S/PV.236 Security Council

It is my duty to report on the conversation.'i which, in conformity with the desireexpres~'ed at the last m{leting of the Council, 1 have had with the representatives of India and Pakistan, and to tell the members of the Council how far we got ,in those conversations. Acting on a fortunate suggestion made on 24 January by the representative of India, the parties agreed to exr.hange written proposaIs. The same day 1 su.bmitted to them the pl'eliminary draft resolution contained in document No. 1 now before the Council, which.l shall read : nière Il The Security Council, Il Whereas India and Pakistan recognize that the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir must be decided through the democratic method of a plebiscite or referendum to he held under international auspices, in order to ensure complete imparti~lity; Il Whereas the parties, being both Members of the United Nations, agree that such plebiscite or referendum should be organized, held and supervised under the authority of the Security Counci1; .donner . Il Take note with sa~faction of thisagree:ment, 1 which it will take the necessary measures to carry out." _ . It was my intention to sugrrest to the pfu4:ies ~e.. tex~ l ~ave just read ~s a.possibl~basisfor ~Scussion m the present Situation. This text was . the result of a recognition of the fact that the documents now at our disposaI show agreement betwoon the parties on the Mee following points : 1. The question a.s to whether the8tate of Janunuand .Kashmir will accede to !uma or to Pakistanshall be decided by a :plebiscite; ~ libid.,. pages 67~87. albid., No. 6, 2318t meeting. F~,. this purpose, the Government of PaJdstan should use all its efforts to stop the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir by persuading the tribesmen and others now in the State territory, who have invaded Kashmir, to withdraw from that territory; it should further prevent the passage through Paldtan territory of such invaders to the Jammu and Kashmir State, deny the use of sucb territü:l-Y for operations against the State and aIso refuse supplies and other material aid, direct and indirect, to such invaqers. .. B. After fighting has ceased and there are no raiders from outside left in the State and there is no further need to continue military operations in the State, the next objective should be the restoration of peace and normal conditions. .. For this purpose, .. 1. AIl citizens of the State who have left it on account of the recent disturbances will be invited, and be free, to return to their homes and to exercise all their rights as such citizens; •~ 2. There shall he no victimization; .. 3. All political prisoners in the State shall be released; and .. 4. No restrictions shall be imposed on legitimate political activity. .. It is anticipated fuata -period·-of about six monfus after the termination of military operations will he required for the restoration of normal conditions and for infusing full confidence into the minds of citizens who have migrated from the State to persuade themselves tu return to their homes with a sense of security. .. It is'further recognized that due, among other things, to the present upheaval in Kashmir, the resources of the Jammu and Kashmir State are not at present adequate.to maintain law and order. The efficient maintenance of law and order·in - the State during the interval between the, termination of military operations and the taking of the plebiscite is essential if the plebiscite is to be free and unfettered. So long as the State remains acceded to Indh, tht, '3()vem:<à~nt of India is •• C. The Emergency Administration under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah wJl immediately be converted by the Maharaja into a Council of Ministers in. which Sheikh Abdullah will be Prime Minister and his colleagues will be appointed by the Maharaja on bis advice. The Ministry will, as far as possible, functioll. as a responsible mînistry. "D. The Commission already decided on should go over to India at once for the purpose of watching, ensuring by advice, and mediation, that the measures agreed on as necessary for the stoppage of fighting and the termination of military operations are implemented effèctively and without 108S of time and of reporting to the Security Council its conclusions. "II. .Ascertaining the wishes of the people of 1 the State. .. E. The principle is recognized that the new constitution to be framed for the State and' the detennination of the question of accession are mattelrs entirely for the free decision of its people. It is hoped that the Maharaja of Kasbmir' and bis Govemment would undertake to ensure this by taking the following steps : rendre en donnant des à l'arrêt militaires perte conclusions nouvelle règlement de problèmes résoudre radjah assureront mesures normales, prendre blée tenant nombre tion électorale devrait, être national alors ment. et l'Organisation alOIS pour respofLsabilité guera Pakistan, yeux. .. 