S/PV.2275 Security Council

In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings [2267//f to 2272ml and 2274th f?wtilIgs], I invite the representatives of Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Togo, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, At the invitation c?f’ the President, Mr. Benyahia (Algeria), Mr. Jorge (Angola), Mr. Kaiser (Bangladesh), Mr. Houngavou (Benin), Mr. Corrza da Costa (BrazilI, Mr. Simbananiye (Burundi), Mr. Dupuy (Canada), Mr. Malmierca (Cubu), Mr. Ashtal (Detnouatic Yemen), Mr. Grdle-Giorgis (Efhiapia), Mr. Jelonek (Federal Republic of Get~any), Mr. Cownbassa (C$inea), Mr. Doaglas (Guyana), Mr. Rae (India), a. Kusumnatm~~~~~i (lndoncsia), Mr. Sheare, (Jamaica), Mr. Kasiwr (Kenya), Mr. Barwin (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Monteiro (Mozambique), Mr. Baba (Nigeria), Mr. Shahi (Pakistan), Mr. Marinescw (Romania), Mr, Niasw (Senegal), Mr. Cmteh (Sierra Leone), Mr. Fousie (South Africa), Mr. Balasubramaniam {Sri La~ka), Mr. Akakpo-Ahianyo (Togo), Mr. Salim (United Republic of Tatxania), Mr. Vrhovec ( Yugoslavia), Mr. Kamanda WI Kamanda (Zaire), Mr. Gonta (Zambia), and Mr. Mangweade (Zimbubwe) took the places reserved for them at the side c~f the Corrmil chamber.

I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Singapore in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council’s agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Koh (Singapore); took the place reservedfor him at the side of the Council chamber.

In accordance with the decision taken at the 2267th meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the Ultited Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members qf the delegation took places at the Cwncil table.

In accordance with the decision also taken at the 2267th meeting, I invite Mr. Peter Mueshihange to take a place at the Council table, At the invitation qf the President, Mr. Mueshihange took a place at the Council table.

I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the 13, In his statement to the Council, the representative of South Africa pleacled for tolerance and understanding and implored the Council to avoid confrontation. These are sweet words. We must, however, judge South Africa-and for that matter any other country-not: by what it says but by what it does. There is, regrettably, no congruence between South Africa’s words and South Africa’s deeds. How can we avoid a confrontation with South Africa if it is not prepared to give up its dream of annexing Namibia? I-low can we avoid a confrontation with South Africa if it is not prepared to terminate its illegal occupation of Namibia? How can we avoid a confrontation with South Africa if it is not prepared to implement Security Council resolution 435 (1978) in good faith? Those who commit aggression and occupy the territories of others illegally are in the habit of speaking the language of peace and preaching international co-operation, understanding and negotiations. We must not be deceived by such rhetoric. 14. I have also examined carefully the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom to the Council on 23 April 1981 [227/sr rlrecti/r~]. In the course of his statement, he read the text of a communique which was issued in London at the conclusion of a meeting attended by the senior officials of the five Western Governments [iDit/,, pura. 881. In that communique, the five Western Powers agreed that Council resolution 435 (1978) continues to provide a solid basis for transition to independence in Namibia, The communique, however, goes on to say that the five Western Powers have considered possibilities for strengthening the existing plan and have agreed that expeditious progress towards a settlement would be enhanced by measures aimed at giving greater confidence to all the parties on the future of an independent Namibia. The London communique has caused anxiety to African and other non-aligned countries, They would like to know whether the five Western Pcwers remain committed to their own plan of action as contained in resolution 435 (1978) and to its faithful imPlementation. What do they mean by “possibilities fcr strengthening the existing plan”? Do they intend tc amend or revise the plan? In our view, there is nothing wrong with the United Nations plan of action. What is wrong is the attitude of the Government of South Africa. It is, therefore, not the plan but the attitude of the Government of South Africa which needs to be altered. 16. I shall conclude my statement by simply joining my voice to those of my colleagues from African and other non-aligned countries in asking the Council to act firmly and decisively bY adopting measures aimed at the prompt and scrupulous implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). 17. Mr. de PINIES (Spain) (intcqmtrrfim ,fiom Spcrnislr): I have already had occasion in the past to congratulate you, Mr, President, on your accession to the presidency of this lofty body, and also to pay a deserved tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Florin, Today I should like to thank the African Ministers for Foreign Affairs for being here. Their presence reflects the particular importance of this debate and indeed reveals the concern of the international community. I wish to pay a tribute of appreciation and admiration to each and every one of them for coming here to New York and drawing attention to this important matter of such great concern. 18. On 30 January of this year [2263~I meeting], we were convened in this very chamber to hear the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) relating to the question of Namibia [S//4333]. A few days earlier, at Geneva, there had been a meeting of all the interested parties to discuss details of the direct implementation of resolution 435 (1978) to ensure attainment of Namibian independence in 1981. 