S/PV.224 Security Council

Is there any objection to the Le PRESIDENT (traduit de ['anglais): Y a-t-il adoption of the provisional agenda? des objections contre 1'adoption de 1'ordre du jour " provisoire?' Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- M. GRO;MYKO. (Union des Republiques sociapublics) (translated from Russian) : I have no listes sovietiques) (traduit du r1-tsse) : Je n'ai pas objection to items 1, 2 and 3 on the agenda, but d'objectionsa formuler contre les points 1, 2et 3, I cannot agree to th~ inclusion of item 4. We hold mais je ne puis accepter l'inscription du point 4 that the question of the "veto", as such, does not a l'ordre du jour. A notre avis, la question du exist, either in the General Assembly 'or in the "veto", en tant que telle, ne peut se poser ni a Security Council and that there' are no grounds 1'Assembll~e generale.pi au Conseil de secui"ite, for putting it, on the agenda of the General Aset c'est sans raisons valables qu'on 1'inscrit a 1'ordre sembly or of the Security Council. Its discussion du jour de l'AssembIee ou du Conseil'de securite. would be merdy a waste of time. We all know L'examen de cette question n'est qu'une perte·de who is raising the issue and what certaiu States temps. Nous savons tous quels sont ceux/qui posent wish to obtain from a debate on it. We also know cette question etquels sont les desseins des Etats that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics cannot qui en demandent l'examen. Nous savons, d'autre in any circumstances agree to any alterations part, que l'Union des Repuhliques sop,alistes sovi6- • whatsoever in this connexion, whether these be tiques ne peut en aucun cas accepter qu'a pi'OpOS amendments to the Charter or to the method of de cette question, on introduisedes modifications work of the Security Council. dans la Charte ou dans la mefhode de travail du Conseil de securite. In my opinion, I£would al~o be merely a waste J'estime qu'en examinan~ cette question au Con-' of time to discuss the question here in the Security seil de. securite, nous ne ferions que perdre du Council. May I suggest that we use our time more temps. Je propose d'employer notre temps d'une " productively or, at least, that we do not squander fat;on plus productive, et en tous cas de ne pas le it in vain. gaspiller en vain. . I cannot, therefore, agree "to the inclusion of . C'est pourquoi je ne puis donner mon accord this question in the agenda and if the President sur 1'inscription de cette question a l'ordre du puts the adoption of the agenda to the vote, I shall jour. Si done le President metaux voix la quesof course .vote against the inclusion of this item. tion de 1'adoption de 1'ordre du jour, je voterai evidemment contre l'inscription de ce point. The P~ESIDENT: I should explain that this item was included in the provisional agenda with the intention of bringing to the attention of the Security Council the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 21 November concerning the voting procedure of the Security Council. The members of the Security Council will, of course, be free to debate the matter when we reach this item on the agenda, but it will not necessarily be reached. The Security Council may feel that the discussion arising out of the letter of the Secretary-General could be deferred. - The point which the :President particularly had in mind in that co~exion was the suggestion contained in the resolution to the effect that the Interim Committee of the General Assembly should "consult with any committee which the Security Council may designate", that is, a committee to study the problem. It seemed proper to bring that suggestion to the attention of the Security Council with a view to a discussion by the Security Council at' this point, if the' Council so desired, or with a view to noting and rec0rding it as a matter which, presumably, will have to be dc;:alt with in the early future. If, on that basis; the representative of the USSR could withdraw his objection to the inclusion of this item inthe agenda, I suggest .that he might leave it to be seen, when we come to the item, Le PRESIDENT (traduit de ['anglais): Je dois expliquer que cette question a ere inscrite a l'ordre du jour provisoire afin d'appeler l'attention I <iu Conseil de securite. sur .la, resolution adoptee .1e 21 novembre par l'Assemblee generaIe au sujet de la procedure de vote au Conseil de securite. Bien entendu, lorsque nous en viendrons a examiner ce point de 1'ordre du jour, les membres du Conseil de securite seront libres d'en discuter, mais nous n'en arriverons pas necessai,rementa ce point. Le Conseil de securite considerera peutetre que la discussion de la lettre du Secretaire general pourrait etre renvoyee a plus tard. La question a laquelle le President pensait notamment a ce propos etait la suggestion contenue dans la resolution, a savoir que la Commission interimaire de l'Assemblee generale devrait "etudier cette question en commun avec toute commission que pourra nommer le Conseil de securite ...", c'est-a-dire une commission chargee d'etudier la question. I1 sembhit opportun de signaler cette suggestion a l'attentiondu Conseil de securite afin qu'il en discutat a ce moment, s'il le desirait, ou afin qu'Ol1 en prit acte et qu'on le notat comme une question qu'il faudrait probablement traiter dans un avenir proche. Si le representant de l'URSS pouvait accepter, dans ces conditions, de retirer son objection a l'inscription de ce point a l'ordre du jour, je suggererai qu'il attende que nous en arriv~ons a ce Mr. KATZ:-SUCHY (Poland) : I do notwantto M. KATZ-SUCBY (:Pologne)(traduitd'e l'anel1ter illtO the merits. of the question which has glais): Je n'ai pas l'intention de disc~tter quant been raised here by the inclusion in our provisional au fond la question qui a ete soulevee ici par agenda of the matter referred to in the letter of l'inchtsion anotre ordre'du jour de la question the Secretary-General. That problem is covered sur l~quelle porte la lettre du' Secretaire general. by one of the most essential Chapters ofthe Chafter Ce probleme est vise par Fun'des Chapitres essen- -which we all signed-namely, Chapter XVIII. tiels de la Charte-que nous 'avons tous signee- , a savoir le Chapitre XVIII. ,'v-". . . I consider that to place on the agenda any of J'estime done que l'inscription al'ordre du jour these problems would,not only be a waste of time, de l'un quelconque de ces problcmes ne serait pas but would also be contrary to the rights and duties seulement uneperte de. temps, mais qu'eHe serait of the Security Council. It. is not the Security egalement contraire aux droit-s·et devoirs du Con- Council, it is not the General Assembly and it is seil de securite. En eHet, saufles dispositions du not any other organ, exC€pt as provided for in Chapitre XVIII de la Charte, ce n'est pas au Chapter XVIII of the Charter, which may pro- Conseil de securite, ni a l'Assemblee generale, ni pose. submit or decide on any amendments to the aaucun autre organe, qu'il appartient de proposer, voting procedure in the Security Council. My de soumettre ou de decider des amendements reladelegation will therefore oppose the inclusion of tifs a la procedure de vote au Conseil de securite. the fourth item itl the agenda of today's. meeting. Ma delegation s'opposera done a !'inclusion du point 4 a l'ordre du jour d~ la seance d'aujourd'hui. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (tra.tlslated from French): I -wonder whether I have quite M. VAN LANGENBOVE (Belgique): Je me de-> mande si j'ai bien compris les objections formulees par le representant de I'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques et par le representant de la Pologne. En effet, le Conseil de securite a ete saisi, il y a peu de temps, d'une recC'tnm,andation de l'Assemblee, dans des conditions identiques a celJes dans lesquelles nous .sommes saisis aujourd'hui de la resolution adoptee par l'Assemblee au cours de sa derniere session. Je vise la resolution que l'Assemb!ee a adoptee le 13 decembre 19461 et qui concernait le probleme dont il est .question e.n ce moment. A la suite de cette resolution, la Iquestion a ete inscrite a I'prdre du jour de la cent quatrevingt dix-septieme seance du Conseil de securite le 27 aotit dernier2. Nous en avons delibere. Le representant d~s Etats-Unis a presente des suggestions et, si je ne me trompe, le Conseil a ete .unanime a estimer que ces suggestions d~vaient etresoumises a l'examen du Comite d'experts. De teUe sorte que, actuellemcnt, le .Conseil de securite est deja saisi de la question, et si aujourd'hui ce point figure de nouveau a notre ordre du jour, c'est parce qu'une resolution adoptee par l'Assemblee generale au cours de sa derniere session a apporte un element nouveau en ce qui concerne cette question du veto. Donc, pour ma part, je ne parviens pas acomprendre les objections qui sont formulees a present au sujet de !'inscription de cette question a l'ordre d? jour:. 'l1n~erstood the objections raised by the rer>resentative of the USSR and Poland. \ As. a matter of fact, an Assembly recommendation was recently referred to the Security Council in circumstances identical with those in which the resolution adopted bjr' the Assembly at' its last session is now referred to us. I allude to the resolution adopted by the Assembly' on 13 December 19461 on the problem with which we are now concerned. As a result of that resolution, the question was placed on the agenda of the hundred and ninely-seventll meeting of tlle SecuritY Council' on '27 August last.2 'We discussed it. The United States representative.made suggestions and, if·I am not mistaken•.the Council was unanitnous in considering that those' suggestions should be submitted to the Committee of EA-perts for study. Thus the' que~on is already before the Security Council, and if this item is again on our agenda today it is because a resolution adopted by the General.Assemblyat its last session has introduced a new :factor into this question of the veto. Personally, therefore, I fail to understand the obj~c­ nons which have just been made to placing this question on the agenda. Yr. Al:'STIN (United~States of America) : The United States position on this matter is substantially this. \Ve are willing to have the item passed over. -w.tth the Security Council doing nothing more than to take note of this resolution. We agree that it is premature for the Council to embark upon a discus..ion of the matter. \Ve shall therefore. ·be glad to have it treated pro fon1!a, M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): La position des Etats-Unis dans cette affaire est au fond la suivante ~ nous sommes disposes a accepter que 1'0n passe sur cette question, le Conseil de securite prenant simplement acte ne cette resolution.Nous sommes d'accord pour reconnaitre qu'il serait premature pour le Conscil de se lancer dans une discussion de cette question. 1 Sce P.esolJltioxs adopted. ~ the General Assembly during 1he sa:ood part oi its first session. resolution 40 (I). :! Sce OfPdol Records of the Security Council, Second Year. ~o. 85. 1 Voir les Resoluti~ns adoptees par l'Assembleegelleruk pendant la'seconde partie'de la premiere session, Resolution 40 (1). 2 Voir les Proces-verbau:r officiels a1t Conseil de securite, Deuxieme Annee, No 85. Mr. EL-KHouRI (Syria) : On reading this reso- . M. EL-:l(E0uRI (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais): lution of the General Assembly, we find that it A la lect":...e de cette resolution de l'Assemblee is· directed entirely towards the Interim, Commitgenerale, nOllS constatons qu'elle s'adresse intetee. Certain requests are made of the Interim Comgralement a la Commission interimaire. Certaines mittee, but there is nothing in the resolution which demandes sont presentees a la Commission intericoncerns the Security Council ,except the last paramaire, mais il.n'ya la rien qui concerne le Conseil graph. The last paragraph reads: de securite, it l'exception du demier paragra.phe de la resolution, dont voici le texte : ((Requests th~ permanent members of the Secur- Invite les membres permanentsdu Conseil de ity Council to consult with one another on the securite it examiner en commun la'question du problem of voting in the Security Council in order vote au Conseil de securite en vue deparvenir a to secnre agreement among them on measures to un accord sur res mesures· propresit assurer an ensure the prompt and effective'exercise by the Conseilde securite l'exercice prompt et efficace de Security Council of its functions." ses fonctions". The other paragraphs in this resolution are not " Les auttes paragraphes de cette resolution ne , to be discussed here, and we have nothing to do doivent.pas faire l'objet (:rune discussion ici. Nous with them at the present time. It is premature for n'avons pas a nous en occuper a,l'heure actuelle. us to consider the other paragraphs. I think that Il serait premature pour nous d'examiner ces putting. this last paragraph on the agenda means atItres paragraphes. Je pense que l'inscription de simply that the' Security Council could add its ce dernier paragraphe a l'ordre du jour avait desire to the desire of the General Assembly in simplement pour eut d'indiquer que le Conseilde requesting "the permanent members of the Se-. s6curite pourrait joindre ses voeux a ceux de .curity Council to consult with one another ... in'!'Assemblee generale, lorsque celle-ci "invite les order ... to ensure the prompt a~d effective exermembr~s.permanenl:S du Conseil de securite it cise by the Security Council of its functions", ::>r. examiner en comml1n ... en vue d'assurer au nothing else need be dQne. The same requ~st was Crinseil de securite eexercice prompt et efficace de addressed to the Security Council last yea' by the ses fonctions". Et il n'y a rien d'autre a faire. La, General Assembly, and that is how the matter meme requete a deja ete presentee au Conseil de stands. I do' not think any other action can be securite par l'Assemblee generale l'an dernier et taken on this resolution. l'affaire en est la. Je ne crols pas qu'aucurre autre mesure puisse efre prise a f'egard de cette resolution. , I The PRESIDENT: Before I call on the representative of Poland, it should be said that we ought not to anticipate the discussion of this item. The remarkf of the representative of Syria were by way of being a discussion of the item as itrwould appear if it were induded in the agenda. We are engaged· at the moment in deciding whether the item should or should .not appear. I therefore ask the representative of (poland and any other speak- . ers who may wish to follow him to keep to that particular point. I should like to ascertain the opinion of the Security Council as soon as possible on the question of the inclusion of the item.. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY' (Polar..:l).: I simply want to reply to the argument which was raised by the representative of Belgium. One cannot draw an analogy bet;,vveen the ;resolution transmitted in the Secretary-General's letter of 3 December 1947 and the resolution which was adopted by the General Assemblyof 13 December 1946. It is true that the Security Council is seized of the resolution of 13 Decembe.r 1946 and that the Committee of Experts is now discussing the problem therein involved. However, the resolution of 13 'December 1946 did not touch upon the voting procedure in the Security Council. It recommended that the permanent members of the Security Council should consult with one another on the problem of voting, as does the resolution of 21 November 1947, but, on the other hand, it recommended "the early adoption of practices and procedures, consistent with the Charter, to assist in reducing the difficulties in the application of Article 27 ..." That was b __ Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Avant que je ne donne la parole au representant de la Pologne, il devrait etre·dit qu'iI ne faut pas anticiper,sur la discussion de ce point. Les l'emarques du representant de la Syrie equivaudraient a une discussion de cette question si celle-ci avait deja ete inscrite a notre ordre du jour. Nous devons decider en ce moment si le point dont iI s'agit sera, ou non, inscrit ~ l'ordre du jour. Par consequelit" j'invite le representant de l~. Pologne et ceux qui pour- . taient vouloir parlerapres lui, a s'en tenir a ce poin~ precis. J'aimerais consulter aussitot que possible le Conseil de securite sur la question de l'inscription a l'ordre du jour du point dont il s'agit. o· • .;,- M. KATz-SUCHY (Poiogne) (traduit de l;anglai9) : Je voudrais simplement ,repondre aux arguments presentes par le representant de la Belgique. On.ne peut tracer de paralleIe entre la resolution qui nous est transmise par la lettre du Secretaire general en date du 3 decembre 1947, et la resolution adoptee par l'AssembIee generale le 13 decernbre 1946. Il est exact que le Conseil de securit~ a ete saisi de la resolution du 13 decembre 1946 et que le Comite. (l'experts examine actuellement le prnbh~me qu'e1le vise. Cependant, la resolution du 13 decembre 1946 ne traitait pas de la procedure de vote au Conseil de securite. Elle recommandait aux membres permanents du Conseil de securite de se consulter sur le probleme du vote, comme le fait la resolution du 21 novembre 1947; mais, par aiIleurs, elle recom~andait "d'adopter sans deIai des methodes et des procedures, conformes a la Charte, qui permettent de faciliter l'application de l'Article 27". . . C'etait Therefore even if the Security Council is seized of the resolution of 13 December 1946, that resolution cannot be put under the same heading as the resolution transmitted by the Secretary-General in his letter of 3 December 1947. Mr. HSIA (China) : I wish to say a few words in support of the formula proposed.by the representative of the United States, namely, that if·the Security Council agrees to include this item in the agenda, it should do so with the understanding that when we come to it, we should just take note of the resolution of the General Assembly \ without entering into a discussion. Actually the Security Councjl is Ill"'J1tioned twice in the resolu-· tion, In point 2 of the second paragraph it is stated that the Security Council "may designate" a committee. That matter can wait until the Interim Committee meets. If the Interim Committee desires action from the Security Council, then the Security Council can discuss it at that time. The Security Council is also mentioned in the last paragraph, where it is stated that the General Assembly "requests the permanent members of the Security Council t{) consult with one another". I do not think that it is necessary for the Security Council to take action on that point. I believe it is up to the permanent members. I think, therefore, that the formula proposed by the representative of the United States is a happy one and that it can solve the present difficulty. . The PRESIDENT: We shall nowvote on the adoption of the agenda. ' A vote was, taken by show of hands, and the agenda was adopted by 8 votes.to 2, with one abstention. Votes for: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, United Kingdom, United States of America. Votes against: rpoland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Abstention: Sy:r!a. 426. Continuation of the discussion on the Indonesian question: work of the Committee of Good Offices . At the invitation of the President, Mr. Pillai, representative of India; Mr. Snouck Hurgronje, representative of the Netherlands; Mr. Ingles, representative of the Philippines, and Mr. Polar, representative of the Republic of Indonesia, took their places at the Council table. M. HSIA (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): Je voudrais dire quelques mots a I'appui de la for- ,mule proposee par le representant des Etats-Unis: c'est-a-dire que si le Conseil de securite etait d'accord pour inclure cette question a I'ordre ~u jour, ce serait avec la reserve que lorsque nous en viendrons a son examen, nous bornerons a prendre note de la resolution de l'Assemblee generale, sans nous lancer dans une discussion. En fait, le Conseil de securite est mentionne a deux reprises dansla resolution. A l'alinea 2 du deuxieme paragraphe, il est dit que le 'Conseil de securite "peut designer" une commission. Cette question peut attendre jusqu'a ce que la Commission interimaire se soit reunie, Si la Commission interimaire desire que le Conseil de securite prenne des mesures, le Conseil de securite pourra, a ce moment la, e.xaminer la question. Le Conseil de securite est egalement mentionne dans le dernier paragraphe ou il est dit que l'AsseinbIee generale "invite les membres permanents du Conseil de securite a examiner en commun. . . ." Je ne pense pas que le Conseil de securite doive prendre des mesures a cet egard. Je pense que cela regarde les membres permanents. Par consequent, je crois que la formule suggeree par le representant des Etats-Unis est heureuse et qu'elle nous permettra de resoudre la difficulte que nous rencontrons en ce moment. Le PRESIDENT (tradfuit de l'anglais): Nous allons mettre aux voix I'adoption de l'ordre du jour. ' It est procede au vote amain levee. Par 8 voix contre 2, a'Vec une abstention, l'ordre duO jour est adopte. Votent pour: Australie, Belgique, Bresil, Chine, Colombie, France, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. Votent contre: Pologne, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. S'abstient: la Syrie. 426. Suite de la discussion de la question indonesienne: travaux de la Commission de bons ~ffices Si fai bien compris, aucune objeetion n'a etp formuIee au Conseil contre le main.tien pour l'an- nee prochaine de la composition actuelle de la Commission. Pour des raisons d'ordre pratique et egalement POUl des raisons de logique, les mem- bres qui ont fait allusIon a. c(~tte question ont ete d'accord pour que la Commission continue nor- malement ses travaux clans sa composition actuclle. A moins que de nouvelles observations ou des objections ne soient formuIees maintenant, il serait bon que le Conseil confirmat oificiel1ement i'accord qui paraissait plus ou moins acquis lors de la deux cent vingt-deuxieme seance, et il serait i110rs enre- gistre au prod~s-verbalque le COTIseil entend bien que la Commission continuera a. exercer ses fonc- tions sans que sa composition soit modifiee. I. M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de l'an- glais) : Ainsi que I'ai dit lors de la deux cent vingt- .deuxieme seance, lorsque la question fut soulevee par le President parlant en tant que representant de l'Australie, ma delegation n'a aucune objection a ce que l'Australie continue a etre membre de la Commission de 'bons offices qui represente le Conseil de securite dans le differend entre la ~e­ publique d'Indonesie et le Gouverl1ement des Pays- Bas. En disant cela, nous voudrions souligner que le fait qu'un membre du Conseil qui quitte le Conseil . continue a. servir au sein d'une commission du Conseil de securite, ne devrait pas constituer un precedent, car }10US pourrions facilement arriver a. cette situation qu'une commission du Conseil de securite serait composee de G6avernements qui ne sont pas membres du Conseil de secul'ite. Mr: KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) : As I stated at the two hundred and twenty-second meeting, when the question was raised by the President as the representative of Australia, my delegation has no objection whatsoever to the continuation of A1l5- tralia as a member of the Committee of Good Of- fices representing the Security Council in the dis- pute between the Republic of Indonesia and the Government «?£ the Netherlands. In saying this, we wish to point out that the fact that a member of the Council which is leaving ihe Council will continue to hold office in a com- mittee of the Security Council should not be treated as a·precedent for the future, because the situation might easily arise where a committee of the -Security Council might be composed of Gov·· ernments which are not members or the Security Council. On the one hand, therefor.e, we took into con- sideration the special interest which the Australian representative had in this matter, as well as his special efforts to bring the case before the Secur- ity Council and his attempts to reach a solution of the problem. For those reasons we supported the continuation of Australia as a n:ember of the Committee. At the same time, we must remember that the Committee of Good Offices was nominated by the parties concerned, and the representative of Aus- tralia was nominated to that Committee by the Republic of Indonesia. There is therefore one es- sential point to consider, and that is whether the Government of the Republic of Indonesia desires Australia to continue to represent the Republic on the Committee of Good Offices. If th~t is the case, we should not have the slightest objection and, quite on the contrary, we should gladly sup- port the continuation of Australia on the Com- ,mittee of Good Offices. Par consequent, d'une part, nous avons tenu compte de l'interet special que le representant de l'Australie porte a. cette question, et, d'autre part, des efforts qu'il a deployes pour que c:ette affaire soit soumise au Conseil de securite et pour qu'une solution intervienne. C'est pour ces raisons que nous avons appuye le maintien de l'Australie comme membre de la Commissi(jn. ' . Par ailleurs, nous· devons nons rappeler que la Commission de bons offices a ete designee par les parties en cause et que le representant de l'Aus- tralie a ete propose pour cette Commission par la ' Republique d'Indonesie. Il faut donc considerer ce point essentiei, qui est de savoir si le Gouver- nement de la Republique d'Indonesie desire que l'Austraiie continue a. representer la Republique ala Commission de bons offices. S'il en est ainsi, nous ne devrions formuler aucune objection, nous devrions au contraire, favoriser sans reserve le maintien de l'Australie a. la Commission de bons offices. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Le repre- sentant de la Republique d'Indonesie desire-t-il s~ rallier a. cette suggestion?' ..

