S/PV.231 Security Council

1 am sure that the representatives of India and Pakistan both intend to nominate their representatives as soon as possible, as provided in the resolution. 1 suggest that we meet again in order ta continue to examine this question as saon as the interested parties and 1 are able ta report-very shortly, 1 hope-on the progress of these mbsequent conversations. la res. If there is no objection it is so agreed. Does no representative wish to speak? The meeting is adjourned. The meeting rose at 12.45 p.rn. TWOHUNDRED AND THlRTYmFIRST MEETING Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 22 lanuary 1948, at 2.30 p.m. Président: Mr. F. VAN .J,.ANGENHOVE (Belgium). Argentine, France, d'Ukraine, soviétiques, rique. Present : The representatives of the following countries: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Sytia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Soc::ialist RepublicB, United Kingdom, United States of America. 20. Provisional agenda (document S/Agenda 231) 1. 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. 2. India-Pakistan"question. Ca) Letter dated 1 January 1948 from the representative of Indïa ~.ddressed to the President of the Security Council concerning the situation in Jammu and' Kashmir (document S/628).1 (b) Letter à~!ed 15 January 1948 from the Minister for Foreign Nfairs of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-Gelleral, conrité, pages 21. Adoption of· the agenda

Before submitting the provisional agenda may 1 draw the Council's attention to an alteration which has been made in it in consequence of a letter" dated 20 JanuaIy, addressed to me by the Pakistan Minister for Foreign Affairs. The alteration-a result of this letter-is in the general description of th~ item on the agenda. On this point 1 have today received a letter from the representative of India, which 1 shall ask the interpreter to read in the original English and then to translate into French. .. To the President of the Security Council .. Sir, .. l ,:,nite to invite your attention" to a report that has appeared in this moming's New York Times, which states that the item on the a,genda of today's me'etiIlg of the Security' Council has been changed from 'The Jammu and Kashmir question' to th~ 'India-Pakistan question '. As you are no doubt aware, item 1 on the agenda of the Security Council has so far been described as 'The Jammu and Kashmir question'. You are no doubt aware that it has already been decided that at .today's meeting of the Security Council, the debate on item 1 of the agenda, namely, The Jammu and Kashmir quèstion, would be continued and that the representative of India would be permitted to reply to thè statement already made by the Pakistan representative. Pakistan's countercomplaint h~ not yet been placed on the agenda, and a debate on it can commence only after India has had an opportunity of filing her answer to it and if is formally placed on the agenda. 1 hope thatthe report appearing in the New York Times is liot correct. It is hard1y necessary for me to add that we shall take the strongest exception to the amendment of the description of the item on the agenda on which the debate is to be resumed today. .. (Signed) N. GOP~SWA:MI Ayy.....NGAR, .. Leader of the Indian Delegation to the Security Conncil" · The PRESIDENT :(translated from French): :t;" not usual for partiesnolmembers of the S\lCurity Council totake part in discussions on the adoption of the agenda. 1 propose, however, that the Council makean exception to .this cQSfom, in view of the delicate nature of the question that the Indian representativehas raised. • Ifthere are no:- objections, it is so decided. · ~See OfJj~ial Records of. the .Security Council, 'Third Year, Supplement for November 1948, pages 67-~7. This letter, therefore, refers to situations other than .the Jammu and Kashmir situation, which we have been debating all these days. If 1 may draw the attention of the Security Council to incidents that have happened in the course of this debate. 1 wouldhark back immediately to what the President said when he adjourned the last meeting of the Security Council. He said: .. 1 propose that we meet again to resume our consideration of this question . . " The words .. this question" can have' had no meaning other than the Jammu and Kashmir question, which we were debating on that day. If the Security Councillooks at what the representative of Pakistan said in this connexion, it will find that in the letter dated 15 Jànuary 1948, with winch he submitted a set of three documents [document S/646], he contemplated that the document relating to the counter-complaint of Pakistan against India was to be taken up separately. In the speech of the representative of Pakistan on 16 January 1948 [228th meeting], he said very çategorically : .. The question of Kashmir has been taken up by the Security Council, as it was bound to be, having been referred to the Council earlier than the other questions which Pakistan has raised. 1 shall therefore, at this stage, confine my submission to the question of Kashmir. However, as 1 have already said, in order to appreciate the Kashmir situation it is essential to view it against its proper background. It is not an isolated incident. At this· stage, therefore, 1 shall touch upon other matters only so far as they are relevant ta a proper appreciation of the Kashmir question. 1 shall develop the rest of my case when its consideration' is taken up by the Security Council." du puisque autres Pakistan. la l'~ la l'examiner s'agit débats, que correctement développerai seil ces dans particulièrement les fait dont constituent action le 1 The rest of the .letter reads : "AIl these situations have led tô a very 'acute crisis hetween Indiaand Pakistan. More particulaTly the continued occupàtion by the armed forces of India of the State of Junagadh, which !s part of Pakistan, and the oppression and spoliation of Ils Muslim population constitute a casus belli and may necessitate military action on the..part of Pakistan unless urgent action is taken by the Security Council. " (Signed) ZAFRULLAH KHAN, Minister of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan." l am quite willing, on behalf of India, for that particular question to be iIicluded on the agenda of the Security Council as soon as possible. 1 have already informed the President of the Security Council that, due to the fact that this complaint was mst put into our hands only after we arrived here, and as we had to communicate with our Government both for authority and for thè materia! necessary to aD.swer the wide ground covered by this counter-complaint, we have to take a little time to file our answer. We hope, however, to be able to do so in the course of the next few days. When our answer is filed and Sir Zafrullah Khan makes his ,statement on that countercomplaintandwe reply to his statement, then the Security Council can proceed to debate that part' of the affair in as elaborate a' fashion as it may desire. But at the present moment, 1 asked the Presidentfor this meeting'of the Security Council for the purpose of resuming the debatewhich was suspen.ded the day before yesterday, and he was good enough to call a meeting for today in, order to resume that debate. The mere resumption of that 'debate and the receipt of the kind of letter that has been sent by Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan cannot be a justification, for altepn,g the description of the item on the agenda, and, therefore, changing the content of this debate. We are very keen, as is known, to get on with the discussion of the Jammu and Kashmir question as soon as possible, and perhaps if we are able to 'arrive at decisions which might be' acceptable toboth, parties, all tb.at is said in the countercomplaint might disappear from controversy altogether~But l do not want to anticipate what we might say in regard to that counter-coll1plaint. ,Ii: is, very important that the provisionalagenda shouldnotb'eapproved asit has been placed beforetheSêcurity Council, bu~. that the, original hèading shouldberestored. If the President of the 1 wish to make it clear that India is not trying to avoid any issue that Pakistan may have raised in its counter-complaint. We are quite willing to answer the whole of their case, and we shaH do sa in due course. But 1 would ask the Security Council to get on \Vith the work it has already started in the investigatioR of the Jamniu and Kashmir question, and to see that this debate is brought to a conclusion as early as possible. 1 hope that conclusion will be one which will eventually be acceptable to both parties. If, however, the title of this item on the agenda is to be changed and the range of debate is to be widened, then we shall have to consider what we shou].d do if such a decision is taken by the Security Council. Obviously, we cannot get on with the debate today unless it is confined to the Jammu and Kashmir question. 1 hope the Security Council will understand the spirit in which 1 have pleaded for the restoration of the item on the agenda as it has been before \ us all these days. 1 hope the Security Counci1 will agree with me.