20. Unfortunately, despite the constructive exchange of views at that meeting, South Africa’s refusal to set a date for the cease-fire caused a suspension-with unforeseeable consequences-in the lengthy process of negotiations which would have made it possible to achieve a negotiated settlement in the immediate future. That attitude frustrated the dialogue between the various parties that had gone to Geneva to define prerequisites for a peaceful settlement: inter ulia, the front-line States, the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the representative of the Chairman of that organization, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sierra Leone, as well as representatives of other important countries, such as Nigeria and the five Western Powers which over the preceding four years had made tireless efforts to design and implement the United Nations plan for Namibia. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations himself indicated in his report, the outcome of the Geneva meeting must give rise to the most serious international concern. 21. However, the failure does not mean that the long series of negotiations in which the United Nations has been involved for several years now has been a waste of time. The settlement plan contained in Security Council resolutions 385 (1976), 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) remains fully in effect; those resolutions still constitute the basic framework for achieving Namibia’s peaceful transition to independence. The creation of a demilitarized zone, the deployment of UNTAG, the organization of free elections to be supervised by the United Nations, and the rejection of any internal settlement continue to be the fundamental points that should guide our efforts to achieve peace, However, it is no longer possible in our work to forget the path we have travelled, or the time that has elapsed without our having been able to achieve the goal of such complex negotiations. The plan contained in the aforementioned Council resolutions must be implemented without delay. 22. Since 1966, when the General Assembly, in accordance with resolution 2145 (XXI) assumed direct administration of the Territory of Namibia until it achieved final independence, the United Nations has borne the primary responsibility for the Territory of Namibia and is in duty bound to give its people independence, no matter what obstacles may exist. Other speakers who have preceded me have reiterated quite accurately here what the fundamental milestones are in the United Nations doctrine concerning the question of Namibia. Therefore, I do not wish to repeat a lengthy list of resolutions either of the General Assembly or’ of the Council, or the learned opinion of the International Court of Justice. “The continued occupation by South Africa the Territory of Namibia, contrary to the ‘esQIEf tions of the United Nations, is a persistent elemert; of conflict in the entire region. We consider that that illegal occupation must be brought to an end c quickly as possible, and therefore we have ~~2 ported [all] resolutions [adopted at the thirty-fourt2; session of the General Assembly] reaffirm.ing the right of the Namibian people to self-determmation . freedom and independence, and the terrlto,jai integrity of a united Namibia”.* 24. The forward thrust of the forces of liberation constitutes an irreversible historic tide the aims Bf which are gradually being achieved, The cornmemoration last year of the twentieth anniversary of the: adoption of General Assembly resolution 1514 CXv, and the accession to independence of countries which like Zimbabwe, had to travel an arduous path in or-&& to achieve liberty, should provide an example and an encouragement to us to solve as soon as possible the difficult situation created by the illegal occupation by South Africa of the Territory of Namibia. As we have pointed out on other occasions, it would Serve little purpose for the liberation movements to be ready to enter into dialogue if the Governments wfiich exercise effective control over the Territories do lnat take the necessary steps to achieve a just and lasting solution. Thus, SWAP0 has given evidence of great political qualities and on repeated occasions has demonstrated a constructive attitude in the search for solutions to the problem of Namibia, making clear its agreement with the United Nations plan contained in Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978). 25. It is also necessary to emphasize the positive attitude demonstrated on numerous occasions by the front-line States, which have engaged in a standing dialogue with the five Western Powers of the contact group and with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Namibia. I should at this time like to join those other delegations which have thanked the Secretary-General for his tireless efforts to find a just solution to the problem that is before us. 26. With regard to the various meetings that have been held within a regional framework to deal with the question of Namibia, we should like to emphaSi*ze among the most recent ones the extraordinary ZZ~I~- isterial meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries, held this month at Al&e@* Among its conclusions, we should like to emphasiZe the meeting’s support for the inalienable right to self* determination and independence of the people of Namibia; the reaffirmation that independence she dd be achieved in Namibia’s entire territory, with no 27, Spain, from its seat in the Security Council, would like to support all efforts that have been made to date-without any slackening of energy-to ensure that the speedy liberation of the people of Namibia may he achieved and that the majority will be able to express its views in an election supervised by the United Nations. Any settlement without the direct participation of the Organization would not be advisable, Similarly, we reject the reinforcement of South Africa’s military presence, the arbitrary detention of a great number of patriots and the repeated acts of intimidation committed not only within the borders of the Territory that is illegally occupied by South Africa, hut also against the neighbouring countries. 