Does the representative of the Republic of Indonesia wish to follow that suggestion? ~ • Mr. PALAR (Republic of Indonesia) :In the name of my Government, I hereby inform the Security Council that since Australia was chosen·by the 'M. PALAlt (Republique d'Indonesie) (traduit 'de l'anglais) : Au nom de mon Gouvemement, je desire informer le Conseil, de securite que puisque Mr. PAROD! (France) (translated from French) : I see no objection to the procedure which has just been adopted nor.to the statement which has just been made. In my opinion, however, they were unnecessary. The Security Conncil established a Committee. The Council was absolutely free to give it whatever membership it thought fit; it was 110t bound to compose it of repr.esentatives of countries whichwere themselves members of the Security Council and it was not in that capacity that they were appointed. There was no indication, when the appointments were made, of any connexion between · the status of a country as member of the Committee and its status as member of the Security Council. We appointed a Committee and, in my opinion, the fact that one of its members belongs to a country which is ceasing to be a member of the Security Council should in no way alter the Coin- · rnittee's composition. I believe, therefore, that the question -is in fact simpler than was implied just now by the representative of Poland; and the membership of the Committee, which was appointed with no specified - term of office, should remain the same regardless of the membership of the Security Council. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): Just for the purposes of the record, may I puint out, in reference to what was said by the representative of France, that the Security Council, in the resolution adopted at its hundred and ninety-fourth meeting, held on 2S August,l stated that the members of the Committee must be selected from the members of the Security Council. The parties to the dispute were not free to select any Member State. They were bound to select a member of the Security Council. Mr.; PARODY (France) (trunslated from French): The French text of that resolution is not before me at the moment, but I had no recollection of a text such as the Polish represP-ntative has just mentione~. "Perhaps the Assistant Secretary- General should clear up that point. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French): I have already had occasion 'to verify this point, and I noticed that the French and English texts did ::10:' agree. Perhaps the As- M. ,PAROD! (France): Je ne vois pas d'inconvenient cl. la procedure qui vient d'etre suivie et cl. la declaration qui vient d'etre faite. Mais, a mon avis, e11es n'etaient pas utiles. Le Conseil de securite a constitue une Commission. 11 etait parfaitement libre de la constituer comme il l'entendait. Il n'etait pas tenu de la constituer de representants des pays qui faisaient eux-memes partie du Conseil de securite et ce n'est pas en cette qualite qu'il les a designes: dans la designation cl. laqueUe il a procede,.i1 n'apparait aucunement qu'il y ait un lien entre la qualite de membre de la Commission et la qualite de membre du Conseil de securite. - oNous avons nomme une Comniission et, a mon avis, le fait que l'un des membres de cette Commission appartienne a un pays qui cesse de faire rartie du Conseil de securite ne doit modifier en aucune maniere la composition de la Commission. Je crois donc qu'en realite la question est plus simple que ne l'aindique tout cl. l'heure le representant de la Pologne et que la Commission, constituee sans limite de duree, devrait rester la meme queUe que soit la composition dp Conseil de securite. M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais) : -Pour que ceci soit note au proces-verbal, pourrais-je indiquer, ala suite de l'intervention du representant de la France, que le Conseil de seCurite, dans la resolution adoptee lors de sa _cent quatre-vingt-quatorzieme seance, tenue le 2S aout 19471, avait dit que les membres de la Commission seraient choisis parmi les membres du Conseil de securite. Les parties au differend n'etaient donc pas libres de choisir un quelconque Etat Membre; elles devaient choisir parmi les membres du Conseil de securite. M. PAROD! (France): Je n'ai pas actuellement sous les yeux le texte fran<;ais de cette resolution. Mais je n'avais pas garde le souvenir d'un texte tel que ce1ui que vient d'evoquer le representant de la Pologne. Peut-etre le Secretaire general adjoint devrait-il preciser ce point. o M. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique) : J'ai eu l'occasion de verifier ce point precedemment et j'ai constate que le texte fran<;ais et le texte anglais ne concordaient pas. Peut-etre le Secretaire general I have been instructed by my Government to refer at this meeting to the work of the Committee of Good Offices, with respect, in particular, to the requests made to that Committee in relation to tlie observance of the cease-fire order of the Security Council. The Australian Government, frankly, has felt some cause for concern in the recent period lest there should be unneccessary delay in the implementation of the cease-fire order. Reports ha.ve come to its notice-I am not indicating at the moment whether they are authentic or not-of tendencies towarqs delay in the implementation of the order and, in the last few days in particular, reports have again been current-I do not know whether they are authenticated or not--of movements on the part of the Netherlanqs forces in Java which, if true, would not be in consonance with the intentions of the Council in issuing the cease-fire order. At all events, it,..is' clear, that the present position is that the cease-fire order has not yet been observec in full and that there are still no agreed plans by which it could be observed in full. , At the same time, the Government of Australia understands that the Committee of Good Offices has put forward a plan to both parties which; in the view of the Committee, is both practicable and reasonable. The plan was put forward early in. December. It was immediately accepted by one party but, up to the time of my information, it had not been accepted by the other part~T. Therefore it is still not being implemented. By reason of the character and the status of the Committee, the member Governments; represented on the Committee have not been officially infonned of the details of this plan, although the plan has, of course, been communicated, as I said, to the two parties to the dispute. In the circumstances, it seemed to my Government desirable 'that the Council should, at this stage, take note of the existence of the plan and of the fact of its submission to the two parties to the dispute; and furthermore, that the Council should ask the Committee of Good Offices to acquaint it with the full details of the plan in order that it might decide whether to discuss it in the Council or to express an opinion as to its practicability and desirability. If it were decided by the Council that the plan was a reasonable and feasible one, then the Council might feel itself in a position to indicate a strong desire for the early acceptance of the plan by both parties. ~ That is the statement which I wished to make as representative of Australia. But as the members of the Security Council will recollect from the information they received yesterday, a communication has, in fact, been received from Java, indicat- Si le Conseil decidait que le plan lui paraissait raisonnable et realisable, le Conseil de securite pourrait alors se sentir en mesure d'indiquer un desir tres net de voir ce plan accepte par les deux parties dans nn avenir tres proche. Telle est la declaration que je desirais faire en, tant que representant de l'Anstralie. Mais, comme les membres du Conseil de securite s'en souviennent, il resulte des renseignements rec;us hier, qu'une commnnication a bien. ere' rec;ue de Java, Sir Alexander CADoGAN(United Kingdom): I am not quite clear what the President suggests the Security Council should do at this moment. The Committee of Good Offices is on the spot. It has lately ent~red on its task and I am sure it will perform it successfully and well. The President has told us of various reports he has heard, and he said he did not know whether they were true or not. I suppose we shall get a fair and objective report on the situation from the Committee of Good Offices, in which we have full confidence. The President added also that he had heard that we should receive, in the course of the next few days, a report from the Committee. I should have thought we had better wait and see what that report contains. If it arrives in two or three days. that would not entail ~my great clclay. If I understood the President's suggestion correctly, it was that we should now ask the Committee of Good Offices to make sure it includes, in that repurt, the terms ofa proposal which it is said to have :made with regard to the cease-fire order. I suppose it certainly would. If it has made such a proposal, I should expect it to be included in the report; and indeed, if we find, when the report is received, that there appears to be a gap, that there is no report on what the Committee of Good Offices has done in regard to the cease-fire order, and if there is no mention of any proposals it has made, then I think we probably could ask the Committee what it has done and ask it to devote a special report to that aspect of the matter. It dop.s seem to me that while we are waiting for the report, it is not showing any great confidence in the Committee of Good Offices to telegraph to it now to say: "Will you please put in a passage to show what you have done about the Cf'.ase-fire order." I hope that we shall get a report on that, and I hope that the report of the Committee of Good Offices, when we receive it, will contain something on that very important point. Having appointed this Committee, I do think we must have some confidence in it. I do not think it will help matters very much if the Security Council addresses interim observations to it on reports, not official, received from other quarters and as to the truth of which we cannot be assured. I should rather urge, therefore, that we should wait to see this report, which is promised in two or three days. If it appears unsatisfactory, then it would no doubt be the duty of the Security Council to do something about that. I should Dans ces conditions, je muintiens ma suggestion, faite 3J1nom de l'Australie, a. l'effet que le Conseil de securite examine mail1tenant s'il y a lieu de demander a. la Commission de bons offices de lui _ communiqueI' sans delai le detail du plan, aHn que le Conseil de securite, lorsqu'ii l'aura reesu, puisse s'it le desire, discuter ce plan et toute nouveUe mesure que ce plan pourrait appele~. ", Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (tradUt:t de l'anglais): Je ne saisi_s pas tres bien ce que le President propose au Conseil de securite de faire maintenant. La Commission de bons offices est sur les lieux; eUe vient de se n1(~ttre a. la tache et je suis sur qu'elle l'accomplira avec succes. Le President a fait allusion a. diverses rumeurs qui sont venues a. sa connaissance et a dit qu'il ne savait ,pas si eUes etaient veridiques ou non. Je pense que nous allons recevoir de la Commission de bons offices-en laquelle nous avons toute confiance-un rapport objectif sur la situation. Le President a ajoute qu'll avait appris que noes devions recevoir un rapport de la Commission d'id quelques jours. A mon sens, i1 serait preferable d'attendre pour voir quel sera le COntenu de ce rapport. S'it nous parvient dans deux ou trois jours, cela n'etrainera pas un retard bien considerable. Si j'ai bien compris la suggestion du President, elle .tendait a.. ce que le Conseil demande a. la Commission de bons .offices de veiller a. ce que le rapport comprenne les termes de la proposition qui aurait ete faite par eUe au sujet de l'ordre de cesser le feu. Je pense que la Commission agira certainement I dans cesens; si eUe a fait une telle .proposition, je presume que celle-ci figurera dans le rapport. En fa:it, si, lorsque nous anrons reesu le rapport, nous constatons une lacune, qu'il n'y a aucune communication relative a. ce que la Commission a fait en ce qui concerne l'ordre de <;esser le .feu et s'il n'est fait mention d'aucuneproposition, nous pourrions alors demander a. la Commission ce qu'elle a fait et la prier de consacrer un rapport special a. cet aspect de la question. Il me semble que ce serait faire pretive de bien peu de confiance envers la Commission de bons offices que de lui teIegraphier maintenant la recommandation suivante, avant meme d'avojr reesu le rapport: "n'oubliez pas d'inclure un passage montrant ce que vous avez fait en ce qui concerne l'ordre de cesser le feu." J'espere que nous serons renseignes a. se sujet et que le rapport de la Commission de bons offices contiendra des indications sur ce point tres important. Nous avons nomme cette Commission, et nO\1s devons lui faire confiance; it ne me semble pas utile que le Conseil de securite lui envoie en ce moment des observation fondees sur des renseignements non officiels, en provenance d'autres sources, et sur la veracite desquels le doute est permis. Je voudrais donc insister pour que nous attendions d'avoir vu le rapport que nous devons recevoir d'id deux ou trois jours. Si ce rapport n'etait pas satisfaisant, le devoir du Conseil de securite serait aIors d'intervenir. Je desapprou- , Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French) : The President alluded to reports concerning troop movements effected by one of the parties. I wonder whether it would be advisable for the Security Council to discuss reports of this nature. They were, indeed, press reports; I read them myself in the 'papers and, if I am not mistaken, they were immediately denied. The President himself, incidentally, deliberately refrained from vouching for their accuracy. To my knowledge, at least, the Security Council has not received any communication on this subject. It has two bodies on the spot, the Committee of Good Offices and the Consular CQmmission. By its resolution of 1 November,1 it entrusted to those two organs a definite task in respect to the cessation of hostilities in Indonesia. Neither of those organs, as far as I knpw, has sent us any information regarding the reports to which the President referred. In these circumstances it seems to me that any discussion of the matter at this point would lack definite foundation and .could serve no useful purpose. The President also spoke, in terms which seemed to me rather enigmatic, of a plan. I do not know exactly to what plan he refers. I myself have no infonnation on the subject and it would therefore be difficult for me to discuss it. The President mentioned, moreover, delays in the accomplishment of the task assigned to the Committee of Good Offices. Here again I have no information that any undue delays have occurred, at least delays for which the Committee of Good Offices would be responsible. The Security Council, in its resolution of 1 November, called upon the parties concerned forthwith to consult with each other, either directly or through the Committee 6f Good Offices, as to the, means to be employed to give effect to the ceasefire resolution and, pending agreement, to cease any activities or incitement to activities which contravened that resolution, and to take appropriate measures for safeguarding life and property. The Council also requested the Committee of Good .. Offices to assist the parties in reaching agreement on an arrangement which would ensure the observance of the instructions received regarding the cea~e~fire. Personally' I am convin~eq that the Committee of Good Offices is concentrating its efforts on the execution of that order and is doing everything possible to that end. In short, I think that we should not inte' .~re, in the present state of affairs, in the activitIes of the Committee of Good Offices, and that in any case we should not do so before receiving its re- M. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique): Le President a fait allusion a des informations relatives a des mouvements militaires accomplis par l'une des parties. Je me demande si le Conseil de securite ferait ceuvre utile en deliberant au sujet d'informations de cette nature. 11 s'agit en e£fet . d' informations de presse; je les ai lues, pour ma part, dans les journaux et, si je' ne me trompe. elles ont fait 1'0bjet d'un dementi immediat. Le President a d'ailleurs lui-meme fait toutes reserves au sujet de l'authenticite'de ces informations. Le Conseil de; securite n'a et€: saisi d'aucune communication a ce propos, tout au moins a ma connaissance. 11 dispose sur place de deux organes, la Commission de bons offices et la Commission consulaire. Par sa resolution en date du ler novembre\ il a confie a ces deux organes une ' mission definie en ce qui concerne la cessation des hostil1tes en Indonesie. Aucun de ces deux organes. a ma connaissance, ne nous a adresse de communication au sujet des informations auxquelles le President a fait allusion. Dans ces conditions, i1 me semble qu'en ce moment, toute discussion ace sujef manquerait de bases precises et ne pourrait avoir aucun effet utile. Le President a parle egalement d'un plan, en teimes qui m'ont paru quelque peu enigmatiques~ Je ne sais pas exactement a que1 plan il a fait allusion.·Pour ma part, je n'ai pas d'informations ace sujet; il me serait par consequent difficile d'en discuter. D'autre part, le President a parle aussi de nelais dans l'accomplissement de la mission assignee de la Commission de bons offices. Je n'aipas non plus d'infonnation suivant laquelle il y aurait eu des delais anormaux, tout au moins par la faute de la Commission de bons offices. Le Conseil de securite, dans sa resolution du ler novembre, a invite les parties interessees a se consulter immediatement, soit directement, soit par l'entremise de la Commission de bons offices, sur les moyens a utiliser pour donner effet a la resolution concernant la cessation du feu; et, en attendant la realisation d'un accord, a mettre fin a toutes activites, ou a tonte incitation a des activites, allant a l'encontre de cette resolution, ainsi qu'a prendre des mesures appropriees pour la prote~on des vies humaines et des biens. Le Conseil'a en meme temps prie la Commission de bons offices d'aider les parties a arriver aun accord sur les dispositions qui permettront d'appliquer les instructions rec;ues concernant la cessationdu feu. Pour ma part, je suis persuade que' la Commission de bons offices concentre ses efforts sur·l'execution de cette disposition et qu'e1le fait toute diligence acet e£fet. Enresume, j'estime que nous n'avons pas aintervenir, en l'etat actuel des choses, dans l'action de la Commission de'bons offices, et, en tout cas, que nous n'avons pas a le faire avant la reception 1 Voir Ies Proces-verbafls u!ficicls du COl/-seil de securite, Deuxil~me Annee, No 103, 218eme et 219eme seances. . The PRESIDENT: At this point I wish to make quite clear what I suggested to the Security Council as the representative of AUSTRALIA. It is the understanding of my Government first, that there is a plan which ha~ been submitted to the two parties to the disptlte for ensuring the observance of the cease-fire order; and, secondly,' that there have been difficulties in the acceptance of that plan. Thirdly, it is the view of my Government that at this point it would be desirable for the Security Council to be acquainted with the details of that plan. ' What I suggested, therefore, was that the Security Council, at this point, should merely ask the Committee of Good Offices to include in its anticipated interim report the full details of the plan for ensuring the observance of the cease-fire order. That, of course, is not committing the Security Council to anything further than a request to be apprised of the details of the plan. The discussion and action, if any, on the plan is another matter entirely.. Mr. PALAR (Republic of Indonesia) : I should like, first of all, on behalf of my Government, to extend my thanks to the Government of the United States of America for its readiness to provide the transport ship Renville as a site for the discussions with regard to the lqng-term settlement of the relationship between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. Thanks to this ready assistance, the n'egotiations regarding the long-term question have commenced and are now being conducted simultaneously with those concerning the execution of the Security Council's cease-fire order, which is the short-term problem. It is our earnest hope that these negotiations will. soon yield a satisfactory solution.. With regard' to the short-term problem, I have been informed that proposals of the Committee of Good Offices for the implementation of the cease-fire order have already been accepted by the Indonesian delegation. As the Netherlands delegation, however, did not accept the Committee's plan, those proposals cannot yet be put into effect. Therefore I fully support the' Australian proposal which has just been submitted. In the meantime, a few events have taken place about which I should like to say something. Al- .though those events may still be a matter of investigation by the Committee of Good Offices they have at the same time been reported by the world press and I therefore feel free to talk about them. The presence of the Security Council's Committee of Good Offices has not prevented the Netherlands from violating the Security Council's resolution of I November. I refer to the Netheriands occupation of Madura, the third island of the Republic of Indonesia. On 9 November, al- 1egedly at the request of a deserter Indonesian Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l/a.nglais) : Au point ou nous en sommes, je desire indiquer clairement le sens de la suggestion que j'ai presentee au Conseil lorsque j'aipris la parole en tant que representant de l'AUSTRALIE. Tout d'abord, mon Gouvernement crait savoir qu'il existe un plan qui a ete presente aux deux parties en vue d'assurer le ,respect de I'ordre de cesser le feu, Il eroit savoir egalefuent que des difficultes se sont presentees en ce qui concerne I'acceptation de ce plan. En troisieme lieu, mon Gouvernement estime souhaitable .'que le Conseil de securite soit informedes details ,de ce plan. J'avais' done suggere que le Conseil de securite se bornat pour le moment a demander a la Commission de bons offices d'inclure dans le rapport interimaire que nous attendons tous les details concernant le plan relatif a l'observation de I'ordre ·de cesser le feu. Ceci evidemment n'engage le Conseil de securitea rien de plus qu'a demander' a etre mis au courant des details de ce plan. Quant ala discussion de ce demier, et aux mesures qu'il pourrait y avoir lieu de prendre a son egard, c'est une toute autre question. M. PALAR (Republique d'Indonesie) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je voudrais tout d'abord, au nom de mon Gouvernement, remercier le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amerique de l'amabilite dont il a fait preuve en offrant le navire de transport Renville comme lieu de rencontre pour les discussions portant sur le reglenient du probleme a long terme des relations entre les 'Pays-Bas et la Republique d'Indonesie. Grace a cette assistance qui nous a ete donnee avec beaucoup de bonne volonte, les negociations concernant la question a long terme ont commence et se poursuivent maintenant en meme temps que ceUes qui concernent l'execution de l'ordre de cesser le feu, donne par le Conseil de securite, qui est le probleme a court terme. Hous esperons sincerement que les negociations aboutiront bientot a des resultats satisfaisants. En ce qui conceme le probleme a court terme, j'ai. ete informe que les propositions de la Commission de bons offices pour l'execution de l'ordre de cesser le' feu ont deja ete acceptees par la delegation indonesienne. Toutefois, etant donne que la delegation des Pays-Bas n'a pas accepte le plan de la Commiss4m, ces propositions ne peuvent 11 pas encore etre mises a execution. J'appuie donc la proposition que vient de faire l'Australie. Entre temps il s'est produit quelques evetiements dont je voudrais parler; bien qu'ils puissent encore faire l'objet d'une enquete de la part de la Commission de bons offices, ils ont ete, en meme temps, signales dans la presse mondiale, et je me sens donc libre d'en parler. La presence de la Commission de bons offices au Conseil de securite n'a pas empeehe les Pays- Bas de violer la resolution du Conseil de securite en date du ler novembre. Je fais allusion id a I'occupation neerlandaise de Madoura, la troisieme He de la Republique d'Indonesie. Le 9 novembre, soi-disant a la demande d'un fonctionnaire indo- It is not my intention to ask the Security Council to express itself at this moment on the question of Madura. In view of the serious violation of the resolution of the Security Council of 1 November, however, I should be much obliged if the President of the Security Council would see fit to re-. quest the Committee of Good Offices to report as soon as possible on the Netherlands military advance in Madura, which, moreover, has already been made a subject of discussion and i1'\vestigation by the Committee. . It is also desirable that the Committee of Good Offices should report as soon aspQssible on an atr.ocity which· the Netherlands army recently committed in Indonesia. This concerns the dea~h of 46 Republican prisoners of war on a train j?urney from ~andawasa to So~rabaja. This conslgnment of pnsoners, numberntg 100 men, had been loaded into three cars in Bandawasa for the thirteen-hour journey to Soerabaja. When the freight cars were opened on arrival at Soerabaja, 46 prisoners were found dead. Some of the survivors declared that the cars had intentionally been tro~s voitures a Bandawasa, pour un voyage de 13 heures jusqu'a Sourabaya. Lorsque ces wagons de marchandises furent ouverts a l'arrivee a Sourabaya,on y trouva 46 prisonniers morts. Certains des survivants declarerent qu'on avait intentionnellement laisse les wagons fermes pendant tout le voyage et que 1'on n'avait fourni aux prisonniers ni ,vivres ni eau. . ' L'armee neerlandaise est effectivement capable de commettre des atrocites de ce genre, parce que le Gouverneur general par interim van Mook a donne des postes de commandement dans 1'armee a des homl11l:s tels que le capitaine Westerling, accuse d'avoir eu le premier role dans les executions en masse et les. actes de torture commis dans le sud des Celebes-Ie nOl11bre des victimes etant, selon les sources de 20.000 ou de 40.000-actes pour lesque!s les mel11bres des forces armees et de la police neerlandaises n'ont pas encore ete condam- . nes. Les membres de la Commission de bons offices qui ont recemment vis.ite le sud des Celebes doiverit savoir que le Gouvernement.·neerlandais n'a pas encore publie le rapport sur les atrocites commises dans cette region, rapport .prepare par un'comite special d'enquete. Nous pensons· aussi que la Commission de bons offices fera rapport au Conseil de securite-:-et je l'espere, tres prochainement-sur un memorandum remis a la Commission par mon Gouvernement et r:oncernant l'aggravation de la situation econo- .nique de la Republique depuis la pretendue action de police. L'aneantissement de la situation economique de la Republique est, en fait, l'un des buts principaux de la pretendue "action de police" neerlandaise. Cette question est en relation directe avec le probleme a long terme. Je me reserve le privilege d'exprimer mon opinion sur cette ques-; tion des que ce memorandum et l'avis de la Commission de bons offices seront parvenus au Conseil de securite. Je crois que le Conseil de securite sera egalement informe sous peu, par la Commission de bons offices, d'une question qui a une portee considera., , k~pt closed throughtout the journey and that no food or drink had been supplied. ' The Netherlands army is indeed capable of committing these atrocities, because acting Governor-General van Mook has given responsible army posts to men such as Captain Westerling, who is accused of having had the greatest share in the mass torture and murders in South Celebes -the estimates are between 20,000 and 40,000 victims-for which the Netherlands army and police have as yet to be condemned. It must be known b~ the members of the Committee of Good Offices, who recently visited South Celebes, that the Netherlands Government up to now has not published a report, prepared by a special investigating committee, ori the atrocities in South Celebes'. . We also expect the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Security Council.:.-and I hope very soon-regarding a memorandum which was handed by my Government to the Committee, and which concerns the deteriorating economic position of the Republic since the so-called police action. Destruction of the economic position of the Republic is indeed one of the basic aims of the Netherlands so-called police action. This question is directly connected with the long-term problem. I reserve my privilege to express my views on the matter as soon as this memorandum and the opinion of the Committee of Good Offices have reac?ed the Security CounciL Speedy advice from the Committee of Good Offices to the Security Council, may also be expected concerning a matter which has an important t~rritories now occupied by Netherlands forces, the Netherlands Government is trying to dissociate the rest of Indonesia from the Republic. This policy has an important bearing on the long-term solution and is, therefore, a matter to be consi- ;'ered by the Committee of Good Offices. questior~ qui doit etre examinee par la Commission de bons offices. Le Go~vernement neerlandais,en faisant usage de ses instruments indonesiens, s'efforce deja d'etablir une federation indonesienne•. ~Toutefois, it est clairement apparu que le Gouvernement colonial emploie des hommes qui ne sont pas de:: vrais representants de la population. Jl y a que1ques jours encore, le Parlement de l'indonesie orientale (territoire cite en exemple par les Neerlandais) a renverse le Cabinet, a. une majorite ecrasante, parce que celui-ci suivait de trop pres la politique neerlandaise. En outre, les elections locales, dans les iles de Sangihe (qui font partie de I'Indonesie orientale) ont eu,pour resultat une victoire a 100 pour cent des partisans de la Republique. A Gorontalo, (dans le nord des Ceh~bes), lors des elections 80 pour cent des voix sont allees ala Republique. Je voudrais mai1'1tenant demander u.n ec1aircissement en ce qui conceme le parngraphe su.ivant de la resolution du Conseil de securite en date du 1er noverilbre: "Fait connaitre aux parties interessees, a la Commission de bons offices et a la Commission The Netherlands Government, by using its 1n- . donesian tools, is already trying to establish an Indonesian federation. It has become clear, however, that the colonial Government is using men who are not true representatives of the people. Only a few days ago, the Parliament of East Indonesia-the territory which has been heid up by the Netherlands as an example-brought about the fall of the Cabinet by an overwhelming majority, because that Cabinet followed the Netherlands policy too much. In addition, local elections in the islands of Sangihe, part of East Indonesia, resulted in a 100 per cent victory for the supporters of the Rcrpublic. In Gorontalo, North Celebes, the elections resulted in an SO per cent victory for the Republic. I should liKe to ask now for a clarification of the following paragraph in the Security CounCil's resolution of 1 Novell1ber:' CCAdvises the parties concerned, the Committee of Good Offices and the <::onsular Commission, that its resolution of 1 August should be interpreted as meaning that the use of armed forces of either party by hostile action to extend its control over territory not occupied by it on 4 August 1947 is inconsistent with the Council resolution of 1 August . . ." ~onsuraire' que sa resoltition du 1er aotlt devrait etre interpretee comme signifiant que l'emploi des forces armees de l'une ou l'autre des parties, a titre de mesure hostile, pour ,etendre son controle sur un territbire. qui n'etait pas occupe par elle au 4 aotlt 1947, est incompatible avec la resolution du ler aotlt ..." . Lors des discussions qui se sont· elevees entre les delegations de Ja Republique d'Indonesie et des Pays-Bas en ce qui ·concerne 1'0rdre de cesser le feu, des opinions differentes se sont fait jour quant aux troupe., et au systeme administratif e-xistant dans ce_que 1'0n a ,appele les ilots, ces ilots qui, dans certains cas, constituent des zones considerables. 