S/PV.22 Security Council

1 take it that the representative makes that as a proposition? . Ml'. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): Yeso

1 should like to consult the Council now as to what it wishes to do. rwould point out that three speakers hav~ indicated their desire to address the Council. In these circumstances, 1 would like to know whether the Council feels it would wish to proceed further or whether we should have an adjournment at this stage. It has been proposed that we should adjourn. 1 would like to know whether it should be until 10 o'dock this evening or until tomorrow morning. Ml'. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): There is a Frenô proverb-Mr. Bidault will correct me if 1 am wrong: La nuit porte conseil. 1 suggest ~e make it tomorrow morning.

The Council stands adjourned until 1i o'dock tomorrow morning. TWENTY-SECOND MEETING Heid at Church House, Westminster, London, on Saturday~ 16 February 1946~ at 11 a.m. P1'esident: Ml'. N. J. O. MARIN (Ausiralia). Pres,ent: The representatives of the following "countries: Amtra1ia, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Mexico, N~therlands, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. ,84. Provisional agenda 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. Letter from the Heads of the Lebanese and Syrian delegatiôhs to the Secretary-General dated 4 February 1946 (docqnient S/5).1 ., 3. Report by the Chairman of the Committee of Experts of the Security Council.on the 1 Seè Qfficial Records 01 the Security Council, First Year, Fii'st Series, Supplement No. ·1, Annex 9. 86. Continuation of discussion of the let- ter from the Heads of fhe Lebanese and Syrian c1elegations

1will now ask the representatives of Lebanon and Syria kindly ta take their seats at the tab' ':. The representatives of Lebanon and Syria took their seats at the Council table. t The PRESIDENT: The second itenl. on the agenda is the letter from the Heads of the Lebanese' and Syrian delegations to the Secretary-General. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico): Mter having heard the statements made by the representatives of Syria and of Lebanon and the declarations made by the representatives of France and the United Kingdom, 1 should like, first of .all, ta express the general attitude of my Government regarding the principle involved in this case. Wc can never approve of the presence of foreign troops in·the territory of a sovereign State without th~ free and express consent of its legitimate government. Witbt respect to the substance of the case under our considerations 1 should like to state that, in my opinion, the claim presented by .the representatives of Syria and of Lebanon, to the effect that·the French and the British troops should be withdrawn from the territories of those countries simultaneously and at the earliest possible date, is justified and in complete accordance with their rightsunder the Chl1rt~r. The British and French troops are not in the territories of those countries by virtue of a..llY treaty provision, but, to put it in the words of the representative of the United Kingdom, as a heritage of the needs of war. At the present time, the reasons for the maintenance of those trCJops in Syrîa and Lebancn do not exist any longer, and the troops should be 'withdrawn. The Anglo-French Agreementwas cbnc1uded when the United, Nations was not yet in existence, and before the Secur~tyCouncilwas established~ But now the situation is different; the responsibility .for world security rests exclusively with the United Narions, 'and is the concrete. task of the Security Council. Therefore, thé Anglo-French Agreement cannot provide groullds for the maintenanëe of foreigntroops in Syria and Lebanon. ' 1 am of the opinion that the Security Council should decide: 1. That the claim of the Syrian and Lebanes~ Governments to the effect that the British and French troops should be withdrawn simultaneously and at the earliest possible date is justified. 2. That the date for the evacuation of such troops should be fixed by negotiations between the parties in this case, it being understood that such negotiations will be concerned exclusively with the military-technical arrangements necessary for the adequate evacuation of sucb troops. 3. To request the parties ta inform the Council when this is done. 1 move that this proposal should be put before the Council for consideration. Ml'. FRANGIE (Lebanon) (translated trom French): Before the Council takes a decision, l feelbound to express my gratitude and that of my Syrian colleague for the concern the Council bas shown in the case of two small Powers. It is certainly a historie event when two small States can, through the action of the Security Council, obtain satisfaction for their claims solely because they have aright to it. We should merely like to state respectfully that the negotiations, or the attempts at negotiation, which have taken place thus far, have failed because the conditions governing these " negotiations were not very clear. 