28. While it is true that problems cannot be solved by words alone, it is no less true that it is certainly realistic to negotiate speedy and effective solutions, as has been indicated in the Charter of the United Nations, which established the Security Council as the principal body responsible for the achievement of concrete solutions to situations of conflict. We consider, however, that the application of indiscriminate drastic measures would perhaps not constitute the best means of achieving the negotiated solution we advocate. Such measures, according to studies made by specialized bodies of the Organization, would have a boomerang effect on the countries which are most interested in achieving a solution to the problem of Namibia and which are currently suffering most from the imbalance that exists in the region. We should like to think that it is yet not too late for a negotiated solution, so long as all the parties to the conflict, and fundamentally South Africa, renounce all delaying tactics and accept the will of the international community. 29. In conclusion, I should like to join in the urgent appeal that the Secretary-General made to South Africa to reconsider as speedily as possible its position relating to the immediate implementation of resohnion 435 (1978).

The next speaker is the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, to whom the Council has extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. 1 invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement. 31* Mr. ABDULAH (Chairman, Special Committee On the Situation with regard to the Implementation 32. I should also like to say, Mr. President, how happy and gratified I am to see you presiding over the deliberations of the Council on this occasion, The commitment of the people and Government of Ireland to the cause of the colonial peoples in regard to selfdetermination and independence is a matter of record. 33. This series of meetings of the Security Council comes at a time when the effort of the international community to bring about a definitive negotiated solution for Namibia has once again floundered on the rock of obduracy so blatantly displayed by the minority regime in Pretoria, These meetings of the Council are a demonstration of the serious concern shared by members of the Group of African States, members of the non-aligned movement and, indeed, of the international community as a whole at the current turn of events with regard to the Territory and underscore our determination to see that all effective measures open to the Organization are taken to eliminate a situation which constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security. Moreover, the open defiance by South Africa of the will of the international community is a damaging affront to the Organization, since it undermines the very principles on which the United Nations was founded. 34. As the United Nations body entrusted with the task of ensuring the full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [Gene~~rl Asset?~hly ,usolution 1514 (XV)], it has been the Special Committee’s consistent position that, given the refusal of the South African authorities to comply with the demands of the international community with respect to Namibia, given their continued resort to force to perpetuate their illegal domination of the Territory, and given their repeated acts of aggression against their neighbours, the full and effective application of measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations will be the key to the speedy restoration of peace, justice and freedom to the Namibian people., The validity of this position of the Committee has, I trust, been more than amply demonstrated. Indeed, the wellknown developments since the adoption of Council resolution 435 (1978) and the dismal failure of the socalled pre-implementation meeting at Geneva resulting from South Africa’s devious and dilatory tactics, have clearly unmasked the true intent of the Government of South Africa: this has been to earn the time, under the guise of negotiation, to consolidate its domination 36. It is against the background I have just outlined that we in the Committee view the present situation obtaining in Namibia. The repeated attempts to bring about an independent, stable, self-governing, democratic Namibia by the exercise of reason through negotiations at an international level have not brought about the desired results. It is indeed past the time to proceed forthwith with other alternatives. The adoption by the Security Council of a comprehensive programme of economic sanctions, on the one hand, and the extension by the international community of all possible assistance to the struggling people of Namibia under the leadership of SWAPO, on the other, is the very least we can expect if we are not to see the present armed struggle degenerate into a fullscale war with all its dire consequences. 37. Before I close, may I be permitted to express my deep appreciation to the States members of the OAU for having taken this important initiative to call for this series of Council meetings on the situation in Namibia. With the full co-operation of the members of the movement of non-aligned countries, I have no doubt whatever that the decisions adopted by the Council during this series of meetings will prove to be a decisive factor in restoring to the people of Namibia their long-denied human dignity and freedom. Delay is the worst form of denial. 38. In conclusion, I should like to pay a particular tribute to the Secretary-General, for his tireless endeavour in the search for a satisfactory solution to the problem of Namibia.

