S/PV.2288 Security Council

Members of the Council have before them document S/14556, containing the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of consultations. I wish to draw members’ attention also to the following documents: S/14549. letter dated I5 June 1981 from the representative of Grenada to the President of the Council; S/14550, letter dated I7 June from the representative of Jordan to the President of the Council; S114551. letter dated I7 June from the representative of the Philippines to the President of the Council; S/14552, letter dated I7 June from the representative of Suriname to the SecretaryGeneral;~S/l4553. letter dated I7 June from the Acting Executive Secretary of the Organization of African Unity to the President of the Council; and S/14559. letter dated I8 June from the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the President of the Council. 3. The first sneaker is Mr. Siavard Eklund, Director General of thi lntemational itomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to whom the Council, at its 22S4th meeting. extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. 4. On behalf of the Council, I thank Mr. Eklund for having been kind enough to appear before the Council. 1 invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statcmeut. 5. Mr. EKLUND: 1 consider the invitation cxlcndcd to me by thr Council to participate in the present debate as recognition of the importance of the statutory responsibilities of IAEA. I regret that. owing to circumstances Iwyond my control. I could not be here 500111)1’. 7. May 1 begin by recalling that this matter was considered by the Board of Governors of the IAEA last week, on 9 June and thereafter, at its regular session, as a special item entitled “Military attack on Iraqi nuclear research centre and its implications for the Agency”. In this connection, the resolution adopted by the Board on 12 June as a result of its deliberations has been placed before the Security Council in document S/14532, in accordance with the request of the Board. The Board also reauzqted me to iransmit to the Council the summary iecords of the relevant oroceedinns of the Board. and thsv have been dispatched to-the Council f&m Vienna (Sll4532lAdd.l]. 8. I considered it my duty to report immediately to the Board of Governors of the Agency on that air attack. which is a source of arave international concern. In my statement at the $ening meeting of the Board on 9 June.’ I informed the Board that according to the Agency’s records the following nuclear facilities existed in Iraq. 9. First, a pool-type light water moderated research reactor using fuel with 10,36 and 80 per cent enriched uranium. That reactor was supplied by the Soviet Union and came into operation in 1967. Agency inspections started in hiay 1973 following iraq’s adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons fGenera/ Assembly resolufion 2373 (XXII), annex1 and the subseauent conclusion of the required safeguards agreement. Since then, periodic inspections, the last of which was in January 1981, reveeled no non-compliance with the safeguards agreement. IO. Secondly. Tamuz-i and Tamuz-2 reactors, which are of tho Osiris type, developed in France. Tamuz-1 is a &megawatt thermal tarik-pool research reactor; Tunuz-2 is a SOO-kilowatt thermrl research motor end It associated with the Tamuz-I -or. Tbo&I of those reactors has 93 per cent enriched uranium. Those two reactors were supplied by France. The construction of the reactors was first inspected by Agency safeguards inspectors in September 1979. An initial quantity of fuel. containing about 12 kilograms uranium, was delivered in June 1980and was inspected upon arrival. That fuel was last inspected in January 1981. Those inspections revealed that no nuclear material was missing. accounted for. 12. All those facilities and that fuel are located at the Tuwaitha research centre and, as indicated earlier, covered by Agency safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement between Iraq and the Agency. 13. The task of the Agency in the implementation of safeguards is to verify that no safeguarded nuclear material is diverted from peaceful purposes. To that end the Agency develops for each facility under safeguards an approach for detecting, by accounting for an inspection at the facility, any anomaly which would indicate diversion-that is, the absence of nuclear material which cannot be properly explained. In a research reactor of the type in question, two diversion strategies are technically possible and therefore have to be countered. The first consists in removing fuel elements and extracting the highly enriched uranium. Therefore, in the first place, safeguards operations have to ensure that fukl elements supplied from abroad are checked on arrival and that, from that moment on, continuity of knowledge is maintained on their location and integrity. The primary measures used for that purpose are counting the fuel elements and identifying them in order to detect dummies. The design of the facility and the fuel elements is such that it provides assurance that the diversion of fuel elements would be detected easily. 14. The second possibility of diversion in a research reactor of the type in question is based on the undeclared production of plutonium. As the fuel elementsconsist of highly enriched uranium, only very small quantities of plutonium can be produced in them and, of course, that plutonium would be under safeguards. Larger quantities of plutonium, perhaps up to the order of one significant quantity-that is, 8 kilograms per year-could be produced only if the core of the reactor were in addition surrounded by a blanket of fertile elements made of natural or depleted uranium. The size and location of that blanket would certainly be such that ordinary visual inspection would mved its presence. IS. It hrs been stated by the Israelis that a laboratory located 40 metres below the reactor-the f&turn was lWr corrected tn four metres-which alle&dly had ti been discovered by IAEA insnectors had been destroyed. The existenfe of a vault’under the reactor that has apparently beet: hit by the bombing MS well known to the inspector;btc. That vault contains the control rod drives and has to be accessible to the staff for maintenance purposes. In order to protect the staff from radiation, the ceiling of the vault consists of a thick concrete slab which in turn is lined with a heavy steel plate and. therefore, thaw space could no1 be used to produce plutonium. 17. As I observed in my statement to the Board of Gnvemors of the Agency,’ this attack on the Iraqi nuclear centre is a serious development with farreaching implications. The IAEA has not since its establishment been faced with a more serious matter that the implications of this development. The Agency’s safeguards system was conceived as, and is, a basic element of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The same system of safeguards is applied to facilities covered by the Tlatelolco Treaty’ and facilities under bilateral safeguards agreements with the Agency. 18. The Agency’s safeguards system is the product of extensive international co-operation. Its basic principles and modus operandi were devised and are constantly being upnraded by the foremost intornational ixpert; in that field. The results of the a&cation of the system are periodically reviewed by tl& Board of Gove;nors and ihe Gene& Conferen& and the 8Yotom has not boon found wantin& its applkatioft‘ is extremely wide. By the ond of 1980 amoxlmatety 98 per cent of the nuclear facilities of &ch the Aiency was aware outside the nuclearweapon States were under Agency safeguards. 19. In fulfilling its responsibilities the Agency has inspected the Iraqi reactors and has not found evidence of any activity not in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nevertheless, a non-Treaty country has evidently not felt assured by our findings and by our ability to continue to discharge our