1think that there is a basic principle on which ev~rybody is agreed, ~n indisputable principle: it is that the wit~drawal of,French and British troops from Syrian and Lebanese territory should not be subject toany condition. It would seem, to j~dge from what 1 have heard iri the Council itself, that all members are agrêed on this fundamental truth. Nevertheless, the Netherlands representative has p~e8ented a motion to the, effect that withdrawal should take place assoon aspossible. The objection 1 have toJodge against this is,that ms motion fails to specify the meanswherebysuch withdrawal is to be carried out. The Netherlands representative .said that the troops should The positive solution we are asking for emerges ftom the Council's own proceedings. In aâdition to the representatives of France and the United' Kingdom, alI the members of the Council have stated their views, and aU have expressed the' same thought more or less explicitly. 1 think that the views expressed at yesterday afternoon's meetirig can be summed up in a few points. AIl the members of the Council consider it essential to affirm the principle of withdrawal. .1 think that everybody aIso said that the conditions attachéd to the Agreement of 13 December 1945regarding the withdrawal infringed upon the sovf..reignty of two States Members of the United Nations and violated the provisions of the Charter. Yesterday, the representative of China, after stressing.the need for evacuation following the disappearance of the causes which brought about the presence of foreign troops on Syrian and Lebanese territory, said the following: "ünly practical arrangements for the withdrawal, including the fixing of a period for its beginning and completion,need to be made." In the light of the statements made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Egypt, Australia, Brazil, Poland and Mexico, what should be the subject of the proposed negotiations? Should they touch upontheprinciple of withdrawal? But that principle is not contested, even by the French de1e-· gation. Should they relate to the need· for an early withdra:wal? Butnobody has contesteà the need for that either. Should they relate to the conditions contained in the Agreement of 13 December. 1945? AlI the members !Jf .the Council have more or· less expressly admitted th~t the terms of that Agreement were not bind~llg as far as Syria and Lebanon were .concerned. The only question which can form the subject of negotiations between the parties is the fixing of atime-limit for carrying out the withdrawal. We thoughtthat the determination ofsuch a time-ijmit might usefullybe undertaken .by the technicalcomrnitteewhich is at the Council's çlisposal.Blltif itis the. Council'swishthat .' conversationsllhould takepllicebetween the parties,to determine the· time-limit and to make ' . ,1 As l said lust now, neither the statements of the representative of France nor the motion of the representative of the Netherlands are satisfactory in this respect. For that reason, we should like ta insist that a clear basis for negotiations be created if that is the decision and the wish of the Council. Ml'. EL-KHoum (Syria): 1 do not wish ta repeat anything aIready said, yesterday or today: by my friend, the Lebanese l'epresentative. But l, tao, wish ta express my hearty thanks ta the members of the Security Council for taking such interest in our case. 1 am grateful ta the representatives who spoke so weIl apd dearly, and made it unnece:ssary for me ta advance further arguments justifying our case. There is one point on.ly to which 1 wish ta refer, inasmuch as virtuall;, lill who spoke suggested the settlement of the problem by way of negotiation. 1 should like some explanation as ta these negotiations. In the first place, the representative of France l..llentioned clifficulties ta be removed without giving any specific.information about these difficulties. Formalities are mentioned. What are these formalities? The Council will excuse our stressing this point, but in view of past experience we feel t.hat we must have full information about the principles and basis underlying these negotiations. The representative of the Soviet Union put a very clear question yesterday te the representative of France when he asked whether the conditions and the demands of France as embodied in the Note of 18 May 1945, which led ta lamentable events in Syria and.Lebanon, were .still insisted upon, ot whether, on the contrary, .they would not be taken as the basis or the subject of the questions ta be discussed duting the negotiations. The representative of France replied yesterday without any reference ta this question. Thus, it remains ambiguous and vague. If these negotiations concern the principle of evacuation, this principle, as my friend the Lebanese representative has already said, is already admitted by everybody. With regard ta the methods governing the evacuation, what are the matters and difficulties which require negotiatian? 1 say, on the basis of the experiencè we have had in the past in different countries and States, that negotiations are nat carr~ed out in ~~. connexion with an evaeualion. ''': 11\1\!1~2"'~"i·.~~M~.