To prevent the discussion from straying it will ne be better to confine it to the question of the terms of the pl'ovisio.nal agenda. . 1 Mr. NOEL BAKER (United Kingdom) : Since my legal àdviser, Mr. Bathurst, called my l'anglais): attention to the item as it now stands on the agenda,. to the change in . the heading, 1 have taken the trouble to inquire how the item came to he included in the agenda as·it now stands. 1 understand that the heading of the item was .le decided upon by the President and the Secretariat. 1 am certain, of course, that the change· was made in complete good faith, and 1 understand very weIl, 1 think, the arguments in favour of that change which seemed convincing to the President. However, if r had been in the President's place -and 1 am very ghid that 1 was not-I think 1 shouId have handled the matter differently. Broadly, 1 agree with the representative of India. 1think that 1 should have arranged the agenda as follows: .. 1. Adoption of the agenda. .. 2. The Jammu and Kashmir question. .. (a) Letter dated 1 January 1948 from the representative of India to the President of the Security Council concerning the. situation in Jammu aild Kashmir (documentS/628). •• 3. Junagadh and other questions. Il Letter dated 20 January 1948 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Govemment of Pakistan addressed to the President of the Security Council (document S/655)." 1 think 1 agree broadly with the representative of India that we shall conduct our affairs best if we keep the question of Kashmir separate, deal with it fust, and then deal with Junagadh and the other marters. Of course,'it is altogether open to the l'epresentative of Pakistan to do again what he did in bis fust great speech : illustrate hi~ argument about Kashmir by other situations-for example, if he so desires, the situation in Junagadh. That is entirely bis right, and no oneleast of all, the representative of India-would desire to deny it. However, we must ask what is most likely to acbieve the object which we all have in view-and the object which we all have in view is to clear up all the questions in dispute between India and Pakistan. 1 believe that if we pursue the question of Kashmir actively, immediately, and with a determination to achieve a result now-within a few hours or days-then, when we have achieved that result, the .question of Junagadh and other questions May look quite different. They may be settled more easily. 1 do not know that this will happen, but it is possible that Kashmir will serve as a model for sorne other situation. Perhaps it may not be necessary to discuss the other matters here at aIl, because the Governments may be able to arrange them between themselves. 1 therefore hope that the Security Council wilJ agree to arrange the agenda as 1 have just .suggested that. 1 should have ~rranged it. If it is desired, 1 shall make a. formal proposal to that effect. At this point, however, 1 should like to amplify what 1 have said by referring to something that was mentioned by the representative of India. He said· that the other questions could be discussed.only after the question of Kashmir had been disposed of..That is the plan wbich 1 think rigbt. But it means, of course, that the question of Kashmir must be disposed of without delay. We cannot deny to the representative of Pakistan the right to raise a matter wmch he thinks urgent, and bis letter of 20 January makes it quite plain that there are otherquestions which he thinks urgent. Wecannot,Isay, deny him. that right by havingthe .discussion of the Kashmir question unduly prolonged, without any l'loper progress being made.. Therefore, irf proposing-with aIl

To avoid a protracted debate on the adoption of the agenda, 1 should be grateful if the representative of the United Kingdom would make a formal proposal, which 1 shall then submit for the Council's approval. Mr. NOEL BAKER (United Kingdom) : 1 have already explained how 1 should frame the proposaI. 1 believe the Security Council understood me. 1 request that this proposal now be submitted to the Security Council: Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : The judicial practice is well known, 1 think, to all the members of the Council, that when a principal clâim is submitted to any court of justice, the other party is free at any time to submit a counter-claim which is relative to the principal daim. The first duty of the tribunal hearing such a case is to determine whether the principal daim and counter-claim are related to each other to such an extent that they can be unified into one case. In that event the claims can be dealt with as ~me case, and they can be solved by one resolution. One judgment can coyer both daims, or, if the claims are not related to each other, they can be dealt with separately. 1 think that the formulation of the agenda, as prepared by the' Secretariat and the President of the Security Council, is correct in this case, becaWle a daim was submitted by the Indian Govemment concerning the Jammu and Kashmir question, and at the same time-even before the .examinées ~st meeting of the Security Council on that question-a counter-claim was submitted by the representative of Pakistan. The representative of Pakistan considered that this counter-claim was related to the mst daim, and that they. should he considered simultaneously. . 1 believe that the President of the Security Council and the Secretariat were correct in submitting both cases on the same agenda item, leaving to the Security COUncil the decision as to whether these two claims were related to each other, whether they were within the same framework and could be given a single solution by one resolution which would cover both of them. oThe· first decision which the Security Council cau take is to unify the daims into one case; however, the Security Council would be free' also to decide that the claims are not related to that exteIit. In the. latter event, the claims would be. dealt with separately-although it would not necessarily be the case that the conuter-claim . ~ould be taken up after the solution of the prin- CIpal claim. The claims may be considered at the Sante time-one at one meeting, and the other at The representative of the Unitd Kingdom did not speak about the relationship between the daims. If he considered them not related to each other, his suggestion would be correct;· but if he considered that they were linked to each other, then his proposaI to have the claims discussed and decided separately would not be correct. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) {translated /rom Russian) : 1 aIso noticed that the Jammu-Kashmir item, which was on our agenda last· meeting, has disappeared today, aIthough we know that only the Council can delete any item from the COlIDCil's agenda. The Council has not deleted this item; hence, the former Jammu-Kashmir item should be included in our agenda. With regard to the new letter from the Pakistani rcpresentative, 1 have no objection to including this letter and the question that .the Pakistani Government wishes to raise in the Security Council as a separate item in· our agenda-I would stress that it would be a separate item of our agenda, since it wouId be incorrect (in this respect 1 am in agreement with the Indian representative) to combine the. substance of the question of the situation in Kashmir with the general problem of the relations betweel1 India and Pakistan. ' The question of the situation in the Jammu- Kashmir State should have a separate status and should remain on the agenda as such until the Council concludes its debates, while the letter from the Paklstani representative, received yesterday by the Security Council, should be included as a separate item of the agenda; for instance, as the third item. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated jrom Spanish) : 1 am very sorry to have to disagree with the opinion of the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, who has submitted a proposaI to alter the agenda-especially as bis view is supported by a legaI opinion, and 1have a great respect for legaI opinions. We must remember, however, that this is not a court of justice but. a political body, which must be governed by fixed rules but cannot pay too much attention to trifling details of form, particularly when they do not involve major questions of principle. l ,have the impression that this is a conflict which might be divided into as many as ten different parts, and that there are some who would wish us to deal with only one-tenth, ,leaving the rest aside. Obviously, if we do not attempt to solve all the difliculties, we shall be unable to solve even the tenth part of the small war which has broken out between Pakistan and India. For the rest, though 1 do not know whether the stateUlt:nts of the representative of Pakistan, which we have just heard, are correct or incorrect, it is obvious that just as we cannot cover up the sky with a sieve neither can we close our eyes to what is there before us. The India-Pakistan problem includes at least ten or twelve points, and the Security Council should take them as a whole, for having been informed of them, it cannot ignore one and deal with another merely because that lS the only one which has been officially brought before the Council. Furthermore, we need only read a little of document II, submitted to the Council by the Pakistan Government on 15 January 1948 [in document 8/646] to realize that these daims have been put before us by the Government of Pakistan, at least implicitly, if not expressly. l have underlined the main ones here. 1 repeat, we cannat shut our eyes to these questions and ignore them; but supposing that, in order to conform to. aIl the rules of procedure of a high court of justice, we were to take the question of Jammu and Kashmir fust and the other questions afterwards, it is obvious that the Council could not deal with them separately but would be obliged to consider them as a whole. It seems ta me therefcre that this discussion is irrelevant, especiaIly,as the Indian representative hasalready asked for an opportunity to reply to the charges made by the representative of Pakistan. . . ~ut let us suppose that this is a court of JUstice. 1 do not know how it would he in other countries, but in my own, when a claim and counter-claim are presented, the two are not filed as separate suits; the judge settles the two together on their metits. 1 think that if the negotiations have not been successful (I do not 1nO'N, but 1 suspect that they have not), the reason is precisely that theyhave not been deaIt with as a whole. To give only one instance, if we followed this course we should be leaving unsettled the question of the .aggression of which, according to the Pakistan representative's statements, the Governmcnt of Jndia has been gQilty in tliki!lg possession of the Junagadh peninsula-which, indeed, as 1 see from this map kindly fumished me by the Indian delegation, is within the boundariesof India, just as Kashmir is. The question would remain unsettled, since the Prince of Junagadh is determined that the State shall become a part ," Pakistan. According to the l>cJdstan representative's statements, India sent in.an army and took control of the whole territory, though 1 do not know whether the Prince.was expelied, If that is not aggression, if that is not war, if anyone thinks that we should close our eyes to these things, 1 for my part cannot assent to such a procedure.,I shall vote for consideration of an the points iD. .the India- Pakistan problem, including.that of the mail which bas been mentioned here, the financial question, an~ aU the other questions. If these problems had been solved before .15 August last year, many unpleasant things would have been avoided, the fust bebg the manner in which the new dominions of India and Pakistan were admitted to membership of the United Nations. Mr. LaPEZ (Colombia) : 1 should liketo support the position taken by the President in regard to this'matter. To.my'mind it isperfr;ctly clear; it seemsto me that we arediscussing today the other end of ~. argumentthat we had on a prp.- vious occasion. At the .previous. meeting of .. the Security Council, the'representanve·of PakiStan was trying to make sure--so itseemed to me--that the Security CouncU would in due course take up the discussion ofthe'other matters whichhe wanted to.bring before the SecurityCouncil, and today.the representative of India-.if 1 do riot misunderstand bis. position"":"wants te.· make' sure thàt we.discuss the Jammu and Kashn,lir situ:J.tion· first. The representative 01 India has.·IIJ.açie it very clear that hedoes. not C)bject to the discussion being broadened.•to incltlde othersitm~tions whiclt the representativeof Pakistanmay-.yish tobring before the SecurÏty>Council. The representative of India, however,. made the very legitirnate. request The proposal that we have already accepted [docwnent S/654, 230th meeting] provides that the commission, wmch the Security Council decided to s~t up, would fust take up the question of Jammu and Kashmir, and next, the matters brought up by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan in bis'letter of 15 January 1948. We have agreed to set up that commission~ and 1 suppose we are now in the process of appointing members to that commission so that it can begin its work on the Jammu and Kashmir situation. In the meantime, ï tlùnk it îs perfectly proper for the representative of Pakistan to have sent bis letter to the Security Council, bringing ta the attention of the Security Council the otht;r situations wbich the representative of Pakistan wishes the Security Council to investigate. Therefore, it seems to me that we all agree that it is perfectly proper to discuss the general question, the fudia-Pakistan question wbiçh covers the two situations, the Jammu and Kashmir question originally brought to the attention of the Security CO'Wlcil by fudia, and the other situations which the representative of Pakistan wants to call to th.e attention of the Security Council now. je au attirait tions sommes ment - englobe Cachemire, à tres, désire en la dans du 'représentant lettre kistan lettre kistan aurons va examiner les et devrmtplusy dont jour., It would be perfectly in order to place the general question on the agenda as it now appears, and then, in the order in wbich t!::.