1. The interim govemment should, as soon as the restoration of normal conditions has been completed, take steps for the convoking of a National Assembly based upon adult suffrage anù having due regard to the principle that the number of representatives from each voting area should, as far as possible, be proportionate to the population. "2. A national Govemment based upon the National Assembly should then be constituted. " 3. The national Govemment will then proceed to have a plebiscite taken on the question of accession. The plebiscite will be taken under the advice and observation of persons appointed by the United Nations. .. 4. The National Assembly will then proceed to frame a new constitution for the State for promulgation by the Maharaja, based on the Pfinciple of full responsible govemment." . The document submitted by the representative. of Pakistan on 27 January 1948 is aIso before the Council. It is document No. 3 and reads as follows: naissent Jammu ou "The Security Council, ," Whereas India and Pakistan recognize that the question whether the State of Jammu and F".ashmirshall acèede to Pakistan or to Inma must be decided· through the democratic method of a "3. The return of all residents of the Jammu and Kashmir State who have left or havebeen compelled to leave the State as a resuIt of the tragic çyents since 15 August 1947; "4. The hoiding of a plebiscite to ascertain the free, fair, and unfettered will of the people of the State as to whether the State shall accede to Pakistan o~ to India; '" Calls upon the parties concemed to give full co-operation and assistance to the Commission in carryingont these and such other directions as may 'be given to itby the Security Council." 1 .said just DOW that the suggestion to make this exchange of notes was a fortunate one. The notes do supply a general pieture ·of the principal factors in the situation. 1 leave it to the represen- tatives of India and Pakistan to amplify and camment on the proposais they have made, should they think it advisable. After the excb.ange of views which these pro- posalshave _produced, l thought itfitting to submit sUll1eadditiûnal suggestions on m.y ownacc()unt. It appeared fo me mat th€à-e werein theproposals or the exchange ofviews some ideascommon to the. twoparties. The&e ideas are : 1. Thatmost concretely expressed in the fust paragraphof the document submitted by the representative of India, reading as follows : '" The mst 'objective to be ache:vied isthestoppage of fighting and the termination l. f ;military ope- rations in Jammu and Kashmir"; 2. The idea that India and Pakistan should co-operate to attain this fust objective and main.tain order and security in the future; 3. The idea .that the freedom of the plebiscite shouIdbe adequatelyassured. Il The Security Council, li Whereas India and Pakistan recognize that the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir must be decided through the democratic method of a plebiscite or referendum to be held under international auspices,'in ord3r to ensure complete impartiality; .. Whereas the parties, being both Members of the United Nations, agree that such plebiscite or referendum should be organized, held 'and super- \7Îsed under the authority of the Security Council; " Takes note with satisfaction of this agreement, whlch it will take necessary measures tocarry out." Here 1 interrupt my quotation.The text 1 have just read exactly reproduces the preliminary draft resolution which 1 submitted to the two parties on 24 January and which 1 read at the beginning of the meeting. 1 continue my reading of the draft resolution set forth in document No. 4. '" In this connexion, the Commission oÏ the Security Council established by the resolution of 20 January 1948 shall take into consideration that, among the duties incumbent upon it, are included those which would tend towards promot- ing the cessation of acts of hostility and· violence, and which are of a particularly urgent character. In the pursuIt of this aim, the Commission shall use every diligence to ensure that its mediatory action be exercised without delay and that its proposals to the Security Council he submitted as soon as possibl~. " Such proposals shall inc1ude measures designed to ensure co-opel'atïon between the military forces of India and of Pakistan with a view to attaining the objectives above mentioned and to maintaining order and security in the future. "The Commission sha11 also repart to the Se~urity Council on the results of its mediatory action as to the fulfilment of such-..,conmtions as are neœssary to guarantee the liberty of the ple- biscite." - .In'/the course 'of the exchange of views which followed, . ~ome textual amendments were consi- dered. They concern partictIlarly the fust paragraphof the preamble. They do not appear to. p~esent speci~ difficulties. Their purpose .is to efuitinate the word .. referendum ", and retain the \Vord .. plebiscite ". Above all, they are intended l'hat completes the report wbich it was my duty to make to the Council. 1 now propose to call upon the representatives of the parties and then on the members of the Council who wish to give their views. First, however, 1 bave a few words to add. The end of the month will soon bring my task ta a close. 