S/PV.241 Security Council

At the time of adjournment of the 240th me~ting of the Seeurity Couneil yester~ day, we were engaged in a discussion of the state~ ments of the representatives of India and Pakistan in relation' to the various proposaIs before us conceming this item of our agenda, and we had heard the statements of the representatives of Argentina .and the United States. We shall now continue the discussion. Mr. TSIANG (China): Before going into the substance of the qu~stions under discussion, 1should like to offet a suggestion in regard to our procedure. We have heard lengthy statements from the representatives of India and Palcistan, and we are now .in the course of a general discussion. 1 suggest that at the conclusion of this general discussion the President again enter into direct conversations with. the reprçsentatives of India and Pakistan to explore the possibility of narrow~ ing the ditferences and of finding new solutions which would be acceptable to both parties. With regard to the substance of the questions under discussion, when 1last spoke in the Security CouncU on the draft resolutions submitted by the representative of Belgium [documents S/661 and S/662], 1 was under the erroneous impression that they hadbeen agreed toby the representatives of India and Pakistan. 1 have learned that this is not the case. However, 1 do notmean to suggest that today.·1 intend to withdraw my support of the draft resolutions. 1find that those draft resolutions, while going ID the right direction, may not meet the case 31ld, therefore, require further consideration. Sorne parts might be amplified and other parts modified. The suggestion has been made that an interim regime be set up in Kashmir. If the President should accept my suggestion for the two parties to enterinto direct negotiations, the ·suggestion of an interint regime might be explored in detail during these private conversations. 1 would. however, make a fûrther suggestion in relation to this matter. In view of the constitutional relationship, it might be that the repreli!en~ tative of India wouldfind it difficult to make Kashmir accept the suggestion of an interim govemment. In that case, we shall again find ourselves deadlocked, withoutany further possibilities as to a solution. An interim. regime is, in fact, a government limited as to time. A government today performs a multitude of functions. What we are interested in is that. the plebiscite to be conducted in the State ofJammu and Kashmir should bereally free. In that case, is it necessary for the S~urityCouncil to recommend that an entire new regime should be set up? Furthemlore, th~question of the comp.etence of the Security. Coundl might be raised with regard to that suggestion. Therefore, 1 suggest that the Security Couneil tl) to provide electoral machinery under which a free plebiscite Ariother idea occurs to me. Both the r"presentative of India ànd the representative of Pakistan have stressed the urgency of the situation. They wish their problems solved as soon as possible. Nowit is clear that the fighting should be stopped as soon as possible. Itseems to me that the Security Council might well recommend to the Government of Pakistan that its legal and moral influence should be thrown in the direction of pacification, and' that the tribesmen shnuld be stopped from further fighting. 1 do not think that sort of recommendation is sufficient 'by itself from bath a factual and a psychological standpoint. 1 would therefore add the 'further recommendation that the Security Council appeal to the Government of India to withdraw its troops progressively,from Kashmir. In regard to the question of the restoration of peace, as well as in regard to the conduct of the plebiscite, 1 suggest that, after the f1md2!!l.ental principles have' been à~tl.~ined in the Security Council, we leave large discretionary powers to the Commission ofthe Security Council on the Jammu and Kaslùnir question, which will be in touch with the personalities, movements and groups in India and Pakistan, and which might, on the spot, discovera, solution-practical, technical procedures-in line with the principles decided upon here, which the Security Couneil, from a distance, cannot produce. Mr. DE LA TOURNELLE (France) (translated/rom F'rench): The representatives of India and Pakistan :b:~ye dwelt at some length on their present dispute with ragard to Kashmir. Each has attributed to the other the responsibility for the violence endured by the Hindu, Moslem and 'Sikh populations. ~ch accuses its neighbQur of having started the conimunal disturbances which have ravaged certain parts of Inœa. ,'\',' 1 l l . At the time'ofdrafting the report ofthe Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier lnçidents [document 8/360] and during the Security i~', Council~s discussions of that report, the French d€flegation maintained that the establishment of rêsponsibility for the Balkan disturbances was relatively unimportant, and that the Council's o~y duty w-as to work out a plan of pacification w.hich w,?uld assure that part of Europe of a 1: l t~ l'~ceful future. It seems tome that. this wise' attitude should be followed in our study of the I~ ~lÏshmir question, and that the Security Council s1:l.ôuld try to put before the parties concerned, for thèir voluntary ar..ceptance, a suitable solution to énd the dispute which separates them. Such a solutionis a matter ofurgency because this dispute nùght, by 111aintaining an·enormous population in·a state of exasperation, endanger'millions of ~ Il n1~mbers of minorities scattered throughout the two States, Hindus in Pakistan and Moslems in India. I~ The question ofthe Maharaja's sovereignty and susceptibilities! and of the incompetence of the United Nations or of the Security Council to interfere in the· domestic affairs of Kashmir by calling for a plebiscite, has been discuss~d at length. The previous speakers emphasized that in their opinion a plebiscitewolÛdinno wayprejudice the Maharaja's persona! position or bis sover~ eignty. 