S/PV.2320 Security Council

Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for the period 16 June to 10 December 1981 [S/14789]. 1. Adoption of the agenda 2. The situation in the Middle East: Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/l4789 and Corr. 1) 4. The first speaker is the representative of Lebanon, upon whom I now call. The meting wus called to order at 5.05 pm. 5. Mr. T&N1 (Lebanon): This may be the last debate on Lebanon with which Mr. Kurt Waldheim is associated in his capacity as -Secretary-General, Ever since his election 10 years ago, Mr. Waldheim has constantly had Lebanon on his agenda in one way or another. Interpreting the responsibility of the Secretary-General in a manner that went beyond the letter of the law, he often said more than off%Al Lebanon could afford to say in defence of our cause-the cause of Lebanon’s right to sovereignty and peace. His concern for my country was not only reassuring; it brought home to us the warmth and comfort that helped us keep our confidence in the community of nations and men of goodwill, when all the world around us seemed to slip away. Adoption of the agenda The situation in the Middle East: Report of the Secretary-General on the United Natlons Jnterlm Force in Lebanon (S/14789 and Corr.1)

I should like t9 inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Israel and Lebanon in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure. 6. On a night in March three years ago in this very chamber, those of us who were here then undoubtedly remember that a tremendous challenge had to be met, in a matter not of days but of hours. The response was UNIFIL, whose fate we are again discussing. Were it not for the consummate diplomacy of X:. Kurt Waldheim, we would have never seen such a meeting of incompatibles, a unity in action of seemingly irreconcilable positions. From the ashes of battlefields, great hopes for peace were almost miraculously created. At the itnitotiotl of the Presidetlt, Mr. Ttte’tri (Lebanon) took (I p/are (III the Couth/ t&/e and Mr, Blrm (lsrcrel) took the plrrce reserved for him at the side of r/w Corm-i/ ht?lber.

I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 18 December from the representative of Tunisia [S/148041 which reads as follows: 7. Romanticism and nostalgia are not usually welcome in the Security Council. Yet, I cannot but ask: where have the hopes all gone? The drama of UNIFlL is best summarized in concrete terms in these few “I have the honour ta request the Security Council to invite Mr. Clovis Maksoud, Permanent Observer I lines fi;>m the Secretary-General’s report which is +::to assure the effective restoration of Lebanese ~before us: I‘the situation in southern Lebanon remains I- ~sovareiglltyl.‘.[ibirl,.pn~n. 61. ~~ ~ ~Precari IUS and fundamentally unstable”; “no ceaseafire, peace-keeping” can continue without negotiaiions; :md “as regards the mandate of UNIFIL, the ~~ difficu’ties” are tremendous, and so on. I am quoting from paragraphs 54 and 55 of that report. 8. U,~doubtedly, all members of the Council have read the report as carefully as I have, and I need not dwell on it much longer. I should like, however, to sum up the problem in the following terms. 9. UNIFIL was sent to southern Lebanon on -a dynamic mission-yet, with only static means and prerogatives, Having been unable to bring about peace, it soon became a static reality caught in the dynamics of an ever-expanding war. Its limited area of operation became a haven of calm, but it has also been held hostage in an Israeli-Palestinian war which seems to continue despite the precarious cease-fire and everyone’s commitment to consolidate that ceasefire. 10. From the north, the so-called armed elements continue their attempts at infiltration; in the south, the so-called tie .fc~~o forces, with the active assistance and participation of Israel, not only prevent UNIFIL from deploying to the internationally recognized boundaries but also engage in acts of harassment and constant attempts at eroding the present area of operation of UNIFIL, its positions and even its headquarters. 11. Now we are told that the situation, which is already unacceptable, is the lesser of two evils, the other evil being what preceded the cease-fire called for by the Cout&il on iI July, after a full-fledged war had been conducted by Israel. The caoital citv of Beirut was savagely bomba;.ded, with the-heaviest civilian casualties ever. All the bridges between southern and central Lebanon were destroyed, two major cities and a number of refugee camps were shelled from the sea, in addition to savage artillery shelling against civilian targets at random from Israel and the so-calledenclave. 12. Where, if not here, and when, if not in such instances, is UNIFIL expected to use its right of selfdefence, as explicitly stated in its terms of reference approved by resolution 426 (1978)? Self-defence, we are told. would include “resistance to attemuts bv forceful ‘means to prevent it from discharging i& duties.” ISll2611 of I9 Matrh 1978. Dara. 4 Id).1 It seems to-& that tie time has come ‘to redef& & mandate in a most unequivocal manner, so that the Force may enjoy the full support of the Council and exercise its deterrent prerogatives fully unhindered, namely, itrlrr trlitr, to “supervise the cessation of hostilities, ensure the peaceful character of the area of operation, control movement and take all measur’es deemed necessary 13. The situation in the Middle East this week has been very much the concern of the Council and the General Assembly. The Council debate on the Golan Heights, concluded yesterday by the unanimous adoption of resolution 497 (1981), was very reassuring. It praved once more, but this time with g&u vigour,-that the Council is aware of the tremendous dangers to peace inherent in the Middle East situation and that its members-individuallv and collecrivelv-are determined to prevent anoiher war. But the danger of war is still real. It is still there in the Golan Heights. as well as in Lebanon br the West Bank. Yet we in Lebanon were hoping that the establishment of UNIFIL would help to insulate the very explosive situation in our country, not only to alleviate the plight of our beleaguered country but also to prevent events in the south from suddenly becoming the detonator for a more general war. We are still very hopeful, despite events in the past week, it will be possible to maintain the cease-fire and to develop the area of relative cahn and tranquillity established under UNIFIL’s authority into a broader zone of peace, which would be our contribution to a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem. 14. It is in this spirit that we wrote to the Secretary- General on I4 December [Sli*:792], asking for what could be described in generic terms as a strengthening of UNIFIL without a change of its mandate, for we know all the reservations that such a proposal would at present arouse. What we are asking for is a more dynamic, more forceful and more determined exercise of the mandate. 15. The original draft resolution which was distributed as the Council was preparing to meet expresses what we felt would have been a new lease on life that this Council should give to UNIFIL, if we do not want that valiant Force to blend helplessly into a most complex political and military landscape. In this landscape, Lebanon’s -real borders risk, in reality, being moved north of the so-called enclave, and Lebanon’s sovereignty could be condemned forever to become a fluid notion, despite all the Government’s attempts at reinforcing its national authority. The present cease-fire obtained at great cost might, in this landscape, remain at the mercy of capricious initiatives, threats of pre-emptive strikes and the goodwill of peace-makers whose efforts are constantly preempted as well, 16. We have stated in this Council over and over again that we are not interested in asking UNIFlL to go to war and enforce peace. Hence, the increase in the number of troops we have requested is not a first step towards the conquest of the enclave. But WC want the Force to be prepared to deploy efficiently there and elsewhere, and we want it to be able to perform “its very demanding tasl without being “stretched to the limit” [S//4789, gala. 631. Indeed, we fully support the recommendation of the Secretary-General that the Council should “continue to give serious m-attention to the appropriate strength of UNIFlL % relation to the tasks which-it performs under the Council’s direction” [ibid.]. Our proposal must be considered in this perspective, and only in this perspective. and security. I should like to single out my brother, Ambassador Slim of Tunisia, who, in his capacity as -the Arab member of the Council, carried the burden of presenting an often arduous, sometimes popular and sometimes impossible case. His consummate diplomacy has made my voice in the Council susceptible of beitlg listened to more than once.

