S/PV.218 Security Council

The parliamentary situation does not require a ruling. There is nc-thing in the rules, I am advised, relating to this subject. The ,practice, as I understand it to be, is to have a written communication to the Security Council by the representative concerned, cO:lsenting to or requesting the deletion of the ,Yord from' the record. Therefore, the matter will have to stand on the statement of the representative of the Phi}ippines. s4Ppre~sion dUI m~t au proces-,:erbal, ou pat .laqueUe 11 consent a sa suppresslon. La'questlon en restera done a la declaration du representant des Philippines. Le point suivant a l'ordre du jour est ,l'examen du texte de resolution sur' la question indonesienne presentepar le SC?us-Comite nomme par le Conseilde securite au cours de sa deux cent dixseptieme seance; en date du 31 octobre 1947. Je vais vaus faire donner lecture de ce texte, donne , audocument S/594, afin qu~ nous ayons l'ensemble du projet present aI'esptit. Puis-je demander au representant de l'Australie de donner lecture de ce texte au Cbnseil? The next item of business is the presentation of the text of the resolution on the· Indonesian question submitted by the Sub-Committee appointed by the Security Council at its two hundred and seven- , teenth meeting, 31 October 1947. The text is' given in document S/594. I shall have it read so that we may have the entire draft in 'our minds. Will the represen\ative of Australia please read the text to the Council? Colonel HODGSON (Australia) : The text reads: Le colonel HODGSON (Australie) (traduit (le l'anglais) : Ce tex,te est le suivant: • "Le Conseil de securite, UThe Security Council, • uHazJing received and taken note of the report pf the Consular Commission, dated 14 October 1947, indicating that the C~:lUncil's resolution of :<4yant ete saisiet ayant pris acte duo rapport de la Commission consulaire en date du 14 octobre 1947, indiquant que la resolutiondu Conseil "Requests the Committee of Good Offices to assist the parties in reaching agreement on an arrangement which will ensure the observance of the cease-fire resolution; ((Requests the Consular Commission, together with its .military assistants, to make its services available to the Committee of Good Offices; '((Advises the parties concerned, the Committee of Good Offices and the Consular Commission that its'resolution of 1 August should be interpreted as 111eaning that the use of the armed forces of either party by hostile action to extend its control over territory not occupied by it on 4 August 1947 is inconsistent with the Council's resolution 'of 1 August'i947; and . "Invites the parties, should it appear th~t some, withdrawals of armed forces be necessary, to conclude between them as soon as possible the agreements referred to in its resolution of 25 Augu~t 1947."

I am authorized to announce tpat all the pro.posals before the Cotmcil, made by the delegations of Chinal, Belgium1., Australia2 and the United States3 are withdrawn in consideration of this text reported by the Sub-Coulmittee. All the amendments which have been proposed are ~merged in the text. of the re,solution now before us. Mr. TSIANG (China) : I have asked' permission to speak on this occasion in order to trace and bring to light the general course of the attitude which the Security Council has adopted, and of which the present resolution is a logical development. . Members of the Council will recall that when this malter was put on the agenda of the Council, the first question. which aroused considerable debate ,was the question of the competence of the Council. Whatever my present opinion. on that· question might be-and I would say that I personally consider that the Council has the competence to deal with the question-I. realized that those who held the contrary opinioil had consider- .able grounds for so doing. Therefore, at the very. beginning of the consideration .of this question, my delegation, together with the Australian delegation aJild several other delegations, tried to steer a CQurse.which would be free of technical questions. . . If we had from the very beginning adopted the other course, the course of strong action and strong Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'a~~glais): I1 m'est permis' d'annoncer que. toutes les propositions deposees au Conseil pay les representants de la Chine\ de la Belgique\ de l'Australie2 et des Etats-Unis d'Amerique3 sont retir.ees, etant donne le texte presente par le Sous-Comite. Tous les amendements, qui ont eteproposes 80nt fondus dans le textJ de la resolution dont nous sommes desormais saisis. M. TSIANG (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais) : rai, demande it prendre,!a parc;>le cl.'ce sujet, afin d'etablir et de mettre en lumiere l'evolution de l'attitucie adoptee par le Conseil de securite, dont la presente resolution est un aboutissement logique. Les membres du Conseil se souviendront que, lorsque cette affaire est venue a l'ordre du jour du Conseil, la premi~re question qui ait fait l'objet de debats importants a He· celle' de la competence du Conseil. Quelle que puisse ·etre mon opinion actuelle sur la question-et je dais dire que, personnellement, je considere que le Conseil est C0111- petent a cet egard-je me rendais alors" compte