1 agree with this view. It sholÛd aIso be pointed out that before the' partition 'of the sub-continent on 15 August last, the sovereignty of the,Maharaja of Kashmir was limited, since Great Britain held suzerainty over Kasbmir. l'sholÛd like toadd a brief comment regard1ng the organization of the plebiscite. The Belgian draftresolution which was submitted to us on 29 January last stiplÛates that the plebiscite sholÛd be held under the auspices'and control of the Security COllDcit In my opinion, the present conditions in Kashmir call for the use of this authority and control. It is clear froril the statements of bC'th p~rties that Kashti1~r is beint ravag€:d by a war which has aIl the chai';acteristics of a. civil war but in which foreign elements are intervening. , As 1 pointed out earlier in my statemènt, it wOlÛd certainly be vainto try to determirie whether part of the poplÛationha's joined these foreign aggressors or whether the latter haye come to the aid of their racial and religious •bretbren whom they éonsider to be in danger. 'In' my opinion snch a provisional govemment· wouldhave to be a coalition government composed TheIndianrepresentativestressedthatKashmir's &ccession to India was onlY accepted by bis Government on condition that a poplÛar referendum sholÛd be held to ratify the sovereign's decision. Itfollows that the Security Council wOlÛd in no way be interfering in Kasbmir's domestic affairs ifit decided to assist India in the execution of an undertaldng subscribed to by both Kashmir and India.' , .On the other hand it is oUr duty t() remove these aggressors and to force them to retum' to their Qwn territory, and to guarantee the indigenous population the right to· express its preference freeIy. The lawfu1 Government of Kashmir, whatever the outstanding qualities or the· patriotism of its cbief, Sheikh Abdullah, when faced with the barsh necessities of civil war, wields an authority which might be disputed by a large section ofthe popuIation,werethe results of the plebiscite to favour its views. The simplest solution,· therefore, wolÛd be to set up a provisiona! govemment which wolÛd hold office while the plebiscite was being prepared andheld. and would later disappear. The French ,delegation eamestly hopes that, -once the Kashmir dispute has been settled, the solution of other outstanding questions between India and Pakistan will be greatly eased. 1 Mr. N:OBL BAKER (Unit~d Kingdom): 1 am very 1 glan that we are now entering upon tbis debate on the substance of the settlement wbich, we hope, will be reached in the questimi. ofKasbmir. 1am du 1 ,grateful for the speeches of those representatives who have preceded me, and forthose of the representat:ves of India and Pakistan with which the discussion opened. 1 do not complain at aU 1 :that in their ~peeches both parties made c'harges '3.D.d cOW1ter-~harges concerning raids on thei" own territory from the other side, and about killings 1 wbich have taken piace. 1 tbink that it was right 1 1 for them to make those charges .and countercharges, even now when we are considering the substance, because it shows that the situation 1 with which we are dealing is' still dangerous in the extreme. 1 It is my conviction that raids and inc'4ents will 'Continue to occur until the question of Kashmir 1 has been âisposed of by the' Security Counci1. Several incidents were cited here of which l'have d heard accounts given by both 8ides, and on which l have received independeiit reports. 1 could· give an explanation ofwhat occurred-an explanation wbichmight make it appear that the blame ou one side or the other was much less than might be ! thc.'Ught at fust sight. The explanation would show • that in reality the incidents were due to an overi riding fear. And, so long as fear dominates the J minds of tb.e peoples in that area of the Punjab j and of Kashmir, incide.nts will continue and the situation will remain extremely grave. l l We have embarked on the discussion of the subj stance of the question as to howwe can stop the fighting, and 1 hope that we shall not cease to deal with Ibis ,abject until we have evol.cdasebeme nos which will do the job. 1 have the greatest sympathy ~ Mf"th t~e Viewpoint from which the representativne .. 0 India started. In response to a remark that fe 1 from mm about ten days ago, 1 said that the 1~ Security Council must be careful not to leave itself j'ai .. open. to the charge of fiddling with phrases whi!e Kashmirbumed. That was made a headline in the ; Indian papers3 l' Council fiddIes while Kasl'mir - Burns ", but 1 would not admit the charge so i implied. Nevertheless, we must stop the fighting .~ and we must stop it soon.pendant ~ ~.' 'c~ ~ :~ii There has been some questit'.:ll as to what. i~ "stopping the fighting" means. Does it simply ;i Mean that India asks Pakistan to do its duty in i.! =~n~t:."'trit,~~':mJ=:n~=~":=t1n= 9 supplies, and that then the Indian Army can lëasilyfinish off the rest? 1 feel sure that the • representative ofthe United States wàs right when he said that that is not whatthe Indian delegation The representative of Inma quoted an article from The Times of London of 26 January. It is a very remarkable article. 1 read it and marked it -1 have a eopy before me now-before the representative of India referred to it at all. 1 know that The 7ïmes never sends men who have not the bighest experience on suchjobs as tbis, and 1have every reason to believe that the authority of tbis WIÏter is very great. In any case, he was quoted -and quoted withapproval-by the representative of India. What isthe meaning of the article? Taken as a whole, what does it say? It says that unless the Security Council reaches a solution ofthe Kashmir question wbich seems just to all, we shall not only not stop the fighting, but we shaU provoke a far worse conflict than now exists because we shall bring down a new influx ofthe tribes. 