~y originally appeared, fust the letter from the rel't'esentative of India; second, the letter from the' Minister of Foreign A1fairs of Pakistan.. dated 15 January 1948; and, third, the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan datecÎ 20 January 1948. Itherefcre believe that once we .have madeit clear that the Security COUncil is going to consider the two situations-Jammu and Kashmir fust, and theother situation,aiterward--there should be no ~er 4isa.greement as ·to, the way in which' they are Includedon the agenda. The PRESIOENT '(translatèdfrom French): The Uni~ IGngdom r~presentative< bas asked to speak ()l't a point of order, and he therefore has priority. In order to avoid all misunderstanding, however, may 1 he allowed to make a brief stafement to explain'tnY~1>osition as l'resident of the CouncU.· ,'-- , ~ ~ As ~President of .the ,Security Council 1 assume responsibility for the provisional agenda, since l Uni a de d'éviter faire ,position sume,la, :responsabilité soire, prendre position sur le a1'P-J,"oy~jt. But 1 had no intention of adoptiIig .any position, as regards the ,inter-relationship· of Mr. NOEL BAKER (United Kingdom) : (1 have asked if 1 might speak on a point of QÇder in order to withdraw the proposal which 1 put forward. It seems plain to me that the proposal 1 put forward is not going to secure the support of a majority of the Council, and 1 therefore hope that 1 may save time and debate by withdrawing it now. ~Iconfess that the reasons adduced by other members of the Security Council against my proposai were precisely those which seemed to me'to be most strongly in favour of it. The essential point in my mind was well expressed by the representative of Syria: Would it be desirable to deal, for example, with Kasbmir and Junagadh in one resolution or,in two ? 1 should have said, from what 1 know of the subject, that it would probably be much better to deal with it in two. That is not excluded if we leave the agenda as it was drafted today by the President. 1 think the substance is what matters. 1 believe the members of the Security Council really are agreed on the substance, and 1 think it is this : that all these matters are on the agenda. As 1 think .the representative of Colombia and the representative of Syria said, they ail have· il relations, one to the other. The reptesentative of Argentina argued very cogently, and with force, that you cannot exclude a 1ater point' brought in by a defèndant. They are related to each other; they can be mentioned. We are all agreed that, broadly, we want to take Kashmir fust, bût Kashmir must he dealt vvith swiftly. We must try to get a settlement because . the other questions alsoare urgent, and we cannot impose an undue delay. If that is agreed all around ; the Security Council table, 1 think it woulc.: be very safe for me to withdraw my proposaI. 1 therefore do so, and 1 hope the debate may reach a speedy conclusion. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) : understand that the question pénding is on the adoption of the agenda, nothing more. Therefore, the technical matter of·whether t1lls is the agenda of the Security Council mustbe detenriined by the provisipnal ,ruIes of procedure of the Security Council, and it. is. so determined..Rule 10 ·.of· the provisional roles of procedure of the Security Council states:· • .. Any item of the agenda of a meeting of the Security Council, consideration of which has not been completédat thatmee·:ing, ghall, unless the Security Councilothemse decides, automatically be includedin· the agenda oi the JT~xt meeting." certains légalement territoire et indienne, ont habitants armées, musulmans conformément ment ordre celui de de achevé. 20 gères faut-il avec l'honneur voquer, sible, d'examiner lettre Le les du entièrement pas effet règlement positions diques, toutes sans. que céder quatorze présente n'est pas qu'un attache à ce point de procédure suffisamment d'importance vue solide. de l'ordre n'en jour Junagadh, L'alinéa à se· d'un tionnel. : Therefore, it seems clear that the item on this agenda should be exactly the same item that was on'the last agenda because it falls within rule 10 of the rulesof procedure, and it has not been conc1uded. To use the language of rule 10, consideration of the item has not been comple!ed. Now then, of what force is this letter of 20 January 1948 from the Minïster. of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Pakistan, which is mcluded in the agenda before us? Does it have anything to do with the agenda? The letter reads , as follows : Il 1 beg to request that a meeting of : the Security Council may be called at as early a · date as possible ta consider the situation . . . set " out in my letter dated 15 Januat'y 1948 addres'3ed to the Secretary-General ". The rest of the letter is an urgent statement of fact in support of that request for a meeting. That decision is .wholly under the control of the President under rule 1 of"the rules of procedure of the Security COUDcil. It has no place whatever on the agenda. Rule 1 of the rules of procedure of the Security Council reads as foilows : .. Meetings of the Security Council shall, with ~e exception of the periodie meetings referred to mrule 4, be held at the eall of the President at any time he deems necessary, but the interval between meetings shall not exceed fourteen days." The paper which is befc,re us as a provisional agenda does not conform to the rules. If there is anybody who cares enough about this fact to make a point, he stands on" good parliamentary ground. However, the whole matter is before us ':>0 that ·"agenda as it layon the table when we parted last. Wehave noteoncluded the business. Juhagadh, as weIl as m.any other things, was included in the agenda of that date. Absolutely nothing Ii.ew has been added to the agenda by the inclusion of subparagraph (c) of item 2, and, of'course, uo' change IS m~de in the issue by editorially ehànging the ~adingOf the item. The substantive issue is in · ese papers, and nothing whatever that the Secretary.;General can do can change the issue. It seemed perfectly clear to me that the rational procedure for the Security Council in this case was recognized in the resolution adopted on 20 January [document S/654]. We referred to the matters before us in this language: •• The 8ecurity Council, •• Considering that it may investigate any dispute or any situation which might, by its continuance, endanger the maintenance of international peace and security; that, in the existing state of affairs between India and Pakistan, such an investigation is a matter ·of urgency • • ." That is the way we used the item on the agenda then. In another part Qf the resolution, we find this construction of our duties and of our rights with respect to the order in which we will handle this business. Clause D of the resolution reads as follows: U The Comniission shall perform the functions described in Clause C : (1) In regard to the situation in the Jammu and Kashmir State set out in the letter of the representative of India addressed to the President of the Security