The next speaker is Mr. Clovis Maksoud, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations, to whom the Council has extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement. 17. In the same spirit, we hope that the Council will reiterate its position concerning the joint phased Programme of activities. In his report, the Secretary- General has explained better than we can the reasons which have prevented the completion and implementation of such a programme, which was first requested in September 1978, when resolution 434 (1978) was adopted. We have gone a long way since, but, if we have to obtain a complete fulfilment of the mandate within a visible time-frame, it is imperative that we should have a precise, but flexible, programme of action supported hy the Council and to which every p3lty will adhere in good faith and responsibility. 22. Mr. MAKSOUD: The debate on this conflict and on the implementation of resolutions 42.5 (1978) and 490 (1981) seems at times to repeat well-established arguments. Israel’s non-compliance with those resolutions is an attempt to render futile all the resolutions of the Council. Israel is attempting to impress upon the world community that only its lawlessness should be recognized as the law in the region, that the legitimacy which is spelled out by the international community must be considered to be an exercise in irrelevance and futility. Hence, when Israel violates the integrity and territorial sovereignty of Lebanon in the same manner as it violates the integrity of Palestinian and other Arab territories, it does so not only to pursue its own expansionist and annexationist policies but also to demolish the mechanism of the Un:’ %? ?’ *:nns and the implementation of its resolutiorc 18. The withdrawal of Israel from southern Lebanon is the first and paramount objective of resolution 425 (1978). Israel has not withdrawn, and we areconstantly treated to variations on the theme of security designed to justify Israel’s continued occupation of Lebanese territory north of the internationally recognized boundaries, as confirmed by the General Armistice Agreement of 1949.’ Soon it will be four years since the Council established UNIFIL with the express mandate of supervising Israeli withdrawal. It is the express decision of the international community represented by the Organization that there should be a zone of peace in southern Lebanon. We are all committed to this-all except one, Israel, which visualizes against all odds its security and international peace in terms of continued warfare. Israel’s noncompliance with resolution 425 (1978) has had serious consequences. But, in all honesty, the most serious of all those consequences was the cycle of violence which we all deplore. 23. On 25 November, the twelfth Summit Conference of the Arab League, at the highest level, met an? reaffirmed in its resolution concerning Lebanor, [S/14779] the commitment of the Arab States and the members of the League of Arab States to resolutions 425 (1978) and 490 (1981) and committed itself unequivocably to support the Lebanese Government’s efforts to deploy the Lebanese army in the south, enabling it to carry out its national responsibilities, and to extend the required assistance so that Lebanon could reinforce its capability to bear the burden that will result from restoring to normalcy all State administrative organs and civil and military institutions and returning them to the full exercise of their authority and functions, especially in the south. 19. I am not speaking here in the name of international morality alone, nor merely in terms of international rights. Peace in southern Lebanon is now a practical necessity, a pragmatic imperative. Non-peace, even in the form of a cease-fire, is a hazard which we cannot afford, which the region cannot afford and which the world cannot afford. It is a hazard which this Council could not and should not permit. The gallant men of UNIFlL areconfronted with a tremendous challenge in my country, and it would be criminal indeed to allow 1JNlFIL to continue with no hope of success. 24. Furthermore, the Conference expressed its commitment to continue to observe and to be committed to the contents of resolution 490 (1981). It further asserted that every possible effort should be exerted to ensure the full implementation of resolution 425 (1978) and the ensuing Council resolutions, including the total withdrawal of lsrael to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon. so that the south would be under the exclusive authority of the Lebanese State as a zone .Jf peace and stability. It added that every necessary and possible measure should be taken by the representatives of the Arab Governments at the United Nation5 10 clabor;~rc ;L 20. In conclusion, I should like to address myself !o members of the Council who are taking part in the debate on Lebanon probably for the last time in their current mandate. They have all given us more than their unyielding support: they have given ~1s thei understanding and conccni fill ilitcrnational peace programmefor the -implementation of the Council resolutions concerning southern Lebt+non and the c$solidationof-tthq pm%cnt~$:a+ire,~ z- _ 25. In reiterating and underlining the Security Council resolutions, the Conference is committing itself to acquiesce in and accept as legitimate the international authority of the Council resolutions. That commitment is very significant, because it indicates that the Arab League and the Arab States are committed as far as they can be to the diplomatic United Nations option as a mechar.;sm and a vehicle to resolve the crisis in the Middle East pertaining to Lebanon. Their faith in the Security Council is their faith in its ability to render its resolutions implementable. 26. The Arab League at the highest level has singled out Lebanon as a framework for expressing instant unanimity, while seeking to achieve unanimity on the more complex and complicated issues that challenge it. It is therefore a realization on the part of the Arab States at their highest level that it is the Lebanese State. the centre! authoritv of Lebanon. that should exe&se its full power, bdministrativeiy and militarily, and be enabled to deploy its forces in order to carry out not only Lebanese legitimacy in Lebanon’s territory, but Arab legitimacy and international legitimacy. Those three legitimaciss reinforce each other, and therefore one cannot exclude the other.