1 say with all conviction that the representative -of India is quiteright when he says that in getting a sett1ement, Pakistan must take strong action in tbis matter; lbat the Security Council must make it possible for Pakistan, in conjunction with India, to do so. We want a: real total stoppage now, without further bloodshed, without more killing of the insurgents, whose votes, after all, we want in the plebiscite when it comes, our aim being to secure a responsible government, as the representative of India has stated. We must get such a .scheme. The question is how to do it. 1 was in warm agreement with much that was ·stated by the representative of China a few moments ago. 1 was not in full agreement with ·what he said-àbout our Commission. 1 do -not ·believe that We could pass a few resolutions here, send the Commission out, and get a stoppage of the fighting. 1 think all my experience-.,.and œrtainly allthe information which 1 have received .-tells me·that it will be far easier in the Security 'Council itself toobtain the agreement and the ;concessions which may be required on the part of ·both sides. . --What is the substance ofthe agreement'1 In the fust place, there is Pakistan's duty in the matter 'of cutting off supplies, of stopping the tribesmen froin coming in, of stopping-their own volunteers, and of encouraging the insurgents to stop. There is the problem of getting those wh,., have gone 'inm Kashmir to come out of il. '...'here is the ·problem of keeping orderafterwards inside Kashmir. Ir this debate we have had further elaboration ·with regard to some of those proposaIs. 1 am in broad agreement WÏth what has been said by the members of the Security Couneil. 1 do not believe we shàll. avert a war unless we can get a scheme founded on the propositions whieh have been put forward. Of course, the vital part of this, the part tl) which everything else leads, is, as the representative of China so rightly urged just now, and as the representative of Argentina urged with great force yesterday [240th meetivg], the plebiscite itself. We have had much discussion as to whether we shall consider first the plebiscite or the stopping of the war, whether we shaU consider the plebiscite and work backwards, or whether we shan consider the stopping of the war and work fOi'Ward. We 1 à1ways have come to the same conclusion, and all the speeches which have been made during this present debate have brought us to that conclusion: that we must consider the whole thing together. . II repeat, as so many others have said before, ~hat if the combatants are now to cease the 'ca,rmige, they must know what is to happen when they do. They are risking their lives because they believe it is better to die than to surrender. We have to remove the basis of that belief.The .'plebiscite is the vital part of the whole settlement. Il·was suggested yesterday-and 1 have the exact words-" that the conduct of the plebiscite was notreally the business of the United Nations; that it rea11y did not concetn the United Nations; tbat,after all, tht'l holding ofit was a matter forthe Government and the people of Jammu and Kas1nirlr ". That must he of vital c!'l1cem to every nation. The principle wali enunciated long ago by Woodrow Wilson in his draft of Artiole Il of the Covenant of the League of Nations which read: (e Any war or threat of war, immediately aftècting any ofthe members ofthe League or not~ is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League..." This principle was put in a new forro, which won the approbation and consent of the whole world, by a ramous spokesman of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) who said that pence is indivisible. Everything which affects peace affects everyone. It is declared in the Charter in Article l, paraM graph 1; Article 2, paragraph 5; and Article 24, paragraph 1, and in other places) tOG. . . This plebiscite must inspire confidence in everYM body, including those who are now fighting. We have all stated it before. The representative of India said at our 239th meeting the day before yesterday that the two parties interested. in the Kasbmir question are Pakistan and the insurgents in Kashmir. Therefore, we have to satisfy thèse two parties. What the Security Council does must seem fair to these. two parties. It must aIso seem fair to the Govemment of Pakistan, to the insurM gents, to the tribesmen, to the Government of India, to the other inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir, and to the outside world. That i& why 1 arrived at the same conclusion as the other members of the Security Council who stated that impartial, interim administrative arrangements must be made. If we are looking into the past for precedents, 1 may say that 1 lived through two international crises; one over Upper Silesia and one over the Saar. 1 think that the arrangements made for those crises between the two·wars will urtainly be in agreement with pr.oposaIs which have been made here. Therefore, 1 hope that we shall now give full consideration to these concrete proposaIs which the· members of the Security Council have put forward. As was said very weU by the United States representative yesterday, l10thing said by either the delegation of Pakistan or the delegation of India has been brushed aside pr rejected. 