11 me semple que ce que le representant des Etats-Unis d'Amerique a dit au sujet du "territoire qui etait soumis a leur controle" lorsqu'il a explique la siguification de cette resolution, devrait permettre de faire disparaitre la divergence d'opinions que j'ai mentionnee. . Lors de la deux cent quatorzieme seance, le 27 octobre derniert, le representant des Etats-Unis a declare: "Nous estimons que les forces armees des deux parties ont le droit de rester sur les positions qu'elles occupaient le 4 aotlt.. "Unpeu plus tard il ajoutait: "Je ferai remarquer en passant que nous ne sommes pas exactement du 1l1eme avis que le general Spoor quant ace qui est soumis au controle de l'une ou l'autre partie." J'espere que le representant des Etats-:Onis confirmera ceci. In the discussions between the delegations of the Republic of Indonesia and tlie Netherlands with respect to the cease-fire order, there existed a difference of opinion regarding the troops and administrative apparatus in the so-called pockets which extended in some cases over large areas. It seems to me that what the distinguished representative of the United States of America, in explaining the meaning of bis draft resolution, said about the term "territory under its control" should he able to remove that difference of opinion. • At the two hundred and fourteenth meeting, on 27 October 1947,1 the United States representative said; "We believe that the forces of either party are entitled to -remain undisturbed in the positions which they held on 4 August." Later he said: "'1 might say in passing that our attitude as to what is under its control is not exactly the same as that expressed by General Spoor." I hope that the representative of the United States will confum this. , Jlfr. AUSTIN (United States of America): A cablegram dated 17 December 1947 and addressed to the President of the Security Council has been rtteived from the secretariat of the Committee of M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais) : Le telegramme' en date du 17 decembre 1947, adresse au President du Conseil de securite par le Secretariat de la Commission de actio~ of the Security Council. No premature or intemperate or hasty conduct on our part can help the Committee of Good Offices. On the other hand, that kind of conduct could damage the Committee very much. It could damage the Committee in the eyes of one of the parties. Our conduct here ,might reflect a judgment not based on facts found by the CommIttee of_Good Offices, which is right on the spot, but based on. rumours. Let the Council consider this. In a court of a justice of the peace, and on the basis of a.ny such evidence as we have before. us', we should not tamper with the rights of citizens in matters involving more than twenty dollars; and here we are dealing with the peace of the world. We should be very careful, as I see it, :not to make wrong judgments. We should certainly not appeal from a decision not yet made,. and that is about what this amounts to. We should not assume that we are not going to be informed of all that it is necessary to know of the progress of the Committee of Good Offices up to date. And if we send, after a solemn act of the Security Council, a request that the 'Committee of Good Offices should put sometning into its report, we should then be implying that we assume it is not doing its work well. Moreover, if we specifically refer to a plan, we are indicating to that Committee that we want to review its plan. Do we, in fact, wish to review the Committee's plan before we know what the facts are? We cannot act on rumours and feel any solid ground -under our feet. I think it would be an intemperate act and that it might do a great deal of harm to the Committee of Good Offices for the Security Council to send a request to it in the face of the cablegram which I have read into the record. Is it possible that we cannot patiently wait until the Committee's report comes, and that we do not have time enough to consider that report and have it circulated so that all can consider it, before the Security Council gets down to the business of asking for something else from the Committee of Good Offices? I think we have plenty of time. No rights of interested parties are going to be injured. The, composition of the Committee of Good .9ffices 'is going to remain the s~me and continue mto the future. Although the composition of the Security Council may change, A.rtide 31 of the Charfer takes care of any interested party, as it provides that any Member of the United Nations Mr. KATZ-SUCHY ('Poland.): I can assure the Council that I do not have the slightest doubt as to the wisdom, honesty or ability of the Committee of Good Offices in representing the Security Council in the·Indonesian problem. If I have any doubts, they concern rather the speed and effectiveness of its'work. I am considerably surprised to hear. the representative of the United States warn the Council against any hasty decisions. If there is any word which can describe the procedure which has been taking place in the .. Council on the Indonesian question, it can by no means be th~ word "hasty" or "quick". I admit, and quite frankly, that the fact that the Committee of G90d Offices and, to a certain extent, the Consular Commission have not been able to proceed effectively is not their fault.' The fault lies rather with the manner in which the Security Council has handled, or perh~ps Il1ishandled, that question. We have been seized of the Indonesian problem since our hundred and seventy-first meeting on 31 July 1947,1 when the representatives of Australia and India. drew our attention to the Netherlands aggression which was taking place during the month of July against the Republic of Indonesia; since then, we have adopted several resolutions. Today, five months after we adopted the original resolution calling for a ~ease-fire,2 we find'that we have not moved very far and that we are really at the same place where we have been every time the Security Council has· met to discuss and review the Indonesian question. I agree with the representative of the United States that at the present moment we do not have any exact information and that we should, with certain reservations, wait until the arrival of the report which has been promised in the cablegram of the Chairman of the Committee of Good Offices. Accusations were made here by the representative of the Republic of Indonesia. Every one of us is well aware of the many Press reports which have appeared since our two hUndred and nineteenth meeting when we adopted the draft resolution proposed by the United States representative. That was on 1 November. We have heard of further military action. We have heard of reprisals C'est pourquoi ma delegation est opposee'a ce que le Conseil prenne des mesures a la presente seance. Je dois dire en passant que c'est avec regret que j'ai entendu s'engager une discus§iion sur le fond de la question et tela tout d'abord parce ql.te • nous ne connaissons pas les faits, et, en second lieu, parce que la discussion du fond du probleme n'est pas inscrite a l'ordre du jour de cette seance. M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pqlogne) (traduit de l'anglais): Je peux affirmer au Conseil que je n'ai aucun dottte quant a la sagesS'e, l'nontietete Ott .l'habiletedeployees par la Commission de bons .offices au nom du. Conseil de securite dans le probleme indonesien. Si j'ai quelques 'doutes,iIs ont trait plutot a la rapidite et I'~fficacite de son travail. J'ai ete tres surpris d'entendre le representant des Etats~Unis mettre le ConseiI en garde contre des decisions hatives. S'il est possible de decrire en un mot toute la procedure qui s'est deroulee au ConseiI a propos de la question indonesienne, ce n'est certainementpas par le mot "hci.tive" ou "rapide". J'admets en toute franchise que si la Commission de bons offices et dans une certaine mesure. la Commission consulaire, n'ont pu aboutir a un resultat tres efficace, cela n'est pas de leur faute. Cela est plutot imputable a la maniere dont le Conseil de securite a traite-ou plutot maltraitecette question. Nous sommes saisis du probleme indonesien depuis notre cent soixante et onzieme seance, le 31 juillet 19471,' epoque a laquelle les representants de l'Australie et de l'Inde ont attire notre attention sur I'agression commise par les Neerlandais contre la Republique d'Indonesie dans le courant du mois de juiIIet; depuis lOTs nous avons adopte plusieurs resolutions. Aujourd'hui, cinq mois apres que nous ayons adopte la resolution initiale tendant a faire cesser le feu2, nous constatons que nous n'avons guere avance. A vrai dire, chaque fois que le Conseil de securite se reunit pour examiner la question indonesienne, nous constatons que nous en sommes toujours au meme point. Je suis d'accord avec le representant des Etats- Unis pour declarer qu'a I'heure actuelle nous n'avons pas re<;u de renseignements exacts, et que. sous certaines reserves, nous devons attendre l'arrivee du rapport qui nous a et~ annonce par le telegramme du President de la Commission de bons offices. Des accusations ont eteportees id par le representant de la RepubIique d'Indonesie. Nous connaissons tous les informations donnees en quantite par la presse, depuis notre deux cent dix-neuvieme seance au cours de laquelle fut adopte le projet de resolution soumis par le representant des Etats- Unis, C'etait le 1er novembre. Nous avons entendu dire que l'action miIitaire continuait, que The situation as described to us, perhaps inadequately, by our President, as representative of Australia, and by the representative of the Repub-, lic of Indonesia, proves again that those members 'of the Council who urged that stronger measures should be taken were right. It proves once more that had we adopted, on 3 October, at our two hundred and seventh meeting,1 the resolution submitted by the representative of the USSR concerning the withdrawal of forces to the positions which they held prior to the opening of hostilities; or the resolution submitted by the Polish delegation on 29 October, at our two hundred and' fifteenth meeting,2 condemning and warning the Government ,of the ~etherlands, there is not the slightest doubt but that we should not be faced today with t~e situation as it is now. . '. It is not only the fate of the Republic of Indonesia which is at stake here. There is the problem of the dignity and· authority of the Security CounCil. There. is the problem of the copfidence which. the Council should enjoy amongst the peoples of the world as an institution which v'Till solve problems and disputes and remove threats of war in a spirit of justice and with due regard for the right of national self-determination. I must sug-gest that we should proceed with this question without any delay and in the speediest possible manner. Since its very existence,' the Security Council has been seized of the problem of Indonesia. We did not solve'it during the London meetings <j.nd we must state today-there is not much use in hiding the fact-that the problem is not solved in the slightest manner at this time. . The cablegram sent by the Chairman of the Committee of Good Offices states that the report will be cabled on or about 22 December. I do not believe that we should infringe, in the slightest manner, upon the duties, rights or ability of the Committel1, or cast any shadow of doubt upon its honesty, if we direct the Secretary-General to communicate immediately with the Chairman of the Committee of Good Offices, asking him to speed up that report and send it as soon as possible, before 22 December, if possible, and asking him to include. any additional· information concerning the situation with regard to troop concentrations, troop movements and the application of the cease-fire order. . Le telegramme envoye par le President de la Commission de bons offices indique que le rapport sera telegraphie aux environs du 22 decembre. Je ne crois pas que ce soit porter la moindre atteinte aux devoirs ou aux droits de la Commission, ni j'eter le donte sur son honnetete, que de.prier ' le Secretaire general d'entrer en communication avec le :president de la Commission de bons offices pour lui demander d'accelerer dans la mesure du possible l'envoi du rapport, pour qu'il soit envoye, si possible, avant le 22 decembre. On demanderait aussi au President de faire ajouter tous renseignements complementaires sur la situation relativement aux concentrations ou mouvements de troupes et cl ceux ayant trait cl la mise cl execution de l'ordre de cesser le feu. En meme temps je propose que 1'on conseille au ·President·de la Commission de bons offices d'entrer en rapport immediatement avec la Commission consulatre qui a acquis une certaine connaissance de la situation, pour lui demander de formuler les observations sur certe situation. Je n'ai pas l'intention de proposer une resolution qui adresserait un appel cl l'une quelconque des parties At the same time, I suggest that the Chairman of the Committee of Good Offices should be advised to get in touch immediately with the Consular Commission, which has gained a certain knowledge of the situatim1, an,9. ask for its comments on the situation. I do not intend to move any resolution cOlitaining an appeal to either of the parties to the dispute, or a repetition of the 1 See Offidal Records orthe Security Council, Second Year, No. 93. . 2 Ibid., No. 101'. 1 Voir les Proces-verbal/..~ officiels du. COllset"l de securite, Deuxieme A!1n~e, No 93. 2 Ibid., No 101. , Mr. SNOUCK H'uRGRONJE (Netherlands): I am rather surprised to hear the President, in his capacity as representative of Australia, bring' up in the Security Council a matter based on an un~fficial report, especially because at this moment-two bodies which were created by the Security Council are on the spot, namely, the Committee of Good Offices and the Consular Commission. If there were any truth in the reports to which the President referred-which is, as the members know, categorically denied by my Government-it would seem very strange to me that these two bodies should remain as silent on the subject as they have been up to now. Moreover, I wish to observe that the Netherlands Government concurs with the representative of Australia in so far as he has expressed his concern. with .respe~ to a tend~ncy towards delay relating to the Implementation of an effective cease-fire. My Governn1ent is extremely concerned about this.point, but since our representatives on th~ C0t1?-nuttee of Good Offices are actively dealing WIth thIS matter, it seems untimely to discuss it here at this time: In conclusion, I should like to say that by the ~ea.tion of ~e. two b?dies which are n@w engaged ID IndoneSIa In finding a solution of the shortterm problem-the observance of the cease-fire ?rder-an~ !Jf the long-term problem, the Secur- Ity Councd Itself showed in which way it wanted to deal with the Indonesian problem. It seems to me, therefore, that at this moment we must leave it to the Committee of Good Offices to consult with ~~. parties and to report the results of its actIV1tie~ to the Security Council. The Security Council could then in turn examine in detail the situation in Indonesia. But we cannot do both things at the same time without having confusion and interference in the work of the Committee of Good Offices. Wi~ regard to the inci~ents to which the representative of the RepublIc of Indonesia has referred, I only want to say at this stage that the Netherlands Goveniment has already informed the Committee of Good Offices of its point of view, and I know that the Committee has not failed to act upon it. The same holds true pf the information given by the Netherlands Government as to the contraventions of the cease-fire order by the Government of the Rep11blic of Indonesia. I do not want to insist on this point now, but I reserve the right of my Government to bring up this matter again and to reply to the.statements of the representative of the Republic of.Indonesia Moreover, today's statement by the representative of the Republic of Indonesia shows that the situation in that country continues to be unsatisfactory and that the Netherlands forces are continuing hostilities and seizing larger and larger areas of Indonesian territory. If that IS so, it is the duty of the Security Council to reopen the discussion on that aspect of the question too. The United States representative said that any request to the Committee of Good Offices for detailed information on the present situation in Indonesia might be detrimental to the authority, prestige and dignity of that Committee. I cannot agree with that view. The Committee of Good Offices is not some sacred thing before which we must bow no matter what it does. If the Committee cannot take appropriate steps to hasten a proper soluHon of tIte differences which have to be settled between the Governments of the Republic o of Indonesia and the Netherlands, if it cannot cope with its tasks or if it works too slowly, our duty is either to give it assistance or to take other, more "effective measures called for by the situation. Words about the dignity and authority of the Committee sound well, but they lead nowhere and explain nothing. We have heard many such words during our debates in the Security Council on the Indonesian situation, but the whole trouble is that the Netherlands Government, which has entered upon the pa.th of aggression against Indonesia, pays no heed to them. Words, therefore, are not enough; definite action on the part of the Security Council is required. ~hether or not we are going to adopt a resolution Je ne sais pas si nous alIons adopter une resolution In connexion with this point, but I support such cl. cet effet, mais j'appuie cette proposition. Il faut a proposal. The Committee of Good Offices should que la Commission nous prescnte un rapport de- Mr. PAROD!' (France) (tra.nslated frol1·t F1'ench) : I fully support what the United States representative said a few moments ago. We have just been informed that in three days' time we are to receive the report which is the prerequisite for a 8erious debate on cl serious question-the Indonesian question. I think our present discussion is rather pointless and lacks the solid basis which will be provided by the data which we expect to receive within three days, With regard to sending a telegram to the Committee, I should like to remind the Council that it i!i now 19 December and a little past Ip:m: The telegram would be sent this evening and could not arrive or produce an efI~ct before tomor-' row. It would therefore not be until 21 December, the very day on which the Committee will be cabling us its report, that the telegram could produce any effect. I really think we might save the expense. . Moreover, as the representative of the USSR has just amply proved, such a telegram could have the effect only of diminishing the authority of the Com!Uitte~ of Good Offices, which is certainly not our mtention. I therefore suggest that we should now adjourn the discussion of item 2 of the agenda and pass on to items 3 and 4, which in my opinion can be dealt with all the more rapidly in that the discussion on item 4 has already taken place. Pers0!1ally I hope we shall not have another meeting thIS afternoon. I therefore venture to ask that the Council should begin as soon as possible to consider items 3 and 4, which can be dealt with in a very short time. The PRESIDENT.: I quite agree with .the representative of France. I should like to say that we should dispose of these points on tpe agenda. The remarks made by the members of the Council seem to indicate that the Council expects t~ receive details of the plan to which reference has been made in this discussion. There is no difficulty.on that point. I certainly do not wish to press any formal motion on the Council. ' .It had been my thoug~t that in acknowledging this telegram of the ChaIrman of the Committee the Council might include a statement to the effect that it assumed the details of this plan would be contained in the report expected on 22 December. ee could conclud~ the matter on that basis or, alternatively, leave the discussion as it is, on the understanding that the members ;..: the Council whose Governments are represented on the Committee of Good Offices may, of course, notify their, Gc;>vernments of the trend of the discussion in the Council here this morning, ~amely, that the Council did not at this point wish to embark on any discussion or the basic question but was anticipating the report and, on the basis of the report, M. PAROD! (France): J'appuie sans reserve la declaration formulee tout a l'heure par le representant des Etats-Unis. Nous venons d'etre avises que d'ici trois jours, nous allions recevoir le rapport, condition necessaire pour que nous puissons avoir une discussion serieuse, sur cette serieuse question qu'est la question' indonesienne. Notre presente discussion me semble assez vaine; elle ne repose sur aucune des bases solides que ,Iourniront les donnees annoncees que nous comptbns recevoir d'ici trois jours. En ce qui concerne l'envoi d'un teIegramme a la Commission, je rappelle au C<?nseil que nous sommes aujourd'hui le 19 decembre, et qu'il est un peu plus de 1'3 heures. Le telegramme sera expedie ce soil'; il n'arrivera a destination et ne pourra etre suivi. d'effet que dans la journee de demain. Ce n'est donc que le 21 decemb!;'e, c'esta-dire au moment meme ou la Commission sera sur le point de nous cabler le rapport qu'elle nous a annonce, que le telegramme qui lui serait adresse pourrait etre suivi d'effet. Je crois vraiment que nous pouvons en faire .l'economie. D'autre p;:...t, et ce que ,vient de dire le representant de l'URSS en est la meilleure prcuve, l'envoi de ce telegramme ne pourrait avolr pour effet que de diminuer l'autorite de la Commssioll de bons offices, ce qui n'est certainement pas notre intention. ' Je suis done d'avis que nous ajournions maintenant la discussion du point 2 de l'ordre du jour, et que nous passions aux points 3 et 4 qui, a man sens, peuvent etre traites d'autant plus rapidement que la discussion relative au point 4 a deja eu lieu. Personnellement, je souhaiteral~ que nous n'ayons pas de nouvelle seance cet apres-midi, je me permettrai done de demander que le Conseil aborde le plus t6t possible l'examen des points 3 et 4, qui peuvent etre traites en '!res.peu de temps. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je suis tout a fait d'accord avec le representant de la France. Je tiens a declarer que nous devrions regler ces questions inscrites a notre ordre du jour. Les observations presentees par les membres du Conseil semblent indiquer que le Conseil s'attend arecevoir' des details sur le plan dont il a ete question au cours de la discussion. Je crois qu'il n'y a aucune difficulte sur ce point et je n'ai certes pas l'inten#on d'insister pour que le Conseil adopte une motion en bonne et due forme. J'avais songe toutefois que dans l'accuse de reception adresse au President de la Commission, il pourrait etre indique que le Conseil de securite 'pense recevoir des details sur le plan dans le rapport de la Commission, attendu pour le 22 decembre. Nous pouvons adopter cette solution, ou bien nous pOUVQns laisser la discussion en suspens, etant entendu que les membres du Conseil dont lea Gouvernements sont representes ii la Commission de bans offices puissent avertir leurs Gouvernements respectifs de la tournure prise ce matin par la discussion qui a eu lieu au Conseil de securite: asavoir que le Conseilne desire pas, au stade actue1, passer a. la discussion d,e la question fondamentale, mais qu'il attend le rapport an!10nce, et M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je m'excuse d'elever des objections, mais je le fais sans hesiter. Envoyer a. la Commission de bons offices un telegramme comme celui qu'on envisage, serait une atteinte a. l'intelligence des membres de la Commission, et toute autre' mesure de notre part aurait egalement ce resultat. Le President du Conseil de securite n'ignore pas que son pays est represente. a. la Commission de bons offices, et s'il estime que le representant de l'Australie a cette Commission a besoin d'instructions de son Gouvernement, <est a. ce Gouvernement qu'il appartient d'en danner. Mais en ce qui concerne le Conseil de s~curite, j'estime que . nous aurions tort. d'envoyer un telegramme de cette nature. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): I apologize for objecting, but I do positively object. It would be as much a reflection upon the intelligence of the Committee of Good Offices, to send it a telegram from the Security CounCil, expressing such a view as that, as it would be to take some other form of action about the matter. The President of the Security Council is aWlli;e that his country is represen.ted on the Committee 6f Good Offices, and if he thinks that the Australian representative on that Committee needs some advice from his country, that is entirely up to his country. But as for the Security Council, I think it would be just too bad if we sent. a telegram of that kind. M. GONZALEZ FERNANDEZ (Colombie) (traduit de l'anglais): Je desire simplement appuyer la proposition tendant a. ajourner la discussion, qui a ete formulee par le representant de la France. Ma delegation est entierement' d'accord. sur les declarations faites par les representants des Etats- Unis et de la France. Nous pensons qu'il est irtutile Mr. GONZALEZ FERNANDEZ (Colombia) : I simply want to'support the motion made by the representative of France for adjournment of the discussion. My delegation fully agrees with the statements of the United States and French representatives. We believe no useful purpose would be served if we continued to discuss this matter here before receiving the report of the Committee of €iood Offices. On the other hand, it would be useless, too, to send instructions or requests to the Committee of Good Offices, if we do not reallv know what the Committee is going to inform us about. ~e c9ntinuer a. discuter id cette question avant que nous ayons re~u le rapport de la Commission de bons offices. D'autre part, il est egalement inutile d'adresser des instructions ou 'des requetes a. la Commission: etant donne que 110US ne savons pas exactement ce dont la Commission va nous informer. Nous pourrons demander des eclaircissements et des renseignements s:ompIementaires, lorsque nous connaitrons le texte du rapport qui nous sera presente. Je pense meme qu'il n'est pas utile de demander a. la Commission de nous envoyer ce rapport .avant le 22 decembre, car il n'est pas possible de l'envoyer avant cette date. . A mon avis, il suffirait done, sans autre decision presidelJctieUe et sans mentionner quoi que ce soit d'autre au proces-verbal, d'ajourner la discussion de cette question en attendant le rapport et ensuite, nous pourrons reprendre 1'examen de cette question tres importante en pleine connaissance de c;:J.use. We can·ask for clarification and we can ask for further explanations, when we know !he text of this interim report that is being offered to us. I do not think it would even be convenient to tell it that we want a report before 22 .December, because there would not be any time to anticipate the date. I therefore believe, without any further ruling, and without any further question being placed on the record, that we should adjourn the discussion and wait until we get the report, and we can then discuss fully this very important question, with full knowledge of the cirLumstances. Le 'PRESIDENT (traduit de ranglais) : Afin de ne pas prolonger la discussion qui n'est fondee sur aucune resolution en bonne et due forme, j'accepte la suggestion tendant a. ajotlrner le debat sur ce point, etant entendu que les Gouvernements representes a. la Commission de bons offices peuvent, s'ils le desirent, adresser des communications a leurs representants a. cette Commission, a. la lumiere de la discussion qui s'est derouIee ici ce matin. !.VI. Pillai, representant de l'inde; M. Snouck Hurgronje, r!Zpresentant des Pays-Bas; M. Ingles, representant des Philippi11.es, et M. Palar, representa.nt de la Republique d'Indo'l1esie, se retirent. , The PRESIDENT: In order not to prolong the discussion, which, after all, has no basis in the sense of a formal resolution, I accept the suggestion for adjournment of this particular item, with the understanding that those Governments represented on the Committee of Good Offices which so desire, will communicate with their representatives in the sense of this morning's discussion. Presid~ni of the Security Councn ConsejI de securite,' fai9an.t rap- reporting on the progress of the port sur l'etat des travaux du work of the Committee with regard Comite"en egard it la resolution du to the resolution of the Security Consen de securite du 15 novemhre Councn of 15 November 1947 1947 (document S/621) (document S/621)