queceux qui exprimaient une opinion opposee avaient des raisons serieuses de le faire. C'est pourquoi, des le d~but de l'examen de cette questipn, ma delegation, avec celle de l'Australie et plusieurs autres, a essaye de se tenir en-dehors de toute complication juridique. Si, des le debut, nous avions adopte une autre methode-eelle des mesures energiques et des ----- 1 Voir les Proces-7Jl!rbau; officiels dll Conseil de ,recurite, Deuxieme Annee, No 102, 216eme seance. ". I am glad to note in the report of the C')nsular Commission that the Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia stated to the Consular 'Commission that Indo':iesians have no hatred of the Dutch as a people." They dislike what is caJ.led \ "Dutch colonialism". They recognize, especially in the economic field, that the future co-operation of the Dutch would be valuable and welcome. • That attitude, it seems to me, gives us added reason for believing that our course of concilia':' tion is the right course. Therefore, I would strongly plead with this Council that tht: resolution now before us is a logical development of the course we adopted from the very beginning, and that this resolutiol;l suits the peculiar circumstances that this problem presents. This resolution is the best .line of action to' serve both the cause of peace and the cause of Indonesian independence. Mr. PILLAI (India)": My Government is at all times anxious to welcome any step the Security Council may take, any resolution .the Security Council may adopt, which holds out a reasonable promise of hastening a just and peaceful settlement of this much debated question. M. PILLAI (lnde) (traduit de l'anglais) : Mon Gouvernement a toujours le souci d'accueillir favorablement toute mesure prise par le Conseil de securite, toute resolution qu'il pourrait adopter et qui pourrait offrir une promesse raisonnable de hater un reglement juste et pacifique de cette'question si debattue. A mon avis, la resolution actuelle, notamment son demier paragraphe, affre une teUe promesse, et je l'accueille don<; favorablement. Testime cependant devoir dire egalement qu'a certain!) egards elIe reste en de~a des exigences de la situation. La resolution laisse completement de cote certains faeteurs de la situation qui nOllS semblent bien etablis. Premierement, elle laisse de cote le . I feel that the present resolution, especially its last paragraph, offers such a promise, and r therefore accord it a hearty welcome. But, I feel it my duty also to say that in some respects it falls short of the requirements of the sitmrtion. .. The resolution ignores completely those factors U1 the situation which we consider to be firmly established. First, it ignores the fact that the ma- The present resolution does not express any regret,' or use any term even faintly indiCative of diti3.pproval, in regard to the fact that the ceasefire order has not been faithfully implemented. For the Security Council, three months after its ceasefire order, not totake any action 6ther than to "take note" of the fact that the order has been disregarded. seems a display of weakness which will be universally interpreted as tenderness to:/ wards the Netherlands. .. . , With regard to the operative part of the resolution, it should be observed that what is being requested is that the Committee of Good Offices should assist the parties in reaching agreement on an arrangement which wiIf ensure the observance of the cease-fire resolution. This raises some ques-" tions for which no answer is indicated: For example, what form is this assistance tc take? What if one of·the parties accepts assistance with the same reservations with which it has accepted the cease-fire order? What is to happen if the terms of the assistance offered are again, as maintained by the Consular Commissi!{n in regard to the ceasefire order, subjected to "<lifferent interpretations" ? The resolution would seem in practice to legitimize the territorial gains made by theNetherlands between 21 July and 4 August, as a result of their superior 1l1ilitary strength. . En, ce qui concerne ledispositif de la resolution, it convient d'observer que ce qu'on demande, c'est que la Commission de bons office~ aide les patties a se mettre d'accord sur un arrangement qui assurerait I'e.xecution de la resolution relative a l'ordre de cesser le feu. Cela pose un certain nombre de questions auxqJell~s il n'est pas donne de reponse. Par exemple, queUe forme prendra cette aide? Ques.e passera-t,..il si l'une des parties 'accepte cette aide en "faisant les memes reserves que lorsqu'elle a accepte I'ordre de cesser le feu? QU'arrivera-t-il si les termes de l'aide offerte font a nouveau I'objet, comme l'a expose la Commission consulaire en ce qui concerne l'ordre de ces-: ser le feu, d' "interpretations divergentes"? It semble que la resolution aurait pratiquement corr-me. effet de· tegi6mer les gains de territoire obtenus par les Pays-Bas entre le ~1 juillet et le 4 aotit par suite de la superiorite de leurs forces militaires. I , ,. . Cette situation, non seulement n'est pas de na- .ture 3. inspit:er confiance aux Indonesiens, mais, c~mme on l'a soulignea plusieurs reprises, elle aurait aussi pour effet de mettre la partie la.pIu's . faible, au point de vue militaire, dans une position d'inegalite, dans une position de£avorable, en ce qui concerne les discussions politiques qui doivent suivre. ren arrive ainsi ,3. la recommandation contenue dans l'avant-dernie'r paragraphe de la resolution. QueUe peitt etre.