somewhat more vigorous and the use of force greater than that proposed in the United States resolution may be necessary. Arbitration by the Council" or the transformation of the Council or·Committee of Good Offices into a cornmis~ion of arbitration, might well prove to be the answer. ' My second point relates t~ the last paragraph of the revised United States draft resolution, discussed here a few minutes ago by the rep- resentative of Australia. My first impression, ~pon reading this paragraph, is that it virtually condemns the advances made by the armed forces of either party to this dispute primarily the Netherlands· .forces, after 4 August 1947 and, by implication, would justify the withdrawal of troops to the points and lines they occupied at that date. In other words, while the phrasing is some- what am~i~ous - in keeping, "I think, with the charactenshc mildness of the resolution and ,~wing to the necessity of adhering to the nice- hes of diplomatic language - I cannot but feel I do not believe that it is the intention of the United States to hav~ the Security Council merely express an opinion or voice a pious hope and stop there. Hence the Australian amendm.ent presented today, which replaces the last paragraph of the United States resolution, prevents that resolution. from being a mere .expression of pious hope; and for this reason the Philippines delegation believes that the amendment should be approved by this august body. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): We are dealing here with a provisional measure. We have called it the cease-fire order and the cease- fire resolution of I August, and we have been informed that it has not .been observed because of a different understanding of its meaning by the parties.to which it was addressed. As a matter of fact, it was not a cease-fire order. It was a provisional measure which did not mention the word !'cease-fire'~. It mentioned the word "hos- tilities". That provisional order was supple- mented on 26 August by another provisional order1 ; and the formation, on 25 August, of the Committee' of Good Offices2, and the request to the Governments concerned to offer the serv- ices of their consular officials; had for their chief purpose the achievement of the aims stated in the preamble to the resolution setting up the Consular Commission2• But those measures also aimed at a permanent solution of the poli- tical question. The cessation of hostilities was a military question and it is the paramount ques- tion which concerns us. That is why we have been debating it for a few days. I should.like to read to the Council the re- levant part of the preamble to the resolution of 25 August establishing the Consular Com- mission: "And whereas it is'desirable that steps should be taken to avoid disputes and friction relating to the observance of the cease.,fire orders, and h; .~reate conditions which will facilitate agreunent between the parties." That·was put into the preamble to the resolu-' tion in order to characterize it and illuminate its purpose. Accordingly, further on, in that part of the resolution which relates to the consular Si moll. interpretation est correcte, il ne reste qu'a demander quelles mesures concretes les orga- nismes interesse~ c'est-a-dire la Commission de bons offices et"""Ia Commission consulaire, sont censes prendre a l'egard des principes formu- les dans le te:x;te revise du projet de resolution soumis par les Etats-Unis. Je ne pense pas que les Etats-Unis tiennent a ce que le Conseil de securite se contente d'ex- primer une opinion ou un espoir tout platonique et s'en tenir ta. Aussi l'amendement propose aujourd'hui par la delegation de l'Australie, et qui vise a remplacer le dernier paragraphe du projet de resolution des Etats-Unis, empeche- t-il cette resolution d'etre l'expression d'un espoir platonique, et c'est pourquoi la delegation des Philippines estime que le Conseil de securite de- vrait approuver cet amendement. M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'ang1ais) : Nous nous occupons en ce moment d'une mesure de caractere provisoire.· Nous l'avons appelee ordre de cesser le feu et resolu- tion du ler aout tendant a faire cesser le feu, et on nous a fait savoir qu'elle n'avait pas ete suivie d'effet parce que les parties auxquelles s'adressait cette 'resolution en donnaient des inter- pretations differentes. En fait il ne s'agit pas d'un ordre de cesser le feu. Il s'agit d'une mesure de caractere provisoire; le texte ne contenait pas l'expression "cesser le feu". Le terme em- ploye etait "hostilites". Cet ordre provisoire s'est trouve complete, le 26 aout, par un autre ordre provisoire1 ; et la constitution de la Commission de bons offices; le 25 Mut2, ainsi que l'invitation adressee aux' pays interesses de preter les ser- vices de leurs representants consulaires, devaient servir la fin principale definie par le. preambule de la resolution portant creati:m de la Commis- sion consulaire2•. Mais ces mesures tendaient ega- lement a la solution permanente du probleme politique: La' cessation des hostilit€s etait une question d'ordre.militaire, et c'est celle qui nous interesse ail premier chef. C'est pourquoi noUS en discutons' ici depuis quelques jours. Je voudrais donner lecture au Conseil de la partie du preambule de la resolution du 25 aout porjant creation de la Commission consulaire: . "Et attend1t qu'il est souhaitable que des mesures soient prises pour eviter tout differend et ,tout desaccord a propos de l'execution des ordres de cesser le feu et pour creer des con· ditions qui faciliteront la conclusion d'un ac- cord entre les parties." . L'insertion c!e cette clause dans le preambule de la resolution av~it pour objet d'en souligner le caractere et d'en preciser les fins avec nettete. En consequence, nous trouvons plus bas dans • >VOir. Ies Proces-verbaux officiels du c;nseil'.de.. s.e.c.:J'. rite, Deuxieme Annee, No 84, 195eme seance. . . 'Ibid., No 83. . . ".. , such reports to cover the observance of the cease-fire on;lers and the conditions pre- vailing in areas under military occupation or from which armed forces now in occupation may be withdrawn by agreemen~ between the parties;". I draw the attention of the members to that point: The' Security Council did not give an order to the effect that the forces should with- draw. The Security Council did not make any finding of facts. The Security Council did not charge one side or the other with guilt. This was a pr0visional measure, aimed at that final sub- stantial settlement between the parties, and it gave priority in point of time to the military question. The Committee of Good Offices which was sent over there was sent there primarily in order to assist in the settlement of the political question. The Committee of Good Offices was not concerned, under the resolution' establishing the Consular Commission, with finding or re- porting or doing anything with respect to that part of the provisional measure taken on 1 August. But - and this is where we are today '-the report of that body of investigators which did have a specific commitment with respect to the cease-fire order, namely, the Consular Com- mission, has come in to us, and it shows beyond question that cease-fire order is not being carried out. It assi!!'ns as one of the reasons for this situation th~ fact that there was a misunder- standing between the two sides. The cease-fire order was not understood alike by both sides. ThE. representative of Colombia therefore called attention to the matter and observed, at the two hundred and eleventh meeting of the Security Council, that that fundamental trouble should be cleared up immediately. That interests the representative of the United States very much, and the pending resolution here' offered by the United States is intended to clarify that situation and expedite the carrying out of that original provisional meaSUre. This is not a final measure. This is not a finding of facts. This is not a finding of guilt. This is nothing but a provisional measure designed to supply the de- fect which was said to be the cause of the f~ilure of the original provisional measure. s~lar Commission. That resolution contemplated port~nt creation de la Commission consulaire. wIthdr~wal _by agreement between the parties, Celle-ci envisageait le retrait des troupes, par and saId so. It also requested'the various Mem- ac~ord entre les parties et en faisait expresse- bel' States to have their consular officials watch ment