The letter from the Chairman of the Committee of Experts explains that' delays have been encountered in the work of the Committee, and that the Committee of Experts is not ready to report at the time it had been hoped. No action by the Security Council is, of course, called for except to note the progress of the Committee of Experts. Mr. KATz-SUCHY (Poland): Concerning the letter of the ,Chairman of the Committee of Experts, my delegation has the intention of submitting a draft resolution.1 I request permission to explain the reasons why we shall submit such a resolution. If it is the wish of the President, I can continue now; if it is the intention to hold a meeting this afternoon; I can continue at that time.

In reply to the representative of Poland, I wish to state that I have examined the text ofthe draft resolution referred tO,and it seems to me to be not in order in the present discussion in any sense that I can understand. This is a matter which has been referred by the Security Council to the Committee of Experts. As I understand it, the Committee of Experts is engaged in close discussion of the matter. I consider that the introduction at this stage of a resolution dealing with the subject matter under cqnsideration by the Committee of Experts is not an appropriate procedure. _ I should· not like the representative of Poland, of course, to think that this suggestion in any way prejudices his right to raise this quetsion again in the Security Council, on receipt of the advice of the Committee of Experts. In the circumstances, I thought it would be much more appropriate to wait until that advice was received. , 1: The following is the text of the draft resolution: Document S/625 19 December 1947 [Origi,wl text: ElIglish] The Security Council Havi'l{J approved the Trusteeship Agreement for the former Japanese mandated islands'as a strategic area, and having accepted thereby the obligations provided for by the Charter; , Directs the Committee of Experts: . (1) To prepare and submit within three weeks for the approval of the Security Council a draft questionnaire provided .for in Article 88 of the Charter, adapted ' to the conditions and needs of strategic areas under ' trusteeship; (2) T9 prepare not later than 31 January 1948, and submit to the Security Council for approval, draft rules of procedure concerning the exercise by the Security Council of its functions and obligations in relation to strategic areas under trusteeship; . (3) To include in the draft rules of procedure concerning strategic:areas under trusteeship detailed provisions regulating in what manner and in what circumstances the Security Council may avail itself in each case -separately of the assist,ance of the Trusteeship Council pursuant to Arti~e 83 of the Charter. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : La lettre duPresident du Comite d'experts explique que le Comite a ete retarde dans son travail et n'est pas pret cl presenter son rapport dans les deIais prevus. ' Le Conseil de securite n'a pas cl prendre detnesures, si ce n'est a prendre acte de l'avancement des travaux dit Comite d'experts. M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais) ; En ce qui concerne la lettre du President du Comite d'experts, ma delegation a l'intention de soumettre un projet de resolution1, et je demande la permissiQn cl'exposer les motifs pout' lesquels nous presentons une telle resolution. Si tel est le desir du President, je suis pret cl le faire maintenant; s'il doit y avoir une seance cet apresmidi, je pourrais continuer cl ce moment-la. Le 'PRESIDENT (traduit de. l'anglais) : Pour repondre au representant de la Pologne, je desire declarer que j'ai examine le texte du projet de resolution qui vient d'etre mentionne, et i1 me semble qu'il 'n'est pas recevable dans l'etat actuel de~ la discussion. Il s'agit,en effet, d'une question que le Conseil de securite a renvoyee au Corrtite d'experts. A ma connaissance, le Comite d'experts examine attentivement la question, et j'estime que la presentation, au stade actu~l, d'une resolution portant sur une question qui est debattue par le Comite d'experts ne me parait pas une procedure opportune. Bien -entendu, je ne voudrais pas que le representant de la Pologne pense que ma suggestion tende cl l'empecher d'exercer le droit qu'il a de soulever cette question cl nouveau des que le Conseil de securite' aura re'1u l'avis du Comite d'experts. Dans les conditions actuelles j'estime qu'il serait preferable d'attendre que cet avis nous soit parvenu. 1 Voici le texte du projet de resqlution: , Document S/625 19 decembre 1947 [Texte original en anglais] Le Conseil de secU1'fte . Apres avoir approuve l'Accord de tt:teUe relatif aux iles precedemment placees sous mandat japonais, ces iles constituant un territoire strategique, et apres avoir, de ce fait, accepte les obligations stipulees par la Cha,rte, Chargele Comite d'experts: 1r de preparer et, dans un deIai de trois semaines, de soumettre a l'approbation du Conseil de securite un projet de questionnaire conforme aux dispositions de l'Article 88 de la Charte et adapte a la situation et aux besoins des territoires strategiques places sous tuteUe; 2) de preparer, pour le 31 janvier 1948 au plus tard; et de soumettre a l'approbation du Conseil de securite un projet de reglement concernant l'exercice, par le Conseil de securite, de ses fonctions et obligations relatives aux territoires strategiques places sous tutelle; 3) d'inserer dans le projet de reglement relatif aux territoires strategiques places sous tutelle, des dispositions detaillees precisant de queUe maniere et dans queUes circonstances le Conseil de securite pourra, dans chaque cas particulier, recourir al'assistance du Conseil C'est preciseinent parce que le Comite d'experts s'est heurte ades complications imprevues, et aussi parceque la resolution adoptee par le Conseil de securite le 15 novembre 1947 etait assez vague et ne donnait pas de directives precises au Comite d'experts, que je voulais soumettre un projet de resolution. ...... Ma delegation estime qu'une te1le resolution est parfaitement recevable, et qu'e1le peut etre discutee au Conseil de securite, meme si le Comite d'experts est encor.e en train d'examiner cette question: M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes .sovietiques) (traduit du russe) : Le Conseil ·de securite n'a donne aucune directive au Comite d'experts en ce qui concerne les propositions que celui-ci doit preparer sur cette question. Le projet de resolution de la Pologne contient un certain nombred'indications concernant la procedure a suivre. Elle donne des directives au Comite d'experts sur la manil~re dont il doit elaborer ses propositions et eUe lui fixe des delais pour ses travaux. Par. consequent, cette proposition est entierement conforme au point de l'ordre du jour qui nous interesse' en ce moment; e1le est donc parfaitement recevable. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : The Security Council gave the Committee of Experts no guidance as to how it was to prepare its proposals en this question. The Polish draft resolution contains some indications of a procedural nature: how the Committee of Experts should prepare its proposals, and also the time-limits for its work. The proposal is, therefore, absolutely relevant to the item on the agenda, and it is perfectly in order to discuss it. M. PARODI (France) : Je crois qu'il nous serait extremement di£ficiie de prendre parti sur le texte qui nous est propose sans avoir examine toute la question que se trouve actuellement devant le Comite d'experts. Evidemment, le point dont'il s'agit est lie a certains autres que le Comite' est en train d'examiner. Je trouve, pour ma part, extremement. difficile de concevoir la possibilite d'examiner cette question isolement. Je pen~e d'ailleurs que, du fait que l'ensemble clu probleme est actue1lement soumis au Comite cl'experts, nous devons comme l'a tout a l'heure indique le President, attendre que le rapport dont il, s'agit soit presente, pour aborder la discussion sur le point me!TIe de savoir si la proposition est recevable. Mr. PARODI (France) (translated from French); I think it would be extremely difficult for u&, to make a decision on the text prpposed to us without, having studied' the whole question which is now before the Committee of Experts. The point is obviously linked with certain others which the Committee is now examining. As far as I am concerned, I should find it extremely difficult to conceive of the possibility of considering this question separately. I think, too, that since the whole problem is now in the' hands of the Committee of Experts, we should, as the President has already pointed out, wait for the report to be submitted to us Before we open the discussion, ~v~n on the question as to whether the prop.osal IS III order. ' M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je regrette de ne pouvoir accepter la suggestion que vient de faire le representant de la France. Le projetde .resolution que j'ai soumis aujourd'hui vise nettement les travaux a executer par le Comite d'experts. Il serait donc impossible de le dis~uter apres que le Comite d'experts aura presente son rapport. Dans une certaine mesure, cette resolution contient des instructions. D'ailleurs, je ne prevois aucune difficulte susceptible d'empecher l'adoption de cette resolution, au cas ou nous deciderions d'en entamer la discussion. Je propose que le Conseil de securite procede a cette discussion soit aujourd'hui, soit lors d'une seance qui devrait avoir lieu aussitot que possible. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): I am sorry to say that I cannot agree with the suggestion that has been made by the representative of France. The draft resolution which I have submitted today refers clearly to the work which has to be accomplished and completed by the Committee of Experts. To have such a resolution discussed after the Committee of Experts sends its report will be completely out of place. To a certain extent this. resolution c~:mtain~ in~truction. t do not really enVIsage any dIfficultIes 111 the adoption of the resolution, if we proceed to the discussion. I suggest that the Security Council should discuss it today Or at the earliest possibl~ meeting. Sir ALEXANDER CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de lJanglais) : Je desire declarer que je . ne suis pas pret a discuter cette resolution aujourd'hui; je viens de la recevoir a l'instant. Je ne suis pas suffisamment pret pour m'engager Sir Alexander CADOGAN ,(United Kingdom): I wish to state that I am not prepared to discuss this resolution today; I have only .just seen it. I am not prepared for a discussion of these matters in detail. I think that we should probably have ~....