1 would like here and now to express my gratitude to the representatives of India and Pakistan for the trust they have placed in me. 1 do not know whether, in my,desire to facilitate an agreement, 1 have not involuntarily annoyed them by my suggestions. If that is ~o, they will, 1 hope, realize that 1 have done so With the best intentions and in the hope of promoting agreement. The problem brought before the Council is one of such great difficulty that one might at times feel discouraged. l, for my part, sincerely believe that the problem can be satisfactorily solved. This belief is based, first, on the terrible consequences that fallure would have, and on the responsibi- lities wbich would fall on those who caused it. At our last [235th] meeting the United Kingdom representative drew attention to this in moving terms. My conviction springs also from the very keen desire of the r6presentatives of India and Pakistan to reach a solution. But let us be careful: we shall succeed only li we proceed methodically and make a careful marshalling of the difficultles. That is what the Council has dOlle hitherto. 1 am persuaded that it has acted wisely in adopting, fust [229th meeting] aresolution calling upon both the parties not only to refrain from any act calculated to aggravate the situation but to. take immediately all measures within their power to - ~_ l 270 The representatives of India and Pakistan have each, in their notes or in their proposaIs, defined the requests which they are addressing to the Council. These comprise elements which are, at the present time, incompatible, and which it seems impossible to satisfy in their entirety at the moment. But fortunately these requests also contain elements which would aIready seem to be either in agreement or reconcilable. It is on these elements that we should now concentrate our effo,rts. 1 alluded to them just now. We may possibly not yet agree as to the consequences that will follow from the ideas which now seem common to the two parties. That is no reâson why we should refuse to give these ideas adequate expression. The Commission of the Council will find in them a guide for action. For us they will be a starting-point towards further progress. Would the representatives of the parties like to amplity or comment on their proposaIs, "or express their opinion on the suggestions 1 mp.de to them in the course of our conversations ? Sïnce no one wishes to speak, we mightproceed to examine the report 1 have just made to the Council. Without placing rigid limits on the dis- cussion it might be desirable to concentrate our attention as much as possible at the moment on the idea of the plebiscite. 1 make this suggestion because, as 1 recalled a moment ago, we have there substantial common ground. 1 would remind the Council that the principle oÎ a plebiscite has been accepted by both parties, and that it is not disputed that the plebiscite must be completely impartial and should therefore be placed under the authority of the United Nations. Does anyone wish to speak ? 1 shall call upon the representative of India. Can he tell me ü he intends to make a lengthy speech? In that case we should use the system of simultaneous interpretation. We shall not do so if he is going to make a short speech. .M. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR (fudia): 1 gathered that the idea of an exposition at Iength with regard to the scheme proposed on either side had been dropped for the time being, because, when the President put the question as to whether either party wanted to say anything on what had been placed before the Security Council, neither the representative of Pakistan nor 1 responded. Tha President then went on to suggest that the Security Council might proceed to consider his de abandonné détail lorsque des propositions représentant répondu. Conseil proposition, bloc, tion, telle o~n proposaI and, further, that instead of dealing \Vith the report as a comprehensive document, the ~urity Conncil might concentrate attention at different stages on particular portions of that report. In this connexiôn he remarked that we might take up .the question of the plebiscite. Unfortuna- rions .. 1 would suggest respectful1y that, having reached the stage that we have, and having aIso decided that we must discuss the President's report-which includes twa schemes which are very much opposed. 01l.~ to the other in regard to two or three fundamentals-the.Security Council must decide whether it intends to follow any particularplan in considering the report. 1 desire that this matter should be elucidated before offer- ing my comments. on the suggestion of the Presi- dent that we should take one particular aspect and debate it now. 1 wis1l to say thisbecause il seems to me that, since .the President himself has said that the one matter on which we are all fundamentally agreed il: the stoppage of fighting and· the. measures necessary to bring that about, it would be.putting . the cartbefore the horse if the Security Council omitted to consider that point at the .very beginning butproceeded instead to deal with the question of a plebiscite wllich, if it is in fact a matter for discussion and decision by this body, should come atthe very end, Forthese reasons 1 suggestwith great respect to the Security Council that 1t should now take up the. qùestion oftbe'arder 111which it intends to consider the various questions connected' with thistrouble. 1 attach the very greatest value to its considering the question of the measures necessary to bring about the stoppage of the fighting before it .entersupon the discussion of anything else. ·1 am sorry that 1 cannot speak at greater length owing to the disability 1 have mentioned.