mention. Elle invitait egalement l~s divers .that withdrawal and report bacl{. to 11S. But it Etats' Membres a donner pour instructions a was _a withdrawal to be made by agreement leurs representants:..unsulaires de surveiller le between the parties., When the original draft retrait et de nOlls ,faire rapport a ce sujet. Mais ~solution of the United States came before le retrait des troupes etait soumis a un accord ~ci1, therefore, ~t did not refer to any- entre les deux p~r~ies. Ainsi, quand le projet "... to consult with each other as to the means to be employed in order to give effect to the cease-fire resolution and, pending agree- ment, to cease any actbities which contra- vene that resolution;". . Next it calls upon the Committee of Good Offices to do something which it has not pre- viously been asked to do. If we had any authority to make the original request, asking the Com~ mittee to intervene and perform good offices in this matter, so we have that authority here. In the United States draft resolution it is provided .that the Security Council: "Requests the Committee of Good Offices to assist the parties in reaching agreement on an arrangement which will ensure the observance of the cease-fire resolution;". The draft resolution thus adheres strictly to the position taken by the Security Council on 25 August. Next, since we have the Consular Commission there, with its military assistants, who have the speciaf knowledge and skill and experience that we knew were necessary in order to carry such agreement into effect, it is possible in the draft resolution that the Security C::ouncil: "Requests the Consular Commission, to- gether with its military assi~tants, to make its services ,available to the Committee of Good Offices;". There is not a word here of compulsion. This is nota command to the parties. This is another provisional measure designed to cure the defect in the original provisional measure. Another thing - if this resolution were passed as originally drafted, it would co-ordinate the work of those two bodies, and it would co-or- dinate them in the direction taken by the re- solution of 25 August setting up the Consular CpmmissiQn,. namely, the direction of an agree- ment between the parties. Is it not true that the Council seeks -to have this b11siriess settled by peaceful means, without going into enforcements and sanctions and that sort of thing? Is it· not true that we are all trying to throw our· moral weight into the scale on. the side of a pacific settlement of this affair? And how can one achieve that by coer- cion or by an order or by a judgment? We. know we cannot achieve it in that way. If we are to have a· pacific settlement, it will be only by the way of agreement. That is why the Council took the course of offering good offices, in order to aid in the mediation of this matter. Ensuite de quoi, e11e' prie la Commission des bons offices de prendre certaines mesures, ce qu'on n'avait pas fait auparavant. Si notts avons eu le droit de l'inviter initialemerit a intervenir et a preter ses bons offices,' nous avons, en l'oc- currence, un droit identique. I1 est dit dans le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis: "Prie la Commission de bons offices d'aider les parties a arriver a un accord sur les dis- positions qui permettront d'appliquer la reso- lution concernant la cessation du feu." Le projet de resolution se confortne ainsi rigoureusement a la position prise par le Con- seil de securite le 25 aottt. Ensuite, tenant compte du fait que la Commis- sion consulaire se trouve sur place et beneficie du concours de ses adjoints militaires, dont les connaissances specialisees, l'habilete et l'expe- rience etaient, nous le savions, indispensabies pour donner 'effet· a un tel accord, il a ete pre- cise dans le projetde resolution des Etats-Unis que le Conseil de securite: "Priela' Commission consulaire de mettre ses services, ainsi que ceux de ses adjoints militaires, a la disposition de la Commission de bons offices ;". Pas un mot dans cette resolution n'a un carac- tere obligatob~. Aucun brdre n'est donne aUX parties en cause. C'est encore une mesure de caractere provis9ire, destinee a corriger l'erreur que contenait la mesure provisoire initiale. Autre chose: si cette resolution avait ete adop- tee dans' sa forme originale, elle servirait a. coordonner les tra'vaux de ces deux organismes et cela dans le seris prevu par la resolution du 25 aout portant' creation de la Commission con- sulaire, a savoir aux fins de realisation d'un accord entre les parties. N'est-il pas exact que le Conseil cherc.1,.e a regler cette affaire par des methodes pacifiques sans recourir ni a des mesures de coercition, ni ades sanctions, ni aaucune forme de penaIite? N'est:-il pas vrai, que nous nous effot<sons tous de jeter ·le poidsde notre autorite morale dans la balance, afin de regler cette affaire de maniere pacifique? Comment done pourrait-on y arriver en recourant aux mesures de coercition, en don- nant des ordres ou en portant un jugement? Nous savons que nous ne pouvons y re11ssir de cette fac;on. Si n011S devons regIer l'affaire pad- fiquement, nous n'y arriverons qu'au moyen d't1~ accord. C'est pourquoi nous avons pris le part! de faire demander au Conseil d'offrir ses bons offices .pour aider a regler 1'affaire par voie de mediatidn. I should like to clarify another point. That is, if we should accept the text in the form proposed by the representative of China, and strike out in one place the words "its resolution of I August should be interpreted as not permitting", substituting for it, at the end of the paragraph, the phrase "is inconsistent with the spirit of the Council resolution of I August", I should under- stand the purpose of that language to be to remedy the defect there is i.n the use of the words "cease hostilities", . The resolution of I August says nothing else. It states in part: tiNoting with concern the hostilities in pro- gress between the armed forces of the Nether- lands and the Republic of Indonesia, "Constatant avec inquietude que des hosti- lites sont en cours entre les forces armees des Pays-Bas et celles de la Republique d'Indone- sie, "Invite les parties "Calls upon the parties "a) a cesser immediatement les hostilites..." Elle ne dit rien de plus. Elle ne commande pas de. cesser le feu, ni de rester sur les positions 'occupeeset evidemment elle ne peut pas com- mander non plus de couper les lignes< de commu- nication qui permettent aux corps de troupes des deux parties de se ravitailler et de subsis- ter. It faut l'interpreter dans son sens. realiste. C'est pourquoi j'aime assez le texte propose par le representant de la Chine, a savoir: "est incom- patible avec l'esprit de la resolution du Conseil du ler aout". I1 est ainsi precise que 'le but envisage par le Conseil de securite en prenant cette mesure pl'ovisoire etait de mettre fin aux hosfilites et gu'il n'avait pourtant pas l'intention d'etre deraisonnable; qu'il ne voulait pas simple- ment donner l'ordre de cesser le feu, mais quil avait en vue tottte action constituant des hostili- tes entre forces armees antagonistes. Le projet de resolution soumis par les Etats- Unis ·ne vise pas a discuter ou a examiner le probleme fondamental et ultime.Nous nous occu- pons, ici, 'de la situation militaire et la reso- lutionn'est qu'une mesure provisoire qui, comme je le repete depuis le debut, ne doit pas modi- " (a) To cease hostilities forthwith ..." It does not say anything more. It does not say to cease firing, it does not say to stand fast and, of course, it does not mean the cutting off of lines of communication that keep bodies of troops on both sides supplied with food and keep them alive. It has to be interpreted in its realistic sense. That is why I rather like the language p~oposed by the Chinese representative, namely, "IS inconsistent with the spirit of the Council resolution of I August". By that, it-is made clear tha~ the intention of the Security Council in takmg that provisional measures was to terminate hostilities and yet that there was no intention to be unreasonable j that it meant not merely to ceas~. ~re, but all those things which constitute hoshhhes between opposing armed forces. ~ ~ow, the draft resolution as offered by the l!mted States does not purport to discuss or con- SIder the fundamental problem,. the ultimate p~oblem. It is a military situation that is dealt W.l~ here, and the resolution is only a pro- liii;al measure which, as I have said since the