Council, dated 1 January 1948 •• -thatwas sub-paragraph (a) of item 2 of the then agenda and the now legal agenda- U and in the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan addressed to the Secretarj-General, dated 15 January 1948 • ; :' which refers to Junagadh. Clause D continues with the construction that wè put upon the order in which these matters are to he taken up. It continues. as follows : u. • • and (2) In regard to other situations set out in the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General, dated 15 January 1948, when the Security Council so directs ". That clause does not bar the Security Council from taking any course which it wisbes to take, but is a practical construction of the business in hand. It is a reason.ablr,} interpretation of. whai we can do and what we Wisely should do in determining this matter-namely" go ahead first wi th 'that imminent question of Kashmir and Jammu. However, that does not exclude the consideration of· all the other questions.that are involved here, including that of Junagadh, which, in due time and in its regulai order when it will be given the right consideration by the Security Council, will be taken up too. But the urgent business' before us is, toexpeditefurtherconsultations with reference .to laying' .down, 'some anangement upon 'WhicJ:1·the partiescan agree, under the. guidance of the Presidentofthe Security Council.. That is what we most desire: an arrangement· to which the parties can agree L'l. order to take car~ of the nrl1itaryand political situations in J~u and Kashmir. The U othersitua,tions" will undoubtedly ~e attended to.They will probably be simplified greatlyby the orderly disposition of this (traduit reste forte tants pas angle du qui provoquent les et ces tien L'une dans indiquées Gouvernement courant l'Inde, mant de nous au bre graphe tromper un question sation ne .constater l'Organisation Sir Mohammed ZAFRULLAH KHAN (pakistan) : 1do not know that it is now necessary for me to add much to the discussion on this point) particularly after the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States have expressed their views. 1 do not desire to take up any purely technical points with regard to this matter. So far as we can visualize the question of the agenda) the Security Conncil is dealing with matters .that are disturbing the telations between India and Pakistan) matters which) if they are not satisfactorily resolved) might endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. One of those matters is that oï Jammu and Kashmir. Other matters are set out in my letter of 15 January 1948. The Government of India knows that has been our position from· the very beginning. In answer to a letter from the Government of India of 22 December 1947) in which it info~ed us that it proposed to carry the question of Jammu and Kashmir to the Security Council, we said as follows in our letter of 30 December 1947, paragraph 2 : " Despite the ominous hint contained in paragraph 3, 1 trust 1 am right in assuming that your letter is not an ultimatum but a forerunner of a formal reference of the matter to the United Nations. If so, nothing could be more welcome, for you will recollect that this is exactly what the "' Pakistan Government has been suggesting throughout as the most effective method of ironing out our mutual differences. 1 am, therefore, sincerely glad· to find that you propose at last to adopt this particulat line of approach to our problems.Il Paragraph 3 goes on to add: .. 1 must, however, confess my disappointment that your proposaI apparently restricts the reference to the single issue of Kashmir. The episode of Kashmir, considered by itself, would look like a sentence tom out of its context. It is but an actin the unparalleled tragedy which is being enacted before our eyes ever since the announcement of the scheme of partition. The reference to the United Nations, therefore, in my opinion, must cover much larger ground and embrace allthe fundamentals of the differences between the two Dominions: As l see it, it is neither Kashmir alone no! Junagadh or Manavadar, por even the, terrible tragedy of wholesale massacres of Muslim men, WOlUen and children in extensive areas of the Indian Dominion, but a totality of these horrors and iniquities, indicating but ope consistent sinister. pattern which should rightly form the subJect-matter .of internationâl investigation. If the .:ootcauses of the evll which is 'Vitiating our relauons .are not determined and removed, it is . much tobe feared thatfresh incidents will .. The tragic e~ents and the happenings in East Punjab and the Sikh and Hindu States in and around that Province had convinced the Musli.'ll population of Kashmir and Jammu State that the accession of the State to the Indian Union would he tantunount to the signing of their death warrant. When the massacres started the Muslim population of the State realized that the fate that had overtaken their co;.religionists in Kapurthala, Faridkot, Nabha, Jind, Patiala, Bharatpur and Mwar, et cetera, wa~ about to overtake them also. A wave of terror thus ran thtoughout the State and the. neighbouring district of West Punjab l'IIld the West Frontier Province. In their desperate situation the Muslim population of the State decïded to make a final bid for liberty and indeed for their very existence, in which they had the full sympathy of their relations and fellow Mrislims in .the neighbouring districts. of Pakistan. Severa! thousands of the MusJhn people of the State, particularly in the area of Poonch, had served in support of the cause of ilie United Nations during the Second World War, and they decided to sell their lives dearly in the struggle with which they werè now faced. . .. The Maharaja ~ade this excuse to 'accede' to the Union of In,dia and the Govemment of India thereupon landed its troops in the State without consultation.with or even· any notice .to the Govemment of Pakistan, 'with whom the State had concluded a standstill agreement, and to .the territories of which. it was contiguous thtoughout practically the whole of its southern and western border." . This portion of our document II makes it pere fectly clear that, at least as we view the strugglc which is going on inside Kashmir, ~t is directly related to what had happened previously in East Punjab and some of the.Indian States. In our document III [document S/646], we said the following : ..It is to be noted that the mst outside incursion into the State occurred more than a week after the Prime Minister of Kashmir. had threatened to calI in outside assistance.. It 1s clear that the sole responsibility for these events must' rest·· on . the Maharajah's' Govemment, which ordered the oppression of the Muslimsasa matter of State. policy. on the. model of what had' happened in East Punjab an9,. States likePatiala, Bharatptir, Alwar, et cetera. In conspiracywith , the ..II1dian Govermnent, .