I understand that the representative of Poland would have no objection to that procedure and that he would not press his resolution; but he would be free to submit it at the following meeting of the Security Council, a.t which time the report of the Committee of Experts might be available to the Security Council. That report would aid the Council in the consideration of this matter. Mr. AUSTIN (Unit~d States of America) : We do not support a ruling by the President to the effect that this proposal may be in order at the next meeting. This is a real, substantial challenge which the President has made with respect to this item. In the first place, it is not on the agenda. In the second place, let us suppose that the Committee of Experts makes one decision, and that the Security Council makes another, directly contrary decision on the same resolution. It would hardly be good parliamentary practice to permit such ap. occurrence. Although I am not a member of the Committee of Experts, I am informed that this precise question is before the Committee of Experts at the present time. Therefore the Security Council should not undertake to pass upon this question at the same time. The appropriate time might be at the ne-xt meeting, but my point is that this question should not be postponed to the next meeting on the understanding that it would then be in order. I The PREhIDENT: I should like to make my position clea:r. I have stated that in the opinion of the Chair this draft resolution is at the· moment out of order. It touches on matters of substance which do not apply to the particular agenda item before this meeting. I hesitate to insist on that ruling. I should like to ask the speakers who wish now to com.inue the discussion to address themselves at least to the relevance of the resolution to the agenda item we are discussing. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I cannot agree with the United States representative's statement that there is no need at all to discuss this draft resolution. Why sQould we refuse to discuss it? Simply because'a particular representative on the Security Council does not wish to discuss it? That is not a cogent consideration. There may be difficulties in connexion with the fact that the resolution was submitted only at this meeting. In that case, if the representative of Poland agrees, we can discuss it at the next meeting; but we have to discuss the resolution before the Committee of Experts finishes its work. , The representative of Fra.nce suggests that we should discuss this resolution after the Committee· . of Experts has submitted its report. If he had read the text of the resolution he would not have made this suggestion. The. whole point of the Polish resolution is to give the Committee of Experts Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Je crois savoir que le representant de la Pologne ne souleve aucune objection contre cette procedure, et qu'il n!insiste pas sur sa resolution; mais il est libre de la presenter de nouveau lors de la prochaine seance du Conseil de securite. I1 est possible, d'ailleurs, qu'a ce moment la le rapport du Comitec'd'experts soit a la disposition du Conseil de secu'rite. Ce rapport facilitera les travaux du Conseil. M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de I'anglais) : Nous n'appuyons pas une decision presidentielle, etablissant que· €~tte .. y:"c-position pourrait etre recevable a une seance ulterieure. I1 y a ici contestation sur le fond de la question. Tout d'abord, celle-ci ne figure pas a l'ordre du jour. D'autre part, supposons que le Comife d'experts prenne telle ou telle decision, et que le Conseil de securite en prenne une en sens contraire, a l'egard de la meme resolution. I1 serait deplorable que l'exercice des pratiques parlementaires permette d'en arriver la. Bien que n'etant pas membre du Comite d'experts, je sais que celui-ci est saisi de cette question particuliere. Par consequent, le Conseil de securite ne devrait pas essayer de prendre une decision sur celle-ci en meme temps. Le moment favorable pourrait se placer a la prochaine seance, mais ce que je desire, c'est que l'on n'ajourne pas la question a la prochaine seance etant entendu qu'a ce moment-la, elle serait recevable. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de' I'anglais): Je voudrais faire connaitre clairement ma position. En. tant que President, j'ai declare qu'a mon avis, a I'heure actuelle, ce projet de resolution n'etait pas recevable. It traite du fond d'une question qui n'est pas liee au point figurant a 1'0rdre du jour de cette seance. J'hesite a insister sur cette decision presidentielle. Je demanderai maintenant a. ceux qui desirent continuer la discussion, de traiter, dans leurs interventions, tout au moins de la'recevabilite de cette resolution par rapport ,au point de l'ordre du jour qui est en cours d'examen. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques. socia- . listes sovietiques) (traduit. du russe) :. Je ne suis pas de l'avis du representant des Etats-Unis d'Amerique selon lequel il n'est absolument pas necessaire d'examiner ce projet de resolution.. Pourquoi devrions-nous en refuser l'examen? Pour la seule raison qu'un representant au Conseil de securite refuse d'etudier ce texte? Cela n'est pas un argument valable. La difficulte tient peut- , etre a re que cette resolution n'a ete presentee qu'a la presente seance. Dans ce cas, si le representant de la Pologne n'y voit pas d'inconvenient, noUS pourrons examiner ce texte a. notre prochaine ·seance. Quoi qu'il en soit, nous devrions examiner cette resolution avant que le Comite d'expt<rts ait termine ses travaux. Le representant de' la France nous 'propose d'examiner cette resolution apres la reception du rapport du ~omite d'experts. Pourtant, s'il avait lu ce texte, il n'aurait pas fait cette proposition. La resolution de la Pologne tend precisem~nt a donner des directives au Comite cl'experts sur la Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French): The French representative proposed just now that the discUssion should be adjourned until the report is received. According to our rules of procedure, such a proposal has priority. Personally I support this suggestion and request the President to consult the Council on the subject. . . . The PRESIDENT: The proposal to adjourn coincides with the. indication from the Chair to the effect that· this particular draft resolution is out of order. They have the same intent, and I shaH take the opinion of the Council. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : The Belgian representative's proposal is not a proposal on a point of oJ;'der. The first part-about adjourning the discussion-indeed relates to a point of order; but the second part.,...-adjournment of the discussion until 'the Committee of Experts has submitted its report-is not a proposal on a point of order bnt an ordinary proposal, a draft resolution. Consequently, if the Belgian representative will delete the second part, the Council will be able to giye his. proposal precedence and discuss it. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de !',.;,nglais) : La proposition d'ajournement coincide ave'c la declaration' presidentielle, al'effet que ce projet de resolution ri'est par recevable. L'intention,en est la meme, et je voudrais maintenant connaitre l'avis du Conseil. it" _ ,. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe) : La proposition que vient de soumettre le representant de la Belgique ne porte pas sur une motion d'ordte. La premiere partie de cette proposition qui tend a ajourner la discussion a en effet trait aune motion d'ordre, mais tel n'est pas le cas de la seconde partie de ce texte qui tend a l'ajournement des debats jusqu'a ce que le Comite d'experts ait presente son rapport. C'est la une simple proposition, un projet de resolution. C'est pourquoi, si le representant de la Belgique consent a retirer la seconde partie de son texte, le Conseil de securite pourrait examiner sa proposition en lui accordant la priorite. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Avant de donner la parole au representant de la PQlogne, je desire lui rappeler la motion d'ordre quia ete presentee. Ce qui est tilaintenant discute par le Conseil, c'est l'ajournement de cette question.