The Council has heard the suggestion made by the representative of the United States, namely, that a small sub-committee of the Council should be appointed to try· to reach agreement on a number of texts that are stl1lbefore the Council. Rule 33 of our rules of procedure states: "The following motions shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting:" Among "the following motions" is: "to refer any matter t9 a committee, to the Secretary-General or to a rapporteur!'. I therefore feel bound to consult the CoUncil in regard to this suggestion. Personally, I should think it would be a good thing to do. We have a number of rather similar, to some extent ,overlapping amendments toa draft, arid it is very difficult 'to. discuss them. in a large gathering. I should 'hope a smaller sub:' committee might be able to reach agreement on them. If the Council agrees to that procedure, I shall make a proposal with regard to the composition of the sub-committee and its terms of reference. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l~anglais): I : representant des Etats-Unis a sugger.e au Cc. 'seiI de nommer un sous-comite restreint du COllseiI qui s'efforcerait d'aboutir a un accord sur un certain nol:nbre de textes dont le ConseiI est encore saisi. 'L'article 33. de. notre reglement interieur stipule: "Ont priorite dans l'ordre ou elles figurent ci-dessous, sur toutes les propositions principales et projets de resolution vlsant la question en discussion, les propositions·tendant ..." entre' autres: "a renvoyer une question a un coniite, au Secretaire general ou a un rapporteur". Je me vois donc dans l'obligation de prendre l'ayis du Conseil en ce qui concerne cette suggestion. Personnellement, je pense qu'il serait bon .de s'y conformer. Nous sommes saisis d'un certain nombre d'amendements qui se ressemblent ass~z! qui .dans une certaine mesure font double empIOl les uns avec les autres' et qu'it est diffidle de discuter dans 'Une reunion trop nombreuse. J'espere qu'un sous-comite restreint pourrait arriver a un accord. sur les textes. Sicetteprocedure~ convient au Conseil, je soumettiai une proposition relative a la composition et au mandat de ce sous-comite. At first sight this amendment improves the United States text, because it does not contain the phrase whic..h provides t.hat insignificant territorial changes may be made in Indonesia, even if the resolution is adopted. The Australian amendment does not contain this phrase. It reads as follows: "Advises the parties concerned, the Committee of Good Offices and the Consular Commission, that any consolidation, control, or acquisition of territory not occupied on 4 August 1947 would not be in conformity with its resolution of 1 August." "Fait connaitre aux parties interessees, a la Commission de bons offices et a la Commission consulaire qu'aucun controle ou acquisition de territoires non occupes a la date du 4 aout 1947, ou aucune consolidation de positions sur de tels territoires ne serait conforme a sa resolution du 1er aout." It follows that the Australian amendment indirectly legalizes Netherlands control and consolidation of the positions captured by Netherlands troop before 4 August 1947. That is the implication of the Australian amendment. Il en resulte que 1'amendement de l'Australie enterine, d'une fac,;6n indirecte, le controle exerce par les Pays-Bas ainsi que la consolidation des positions que les troupes neerlandaises avaient occupees avant le 4 aout 1947. Voila ce qui ressort de l'amendement propose par l'Australie. Nous ne pouvons accepter un tel amendement, meme si, a premiere vue, il semble ameliorer le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis, car ce n'est la qu'une apparence; en realite il ne 1'ameliore pas sensiblement. La resolution des Etats.,Unis egare l'opinion publique, car e1le fait naitre 1'impression que le Conseil de securite agit, alors qu'en realite il ne fait rien. En adoptant la resolution des Etats-Unis, nous adopterions - je l'affirme a nouveau - rune des propositions les plus deshonorantes qui aient jamais ete soumises au Conseil de securite, car dIe donne le signal a rune des parties en confHt de continuer ses actes d'agression. We cannot accept such an amendment, altho?gh at first sight it appears to improve the UnIted States draft resolution. This is only at ~rst sight, however; it does not substantially unprove the text of the United States resolution. The United States resolution misleads public opini~n, since it creates the impression that the Secu~Ity: Council is doing something, whereas in fact It IS doing nothing. If this United States resolution is adopted, I repeat that we shall hil.Ve accepted one of the most shameful proposals ~ver. submitted to the Security Council, since dI~CUSSlllg this proposal to set up a sub-com- .,e tOL:~~..unifY these amendments. We I~ gIves one of the parties "to this dispute the SIgnal to continue aggressive action. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Je voudrais simplement ajouter quelques mots ~fin d'ec1aircir la situation. Nous discutons en ce moment la proposition tendant a instituer un The.PRESIDENT: I just wish to say something t~ clarI.fy the situation. We are, at this moment, CG~ncil and be voted upon. The whole point is that the United States resolution comes before us now with a series of amendments - or rather some of themon the same lines, overlapping each other. I am sure it would be for the convenience of the Council as a whole, in the judging of this United States resolution, if the proposer and those who have put forward amendments could get together and see whether they could put before ~s one text for our decision. \Ve should have an extremely confused discussion here around the Council table if we spoke to all these documents which are now before us. For that reason I still think, and I believe the members of the Council will think, that it is wise to set up a sub-committee. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): My delegation does not see any need for a sub-committee to be formed at this stage of our discussion. I believe that we have a certain draft resolution which has been described by several and discussed by all the members here. I referred to it in my statement. We have some amendments now which, in my opinion, are not even amendments, but are simply drafting changes. We do not want to change the sense of the resolution in the slightest manner. As I stated before, that would not make the resolution acceptable to my delegation, just as it was not acceptable before the drafting changes were introduced. If there was an appropriate time for the subcommittee, it was this morning, after we had finished the general discussion. We had several resolutions with several divergent views expressed in them. It was the duty of the Council to take up all these views in an attempt to conciliate them. The United Nations is built on a principle of conciliation and not on a principle of voting through important matters by a majority vote. At this moment I do not see any reason for the creation of the sub-committee and I shall vote against it. Should the establishment of the sub-committee be passed however, I should ask the President to put my draft resolution to a vote, today if possible, because I believe that several members of the Council, speaking prev:ously, expressed the same feelings and opinions as are contained in that resolution. In any case~ generally speaking, there was nobody who denied the condusion to which the Polish delegation came, namely, that there was a defiance of the recommendation on the part of the Netherlands Government. The M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de ['an- ,qlais): Ma delegation ne voit pas pourquoi, au stade actuel des debats, il serait necessaire d'instituer un sous-comife. It me semble que nous sommes saisis.d'!ID certain projet de resolution qui a ete developpe par plusieurs membres presents et discute par tout le Conseil. Je m'y suis moimeme refere dans mon expose. Nous sommes maintenant saisis d'un certain nombre d'amendements qui, a mon avis, ne constituent pas de ~l veritables amendements, mais de simples modi- .;tl fications de forme. Nous ne desirons pas, quant .~ a nous, changer le moins du monde le sens de ,~ .•.'.',.j. la resolution. Aucun changement, comme je l'ai!~ signale auparavant, ne rendrait cette resolution '.~~ plus acceptable pour ma delegation qu'elle ne l'etait avant toute modification de redaction. S'il y a jamais eU un moment opportun pour creer un sous-comite, c'etait ce matin, apres que nous en avions termine avec la discussion generale. Nous nous trouvions en presence de piusieurs resolutions qui exprimaient divers points de vue differents. Il incombait au Conseil de securite de recueillir toutes ces manieres de voir et de s'efforcer de les concilier. Le principe qui anime l'Organisation des Nations Unies, c'est de rechercher la conciliation et non de regler purement et simplement des questions importantes par un vote majoritaire. Je ne vois pour le moment aucune raison valable d'instituer un sous-comite et je voterai contre cette proposition. Toutefois, si le Conseil vote la creation de ce sous-comite, je demanderai au President de mettre mon projet de resolution aux voix, aujourd'hui si possible, car je crois que plusieurs me~' bres du Conseil qui ont pris la parole avant mal, ont manifeste des sentiments et expose des vues identiques a ceux qu'exprime ladite resolution. En tout cas, -l'tme maniere generale, personne n'a refute: <:!J; •.lxttat;ol1 faite par la delegation de la Polog-r!:'. a sa-tTohque le Gouvernement des Pays-Has '" brav,c la recommandation du Le PRESIDENT (iraduit de I'anglais) : Je repondrai au representant de la Pologne qu'a 1'0rigine, j'avais l'intention de proposer au Conseil de composer eventuellement le sous-comite de la maniere suivante: le representant des Etats- Unis, auteur de la resolution qui nous occupe; le representant de la Pologne, en raison du fait que nous sommes egalement saisis d'un projet de resolution soumis par sa delegation; enfin les representants des trois delegations qui ont propose des amendements a la resolution des Etats-Unis, a savoir la delegation de la Chine, celle de la Belgique et ce11e de l'Australie. Mais si la delegation de la Pologne s'oppose a l'institution d'un sous-comite, je ne puis evidemment pas lui proposer d'en faire partie. J'avais egalement l'intention de proposer que le sous-comite examinat non seulement le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis, mais aussi celui de la Pologne, dont nous ne nous sommes pas encore occupes. Toutefois, si la delegation polonaise decide categoriquement qu'elle s'oppose a la constitution d'un sous-comite, je ne puis evidemment lui demander de participer a ses travaux. M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais): Le President a laisse entendre que, du fait que je m'opposais a la constitution d'un souscomite, je ne devrais pas prendre part a ses travaux. Je ne suis pas d'accord avec cette fac;on de voir. S'il en etait ainsi, les sous-comites et commissions ne seraient jamais composes que des membres d'une majorite dormee appartenant a un groupe donne. J'avais cru comprendre qu'il s'agissait d'un sous-comite qui prendrait pour base de discussion la proposition des Etats-Unis ainsi que les amendements presentes par les diverses delegations a la proposition des Etats- Unis. Je· ne connais toutefois pas le mandat du sous-comite. Mon attitude definitive a cet· egard dependra du mandat qu'on entend lui confier. Si le President propose que ma delegation fasse partie du sous-comite, et que la proposition de la Pologne soit discutee dans un esprit de conciliation en meme temps que la proposition des Etats- Unis, nous poufrions modifier no.tre attitude a son.egard. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): The President mentioned that in view of the fact that I was opposed to the formation of a sub-committee, I should not participate in that sub-committee. I cannot agree with that view. If that were so, sub-committees and committees would be formed only by members of a certain majority in a certain body. I understood that it would be a sub-committee which would have as a basis for discussion the United States proposal, as well as the amendments submitted by the various delegations to the United States proposal, However, I do not know the terins of reference of the sub-committee. My final attitude on the matter would depend upon the terms of reference proposed for the sub-committee. Should the President propose that my delegation should be included in the sub-committee and that the Polish proposal should be discussed along with the United States proposal, in a certain middleof-the-way manner, we might review our attitude towards it.