~n pratique la force d'un t~nne tel que '~fait connaitre", tenrte parlequel debute ce paragraphe? QueUe peut etre en pratique ~ force d'un terme tel que "fait connaitre" quand· it s'agit d'une situation ou meme une invitation Not only is this situation not calculated to inspire confidence on the Indonesian side, but, a1; has been repeatedly pointed out, it has also the effect of placing the weaker party, from the military point bf view, on an unequal and unfavourable ,footing in relation to the. political discussions that are to follow. .This brings me to the recommendation contained in the penultimate par,agraph of the resolution. What can be the effective force of such a word as "advises", the word wi 1th which that paragraph. opens? What can be the effective force of a word such as "advises" in a situation where even a definite request to cease hostilities has been.flouted for. The final paragraph gives all answer to bis question. It says: "Invite the parties, should it. appear that some withdrawals of armed forces be necessary, to cenclnde between them as soon as possiole the agreements refer~ed to in its resolution of 25 August 1947." I must say that this, undoubtedly, is the most promising part of the resolution. Nevertheless, I am constrained to remark that the resolution .as a whole shows an anxiety to avoid facing the unpleasant fact that ,the primary responsibility for non-compliance with the ceasefire resolution rests upon the invaders. Let us remember that nothing should be done to strengthen the suspicion' that the United Nations acts l~ss firmly and decishre!y in relation to the transgressions of a colonial power than in other matters. • For these reasons I would strongly urge the Council not to content itself with just passing this resolution, but to see to it that the final paragraph of the resolution is implemented' much more effectively than was the case with the ceasefire order, and to assure itself that the withdrawal of troops is faithfully carried out. Before I conclude, I hope the .President wil~ permit me to say a word about Mr. van Kleffens kind reference to India in his statement at the Council's two hundred and seventeenth meeting. Alh,tsions to internal conditions in India or to any other country would, I should have thought, be entirely out of place and unwarranted in a discussion on the Indonesian situation. I should, however, express my gratification that Mr. van Kleffens sees hope for the future of my country. No doubt he willpepnit me to assure him that I have never wavered in" my belief that the Netherlands, small as it may be territori~lly and in some other regp<eo:ts as compared to India, has an equally notable contribution to make to the peace and well-being of mankind. At·the same time, I have every confidence that the Netherlands Government will, in time, recognize that strength and prosperity cannot be built enduringly on the backs of a rebellious colonial population. My only regret is that Mr. van Kleffens should have sought to divert the attention of the Council from the iniquity. 'Jf the war in Indonesia by irrelevant and ill-infomled references fo my country or any other country. ' " : Mr. GRtlM:YKO (Union of Soviet S~ialist Re- M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques' sodapublics) (translated from RussuL1t) : We have belistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe) : Nous avons fore us the resolution drawn up by the Sub-Comdevant nous la resolution eIaboree par le Sousmittee which was established y~sterday. It comcomite que nous avions forme hier. Ce texte est Neanmoins: je suis contraint de remarquer que la resolution dans son ensemble reveIe u•.!. vif sauci de chercher a ignorer le fait q.esagreable que la rcsponsabilite premiere pour la non execution de l'ordre de cesser le feu pese sur les envahisseurs. Rappelons-nous que nous ne devons rien faire q1;1i soit de nature a confirmer l'impression que I'Qr- ~nisation des Nations Unies monb:e moi11S de fermete ef de decision que dans d'aut!'e~ questions lorsqu'il s'agit des infractions commises par une puissance coloniale. . Pour ce,. raisons, je p~ie instarnment le Conseil de ne pas se contenter de voter cette resolution, mais de veiUer a ce que le dernier paragraphe de la' resolution soit applique d'une mahiere beaucoup plus effective que ne l'a ete l'ordre de cesser le feu, et de veiUer a ce que l'ordre de retrait des troupes soit fidelement observe. Avant de terminer, j'espere que le President me permettra de dire quelques mots au sujet de l'aimable allusion a l'Inde faite par M. van Kleffens au cours de son expose a la deux cent dixseptieme seance du Conseil. J'au:r;ais cru que des allusions it la situation interieure de nnde ou de tout autre pays fussent absolument deplace~s et injustifiees dans une discussion r~lative a la SItuation en Indonesie. Je suis neanmoins. reconnaissant a M. van Kleffens d'avoir confiance dans l'avenir demon pays. Ii me permettra certaine.. ment de lui assurer que je n'ai jamais cesse de croire que'les Pays-Bas, si petits, qu'ils soient au