First of all 1 am sure the members.of the Council, like myself,aresorry to have learned that the representative of India was finding it difficu1t to speak. 1 am sure we all wish for his early recovery andfof an improvement in the condition of his.throat.· 1 therefore suggest that, in this fust discussion at any rate, no restrictions should be imposed, and all points arising during the discussion should be examîned. After such a general discussion we should· be able to see whether it is advisable to concentrate our attention on any particular point. Sir Mohammed ZAFRULLAH IrJWIÎ (pakistan) : At the outset, 1 desire to give. expression to our deep gratitude to the President of the Security Council for bis continuous anll 'unfailing efforts to.bring the parties together, and' to seek a ~ay of settlement between them by a~~reement. 1 very much fear that we must have be~:n the source of great weariness to him. However, we never noticed any signs of impatience CIn bis part. The President of the SecurittJ Council has . indicated the possibility that bis responsibilities in connexion with this particualr matter, which he has so far carried with admirable patience, impartiality and courtesy, may have to be transferred to.bis successor. Of course,that is a matter for the Security Council to decide, but 1 do ven,ture to express the hope that ifit is at aIl pos- ~ble, the President, in bis capacity as ]:epresenlative of the mefuber States of the Security Council, might be requested to carry on thefunctions which'hehas been carrying on bitherto with respect to this matter. l'Inde. .de OI also desire to.associate Dlyself wiili' the wish eij)r~sed by.the .Pre.sident that the representative of.India will soon·be rid of the impedimentfrom ~!!!cJ1 he. il!.unfortunately sufIering this aftemoon. With .regard to what the representation of Inwa has just submitted to the Security ':u.•llcil, lde.sire tosay the.following. 1 respectfu1~\r ·}~r.,~U'e to submit that it would be .of he1p to· the. ~·c,.Ji.ty Ç~uncilif it kept in view the scope of the debate wïth whichit is dealingatthe moment. It has been represented on behalf of India that the dispute lies within a very narrow scope. India has, ln fact, ~jet out this positionatthe outset of document No. 2, wbich was submitted by it to the President Of the Security Council on 27 January. Paragraph A· of section 1 of document No. '2\ sunnnarizesthe·pointo~ viewof the representative! of In<:iia.. In. bis: openmgaddress, aIso,· he said. that the L':lSUeWas simple and straightforward;! that, according to bis Government's view, the' State of Jammu and Kashmir having .acceded to Indiajn regard. to defence, foreign affairs and. . c~n:unU!Ûcations,. it became. India's. duty to dea1i With this threat to the. security of the State which;, 1 That is a very simple view to take of the matter. At the very threshold of this problem, Pakistan raised the question of the legality. and validity of Kashmir's purported accession to India. That is one problem. There is another problem: Why is there fighting in Kashmir? W,ho· is fighting? For what are they fighting? ,What are the inc~dents that led to thatfightings? This problem raises a number of questions to' which 1 have alreaéty adverted in the 'submissions 1 have made to the Security Council hitherto. But one outstanding façt is that the fight is beingcarried on mainly by tbepeople of the State, whatever may be the degree of help they arereceiving .from outside, and the causes which led to'that fighting, as weIl as the objectives which those people set for themselves when they started the fighting. This 1 have already submitted tothe Security Council, '. particularly in the words of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah himself. That is .another aspect of the over-alldispute. 'True, India has claimed at variousstages that aIl it desired from the Security Council wasa directive to Pakistan to do certain thîngs or to refrain from ·doingcertainother things which lndia allege;dJtwasthe duty of ,Pakistan todo but which it was. not .doing, or )Vhich it was the dutyof Pakistan to,refrain from . doing .but in which it wasindulging. All.those, allegations,. even if they couId be made OJ,lt in fact:-which is qisputed--are.based upon theassumption ·of the validity and the legality of the .accession of.the Sta.teof .Kashmir· to Inêlia, whichraises, as the Security '.COl,lncilw.U1 obs~rve,· ..questions of . fact and questions of Jaw. . ' 1 submit,'Withalltespect, that thereasol1 why the question of a plebiscite.is so important is -ethat,irrespecityeof the vie)Vs which. 'the parties take 9f the questio~Ihavesubmitted,thisjs the !onepoïntQf agreement which,canJead to a settlement without the Security Council's' having to ,engagein a11 inyestigation of facts and an investijgatioll ..ofquesti0lls. of.law which. mightbe' ofso ;çompl~x aJld of sodelicatè' a nature as toneces- 'sitate, an advi~ory opuncin of the International Court of Justice; -~--';':':-"': ;-".<.'