~.M~ 1 declare solemnly here, in the name of my_ Government, that we shall raise no objections to evacuation.We shaIl impose no conditions as ta formalities. We shall n0t say anything. Let them evacuate without asking us, without negotiating with us, because for us there is no question of opposing a principle the application of which we are emphatically demanding. Furthermore, 1 would most respectfully ask the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States· of America and France, if they have negotiated regarding the evacuation of thcir troopsJrom one country ta another? In England, there are Anlerican troops and we see in the papers that they are evacuating, leaving from time ta time. 1 would ask them. if they ~ave entered into negotiations to decide formalities and solve difficulties conneçted with this evacuation? This evacuation is being effected without any formal negotiatiuns and is still go~g on. Mr. BEVIN(Unit~dKingdom): We have had to negotiate on the brides. Mr. EL-KHoURI (Syria): 1 should like to ask the representative of. France a question. There are American and British troops in France, andthey are beingevacuated. What would be the position of the French Government if the United States military authorities said ta it: "Let us negotiate. We will not withdraw unless we have negotiations and an agreement between the parties'~? Would Franc~ accept that? 1 know that evacuation from aIl countries is going on·without negotiation; itdoes not require negotiation. Let the English and the French act likewise and we wm be ready ta assist them whenever theyask us. The repres~ntative of the United Kingdom declared yesterday that the presence of British troops in.Syria is intended to prevent friction between the French troops and the Syrian popu- " lation; he hasalso declared that the French. would. not withdraw frorn ~hat country unless That is our case.· The representative of the Soviet Union said yesterday that if the cause were removed the question would be settled. ,This question raises no diffictilty. Our case is so simple and so c1ear, and sending it for negotiation would complicate merely in order to clarify it again. go 1 say that niy Government, the Syrian Government, is not willing to enter ioto .negotiations, not becnuse it would hate to have the honour of meeting such great Powers as the United Kingdom and France, but because there is no need for that and because my Government fears it would complicate the sitvation.. It would be sufficient for the Security Council, to whom this question is referred by the parties concerned, to .recommend that the evacuation should be carried out witliin a limited time, and that the matter should remain on the agenda of the Council until evacuation is completed.

1 understand that the representative of Egypi; desires to put forward a resolùtion?· . Mr. RrAz (Egypt) (translated from French) : r should like to submit the following resolution, which takes into consideration all the points of view expressed in the course of previous meetings. A copy of it will be handed to you, but 1 would draw the attention of the members of the Council to the fact that a passage has been added, which does not, however, affect the substance of the resolution. 1 shall point it out when 1 reach the passage. Here is the text of the resolution: Mter having hearèl the statements by the representatives of Lebanon, Syria, France and the United Kingdom, and ",.fi:~ having exchanged views .on the case ~'.ur'- is submitted to.it, (1,fe1t I ought to add a reference to the exchange of views, since the resolution incorporates the points of view expressedby the other representatives.) , The Sécurity Council~ Considering that the presence of British and _French troops on Lebanese and Syrian territory is.incompatible with the principle ofthe sovereign equality of allMembers laid down in the Charter; Believing that this principlè, the validity·of which is Jully recognized by all the parties concerned, should receive its full application .by the immediate and· simultaneous with- Mr. BIDAULT (France) (translated trom French): 1 have just been reminded that 1 have been asked a number of questions. Here is my reply, which is perfectly cleàr and simple ,both as regards the Note of 18 May 1945 and the remaining questions. The Note menti0ned yesterday deals with France's special interests in Syria and Lebanon. Since France was given special responsibilities in these countries by the previous international organization, she naturally has special interests there. That is only common sense. But what is the nature of these interests? In the first place, there were the so-called special, troops regarding which 1 have been questioned. These were troops recruited on the spot, mostly officered by Syrians or Lebanese and merely under the French commando Since the question has been brought up, 1 assU:""le that the Governments of Syria and Lebanon are aware of the tact that since then these troops have been returned, to them. ,The reply to the question was, therefore, known. 1 have aIso been advised, and 1 must say that 1 fully agree with that advice, to defend the important cultural interests which France has in Syria and Lebanon. You have seen evidence of , these cultural interests, were it only in the reading of the letter in which the delegations of Syria and Lebanon stated their complaint; the <?riginal text of tbis letter was drafted in French. l'have heen advised ta defend our cultural interests by cultural means. 1 fully agree with this method since 1 have long'known full well that -intellect can he influenced only by,intellect. 1 could wish only that the voice of intellect could be heard and that, in particular, our French .