Let me begin by congratulating our current President, the representative of Mexico, who has acquitted himself with distinction in carrying out his difficult responsibilities, showing so keen a sense of the importance which the international community attaches to these deliberations. 21. May I also congratulate the representative of Japan, who last month earned the esteem of the entire z;;;;:s by managing our affairs with such singular 22. The issue before the Council in the past week -Israel’s attack upon the Iraqi nuclear reactorraises profound and troubling questions that will be with us long after the conclusion of these meetings. The Middle East, as one prominent American observed last week, “provides combustible matter for international conflagration akin to the Balkans prior to World War I”, a circumstance made all the more dangerous today by the possibility that nuclear weapons could be employed in a future conflict. 23. The area that stretches from South-West Asia across the Fertile Crescent and the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean is, as we all know, torn not only by tension and division but also by deeply rooted, tenacious hostilities that erupt repeatedly into violence. In the past two years alone, one country in the area, Afghanistan, has been brutally invaded and occupied, but not pacified. Afghan freedom fighters continue their determined struggle for their country’s independence. Iraq and Iran are locked in a bitter war. And with shocking violence, Libya, whose principal exports to the world are oil and terror, invaded and now occupies Chad. Lebanon has its territory and its sovereignty violated almost routinely by neighbouring nations. Other Governments in the area have, during the same brief period, been the object of violent attacks and terrorism. Now comes Israel’s destruction of the Iraqi nuclear facility. Each of these acts of vioience underminos the stability and well-being of the aroa. Each gravely jeopardixes the peace and securit;r of the entire area. The danger of war and anarchy in this vital strategic region threatens global peace and presents the Council with a grave challenge. 24. My Government’s commitment to a just and enduring peace in the Middle East is well known. Wc have given our full support to the efforts by the Secret%y-General to res&e the war between l& and Iraa. Our abhorrence of the Soviet Union’s invasion and’continued occupation of Afghanistan-against thr 25. As in the past, United States policies in the Middle East aim above all at making the independence and freedom of people in the area more secure and their daily lives less dangerous. We seek the security of all the nations and peoples of the region: the security of all nations knowing that a neighbour is not seeking technology for purposes of destruction; the security of all peoples knowing that they can live their lives in the absence of fear of attack and do not daily see their existence threatened or questioned: and the security of all people displaced by war, violence and terrorism. 26. The instability that has become the hallmark and the history of the Middle East may serve the interests of some in the Council; it does not serve our interests, it does not serve the interests of our friends, be they Israeli or Arab. We believe, to the contrary, that the peace and security of all the nations in the region is bound up with the peace and security of the area. 27. It is precisely because of my Government’s deep involvement in efforts to promote peace in the Middle East that we were shocked by the Israeli air strike on the Iraqi nuclear facility acd promptly condemned this action, which be believe both reflected and exacerbated deeper antagonisms in the region which, if not ameliorated, will continue to lead tc outbreaks of violence. Lg. However, although my Government has condemned Israel’s act, we know it is necessary to take into account the context of this action as well as its consequences. The truth demands nothing less. As my .?resident, Ronald Reagan, asserted in his press conference: “1 do think that one has to recognise that Israel had reason for concern in view of the past history of Iraq, which has .lever signed a cease-fire or recog nized Israel as a nation, has never joined in any peace effort for that . . . . it does not even recognize the existence of Israel as a country.” With respect to Israel’s aLtack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, President Reagau said, “Israel might have Gncerely believed it was a defensive move,” ally. 30, None the less, we believe the means Israel chose to quiet its fears about the purposes of Iraq’s nuclear programme have hurt, and not helped. the peace and security of the area. In my Government’s view, diplomatic means available to Israel had not been exhausted and the Israeli action has damaged the regional confidence that is essential for the peace process to go forward. All of us with an interest in peace, freedom and national independence have a high stake in that process. Israel’s stake is highest of all. 31. My Government is committed to working with tht - :urity Council to remove the obstacles to peace, We made clear from the outset that the United States would support reasonable actions by this body which might be likely to contribute to the pacification of the region. We also made clear that my Government would approve no decision that harmed Israel’s basic interests, was unfairly punitive or created new obstacles to a just and lasting peace. 32. The United States has long been deeply concerned about the dangers of nuclear proiirelation. We believe that all nations should adhere to the Non- Proliferation Treaty. It is well known that we support IAEA and will co-operate in any reasonable effort to strengthen it. 33. We desire to emphasize, however, that security from nuclear attack and annihilation will depend ultimately less on treaties signed than on the construction of stable regional order. Yes, Israel should be condemned; yes, IAEA should be strengthened and respected by all nations. And yes, too, Israel’s neighbours should recognize its right to exist and should enter into negotiations with it to resolve their diiercnces. 34. The chalknge before the Council was to exercise at Ieast the same degree of restraint and wisdom that we damand of the parties directly involved in the Middk Emt tensions. InfIammatory charges, such as the Soviet statement that the United States somehow encourageri the raid, or that we knew of the raid beforehand, are false and malicious. One can speculate about whose interests are served by such innuendo. Certainly the spirit of truth, restraint and peace are not served by such innuendo. Certainly the process of peace is not forwarded. 35. Throughout the negotiations of the last days, ml Government has sought only to move US closer to the 36. In that search we were aided by the co-operative spirit, restrained positions and good faith of Iraq’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Saadoon Hammadi. We sincerely believe the results will move that turbulent area a bit closer to the time when all the States in the region have the opportunity to turn their energies and resources from war to peace. from armaments to development, from anxiety and fear to confidence and well-being.

The next speaker is the representative of Israel. 1 invite him to make his statement.