Before the representative .of Poland speaks, I wish to remind him of the point .of order which has been raised. The proposal now before the Council is the adjournment of this question. . M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je voudrais tout d'abord parler de la motion d'ordre. Puis-je faire observer que le paragraphe 5 de l'article 33 du reglement interieur prevoit qu'une discussion peut etr.e renvoyee a un jour detennine. La motion du representant de la Belgique ne prevoit pas de jour determine. Sa motion n'est donc pas de celles qui ont priorite sur les propositions principales. En second lieu, je voudrais' indiquer que deux motions ont ete presentees. J'avais propose anterieurement que la discussion fut renvoyee a la prochaine seance. Par consequent, si le President desire consulter le Coriseil sur la question cle l'ajournement, la proposition tendant a ajourner a la prochaine seance doit etre miseaux voix la premiere, puisqu'elle a ete presentee avant la motion de la Belgique. En ce qui concerne la question de savoir si la proposition est recevable, et la these selon laquelle cette discussion n'est pas prevue a notre ordre du jour, je voudrais attirer l'attention du Conseil sur le point 3 de l'ordre du jour d'aujourd'hui, qui est ainsi conc;u: "Lettre en date du 12 decembre adressee par le President du Comite d'experts. au President du Conseil de securite, faisant rapport sur l'e1;at des travaux du Comite eu egard a la resolution du Consei! de securite du 15 novembre 1947." Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (;Poland) : I shall speak first to the point of order. May I note that according to rule 33, paragraph 5, a discussion may be post-. poned to a certain day. The motion of the representative of Belgium does not indicate that certain day, It is therefore not a motion which takes ~recedence over any other principal motion. Secondly, two motions hwe been made. I previously proposed the adjournment of the discussion until the next meeting. Should the President.take the sense of the Council on the question of adjournment' the motion to postpone to the next meeting, which preceded the Belgian motion, should be put to a vote first. In reply to the question as to whether the proposal is out of order and the discussion not a . part of our agenda, may I draw the attention of the Council to item 3 on today's agenda which reads: "Letter dated 12 Decelflber 1947 from the Chainnan of the Committee or Experts addressed to the President of the Security Council reporting on the progress of the work of the Committee with regard to the resoiution of the Security Council of 15 November 1947."