.,- ";Pilistanwasand i5 willing to forego ail these JnyestigatioIls·iftheone point onwhich' the parf:j.esareagJ;'eed,. nalIlely,"fue q\lestion.of.the aCCeS- ~iQn<QftheKashmir StatetoIndfaor toPakistan sb:all bb.decided bY1l1eans'pfa.plebiscite, and if, morder to sectlre '. its .fairness and imparti~ity, .the plebiscite is.carried out under the aegis of the •,SecurityCouncil. If this objective is agreed . upon, .if thelllethod of, settlement is not in dispute ,betweeD,.the parties, it se~ms.to me, . with~ respect, thatJt is futile to enter futo debate,!nhat mav .ttltn ouf.to 17e purely 'academic, havingreg~rd to th~ 'obj~cithat,has.to be' achieved. Therefore, l .'..re!lpectfullystlbinit tJiat •.the suggestion'made by the Presideïit,should be Iollowed:that the Se- ~curity Conncil shouId concentrateuponsecuring, ,~ 1 urged that the stoppagè of fighting should lave precedence ove! everything eIse. The repretative of Pakistan bas urged that the substanmatter in issue is the question of accession, ,d, therefore, the questiop. of the plebiscite must ive precedence over everything eIse. In. sup- IÙl?rting'fuis position, he advanced an argwnent .Ihich, it seems to me, cannot appeal to an inter- ;national body the primary function of which is 19 see that every Member of the United Nations ~ts the rights of other nations and discharges, ' ,'{D"tbe proper manner, its own obligations to other nations. . i;t' • i:The argument advanced was: Let us assume' ,mat Pakistan is guilty of everything that it has :jeen alleged to have done which it should not ~ve done, and that it has refrained from doing r}V",~I,t it should have done. Even so, it seemed to .~'argued, the question of Pakistàn's international gbligations would depend, primarily, upon the Hther question: whether or not Kashmir's accessi,on to India was valid. 1 submit to this interna- ~(>na1 body ,that this argument will not stand ~xam.ination, Jor this reason: Let us assume-I LshaU use the same kind of argument that was used by the representative of Pakistan-fuat this accession was' invalid, which we donot for a moment admit; Pakistan would still havebeen uuder', the ob~gations from which we say ithas 'departed in this connexion. ' Let us assume' that., Kashmir's acéession to India isillegal.What would be the position? The position wouldbe thatKashmir has not valid1y' ;àeceded to' India': but it bas not acceded to . Ràkistan 'at aIt'So thatthe positionwould be the following:Kashmiras a State, standing by itself, contiguous to both Indiaand Pakistan, ina difficulty,:appeals to itsneighbour, India, for help. ' The legitimateGovemment of Kashmir applies to b.idiafor help. India goes, toitsaid. ,By an prin- 'clplesthat gov~rn international relations, fudia hasthe.rightto go to the aid of a legitimate Govenunent,evenif the,opposition to that Govern- Ililent, i8 from its' own insurgent, nationals. India viras perfectly \vithin.its rights ingoing to the aid . .()fKashinïr. indépendant~ se sine, mire"fait son régiss~nt droit time, une tissants de mire. mets cette Cachemire pays·même, se ''''What \Vould, .be "Pakistan.'s, ,position? l "a.Iil ,assunrlng for'. the, moment, ,th01igh 1· do 'not grant :tl1eassumption.infull, thatthebulk of the 4~ouble Ü1Kashmir ls the'work of Kaslmiir na- '~(Jnal~, ,the 'peopleftoQl :outside. having" only Now the stark fact is there: the fighting is going on today; day after day, hour after hour, the situation is deteriorating. Yet it is proposed that we proceed to debate leisurely the question of the manner in whicb a plebiscite is to be held. On the question that the plebiscite will be held, there is no difference. The only difference is in regard to the manner of holding the plebiscite, the conditions under which the plebiscite should be held. Are we going to waste time on this matter, ~efore we consider the urgent, the immediate question of stopping the fight in Kashmir? Sir ~ohammed ZAFRULLAH KHAN (pakistan): 1 do not claim to be any kindof authority ûi1 mternational law, but even ônthe point of view submitted by the representative of !ndià, the question is not disposed of '50 easily. ,.1 have already submitted to the Security Council the cause of the.fight in Kashmir. 1 drew'atten- :non, in IIlY mst speech" tothe tragic events which have gone .on in some of ,the other Indian States, hot véry f.ar fromKashmir,,' where theMuslim pOJ?ll1ation has beenaltogether wiped out. The people of KashmirseilSingthat their. Ruler,. in spite,pf .the ,overwhelming .population, of Kashmir are Muslims, was designingto'accede to India .aild,conseqlIently,fearful.th8tif accessionto .fuma were brought about, their fate wouldbe similarto thefâte ofthe Musthns of those 'States in East Punjab .which .had accededto India, were in.astate ofterror..In Kasbmir;the troops of. the Mahàtaja, presumàbly under his orders,' undertook what appèared to the people of those areas ~of Kashmir to be a Càinpaign of'extennînation'of Muslims. These people, tberefote, tose'a-gainst these acts otextermination; theydrove away the 'forces of the Maharajafrom ·largeareas of 'Kashmir; theysettlp',:aprovisional Govemment of their own over large tracts of the Jammu and Kashmir State, in which'the tuleof the Maharaja no longer prevails. Gilgitis one of thosehuge.tertitones which is ·in that ·position, and there are exist'~nce and liberty of the people of Kashmir. But that is the picture, and that does raise a delicate question. .The representative of India stated that the immediate and grave question concern,; the stoppage of the fighting. But what does he mean by •• stoppage of the fighting U? The only proposal that he has advanced with regard to the stoppage of the fighting. is that the Security Council should issue a directive that Pakistan do more than it bas been 'doing to stop the infiltration of the tribesmen. That is pU. Will tbat stop the figbting in Kashmir? 