·they seized 'upon this incursioll .as the.' occas~on for putting into. effect the p~e-plaDij.e.d ~cheme for the .accession of Ka~bniit as à cl]itpd'étqt~d for the occupation Here again, the events in East Punjab and the other Indian States are set out as forming the background of what happened in Kashmir, and the qllestion of the legality and the validity of the accession is raised. That is the most important question of all these matters that have to be resolved between India and Pakistan. The solution of that question would apply not only to Kashmir, but also to Junagadh. As the members .of the Security Council are aware, the Junagadh State acceded to Pakistan'long before the Kashmir State acceded to India, and the Junagadh State today is under the military occupation of the forces of the Government of India. When one addresses himself to the problem of what principle to apply to the question of how a State is to be deemed to have validly acceded to one Dominion or the other, surely he cannot exclude a parallel case from consideI?.tion. Otherwise, he might find himself in this p~sition : naving applied certain considerations to the case of Kashmir, he might find, when he came to deal with the case of Junàgadh,. that the elements in the situation were not susceptible-they thight be, but it is also true that they might not be-of having the same considerations applied to the determination of the question of accession there. Our. case throughout, then, has been that there is a situation or a number of situations which have unfortunately arisen between Pakistan and fudia, and that these incidents are the manifestations of those situations, and we have COme here with the request that the Security COuncil should intervene to bring about an amicable adjustment and settlement of ail these questions. 'T'arder in which it may appear convenient anli reasonable to the Security Council to deal with these matters is emirlently a matter· for the· Council to decide. As 1 have said, I· am not concerned with the technicalities of the question. So long as it is deemed that ail these questions are before the Security Council and on its agenda, 1do not insist that a particular heading be applied and 1 do not· Care whether. the questions are set ?ut as a, h, and c, or as 1, 2 ànd 3. That is entirely nnrnaterial to me. However, 1 was fo~ced t~ draw the attention of the President and the Council to these other D1a,tters also, in spite of the fatt that our letter of 15 Jantlary had aIready stated: .. It is requested that .these documents may beplaced before the Security Council and that the Security Couneil may be requested to deal with the complaillt convenable sera Comme détails bien l'ordre est que d'attirer l'attention' ces trouve du soumettre l'inviter If sueh a solution is attained, then the other matter:> cau itnmediately be taken up. If the JaInmuând Kashmir question appears to proceed too slowlyand'efforts are being inade-.-either in .tne CounciF or, under the guidance of the President, outside.· the Couricil-to arriVe at a setflenrelit; an.d if there i8 time, consideration of these other matters by the Councilas a whole may aIso be started. That, naturally, must be left to the President and to the Couneil itself. As 1 have said, these are technical matters with which 1 .am not coneemed. So long as it is understood'that all these matters are before the Council and properly on its agenda,'and that the Couneil is seized of the whole matt.er, Iam satisfied. dire Conseil l'Inde Conseil Jammu lesquelles seule notre discussion sujet l'intention Jammu mieux que d!e . de Ithas been pointed out by the representative {lf .the United States that the deternrlnation of tbis question shouldbe governed by rule 10 of the mIes of procequre, whièh states: .. Any item of the agenda of ,a meeting of the Security Council, consideration of wIrlch has not been ~oDlpleted at ·that·meeting, sball, unless. the Secur- ~ty .Council otherwise decides, automatically be m~luded in the agenda of thenext m,~eting".•The rme beiugwhat it is, 1 was certainly not surprised at.the vt.\ry appropriate remark oftherepresetltative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics thathe found it difficuItto understand why an The representative of the United Kingdom who, 1 believe, moved a very proper amendment to the provisional agenda, has now withdrawn that 'amendment laigely on account of the apprehensions he apparently entertained as. to whether it would secure thenecessary support in this body. The representative of the United.Kingdom went on ta insist, however, that v:rhat we now have to discuss is the Jammu and Kashmir question. 1 .think thatSir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan took a very proper view, in his· remarks, when he said that while the Security Council is seized ofboth sets of complaints, it did not matter to him how those complaints were dealtwith orin what order they were· considered on the agenda, and that he, for one, would not have objected to the .amendment that was moved by the representative of the United Kingdom, which was unfortunately withdrawn. Before 1 have to decide what omown attitude shouId· be, may 1 have a clear ruling from the President, Oran assurancefrolll the· Security Council, that we shall now proceed only with the debate on the Jammu .and Kashmir questioD., ·and that, as. soon>as theother matter is ready, it caL1 be p~tonthe agenda and we can proceed to deal withit aIso ? . There is one other matter lwish to present to the Security Council .in thisconnexion. It really doesnotmatter how the particular item is .described, whether it. be the." India-Pakistan question,"for the Jammu and Kashmir question. is really an India-Pakistan .question. 1 quite recognize that. But as. Ipointed .oUt tothe mëmbers, what~earenow trying to. decicIe is. what, in particular,in comiexion with the India-Pakistan question, wearediscussing now. If paragraphs(a) and (b) under item 2 of the provisional agenda stoodby themselves and the heading was .. The India"Pakistan question,"itmight have been sorne indicationto me thatthe intentionwasto confine tb,ematteronlyto· the Jammu and Kashmir question,becauseboth paragraphs (a) and(b) Qf item 2 refer tothc;lJanl1~u.and. Kashmirsiwa.tï.on, HoWeyer,paragraph. (c) is also·includedünder tJHs ..heading" and itrefers to situations Qther than -the. Jammu. and Kas:hmir situation, as 1 1 do not wish to sound a note of dissent from what may be the general opinion among the members of the Security Council, but as 1 said in the speech which l made earlier this aftemoon, unless we are satisfied that the debate which we are now continuing is a debate which, for the time being in any case, is restricted to the Jammu an.d Kashmir question, we shall be performing no useful service in continuing to participate in this debate. . As suggested by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United Statès of America, 1ask that we recognize that it is only the Jammu and Kashmir question which is under consideration. 1 believe even Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan said that we should now proceed with the Jammu and Kashmir question. We shall try our best to bring up other questions for debate as early as possible. Unless that assurance is forthcoming, we shall be placed in a very difficult position. les Unis la ment K:han maintenant Nous questions Si nous difficile.