point de vue territorial et acertainsautres egards en comparaison. de l'Inde, peuvent apporter une contribution tout aussi consid~rable a la paix et au i:;ieD-etre de l'humanite. De meme, j'espere fermement que ie Gouvernement des .Pays-Bas reconnaitra en temps voulu qu'on ne peut fonder de prosperite durable sur l'echine d'une population coloniale en revolte. Je regrette seulement que M. van Kleffens ait essaye de d~tourner l'attention du Conseil du caractere injuste ,~e la guerre d'Indonesie par des allusions deplacees et mal fOJ.1dees a mon pays ou a tout autre pays. ; The resolution submitted by the Sub-Committee has the same basic defects as were contained in the United States resolution' and in the amendments to it. I must admit it is true that there is some improvement on the original United States te.,'{t, in that the first paragraph of that text, at least in the form in which h figured in the United States resolution, is no longer there. The United States resolution clearly provided that only considerable changes in the areas occupied by the Netherlands troops were· forbidden. This, a~ I pointed out at the two hundred and seventeenth meeting, amounted to a signal to the Netherlands troops that they could continue military operations against the Indonesians. This paragraph does not appear in the Sub-Committee's resolutio~. In that respect it is an improvement, but the tmprovement is only in that part of the resolution. Otherwise the resolution has the same defects as the United States draft which was submitted 'earlier. The resolution does not provide for the withdrawal of troops to the positions which they occupied before ~the outbreak of military operations. Yet that is the main point. The Security Council has ·already adopted two resolutions regarding the cessation of military operations1 ; neither of these resolutions has been implemented. vVhy? Because the Netherlands' troops have not been withdrawn to theirpreviously held positions and have continued military operations. That is why, in the first place, I consider this draft to be entirely unsatisfactory, weak and inadequate. Seco~<!ly, the penultima~e paragraph of the Sub-Commtttee's draft contams the words: "advises the parties concerned ...", which show that an extension of control over the territories that were not occupied on 4 August is incompatible with the resolui:ion of the Security Council. This means that territori~s which had been seized by the Netherlands troops prior to 4 August may be considered to be under the legitimate control of the Netherlands authorities. In other words, this legalizes in fact the centrol . exercised by the Netherlands auth~riti~5 and. Netherlands High Command over terrItOries that were occupied by Netherlands troops on .4 August 1947. Of course, it may. be said that there is no direct mention of tl1is in the paragraph in question. It is true that the paragraph does not say so explicitly, but that is how it may be interpreted. This is another serious defect of the Sub-Committee's resolution. For: this reason I cannot agree with the resolution and cannqt support it. The resolution leaves the decision on the question regarding a possible withdrawal of troops to the parties concerned, who" it is alleged, can reach an agreement on the subject. But we know that the Netherlands Government will not even hear of proposals concerning the withdrawal of troops. The Security Council has heard repeated official statements to that effect. Therefore this sentence is meaningless, it merely deludes whoever reads this resolution, because the impression is created that agreement is possible between the Netherlands and Indonesian Governments; hut since the Netherlands Government ignores any advice of this nature and rejects all proposals concerning the withdrawal of troops, this paragraph is a w~ll­ sounding but quite meaningless sentence that Imposes no obligation on anyone. e~t possible.entre les Gouvernements neerlandals et indonesien. Or, comme le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas ne tient aucun compte des conseils de ce genre et comme il rejette toute proposition relative au retrait des troupes, ce panigraphe n'est qu'une phrase sonore mais absolument vide de sens, une phrase.qui n'oblige personne a rien. Que reste-t-il done de cette resolution? Ce, te:xte, meme s'il etait adopte par le C;onseil de securite, ne permettrait d'esperer aucun changement radical de la situation. Par consequent, je ne puis soutenir ladite resolution. . Par contre, le representant de la Pologne nous a soumis une resolution1qui donne, a mon .avis, , une appreciation correcte et precise de l~ situation en Indonesie et qui· contient une di!'positiot! permettant de redresser la situation dans ce pays. Etant donne que la proposition de l'URSS relative au retrait des troupes des deux,. parties sur les positions qu'elles occupaient avant l'ouverture des hostilites n'a malheureusement reuni que quatre voix et, par consequent, n'a pas ete adoptee, j'estime pouvoir soutenir sans reserves la resolution de la Pologne. En effet, cette resolution contient-je le repete--une disposition qui permet de redresser la situation en Indonesie, de mettre fin aux hostilites qui se. deroulent dans ce What then remains of this resolution? The resolution provides