This has been a lengthy debate. It has been deliberately protracted in a conscious effort to confound and confuse the issues. In the course of it, we have heard many statements which, regrettably, are simply not worthy of serious consideration. 39. How, for example, are we to regard the profound concern for human life e;:pressed in such high-minded terms by Viet Nam in the-light of the atrocities that it has perpetrated and is perpetrating in South-East Asia? How, for example, are we supposed to react to protestations by the Soviet Union concerning anmession and violaiion of national sovereignty wh<c the Soviet occupation of the whole of Afuhanistan is still going on, an& indeed, naked Soviet a&ession against the Afghan people is still being perpetrated? And when Hungary and Czechoslovakia entered the fray, they in fact only served to remind us that Afghanistan is not the first victim of Soviet aggression. 40. On the other hand, there have been those who have taken part in this debate with great sincerity. Besides them, there are no doubt many outside this chamber for whom the subject of this debate has also raised far-reaching questions. 41. My country has approached the matter before the Council with the utmost seriousness and has raised questions of great import, to which wo have not received any substantive answen. 42. We have been told that Iraq’s nuclear programme was designed for peaceful purposes. Yet solid and decisive evidence points emphatically in the opposite direction. 43. Iraq’s nuclear activities have troubled many Governments and experts around the world. We indicated some of the questions arising in this regard; Beat Copy Available 5 44. Because of their extreme importance, permit me to repeat and enlarge upon those auestions which 1 should like to addiess ‘to the Fotiign Minister of Iraq. First, why did Iraa tirst try in 1974 to acauire a 5OO:megawatt nuclear reactor -of a kind designed primarily to produce !arge quantities of plutonium for military use? Moreover, why is it now trying to buy an up-scaled, Cirene type plutogenic reactor, whose military use is clear, but whose commercial use is not proven? Secondly, why did Iraq insist on receiving a 70.megawatt reactor which has no usable application as an energy source, which does not correspond to any peaceful energy plan and which, incidentally, is far too large for Iraq’s most ambitious scientific needs’! Thirdly, why did Iraq insist on receiving weaponsgrade nuclear fuel, rather than the less proliferant alternative of “Caramel” fuel which it was offered? Fourthly, what is Iraq’s demonstrable need for nuclear energy, given its abundant oil reserves? Fifthly, if Iraq hos a need of this kind for either the short or the long term, why has it not developed a commercial nuclear energy programme? Why has it not made any transactions which would be relevant to such a programme? Sixthly, why, if it is genuinely interested in nuclear research, did it rush to buy plutonium separation technology and equipment that cannot be justified on scientific or economic grounds? Seventhly. why has Iraq been making frantic efforts to acquire natural uranium, wherever and however it can, in at least four continents, some of which uranium is not under IAEA safeguards? Why has Iraq taken the highly unusual step of stockpiling uranium, before it has built power reactors? 45. 1 think that all these questions are fairly intelligible to the layman and must make everyone think. They are certainly intelligible to the expert, who will confirm that tbey point in one direction only -namely, a weapons-oriented nuclear programme. 46. Let me, just for the sake of illustration, elaborate on one of these questions: Iraq’s insistence on receiving weapons-grade nuclear fuel and its adamant rel sal to accept a less prolifcrant variety when offered. The International N!ui.ic;lr Fuel Cycle.Evaluation (INFCE). an international body. convened under the auspices of IAEA, to deal, inrcr~alia, with the nonproWration aspects of the nuclear fLel cycle, was grea:ly concerned with the already wide distribution of enriched uranium rind the production of flssile material in nuclear reactors of the I to 5 megawatt size. not to speak of a 70-megawatt facility like Osirak. Consequently, INFCE has set up study groups under the auspices of IAEA, to make recommendations on the subject. The report of Working Group 8. entitled “Advanced fuel cycle and reactor concepts”. docu ment INFCE/PC/Z/I( of January 1980. is most illuminating. “The trade in and widespread use of highly enriched uranium and the production of fissile materials constitute proliferation risks with which INFCE is concerned.” It recommended that proliferatiou resistance can be increased by: “Enrichment reduction preferably lo 20% or less which is internationally required to be a fully adequate isotopic barrier to weapons usability of 23X1.” 48. In another section of the same report, dealing with French reactors of the Osiris type-which would include Osirak--the authors state: “The Osiris core was coverted from the highly enriched uranium to the low enriched UO2 Caramel fuel, with startup of the reactor in June 1979. The ;;;eral success of the work developed on Caramel . permits Osiris to be completely loaded with Ca&el assemblies.” 49. In layman’s terms, had Iraq so wished, it could have successfully operated Osirak on Caramel-type fuel, thereby at least eliminating the option of diverting weapons-grade nuclear fuel. But it refused to do so, and insisted on receiving weapons-grade enriched uranium. 50. But to come back lo my list of questions as a whole: if Iraq’s representatives could not address themselves to them, other people have done so. They include three eminent French nuclear scientists, who have made a serious examination of these and other disturbing questions related to Iraq’s nuclear develop. merit programme. 51. The French scientists are: George Amsel, Director of Research a~ the Centre National de la Recherche Scientilique, Unit for Solid Physics at the Ecole Normale Sup&ieure; Jean-Pierre Pharabaud. Engineer at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Laboratory of High Energy Physics at the EcoIe Polytechnique; and Raymond Sehe, Chief of Research at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Laboratory of Particle Physics at the Co&e de France. 52. The analysis and conclusions of these three prominent scientists are to be found in a comprehensive memorandum entitled “Osirak et la prolif&ation des armes atomiques”, which they presented to the French Government and public in May of this year. 53. lt is of great interest and relevance to compare their scientific findings and conclusions with the 54, Let us look at what the French scientists say about each of these hypotheses-or, to be more accurate, about these possibilities. Chapter II of their memorandum is entitled “Possibilitis de prolifkration”. Paragraph 5 thereof is headed “Les possibilites d’obtention d’explosifs nucltaires likes & Osirak”. 55. Concerning the uranium path, they indicate that two options exist: (a) the use of the fresh enriched uranium; and (b) the use of slightly irradiated enriched uranium. 56. Even assuming that the diversion of the enriched uranium were to be detected and that the supplier would immediately halt further deliveries of enriched uranium, the authors of the memorandum conclude that Iraq already possesses sufficient weapons-grade material to produce two nuclear bombs. 57. As regards the production of plutonium, the French scientists observe in their memorandum that, by introducing a blanket of natural uranium around the reactor core of Osirak. plutonium can be produced. After the chemical separation of the plutonium. the yield per annum would be sufficient for one nuclear bomb. This separation can be carried out in the facility based on the hot-cell installation supplied to Iraq by Italy. This method does not involve any diversion of the enriched uranium fuel. In addition, plutonium production can be accomplished even if the supplier imposes the use of the less enriched “Caramel” type of fuel in the nuclear reactor. 58. Given the nuclear facilities and materials and the complementary technology that Iraq had at its disposal, lo try to dismiss in the Council either of these paths leading to the manufacture of a nuclear weapon as “groundless hypotheses”, or even to make light of them, is irresponsible. Such an attitude flies in the face of incontrovertible scientific data, readily available to informed observers. 59. Indeed, it also flies in the face of statements by French ofMcids. As moorted in The New York Times of 18 June 1981, Dr. M’ichel Pecqueur, the head of the French Atomic Energy Agency, while trying to defend the 88feomenta between his country and Iraq, conceded that: “in theory the reactor could be used to produce a ‘significant quantity’ of plutonium, which means enough for a bomb, by irradiating a large amount of natural or depleted uranium. ‘6~ plut&ium could then be extracted in a ‘hot-cell’ I&oratory supplied by Italy, although thir reprocessing i\ technically difficult.” 68. Fif’thly, the inspectors must have access to everything relating to fissionable material. However, they are not policemen; they can only inspect what has been declared. Thus, any hot-cells and chemicalseparation facilities constructed in secret elsewhere will escape all inspection. 69. Sixthly, the inspectors within the facility are always accompanied by representatives of the State concerned. 70. Seventhly, the effectiveness of the safeguard measures depends on the co-operation of the country concerned. In this connection, the authors of the memorandum observe that for IAEA and France, Iraq’s good faith has been taken for granted and its assurances at face value, without any guarantees, 61. In another article in The New York Times of lg June, two professors of nuclear science and engineering at Columbia University explain how Osirak provides the neutron bombardment for converting natural uranium into plutonium. In the same article, the chief nuclear attach6 at the French Embassy in Washington is quoted as saying that: 71. Eightly, experience shows that inspections can be blocked for a certai.1 period without causing any reaction. On this point, the authors of the memorandum rightly recall: “the basic design of the French export model, known as Osiris, shows a cavity in the reactor that can hold material for neutron bombardment.” “That is what happened on 7 November 1980 at the beginning of &e Iran-lraq war. when Iraq informed IAEA that the insoectors from the Agency could not at that time get td Baghdad to monit& thk two reactors. A well-informed French source at that time stated: We are in a completely new situation which has not been foreseen in any international treaty.“* 62. In the course of this debate, great play has been made of the fact that Iraq is a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that its nuclear reactors have been inspected periodically by IAEA. Let me again draw the attention of members of the Council to the French scientists’ memorandum. Chapter III is entitled “Les sauvegardes”. It is an extensive analysis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards systems and takes up about one third of the whole paper. Among the more significant points made are. 72. In brief, there are several serious loopholes in the non-proliferation safeguards system that can easily be exploited by a country, such a; Iraq, if it is determined to obtain a nuclear weapon. 63. First, the country being inspected has to approve in advance the name of the individual inspector whom IAEA wishes to designate. The country being inspected can reject the inspector whom the Agency has nominated. 