1 calI upon the representative of" the United Kingdom. 1 am sure that after we have heard him, the Council will wish' to take a decision on the agenda. sentant l'avoir entendu, ordre Mr. NOEL BAKER (United Kingdom): 1 OnlY want to say to the representative of India that 1did not withdraw my motion because 1 thought it inelegant, inappropriate or wrong. 1 withdrew· my motion because 1 saw that it was not going to receive the necessary majority and 1 hoped that we might perhaps save time, and 1 felt then quite clearly that we were-:-all of us-agreed on the substance. l'anglais) sentant proposition inopportune que majorité perte moment fond. retiré et ont peut façon Now the debate which has taken place since l withdrew my motion has confirmed me in my view, and 1 think, if 1 have understood the speeches, that the representative of India can have from these speeches the assurance be desires as to how our work is now to be conducted. le proposition séance. résolution l'ordre l'Inde présidentielle. touchant pouvoirs Conseil de

The position is this: the United Kingdom representative has withdrawn a proposai he made earlier in the debate. We have no other resolution before us for a change in the provisional agenda. The representative of India has asked me, as President, for a ruling. If 1 made"such a ruling, which would touch upon the substance of .the matter, 1 think 1 sh9uld be exceeding my powers, and 1 shall therefore ask the Council itself tOi decide OD. the matter. Sir Mohammed ZAFRULLAH KHAN (pakistan) : When it is said that we should proceed immediately with the question of Jammu and Kashmir, 1 have no objection. to that, as 1 have alreudy stated. But 1 made it clear from what 1 said that my position was not that we must necessarily await the conclusion of the whole matter of Jammu and Kashmir before any of the other matters are taken up by the Security Council. 1 did say that if we proceed swiftly with it, and find that the matter occupies the whole time either of the President or of the Secmity Council, obviously we cannot start with anything else. But if we should arrive at any stage where either the Security Council or the President is unoccupied-particulady the Security Council-and it is felt that the stage has been arrived at when a discussion of the other matter might. usefully be started, that possibility should not be excluded.

If no member of the Council wishes to speak, we shall proceed to adoption of the agenda. If no formal vote is called for and there is no objection, 1 shall consider the agenda adopted. 22. Discussion al the India-Pakistan question The PRESIDEl\"T (translated jrom French): 1 have a brief statement to make. Since our last meeting, the representative of India, the representative of Pakistan and 1 have been continuing our consultations. In the course of these the following points were raised : (l) The object of the investigation to be under- taken by the Commission set up under the reso- lution of 20 January'1948; (2) The measures to be taken with a view to putting an end to the acts of hostilitv and violence which are taking place in the State of Jammu and Kashmïr, taking due account of the participa- tion of both indigenous and foreign elements; (3) The organization of a plebiscite, the prin- ciple of which is agreed to by both parties, with ,a view to deciding the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir; (4) The conditions under which such a plebis- cite might be organized under the authority of the Security Council, so as to ensure a free and impartial consultation of the population. of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 1 convened the Council today in the fust instance because of the desire expressed by the representative of India to make a statement in In the second place, there is the resolution of 20 January, 1?Y which the Conncil appoints a Commission to proceed to the spot as quickly as possible, investigate the fa:;ts of the case, eXf;rcise, wi.thout interrupting the work of the Council, a mediatory influence and carry out the directions given to it by the Council. . Thirdly, both parties in their introductory memoranda have stressed the urgent nature of the situation. The Council took note of that fact in its resolutions of 17 and 20 January. Fourthly, thè United States representative asked me at our 230th meeting on 20 January whetber, following the adoption of the second resolution, the conversations between the parties would con- tinue under the aegis of the President of the Council, and 1 replied that 1 believed 1 was ïnter- preting the intentions of the representatives of India and Pakistan correctly when 1 said that both of them recognized the desirability of pursuing their conversations without interruption with a view to working out a basis for a settle- ment. My statement was not contradicted. Furthermore, the resolution of 20 January makes it clear that the functions of the Setlurity Council Commission will be pursued without interr:upting the work of the Council. Fifthly, both parties have admitted in principle that tb.e future of the State of Jammu and Kash- mir should be decided by plebiscite. The commu- nication from the Government of India to the President of the Council, dated 1 January, states tht in the final analysis the people will be free to decide theirfuture by the recognized demo- cratic method of a plebiscite or referendum, :vhich might be held under international auspices 1l1,order to ensure its complete impartiality. That declaration was confirmed in a statement by the representative of India on 15 January before the Council [227th meeting]. The same principle may he noted in the Pakistan representative's commu- nication of 15 January to the Secretary-General. populaire dernière de reconnue pourrait tionaux impartialité. l'exposé 15 même adressée Secrétaire général le pour tée Charte. Such is the basis upon which the Security Council is ta. carry out the mission invested in it by the Charter in the matter that has been brought before it. The Security Council is to convene tomorrow morning to deaI with another matter on its agenda. Tomorrow aftemoon is free; the Council might therefore devote the aftemoon to the continuation of this debate, wmch would begin with the state- ment of the representative of India. Mr. NOEL BAKER (United Kingdom): 1 have two questions. First, would the President propose that we shor' j have the system of simultaneous interpretatiolJ. for the speech of the representative ,of India ? Second1y, in view of the great urgency 'Ûfthe task on which we are engaged and the importance of trying to reach the next stage, namely, that the President should begin again his ,discussions with the parties before the weekend, would it be possible for us to have our meeting on this subject tomorrow and put off whatever other business there may be until a little later?