no grounds for thinking. that the situation might radically change if the Security Council should adopt it. For that reason I am unable to support such a resolution. On the other hand, we have the Polish resolution1 which, in my opinion, gives a correct and accurate evaluation of the situation in Indonesia and con~ tains provisions for the rectification of the situation existing in that country. In view of the fact that the USSR proposal regarding the withdrawal of troops by both sides to the positiGlns they occupied previous to the outbreak of hostilities was, I regret to say, rejected, as it obtained only four votes, I consider it possible to give my full support to the Polish resolution. It contains, I repeat, provisions that make it possible to rectify the situation that has arisen in Indonesia, to put a stop to military operations there and to create conditions favourable to a satisfactory solution of Of ,course this resolution is, not nearly all· my delegation desires: Mr. Gromyko often quotes Russian proverbs in this Council, andI can quote a proverb this morning: "half, a loaf is better than none." In regard to this question, we cannot wash our hands of the whole thing a..t1d say we shall do nothing: That is particularly true in the light of the well-known views held by some members of the Security Council on this question and their opposition to-any positive action by the Sect'rity Council at all. , I suggest that if this resolution is adoptedand we trust it will be-copies of it should be sent by telegram to all the parties concerned; that is, the two parties to the dispute, the' Chairman of the Committee of Good Offices, and also to Mr. Foote, the chairman of the Consular Commission. Not'-only that, but we think, if it has not already been done, that as the meetings are held and the verbatim reports are circulated, the parties concerned should also rec~ive copies of the verbatim reports of the Security Council, starting with the two hundred and seventh meeting, held on 3 October, when.this question was reintroduced on the occasion of the consideration -of the interim report of the Consular C0[1mission.1 I think 'that in this communication the attention of the Consular Commission, especially, should be invited to the statement ot the President at our two hundred and seventeenth meeting about the continuing role of that consular body to observe and report. In this respect, I notic~ that this resolution has no' provision whereby we, as' a body, are to have a report submitted to us on the measures taken to give effect to this I particular resolution, and how it,is implemented. My delegation thinks it is essential that we should receive reports on the progress and development of this particular question from the Consular Commission and, if the intention is clearly tha,t the Committee of Good Offices shall f~rons rien du tout. Ceci' est particulierement vrai si 1'0n tient compte des opinions averees de que1- , ques membres du Conseil de securite a ce sujet et de leur opposition a toute action positive du Cons,eil de securite.' Je propose, sUa resolution est adoptee-et nous 'esperons qu'elle le sera-d'en envoyer copie par telegramme a'toutes les parties interessees, c'esta-dire aux deux parties au differend, au President .de la Commission de bons offices et egalement a M. Foote, President de la Commission consl.tlaire. De plus nous estimons que, si cela n'a pas deja ete fait, au fur et a mesure des seances et de la distribution des compte;' .rendus stenographiques, le;' parties interessees doivent aussi recevoir des copies des comptes rendus stenographiques des seances 'du Conseil de securite, en commen«sant par la deux-cent-septieme seance du '3 octobre, date a laquelle cette question a ete reprise a l'occasion de l'examen du rapport proviso!.re de la Commission consulaite1• Je crois que dans cette communication, it conviendrait notamment d'attirer l'attention dela Commission consulaire sur la declaration faite hier, au cours Qe la deux cent dixseptieme seance; par notre, President sur le role qui' est toujours celui de la Commission consulaire, a savoir decontinuer a observer les faits et a nous faire rapport. A 'cet egard, ,je remarque que cette resolution ne contient pas de dispositions prevoyant que le Conseil, en tant que tel, se fer~ presenter un rapport sur les mesures prises pour appliquer cette resolution, et s1.\r la maniere dont elle est appliquee. Ma delegation estime indispensable que nous recevions, de la Commission consulaire, et certainement de la Commission de bons offices-si 1'0n a clairement l'intention de confier a cette,derniere une autorite souveraine-des rapports sur 1 Voir les Proces-verball% officiebs dll CO?l.reil de sew-. J rife, peuxieme Annee, No 91.' .-... Ce matin on a pose des questions au sujet du caractere vague des termes employes dans la resolution, et la difficulte peut resider dans 1'interpretation. Je crois que lious devons nous reposer, dans une large mesure, sur le bon sens de la Com": mission de bons offices et j'estime qu'il est tres heureux pour nous que cette Commission comprenne des hommes aussi eminents que ceux· designes par le pays interesses. Nous esperons que la resolution dont nous sommes saisis, si elle est adoptee, aura des consequences favorables et durables.