73. The flawi in the safeguards system are now coming into the open. No less an authority than the forme; Director of Safeguards Operations it IAEA in Vienna, Mr. Slobodan Nakicenovic. attested to the inadequacies of the Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards on Austrian Radio on 17 June. Incidentally. Mr. Nakicenovic was appointed Director of Division of Safemuards and Insoections of IAEA in September 1964. H: was initially kesponsible for the development of instrumenta used in the Agency’s inspection work. As Director of the Division, he was charged with the task of implamenting all the safeguards agreements to whkh the Agency was a party. 64. Parenthetically, let me mention in this regard that, according to information submitted yesterday, since 1976 only Soviet and Hungarian inspectors have inspected Osirak. 65. To come back to the scientists’ memorandum: the second point they make is that the frequency of routine inspection8 is a function of the size of the reactor. For Osirak, this means no more than three or four inspections a year. 74. These serious weaknesses in the safeguards system were incisively analysed in ;L Icading article in The Washingtort Post of I6 June I981 entitled “Nuclear Safeguards or Sham”. in which the Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards system was shown to be 66. Thirdly, for routine inspections, advance notice is given. 67. I:ourthly. in principle. t+c po\\ibiky exists of unscheduled inspections. that IZ to say, surprise visits: “is written in such a way that a violation does not technically occur until nuclear material-uranium or plutoniu&-is diverted from its approved use. But this may occur within a few days of its insertion into a nuclear bomb. Since IAEA inspectors come around only a few times a year, the international safeguards system amounts to only an elaborate accounting procedure that relies on the good intentions of the parties being safeguarded.” 75. In these circumstances, it is surely not unreasonable to raise serious doubts about the eflicacy of the Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards system. There is certainly room for grave reservations when the country supposedly bound by these safeguards makes no secret of its ambitions to obliterate another country. 76. In this connection, let me refer to a report in today’s edition of The New York Times based on information from uffLzials and diplomats at IAEA in Vienna. One of them has lifted the veil from Iraq’s nuclear programme. He is quoted as saying: “If you ask whether Iraq had it in mind to make nuclear weapons one day, then I’d say a lot of people at the agency thought it probably did. A lot of things it was doing made sense only on that assumption.” 77. Could it be that this was the reason why Israel was muzzled last week in Vienna and denied the poss’bility of presenting its case to the Board of Go\ :mors of IAEA before that bodv proceeded to condemn my country? _ . 78. There is no question that Iraq regards itself as being in a state of war with Israel. Its leaders admit this openly and have called time and again for the liquidation of my country. Such a flagrant violation of Atticle 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations is apparently perfectly in order. As far as we have been able to ascertain, the Security Council, or for that matter the United Nations as a whole, has never called Iraq to account for this, over the last 30 or so years. It is apparently perfectly in order to use the t&atof force against Israel, to train and send in tQTWI#s to commit mindless acts of murder, and to joi8 in Arab wars of aggression against Israel in 1948, in I%7 and in 1973. and then to retreat to safety, using other Arab countries as a buffer between its heroic armv and Israel. 79. In the light of Iraqi declarations and deeds, and Iraq’s refusal even to sign an armistice agreement with I,<racl. Israel had full legal justification to exercise its inherent right of self-defence to ahort the Iraqi nuclear threat to Israel. 81. In this connection, I cited in my statement of 12 June [228&h meeting] Sir Humphrey Waldock, who observed a few short yexs after Hiroshimu that: “it would be a travesty of the purposes of the Charter to compel a defending State to allow its assailant to deliver the first and perhaps fatal blow. . . . To read Article 5 I otherwise is to protect the aggressor’s right to the first strike.” 82. Yet some of those who have taken part in this debate obviously consider themselves greater authorities in international law that Sir Humphrey Waldock, who happens to be the President of the International Court of Justice. 83. No doubt they would also dismiss the views of another eminent international lawyer. Stephen Schwebel, who was only recently elected to the International Court of Justice, and who in 8 lecture at the Hague Academy of International Law some IO years ago, observed: “Perhaps the most compelling argument against reading Article 51 to debar anticipatory self-defence whatever the circumstances is that. in an age of missiles and nuclear weapons, it is an interpre!:ltion that does not comport with reality.” 84. Serious people do not haughtily brush aside the views of the President of the International Court of Justice and of its judges. Nor are they cavalier about the views of such a-pre-eminent auihority on international law as Professor Myres McDougrl of Yale Law School, who, writing in The American Journal of international Law in l%3, stated: “under the hard conditions of the contemporary technology of destruction, which makes possible the complete obliteration of States with still incredible speed from still incredible distances. the arinciole of eifectivencss requiring that agrcelnents lx Interpreted in accordance with the major purposes and demands projected by the parties could scarccl! hc served by requiring states confronted with necessity for defense to assume the posture of ‘sitting ducks’. Any such interpretation could onlv nlnkc a mockery. both in its acceptahitity IO &tc\ ;tnd in it\ potential application. of the (‘11;~ tcr’-+ major p”r ~WC 85. Indeed, the concept of a State’s right lo selfdefence has not changed throughout recorded history. Its scope has, however, broadened with the advance of man’s ability lo wreak havoc on his enemies. Consequently the concept took on new and far wider application with the advent of the nuclear era. Anyone who thinks otherwise has simply not faced up lo the horrific realities of the world we live in today, and that is particularly true for small States whose vulnerability is vast and whose capacity to survive a nuclear strike is very limited. 86. We have been told in the course of this debate that one cmuot isolate the subject before the Council from the root cause of the Arab-Israel conflict. Israel agrees, and this debate has, if nothing else, been an object lesson of what the root cause of the Arab-Israel conflict really is-that is, the absolute refusal of most Arab States to recognize Israel and its right lo exist. 87. Take, for example, the new Syrian representative whose maiden ipeech (see 22&&h me&g] we had the pleasure of hearing on Tuesday of this week. It goes without saying that Syria deeply laments the smashing of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear capability. With his bosom friend and ally the representative of Iraq sitting at his side. the representative of Syria made his country’s attitude tohards Israel patently clear by describing my country as a “cancer in the region” suffering from “congenital deformities”. He is obviously a soul-mate of the representative of another Arab State with which his country has fraternal relutions. namely the distinguished representative of the Palestinian Arab State of Jordan, who has in the past delicately alluded to bubonic plague and venereal disease in referring to my country. Those epithets are more than mere pejomtives. They demonstrate the inability of most Arab States lo reconcile themselves lo Ismel’s existence and lo its right to exist like any other sovereign State. 88. This, and only this, is the root cause of the Arab- Israel conflict. And there will be no solution lo the conflict un!il the rtiectionist Amb States come lo terms with Israel and negotiate peuce with us. 89. But that does not mean that the Middle East is doomed to live under Ihe threat of nuclear war until a comprohonsive peace is echieved. Israel has dways sumed rhe principle of non-proliferation. In lw8 Israel voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXIII. on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since theu Ismcl has studied carefully various asp& of the l’rcaly as they relate 10 conditions prevailing in the Middle Eus+conditions which, rcgrcltably. preclude Ihe ‘I‘rraty’s implcmen~ation in the region. 91. Almost half the States in the now Arab League --the now Arab League, with its headquarters at Tunis-are not bound by the Non-Proliferation Treaty rdgime. And some Arab States which are parties to the Treaty havo entered reservations specifically dissociating themsolvos from any obligation towards Israel in the con1ox1 of the Treaty. 92. Moreover, other Arab States, also parties to the Treaty, are not only suspected of searching for a nuclear-weapons option but aro known lo have been involved in unsafoguardod transfer of nuclear material. Libya, for instance, was reported in 1979 to be involved in an unsafoguarded international uranium deal between the Niger and Pakistan--that is, two States n9t party to the Treaty. Libya has also purchas:*d several hundred tons of uranium from the Niger, apparently without involving IAEA. 93. Beyond the Middle East, Pakistan is considered lo have all its known nuclear facilities under safeguards. But, as is also well known, it has in parallel embarked on the reprocessing and umnium-enrichmerit courses through the acquisition of unsafeguarded equipment by exploiting loopholes in the export guidelines of the London Club member States. 94. In the light of the foregoing. it is clear that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is no effective guarantee against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. 95. In such circumstances, Israel is of the view that the most effective and constructive step which could be taken would be to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, based on the Tlatelolco model.’ freely arrived a1 by negotiations among all the States concerned and anchored in a binding multilateral treaty to which they would all be signatories. I( is for this reason that Israel has resubmitted its proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The details of that proposal are set out in my letter of IS June to you, Mr. President [S//45~41. While obviously it would not solve the Amblrmel conflict as a whole; we believe that our proposal, if advanced. would constitute a signiflcant contribution to the future well-being and security of all the States of the Middle East. 96. It is for this reason also that Israel has submitted its proposal independent of other efforts being made lo reach :I comprchcnsivc solution lo the ccnflict. Hence Israel’s propos:rl is aI1 unlinked dcul, standitlg on its own. scpar;~tc and independenl from i\n~lhitlg else which may delay its fullilment. Hence. too. I\C‘ have submitted our proposal withoul prcjudicc IO an! polilicnl or It& claim fihich 311~ Of the SlillC\ concerned may have on ;uly other. p8. Yet another biased, anti-Israel resolution by the Council will not bring peace any closer. But much may be achiovod for the common good and security of all the States in the Middle East if they and the States adjacent to the region indicate their consent without dolay to the holding of a preparatory confomnce to discuss tho modalities of a conference whore a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-ffae zone in tho Middle East would be nogotiatod. Israel therefore roitorates its call to all the States concerned to give serious and urgont consideration to our proposal.