Once again the Council is about to renew the mandate of UNIFIL. The Council has on its record Israel’s position with respect to the more complex issues arising in this context, especially as regards UNIFIL’s three-fold mandate, as laid down in resolution 425 (1978). The Council is also acquainted with our position regarding the broader context of the tragedy in Lebanon. This being the case, I can be very brief, and I shall therefore refrain from addressing seeking to destroy t& ability of the Lebanese State to exercise its sovereignty over its territory, to bleed the Palestinian refugees, to bleed Lebanese villages and towns, to create new refugee problems-Lebanese refugees in their own hoses. It creates a new status whereby it can manipulate things, through its own mercenaries, so that the legal authority is pre-empted from taking over its own land. 27. However, by flouting all resolutions, by its attempts to transform the south of Lebanon into an arena for settlinp. bia issues in a small area. Israel is myself to the rambling harangue of our scholar-inresidence, Mr. Maksoud.. 28. Thus, as long as Israel is capable of maintaining military and strategic hegemony over southern Lebanon, deploying and threatening to deploy its armed forces in order to strike at will at Lebanon, it will be disabling our desired territorial and other unity and preventing us from exercising full sovereignty. It seeks to do so because Israel considers Lebanon an experiment in a humanist, integrationist philosophy, according to its own exclusivist racist ideologies. It considers Lebanon to be the civilized answer to Zionist egocentrism; it considers Lebanon to be the anchor of Arab intellectual renaissance; it considers Lebanon to be one of the major correctives, one which blends all civilizations and cultures into a pluralistic expression of a new humanity. It is that which Israel is seeking to destroy, because it seeks to partition Lebanon by all means, and to threaten Lebanon’s existence, because it feels that if it can stimulate a partitionist tendency it can then prevent the Palestinians from exercising their right to return to their homes and their homeland. It is thus that they try to plan a-wider qbjective-namely, to reduce the Palestinian people from a people to mere -demographic additions in -the respective communities of their temnorary abodes, It is this scheme that makes Israel addicted io preserving in Lebanon a status of hegemony-strategic, military, political and ideologicalin order to deprive Lebanon of the resilience of its unity and to prevent the legitimacy of the United Nations from being fully implemented. 29. That is why the Arab League, at the highesr of its councils, reaffirms its commitment to the Lebanese State and to United Nations resolutions, in the hope that we do not merely rearm previous resolutions. It is our hope that UNIFIL not only is made deployable but is given the ability to deter aggression and expansion. Only then can our faith in the United Nations be creditable to our people and the world community.

The next speaker is the representative of Israel, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement. 32. The tragic reality prevailing in Lebanon must be recognized by all of us. Lebanon still remains a country occupied by alien forces. While Syria still maintains in Lebanon a sizable portion of its army-that is. about 25,000 troops and upwards-the PLO [I’ulcsthe Liberation Orgunizufiart] still has over 15,000 terrorists operating in the country, of whom over 2,000 are positioned south of the Litani River. About 1500 of these terrorists are located in the so-called Tyre pocket, and around 700 are deployed in some 40 pockets and nests within the UNIFIL area of operation, with the clear intention of using that area as a springboard in their attempts to terrorize Israel’s civilian population. As long as those non-Lebanese elements are allowed to operate within and from Lebanon, no real progress will be achieved towards the return of the effective authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout the length and breadth of that country. 33. UNIFIL’s mandate was originally set out in resolution 425 (1978). At the time that resolution was adopted, the Council took cognizance of the problem of Lebanon in its entirety, recognizing that the presence of Syrian troops and the PLO terrorists on Lebanese soil constituted a major obstacle to the reestablishment of Lebanon’s authority over its own I , , territory and to the res oration of international peace and security. With those considerations in mind, the -Council in that resolution called for “strict respect for the territorial integrity, soverei8nty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries”, and UNIFIL was entrusted with an appropriate three-fold mandate, namely: first, to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces; secondly, to restore international peace and security; thirdly, to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. recovery to the officers and men of UNIFIL who have been injured in the same cause-the cause of peace.