1submit that it will not. Undoubtedly, the object should be to stop the fighting. We are not saying the figbting shou1d not be stopped. But we desire to stress the fact, that what we must first consider, is : What will stop the figbting in Kasbmir? What 'Yill stop the fightingin Kasbmir will be tl!~. :temoval of the apprehension of the people of Kasbmir that tbey will be subjected to the fate 10wbich Muslims similarly situated in Kapurthala were subjected or to which Muslim minorities in the States of Patiala,' Jind, Nabha and Faridkot -::-erç r,abjected in spite of the fact that, at that time, those States were in accession to India. That is the first step wmch will Iead to the stop.. page of fighting. Once that assurance can be devised and made effective, it will ai.10 be the sttongest step leading toward the stoppage of the infiltration of the tribesmen. Once the people of Poonch,. Mirpur and Gilgit-are ·satisfied that it is for them to decide the question as to whether they will accede to Pakistan or whetber they will accede to India, that there will be no'persecution or victimizatioD, :imi that the decision will be entirely in the own' hands, the' prÎ:ilcipal grievance. -or at least the reason fOl, their terrorand' apprehension-will have disappeared. It will then be possible to stop the figbtingeasily. . .r ask the President and the members of the Security Council to assume for a moment, without our making any admissions, that the tribesmen could be ,physically stopped altogether· from coming into Kasbmir. Doesthat put an end to the fighting insideKasbmir? Does that settle the dispute between the people of,Kash.miiand the ~aharaja? Up to a certain time, the Maharaja did represent the legitimate,Government of Kashmir. 1 submit that when bis troops-as 1 said, presumably under bis orders and direction-, undertook this campaign, the elements of wbich 1have a1ready submitted to the. SecurityCouncil, tegardless of what the Iegal position may '. have been, the moral validity of bis coiitinuing to mIe . Over Kashmir.disappeared, '.and that doe~ raise a delicate question of international Jaw.. ITb,!~ only way to settle the dispute, and therefort' theonJy effective way aIso ta stop the fighting, is to convey

1 reco8!lÏze the representatidn of the. United States of America on apomt of, order. Ml'. AVSTlN (United States of America) : 1 do not .intend by.this i~tetvention to try to. put off or shorten the disc~sion by the representativès of the twa parties. That is not the purposeof my asking fu" fue ruling ofthe President at this p()int. 1 ask .th.~ question in order to keep the record straii!ht; 1 realize that inpast times the position of the Security .Council has been awkward because the parliamentary, procedure·was not definite1y understood in the beginning..My question is : .What is the· parliamentary situation? Have the parties ended their negotiation under the. guidance of the President of the Secw.ity Counci1?Have the partiesreached that .stage Qf their negotiations, where theyhave decided further negotiation would be futile? If that is notthe case, then is the Security Councilnow, engaged in encouraging the parties to procede further with theirnegotiation, and attempting to guide them by our discussion? If this were th~ parliamenary situation then it would he perfectIy clearthat a long debate would be profitable, as it would lead to further negotia- 1ions,an-.l possibly to a desirable agreement between the parties. On theother hand, if the parliamentary situationis one in which the Sccurity Council isbound to Bct lUlder- Chapter VI of the Charter because of lbe failure of the negotiations, and to make a recommen'dation, .perhaps under Article 37" then it seems to., me that the business before the Security Councilis the question of the manner in which we are to proceed in order to determine our·recommendation. Of course we·want the ideas ofthetwoparties, but it seelils to me they should be kept to this main point. The twopartieshav~no.real privilege wder the Charter to discuss the procedure of thé Seeurity Council. .Jnionèt~specftbis isapeculiarcase; .which isthe reasonTask my question. In thecomplaint Sllbmitted by India, documentS/628, India alleges tbat the situationislikely to endanger the maintenanceofinterD~tionalpeaceand security. In tlie~compJaintsubmittedbyPakistandndocument••··S/646,··.'P~.·aUege~that-1hese·.·disputes ~~.··likeIytoen<:1angerthe maintenance of<mternatiOIlal peaceilndsecurity".Thereis cno room .fordÎSJ:lù.te .o~··this .point.•It1 bringing. this •case to the~tyÇ()lIl1cilbothparties allege that this ·isa c,ase whichfallSwithin the condition set'forth in<Afticle37, paragraph2, which stâ.te.~:"1f the Secuiity Council deems thatthecontinuance of .the disputeisin fact likelytoendangerthe maintenance of intemationalpeaceandsecurity, it titeory~at the two parties have falled ta reach agreeml~nt and that thcre is no hope of furtber negotiations, and therefore that it is our duty to recommend such tenns of settlement as we may consider appropriate.