I should like to inform members of the Council that I havo just received a letter ftom the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahirya in which he nquests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council’s agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, 1 propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion, without the right to voto, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional NiOS of procedure. It is so decided.

I invite the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to take a place at the Council tablo and to make his statement.

I thank you, Mr. President, and through YOU the other memb&s of the Council, for giving nie <his opportunity. I am sorry to have asked to speak at this time. However, the representative of the United States has chosen the wrong time to attack in all directions, including the direction of my country. 102. Although the item before the Council is the Israeli aggression against Iraq. the United States has chosen to attack everyone. This is the same tactic that has been used by the Israeli representative to divert attention from the issue. In her statement, the United States representative said that: “Libya, whose principal oxports to the world are oil and terror, invaded and now occupier Chad” [porch. 23 above]. Libya, upon tho rcquost from the Government of Chad and on tire basis of a treaty between the two countfiea, &$sthd& gt# an ond to the civil WY In Chad fd ng on there for but I6 years. Libya wants stabi ity and progress in Chad. Also, the situation in Chad affects the security of Libya. Libynn troops have started withdrawing and will leave Chad completely when there is no outside danger to the security of Chad. 103. When the United States representative said, “Israel is an important and valued ally” (IMVU. 29 IO 1~. The PRESlDENT Wcprc~ratiot~ fkom Spanish): Now 1 shall make a statement in my capacity as representative of MEXICO. 10s. The Council is meeting in order to consider a case of aggression, admitted to by the violating State itself, and directed agninst a high-technology installation which was built as the result of international co-operation and the undeniable objective of which was to promote the independence and the progress of a developing country. 106. This act constitutes a serious viola(ion of international legal order and thus produces tensions in the Middle East and tends to cancel any possibility for peaceful settlement in the region. for which so many efforts have been made by the United Nations. 107. We feared the imminence of new acts ot aggression, but nobody would have imagined such violent action, conceived and carried out in u manner so offensive to the Arab nation, to the third world and to the international community as a whole. 108. That act has been committed at one of the most delicate political moments we have exprienced since the Second World War. It is a moment when the super- Powers are attempting to redefine their spheres of influence and when many countries are resisting imprisonment in hegemonistic spheres and are struggling for the aBlrmation of their sovereign rights. for peace and for development. 109. All of this explains the significance of this debate. Few times in the life of the Council have more than 50 speakers come to consider an item. Few times have so many voices been raised to express the snme tWga: rlum, indignation and condemnution. 110. At the end of this lengthy debate it would be dimcult to add a new argument and it is unnecessary to repeat those which IIUVC been so clearly and convincingly put forward already. It would seem more OppO~tUllC lo attempt a SUi~l~li\~y of lh0 StWlllellls which clearly show the convcrgencc of vie\\; ~1’ the spokesrncn of the international community. I I I. The points of convcrgcncc arc II~C foiiowing. 113. Secondly, that attack is totally ul\/ustitlod, since the aggressor State has not offered any proof that the Iraqi installations wore for military purposes. On the contrary, the competent international o J anization and the States which worked on tho p act and contributod to its implamentation have given conclusive and authoritative ovidonco that its nature and its ob]octives wore purely peacofbl. In the face of those tostimonies, there is not much validity in arguments which aro tardy, partial and cannot be provod. 114. Thirdly, the suspicion, invoked by the Oovomment of Israel, which comes from doubtful confidential sources of information, did not in any way authorizo it to commit aggression. nor is it oven a reason for relieving it of responsibility on a psycholo&al lovol. If the uggressor had truly believed that the Iraqi installations entailed a threat to its integrity, it had effective multilateral and bilateral recourses available to it in order to avoid that threat. 1 IS. Fourthly, the reasons on which the Oovommont of Israel bases its contention are as unacceptable as the act of aggression it committed. It is inadmissible to invoke the right to self-defence when no armed attack has taken place. The concept of pravontivo war, which for many years sowed as justincation for the abuses of powerful States, since it loft it to their discretion to dofine what constituted a threat to them, was dofinitively abolished by the Charter of the United Nations. 116. Fiflhly. the absence of formal relations between States in no-way justifies acts of aggression. It if did, the withdnwal of diplomatic Writs would suffice for the initiative of an -armed at&k, as was the usual custom in the past. Invoking a supposed atate of war to conceal ruch actions doas not constitute a v&l ICpr argument either. By tha terms of the Charter, the pr&ibition of the usa of forca is a catopricrl obliption. All war is ilk& 117. Sirthly, Isrwl’s attack on Irq’s nucbu instaltstlons is not an isotated act: it should be seen as the climax of escalating violations of international law. l’hc background to it has already been described both by the Gcncrul Assembly and the Security Council. It includes the annexation of territory by conquest, pcrsistcncc in an illegal occupation, the denial of the inalicnablc rights of the l~alestinian people. and frcqucut acts <f aggression and harkrknt against neighbouring States. 119. Eighthly, the destruction of the nuclear plant, whose purposes woro peacef’ul, revoals an intention to affirm the strategic and technological superiority of ono State over others. It oxomplifies the dangerous trend towards the creation of regional sub-Powers which arrogate to themselves tho right to impose their will bv force in a given neographical area. Those pretonhers to surroiate empire; with autonomous power aro trying to free themselves of all international control and to destroy, for their own benefit. the precarious political equilibrium of our times. 120. Ninthly, aggression against a country that is not a member of any military pact or alliance damages the very principle of non-alignment. Were it to go unpunished, it would call into question the sovereign viability of nations, would encourage hepemonistic claims and would end by forcing the weaker States to seek the protection of the great Powers to shelter themselves from attacks by stronger countries. 121. Tenthly. the warlike initiative which we deplore undermines the foundations of the disarmament process and it challenges the non-proliferation rCgime which has been so carefully built up by the international community. The Treaty on that subject has to date been ratified by more than 100 States; among them we do not find Israel, which could very well have already developed an offensive nuclear capability. Nevertheless. it takes the liberty of attacking another country which has submitted scrupulously to the existing safeguards rtgime. 122. Eleventhly, the action we ure considering entails, to that extent, contempt for the authority of IAEA, as may be seen from the unimpeachable statement just made by the Director General of that &ncy. By casting aspersions on the effectiveness of the competent institution, the Government of lsrael has proved its contempt for the United Nations syatom. It attacks not only the security of a State. but the vary prinoipk of international security. 123. Twelfthly., given that the Iraqi installations were a result of the long efforts of a people to make a qualitative udvancc in the scicutifk and technological field. their destruction amounts to an attempt to restrain the struggle for devclopmcnt. It is a pcrvcrted version of the cliih 4c theory of the international division of labour. which we hi\vc CO\II~~~IU~ with ~hc concept of tbc new intcrnntional economic ardcr. Karcly has tberc been such an explicit uttcmpt lo 124. Thhteenthly~ the argument put forward hem that a country with oil msoumos has no mason to gain l caoas to altoraativo 8ourcos of energy contradicts tho aima to which the lntomatlonal community has sot for itsolf. We advocate a rational and just transition botwoon two 8~: the one in which non-renewable dourno of onorgy have t&on pmcodonco; and the other, in which all countries can develop new energy m8ourcos. To mstriot a nation to the oxclusivo role of hydproduco+deflning it a8 an oil~pmducing country only-l8 memly to m roduoo an old cat& aatum: that of the banana mpubl P c, which, fortunately, tho mvolutionuy outlook of our people8 is changing. 12% Fourteenthly, the continual violations commitgzx? ar 88oc Government call into question the oconomk mlations based on good will which many countries, mine included, maintain with the people of Israel. That oxplalns the fact that many condemnations came tirn Oovommonts that am ffiondly to the 18raoll nation. Out of res t for the ba8ic prlnciplor of intomatlonal p” co-ex atonco, wo annot accopt that our cl08 of co-operation wlth any country rhould servo a8 oncouragomont for or tho instrument of policies of oxpanaion and aggression. 126. Flfteenthly, the view of the international community ia unanimous, as is it8 conviction that the Security Council must act unequivocally to live up to its msponsibility a8 a guarantor of peace. With varying dogmas of omphosir and various nuances, spoakora havo called on us to go beyond mom condemnation and to adopt rnea8ure8, as effective as posslblo, aimed at halting aggmssion and mstoring peaceful alternatives for the solution of conflict8 in the Middlo But, 127. Mexico has reitonted, tkto and again, thrt compliance with princi others am the main do P les and mrpect for the rights of once of weak peoples: Wo have never hesitated to conclomn acts contrary to inter. national law, mgardlesa of the bilateral mlatlons we may maintain with the country that commits them, mgardlo88 of the greatneat of itr powor, and without allowing our judgement to into&m with the respect its pcopI0 doMrw8 fkom ua. 128. scomCortholtoMud~onca WI dmply bolhvo that if wo accopt.dn&n&o~ W$iklkilltpb&~allwtr -Ltmbn wrsdwutpmpIMukooumand acing ou1’80lv08 in a morally untenable position for the fbture. w&id be ad” 129. Abuse of the concept of security in favour of OM! Stclte and against others, which is what is behind this act of aggression, is D blntnnt application of the so. called theory of vital ifiterests. That thesis denies the very principle of the sovereignty of States and 130. The debato which is now coming to an end has shown, through a wido sample of international opinion, that we am reaching the last frontier between tolerance and excess. Tomorrow’s historian will easily detect, in the statements we have heard, evidence of deep concern similar to that felt on the eve of the Second World War. 131. Those past few days arc testimony to a state of universal awamnoss. There is a widely held conviction that an act of such unprecedented gravity, if tolerated. could mark the beginning of an extremely dangerous deterioration of the norms of relulions among States including the unwritten rules which have enihled us to survive in a limited and fragile peace which, .- _-_ nevertheless, allows us to hope. - - 132. Mexico trusts that this mooting will culminate in a responsible and uuanimous decision on the part of tho Council that will mspond to deep consternation of the world and ox ress the resolve of Member States affectively to avo d the recurrence of similar acts and P the fLrthor deterioration of international relations. It is in this rpirit that my delegation will cast its vote. 133. I now resume my functions as PRESIDENT. I understand that Council members arc prepared to vote on tho drafi resolution before them. If there nrc no ottloctions, I shall put the drawl resolution to the vote. 134. First, I shall call on those members of the Council who wish to speak in explanation of their votes befom the voto.