I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Kuwait and the Syrian Arab Republic in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite them to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of :he Council’s provisional rules of procedure. 34. In co-operation with the Israel Defence Forces, UNIFIL has successfully carried out the first part of its mandate. The completion of Israel’s withdrawal was confirmed by the UNIFIL Commander on 13 June 1978 and recorded in the progress report of the Secretary-General on the same day [S/12620/Add.5]. Regrettably, the remaining two parts of UNIFIL’s mandate have not yet been implemented: international peace and security have not been restored in Lebanon because of the continuing presence of the Syrian army of occupation acd the massive presence of PLO terrorists on Lebanese soil. At the invitafiott of the President, Mr. Ab~dhasscttt (Kuwait) and Mr. El-Fattal (Syrior Arub Republic) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chumber.

The next speaker is the representative of Kuwait, who wishes to make a statement on behalf of the Group of Arab States at the United Nations. I invite him to take a place at the Council table an to make his statement. 35. Although Israel’s position of principle concerning Lebanon is well known, I should like once again to reaffirm that Israel continues to support the independence, sovereignty, territorial andpolitical integrity and unity of Lebanon withill its intemationally recognized boundaries. Israel wants peace, bothin and with Lebanon.

In my capacity as the Chairman of the Arab Group at the United Nations for this month, I have the honour of making the following statement. 42. The fact that the cease-fire on the southern borders of Lebanon is still holding should not mislead us to believe that peace and stability have been established in that !uea. The situation is still precarious, and even the mdst unexpected event could trigger new rounds of hostilities on various fronts. 36. The restoration of peace in Lebanon and the solution of all its problems must not be contingent on the attainment of an overall solution to the Arab- Israeli conflict and should not await that overall solution. Regrettably, it is precisely those alien forces in Lebanon which have been working against peace in the Middle bast in general that have also undermined its sovereignty and are impeding the restoration of its national independence. 43. The sudden, but not totally unexpected, annexation of the occupied Syrian Arab Golan Heights by the expansionist Israeli occupiers is only a reminder of the kind of events which could plunge the whole area into a new chain of violence alld hostilities. Besides, it is now an established fact that the Israelis have in recent years been using their northern border with Lebanon as a soft spot to be encroached upon every time the Israeli le. ders want to make a political point or to create diversionary tactics. Tlte New! York i’itnes supported that idea in its editorial comment 011 the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights by saying: “Begin does not hesitate to solve his domestic problems at the expense of his diplomacy.” 37. In concluding, I wish to take this opportunity to pay a tribute to the Commander of UNIFIL, Lieutenant-General William Callaghan, and his staff, as well as to the officers and other personnel, both military and civilian, serving with UNIFIL. They are carrying out their duties in arduous and often trying circumstances and have been courageous and enterprising in the fulfilment of their tasks. My Govemment wishes to express its appreciation for the constructive and efficient manner in which they have tackled and solved practical problems at hand. 44. With the impending threat of more Israeli incursions into southern Lebanon to suit the Israeli political designs, the situation in that area will remain mercurial and thus require more efforts to stabilize the situation in a more solid way. 38. I should also like to express Israel’s appreciation to the countries contributing contingents to UNIFIL in the service of international peace. Furthermore, we shouid like to take this oppo&ity to extend our condolences to the families of all those who have made the ultimate sacrifice in the cause of peace during the period under review and to wish a speedy and full 45. UNIFIL, the renewal of whose mandate is the subject of our discussion at this Council meeting 10dny, has undoubtedly played a role in such efforts to solidify 5’ the situation in southern Lebanon, Nobody denies that the task of UNIFIL is cumbersome and that it ~has been working against odds; and that is because the challenge of the Lebanese situation is of the greatest magnitude. However, I should like at this point to express, on behalf of the Arab Group at the United Naticl*?, support of the Lebanese contention, as exprt,;ed by the representative of Lebanon: that the cease-fire should never be considered as an end in itself but merely as a step towards the full implementation of resolution 425 (1978). 46. The Arab summit at Fez made it abundantly clear in its resolutions on the Lebanese situation that the Arab countries are greatly concerned about the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the whole of Lebanon as well as of safeguarding stability in southern Lebanon. 47. With all that in mind, thk Arab Group would like to make the following observations. First, since any threat to southern Lebanon jeopardizes other Arab countries in general and the Palestinian cause in particular, its problem is increasingly becoming an Arab, as well as a Lebanese, problem; the Arab Follow-up Committee which includes my country, Kuwait, does not, therefore, spare any effort at seeking solutions for all aspects of the unfortunate Lebanese situation. Secondly, the main threat to southern Lebanon still comes from the Israelis, who, as I have already stated, use Lebanese soil as a soft spot to carry out their expanding political purposes. Thirdly, the friends of Israel, notably the United States, should contribute to the efforts to stabilize that area by pressuring Israel to stop its cheap exploitation of a dangerous and explosive situation in Lebanon. Fourthly, the Security Council bears responsibility for the implementation of its resolution 425 (1978), with all its ramifications.