1 hope we shan consider th~ concrete proposaIs put forward by the members of the Security Council ~o end the carnage, to get the tribesmen and the other intruders out of Kashmir, to restore order and maintain it wh~n it has been restored, and to organize the plebiscite and ensure by fair and impartial interim administrative arrangements that the plebiscite is properly conducted. If we are to do that, 1 venture to think, with great respect, that the two resolutions which are Mr. L6PBZ (Colombia): There is very !ittle, if anything, that 1 can usefully add to the statements already made on behalf of India and Pakistan by their representatives, and to the very able discussion carried on by the representatives of those nations which are more intimately connected than we with India and Pakistan, who therefore are in a much better position to speak intelligently on this matter. The Colombian delegation was ready to support the two draft proposaIs submitted by the representative of Belgium [documents 8/661 and 8/662] although it did not find itself in full agreement either with the idea of dividing the two questions into separate proposaIs or in weakening the position previously taken by the former President ofthe Security Council in his original draft resolutions. However, 1 do not intend to go into the merits of those proposaIs because, today, the consensus of opinion of the Security Council is that the conversations initiated by the former President ofthe Security Council with the representatives ofIndia and Pakistan should be carried on, and that the draft proposàls or ideas heretofore submitted on this question should be used as a basis. . : '1 1 I, l' ·l I[ l 1, '1 J i 1 , . j ;j :1 j 1 A few minutes ago, 1 heard the representative of the United Kingdom say that it would be desirable aIso to have, if it were possible, any new contribution in the shape of a more comprehensive proposaI wbich the President of the Security Council might take into consideration in bis new conversations with. the representatives of Inma and; Pakistan. Therefore, . shall take this opportumty to read to the SecuriW Councila memorandum which 1 have prepared, not with the idea of submitting an exact proposaI, but with the idea 1,1 :.1 0'1; ~{f.\ !1 1 The reference is to the assassination of Mohandas K. Gandhi. . " Whereas the Members of the United Nation.s have conferred on the Security Councn primary responsibility for the maintenance ofintemational peace and security, and agreed that in carryiu.g out its duties under this responsibility the Security Counci1 acts on their behalf, $! The 8ecurity Council, . Ct Having considered the claims and allegations of India and Pakistan and their requests to the Councn to adopt appropriate measures for the pacific settlement of theit disputes and the restoration of friendly relations between the two COUDtries, " A. That the cessation of fighting and other acts ofhostility is ofa particularlyurgent character in the Jammu and Kashmir State; "D. That an interim administration which will command the full confidence .and respect of the people of, the Jammu and Kashmir State is essential to the attainment of the aims and pur- poses of this resolution; "E. That for its information and gUidance, the Security Council should bein a position 10 ca11 for and to receive from its chosen represen- tatives direct reports of conditions in the Jammu and Kashmir State and other parts of India or Pakistan; "F. That the Commission established by the resolution of 20 January 1948 [document 8/654] will have to perform with the utmost dispatch various and complic~ted d~ties which caU for a more nunIerous membership; ct B. That in conformity with the policy of the Indian Government that in' the case of any State where the .issue of accession has been the subject of a dispute, the question should be settled by a reference to the people, India and Pakistan have agreed that the question of whether the State. of Jammu and Kashmir shall accede to Pakistàn or to India'must be determined tbrough a plebiscite to be held under international auspices; , ct C. That the plebiscite as a method of deter- mining the future govemment of the Jammu and Kashmir State is the most desirable and democra- tic, provided the will of the people is given free, fair and unfettered expression; " Adopts the following resolution: "'1. The Commission of the Security Council shall he composed of rcipresentatives of five Members of the United Nations, designated on or before the date of the 242nd meeting of the Security Council, as foUows: one to be selected by India, one by Pakistan, as already provided in 1 i. fi In this connexion, the Commission shall seek i to ensure co-operati<;n bctween the military i;orees of India and Pakistan with a view to bringing about an immediate cessation of fighting in the Jammu and Kashmir State and to maintaining order and security unill the question of accession shall have been determined by the plebiscite. .. 3. The Security Couneil further recommends that .the Emergency Administration of the Jammu and Kashmir State be reorganized on the advice of the Commission, giving adequate proportional representation to the Muslim and non-Muslim groups of the population. .. 4. After fighting has ceased, " (a) AU citizens of the· Jammu and Kasbmir State who had left it on account of the recent disturbances shan be invited and be free to retum to their homes and to exercise aU their rights without any restric- tions on legitimate political activity; "(b) There shan be no victimization; "(c) AU political prisoners shan be re- leased. ,: S. The plebiscite referred to in paragraph B of this resolution shan be oÎ'ganized under the advice of, and supervised by, the Commission of the Security Council. " 6. The Commission shan go at once to India in order to implement the resolutions and instruc- tions of the Security Council" a Colombie. ce sécurité renseignements des du pas qui concerne plébiscite nement manière lation seront au qu'il This Memorandum has been presented in order to convey our thoughts regarding the debate thus far. 1shan refrain from elaborating on the subject. The members ofthe Security Council have already had the privilege of receiving full information from the parties and have had adequate comment from the other meJllbers of the Security Council. Therefore, there is absolutely no need for me to repeat the arguments that have been advanced so far in favour of stopping the fighting and having an impartial plebiscite, and organizing the Govern- ment of Jammu and Kashmir State so as to give reasonable assurance to an groups of the popula- tion that their rights will be properly respected. 