There being no objection, the Secltrity Council orders the transmission of copies of the resolution and of the verbatim records of the Security Council relating to .this matter, as described by the representative of Australia. . Le PRESIDENT (trad/l~it de l'cmglais) : Personne nepresentant d'objection,le Conseit de securite ordonne que des copies de la resolution, ainsi que des copies des comptes rencIus. stenographiques des seances du Conseil de securite consacrees a cette question, soit transmises ainsi que vient de l'exposer le representant de l'Australie. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): Before the resolution is transmitted it should be adopted. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit de l'anglais): Avant de transmettre la resolution, it {aut l'adopter.

.r accept the correction of the USSR r.epresentative .and shall amend the Council's order by the addition of the words "if adopted": There is just one other point, and. that is the subject of continuing reports. A ruling was made at the two hundred and seventeenth meeting by the member who was then occupying this Chair that the resolution. of 25 August establishing the Consular Commission1 requires reports on the situation followingthe resolution of the Council of I August 1947, and that such reports cover the observance of the cease-fire order and the conditions prevailing in areas under military occupation, or from which armed forces now in occupation may be withdrawn by agreement between the parties. Although the present occupant of the ChaIr is not makingan additional ruling, he holds that since that parliamentary ruling was not challenged, it stands. . Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): J'accepte la mise au point du representant de l'URSS et je vais modifier l'ordre du Conseil en ajoutant les mots: "si elIe est adoptee". . .II ne reste qu'un seul point a examiner: c'est celui des rapports continus. Lors de la deux.cent dix-septieme seance, le representant .qui 'occupait alors le fauteuil presidentieI a pris une decision en vertu de laquelle la resolution du 2S aoftt creant la Commission consulaire1 exige, pour ~onner suite a la resolution du Conseil du ler aoftt 1947, des rapports sur 1'execution de l'ordre de cesser le feu et sur la situation qui regne dans lesregions occupees militairement ou dans les regions que pourraient evacuer, par accord entre 'les deux parties, les forces armees qui les occupent actuellement. Bien qu'en tant que President, je ne prenne pas .de nouvelle decision, j'estime que cette decision de seance, n'ayant fait l'objet d'aucune opposition, reste ~alable. Mr: LOPEZ .(Colombia) : Unless I am very much mistaken, my impression is that, if we accept this resolution, we shall also be accepting, implicitly at least, the thesis that the Security Council has no competence to deal with this matter, because if it has competence in the matter, I believe it should be of very deep concern to the Security Council to be content to say that it is taking note that, according to the reports, no attempt has been made 0.0 either side to comply with the recommendatIons OJ; the wishes of the Security Council. M. LOPEZ (CoIOlAbie) (tr~uit de l'anglais): Si je ne me trompe fort, j'ai bien 1'impression que, si nous acceptons cette resolution, nous accepterons egalement, a tout le moins implicitement, la these selon laquelle le Conseil de securite n'est pas cotJilpetent en la l11atiere; en effet, s'il est competent, je crois qu'il serait tres· ,facheux pour le Conseil de se contenter de declarer qu'il prend acte de ce que les rapports signalent que les deux parties n'ont fait aucune tentative pour se conformer aux recommandations du Conseil de securite ou pour de£erer a'ses desirs. Cette declaration me semble tres acceptable, a condition, comme je viens de le dire, qqe nous acceptions le principe que le Conseil n'est pas competent en la matiere.. Si la pretention du representant des Pays-Bas est justifiee-et il n'a pas This declaration, to my mind, is very acc~pta­ hIe, provided, as I say, we accept the position that the Security Council has n(l competence in the mat- !er. If the claim of the Netherlands representative IS correct-and he has all along cO:1tended that • • 1 Voir les Proces-verbawr officiels dll COl/oseil de secltrite, Deu!ldeme Annee, No 83. ;,..--- - ' ". --- .... , _·?_;;;.>':r,~~.~:r.,:;,;;"D:s;;Ji~....~,~'-1s--iitil!iiji<fii-i& ·· However, as this is a breach of the peace, it comes within the jurisdiction of the Security Council. In that case, I believe the matter is entirely different; it is a matter of grave concern to the Security Council to determine whether or not the recommendations of the Council should be complied with. In those circumstances, I suggest that the Security Council, and the whole of the Organization, would he placed in a very awkward position, if, as I stated at the beginning, the Council is content to note that its recommendations have been disregarded. Then, I might very respectfully ask: 'Where are we going? Where is this leading to if everybody feels free to say, "V/ell, in my opinion, I am free not to do as you suggest"? That is practically what we are doing, perhaps not in this particular case, but in almost every important case which comes up here and also in the General Assembly. Everyone chooses his position, and then we find some .way· of accepting the position. I think we have returned to the question of the competence of the Security Council to deal with this Platter, which Mr. van Kleffens'very properly raised from the beginning. Of course, if in the opinion of the majority of the Security Council, we are not competent to deal with the matter, and if the Council accepts that interpretation, I find that the proposal is a great improvement over the proposals we have discussed thus far. However, if the opinion is otherwise, and if the question is open to doubt, I very respectfully suggest that it would be a rather serious matter to state that we are content to note that these recommendations of the Security Cpuncilare persistently and lightly disregarded.