With regard to the fust question, if there is no objection we could have the statement or the representative of India interpreted simultaneously, as was done with bis earlier statements and those of the representative of Pakistan. As for the second question, as 1 understand it, the United Kingdom representative would wish us to devote the whole of tomorrow to the question now before us. Are there auy objections? Mr. NOEL BAKER (United Kingdom) : 1 propose that we should start with this matter. If we find, by any chance, that the continuation of our debate is not required, we could then ask the President ta resume bis discussions with the two parties, and perhaps the rest of tomorrow could he taken up with other business. 1 was only suggesting that, as this is a very urgent matter, we might take it up fust. The PRESIDENT {translated jrom French)': In other words, the United KingdoD;l representative proposes that we reverse the order of our meetings. Mr. NOEL· BAKER (United Kingdom): 1 wish it to be correctly understood that 1 propose that we should continue tomorrow and, if necessary, on Satut'day, as long as we have something useful to do in the Security Council itself, before the Pr~sident resumes ms work with the parties. If we :fu1d in the middIe of tomorrow aftemoon that we oCould usefully make a stopping point in our discussion of this question,·the President could then take up the other matter. That is no formaI arrangement. l\rfr. NOEL BAKER (United IGngdom): 1 do not wish to upset any plan and 1 do not wish to do anything which would be contrary to the public interest and to the. good ordering of the work of the Security Council. However, if 1 understand the task which is proposed for the closed meeting, it is one which would be generally agreed, 1 think, to be of much less urgency than that with which we are now concemed. 1 should fb.ei'efore have hoped that it could be put off until a later date. It·has aIready bs:en under the consideration of the ~curityCouncil fDr a considerable time, 1 believe, and 1 do not think that a delay of another day or two would seriously affect the outcome of the work.

Daes the representative of the Bnîon of Soviet Socialist Republics maintain bis objection? If so, would he agree to the following solution: that we hold a private meeting devoted to the Trieste question early in the aftemoon? The meeting would probably not take long, and we could devote me rest of the aftemoon, if necessary, to the continuation of the debate on the question now before us. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated jrom Russian): That is one of the passible decisions. It would be desirable, however,since we have fixed a closed meeting of the Council, that this meeting should take place. It is not really important whether it takes place in the morning or in the aftemoon.

Wou1d that satisfy the representative of the United Kingdom? 1 Mr. NOEL BAKER (United Kingdom): -Certainly, espedally since the President holds out a certain hop~ that the meeting on the Trieste question may not be very long. We may be able to meet at 3.30 or 4 p.m. tomorrowon the Jammu and Kashmir question, have a good session tomorrow aftemoon, and, if necessary, meet on Saturday morning. What I am anxious about is this: that the President should be able to reach the next stage of bis work by the week-end. That is my objective. . Mr. AUSTIN (United States) : We are aU eager to finish our business as expeditiously as possible. If there is no objection to our starting in the morning, let us start in the morning. Let us settle that point, at any rate: that we shall start tomorrow morning. It would be feasible, l think, to hear the representative of India and, «after he finishes, to go into a secret meeting and consider the other matter of Trieste. That would be' the most conveniént arrangemènt. However, if there is a great choice about when to hold the secret meet- Mr. NOEL BAKER (United Kingdom) : Can we agree that the Security Council should reconvene nfter the private meeting not later than 11.30 a.m'I tomorrow? It the private meeting were to occupy the rest of the weekend, it would really be most unfortunate to the public interest. 1 think no one can hold that a further discussion on Trieste can be a matter of such immediate urgency, in view of the fact that it has been under discussion for twelve months now, that a day or two added to that period would make an immense difference.. It is important that we proceed. If we can be sure, of course, that the fust discussion will end by 11.30 a.m., theu I fuHy agree to that arrangement. 1 should have thought that the best plan was the one the President suggested a little earlier, to which 1 made no objection; 1 only made a comment which 1 am afraid provoked further debate.

May 1 draw the attention of·the repl'esentative of France to the materiaI difficulty involved in beginning \Vith the discussion of the Trieste question ? Since we are unable to say exactly when w~ shall finish our discussion on that problem, it wLI be impossible for us to fix the time for the debate on the Indian problem, and the delegations of fuma and Pakistan might therefore he kept waiting. Could we not agree on the following solution: to hold a meeting tomorrow at 10.30 sharp and hear the statement of the representative of India ? We could then at once take up the question of Trieste in closed session. We might possibly dispose of it before the end of the morning and we could continue with the Indian question, if necessary, during the aftemoon. Mr. DE LA TOURNELLE (France) (translated trom French): Ido not wish to do anything which might complicate your task, Mt. President. 1 therefore accept your proposaI. The PRESIDENT (translated jrom French): 1 thank the representative of France for his cooperation. There are no further objections. We shaH meet tomorrow at 10.30 to hear the representative of India. . The meeting rose at 6 p.m.