1am therefore submitting t. memorandum for whatever use it may be to the Securi.ty Council. sans ce que n'à membres généralement que même . Mr. VAN LANGBNHOVB (Belgium) (translated jrom French): May 1 point out that, during this debate, neither of the two draft resolutions which 1 had the honour to submit to the Council has been opposed in principle.'" The members of the Council who spoke on these draft resolutions were generally in agreement that these drafts concemed two aspects of the same problem. " • t The Indian representative proposed an addition wbich is in principle reasonable. namely. that the Pakistan Government should he asked to try to persuade the tribes which have penetrated into Jammu and Kashmir towithdraw. The members of the Couneil. however, did not seem to think it would he possible to convince the Pakistan Government that such an effort of persuasion would he eff~tive under present conditions. As regards the second draft resolution con- cerning the plebiscite, the United States represen- tative stated the legal position with remarkable clearness, namely, that the Security Council has not yet reached the stage of recommendations; it is continuing its efforts to bring about an âmicable settlement between the parties. What is the situation in this re~~ct'1 The parties bave brought their dispute regazding the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India before the Seçurity Counci1. They are of the opinion that thisquestion should be settled by an impartial plebiscite, and they anticipated that the Seeurity Council would intervene to thst end. What would be the object of sucb intervention? The Council would, by its·intervention, be called upon to guarantee the impartiality of the ple- biscite. It would certify, so to speak, that the plebiscite was a fair expression of the will·of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Consequently, it is for the Council to state the conditions on wbich its help· will be given. The parties are entirely free to express their views on the subject of the dispute and its settle- ment. A fortiori, the members of the Couneil have the right, afier hearing them attentively, to express their views collectively and individually for the edification of the parties and public opinion. No one here would dream of contesting tbis. 1 think tbat the Council is justified in expressing the opinion, wh'ich emerges from several of the statements made during the discussion, that a plebiscite organized under the Security Council's auspices is necessary in order to create and strengtben the belief that the plebiscite will faith- fully refiect the will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir; that such a belief would be the best means of persuading the foreign elements which have penetrated into·· Jammu ami Kashmir to withdraw, and the indigenouspopulation itself to put an end to aU acts ofviolence and hostility; and lastly, that the Governments concerned should henceforward I;:o-'operate to that end. The opinion l have. just expressed. whi -;h 1 belie.ve is that. of most of the members ot the Council, is embodied in the resolutions· WhiC~1 l, as. Belgian representative, submitted to theCouncil in order, as 1 said at the time, to facilitate the discussion. These resolutions are not·immutable repr~sèntative of Belgium [documents 8/661 and 8/662], who was then President of the Security Council, he wisely conducted the business of the Security Council step by step. He submitted the successive draft resolutions to he adopted one by one, and in that Viay registered an the points on which agreement was reached between the parties. It will certainly be good procedure if we continue in this manner and place on record by the adoption of resolutions the points on which both parties agree in their private conversations under the auspices ofthe President of the Security Council. 1 have expressed the position of my delegation in favour of these two draft resolutions. 1 consider that they are one step forward toward the final solution of the problem before us. The representative of the United Kingdom has stressed, more than once, the fact that the final detailed settlement of the question will take place in the Security Council, and that it will be passed to the Commission for its execution and imple- mentation. In the resolution of 20 January by which the Security Council established the Com- mission, there was the implication that the Commission would implement the decisions of the Security Council and report to the Security Council on its activities. It was realized that before coming here the parties had not met an the conditions set forth in Article 33 of the Charter, namely, exhausting an the means for arriving at a settle;ment by negotiation between themselves. A:1 that happened was, as we understand from the various statements made, that there had been an exchange of letters and telegramJ between thern. Although that exchange of letters did notsettle the question, i it contained serious points which might assist very i well in the final solution. The parties agree, it f seems, that the State of Jammu and Kashmir is free to make its own decision to accede to Pakist9!i or India, and that thi~ should be accompli<ned by a plebiscite. They further agreed to refet the matter to the United Nations for supervisiG:l1 in arriving at a solution. The steps which have been taken are good steps, althoughno details have been established and 1 substantiated in this matter. When the two draft 1 !esolutions were presented t9 us, 1 was under the ~ Impression that they would meet no opposition .