In answer to the representative 9f Colombia, I wish to say that no action has been taken by the Security Council on the question of general jurisdiction. No decision whatever has been made upon the challenge of competence or jur-isdiction of the Security Council in this matter. On the contrary, whatever action has occurred because of decisions taken in the Security Council has been characterized by a definite understanding in .the record that no such decision is being made. On that understanding, the very first decision on 1 AugUst, which was of a provisional character, called upon the parties "(a) to cease hostilities forthwith, and (b) to settle their disputes by arbitration, or by other peaceful means Le PRESIDENT' (traduit de l'anglais):' En reponse au representant de la Colombie, je tiens a dire que le Conseil de securite' n'a pris auc,w;e decision sur la question de sa competence generale. Aucune decision, queUe qu'eUe soit, n'a ete prise sur la recusation de la competence ou de la juridiction du Conseil de s.ecuri~e a cet egard. , , . Au contraire, chaque fots qu une mesure a et.e prise en raison de decisions arretees par le Couse!l de securite, il a ete bien marque, par l'accord precis inscrit au proces-verbal, qu'il n'etait pris aucune decision de cet ordre. Ceci etant entendu, la toute premiere decision~ en date du 1er aotit! d~­ cision qui est de caractere provisoire, invital~ .l~ parties a a) A cesser imm~diatement les lrostlltt~s et b) A regler leur differend en recourant al'arbt-4 We now come to the present resolution. That resolution does not decide that the Security Council has no competence or jurisdiction. The resolution does not decide that the Council has competence or jurisdiction beyond the point of adopting this as another provisional measure which undertakes to carry out the previous two provisional measures. Therefore, I understand that the general question of the Council's jurisdiction regarding the different aspects of the case is not being passed upon by this resolution. The President has no doubt that the Security Council has jurisdiction to act as indicated in this resolution. Speaking as the representative of the United States of America and not as the Presi~ent of the Securitv' Council, I consider that this resolution is the wise course for the Security Council to follow under the present circumstances, in view of the history of the action of the Security Council up to this point. Mr. LOPEZ (Colombia): Perhaps I was not clear enough when I made my previous remarks. It was certainly not my intention to say that we are taking any decision on the question of the competence of the Security Council in_ this connexion. On the contrary, if my memory does not fail me, the first thing I said was that if we accepted this proposal, we should be implicitly accepting the thesis that the Security Council has no such competence. Although it is clear'to me that in the first instance our resolution was taken with the understanding that no decision was being made regarding the question of the c011)petence of the Council, subsequent acts and developments in connexion with the Indonesian question do change the position. It is true that we made certain recommendations originally on the understanding that the question of competence was being left pending. But those recommendations remain without effect; they have not been complied with. Time and again the representative of the Netherlands has insisted in all his statements that his Government does not recognize the competence of the Security Council. I am not a lawyer and I am not familiar -'::h colonial policy; but I submit that that being the case, by saying now simply that we take note that ,no attempt has been made to comply with the recommendations or decisions of the Security Council we should be accepting by implication the thesis that the Council has no competence. Or, what is worse, by not accepting that implication, we are satisfied to have the recommendations of the Security Council disregarded without taking any action about it. M. L6p~z (Colombie) (traduit de.l'anglais): Je ne me suis peut-etre pas assez clairement exprime an conrs de mes remarques precedentes. Je n'avais certes pas l'intention de dire que nous prenons une decision sur la question'de la competence du Conseil de securite a ce propos. Au contraire, si je me souviens bien, la premiere chose que j'ai dite etait que, si nous acceptions cette proposition, nOUs accepterions implicitement la these se10n laquelle le Conseil de securite n'est pas competent sur ce point. . . , Bien qu'il m'apparaisse' clairement que dans le premier cas, nous avons pris la resolution en admettant qq'aucune decision n'etait prise a regard de la competence du Conseil, des mesures nouvelles et l'evolution uIterieure de la question d'Indonesie modifient certainement la situation. 11 est exact que nous ayons adopte d'abord certaines recommandations ala condition que la question de la competence restait ouverte. Mais ces recommandations sont restees sans effet; e1les n'ont pas ete appliquees. Le representant des Pays-Bas n'a cesse d'affirmer, au cours de chacune de ses declarations, que son Gouvemement ne reconnait pas la competence du Conseil de securite: Je ne suis pas un juriste et je ne suis pas expert en politique coloniale, mais j'estime que, dans ces conditions, en declarant simplement a l'heure actuelle que nous prenons acte que les 'deux parties n'ont fait aucune tentative pour donner effet aux recommandations et aux decisions du Conseil de securite, nous accepterions implicitement la these selon laquelle le Conseil n'est pas competent. Autrement, ce qui est pis encore, si nous n'acceptons pas cette consequence, nous acceptonsque l'on passe outre a des recommandations du Conseil de securite sans prendre aucune mesure a cet egar<!:

I have three requests to speak. We shall therefore recess until three dclock this afternoon. TWO HUNDRED AND l''1NETEENTH DEUX·CENT·DIX.;NEUVIE~iE SEANCE 'MEETING Held at Flushing Jvfeadow, New York, On Saturday, ! November 1947, at 3 p.m. President: Mr. W. AUSTIN (United States of America) : Present: The representatives' of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Co- lombia, France, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 407. Continuation of the discussion on the Indonesian question At the'invitation of the President, Mr. Pillai, representative of India; Mr. van KlefJens, repre- sentative of the Netherlands; General Ro-mulo, rep- , resentative of the Philippines; and Mr. Palar, 'rep- resentativeof the Republic of Indonesia, took their places at the Council table. .'