Under the rules of procedure I am bound to put to the vote, first of all, the proposal made by the representative of the United States to the effect that a sub-committee should be set up to consider his draft resolution and the amendments thereto. If that were approved, I should subsequently ask the Council whether it could agree that the terms of reference of that sub-committee should extend also to the outstanding Polish draft resolution. If that were agreed to, I should then submit to the Council the list of those whoD,1 I should propose for membership of the sub-committee. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de I'angtais): Conformement a notre reglement interieur, je we trouve dans 1'0bligation de mettre aux voix en tout premier lieu, la proposition emanant du representant des Etats-Unis, tendant a l'institution d'un sous-comite charge d'examiner le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis et les amendements y proposes. Si cette proposition est adoptee, je devtai ensuite demander au Conseil s'il serait d'accord pour confier egalement au sous-comite mandat d'examiner le projet de resolution de la Pologne en instance d'examen. Si le Conseil en decide ainsi, je lui presenterai ensuite la liste des membres avec lesquels je proposerais de composer le sous-comite. ~r. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) : I wish to raise a pomt of order. Would it not b~ l"rJ.ore suitable M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais presenter une motion de

I do not see very great difficulty myself. I put it that way because, as a matter of fact, the only proposal before t.he Council was the proposal made by the representative of the United States. I do not see why we could not agree, first of allif we do agree wIth the representativ\:: d the United States - that it is necessary to have a sub-committee to examine the United States draft resolution and the amendments thereto, and then agree, if we will, that its terms of reference should be extended. I think it is the logical and simple way of proceeding. I think the representative of Syria asked to speak. Is it on a point of order in connexion with this procedure? Mr.. ARSLAN(Syria) \ translated from French) : I should like to ask the President whether the sub-committee will be empowered to interpret the words "cease hostilities" or "cease fire". That point will deternline my decision to vote for or against the establishment of the sub-committee. For this is a situation which may recur at some future time. I do not want to go into the details of the various proposals which have been submiLted to the Council, but in my opinion the construction which has been placed upon the term "cease hostilities" is incorrect; that term means nothiIlg other than "cease fire". But "cease fire" is a military command; only tt'1e commanders-in-chief can give iliat order~ Thus, if the Council's decision was transmitted to the two commandeI-s of thetwo armies through their respective Governments, they should have given the order to cease fire. I do not think the word "hostilities" has a political connotation in this instance.