§.chools in Syria were'not at present the object of "discrinlinat9ry ,measures which are. ,not ID keepingwiththe status of the other schoolsin that country; Then there are economic interests. This question was alsoraised, and 1 am bound to say that 1 think it was raised in vain, because there is no prohlem; we have transferred most 'of the serv- .;:'..:lin tbis category, and as for the rest, there is not, sa far as 1 am aware, anyserious difference ,outstanding between S-yria or Lebanon' and o1.lI'selves. Lastly,'.therehas been reference to strategic " 'interests; it was. inparttodeal with thesethat the Franco-British Agrêement of 13 December To begin with, \Ve were not concerned with a previously independent State wmch was a Member of the League Qf Nations. France was given a mandate by the former international organization; that is to say, she was given certain responsibilities. When France, without paying too close attention to the letter or to the formal legal aspect of the situation decided, in the middle of the \Var, to proclaim the independence of Syria and Lebanon with the de facto and de jure consequences arising out of that step, we were confronted with a vacuum, and in the middle of the war we did not at once envisage what might .take the place of the previous regime. In order to fill this gap, the Agreement of 13 December 1945 proposed a system of collective security. . Article 43 of the Charter, to wmch the representative of Egypt referred yesterday, does not seem to me either in law or in common sense to invalidate the clause in the Agreement of 13 December 1945 referred to, because in paragraph 2 of Article 43, 1 read the following: "Such agreement or agreements . . . (that is to say, agreements concluded for the purpose of making armed forces available to the Security Council, etc.) ... shall govern the numbers and ..types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the !lature of the facilities ,and assistance to be provided." We were, therefore, fully within the terros of Article 43 when we contemplated the action we in fact took: Moreover, the representative of Syria said just now that there was no·need ta negotiate on evacuation.. 1 shall return to this point. 1 agree that, in regard to troops which were in a certain area as a result of the war, and in the face of a proposal to transfer responsibility toan organ of the United Nations, there was no need for prior negotiations. 1 should like ta repeat what 1 have already said in .order to allay all anxiety. What 1 said, and what 1 say again now, is that the stipulation in the Agreement that the regrouping.of forces would be subject to a decision by the Security Council was not meant to imply that, in.the al;lsence ofsuch a· decision, troops would be tnaintained at their present stations indefinitely. l fail ,ta understand how thisreiteration of the Security Council's authority in this matter can in. any way be regarded as an.infringernent of theCouncil's rights or. as a.violation of the Charter. Anotl1er ·questionhas. been askedregarding what happened aS a result of that .Agreement. The whole problem can therefore he smted thus: we have accepted-and this is stated in the Agreement of 13 December-the essential part of the request made by both the parties, that is to say, withdrawal by agreement with the' local Governments. 1 now lh"1derstand that negotiations are not wanted. Here there is a point which 1 should like to raise. Either there is a dispute, in which case we are required under .Article 33 of the Charter ta negotiate with a view ta seeking a solution of the dispute; or e1se,if there are no negotiations and if there is a refusal to negotiate, the assumption must be that there is no dispute. The position is therefore quite clear. There is no dispute on the substance on the -matter. As 1 see it, what has been happening at this tablein-the lastfew hOlLrs is this: Alû~ough there is no.cdispiite ·OIl îundamentàls, an attempt is being. made to secure, in addition to full satisfaction, something resembling a vote of censure against France. . 1 should merely like ta say most emphaticàlly that, knowing what my country did during the period of the mandate and 'previously, at the cast of the blood of her children and of considerable financial sacrifice, not out of se1f-interest but in arder to serve the wider cause of humanity in these territories-which have become dearer· ta us. thanever since their independence --knowing this, 1 say that France would not 'UJlder any.drcumstances be prepared to accept such a stigma. Mr. RIAZ (Egypt) (tra:nslateà trom French): Tlle .representative of France expressed a point of view entir~ly contrary to. the one 1 expressed yesterday ID··analysing Article 43 of the Charter. If r understood correctly, Mr. Bidault said· that paragraph 2 of that Article isin fact the basis of that part of the Agreement of December 1945 which provides for the presence and regrouping of Anglo-French forces to maintain . collective security in.those territories. 