My delegation will voto in favour of the dratt resolution now bcforc the Council. However, because of certain beliefs which wo strongly hold, I fool obliged to proffer a brief explanation of our position on the issues involved. 136. thoi Listening to tho mpmsentativo of Israel, one got saion that the issue the Council wab to detes wa8 whether Iraq possessed a capability to produce nuclear weapons. In his attempt to provo that 8uch wu the CUQ, he quoted sourcou which only W&s and, on the basis of this spewture, h8 triad to justify tho rction t&on. 137. But missing front the statement of the rcpresentativc of Israel was uny mcnlion of the nuclear arsenal which Israel possesses a~ Dimona, where Israel is nlnnufacturing nuclear wcupons with ilnpunity. The representative of Israel procecdcd 10 lecture us once aguin on his proposal for a nuclcur-free zone in the area. 1 will quote the statement which we made on “The Israeli discourse on the need fbr a nuclearweapon-free zone in the Middle East retiinds me of an armed bandit who walks into a courtroom, takes everybody hostage and then lectures the group on the virtues of being a law-abiding citizen.” i2282nd meeting, para. 281. 138. What right does a country not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have to impose itself in a position of policeman vls-d-vls countries like Iraq which are signatories to the Treaty? What right does such a country, acting on mare speculative coqjectum, have to retain the monopoly of nuclear weapons in the region? 139. The facts of the case on which the Council is about to pronounce itself are very clear and are not in dispute; they are admitted by Israel, the perpetrator of this outrageous offence. Save for Israel itself, all who have purticipated in this debate have overwhelmingly asserted that Israel’s destruction of Iraq’s nuclear research centre constituted an unprovoked act of aggression and a grave violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a Member State. for which them can never be justification, either under the lax principles of customary international law or the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. All the participants have characterized the Israeli act of aggrcssion as one which gravely threatens international peace and security and profoundly jeopardizes the prospects for peace in the Middle East. 140. The attack on the Osirak nuclear complex is not an isolated instance but a continuation in the pattern of blatant aggression by Israel against Arab countries, for which the Council and the General Assembly have repeatedly condemned it. 141. In his attempts to justify Israel’s action, the Israeli representative quoted the provisions of Article 5 I of the Charter. But, as has been stated by many members, in order to bring his case under that umbrella. the Israeli representative had to prove an armed attuck. And he has not proved to the satisfaction of the Council that theti was such an armed attack. Anothar requirement of that uticie is that such a matter should be promptly reported before tb Council. 18 it a cohcidence that the mpms6ntative of Israel did not report the matter promptly to the C!tn~ncil after tha attack? It ir in f&et because ha saw thot his country’s actions could not fall within the purview of the Charter. 142. The Isrueli action is morally indefensible and definitely legally untenable and has imponderable consequences for (he laws governing relations among nations. There ure no mitigating circumstances. lnstcad of showing remorse, Israel has openly sworn to rcpe;\t its action against a?y State in the region. 143. My delegation strongly balioves that in this case the Council ought to have acted dccisivoly in accordance with the punitive provisions of the Chartor. We submit that Israel’s systematic arrogance and adamant behaviour are contributed to, in part, by the failure of the Council to assert itself and act to ensure dotermncc. It is for that mason that my deleaation would have wished the Council to invoki the irovisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. We would have firther wished the draft resolution to contain an expression of the fact, overwhelmingly oxpressed in the debate, that Israel’s act was indeed an act of aggression for which there is no justification whatsoever. 144. We have, however, decided to join in supporting the consensus dreft resolution because, in the first instance, it is acceptable to Iraq, a country with which our own eqjoys friendly relations and common solidarity. 145. Also, we support the draft resolution because it rejects Israel’s dangerous notion of the doctrine of self-defence, under which it claims the right to attack a Member State on the basis of the speculative conjecture that a nation engaged in peaceful scientific research might possibly, at an unforeseen time, use its technology for offensive purposes. 146. We wish also to sound a warning to any other reckless adventurer who might desire to emulate Israel that the international community will not countenance such acts of banditry. 147. We also support the draft resolution because it cdl8 upon Israel to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. 148. For those reasons, my delegation will vote for the draft resolution.