I am in a little difficulty concerning these yarious motions for adjournment. There is no ''E1esire on the part of the Security Council, as I see it, to ,exclude discussion of this matter in the Security Council. But there is reluctance, on the part of the Security Council, to discuss it now. With respect to the relevance of the resoiution to the agenda item, I am inclined, in order not to get further involved in procedure, to give as my ruling that the int.roduction and discussion of this resolution is out of order in relation to item 3 on the agenda; and we shall prpceed to item 4. Mr. GROMYKO (Upion of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I disagree with the President's ruling and I consider it wrong. This draft resolution has a bearing on the problem under consideration by the Committee of Experts..The Committee of Experts has sent the Security Council a letter, and we are bound to react thereto. One representative on the Council has submitted a proposal in connexion with the discussion of this letter. On what grounds does the Pres~dent declare that this proposal has no bearing on the problem under consideration by the Committee of Experts? Such a view is completely unfounded. No one can decide this question arbitrarily-neither the President, nor the representative of the United States of America, nor anybody else. With regard to the question of procedure, two proposals have been made, as we know: one by the Polish representative, to the effect. that we should postpone the discussion until the next meeting of the Security Council, since the resolution was submitted only today; and the second by the representative of Belgium. The Belgian representative's proposal does not concern a point of. order unless he separates the second part of his proposal from the first. It is the President's duty to put these proposals to the vote in the ( order in which they were submitted, giving them precedence over his ruling, unless he intends to withdraw it.

At the o~tset of the discussio~ I gave warning that the ruling I have just made might be forthcoming, and it has so come forth. The ruling is now before the Security Council. In the circumstances, as the ruling has been challenged, I can allow no further di!?cussion. I shall put the ruling immediately to 'the vote of the Security Council. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais)-:Ces differentes motions d'ajournement creent quelques difficultes. I1 me semble que le Conseil.de se~rite n'a aucunement'l'intention d'eviter la dLcussion de cette question au Conseil. Mais il semble que ce dernier n'est pas.dispose a procMer a cette discussion maintenant. • En ce qui concerne la relation entre la resolution et le' pomt inscrit a 1'0rdre du jour, et~din de ne pas nous laisser enliser dans la procedure, je suis cl. pret prendre une decision presidentielle, a l'effet que le point 3 de notre ordre du jour n'appe11e pas la presentation ni la discussion de la resolution, et nous allons passer au point 4. ' M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe) : Je ne suis pas d'accord avec la decision presidentielle, car j'estime qU'e:lle n'est pas justifiee. Ce projet de resolution porte sur une question dont l'examen a ete confie au Comite d'experts. Le Comite d'experts a envoye une lettre au Conseil de securite. Celui-ci doit donc reagir. Un membre du Conseil a soumis une proposition en liaison avec l'exaJ.llen de ce document. Sur quoi se fonde le President pour declarer que cette proposition n'a rien a voir avec la question dont s'occupe le Comite d'experts? Il n'y aucune raison de le pretendre. Personne, ni le 'President, . niIe representant des Etats-Unis d'Amerique, ni personne d'autre n'a le droit de trancher cette question d'une fa<;on aussi arbitraire. Quant ala procedure asuivre, nous savons bien que nous sommes saisis de deux propositions: d'une part, le representant de la Pologne a propose d'ajourner la discussion a la prochaine seance du Conseil Cle securite, puisque c'est aujourd'hui seulement que sa resolution a ete introduite. La seconde proposition est celle du representant de la Belgique. Cette proposition ne porte pas sur une motion d'ordre. Elle ne s'y rapporterait que s'il consentait cl. separer la premiere partie de sa proposition de la seconde. Le President doit mettre .ces propositions aux voix dans 1'0rdre ou elles ont ete presentees, et leur accorderla'priorite sur la decision presidentielle, s'il n'entend par retirer <;.ette derniere. ' Le PRESIDENT (traduit dc.l'anglais) : Au debut de la discussion, j'avais averti le Conseil de l'eventualite d'une decision presidentielle. Celle-cl a maintenant ete prise. Le Conseil de securite en est saisi. Etant donne qu'eUe a ete contestee, it ne peut plus y avoir de discussion. Je vais demander au COf}seit de securite de voter immediatement sur cette decision presidentielle. Il est procede au vote amainJevee. Par·9 voi:c contre 2, le Conseil de securite approuve le decision presidentielle. A vote was taken by show of hands. The ruling of the President was upheld by 9 votes to 2. 428. Discussion du point 4 de I'ordre du jour: procedure de vote au Conseil de .securite: lettre en date du 3 decemhi'e 1947, adressee par le Secretaire general au President du Conseil de securite, transmettant la resolution 117 (IT) adoptee par I'Assemblee generale a sa 123emeseance pleniere, le 21 novembre 1947 (document S/620) 428. Discussion of agenda item No. 1-1: voting procedure in the'Security Council: letter dated 3 December 1947 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council transmitting resolution 117 (11) adopted by the 'General Assembly at its 123rd plenary meeting, 21. November 1947 (document S/620) Le 'PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Y a-t-il ' des ohservatibns sur ce point de l'ordre du jour? . The PRESIDENT: Are there any observations on this item of the agenda? M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je desireilPoser une question au President, cl propos du point 3 de l'ordre du jour. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) : I have a question to ask the President concerning item 3 of the agenda. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Nous discutons actuellement du point 4 de l'ordre du jour. Si le representant de la Pologne desire faire des observations cl propos de l'ensemble de l'ordre du jour, je crois qu'il devrait attendre que nous ayons termine l'examen de tous les points figurant cl l'ordre du jour.