~ from the panies because they were based on the sa1D;e principles which were accepted by the parties ') dunng the exchange of letters and telegrams, which happened before they came to the Security As the representative of China stated at the opening of' tms meeting, 1 helieve that conversa- tions again may he renewed on the basis of this detailed resolution which is to be considered by the Security Council, especially inview of the fact that both parties are friendly to each other. In this respect, this dispute does not resemble any other dispute which previously has come before the Security Council, wherein both parties have been antagonistic and hostile 10 each other. Here, 1 am glad to say, the situation is just the contrary. The parties are friendly towards each other and they have been living together in one country for centuries. Even though they are now separated from each other in a political sense, that does not mean that they should he separated in .sentiment and sympathy towards each other. They know thàt their future depends upon a situation wherein each of the parties will make concessions. One thing which i8 to he considered above all eIse îs fuat justice should. he respected. Justice alOne would please the parties and etiminate aU disputes and differences. Any just ruling should he satisfactory toboth parties. The Security Council sbould put justice before all else, and it should see to it that the recommendations to be given to both parties are defensible from every point of view of legality. For this reason, 1 feel that we cannot now continueany further. As long as the representative of 'Colombia has submitted his memorandum, 1 feel that oUr present President should continue the conversations which were startedby the former President ofthe Seèul'ity Counell. We are fortunate in that, during thismonth andlast month, we have had successive Presidents who were willing, active, and wise enough to conduct the negotiations in a manner which aims at achieving .a resolution which will he satisfactory to·ail parties concerned. 1 now believe that the resolutions which'were submitted by the representative of Belgium will he revise..i under the present circumstances and according to the representations which were made by bothparties. li is quite clear, as 1 stated before, that recom- mendations with regârd to the cessation offighting are of no use if they-are· not connected with substantial assurances to the _parties whichwill satisfy them and place them in the definite position ofknowing .that their demands -will be fu1fi.lled and--consecrated by the -processes reeommended by the Security Council. -, We cannot make recommendations to these people without assuring them that the reason for the conflict and the aim towards which they are directing their efforts will be secured in a good andsafe way. That is all 1 have to sayat this time. When we have the final resolution, which will be prepared, if possible, by our President in conjunction with both partiès-and the represèntative of Colombia May meet with them, or the President may wish to call on some other merilber of the Security Council to help in cOlllducting these conversations -it will certainly be helpful, and perhaps we can attain an end which will he respected by all. The PREsIDBNT: The representative of India has informed me that he would like to have the privi- lege of giving certain additional infotmation which he believes to be desirable to the members of the Security Council, in view of statements which have been made. As there appears to be. no objection, the Security Council will accord that privilege to th~ repreflentative of India. tant' net· estime aient· ces qui semble que le de prétation l'anglais): fait j'ai cetteséailce. vant. les nous points soulevés de sécurité voudra certainement.connaitr-e les vues de levés l'ocçasion. délégation Mr. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR (India): 1 am not quite sure whether 1 made myself clearly under- stood in ,the conversation which 1 had with.the President. The point which 1 raised with the President was whether this debate would be con:- tinued after the members of the Security Council had all spoken, in order.to give my delegaticil an opportunity totake up several orthe points which had arisen in the course of this debate, so that the Security Council, Defore taking the next step, might have before it the views of my delegation on the points which had cropped up. 1 particularly desire that, if possible, an oppor- tunity be given to one memherof OUIdelegationto clarify certain points and to leave no doubt about them in regard to conditions in Kashmir, so that the members ofthe Security Council may be in full possession of aIl points of view before they tackle the next step. ' 1 do not know whether it is the desire of : the President to continue this debate further. j 1 think that so many points have been raised, in j the course of the remarks by the members of the i Security Council tOOt it is necessary to have an ',.: adequate opportumty to deal with most of them, :;J if not all, before we proceed to what 1 have , 'j referredto as the next step. If 1.have to deal with ;1 all of them today, it may take quite a long time. l~s membres points de vue avant d'aborder l'étape suivante. continuions nellement, soulevés Conseil sibilit~ ou que suivante. aujourd'hui, Mais à à ce' '1 However,I am entirely in the hands ofthe.Security ;. Couneil in regard to the procedure which it wishes '! to fôllow'in this connexion. My request· to speak ~.,j ~ow is. not. Iile~ely.for the purpose of giving ad<!i- ." tlon~l information. In rèference to that phase oftt, ,1 think 1 shan ask one of my colleagues to speak, 2particularly with regard to Kashmir. . r~nseignements à ,. The sys.tem· Df cOllsecùtive interpretation .was T~Sunied at this point. ,The'~IDENT: The members of the Security Cauncil have heard the,remarks of the represen- tative of. fudia. As ther~ is no objection, it 'is decided that, in extel1dïng ~o the representative of lùdia th~ .privilege of speaking, further to ,the $ecurity CQuncil, the Councnhas placedno resmc:. tion ontheform or.sco~ of bis remarks~ Weare àmous-'-indeèd, 1 think the' world is amtious, -to be sure that, before conclusions are rèached in the Security'Council, all reœVl\nt matter~.will hav.e b~n place4adequately before the. çounpiI. 