For four years my country, together with the four other members of the contact group, has been engaged in a continuous, tireless quest for a peaceful and internationally accepted solution for the painful problem of Namibia. 40. Since the submission of the settlement plan by the five Powers [S//2636], negotiation has gone through 41. When South Africa and SWAP0 accepted the: plan, when the Security Council adopted resolution 435 (1978), we thought that our goal-the emergenec of a free and independent Namibia-was finally go- “% to be reached. Naturally, we were disappointed that problems arose subsequently regarding the imew,,- tation and implementation of the settlement PIan Many people thought in the spring of 1979 that nego& tion had been compromised once and for all. Never, theless, tirelessly, means to resume negotiations were sought out and found. 42. The proposal put forward in 1979 by the late President Neto of Angola to create a demilitarized zone on the northern border of Namibia enabled us at the time to resume negotiations. The progress made and the good will that seemed to prevail on all sides at the time rekindled the hope that in a reasonable time independence might be achieved by Namibia. me goal of the Geneva meeting held from 7 to 14 January last was to agree on a date to start implementing resolution 435 (1978). 43. The failure of the Geneva meeting disappointed us. We especially understand the bitterness of the African countries because we ourselves witnessed the determination to succeed within the delegation. of SWAP0 and the delegations of the front-line States. Nigeria and the OAU. On the other hand, the arguments used by the members of the South African delegation did not seem to us sufficient to justify postponing the entry into force of the settlement plan - 44. Since the end of the Geneva meeting, the countries members of the contact group have thought about the attitude to be adopted. Both because We were faced by a new situation and because a change Q,f Administration had occurred in one of the five Powers 9 the period of reflection of the contact group was longer than certain people had expected. Several speakers blamed us at the resumed thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly for not having proposed anything new, and even for being silent, Some delegations concluded that recourse to force and enforcement measures would now have to take over from negotiation- 45. Can anyone really believe that the appeal in the= Security Council for comprehensive mandatory sanctions could enable Namibia to achieve independence in 1981, which was the goal of the Genev’” meeting? We for our part do not believe that it cotif d - 47. My delegation is convinced that the time for negotiation has not passed. The positions of the parties are not so far apart that no hope remains. 48. Although disappointing, the Geneva meeting was not, we think, useless. The objections raised by one delegation had nothing to do with the validity of the United Nations plan. The parties to the settlement accept, as does the international community as a whole, the independence of Namibia, the holding of free elections and the deployment of UNTAG on the Territory of Namibia. No one has challenged resolution 435 (1978). The problem raised by the South African delegation had to do with &he impartiality of the United Nations and trust between the parties. I should like to observe in passing that there would be no problems of distrust had South Africa followed, in respect of Namibia, the policy that has been followed by Powers entrusted with Mandated and Trust Territories. There would be no problem of distrust quite simply because, under this hypothesis, there would have been an independent Namibia more than 20 years ago; there would have been no SWAP0 since there would have been an internationally recognized Government of Namibia. 49. In our view, resolution 435 (1978) must remain the solid basis for any future solution, If arrangements should prove to be still necessary with regard to the plan, that could only be the case within the framework of the United Nations. 50. We must now consider the ways and means to overcome the obstacles that emerged in Geneva, in order to implement resolution 435 (1978), thus achieving our common goal. Fears have been expressed concerning equal treatment of the parties as well as the democratic future of the Territory. We feel that these apprehensions can be allayed. The international community should be able to provide the assurances necessary to restore a climate of trust which is indispensable to make progress, 51. It is in that direction that we feel we should proceed. As is stated in the communique published in London on 23 April [S/14457, annex] and as was stated in the Council by the representative of the United Kingdom [227/st nzeeting, prcr. 881, it is towards that goal that the countries members of the contact group are now committed. It is too early to submit any precise proposals, but that is the way in which we wish to work, 52* To us that would seem to be the only valid way. Whatever resentment and bitterness may have accu-