1 would askthe representative of France ta correct me if 1 have not undei'stood him aright. - 1 would· recall that paragraph.2 of· Article 43 readsas follows: "Snch agr.eement.or. agreements shall govern the numbers·and types of forces, their degree of readiness.'andgeneral location,· and the nature " of the.Jacilitiesand assistance tobe provided." (CAll Members of the United Nations, in arder ta contrlbute ta the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake ta make available ta the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." It is clear that tlùs refers to the territory aIid armed forces of the State concemed, and not ta the forces of a foreign country. When, therefore, paragraph2 speaks of an a15Teement or· agreements, meaning the agreements mentioned in paragraph 1, the reference is ta :national forces and not ta f"reign forces. It follows that any provision in an agreement purporting to Ilt.rengthen collective security by the use of foreign troops is contrary to Article 43, and cannot be reg:'l.rded as being based thereon. Mr. BEVIN (United Kingdom) : 1 do not want to savery much abo,lt this problem. 1 tlink that me British Government has made itspositian clear in its desire ta clear out and to have our troops withdrawn. 1 cannat forget that there is a history to the whole of this business. Since 1 have been in office, l have found myself confronted with many historical events that occurred during the war and subsequently which did complicatè the situation. But my Government decided to take steps immediately following the election to try to bri:ng this thing ta an end. ln this discussion, any doubt about the per-' manence of the disputed clause seems to have been eliminated by the declaration of the French Governinent.disclaiming ,permanent right in tbis place. Everybody has agreed that it is a .thing 'that can be negotiated. 1 would'like to say this about France:While we are, 1 hope, goodfriends with the Syrian and the Lebap.ese people and have tried ta do what they wanted us to do, we are equally good friends with the French people, who are recovering from a terrmc struggle in whichthey were overrun. " ln tbis business, the British people can never forget, not alone whath~ppenecl in this war, but aIso the terrifie priee that France paid for the security of the world in the 191.1:-1918 war. 1 was extremely sorry 1 could not attend yes-, terday. l attended on Thursàay, but unfortunately the meeting was taken up with procedure, and Government work took up my whole day yesterday. But 1 have obtained from my colleagues the main llile of the discussion. 1 consulted my Government, and it is willillg to accept the general ouiline of Mr. van Kleffens' motion. 1 do not think it is a bad thing that in the Security Council, after what we have 'been through, we should wind up expressing confidencein somebody. If.it happens to be Great .Britain and France, we will reciprocate by going awaywithconfidence in everybody eIse, all the other Powers who have been at the Assembly. 1 rather -like -those words, notbecause my Government was affected, but because we are not really inv.olvedin·the controversy as to'withdrawal; Imean that we are ready to go. 1 am therefore trying to take the spirit of the Council. We thought that, with the declarations made yesterday, we had really arrived at the position in which this matter couldbe disposed of by the four Governments, especially havingregard·to the fact that we-have to inform the. Council, which means that the matter is on the agenda . if we donot do the job properly. 1 am ratherreJuctant to rub it in too much, if-1 Illay use a British colloquialism, because it will be foundthat when we have moved another year away from war, ..many of these difIiculties all ôver the world will have disappeared. At least,.Ihope so. We are very near to the war, and 1 have vivid recollections of the enormous task at the end of the last war, the FirstWorld War, of clearing up theoutstanding difIiculties that then existed. And, ifl ~aysay so with respect, the work ofthe Big Tlrree, the work of the Council of Ministers of ForeignAffairs, in spite of aIl 'our.liUle çontroversies, is prooeeding td dear \ip a m~ch ·"'-i J1···························· Therefore, the spirit of. Mr. van Kleffens, mo~ tian, rather than the definitive text and what 1 regard as a little condemnatory language in the other resolution, meets the position of the British Government, in collaboration with the other three Governments ta get this entirely c1eared up. 1 took it from Mr. Bidault's statement yesterday that there is no conflict in the acceptance of the sovereign rights of Syria and Lebanon. That is"accepted. Therefore, if it can be l'eferred ta them with the knowledge of aIl the opinions expressed at this conference, which have made quite c1ear '\\that the members' feelings are, the British Government,in so fàr as it is affected, wotùd not forget in dealing with· the p::ublem the opinions expressed by every member around this table. We will bear that in mind and work ÎJ."'1 the hope that this, like other problems' that are left over from the war, may be cleared up in a good international and, if 1 may say so, comradely spirit-an expression which, while hackneyed, is at least of socialist origin. sisteraient voies n'a anglaises. se concerne troyait le mandat de m'attendais Conseil, ce cherchât quelques des pour de que :Mr. FRANGIE (Lebanon) (translated trom French) : Mter the statement made by the representative of France, 1 should merely like ta c1eal' up a few points. The issue between us is not a quarrel or an economic question. The Note of 18 May 1945 ta which Mr. Bidault referred merely dèalt with problems of strategy-I have that memorandum in front of me, and 1 take the liberty of reading from it the following" passage: "As regards strategic positions, these will consist of bases' making' it possible to safeguard the communications of France and her overseas possessions." , You know what followed: the incident of May which was terminated only after the intervention of British troops. Mr. Bidault said that France could not evade the responsibilities for security conferred" upon it under the League of Nations mandate. 