The reoresentative Qf the United States asked me wbether the partie~ bave given up hope of bringing their negotia1iono. to a successful end under my chairmansbip, and wbether they have .concluded tbem. It is &. very delicate matter for me ta interpret the plh-fe.r,' intentions. 1 sball try, however, to reply as well as 1 can to the question put to me, but it i8 always open to. the representatives of India and Pakistan to correct me if 1 do not exactly convey their true intentions. 1 think 1 can reply that the representatives of India and Pakistan have not given up bope of xeaching an agreement-at any rate on some of the points dealt with in the report whicb 1 laid before, the COUDcil 'at the beginning of this meeting.' 1 tbînk' the suspension. of our negotia- 1ions was caused bythe desÎIe ta give members -ofthe COUDcil an opportunity to express their 'Views on points which had been discussed between the parties, sothatguidance could be derived from views in the course of subsequent negotiations. . Itgoes .withôut saying, hoW'ever, that negotiations between the parties' with the assistance of the Prt:sident cannot be resumed for a long time set, sothatwe •shallpI'obably,know'soon whether 'the bopeto whicb 1 bavealluded of seeing these lllegotiations succeed is jU$tified. Mr"NOEL 13AKER (United Kingdom) : If1have 'Understoodrig4tly wbatthePresident has. iust :said inanswer tothe question put to bim. bythe 1 Then, if 1 understood the President, he thought it would be a good thing-and he expected ~at the parties wonld think so, too-for ~e President and the parties to continue negotiations in order to ascertain whether, in fact, what the members ·of the Security Council had said had made it easier to come to a greater measme of agreement, if not complete agreement, in the talks between ·the President and the two parties. . 1 have always hoped, as 1 said before, that·the parties taking part in these discussions would be regardecl as a kind of sub-committee of the Secu- ·rity Council; and the President, acting as Rapporteur, would take full charge of the dic.lcussions and report to us, 1 am sure that is the right plan. Then, if 1 understood the President, he wanted to set a time limit, or at least to say that we could not allow these talks to continue for an indefinite time ",ithout a definite result. In that view, 1 am sure the representative of fuma will agree with the President, as 1 do very warmly, 1 sharehis view that it is v..rgently important to bring an end to the fighting now gmng on in Kashmir. 1 •remember what the representative of fudia .said inhis firstspeech here [227th meeting] \;Vhich 1 have before me. He said: cc There is at this very moment a small war going on in Kashmir. Every day that passes brings in its wake added sorrow and suffering to the people of Kashmir. Furthermore "-andthis is muchmore important- ... everyday that the war is prolonged, the danger of the extension of the area of conflict grows... That is what we' hav~ to get into out mimIs. If we do follow the procedUre as the President has nowsketched ~t, 1bope that we shall make it plaintpat we cannot lét manydays go· by·before the SecurityCouncil mu.st take up the matter on a different footing, namely, on the basis of Article 37 of the Charter, as suggested by therepresentative ofthe United States, in order that we may .make qefiniterecommendations for a settlenIent. T.his.does not admitoUong delay. 1 hope that we shall so proceed and, if that is agreed bythe Security Council, that we shaH makeobservations·on some.of the points which havearisen. l,for my part, \Vould he able to S9,y a little more on what has been put forward by the parties this aftemoon. 1 do not do it now, but Mr. NOEL BAKER (United Klngdom) : 1 should like to make sorne not very maturely considered observations on the points wbich have been raised by the President and' by the representatives of Inma and Paklstàn. 1 wish also to say how very sorry 1 am that this debate shouId he imposed on the representative of India when. he is suffering as he is, but 1 hope that 1 shaIl not succeed in provoking him into a' long speech which would seriously retard his recovery. The point which arose in discussion between the representatives of India and of Pakistan \Vas which question should be discussed fust: which of the various issues which emerge in the documents now laid before us? Should it be the plebiscite, or,~shouId it be what· the ··represen~tive ·of India regaJ:ds as overwhelminglytht. ".,;:\st iniportant matter before us, nameiy~ stopping the fighting in Kashmir? If the question is put Iike that, 1 do not know that l have anyvery fixed Or dogmatic views. It is clear to me that nowthat we have had time to look at the document~.nd. 1 hope we shaIl go on tomorrow morning havmg studied them more fuIly""""""the Security Councù ought to discuss the substance of the problem on the basis of these documents, and of the statements already made' by the parties and any further statements they may care to make. 'O":vh·'~ ~ On the order of the p . ts, there may be various views. My own, as say, is not at an dogmatic. It is that 1 in e to agree with the. suggestion made by the' resident that we should discuss the plebiscite mst. Why? Not at aIl because 1 am against e view expressed by the representative of In .a that stopping the fighting is our most vrgent ask. 1 agree with him very fully. 