During the debate my delegation strongly cmdomaed Israel’s act of aggression against Iraq and supposted the demands of t& lrqi G&ernmen6 the Leeme of Amb States and the non-slimted countries. It Was in full -mat with the Ia& nqiority of 8nmkeraw~dv~~te~for8top 150. On the basis of the outlined principled point of view of the German Democratic Republic, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/14556. The draft resolution expresses strong condemnation of the Israeli act of aggression and deep concern at the danger to international peace and security arising from that unprecedented act. We consider the provisions of the draft A vote wus taken by show of hands. The drqfi resolution was adopted unanimously.’ 152. The PRESIDENT Werpretation from Spanish): I shall now call on those members of the Council who have asked to be allowed to speak following the vote.

The Council has just concluded its debate on the “Complaint by Iraq” by adopting a resolution which has won unanimity in the Council. In view of the lateness of the hour, I should simply like to confine my statement to two comments. 154. First, my delegation is always pleased when the Council achieves consensus in cases where it is called on to take decisions on such serious and important matters as the one on our agenda today. My delegation has always worked to achieve this goal of consensus whatever the subject under discussion. 155. My second comment is that my delegation is displeased at the fact that the decisions contained in the-resolution just adopted by the Council, with which my delegation went along, are far from being commensurate with the serious nature of the act of aggression committed by one Member State against another Member State of the Organisation. It is important to realize that the international community has resolved not only to condemn Israel in the most energetic terms for the acts which it has committed in contempt of the Charter of the United Nations and the laws governing international life, but also and particularly that it has resolved to prevent Israel from pursuing its policies of aggression. It is important for it to be made peltectly clepr that the international community has decided to take the measures provided in the Charter against thosewhoam lltyofmactof dthe ace $ .&r obligationr in rzzA% princi s contained in the Charter which govern our work make this a matter of necessity for us. IS6. Mrs. KIRKPATRICK (United States of America): Like other members of the Council, the United States does not regard the resolution just adopted as a perfect one. 157. With respect to the rehuiution, I Iliust pui~ out that my country voted against the resolution of IAEA 158. Nothing in this msolution will affect my GOV- -emment’s commitment to Israel’s security and nothing in these reservations affects my Government’s determination to work with all Governments of the region willing to use appropriate means to enhance the peace and security of the area.

My delegatibn is pleased that the draft resolution contained in document S/l4556 has just been adopted unanimously, thanks to the assiduous efforts of you, Mr. President, the Secmtary-General and the parties concerned. My delegation welcomes and finds most significant the fact that the Council could reach a unanimous decision on this important issue pertaining to international peace and security. 160. My country has joined in the unanimous adoption of the draft resolution because it contains the minimum common elements voiced by the international community concerning the various problems caused by the incident in question. 161. Now that the resolution has been adopted, my Clovemment believes that Israel should humbly heed the unanimous voice of the Council, and indeed of the international community. It should be stressed that, as stated in the msolution, Israel should “refrain in the future from any such acts or threats thereof ‘. IQ. My delegation wishes on this occasion to mite&the appeal which was made by my Permanent Representative before the Council on IS June that “the countries which UC not party to the Non- Prolifemtion Treaty, including Israel, should accede to it as soon aa possible.” [2282nd meering, paro. 99. j

The dele@tion of the Soviet Union voted in favour of the msduh in wbicb the swrity c.!ouncil hu expressed it, deep m about the dMpt to international paace and sect&y created by the pmmeditated Israeli attack on Iraqi nuclear installations on 7 June this year, and has strongly condemned this armed attack by Israel, quite correctly describing it as a clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct. 164. The delegation of the Soviet Union supports the clear-wt demand that Israel refrain in the future from any such acts or threats to carry out such RC!~ 166. The resolution also affirms Iraq’s right to receive appropriate compensation for the damage it has suffered as a result of this act of aggression. 167. During the Council’s consideration of the case of the Israeli aggression against Iraq, an overwhelming mt\jority of those who spoke advocated the adoption of decisive measures against Israel, including sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Council quite clearly demonstrated the urgent demand of the international community that a decisive end be put to the aggressive and expansionist policies that Tel Aviv has been practising for many years against Arab States and peoples. These just demands, however, are not duly reflected in the resolution that has been adopted, and this can oniy be regarded as a serious flaw in that resolution. 168. One does not have to go very far to find an explanation for this. It is a secret to no one that Israel’s pursuit of its policy of aggression and expansion is made possible only by the patronage and comprehensive support of the United States of America. Israel is extracting the most sophisticated forms of weaponry from the United States arsenals and enjoys the political tutelage of Washington, including here in the United Nations. The statement made today by the representative of the United States sounded more like a justification than a condemnation of Israel. Obviously, the introduction of certain side issues by the United States representative-and particularly her attempt 10 distort the nature of the events connected with Afghanistan-was calculated to distract the Council’s attention from the substance of the matter. The Soviet delegation does not intend to yield to such a diversionary tactic. 169. The United Slates representative’s attempts to prove the lack of complicity by the United States in is~i*s act of aggress& Pgalnti Iraq sound extremely unconvincing. In addition to what has been said previously, we only have to add that, as the press in the United States h8s stated-and I am referring in p&tic&r to The Wash&@m Post of 19 June; that is, toda~‘s editiowiust b&re this Israeli r&l. Israel requ&ed from thb relevant United States Department information regarding the results of the possible bombing of a nuclear installation by means of powerful bombs. In this conncxion I should like to quote the rclcvatit part of the arMc in 7‘1~ Wd~irigtm Pm: “lsr;~cl. at the time it was considering bombing Iraq.,. rcqucstcd and rcceivcd U.S. Government assistance in assessittg how much damage would bc inflicted on One would have to be extremely naive indeed not to draw any conclusions at all from the very fact of this Israeli application to the United States. 170. Nevertheless, the consideration of Iraq’s complaint which the Council has just concluded has quite clearly demonstrated Israel’s isolation on the international scene. Israel has been placed before the court of the international community and has seen rejected its attempts to camouflage iis aggression by-a deliberate falsification of facts and pseudo-juridical acrobatics. 171. The discussion we have had in the Council should serve as a serious warning 10 Israel’s ruling circles, which have embarked on dangerous military adventures in the Middle East. The delegation of the Soviet Union considers that Israel should learn a very grave lesson for the future from this discussion.

The international community which the Security Council represents, has just pronounced itself. 173. With reference lo the remarks by the representative of Israel, 1 shall not reply lo that part in which he read out incomplete quotations, taken out of context. 1 shall simply recall a1 this stage that by exporting nuclear technology, muttriel or matter, the French Government applies two principles. 174. First, it ensures that those exports are subject to all the guarantees required in the domain of nonproliferation; in particular, it applies the rules that have been defined at the international level. 175. Secondly, it considers that all States have the right, for purposes of their economic and social development, to carry out research in all the areas of the peaceful use of nuclear technology and to acquire the technology. maMrie/ and matter necessary lo the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 176. In its co-operation with Iraq, France abides by those two principles. For its part, Iraq has agreed to comply with dl the rules and safeguards imposed by IAEA, as was very clearly recalled just now by Mr. Eklund, the Director General of that Agency, who also expressed the wish that French technicians be retained in the programme. 177. My Government knows of nothing that could cab: doubt on what I have just said. The President of the French Kepublic has just made a very cleat statement on the subject. The de\clopmcnt of inter- ---~ - 178. As I have said. the French Government is ccmmitted to the existence and security of Israel. We do not believe that recourse to force will serve the interests of its security or its future. On the contrary, we are convinced that the future of all the States of the region will be guaranteed only by the renunciation of force and a just and negotiated settlement of the Middle East conflict with trust and mutual respect among all the peoples living there.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq has asked to be allowed to speak. I call upon him.