The next speaker is the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement. 49. Mr. EL-FATTAL (Syrian Arab Republicj: Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you once again and to express my admiration for the wisdom and patience you have shown in conducting the deliberations ofthis Council during a particularly busy month. 50. We should also like to express our thanks to Ambassador Slim, your predecessor, who has shown considerable skill as a negotiator during the discussions on the latest grave violation of the Charter when Israel defiantly annexed the Syrian Golan Heights. 51. We are all aware of the fact that the Council has unanimously and constantly upheld the position that Israel should totally withdraw itself and its puppets from southern Lebanon. There is no ambiguity in resolulion 425 (1978) and subsequent ICW~II~IOI~~, all of which call for the total withdrawal of Israeli forces back to the internationally recognized borders. But despite these resolutions, -Israel has exerted all efforts to keep southern Lebanon a powder keg. Israel has not fulfilled its obligations under the various Council resolutions; therefore, it is the duty of the Council to denounce its aggressive policies and practices, which prevent the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty over the entire area of southern Lebanon controlled by Israel and its puppets. 52. The Syrian Arab Republic has time and again called for respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integl:ity of Lebanon; despite its clear stand, the Israeli representative distorts the Arab role in Lebanon in order to deflect attention from his country’s aggressive policies and armed attacks against the people and the land of Lebanon and from its continuing occupation of parts of southern Lebanon. The Secretary-General’s report amply demonstrates that Israel and its puppets prevent the extension of legitimate Lebanese authority to the internationaily recognized borders of Lebanon. 53. The Israeli representative-an alien to the region, astranger, an occupier-cannot beexpected but to try to twist facts and misinterpret realities, as he did yesterday in regard to Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights. 54. When they should be crestfallen and apologetic, the Israelis mount their attacks in an effort to absolve themselves and their actions. They falsify history; they rewrite international law to accommodate theil objectives; they misquote out of context. They will resort to all means to legitimize every new usurpation. They truly believe that by extolling themselves and by continuing morally and physically to assault their victims they will eventually triumph. But we are too familiar with these tactics to be intimidated by Israel. 55. Need we remind the Council that whenever a national reconciliation process dawns on the Lebanese horizon, Tel Aviv or Washington, or both, see to it that that new incentive, particularly if it is purely Arab, is subverted and shelved. Miraculously we do not despair, nor do the brave Lebanese people for that matter. 56. The Syrian Arab Republic wishes to reiterate that the sole purpose of the establishment of the Arab Defence Force in Lebanon is to terminate a tragic fratricidal war and to grant the Lebanese people the opportunity to determine its own destiny in unity without external interference. Let it be quite clear that the Syrian Arab Republic will never relinquish its national duties and obligations to defend sisterly Lebanon’s unity and internal peace, 2nd the Arab Defence Force will continue to fulfil its duties under a mandate determined and renewed by the Arat l.eague. To portray us as the Israelis have portrayed us must be undcr\lood m the c<)nlext of Zionist colo- 57. The Syrian Arab Republic has a national duty to Lebanon and for Lebanon. We were called upon by Lebanon to perform a fraternal duty, to stop a civil war and to prevent the partition of the country into “mini-States”. 58. Syrians and Lebanese alike have since 1948 realized that Zionist expansionism will not spare them. Nor have the Zionists hidden their intentions, territorial or otherwise, in regard to Arab sovereign countries bordering on Palestine. As early as 1919, the Zionist movernent, in collusion with the colonial Powers at the time, who were busily dissecting the Arab nation, made it clear in their plan submitted to the Versailles Peace Conference that southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights, as well as neighbouring zones in Jordan, were sooner or later to be inc1udeL in the so-called Eretz Yisrael. As early as 1919, the Zionists realized that they could not create a State for all the Jews and for Jews alone without controlling the water sources of Palestine, which lie in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Occupation and control of those parts of the Arab homeland was a prerequisite for the strengthening of the demographic, agricultural and industrial capabilities of an ever-expanding Zionist militaristic State. Indeed, Israel accomplished part of its design in 1%7 by occupying the Golan Heights and its water resources, and pending before the Council today is the illegitimate Israeli act of annexing the Syrian Golan Heights, which a shocked Security Council and an indignant General Assembly have declared null and void. 59. A question that may occur to us is why in 1948, again in 1%7, aqd between those two dates and since, Israel has refrained from extending its domination over southern Lebanon, a highly coveted region. 60. Israeli literature reveals that in 1954 a bitter debate began as to ways and means of dismantling a flourishing Lebanon, a controversy which arose not 011 substance but rather on timing. The Ben Gurion- Sharrett correspondence remains the best example of that debate. The Israeli intervention did not start to assume its ominous course openly until the year 1973. The timing was propitious, for it accompanied the beginning of the process of Egyptian capitulation. In order to deflect public attention from the Second Sinai Agreement ofseptember 1975 (S//1818/Add./4], which neutralized Egypt, Israel calculated that the time was ripe for it to strike and restrike at southern Lebanon under the pretext of pre-emptive and protective self-defence operations. 61. Simultaneously, Israel is engaging in subversive 68. I do not want to speak here nt great length. cithcr activities to destroy the fabric of Lebanese society, about the mandate of the I+rcc or nbout the dc\clol> 62. The Israeli delegation may repeat its hypocritical concern for Lebanon and the Lebanese; yet Israeli pilots drop bombs on Lebanese villages and cities. The latest such incident was the Beirut carnage. The Israeli air force spares neither hospital nor school nor archaeological treasure; the Israeli army burns and destroys agricultural crops and attacks civilian installations. This scorched-earth policy is aimed at emptying the south of its inhabitants, of both Lebanese and Palestinian refugees, in preparation for a new Israeli Lebrrrsrurr~n. 63, We believe that nothing will prevent Israel from continuing its acts of aggression against Lebanon unless the United States of America, which has concluded with Israel a pact of aggression against the Arab nation, is prevented from reaping the fruits of this new pact. The Arab nation is totally prepared to abort such a belligerent attitude by the United States. Ultimately, the United States has to realize that the Arabs arc not the natural protectors of the United States and Western interests in the Middle East. 64 Whoever claims to have an interest in the Middle East must prove first that he respects the interests of the Arab nation-interests which claim nothing more than respect for the Charter of the United Nations, that is, the non-acquisition of territory by force, which means total Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, and first and foremost from Palestine. 65. Whether we speak about Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine or Egypt, we have to speak louder in order to inform the American public that the course pursued by its Administrations, including the present one, will not help their interests or ours.