1 really did notexpect the representative of France to bring up the mandate in this Council. "1· did not expect that an attempt would be made, several months after the United Nations Charter had been signed at San Francisco, to qeduce any consequences from the mandate. As far as we. are concerned, this mandate has beeIi dead and buried ever since the Charter was" signed. Wc; no longer recognizeanybody's right toargue on the basisofthat mandate, and in particular Mr. van Kleffens, like aU the other 'members of the Council, is in agreement with our purpose; but it is the actualmethods which wc should like to have more accurately defined. If wehad to choÇlse, wc should support, not Mf. van-Kleffens'proposal, but that.ofthcl'epresent.. ative of Egypt, which is clearer. If for any reason that motion should not be adopted, we should support that of the representative of Mexico. .' . The PRE$IDENT: 1 should like at.this sta.ge to point out to theCouncil tliat there.aré atlêas~ three representatives who stillwiSh. to speak. 1 waswondering whether the Council desires.to proceednow or possibly toadjoum until later on today.. Hit is the wish of the Council that we should nowileat the remaining speakers, 1 will caU upon them. Mr. .EL-KHoURI· (SYIU): .1 mould like to r~ferto some POi11ts which .lheardthis morning from the representative of France. He mentioned the word "'blame". 1 do not sec that there.is any blamein our request tothe·Security Council for thè adjustment of the· question wmch wehave I"'t bef"",it.We ."'" notblaming Franco.11OW foranything in~ matter. Mr. Bidault.IIlentionedalso some situations which Fl'aficewants to readjust. 1 say thatthe questionnow beforethe ,ColW-cil doesnot refer tothesesituatioDS. Any J1egotiations aboqtother II\atters maycertainlytakeplaceaftel' the evacuation. The .·Syrian.· Government.isnot ..asking.·t9 entel'intonegotiatioDS<on·anysubjectunder the pressure .of armcd forces ,in itsterritory.lt is obliged to sayth~t becauseoftJte Iast experience The representative of France also referred yestèrday and today to the Agreement of 13 Decembèr as being in conformity,vith the Charter. 1 searched tluough all the Articles of the Charter,and 1 could not find any A.rticle applicable to this Agreement., ' As to the collective securityfor which he considers France has sorne responsibility, together with the United Kingdom, 1 say that the Char~ ter makes provision for collective security in the transitory period, and that ):Irovisions for collective secll.lity cannot be adopted or carried on by any Members of the United Nations except in accordance witll the terms laid down in the Charter. If we look at Article 106 of the Charter, we findthat it defines the way in which collective security is to be ensured if and when the occasion arises. This Article reads as follows: "Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referrcd to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities. under Article 42, -the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow 30 October 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and··as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view ta sùch jomt action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintainmg international peace and security." , It is clear iliat, if anythfug is to be done before the final establishment of the Security Council, it must be done in conformity with Article 106. 1 wonder if the signatories to this agreement have consultedeach other? Have France and the United .Kingdom consulted the United States? Have they consulted the. Soviet Union? Have they consulted China? Have they· cOIlSulted us, because :We also are Members of the Unfted NatioFlS and bl:;cause we are concerned in tlllS matter? They have not done so. l have come to the conclusion, therefo:r;e, from what 1 have seen and heard in tllis· Council yesterdaya.nd today,thatalreadyfour of the "Big Five" have' clearly. expressed their opinion that collective security is' not ta be safeguar-ded by aIl fiveofthem, but only by two.of them. For this reason, it is clear that the Anglo- French Agreement of 13 December 1945. is not in conformity with the Charter. 