I reply to .the point just raised by the representative of Syria, I must point out that the original resolution of 1 August called upon the parties "to cease hostilities". That is the exoression used. I do not think that any formot sub-committee which we are now contemplating would. undertake any clarification of that, but I do not know what the author of the resolution thinks. I think the purpose of the sub-<;ommittee is pri!narily to try and simplify, unify, if possible, a text that the Council can subsequently consider. If, when we reach that point, the representative of Syria still feels that there is a considerable difficulty, he can no doubt r..ise the matter again. I shall put the·proposal made by the representative of the United States to the vote. Le PRESIDENT (trad'ttit de l'anglais) : Pour ma part, je neV:e1s pas de grande difficulte. J'ai presente les choses de cette maniere parce que, en fait, la seule proposition dont le Conseil fut saisi etait celle qU'avait faite le representant -les Etats-Unis. Je ne vois pas pourquoi, si nous nousrangeons cl l'avis du representant des Etats- Unis, nous ne poUrric.lls nous mettre d'accord en premier lieu sur le fait qu'il est indispensable de confier a un sous-comite mandat d'examiner le projet de resolution. des Etats-Unis et les amendements y proposes, puis decider en second lieu, si tel est notre desir, qu'il convient d'elargir ce mandat. Je pense que cette procedure est cl la fois logique-et simple. Il me semble que le representant de la Syrie a demande la parole. S'agit-il d'une motion d'ordre relative a la procedure que je viens d'indiquer? M. ARSLAN (Syrie): Je VoUClralS poser au President la question de savoir si le sous-comite aura la faculte de donner une interpretation aux termes "cesser les hostilites" ou "cesser le feu". D'apres cela, je voterai pour ou contre la creation du sous-comite. En effet, il y a la une situation qui peut se repeter dans l'avenir. Je ne' veux pas entrer dctns le detail des diverses propositions soumisef3 au Conseil, mais l'interpretation donnee a l'expression "cesser les hostiIifes" me semble erronee; pour moi, elle ne veut pas dire autre chose que cesser le feu; mais, "cessez le feu" est till commandement militaire; seuls les commandants en chef peuvent donner cet ordre; c'est:-a-direque; si la decision du Conseil a ete transmise aux deux cominl:mdants en chef des deux armees, par leur Gouvernement respectif, ils auraient dii' donner l'\ordre de cesser le feu. Je ne crois pas que le mot "hostilites" ait id un sens po]itique. ' I , Le PRESIDENT (traduit 4e l'anglais) : Je voudrais faire remarquer, pour repondre a la question soulevee cl l'instant par le representant de la Syrie, que la resolution initiale en date du ler aoiit invitait les parties "a cesser immediate- I ment les hostilites". Telle est l'expression employee. Je ne pense pas que, queUe que sait la nature du sous-comite dont nons envisageons en ce moment la creation, celui-ci entreprenne de donner des eclaircissf'tUents sur le sens de ces rnot!:1) mars je ne sals pas ce qu'en pense l'auteurde la resolution. A mon avis, le but du souscomite consiste tout d'abord a essayer de simpIifier une question complexe et d'arriver si possib!e a· un tex.:(~ unique que le Conseil puisse examIner dlSt,:t::. Si, quand nous en serons cl ce point, le rtfi··"'swtr;;;'· de la Syrie voit encore la une diffic'lh.,;: uJOsiderable, it lui sera loisible, sans aUCUlJ doute, ac poser a nouve;;tu la question. Je m'en vais maintenant mettre aux voix la proposition formulee par le representant des Etats-'!J1118. . America~ Abste1Ztions: Austra.lia, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The next point is whether the terms of reference of this Sub-Committee should be extended to include consideration of the Polish draft resolution. If any formal motion to that effect is required, I should make a motion myself. Mr. KATZ-SucrTY (Poland) : I want to ask th~ President what he means by the the words "should be extended to include", because. he . said before that the basis· of the Sub-Committee's work should be the United States draft resolution. If the. words "should be extended to include" are used, the Sub-Committee would· have two bases for discussion, nam~ly, the Polish draft resolution and the United States draft resolution.

My hope was that it might be possible to :reach some compromise between the Polish draft resolution and the United States draft resolution, either in its original form or as it is amended. Mr. (;.ROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): It would be interesting to know whether the Polish representative prefers the resolution to go to the Sub-Committee or to be voted on here in the Security Council. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (tradttit de I'anglais) : Il serait interessant de savoir si le representant de la Pologne pre£erequ'on rer: Jie la resolution· au Sous-Comite ou qu'elle fasse 1'0bjet d'un vote du Conseil de securite.

I apologize to the Polish representative. I failed to answer a question he put to me earlier which was: if it was decided to set up a sub-committee, should we proceed to vote on his draft resolution now? That would not be strictly in aQcordance with the rules of procedure. Rule 32 of our provisional rules of procedure says that: "Principal motions and draft resolutions shall have precedence in the order of their submission"; but of course, if the Council wishes to vote on the Polish draft resolution, I am in its hands. 1 have no objection to putting it to the vote, but should we' not vote first on the extension of the terms of reference of the Sub-Committ~e? Le PRESIDENT (trCuluit de·l'angldis) : Je prie le representant de la Polognede bien vouIoir m'excuser. Je n'ai pas repondu a une question qu'il m'a posee un peu plus tot et qui etaitcelIe:' ci: si' l'on decidait d'instituer un Sous-Comite, devrions-nous mettre atlx voix des maintenant ·le projet qe resolution de la delegation polonaise? Ceci ne. serait pas rigouseusement· conf6rme a notre reglement interieur. L'article 32 de notre reglement interieur provisoire stipule que "les propositions principales et les· projets de· resolution {lut priorite dans l'ordre ou lis sont presentes"; toutefois.evidemment, .si le Conseil desire se prononcer sur le projet de resolution du representant de la Pologne, je me conformerai ala decision. Je ne suis nullement oI'Pose al'idee de mettre ceprojet de resolution aux voix, mais neconviendrait-il pas que nous nous prononcions d'abord sur l'elargissement dumandat du Sous- Comite? Co~onel HODGSON (Australia) : I wish to raise a pomt of order. I think it would simplify matters, and probably avoid the vote, if the Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): Je desire presenter une motion d'ordre. Je penseque·la que~'.:ion se trouverait simpIifiee, et un voL:c probablement evite, si le repre-. sentant de la Pologne voulait bien reporrdre a la question que lui a posee. le representant de I'URSS: a savoir, prMere-t-ilque sa resolution soit renvoyee au Sous-Comite que nous venons de creer ou desire-t-il que le Conseil Sf.:.' prononce a son sujetce soir? . r~presentative of Poland would answer the questIOn put to him by the representative of the l!SSR, namely, whet4er he prefers his resolutIon to go to the Sub-Committee which has now been established or whether he desires a .vote o~ it this evening. . 0.'-.-..- S'abstienne1Lt: .f..ustralie, Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques.. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) :. Nous devons maintenant. examiner s'il convient d'elargir le mandat duSous-Comite de maniere a y faire figurer l'examen du projet de resolution de la Pologne. S'il est besoin de deposer une motion formelIe a cet effet, je le ferai moi-meme. M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais): Je tiens a savoir. que! sens le· President donne aux mots "il convient d'elargir' le mandat de maniere a y faire figurer" parce qu'il a indique precedemment que la base de travail du Sous- Comite serait le projet de resolution des Etats- Unis. Si 1'0n emploiel'expression "Il convient d'elargir le mandat de maniere ay fairefigurer", le Sous-Comite aura deux bases de discussion: le projet de resolution de la Pologne et celui des Etats-Unis. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): J'esperais que 1'0n pourraiteventuellement arriver a un compromis entre le pr::>jet de. resolution de la Po16gne et le projet de resolution des Etats- Unis.1 soit sous sa forme primitive, soittel qu'il a ete modifie. First of all, my position depends on whether the Polish resolution were to be submitted for discussion by that Sub-Committee on an equal basis with the United States resolution, in order that the Sub-Committee might find some solution satisfactory to both parties, that is, both members who have put draft resolutions berore the Security Council. Of course, I agree that the Polish resolution cannot be voted on today. The Polish delegation has always been very reluctant to ignore or avoid any rules which have been accepted, and we shall m~ke no special difficulties on the question of voting today. Our attitude towards . this matter will depend on whether t)1e Polish resolution would be treated equally as a basis for discussion with the United States resolution. I understand the usual procedure is that should the Sub-Committee, in accepting the Polish resolution as a basis for discussion, come to no conclusion satisfactory to my delegation, the Polish draft resolution will be put to the vote at the usual time. .