The Secretary-General, in paragraph 62 of his current report on UNIFIL. states that UNIFIL’s ~~~~ ~.~~ ~ “presence and activities in southern Lebanon are an indispensable element in m&ntaining peace, not only in the immediate area but in the Middle East as a whole.” Ireland agrees fully with that assessment. My dclegation believes, therefore, that the Council should now extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a furthe! six-month period, that is, until 19 June 1982. 67. UNIFIL faces a difficult task and an unstable situation in the area. But, despite the difficulties pbdced in its way, UNIFIL’s success in helping to maintain peace in the region is clear for all to see. To appreciate this fully, one need only consider what the situation would now be if UNIFI’, did not exist. 69. I want simply to refer to some developments over the past six months which we feel to be of particular importance. 70. After the hostilities of last July in Lebanon. Irtland co-sponsored and supported council resolu; tion @Xl (19811, which called for an immediate cessation of all armed attacks, The cease-fire is still holding, despite the continued tension in the area, and UNIFIL, by its presence, has been able to make a particular contribution in support of this cease-fire of July. 71. But in the Council we must always keep in mind UNIFIL’s basic mandate. For its part, Ireland, as a member of the Council and as a troou contributor. attaches the greatest importance to piogress in thd fulfilment of this mandate as set out bv the Council in resolution 425 (1978). This, as we knbw, had three elements: to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, to restore international peace and security and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority to the area. 7?. It is clear that UNIFIL has achieved a considerable measure of success. This is evident. for example. from the Secretary-General’s report. In paragraph-33; he speaks of “an influx of people into the UNIFIL area ..om other parts of Lebanon seeking safety”. Indeed, it is principally this which has stretched the manpower ofUNI$ILio its limits-a point which the Secretary-General has noted in paragraph 63 of the same report. But it remains the case that, as he also points out, in paratwph.Y, ~~ “the difficulties which the Force has experienced since its inception have continued to obstruct the full implementation of the task allotted to it by the Security Council. The full co-operation of all parties which such implementation wou!@require is, regrettably, still not forthcoming.” 73. This failure by all parties to give full co-operation is a failure to respect previous decisions of the Council. This is dangerous, in our view, because it can lead to increased tension and violence in the area as a whole. Lives are lost as a result, including the lives of innocent civilians and those of members of UNIFIL. who serve the cause of peace. 74. On the one hand, the persistent attempts at infiltration through UNIFIL’s ar9a and. on the other hand. the continu& harassment, including most recently thd serious incidents at Hill 880, which involve the Irish contingent, have given us particular cause for concern. ‘IS. I have had occasion to say before in the Council that Ireland believes that a peace-keeping force should 76. We have been encouraged by certain improvements, but we insist on the need for full co-operation with UNIFIL. from all parties. 77. Equally, it should ?e a basic principle that the despatch by the Council of a peace-keeping force is not a substitute for the effort to negotiate a settlement. What the work of any peace-keeping force does is, rather, to allow an opportunity for peace-making, that is, allow an opportunity for the parties concerned to seek a more permanent and lasting solution to their differences. The Secretary-General emphasizes this point also in his report. He states, in paragraph 54: “No cease-fire, peace-keeping operation, ot other expedient for containing the conflict can, in the end, prevent new outbursts of violence as long as the basic elements of the problem are not tackled in negotiations involving all the parties concerned”. 78. It remains very important, in our view, while extending the mandate of UNIFIL, to try to ensure that all basic elements of the problem will be dealt with through negotiations. 79. In cdnclusion, I wish, on behalf of the Governmen: of Ireland, to express our very sincere and special appreciation for the untiring efforts of the Secretary-General. It is customary, I know, to use the phrase “untiring” efforts. In this case, I believe the adjective is fully merited by Mr. Waldheim. I should like to thank him most warmly on behalf of my Government for the efforts he has made in regard to UNIFIL and in SO many other matters over many years. 80. I also want to thank very warmly Under-Secretary-General Urquhart and his staff and also, 1 should like to mention, the Force Commander, my fellow countryman, Lieutenant-General William Callaghan. I also join sincerely in the tributes to the courage, dedication and skill of the officers, men and civilian staff who make up UNIFIL. WL:n the United Nations is criticimd, as it sometimes is, the efforts and dedi.. cation of the 6,000 men of UNIFII, in southern Lebanon and of the many other United Nations peacekeeping forces over the years, which total, I believe, over 3oO,OOO from SO many diverse countries, should be remembered and recognized.

Members of the Council have before them document S/14803, which contains the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council’s consultations. It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to a vote on that draft resolution. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put it to the vote. 83. I shall now call on those representatives who wish to make a statement before the vote.