1 shall.3s.lç-the .repres~ntative 'of·fudia to proceed On that basis. '"Mr: NoJ3i, .BAKER.(United Kingdom): ldo not knowwhéther 1 fully 1Ùldeistoodwhat \vas said by the" repres~ntative .of,India. However, if 1 did understand him;he suggested to us that hè would like one of'bis. delegation ta addi'ess' 11IS on his behal( with,regard to the ~ituation ip. Kashmir, and that he, himself, would Uke to make~,a s~at~ IJl~t about the generai course ofthe debate before 'we' pÎ'6~ed further. , ' , . :. ",. ~ t~~l cerUiinin' ,my 'own. ~9 thàt :aU ,the' 'n,ieinbers of the" SecurityÇouncil ,w.ill wish. to ~ccëdè:'to ~oth those requests, if requ~~ts t~ey be.ces FQr,D)Y part,.1 amalwaysvery aJl!ÇÏouS toseçure as large~.retm'n o.fproductive work per man~ho.ur Of travel Wbich. ,w~ have to undertake,as. may 'be ppssif>le;Therefore, 1 I10pe we can npw proceed further with.~our :work. ~owever, tqe 'represe~- ~~t!v~'.opndia said.that h~ wouId llk:etQ make bis pomts ID regard to the debate tomorrow. That request seems to me to be a teasonable one. . "•.1 w()nd~r whether bis colleagÙe migh~ perhaps address -the SçcùrityCouncil on Kashmir .Dow. TtieSecurity .,CouncilcouIdth~nhear the state- ment 'b)' MT.. GÔpa1a.s~a.mi' A-YYânga.r. tomorrow. . ;', " ". ' '.', " . " . On the invitation of the President, Sheikh Mohamntad Abdullah, representative ofIndia, took his. place a.t. the 8.ecurity" Counciltable. The system of'simultaneous interpretation was adoptedat this point•. :' Sheikli Mohammad ABDPLLAH(lndia): 1 do not propo.seto '~make a long. sp~h tbis' aftemoon. Iprppose simply to.review .the actua1 state of affaftsprevalliIigat'present in mycountry. 1 have·heardwitllpatience, attention and resp~ the statements 'm,ade;by the representative of Pakistan and members of the Security. Council, asweUas thestatements made on various occasions by, the, members .~f ·r;:iY.'own' delegation. .The SecurityCouncil will conc~e that lam pJ:obably the one man mast concel'ned in tlUs dispute, There are many troubles in Kashmir. 1 have listened patiently to the debate in the Security Couneil, but 1 feel that 1 am rather confused. Mter all, what is the point in dispute7The point in dispute is not that the sovereignty of the Prince is in question, as the representative ofPakistan stated yestèrday. After aU, 1have suffered the punishment of being sentenced to nine years' imprisonment for saying what the representative of Pakistan said with regard to the Treaty of Kashmir of 1846. 1 am glad that he said it in the Seeurity Council, where he is inlmune from any punisbment. There- fore, 1 am not disputing that point, and that is not the subject of the dispute before' the Seeurity Council. The subjeet of the dispute before the Seeurity Couneil is not the maladministration of the Princely State of Kashmir. In order toset right that maladministration, l think 1 have suffered the most; an,d today, when, for the fust time, 1 heard the representative of Pakistan supporting my ~ase, it gave ID:e great pkasure. Mter aIl, what is the dispute between India and Pakistan7 From what 1 have learned· from the complaint brought before the Security COUDcil by my own delegation, the dispute revolves around the fact that Kashmir acce-ded legally and constitu- tionally to the Dominion ofIndia. There was some trouble about the democratization of the Kashmir administration within ,the State, and the tribesmen from across the border have poured into my country. They have been helped and arebeing helped by the Pakistan Government,with the result that there is the possibility of a greater conflagration. between India and Pakistan. India sought the help of the Security COUDcil so tha:t Pakistan might be requested to.desist from helping the tribesmen, and to desist from supporting the inside revoit, should 1 say, against the lawful authority. 1 should have ut~derstood the -position of the representative of Pakistan if he hJ.d come boldly before the Security Council and maintaine:d: " Yes, we do support the tribesmen; we do support the rebels inside the State because we feel that Kashmir belongs to Pakistan and not to India, and because we feel that the accession of Kashmir to India was fraudulent" Then we might have discussed the validity of the accession of the State of Kashmir to India. But that was not the position taken by the representative of Pakistan. He completely. denied that any support was being given by the Govern- ment of Pakistan to either the tribesmen or those who are in revoit .within the State against, the constituted authority.' How am 1 to convince the Security Councilthat the denial is absolutely untrue71 am sitting before theSeèurity Couneil at a distance of thousands ,of miles ,from my country. 1 have· fought many que ce démenti est entièrement faux7 tenant j'ai The denial has come so fiatly that it becomes very difficult for me to disprove it here before the Security Council, unless th~ Security Council aœedes to our request to send a commission to the spot and to find out first whether the allegations brought before the Security Cauncil with regard to the aid given by the Govemment ofPakistan are correct or incorrect. If they are incorrect, the case faIls; ifthey are correct, then the Security Council should take the necessary steps to advise the Government of Pakistan ta dèsist from such support. But then, this simple issue has been confused. On the one hand, the Pakistan Government says: ft We are not a party to the trouble within the State. The trouble within the State exists because the people are fighting against the meladministra- tion of the Jammu and Kashmir Government." Yes, we are fighting. We have been fighting against the maladmiuistration of that State since 19'31; we have been demanding democratization of the Govemment there. But how is it. that today Pakistan has become the champion of our liberty? 