The next speaker is the representative of Guyana. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. President, I should like first to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. 55. The abortive pre-implementation talks at Geneva last January saw the climax of the international community’s patient and reasoned dialogue with South Africa designed to achieve the decolonization of Namibia. The brutal and cynical fashion in which South Africa wrecked those talks demonstrated unambiguously the Pretoria regime’s determination at all costs to maintain its colonial presence in Namibia and to frustrate the efforts of the international community to bring about the independence of that Territory. In a sense our presence here today bears witness to the futility of our forbearance. But, more significantly, our presence here is testimony to our resolve to apply the necessary pressure that South Africa’s intransigence has so long demanded in the face of its inflexibility, deviousness and procrastination. It is the recognition of the gravity of the disquieting developments concerning the Namibian question that has led so many statesmen to appear before the Council to demand that it respond in appropriate measure to the challenge posed by South Africa’s refusal to implement United Nations decisions on Namibia, and to the consequential dangers that such an attitude implies for peace and stability in the region. 56. The grave situation that has necessitated these meetings of the Council cannot be resolved by compromise solutions. The long history of our consideration of the question of Namibia has been one of compromise. It was within the spirit of accommodation that the Council adopted resolution 435 (1978), laying down the basis on which Namibia’s independence could be achieved and giving rise to some optimism that a decisive hurdle had been cleared on the road to freedom for the occupied Territory. The passage of time has shown that, whereas SWAPO, the sole and legitimate representative of the Namibian people, and the vast majority of the international community saw compromise as a speeding up of the decolonization process, South Africa, on the contrary, saw it as an expedient to delay Namibia’s freedom indefinitely. To 57. It is distressing, therefore, that, in spite of a clear pattern of South African deceit and evasiveness over the years, culminating in the theatricals at Geneva, conveniently timed initiatives are being taken that would suggest that further concessions need to be made to placate South Africa. Does not the evidence of South Africa’s past behaviour show that it regards no concession as final? Is it not clearly obvious to all by now that South Africa’s appetite for concessions from the international community on the question of Namibia’s independence cannot be sated? And it cannot be sated because South Africa has no interest in a solution that means the end of its occupation of Namibia and the freedom of the Territqry. 58. A framework for the independence of Namibia exists. It is to be found in resolution 435 (1978), a resolution that enjoys international consensus and for which the five Western Powers have a special responsibility. To modify this resolution or to deviate from its principles simply to satisfy the tactical demands of South Africa would be to call into question our seriousness of purpose and our commitment to a just settlement of the Namibian question. It is only on the basis of this resolution and within the United Nations that initiatives for a final and peaceful solution can be taken. 59. What must concern us is the equivocation and inconsistency of the five Western Powers as shown in their uncertain commitment to the spirit and letter of resolution 435 (1978). The timidity with which the Western countries have sought to enforce a resolution of which they were the architects and for which they obtained the support of the international community owes much to the primacy iif the strategic and economic considerations that continue to distort a simple, straightforward question of decolonization and to make Namibia a focal-point of East-West confrontation. Such an outlook is completely at variance with that of most member countries of the international community and is responsible for the obduracy of the South African racists because of their belief that in the last resort their Western friends will not be prepared to apply the kind of pressure that will end South Africa’s illegal occupation of Namibia. 60, Given the conduct of Western countries so far, there is no reason to dispute South Africa’s assessment of Western priorities. The readiness of the West to defer to the South African point of view forces us to face squarely the question of whether the role of Western countries is one of mediation or of tacit alliance with South Africa. It is by resolute action in the Council that those key Western countries can allay the legitimate fears that have arisen about the true 62. We are certain that our diplomatic efforts here will supplement the intensified struggle of SWAP0 in its war to rid Namibia of South African occupation forces. SWAP0 has always stood ready to seek a negotiated solution to the Namibia conflict at the bargaining table, but it has always been conscious that in the final analysis it would be the progress it made on the battlefield that would determine the outcome of the liberation struggle. Events have shown that it is the military option that SWAP0 must now exercise to deal with South African aggression and intransigence, The international community must accordingly give those valiant fighters for freedom the maximum support possible for the struggle both on and off the battlefield. Support must also be given to those front-line States that are the constan’t targets of Pretoria’s bestial attacks, 63. The decolonization of southern Africa is a process that may encounter temporary setbacks, but it cannot in the long run be stopped. Guyana is convinced of the inevitable victory of the liberation struggle. It is a victory that can be hastened by the imposition of sanctions by the Council.