1 have said 0 already, and 1 have quoted bis own words. f s we sit atthis table •and exchange legal and other technical observations, we must remember constantly that there are vast masses of women !ll1d c:hildren suffering as re- ~gees, and men dying at the battle front. The representative of India said this aftem,oon that the situation is deterioratingfrom day today. We are, then, confrontedi. with the question of how to stop the fighting..What will stop it,. and in what way should itbe stopped~ î\- \ 1 do not believe fore mornent that the Indian delegation or the Indian Govflmment desire to stop this fighting by a military victory if it can be stopped by any other means. They do not wantto crush those who are up in ~s against their troops at this moment if they caIibe brought to an agreement in another way. They wantthem This is not a new point between the representative of India and myself. l have said it ta him a number of times. He is familial' with my views. Stopping the fighting by the sword has rarely proved, in history, ta be a satisfactory way. would not be very good preparation for a plebiscite. It is utterly out of accord with the philosophy and the thinking of the two Govemments which have been wise enough ta bring this dispute here ta us today. What these two Govemments want, and what we aIl want, is that the moral power and authority of the Security Council be brought ta bear on situation sa that there can be a conviction all sides that justice is ta prevail, and that violence need not go on. Moreover, our abject is not only ta stop the fighting, but ta keep it stoppd. have ta arrive at a settlement which will prevent a new outbreak. The fundamental dilIerence of view between the two parties is on the question: Ta which Dominion sha11 the people of Kashmir accede? But they bath hold the view that that question to be settled by the free expression of the people of Kashmir. l say in parenthesis that if that done, the divergence of view-sometimes it might seem ta outsiders ta be bittemess-which this question of the future of Kashmir is now causing between parties, may easily disappear. After the last war, there was a dispute between two Govemments in Europe conceming a frontier laid down in the Paris Conference. It was not large area that was in dispute; it was high and mountainous country like Kashmir, less rich and less beautiful than Kashmir, but very beautiful European standards. The Governments came, would not say near ta war, but ta a point of great tension. They submitted the dispute ta an international tribunal. An answer was returned. The parties agreed, and, within a year, they had made of that territory an international park dedicated ta lasting agreement between the coulltries. addition, they signed a t1'eaty of alI-in compulsory arbitration. 1 hope that this question, when solved by the Security Council, as 1 believe it will will lead ta that kind of result. 1 further hope that the solution will make Kashmir not a dividing factor but a link between thc parties, and that people of Kashmir will bcnefit from the free and friendly co-operation of bath Governments. If 1 have carried the members of the Security Council and, as 1 hope, the representative of India, with me thus far, 1 wight suggest that it would be wise to star!: with what. alJ. of us· agree is a vital part of the settlement, upan whil:h agreement hàS been reached; namely, the plebiscite. li the representative of fudia {('und at any moment that bis views were being prejudiced or that bis case was not being justly treated, then, of course, we cculd tum ta another point to which he could divert our attention, or he would be able ta correct us in any way. However, we are on firm ground if we discuss the tbree point.~ on which, as the President reported, the pa..-rties are agreed: fust, that there shall be a plebiscite to sertIe the question as to whether Kasbmir shaH accede to India or to 'Pakistan; second1y, that this plebiscite must be held under conditions which will guarantee itsfairness and impartiality; and thirdly, that the plebiscite must be held. under the auspices of the United Nations. The formula which the President originally prepared has been improved by the amendments which he' reported on this aftemoon: by the omission of the word" referendum ",and by defining the object of the plebiscite as the choice of accession to India or to Pakistan. Therefore, 1 think that real progress has been made. As the President stated, a further question arises as to what should follow from the use of question the words .. the auspices of the United Nations n. entendre As 1 understand it, that is the point under debate. nisation 1 hav~ views on that point. 1 do not eXptefJsthem , ti.ien,. at this moment because 1 am speaking on the ~lon; procedural aspects. Je parle et convénient du aucune de nous exemple, 1 hope 1 have succeeded in making the S.~curity Counciland the partie& com:emed think that it would not be inconvenient tQ start with the plebiscite. Of course, this would not exclude anything else wbich the representative of Indià may think: relevant to the points which come up. We should not thereby he putting off the question of stopping the fighting. Perhaps we might be accelerating it

Does anyone wish to speak? We shall obviously be unable to fulish this discussion today, and 1 suppose that members of the Couneil will wish to have an opportunity of examining at their le.isure the documents 1 communicated to them at the beginning of this meeting. So we could continue t'he discussion tamorrow. If 1 am correctly informed, tomorrow moming there will be a meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Chaimtan of that Commission is present. Would he care to say whether that is true? Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): A meeting oI the Working ComII1ittee of the Atomic Energy Com- II1ission has been scheduled for tomorrow mommg, and it would be railier difficult to alter that schedule. 1 think it would be advisable for the Working Committee to meet tomorrow moming as schedùled.

Do we agree ta continue this discussion tomorrow aftemoon at 2.30? Sïnce there are no objections, we shall do so. TWO HUNDRED AND TBIRTY-SEVENTH MEETING ReId aL Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 29 January 1948, at 2.30 p.rn. Président: Mr. F. VAN LANGENBOVE (Bel- gium), Present: The i'epresentatl.ves of the following counmes: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, C\lIombia, France, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet So- cialist Republic, Union'of Soviet Socialist Repub- lies, United Kingdom, United States of America. 34. Provisional agenda (document SIAge:t:tda 237) 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. India.;,;Pl.lkistan question: (a) Letter çlf1ted. 1 January 1948 from the representative of India addressed to the President nf the Security Council concem- ing the situation in Jammu and Kashmir (document S/628).1 (b) Letter dated 15 January 1948 from the Minister for Foreign MIairs of Pakistan addressed to tht;; Cecretary-General con-