The Council is once again compelled to take up the question of extending the mandate of UNIFIL. Despite the fact that, as early as 1978, in its resolution 425 (1978) the Council directly called upon the aggressor, Israel, to respect the tcrritorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon and to withdraw completely from Lebanese territory, the ruling circles in Israel have intensified their aggressive policies towards Lebanon. 85. The General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session adopted resolution 36/226 A, paragraph 9 of which reads:- ~~ .~ ~_~ -_ “Strmgly condetnns the Israeli aggression against Lebanon and the continuous bombardment and destrnction of its cities and villages, and all acts that constitute a violation of its sovereignty, indcpendence and territorial integrity and the security of its people, and prevent the full implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, including the full deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in LebP,non up to the internationaliy recognized borders”. 86. As a result of the aggressive policy of the ruling circles in Israel and Haddad’s bands in southern Lebanon who are in their pay, it has not been possible to carry out the mandate of UNIFIL. In view of that, we cannot but refer to the responsibility of the United States, which has given comprehensive support to Israel and has blocked any steps on the part of the Council against the aglrressor. Instead of doing what the circumstances obviously dictate, that is, making use of every available opportunity that would force Israel to withdraw completely from Lebanon and to refrain from giving support to Haddad’s bands, the ruling circles of the United States quite obviously are attempting to use the unstable position which has been caused by Israel in r ’ “anon to serve their own interests in order to satisfy their aspirations for domination in the Arab region. 87. It has once again been confirmed that the absence of a con~prchcnsive political settlement in the Middle 88. The German Democratic Republic, together with other socialist States and peace-loving countries, has unswervingly supported a comprehensive, just and durable political settlement of the Middle East conflict, It is essential that Israel withdraw from all the Arab territories which it occupied in 1967; that the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine be guaranteed, including the right to return to their homeland, to self-determination and to establish their own independent Palestinian State. 89. Unfortunately, the draft resolution before us does not contain any vigorous steps that would be conducive to ending Israel’s aggressive actions and the actions of Haddad’s bands against Lebanon and the Palestinian people. That being so, we should like once again to draw attention to the fact that armed forces acting on behalf of the United Nations must act solely on the basis of decisions of the Security Council. 90. Although we have no objection to extending the mandate of UNIFIL, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, however, will abstain in the vote on the draft resolution, since we maintain our previous reservations in connection with the terms of .reference of the mandate, the composition and tinancing of UNIFIL.

Aware of the important role played by UNIFIL in maintaining stability in southern Lebanon, my delegation unhesitatingly took part in the work of the Council on this subject. In doing so, my Government wished to express its attachment to resolution 425 (1978) in all its provisions. It endorses the three fundamental objectives set for UNIFIL: to confirm the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, to restore international peace and security and to help the Lebanese Government to ensure the restoration of its effective authority in the region. -92. -It is necessary to point out, however, as the Secretary-General states in his report, that UNIFIL. has not been able thus far to fulfil all the terms of its mandate, despite the praiseworthy efforts made at various levels. Of course, thanks to its action, the cease-fire called for by the Council in resolution 490 (1981) of 21 July last has been maintained and the are;, in which UNIFIL operates has been un~ually quiet, despite the persistence of latent tensions. But there are still too many incidents, and the obstacles which are raised to prevent the Force from carrying out its mission are still too many to allow us to pass 0~~1 them in silence. Those incidents, most of them +::> orately provoked by the parties in the field, call fr ;:I in disapproval on our part I quote from paragrar ’ 14 ‘1: the report of the Secretary-General in this connectru!l. =- “Certain armed elements, moreover, are still _-attempting to establish their presence in some parts -of the Scncgalese battalion area. These attempts -=havecontributed to tension in the area and, on occamm sion, have led to clashes between sympatvzers of -~ various factions.“. 93. The dr frrcm forces have continued successfully to thwart any new deployment of UNIFIL in their enclave; they have been preventing the freedom of movement of UNIFIL and United Nations Truce Supervision Organization personnel in their zones. They are maintaining their presence in four positions in the Force’s area of operations. Hence we fully support the recommendations in the Secretary-General’s report. It is absolutely essential that all parties in the field give their full and unreserved co-operation to the Force in the implementation of its mandate. 94. In that synit, we urgently appeal to all the parties’ to continue to respect the cease-fire and to refrain from any action liable to lead to violent reactions, and to make a resolute effortto allow consolidation of the UNIFlL area, 95. In that connection, I wish to pay a due tribute to the efforts made in very difficult circumstances by the I.ebanese Government to help ,UNIFIL carry out its tasks. As indicated in the Secretary-General’s report, 1,350 officers and troops are currently under the operational control of the Commander of the Force. l%lrthermore, a Lebanese engineering unit is endeavouring to repair existing buildings and to construct shelters: it is also carrying out projects for the benefit of the civilian population in the zone of operations. Together with those efforts, co-operation between UNIFIL and the Lebanese internal security forces has been further strengthened. 96. These are encouraging signs on the road towards gradual restoration of Government authority in that part of the country. Need I say that France is still attached to the territorial integrity, sovereientv and political independence of Leb&on; That isw6y my delegation, which rightly values the determination of the Lebanese Government to enhance its presence, both military and civilian, in the region, is ready and willing to support any initiatives that might be undertaken by the Lebanese authorities to improve the situation. The French delegation favours the earliest possible resumption of the activities of the Israel- Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission and also welcomes the idea of strengthening the means and objectives of UNIFIL as advocated by the Beirut Government. 97. Before closing, I should like to pay a particular tribtltc to the Secretary-General for the outstanding contribution he has made over all these years to a much-needed restoration of peace to that sorely tried l?i\rt of the world. I also offer the congratulations and thanks of my delegation to General Callaghan for the remarkable way in which he has been discharging his tasks as Force Commander, My congratulations and good wishes go also, ~of course, to the officers and troop* of !he Force.

I now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/14803. A vote wus taken by show of hatrds. Iti .favour: China, France. Ireland. Japan, Mexico, Nige;, Panama, Philippines; Spain, i‘unisia, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America Against: None Abstaittittg: German Democratic Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics The &oft resohtiotr was adopred by 13 votes 10 none, willi 2 ahrenrions (resoMott 495 (1981)).