1 draw the attentionof the Council to this point. Furthermore,as l said before, we do not see any ,difficulties in the evacuatlon.as the case·is presentec,I before theCouncil.If t~e French Government sees difficulties, it has ta clear. them up We are certainly not ready to enter into negotiations on subjects other than the evacuation, and the evacuation concerns only the interested parties, the United Kingdom and France. They have to arrange .lor the evacuation. Vve consider that their Agreement for the evacuation of their troops does not conform to the provisions of the Charter. That is aU I·wish to say now. 1 expect that the members of the Security Council will give us justice in fuis matter as it , is presented before them, irrespective of their confide.nce in this or that;- there can be confidence in justice and_ in right and in nothing eIse. Since some other parties· have concluded an agreement outside the terms of the Charter, 1 do not see how the Syrian Government and the Lebanese Government can have confidence in the settlement of the matter, if it is left to them alone. We are parties in this matter, and we say that we have no objection whatever to the evacuation and raise no difficulties in the case. Mr. STETTI~UUS (United States of Am~rica): l shall be very brie! since 1 know that the Council would like us. to adjourn. A great· deal has been said about confidence. Ido not believe that there is anything more important at this point than that the countries round fuis table and the countries in the United Nations as a .whole should have confidence.in one.anothel'. 1 have already made it very dear that the Government of the .United States of America regards th$= desire of Syria and Lebanon, to have the.foreign troops at present stationed in. their territories withdrawn. at the earliest· practicable moment, as a .fully justified desire on the part of those countries. The only question thatremainsis the method .(or the mechanics, 1 might say) •asJ:Q.llQ'Y tllis is. to. be arranged. This certainly rêcil.l.rresagreement and discussion between thê parties concerned. 1 have· studied very carefully· the proposaIs of Mr. van KlefIens, and 1 think that they contain a valuable element for the sdution of the problem· befote us. 1 wQuld like to màke a proposaI that somewhat inodîfics. those of Mr. van Kleffens, whidl 1 hope will be acceptable to aIl concerned and will lead us out of the present dilemma in which we find ourselves. 1 shall readthe followiIlg which 1 have had typed ready for distribution: The SecurityCouncil Takes note of the statementsIIlade by the four parties and .by the ·other IIlembers of the Council; " Mr. RrAz (Egypt) (translated from French): The proposaI which 1 have had the honour ta submit in the course of this meeting seems. ta have bœn misinterpreted in certain quarters; it has been takento imply censure. 1 shouk'. like ta dispel that impre..~ion. 1 remained studiously objective in my cIrait resolution. As far as 1 am concerned; the debate has at aIl times been confined ta an interpretatioI! of the text of the Charter. There was never any idea of censure in my mind. Moreover, if somebody says he is being censured by bis antagonist every time there is disagreement en the interpretarion of a text, 1 really do not see how any question can come before the Council without a censure being invalved. 1 should like ta say trlat, for my own part, 1 did not wish ta blame anyboè.y. Careful reading of the draft wmch 1 submitted .will show that 1 am merely affirming certain'principles which are admitted by everyone present here. We are all agreed that this matter is governed by the principie stated in the Article of the Charter which establi<.lhes the .sovereign equality of aIl the Members of the United Nations. This principle is recognized by everybody, and in my proposaI, '1 said that none of the ?arties concerned, whether it he Lebanon,. Syria, the United Kingdom or France, contested this point. So where is the blame? 1 do not think that there is any blame implied in sayin.g and repeating a statement on which everybody isagreed, and saying, furthermore, that everybody is agreerl on it, including the parties concerned. Then, in my draft, 1 go on ta say exactly the same tlring as Mr. Stettinius has just said,' and 1 am grateful ta· him for having reaffirmed this point. The remaining pointis negotiations. My text speaks of negotiations,not on the question oof principle (on which my resolution says that everybody is agreed), but on the steps ta be taken in arder ta reach the desired result. 1 would remind Mr. Bevin of what he said here a short time aga, which was in substance: "We are great Powers; we cannat he1phaving strength on our side.· That is' why, in the case before us now, 1.ask that a great Power should not be left alone face to face with a small one."l Today two great Powersare .face to face with two very small ones-I hope the representatives of Syria and Leban'on will forgive my saying We. are all fully agreed; we all mean the same thing. But precisely because of what· has been said by one of the parties to the .dispute today, we must try to keep the discussion within the desired limits. For that reason, 1 ask Mr. Stettinius whether the concluding passage of my resolution does not'express rather more precisely bis own meaning. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist RepubIics) (translated from Russian) : NOTE: The following is a translation of a Rus~ sian taxt of Mr. Vyshinsky's statement supplied by the 1'epresentative of the Soviet Union after the meeting. Severaldraft resolutions on ilie question con~ cerning the withdrawal of Anglo-French troops from Syria and Lebanon have been brought before the Security Council'for' consideration. Let us begin the consideration of these drafts with the proposal of Mr. van Kleffens. By the way, Mr. van Kleffens' draft resolution in no way differs in substance from the draft resolution proposed by Mr. Stettinius. After all, neither the draft resolution of Mr. van Kleffens, nor that of Mr. Stettinius states what actually is envisaged by the negotiationsamong the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Syria and Lebanon which were referred to by Mr. van Kleffens and Mr. Stettinius in their drafts. Therêfore, the substance of the problem to which these proposed negotiations between the two sides should relate, is not revealed, either in the draft reso- . lution of Mr. van Kleffens, or in that of Mr.. Stettiniull. 