I should now like to make a statement in my capacity as representative of IRELAND. 65. I can scarcely begin, as many others have done, with kind and flattering words addressed to the President, though it is true, of course, that I do wish him well. However, I should like to express my good wishes in person to my immediate predecessor, Ambassador Florin, now that he has returned to New York, and to thank him for his work as President of the Council during the month of March, 71. Ireland fully supported the 1966 decision of the General Assembly to terminate the Mandate. It also welcomed the Security Council’s decision of 1969 to assume its responsibilities in the new situation.,We did so because the Irish Government considered, even at that stage, 11 years ago, that it was the Security Council, and the permanent members in particular, which had the responsibility and the power to bring South Africa’s illegal presence to an end. Indeed our then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aiken, had stated that position as far back as 1966. 67, In 1920 South Africa received a Mandate from the League of Nations in respect of the former German territory of South West Africa, renamed Namibia in 1968. It was charged with promoting “to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress ofthe inhabitants of the Territory”.” When the League of Nations went out of existence and yielded place to the United Nations, South Africa, unlike other Mandatory Powers, declined in 1946 to place the Mandated Territory under the new United Nations Trusteeship System. In 1949 it declined even to continue submitting reports to the United Nations on the Territory, as it was obliged to do under Article 73 e of the Charter. Nor would it accept the 1950 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice,+’ which held that in the changed circumstances after the Second World War the functions of supervision under the Mandate should be exercised by the United Nations. 72. That South Africa’s presence was illegal was soon clarified beyond any doubt through an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1971.’ This stated explicitly that South Africa was under obligation to withdraw from Namibia immediately, and that Member States of the United Nations were under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa’s presence there. I emphasize the word “obligation”. In its resolution 301(1971), the Security Council agreed with those conclusions of the Court, and since then it has sought to ensure that they are put into effect. 73. A new and serious effort to do that began with the adoption of Council resolution 3115 (1976). The Council declared in that resolution that it was imperative that free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations should be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity. But those proposals were in outline only. What was needed was a specific set of proposals and a specific plan through which they could be implemented. That came the following year, when the five Western members then on the Security Council engaged themselves actively in the search for an internationally acceptable solution on the basis defined by the Council one year previously. 68. But the United Nations effort continued. An rrd hoc committee of the General Assembly in the early 195Os, a good offices committee from 1957 onwards, and a special United Nations mission in 1962 all failed -ultimately because of South Africa’s attitude, It is true that South Africa drew back from its initial intention to annex the Territory formally. But over that period it applied step by step to Namibia many of the Policies of qmthcitl which it was also imposing on its own people, as well as the repressive measures necessary to enforce those policies. 69. A new phase began in the 1960s. After a further case in the International Court of Justice” had failed because the Court held that the countries that brought it had no standing to do so, the General Assembly decided to terminate the Mandate, That decisive resolution of 1966 [resolrction 2/45 (XXI) J declared that since South Africa had no other right to administer the Territory, South West Africa was henceforth a direct responsibility of the United Nations. In 1967 the Assembly established the United Nations Council for Namibia [wwlution 2248 (S-V)]. It then formally asked the Security Council to take effective measures to ensure the removal of what was now the illegal presence of South Africa in the Territory. 74. That was indeed a hopeful development and my Government welcomed the plan which the five Powers proposed [S/126.36]. We welcomed, too, Council resolution 435 (1978), which endorsed detailed settlement proposals based on that plan. We saw it as a serious and practical effort to bring Namibia to independence undertaken by those in the best position to carry it through. We also saw it as a new and welcome attempt to solve by peaceful means within a United Nations framework an international problem which had so far proved intractable. 75. Much thought went into the plan but progress in carrying it out was painfully slow. Nevertheless, agreement was reached over the following years on many aspects of the proposals and how they would be implemented. Particular efforts were made during 70* In March 1969, the Security Council addressed helf to the problem for the first time. In its resolution 264 (1969), the Council recognized the termination of 76. Yet the key question, as always, remained. What was the real attitude of the Government of South Africa’? They accepted in principle the United Nations proposals for an internationally acceptable settlement but, while continuing to discuss them, they tried at the same time to promote an internal settlement in late 1978 through unilaterally organized elections and arrangements. That effort was rightly rejected by the international community and it was declared null and void by the Security Council in its resolution 439 (1978). 