The Council has already.approved the original United States proposal for the creation of a sub-committee. I now propose that the terms of reference of that Sub-Com-. mittee should be extended in this way: that it should examine both the United States and Polish draft resolutions on a:p equal footing-, together wth the amendments which have already been submitted to the United States proposal. Of course, if the Polish representative is not satisfied with the results of the labour of the Sub-Committee, he has the rjght to put his draft resolution to the vote in the Council subsequently. We shall now take a vote on the extension I have just proposed. A vote was taken by show of hands. There 'were 5 votes in favo.ur, 2 against and 4 abstentions; The proposal 'was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative votes of seven. members. Votes for: Australia, Colombia, Poland, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Votes a.qainst: Beigium, United '$tates of . ~I\merica. Abstentions: Brazil, China, France, Syria.

We are left, therefore, with a. Sub-Committee to examine the United States draft resolution and the amendments which have been moved to it. . In these cir<;umstances, I suggest that :<!.s this is merely a mechanical,; uangement to try t6 Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Le Con- .seil a deja. approuve la proposition initiale des Etats-Unis tendant a la creation d'un Sous- Comite. Je propose maintenant que 1'0n elargisse le mandat dudit' Sous-Comite en le chargeant cl'examiner sur un pied d'egalite les projets de resolution des Et<;lts-Unis et de la Pologne, ainsi que les amendements a.'la proposition des Etats- Unis qui ant deja. ete deposes. Evidemment, si le representant de la Pologne n'est pas satisfait des conclusions du Sous- Comite; il est· fortde a. demander que, par la suite, son projet de resolution soit mis aux voix au Conseil. Nous allons maintenant mettre aux voix l'elargissement du mandat que je 'liens de proposer. 11 .est procede au vote a main levee. Il y a 5 voix pour, 2 contre avec 4 abstentions, N'ayant:, pas obtenu le ,[.Iote affirmatifde sept membres, \ la proposition n'est pas adoptee. V o~ent pour: Australie, Colombie, Pologne, Royaume-Uni, Union des Republiques so- 'cialistes sovietiques. Votent contre: Belgique, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. S'abstiennento' Bresil, Chine, France, Syrie. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Il noUS reste donc un Sotis-Comite charge d'examiner .le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis ainsi que les amendements dont il a fait,l'objet. Dans ces· conditions, je crois, du fait ~u'j[ s'agit sunplement ici d'un arrangement pratique Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): After the taking of the vote I should like to make a shoI:t comment.

First 'of all I must put to the vote the composition of the Sub-Committee which I have indicated. A votes was taken by show of hands, and the motion was adopted by 7 votes in favour, none against and 4 abstentions. Votes for: Australia, B.elgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, United Kingdom, United States of America. . Abstentions: France, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Le Sous- Comite se compose des representants de l'Australie, de la Belgique, de la Chine et des Etats- Unis d'Amerique. M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais): Je tenais simplement a formuler quelques observations en ce qui concerne le vote prece- , dent relatif al'elargissement du mandat du Sous- Comite, dt: maniere a ce qu'y figure egalement l'examen du projet de resolution soumis par la delegation de b Pologne. Je tiens a signaler que les resultats de ce scrutin constituent un autre exemple d'une tentative de conciliation rhise en echec par la faute d'uncertain groupe de membres du Consei!. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Je crois que le' representant des Pays-Eas demande la parole. . M. VAN KLEFFENS (Pays-Bas) (traduit de l'anglais): C'est exact, mais j'aimerais que l'on procede cet apres,-midi a autant de scrutins qu'il est possible et que 1'0n ne passe pas ensuite a l'examet:l du projet de resolution de la Pologne. Je suis tout dispose a prendre la parole. Toutcfois, je m'en remets entierement au President. Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais): 11 s'agit d'une simple formaIite. Je prierais le President de demander au representant des Etats-Unis de bien vouloir prendre la responsabiIite de convoquer ce Sous-Comite. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : ]'espere que le representant d.es Etats-Unis acceptera de s'en charger. : -~, M. AUSTIN (Et, ;Tn~s d'Amerique) (traduit de 1'anglais): Cer- __ ,-,uent. M. -PARODI (France): Je "mudrais faire une seule remarque au sujet de la declaration du representant de la Pologne.

The, Sub-Committee consists of the representatives of Australia,' Belgium, China and the United States. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): I simply wanted to comment on the vote which was taken previously, as to the broadened terms of reference of the Sub-Committee to include the Polish draft resolution. I wish to state that the result of this vote is another case where an attempt towards conciliation has been frustrated by a certain group of the members of the Council.

I understand that the representative of the Netherlands wishes to speak. Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): That is so, but I should like all the voting that can be done to be done this afternoon, and not to proceed with the Polish draft resolution subsequently. I am quite prepared to speak after that. However, I leave myself in the President's hands. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): This is just a formality. I shall request the President to, ask the representative of the United States if he would be good enough to accept the respnllsibility of convening this Sub-Committee.' The PRESIDENT: I trust the representative of the United States will accept that. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) : Yes. Mr.PARODI (France) (translated from French): I should like to say just one word in connexion with the remarks of the representative of Poland. . IIrrn 'hr,',... M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de 1'anglais) : Apres qu'on aura procede au vote, j'aimerais ajoliter un bref commentaire. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): le dois tout d'abord mettre aux voix la composition du Sous-Comite, telle que je l'ai proposee. 11 est procede au vote amain levee. Par 7 voix pour, zero contre, avec 4 abstentions, la motion est adoptee. Votent pour: AustraIie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. S'abstiennent: France, Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): In this respect, I am prepared to accept a.ny ruling made by the President.