I now call on the Secretary- General.

I have taken note of the resolution just adopted by the Council and its decision to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further p&pd of-six-months, until 19 June 1982. 101. I have on numerous occasions drawn the Council’s attention to the root-causes of the difficulties faced by UNIFIL, and I do not need to reiterate them today. Needless to say, with this renewed expression of support by the Council UNIFIL will continue to exert all possible efforts to carry out fully the tasks entrusted to it. I am sure that my successor will, as I have done, do all that he can to promote the full implementation of the Council resolutions on UNIFIL in all their parts. 102. I would hope, at the same time, that the members of the Council will bring their fullest influence to bear on the situation so that the parties will heed the position taken by the Council, without furthe] delay. I consider this fundamentally important if our objectives are to be fulfilled. 103. I wish to pay a tribute once again to the Commander, the officers and men of IJNIFIL. In this, one of the most important and most difficult United Nations peace-keeping operations, they have carried out their duties with exemplary efficiency, dedication and courage. 104. Finally, may I take this opportunity to express my warm thanks to the members of the Council for the kind words addressed to me.

I shall now call on those members of the Council who have expressed the wish to make statements following the voting. IO

Once again the Security Council has met and ha&takej! a decision to extend the mandate of UNIFIL.

Today we have considered the renewal of a body that has performed a crucial role in preserving peace in the Middle East. The existence of UNIFIL, with all its imperfections, has helped materially to reduce dangerous confrontations among the various antagonists. This, in turn, has made it possible not only to work towards a peaceful evolution of Lebanon’s domestic political development with, it is hoped, the co-operation of certain other States in the region but also io maintain momentum towards a peaceful settlement of the broader Arab-Israeli conflict towards a negotiated settlement-let me add-on the basis of the Council’s resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and the Camp David framework. 107. As everyone is well aware, that Force was set up on an interim basis in March 1978 primarily in order to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanese territory. It has now been in existence for practically four years. However, it still has not carried out its mandate, and there is no foreseeable end to its activities. 108. The reasons for such an abnormal situation are, as is known, the virtually constant aggressive armed provocations by Israel and its agents, the separatist contingents of Haddad, against Lebanon, against the Palestinians in that territory, and against various units of UNIFIL. At the same time, we cannot fail to note that Israel has quite clearly expressed expansionist designs towards southern Lebanon. This is borne out by the fact that in the course of the Council’s recent consideration of Israel’s illegal activities concerning the Syrian Golan Heights,- many representatives, including the representative of Lebanon, clearly indicated that, after Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, southern Lebanon may well become the next target of israel’s expansionist and annexationist policy. 114. The cease-fire recently put in place in Lebanon -which UNIFIL helps substantially to preserveserves the interests of all the parties involved. As we all recognize, however, the situation remains precarious, and the distribution of forces in the region on which the cease-fire is based cannot be considered permanent. But the only way to reach a final settlement is first of all to avoid eruptions of violence, and achieving that is the role which the cease-fire in general and UNIFIL in particular must be allowed to play. 115. We are pleased that this renewal resolution contains language firmly recognizing the Lebanese Government’s sovereignty in the region and the integrity of its national territory. The authority of the Lebanese Government must be restored with all possible speed in that region, and my Government pledges itself to help in any way possible towards that 109. In this connection, the Soviet delegation believes that in considering the extension of UNIFIL’s mandate the Council should have focused its attention on aspects of the situation prevailing in southern Lebanon, such as protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country. It should have taken vigorous and effective steps to counter the implementation of Israel’s aggressive, expansionist designs towards Lebanon and to secure the fuull withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Lebanese territory, g0d. 116. We applaud the efforts of the Lebanese Government to deploy its army in operations with UNIFIL in the south. We encourage the Government of Lebanon to continue efforts to extend its authority throughout its territory. 110. Ths position of the Soviet Union with respect to UNIFIL is one of principle and remains unchanged. It is based on the need to protect the victims of Israel’s aggression and to ensure the complete withdrawal of Israel’s troops from all Lebanese territory without in any way encroaching on the sovereign aghts of the Government of Lebanon. 117. Far all those reasons, we have supported the resolution and the renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate for another six months. 118. Finally, we wish to express our admiration and support for the Commander, officers and personnel of UNIFIL whose braverv and dedication in the cause of aeace deserve the gratitude of us all. It would be well if th world’s political leaders would follow that example. 111. At the same time, we should like to confirm that UNIFIL should function in strict conformity with the Charter, under the control of the Security Council, particularly with respect to its functions, its total strength, the principles underlying the selection of national contingents and the procedures whereby those troops are financed.

The representative of Lebanon has asked to be allowed to speak and I call ou idm. 112. The delegation of the Soviet Union abstained in the vote just taken on the resolution to renew the mandate of UNIFIL for the same reasons which caused it to abstain in the vote on the original resolution which established the Force-resolution 42s (1978).

I have asked to be allowed to speak principally to address to you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Co&il the thanks of the Government of Lebanon for yet another prompt response. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATlONS United Nalions publications may be obtained liom bookstores and distributors ibroUk!bOUl Ihe world. Consult your bookstore or write to: Uoiled Nations. Sales Section. New York or Ge~le’~a. COMMENT SE PROCURER LEX PUBLICATIONS DES NAllONS UNlI?S Lcs publications des Nations Unies som en venledans Its librairiesct lcsa~encesdeposilaircsdu monde emier. Informez-vow aupr-3 dc vow libraire ou adrcsswvow A ; Nadons Unies. ticlion des venles. New York o” G&VC. MJ3M) li6.611034une 1988-2.050