77. However, by the end of last year, after much painstaking negotiation, it seemed as if the long and wearisome history might at last be coming to a satisfactory end. The Geneva meeting in January 1981 was to be the final stage. It was arranged to promote confidence and to get firm agreement on a date for a cease-fire so that the proposals of three years earlier might now be implemented. But at Geneva, despite the high expectations in all quarters and every evidence of good will on the African side, South Africa declared, according to the report of the Secretary-General of 19 January 1981, that “it would . . . be premature to proceed” [S/14333. para. 161. 78. Premature to proceed! Sixty years after the original Mandate was granted; 35 years after the General Assembly first rejected South Africa’s wish to annex the Territory [wsolution 65 (I)]; 30 years after the International Court of Justice found that South Africa was bound to submit to the supervision and control of the General Assembly;4 15 years after the Mandate was ended [Geuernl Assembly wsolrrtiolz 2145 (XX/)]; 10 years after the Security Council, in agreement with the World Court, found South Africa’s presence illegal and ordered it to leave [resolution 301 f/971)]; 3 years after the detailed proposals were put forward [s/12636]; 2 years after South Africa informed the Secretary-General by letter that it had “decided to co-operate in the expeditious implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978)” [S/12983, NI~IZL>X]. After all of that, South Africa finds it premature to proceed. 79. Was there ever in recent history a transition to independence so thoroughly prepared and so carefully 80. What can one possibly say in answer to this plea? Let us, nevertheless, make the effort and try to understand. 81. We have carefully read all of the documents and in particular the Secretary-General’s report on the Geneva meeting, document S/14333. We have listened carefully to the South African statement made earlier in this debate [226&h meeting]. It is still difficult to understand. 82. It seems as if the reasons-at least the overt reasons-which South Africa has given for its refusal so far to implement in practice what it accepted in principle in 1978 really amount to two: first, it claims that the United Nations would not be impartial; and secondly, it professes a fear, on behalf of those whom it describes as the people of Namibia, that implementation of the plan might lead to “one man, one vote, one time” [S/14346, pura. 71. 83. The basic question for us at this stage is whether these reasons can possibly be genuine, or are they rather a pretext for a refusal to carry through the plan in the hope that changed international circumstances may allow South Africa to retain control over Namibia? In other words, to put it bluntly, the real question for us now is one of good faith: what South Africa itself calls trust and confidence-but not, as it says, the good faith of the United Nations and of the world community but that of South Africa itself. 84. Let us, however, suppose for a moment that the South African concerns are genuine and see how they can be answered. 85. On the first point, that of impartiality, one fact should be obvious, though it is sometimes obscured. That is, that under the plan endorsed by Security Council resolution 435 (1978), and, of course, without prejudice to the international legal position, it would not be the United Nations which would organize the elections: the United Nations would supervise and control the elections; the South African administration would remain in place until independence. So the argument that the United Nations might not be impartial is rather specious. 86. So too is the argument that the United Nations is partisan because it has given recognition and some limited support to SWAPO. It is true that the General Assembly recognized SWAP0 as the “sole and authentic representative” of the Namibian people 93. But if, nevertheless, the point is felt to have substance, and if that were all that remained, then I believe that it too could be met, granted one further display of that good will which was so evident on one side at Geneva. 94. What is not acceptable, however, is that this point, which was first put forward on the South African side quite recently, after years of negotiation on other issues, should now become a reason to call into question and reopen the whole effort to bring Namibia to independence on the basis of the settlement plan endorsed in resolution 435 (1978), a plan which South Africa, according to its public position, still says it is in principle willing to implement. 87. A further important point, which I note from the report of the Secretary-General of 24 November 1980, is that his representative, Mr. Urquhart, reiterated during his visit to Pretoria that: “All participants in the political process would, at the commencement of the transition period and thereafter, be placed on an equal footing by UNTAG, which would be directly responsible for implementation.” [S/14266, ~NIYI. 12.1 95. On this last point-the need to keep to the framework already agreed-I cannot do better than quote another distinguished source whose views thereon deserve attention. I refer to the opening two sentences of a letter of 29 August 1980 to the Secretary-General, which is included in the documents of the Council: 88. We believe that the commitment already made by the United Nations, which we could readily endorse, can easily provide the basis for a resolution of this issue of impartiality in so far as it may have any substance: and indeed that was evident at Geneva. “The people of South West Africa/Namibia and the South African Government are determined to conclude successfully the negotiations of the past three and a half years to bring the Territory to independence. During this time, much has been achieved and it is in the interests of all concerned that these achievements should not be forfeited.” [S/14139, parN. I,] 89. What of the second basic issue raised by South Africa and referred to again when it spoke here on Wednesday last? That is, the fear which it professes that the electoral process in Namibia would result in practice in “one man, one vote, one time”. 