I can give only the ruling that is correct, which is to wait until the United States draft resolution has :been voted upon. Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): I have three points which I shall endeavour to state very brieflyo In the first place, lest it should be thought that my silence hitherto with regard to the various amendments that have been presented to the United States draft resolution shows a certain indifference on my part, I want to state quite clearly that I am very deeply interested in .them and that -the only reason I do not think I should comment on them at this stage is that I do not wish to add anything that might lessen ' the chances of conciliation ar.d of arriving at a result satisfactory to everybody, ourselves included. The second point is this. I am _very sorry that the representative of the Philippines. has left, because he spoke of what he termed my "defiant attitude" or our "defiant attitude". I am getting used to pretty strong language being hurled at me, b1;lt I must raise a word of protest here. When one sees the reality of the situation, one· must realize how unjustified· such language is. I may say that under great ptovoc.ation we have acted as much as was possible in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the cease-fire order, as I think nobody. else .in such circumstances would ha.ve done. We have helped the Consular Commission wherever we .could and we have been thanked for the help we have rendered. vVe are now preparing to use the good offices of the Committee of· the Security Council-in order to reach a settlement, and I have already stated that we shall do whatever we possibly can to enable these labours to be fruitful for the common good.. These facts, I think, speak for thems~lves, and I do not want.to hear words like "defiance". The third point is this. I have now been asked to state to the Council what we think about, the Linggadjati Agreement, whether it is still considered valid by the Netherlands Government. I have no objection to asking my Government. In fact, I have ;:tlready asked my. Government wh;:lt its position is, but I do not want Le PRESIDENT (trad1tit de· l'anglais): Il est encore un point qui reste obscur pour moi. Le representant de la Pologne insiste-t-il encore, comme il I'a fait plus tot dans la journee, pour que nous votions, sur sa resolution? Comme je l'ai explique alars, cette procedure ne serait pas tout a fait conforme au reglement. Toutefois, avec la permission du Conseil, je puis mettre ce projet de resolution aux voix. M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (tradttit de l'anglais) : Je suis, a cet egard, pret it me conformer a toute decision du President. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je ne puis prendre qu'une decision conforme au regIement, c'est-a-direqu'il convient d'attendre jusqu'a ce que nous nous soyons prononces sur le projet de re~olution des Etats-Unis. M. VAN KLEFFENS (Pays-Bas) (traduit de l'anglais): I1 est trois points que je vais m'efforcerd'exposer tres brievement: En premier lieu, de crainte que l'on ne voie dans le silence que j'ai observe jusqu'ici en ce qui concerne les divers amendements proposes au projet de resolution des Etats-Unis une certaine indifference de ma part, je tiens a declarer nettement que, j'y attache--tm interet profond ; le seul motif qui me pousse a penser qu'il n'y a pas lieu de formulerd~3 observations it .leur sujet pour le moment, est que je tiens a ne rien ajouter qui puisse amoihdrir les chances de €onciliation 'et restreindre. les possibilites d'aboutir it une conclusion satistaisante pOUf' tous, nous y compris. . Voici le deuxieme point. Je suis desole de ce que le representa~t des Philippines ait quitte la seance, car il a parle de ce q~'il a qualifie "d'attitude de defi" de ma par~, ou de notre part. Je .commence a prendre l'habitude de m'entendre adresser des paroles assez peu lllesurees, mais il me faut ici eIever une protestation. Quand on considere la situation en face, on doit voir a quel, point ce la.ngage est injustifie. Je puis dire que, en depit de violentes provocations, noUS nous sommes conformes, dans toute la mesure du possible, it l'esprit et it la lettre de l'ordre de cesser le feu, comme, je pense, pei-sonne d'autre ne l'aurait fait dans les memes conditions. Nous avons prete notre concours a la Commission consulaire totites les fois que neus l'avons pu, et l'on nous a remercies de l'aide que nous lui avons apportee. Nous nous preparons ma~ntenant it recourir aux bons offices de la Commission du Conseil de securite afin d'arriver it un regIement et j'ai deja signale que nous ferions tout ce qui est en notre pouvoir pour permettre acesefforts (le r'ot-ter leurs fruits dans l'interet de tous. Cc.-;fa.its, nous semble-t-il, se justifient d'eux-m:;'(,CS,:t It, ne veux pas entendre prononcer (kc' mut~,. tels que celui de "defi". Enfin, V{.lki l..~ troisiem~ point. On'vient deme demander de faire connaitre au Conseil nOS vues sur l'Accord de Linggadjati; et si le Gou~ vernement des Pays-Bas le considere comme encore en vigueur. Je ne vois aucune objection a poser cette question a mon Gouvernement. E!1' fait, j'ai deja.- demande a celui-ci -queUe etal~ Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): En ce qui concerne le premier point souleve par le representant des Pays-Bas, je dois dire qu'il aura loisir de formuler ses observations sur toutes les conclusions que pourra soumettre le Sous- Comite. En ce qui concerne le deuxieme point, il est exact,et je le deplore, que nous nous habituons ici a un vocabulaire et a un langage que l'on n'aurait pas entendus il y a vingt ou vingt-cinq ans. Je crois que c'est la une tendance facheuse et je souhaiterais qu'on puty mettre un frein. On pourrait penser que c'est la tache du President et qu'il est fautif s'il manque a le faire, mais il est parfois tres difficile, lorsqu'on preside une reunion internationale, d'interrompre l'orateur et de le rappeler a 1'0rdre. En particulier, il me semble que je n'ai guere rencontre de texte qui ne se trouverait ameliore par la suppression de toutes les epithetes qui n'ajoutent pas beaucoup au sens. En ce qui concerne le troisieme point souIeve par le representant des Pays-Bas, j'espere que le representant de la Republique d'Indonesie aura l'amabilite d'agir comme on l'a suggere, c'esta-dire d'obtenir de son Gouvernement une declaration analogue a celle que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas a ete invite a fouinir. In regard to the second point, it is true that we are unfortunately becoming accustomed to language :md phrases here that were not heard twenty or twenty-five years ago. I am ~frai~ that has become a tendency, and I WIsh it could be checked. It may be thought that it is the fault of the President for not checking it, but is is sometim{'..s very difficult, when presiding over an international gathering, to' interrupt and to keep order. In particular, I think that I have hardly ever seen a text that would not be improved by the removal of all adjectives that do not add very much to the sense. With regard to the third point of the representative of the Netherlands, I hope that the representative of the Republic of Indonesia will be good enough to do as was suggested and obtain a statement from his Government similar to that asked from the Netherlands Government. M. PALAR (Republique d'Indonesie) (traduit de l'ang1ais): Je ne puis donner qu'une reponse: du fait de la denonciation par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas de l'Accord de Linggadjati,mon Got1vernement est maintenant libre de juger s'il est ou non lie par cet Accord. Mr. PALAR (Republic of Indonesia): I have only one thing to say and that is this, that by the Netherlands Government's abrogation of the Linggadjati Agreement my Government is now free to be bound or not to be bound by that Agreement.

I thought it was not established that the Netherlands Government had abrogated the Agreement, and that the point of the request made to the representative of the Netherlands, who has undertaken to put that request to his Government, was to ascertain whether the Netherlands Government had or had not abrogated the Agreement. Could not the representative of the ReJ:>1tblic of Indonesia ask his Government whether it still adhered to the Agreement, on the understanding, of course, that the other party adhered to it also? Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais) : Je pensais qu'il n'etait pas prouve que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas avait denonce cet Accord, et que l'objet de !'invitation adressee au representant des Pays-Bas, qui s'est engage a transmettre cette invitation a son Gouvernement, etait de savoir si oui ou non le Gouvernement des Pays- Bas avait denonce ledit Accord. Le representant de la Republique d'Indonesie ne pourrait-il pas demander a son Gouvernement si celui-ci s'en tient toujours aux dispositions de l'Accord, dans l'hypothese evidemment ou l'autre partie observerait toujours, de son cote, ces memes dispositions? . Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): In that ase, I should suggest that the enquiry of the representative of the Netherlands should also cover the question as to whether the Netherlands Government had abrogated the Agreement or M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (iraduit de l'anglais): Dans ce cas, je me permets de suggerer que le representant des Pays-Bas s'inquiete aussi de savoir si le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas a ou non denance cet Accord, car, si j'ai bien compris la question precedente. il s'agissait de savoir si le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas etait toujours lie par l'Accord. S'il est lie par un accorJ. qui a ete denonce, cet accord n'a pasune tres grande force d'obligation. ~ot, b:cause if I understood the previous queshon, It was whether the Netherlands Government is bound by the Agreement or not. If it is bound by the abrogated Agreement, that Agreement does not have much force. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais): Te ne connais pas l'opinion du representant des 'Pays- Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): I asked the question in what I hope was in intelligent way. In.that sense then, the answer will, I trust, disclose whether my Government does or does not consider itself still bound by the Linggadja.ti Agreement. I have no more to say 1:l'lan that. Mr.PALAR (Republic of Indonesia): I think that the q\lestion is this : has the Netherland::; Government abrogated the Linggadjati Agreement or has it not?