1 have already twice asked Mr.Bidault what negotiations he is contemplating in bringing fo~ard his proposais·before the Security Coun.. cil, and 1 havenot received a reply. 1 am asking MT. Bidault for the third time: 1 ask you, Mr. Bidault, as weIl as Mr. Stettinius and Mr. van KIerfens, to tell me 'what negotiations you have in mind. You want to gain the confidence of the Security Council. We would like to show you this confidence. You speak of the necessity for co-ordinated decisions. But in order to reach co-ordinated decisions, one has to know what in your opinion should he the substance of the negotiations bétween the GovermFents of Great nritainand France on the one hand, and the Governments of Syria and of Lebanon on the other. Wecannot adopt a resolution without knowing this, because this method is not in accordance with the dignity of the.United !\aùms. The second part of the draft resolutio:ns of Mr. Stettinius and Mr. van Kleffens is aIso unacceptable, because as long as it is unknown what is to he the subject of the negotiations, no assurance can be expressed in the success of these negotiations. If the negotiations are to relate to whether or not Anglo-French troops are to be withdrawn from Syria. and Lebanon, this brings us back to the wel1-known memorandum of 18 May 1945, about which 1 spoke in my fust speech and which, as 1 understood today from Mr. Bidault's speech, the French delegation still supports at present. If Mr. Stettinius and Mr. van Kleffens have in mind such negotiations, that is negotiations whether Anglo-French troops are ta be withdrawn from Syria and Lebanon or not, then such a resolution is absolutely unacceptable. This question must be fully cleared up. If you ,:onsider that the sovereignty of Syria and Lebanon is not worth anything and must not be taken into account, then say sa. The Security Council does not emt in order to protect the peace of mlnd of every member of the Council; it emts in order to protect the sovereign.rights of all the United Nations, to protect their sovereignty from encroachment of any kind from any source, to safeguard peace and the security of peoples. It is impossible to admit the slightest deviation by the Security Council from these great principles on which the whole Organizatian of the United Nations is based. Mr. STETTINIUS (United States of America): 1 would like to say just a ward. before the ad· journment. Mr. Vyshinsky states that there is no character or basis to the proposals of Mr. van Kleffens and myseH. 1 would like ta caU theahention of the Council ta the~e few words in the second paragraph of the proposaI that 1 suggested: "... foreign troops in Syria and Lebanon will te withdrawn as saon as practicable, and that negotiations ta that end will be undertaken by the parties without delay." 1 donot know what couid be more clear or more specific than that purpose contained in· those words. 1 would like to resume mY remarks at the openïng of the next session. .

1 take,it that it is the wish of the Council that 1 should suspend the sitting 87. Continuation of discussion of the Jet.. ~er from the Heads of the Lebanese and Syrian delegations1 Mr. STETTINIUS (United States of America): 1 said fuis morning that 1 was sorfy that Mr. Vyshinsky apparently failed to grasp the exact meaning of the proposal which l presented at this morning's session. 1 think that the proposal is clear. We are all agreed that the troops must be withdrawn; the Council has expressed its confidence that fuis will be done. It notes that negotiatior.'3 are to be held ta that end, tha:t they are ta be on the subject of the withdrawal of the troops as soon as practicable, and that they are to be undertaken without dday. Nothing to my mind could be dearer. 1 urge the Council to accept fuis proposal, and for us to· demonstrate ta the world that where we are unanimous in principle the Council will not permit itself to be divided by a lack of mutual confidence and mutual 'Cl'ust. Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Net4erlands): ln reply to M" Vyshinsky's statement, 1 wan~ed to say only that the text of the resolution 1 proposed yesterday makes the withdrawal of the troops not dependent on negotiations, but it says that it shall be done after negotiations or otherwise. Therefore, the question of what exactly the negotiations have ta bear upon seems to me Ïn"materiaI. Mr. RIAz (Egypt) (translated trom French): This morning, 1 took the liberty of asking Mr. Stettinius a question as ta the difference between the meaning of bis proposal and mine. He has replied this afternoon, and from the explanations he has given us, 1 conclude that bis own text requiresexplaining, whereas mine does not. Mr. VYSHn~SKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republks) (translated trom Russian): 1 should. like to reply in a few words ta bath Mr. Stettinius and Mr. van Kleffens.