90. I do not believe that South Africa’s fears will prove to be true but I cannot help retorting that even if those fears were to prove well founded, then at least the people of Namibia would in that event have had one free election more than either they or the majority of the people of South Africa itself have ever been allowed in all of their lives under white South African rule. A better answer, of course, is that, like other nations, the people of Namibia as a whole must have the right they have never had so far to determine for themselves their own destiny as a people, including the political structures under which they want to live. 96. The author is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, and the date is within the past year. We may doubt in many respects South Africa’s will to proceed, but the Minister is certainly right in saying, as he did, that it is in the interests of all concerned that what has been achieved over three and a half years should not be forfeited-as I believe it would be if we were now to abandon the framework within which it was achieved. 97. Of course, it must be clear from all that I have said that my delegation remains deeply sceptical about South Africa’s underlying intentions in a larger sense. Yet to admit failure now, or to change course in some fundamental way from the effort to bring South Africa to carry out in practice what it accepted in principle in 1978-that is, the future independence of Namibia on the basis of resolution 435 (1978)-would have momentous consequences. 91. But underlying the point made by South Africa there appears to be a fear for minority rights in a future Namibia. One cannot but marvel at this concern for minorities shown by a Government which has itself always ruled Namibia in the sole interest of one minority, and which represses and disenfranchises the great majority of the people of its own country. 98. What is needed instead at this time, in our view, is the following: a reaffirmation of resolution 435 (1978); a further effort on that basis and within that framework to meet and resolve any remaining obstacles, to the extent that they are not specious; and a 92. But perhaps others with a better right than South Africa may feel that concern about this point is legitimate. I do not think they need to be afraid in practice that there will be oppression of minorities in the inde- 1 Il. If this sustained effort which we are making to avert division in the Council does not succeed, then my delegation will have no other option but to address itself carefully to every aspect of the draft resolutions which may come before us to see how best we should vote-with realism but with a clear intention to send to South Africa that signal of firmness of purpose which we believe’each member of the Council should send, But our major effort’is still to avoid a division in the Council at this time. 107. Beyond this, such an outcome would also disappoint greatly all those who might be ready to take a lesson from such a sustained effort based on unity in the Council, and who could come to see it as an example of how a major international problem can be addressed and solved on a peaceful basis, through common accord. 108. What we need here most at this moment, therefore, is not division and disagreement through stubbornness on either side, not a clash of will which leaves both sides angry and our common purpose damaged, but a clear signal lo South Africa of our unity and common determination. 112. I pray that this effort will succeed, since I believe that unity in the Council, along with firmness of purpose in our common commitment to what has been agreed, is the signal that we most need to send from this major debate to advance our aim-the early independence of Namibia. 109. That common purpose must be to see Namibia at last become independent through a process of free and fair elections under United Nations supervision and control, within the framework set by Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), and patiently negotiated over three years. If any genuine obstacles remain, they can be resolved quickly to the extent that they are genuine. But they must be resolved without basic change in what is already agreed, or in the framework within which it was agreed. For my part, I say again that Ireland’s aim is to see Namibia become independent within a year, and then we want to welcome it here as a Member of the United Nations, rim, Plenary Meetbgs, 4th meeting, para. 133. .1 Reproduced in O,fficicrl Recwds qf the Gorerd Assotibly, Sixth Sessh, Artrrexcs, agenda item 38, document A/1901, appendix 1. 4 ItrterrtcM~td Statrrs qf South West A,fkw, Ahisory Opithtc I.C.J. Reports 1950, p, 128. s Sorrth West Africa, Second Phosc, Judgmo~t, I.C.J. Reports 110. The Irish delegation commits itself to that aim. We want to see the Council united in its effort to bring it about and we shall continue to work, as we have been working since this debate began one week ago, to try to avert a division in the Council which we believe 1966, p. 6.