I cannot see any great difference'myself. If the Netherlands Government consider' itself bound by the Agreement, presumably it has not abrogated the Agreement. I think we must wait to see what the reply of the Netherlands Government is. Meanwhile, I hope that the representative of the Republic of Indonesia will try to get some parallel declaration· fmm his· Government. I think· there is nothing more we can do on this subject tonight. I suggest that the Council shon!d. meet here again tomorrow at 11 a.m. The intention of the Sub-Committee is to meet earlier than that. I hope that the Sub-Committee will have finished its labours in time to' report· to this Council at 11 a.m. Incidentally, this procedure is entirely out of order; since I forgot to ask the next President of, the Security Council whether he agreed to this next meeting or not. Mt. AUSTIN (United States of America) : Yes, I agree.

As there is no objection, the . Council will 'meet again tomorrow, 1 November, at 11 a.m. M. VAN KLEFFENS (Pays-Bas) (traduit de l'an" glais) : J'ai pose la question sous une forme que j'espere intelligente. En ce sens, la reponse, je crois, indiquera ~sir mon Gouvernement se consi- dere ou non encore lie par l'Accord de Ling- gadjati. Je n'ai rien a ajouter a ceci. M. PALAR (Republique d'Indonesie) (traduit. de l'anglais): Je pense que la question est la suivante: le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas a-toil ou non denonce l'Accord de Linggadjati? Le PRESIDENT (trad1.tit de l'anglais): Jene vois pas grande difference moi-meme entre les deux questions. Si le GO~1Vernement des Pays-Bas se considere lie par l'Accord, il est a presumer· qu'il ne l'a pas denonce. Je crois que nous devons attendre la reponse du Gouvernement des Pays- Bas. Entre temps, j'espere que le representant de la Republique d'Indonesie s'efforcera d'obte- nil' de son Gouvernement une declaration paral- We. Je pense que nous ne pouvons pas faire plus a cet egard ce soil'. Je suggere que le Conseil se reunisse de nouveau id demain a 11 heures. Le Sous-Comite a l'intention de se reunir plus tot. J'espere qu'il aura fini ses travaux en temps. utile pour en faire rapport au Conseil a 11 heu- res. Soit dit en passant, cette procedure est tout a fait anormale, etant donne que j'ai oublie de demander au prochain President du Conseil de securite s'il est d'accord pour cette prochaine seance. M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Entieremelit. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Puisque personnen'y voit d'objection, le Conseil se reunira a nouveau demain ler novembre a 11 lleures. La seance est levee a18 h. 40. FRANCE Editions A. Pedone 13. rue Soufflot PARIS. Ve GREECE-GRECE "Eleftheroudakis" Librairie internationale Place de la Constitution ATHENES GUATEMALA Jose Gouhaud Gouhaud &Cia. Ltda. Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. GUATEMALA. HAITI Max Bouchereau Lihrairie "A laCaravelle" BOlte postale 11l·B PORT-AU·PRINCE ICELAND-!SLANDE BokaveX'zlun Sigfusar Eymundwnnar Austurstreti 18 REYKJAVIK INDIA-INDE Oxford 'Book & Stationery Company Scindia House NEW DELHI IRAN Bongahe Piaderow 731 Shah Avenue -TEHERAN IRAQ-IRAK Mackenzie & Mackenzie The< Bookshop BAGHDAD LEBANON-LIBAN Librairie universelle BEYROUTH LUXEMBOURG Lihrairie J. Schummer Place Guillaume LUXEMr.OURG DENMARK--DAN~R~ Einar Munksguard N9lrregade 6 Kj2lBENHAVN DOMINiCAN REPUBLIC- REPUBLlQUE DOMINICAINE Libreria Dominicana Calle Mercedes No. 49 Apartado 656 CIUDAD TRUJILLO ECUADOR--EQUATEUR Iviuiioz Hermanos y Cia. Nueve de Octuhre 703 Casilla 10-24 GUAYAQUIL NETHERLAND5-PAYS·BAS N. V. Martinus Nijhoff Lange Voorhout 9 'S·GRAVENHAGE NEW ZEALAND- NOUVELLE-ZELANDE Gordon & Gotch, Ltd. Waring Taylor Street WELLINGTON United Nations Association of New Zealand P. O. 1011, G.P.O. WELLINGTON NICARAGUA Ramiro Ramirez V. Agencia de Puhlicaciones MANAGUA. D. N. EGYPT~GYP'!'E Librairie "La Renaissance d'E~ypte" 9 Sh. Adly Pasha CAIRO .ETHIOPIA-ETHIOPIE Agence ethiopienne de puhlicite P.O.Box8 ADDIS·.AnEBA NORWAY:-NORVEGE Johan Grundt '.l'anum Forlag Kr. Augustgt. 7A OSLO PHILIPPINES D. P. Pe.'rez Co. --132 Riverside SAN JUAN. RIZAL POLAND-POLOGNE Spotdzielna Wydawnicza "Czytelnik" 38 Poznanska WARSZAWA SWEDEN-SUEDE A.·B. C. E. FritZes Kungl. Hofhokhandel Fredsgatan 2 STOCKHOLM SWITZERLAND-SUISSE Librairie Payot S. A. LAUSANNE. GENEvE, VEVJ::Y. MONTREUX, NEUCHATEL, BERNE. BASEL Hans Raunhardt Kirchgasse 17 ZID 'CH I SYRIA~SYRIS Librairie universelle DAMAS TlJllKEY.-:r'URQUIE Lihrairie Hachette 469. Istiklal Caddesi BEYOGLU'!sTANBUL UN1PN. OF SOUTH AFRICA- UNION· SUD·AFRICAINE Central News Agency Commissioner & Rissik Sts. . JOHANNESBURG and at CAPETO'WN and DURBAN UNITED KINGDOM- ROYAUME·UNI H.l\f. Statione!'Y Office P. O. Box 569 LONDON. S.E. 1 and at H.M.S.O. Shops in LONDON, EDINBURGH, MANCHEST CARDIFF, BELFAST. BmMINGHAM and BRISTOL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA- ETATS·UNIS D'AMERIQUE International Documents Service Columbia University Press· 2960 Broadway NEW YORK 27. N. Y. URUGUAY Oficina de Representaci6n de Editoriales Av. 18 de Julio 1333 Esc. I MONTEVIDEO VE~~EZUELA Escritoria Perez Machado Conde a Piiiango 11 CARACAS YUGOSLAVIA-YOUGOSLAVIE . Drzavno Preduzece ' Jugoslovenska Knjiga Moskovska Ul. 36 BEOGRAD t4