We are now discussing item 4 of the agenda. If the representative of Poland has any observations arising out of the agenda as a whole, I suggest that he should reserve them until we conclude discussion of all the items on the agenda. M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de l'anglais) : I1 s'agit d'une motion d'ordre. D'apres la decision du President, le Conseil de securite vient de passer cl l'examen du point 4 de l'ordre du jour. Le point 3 consistait en l'examen d'une lettre emanant du President du Comite d'~xperts. Je voudrais demander au President quelle suite a ete donnee cl cette lettre par le Conseil de securite? Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) : I have a point of order. According to the ruling of the President, the Security Council has now passed to discussion of item 4 of the agenda. Item 3 of the agenda was a letter from the Chairman of the Committee of Experts. I wish to ask the President what action has been taken by the Security Council on that letter. Le PRE§iIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Le representant de la iPologne est autorise cl revenir au point 3 de l'ordre du jour. • -

I shall allow the representative of Poland to return to item 3 of the agenda. 429. Suite de la discussion du point 3· de I'ordre du jour 429. Continuation of the discussion on agenda item No. 3 Le PRBSIDENT' (traduit de l'anglais) : Le compte rendu indiquera que j'ai fait part du contenu de la lettre du Comite d'experts au Conseil et l'ropose que ce1ui-ci eft prenne. acte. Aucune observation n'a ete faite sur r;:e point. Conformement cl la pratique suivie par le Conseil, nous convenons que la lettre a ete enregistree sans commentp.ires.

The record will show that I indicated the contents of the -letter from the Committee"of Experts and suggested that the Security, Council should take note of the advice contained therein. No observations were made on that point. In accordance with our practice, the letter was taken as noted without observations. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques soclalistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Je crois qu'ulle telle declaration n'~ pas de sens. Que signifient les mots: "prendre acte"? (Vorateur poursuit en anglais,) Le Comite d'experts, en effet, a demande au Conseil de securite de reculer la date limite cl laquelle il devait lui presenter son ' rapport. Nous n'avons rien decide cl l'egard de ·cette demande. Dne proposition la concerl}.ant apparaissait dans la resolution de la Pologne, mais le Presiclent a declare que cette derniere n'etait pas recevable. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I dQ. not think there is any sense in this statement. What do the words "take note" mean? (The speaker concluded his statement in English). TheCommittee of Experts requested the Security Council to postpone the final date for the submission of its report to the Security Council. We did not take any action on that request.~A proposal in this regard was contained in the Polish resolution, but the President declared the Polish resolution out of order. 430. Continuation of the discussion on agenda item No. 4

Are there any observations on item 4 of the agenda? - Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) : The Committee of Experts was granted four weeks for the completion of its work; it did not complete it. That is why the Committee sent a letter to the Security Council. If the statement which was made by the representative of Syria had been made by the President, it would be absolutely clear that the Security Councll grants addi- ". tional time to the Committee of Experts. But it is not sufficient to say that we take note of the Committee's letter. The PREStDENT: We are discussing item 4 of the agenda. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): I ask the President to register the opposition of the Polish representative to the decision to take note of the letter.

I repeat: are there any observations on item 4 of the agenda? Mr1 GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) : Are we discussing the items 3 or 4 on the agenqa? What I said before related to item 3 of the agenda. The President did not close the discussion on item 3 of the agenda. -My remarks in relation to item 3 ofthe agenda were for the record. The PRESIDENT-: The discussion on item 3 of the agenda was closed, even though some representatives may have been unaware of that fact. The President has already asked the following question of the Security Council: "Are there any observations on item 4 of the agenda?" Le fait que le-Conseil de securite a pris note decette lettre signifie que le Conseil -de securite a accorde un delaLsupplementaire pour la presentation du rapport; et rien de plus. Le Comite n'a pas demande de directives, ni de nouvelles directives. Il ne serait pas opportun, pour le~-C::onseil de securite, de donner au Comite d'experts de nouvelles directives pu~sque le Comite n~en a pas demande. Le Comite ne se plaint pas de manquer de directives. Qu'il continue donc son travail, et si par la suite no~s constatons des lacunes dans le rapport, il nous sera toujours loisible de lui donner de nouvelles instructions. lIme semble que l'affaire peut etre reglee de cette fa<;on-Ia. Cela signifie que nous accordons au Comite un delai compIementaire, le rapport devant nous etre presente des que possible. 430. Suite de la discussion du point 4 de l'ordre du jour Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais) : Y a-t-il des observations apropos du point 4 de l'ordre du jour? ' . M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes. sovietiques) (traduit de r:ang1ais) : Le Comite d'experts avait un delai de quatre semaines pour terminer son travail; il ne l'a pas termine. Voila pourquoi le Comite a adresse une lettre au Conseil de securite. Si la declaration que vient de faire le representant de la Syrie avait ete faite par le President, il serait parfaitement clair que le Comite d'experts a re<;u du Conseil de securite un delai supplementaire. Mais il ne suffit pas de dire que nous prenons acte Qe la lettre du Comite. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais): Nous discutons en ce moment du point 4 de l'ordre du jour. M. KATZ-SUCHY (PoJogne) (traduit de l'anglais): Je demande au President defaire noter l'opposition du representant de la Pologne a la decision tendant a prendre acte de la lettre. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais) : Je repete: Y a-t-il des observations apropos du point 4 de l'ordre du jour? M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit de l'anglais): Sommesnous en train de discuter le point 3 ou le point 4 de l'ordre du jour? Mes paroles se rapportaient' au point 3 de l'ordre du jour. Le President n'a pas declare close la cliscussion sur le poinf 3. Mes observations apropos du point 3 ont ete faites potir etre enregistrees au proci~s-verbal. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'angkiis): La discussion du point 3 a ete dec1aree close, meme si certains represental1ts semblentJ'ignorer. Le President a deja demande au Conseil de securite s'il y avait des observ'ations apropos du point 4 de l'oi-dre du jour. M. GROMYXO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe) : Je me permettrai de faire observer que si le mot "re<;ue" signifie que le Conseil de securite est simplement entre en possession de cette resolution, il est difficilede nier que ce texte a ete effectivement re<;u et transmis au Conseil. En ma qualite de representant de l'URSS, j'ai eleve des objections cl l'inscriptio.1 de cette question cl l'ordre du jour et je continue cl m'opposer cl son examen par le Conseil de securite, comme du reste je m'opposerai cl toute action que le Conseil de securite voudrait entreprendre cl propos de cette resolution. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (tra'nslated fr01n Russian): May I say that if the word "received" means that the resolution has been received in the physical sense, it is difficult to deny that it was received by and referred to the Security Council. As the representative of the USSR, I objected to this question being placed on the agenda and I object to it being discussed in the Security Council, just as I object to any action on this question by the Security Council in connexion with this resolution. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): La reserve du representant de l'URSS sera consignee dans le proces-verbal.

The reservation of the representative of the USSR will be noted. 431. Date de' la.prochaine 'seance 431~ Date of next meeting Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Avant de lever hi. seance, je devrais peut-etre demander l'avis des membres du Conseil de securite au sujet de la date de la prochaine seance. La seule question qui soit cl envisager est celle de l'Indonesie. Si le rapport de la Commission de bons offices nous parvient au debut de la semaine prochaine, les membres du Conseil voudront certainement disposer d'un certain delai pour l'examiner apres sa distribution. Il ne nous sera pas possible de sieger la semaine prochaine, meme si nous le souhaitions, du fait des vacances. Il ne nous reste done plus qU'cl nous ajourner cl la semaine suivante. A titre provisoire, je suggere, la date du mardi 30 decembre 1947 po1:l.r la prochaine seance du Conseil de securite. Cette seance sera naturellement la derniere de l'anllee. Cette date fera l'objet d'une confirmation au cours de la semaine prochaille. I

Before adjourning the meeting, I should perhaps consult the members of the Security Council regarding the dat.e of the next meeting. The only question which appears to be in prospect is that of Indonesia. If the report of the Committee of Good Offices is received early next week, the members would certainlydesire time to cOnsider it after it was circulated. A meeting next week, if found desirable, would not be possible, after Tuesday, in view of the holidays. That leaves as the only alternative the following week. I should propose, tentatively, Tuesday 30 December 1947, as the date to be set aside for the next meeting of the Security Council. That meeting, of course, will be the last meeting of the year. The date will be confirmed during the next week. 432. Continuation of the discussion on agenda item No. 3 432~ Suite de la discussion du point 3 de l'ordre du jour Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland): I regret that I must refer again for a moment to the Polish resolution. We consider the action which has been taken as contrary to the rules of procedure, and we reserve our right to submit that resolution again as a separate item on the agenda. M. KATZ-SUCHY (Pologne) (traduit de l'angl(];is) : Je regrette d'avoir a. revenir de nouveau sur la resolution de la Pologne. Nous estimons que la mesure qui a ete prise est en contradiction avec notre reglement interieur et nous reservons le droit de presente!;' cl nouveau cette resolution, comme une question distincte de l'ordre du jour. La seance est levee a14 h. 15. The meeting rose at 2.1,5 p.m. FRANCE Editions A. Pedone 13, rue SoufBot PARIS, ye GREECE-GRECE "EIeftheroudakis" Librairie intemationale Place de la Constitution ATHENES GUATEMALA Jose Goubaud Goubaud & Cia. Ltda. Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. GUATEMALA . HAITI Mu Bouchereau Librairie "A la Caravelle" Boite postale 111-B PORT-AV·PRINCE ICELAND-ISLANDE Bokaverzlun. Sigfusar Eymundsonnar Austurstreti 18 REYKJAVIK INDIA-INDE Oxford Book & Stationery Company Scindia House NEWDELW IRAN' Bongahe Piaderow 731 Shah Avenue TEHERAN IRAQ-IRAK Mackenzie & Mackenzie The, Bookshop BAGHDAD i,EBANON-lIBAN Librairie universeUe BEYROUTH LUXEMBOURG Librairie J. Schummer Place Guillaume LUXEMBOURG NETHERLAND5-PAYS·8AS N. Y. Martinus Nijhoff Lange Voorhout 9 'S-GRAVENHAGE N~rregade6 K~BENHAVN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-- REPUILlQUE DOMINICAINE Libreria Dominicana Calle Mercedes No. 49 Apartado 656 CIUDAD TRUJILLO NEW ZEALAND- NOUVELLE.ZELANDE Gm'don & Goteh, Ltd. Waring Taylor Street WELLINGTON Unitt'd Nations Association of New Zealand P. O. 1011, G.P.O. WELLINGTON ECUADOR~QUATEUR' Muiioz Hermanos y Cia. Nueve de Octubre 703 . Casilla 10·24 GUAYAQUIL ·EGYPT-EGYPTE Librairie "La Renaissance d'Egypte" 9 Sh. Adly Pasha CAIRo ETHIOPIA-ETHIOPIE Agence ethiopienne de publicite P.O.Box8 ADDIS·ABEBA NICARAGUA Ramiro Ramirez V. Agencia de Publicaciones MANAGUA, D. N. NORWAY-NORVEGE Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag Kr. Augustgt. 7A OSLO PHILIPPINES D. P. Perez Co. 132 Riverside SAN JUAN, RIZAL POLAN~POLOGNE Spotdzielna Wydawnicza "Czytelnik'! .r-. 38 Poznanska WARSZAWA SWEDEN-SUEDE A.-B. C. E. Fritze,s Kungl. . Hofbokhandel '. Fredsgatan 2 STOCKHOLM ',' . SWITZERLAND-SUISSE Librairie Payot S~ A•. LAUSANNE, GENEVE, VEVE};, MONTREUX, NEUCHATEL, BERNE, BASEL ....H.ans Raunhardt Kirchgasse 17 ZumcHI SYRIA-SYRIE Ubrairie universelle DAMAS, TURKEY-TURQUIE Librairle Hachette 469 Istiklal Caddesi BEYOGLU.IsTA'NBUL UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA- UNION SUD·AFRICAINE Central News Agency Commissioner & Rissik Sts. JOHANNESBURG and at CAPETOWN and DURBAN UNITED KINGDOM- ROYAUME·UNI . H. M. Stationery Office P.·O. Box 569 LONDON, S.E. 1 and at H.M.S.O. Shops in LONDON, EDINBURGH, MANCHESTER CARDIFF, BELFAST, BIRMINGHAM and BRISTOL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA- ETATSmUNIS D'AMERIQUE Intemational Documents Service Columbia University Press 2960 Broadway NEW YORK 27, N. Y. URUGUAY· Oficina de Representaci6n de Editoriales Av. 18 de Julio 1333 Esc. 1 MONTEVIDEO VENEZUELA Escritoria Perez Machado Conde a Piiiango 11 CARACAS YUGOSLAVIA-YOUGOSLAVIE Drzavno Preduzece Jugoslovenska Knjiga Moskovska U1. 36 BEOGRAD