Mr. President, I should like to exoress to YOU our gratitude and aooreciation for the manner in which you have conducted the deliberations of the Council. Your efforts as well as those of the other members of the Council to arrive at a decision on a matter of great importance to the international community have been appreciated by our Government. We are also deeply grateful to all the Member States which have participated in the debate for their support. Our thanks go also to the Secretary- General for his efforts ir. achieving a unanimous resolution by the Council. 181. Now that the Council has adopted a resolution on the complaint by Iraq in connection with Israel’s air raid of 7 June on Iraq’s nuclear installations, it remains for us to evaluate this conclusion on the basis of all the events that unfolded during the consultations. 182. We believe that it has become abundantly clear during the debate in the Council and from the positions adopted by States throughout the world that the Israeli act constituted an act of aggression and a serious violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law and conduct. 183. Israel’s attack called not only for a strong condemnation but also for the adoption of sanctions in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter. We believe that those elements should have been embodied in the Council’s resolution as a reflection of ovsrwhelminq world public opinion against Israel’s policies of expansion and aggression. That is not the cam as tire msolution does not includr sanctions. and thi reason should not be dlfflcult to understandit is the veto nowar of the United States. No doubt the resolution could have been substantially better in reflecting world public opinion and in dealing with the situation adequately and fairly had it not been for the position taken by the United States in supporting Israel. 184. What has transpired in the Cotmcil will undoubtedly have its impact upon the international 185. The implications of the resolution for the Arab world would simply be that the region has been moved further away from the just and durable peace for which the international community iS insistently calling, The responsibility for this set-back falls upon the State which has supplied Israel with military, economic and technical assistance, providing it with nuclear capability and the maximum degree of armaments. That country is the United States. It is that unlimited support and assistance that has enabled Israel to commit its repeated acts of aggression, to refuse to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people and to persist in its policy of territorial expansion. To us, the people of the Arab countries, the Israeli act adds another proof that the Zionist entity, being based on a Fascist ideology, does not believe in ajust and durable peace. Its main concern is territorial expansion through the use of blind force and aggression whenever that is possible. 186. Nevertheless, we for our part continue to have faith in the United Nations in spite of the fact that because of the power of the veto the United Nations is driven to adopt half-measures or no measures at all. Consequently the United Nations ability to protect the independence of Member States and to prevent aggression has been considerably weakened. My Government is not satisfied with this resolution and it reserves its right to pursue the matter through all appropriate channels including the General Assembly.

The representative of Israel has asked to bc allowed to speak. 1 call on him.

Israel unreservedly rejects the biased and one-sided resolution just adopted by the Council. The resolution fits into the oattem of so many of the resolutions of the same kind which have consistently and deliberately ignored the root cause of the Arab&rael conflict and of all its manifestations-namely, the refusal of most Arab countries to come to terms with Israel’s existence and their avowed intention, expressed in their ongoinq aqqression against my country, to hri~~ shout its liquidation. 189. Yet here at the United Nations, a body that has been divorcing itself from the realities of the Middle East, the Arabs can do no wrong, while Israel can do no right. 190. Thus, the Council can conveniently turn a blind eye to lhc nuclear threat which Iraq was building up against Israel in flagrant violation of the Charter of the 191. Iraq, which for three decades and more has considered itself as being in a state of war with Israel; which actively participated in the Arab wars of aggreSSiOn against Israel in 1948, 1967 and 1973; which has refused to conclude even an armistice agreement with Israel; which has repeatedly denied even the right of Israel to exist; which has been bent on developing a nuclear-weapons capability to destroy my country -this Iraq has been pronounced by the Council to be an innocent lamb. At the same time, Israel, which for three decades and more has been subjected to Iraq’s aggression, has been cast by the Council in the role of the villain. 192. What a travesty, what an utter travesty! 193. The tyrannical and oppressive regime of Saddam Hussein, which constitutes a threat not only to Israel, but also to many other countries in the region, can derive only encouragement from this resolution in the pursuit of its lawless conduct. So will other rejectionist Arab States determined to block the peace process in the Middle East. 194. h’ael rejects the attempts to condemn an action carried out in the exercise of its legitimate right of selfdefence. If the Council considers that Iraq is entitled to appropriate redress. we can only ask: what is the appropriate reward that can be claimed by a country for coldly planning the nuclear obliteration of another country’? And how does one have to treat the demands on Israel. which members of the Council, including permanent members. have not fulfilled because they are not bound by the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime’! 195. Israel. for its part, will treat this resolution with the respect it deserves.

The representative of Iraq has requested to be allowed to speak. I call on him.

I apologize to you. Mr, Resident. and the members of the Council for having asked to be allowed to speak for a few minutes at this late hour. 200. Sir Humphrey Waldock said exactly the following: “The Charter prohibits the use of force except in self-defence. The Charter obliges Members to submit to the Council or Assembly any dispute dangerous to peace which they cannot settle. Members have therefore an imperative duty to invoke the jurisdiction of the United Nations whenever a grave menace to their security develops carryiig the probability of armed attack. But. if the action of the United Nations is obstructed. delayed or inadequate and the armed attack becomes manifestly imminent, then it would be a travesty of the purposes of the Charter to compel a defending State to allow its assailant to deliver the first and perhaps fatal blow. If an armed attack is imminent within the strict doctrine of the Cnrolirtc, then it would seem to bring the case within Article 51. To read Article 51 otherwise is to protect the aggressor’s right to the first stroke.“’ 201. That is what was said by Sir Humphrey Waldock in the article referred to by the representative of Israel. Yet. the representative of Israel on two occasions deemed it fit to quote Sir Humphrey Waldock as having said: “It would be a travesty of the purposes of the Charter to compel a defending State to allow its assailant to deliver the first and perhaps fatal blow. . . To read Article 5 I otherwise is to protect the aggressor’s right to the first strike.” [ha. 81 thJW.] 202. That shows members of the Council what kind of credibility we can accord to the quotations-or. perhaps. misquotations-which they were presented with this morning and on I2 June by the representative of Israel. 203. We are indeed not surorised at such behaviour. The representative of l&l was following in the footsteps of his Prime Minister when he tried to build allegations on pure lies and fiction. Governors of IAEA, the oMcial records of which are issued in summary form. ‘See resolution 487 (1981). : Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 5 Academy of international Law. Rrcwil drs cows (1952. vol. II). (United Nations, Treaty Series. vol. 634. No. 9068. p. 326). tome 81. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PGBLICATIONS United Nanom pubkcatiom ma) be obnnncd lrom bnnk\torcx and dntnbutnrr thrnnghout the world. Consult your bookwrc or wrne to: Unnrd Nation\. Sale. Srrnon. Neu York or Geneva. COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NAllONS UNIES Ler publications des Nations Unrc? writ cn \-emu dam ICI hbnnne~ ct IL’% agenccs dipo~it,tne~ du monde entier. Infnrmez-vnus auprcs de vntre lthraire nu adresser-vour ti : Saunm lime\. Lcnon dcr venter. New York o” Gcne\~. COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONRS UNIDAS Las pabllcacloaes de Ias Nacioaes Unidar e&t&a en venta en libnrtas y casas distribuidorar en todar patter del mundo. Conrulte a so librero o dirijase a: Nacioncs Unalas. Se&An de Ventas. Naeva York o Giaebra.