The que.stion with which the Security Council is seized this afternoon is the resolution relating to the Indonesian question, submitted. at our morning meeting by the Sub- Committee appointed ',by the Security Council at its two hundred and seventeenth meeting held 011 31 October 19471• Mr. GROMYKO: (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian). It is not quite clear to me how the question of the competence of the Security Council has arisen here. We dealt with that question at the outset of our discussion on the, Indonesian problem. As you know, certain proposals were made in that connexion and were rejected. I would remind the Council that the Belgian representative proposed asking the opinion of the International Court of Justice on whether the Security Council was ~ompetent to discuss the question of the Indonesian situation, raised by Australia and India. The text of the Le PRESIDENT (trqduit de l'anglais): Trois orateurs ne sont fait inscrire. Nous alIons donc lever la seance; nous nous reunirons de nouveau cet apres-midi a trois heures. La seance est levee a13 h. 15. Tenu; aFlushing Met;triow, New-York, le sa-medi ler novembre 1947, a15 heures. President:lM. W. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d',Amerique). Pr~sents: Les representants des pays suivants: Australie, Be1gique" Bresil, Chine, Colombie, France, Pologne, Syrie, Union des Republiques socialistes .sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. ' 407. Suite de la discussion de la question indonesienne Sur l'invitation du President, M. Pillai, representant de l'Inde; M. van KlefJens, re'pt'esentant des Pays-Bas; le general Ro-mulo, representant des Philippines,et M. Palar, representant de la Republique. d'Indonesie:, prennent place ala table du Conseil. . , Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglaist: Le Conseil de securite est, cet apres-midi, saisi de la resolution sur la question indonesienne,. presentee a notre seance du matin par le Sous-Comite nomme par le Conseil lors de, sa deux cent dix-septieme seance tenue le 31 octobre 1:9471 • M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques, socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe) : Je necomprends pas tres bien a quel propos on a pose ici la question de la competence du Conseil. Nous en avons discute au commencement des debats sur la question indonesienne. Comme le Conseil le sait on nous avait soumis certaines propositions a ce sujet, mais elles ont ete rejetees. Je r~pelle­ rai au Conseil que le representant de la Belgique avait propose de demander I'avis de la Cour internationale de Justice pour savoir si le Conseil de securite a le droit d'examiner la question soulevee par les representants de l'Australie et de fIANCE Editions A. Pedone 13, rue Souftlot PARIS, Ve GREECE-GREC! "Eleftheroudakis" Librairie internationale Place de la Constitution ATHE.NES GUATEMALA Jose Goubaud , Goubaud & Cia. Lids. Sucesor Sa Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. GUATEMALA HAITI Max Bouchereau Librairie "A la Caravelle" Boite postale 111·B PORT·AU·PRINCE ICELAND-ISLANDE Bokaverzlu..tl Sigfusar Eymund80nnar Austurstreti 18 REYKJA.VIK INDIA-INDE Oxford Book & Stationery Company Scindia House NEW DELHI IRAN Bongahe Piaderow 731 Shah Avenue TEHERAN COSTA RICA-COSTA·RICA Trejos Hermanos Apartado 1313 SAN JOSE CUBA La Casa Belga- Rene de Smedt O'Reilly 455 LA HABANA CZECHOSLOVAKIA- TCHECOSLOVAQUIE F. Topic Narodni Trida 9 PRAHA 1 . 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