1 know very weIl that in 1946, when 1 raised the cry of" Quit Kashmir ", the leader ofthe Pakistan Govemment, who is the Governor-General now, Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, opposed my Govern- ment, declaring that this movement was a move- ment of a few renegades and that Muslims as such had nothing to do with the movement. The Muslim Conference, which has been talked about so much, oppased my movement and dec1ared its 10yaIty to the Prince. The represen- tative of Pakistan now says that Sheikh Abdullah, once the supporter of "Quit Kashmir", has joined hands with the Maharaja of Kashmir, and that in one of my public speeches 1 declared that 1 wanted the Maharaja to be the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir-not the Maharaja of Jammu only, but the Maharaja of the entire State. 1 should like to correct the misreporting of my speech. 1 did deliver that speech in Jammu, which is the winter capital of our country, but it was in a different context. As the members ofthe Security Council have already heard from the head of my delegation, some massacres did occur in the Jammu Province. After the Kashmir Province was raided by the tribesmen, and after thousands of Hindus and Silffis were uprooted from the villages and towns in the Kashmir Province and found their way into the Jammu Province, there was sorne very bad retaliation. 1 could not go to Jammu Province to control that situation, because 1 was busywith the raiders in Kashmir Province. However, as soon as Ihad some time, 1 flew down to Jammu Province, ~ ,:jdresr~d a gathering of 60,000 Hindus and ~ikhs in Jammu City, and gave them sorne plain advice. 1 told them clearly that this policy of retaliation would bring no good to them as Hindus and Sikhs The situation Y/BS wr.~s\ining day by day'and the rninority in our State was feeling very nervous. As a result, tremendous pressure was brought to bear upon the State administration to release me andmy colleagues. The situation oùtside demanded the release of workers of the National Conference, along with its leader, and we were accordingly set free. Immediately we were liberated from prison we were faced with the important question of whether Kashmir should accede to Pakistan, accede to India, or remain independent, because under the Pi;lrtition scheme these three choices were open to us as,. indeed, they were open to every Indian Staj;e. The problem was a very difficult one, but 1 advised the people of my.country that although the (question was very important to us, it was a secondary consideration. The alI-important matter for us was our own liberation from the autocratie rule of the Prince, for which we were J ":Jfighting and had been fighting for the past seven- Naturally, as 1 have inmcated, we could not decide t,his aU-important issue before achieving our own iiberation, and our slogan became " Freedom berore accession ". Sorne fiiends from Pakistan met me in Srinagar. 1had a heart-to-heart discussion with them and explained my point of view. 1told them in plain words that, whatever had been the attitude of Pakistan towards our freedom movement in-the past, it would not infiuenc-e us in our judgment. Neither the friendship of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and of Congress, nor their support of our freedom movement, would have any infbwnce upon our decision if we felt that the interests of four million Kashmiris lay in our ac.,;ession ta Pakistan. 1requested them not to precipitate this decision upon us but ta allow us time, supporting our freedom movement th~ while. 1 added that once we were free they should allow us an interval ta consider this aU-important issue. 1 pointed out that lndia had accepted this point ofview and was not forcing us ta· decide. We had, in fact, entered into a standsti1l agreement with both Pakistan and India, but the leader of the Indian delegation has already explained ta the Security Council what Pakistan· did to us. While 1 was engaged in these conversations and negotiations with friends from Pakistan, 1 sent one of my colleagues to Lahore, where he met the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, and other high dignitaries of the West Punjab Government. He placed the same point of view before them and requested that they should aUow us time to consider this vital question, first helping us ta achieve our liberation instead of forcing us to declare our decision one way or the other. Then, one fine morning while these negotia- tions were proceeding, 1 received news that a full;. fledged attack had been camed out by the raiders on Muzaffarabad, a frontier town in the Kashmir Province. The representative'of Pakistan has stated that immediately upon my release 1 went down to Delhi to negotiate the aécession of Kashmir to lndia. That is not a facto He probably does not know that while in gaol 1 was elected President of the AU India States People'sConference, and that immediately upon my release 1 had to take up my duties. Accordingly, 1 had called a meeting ofthe executive of that Conference in Delhi, a fact wmch 1 had conveyed ta the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Indeed, 1 had told the Prime Minister ofPakistan that immediately upon my return from Delhi 1should take the opportunity ofmeeting him personally to discuss my point of view with him. 1·didn9t go to Delhi to concludeany agreement on· behalf of Kashmirbecause, although released~ 1 was still considered a rebet 1 might inform the representative of Pakistan that although 1 am beyond doubt theheadof the des des rité mans. de jeunes filles. des cet militaire, Maharadjah, en Le que . It is said that Sheikh Abdullah is a friend of Panèit Jawaharlal Nehru. Yes, 1 admit that. 1 feel honoured that such a great man c1aims me as bis friend. And he happens to belong to my own country: he i8 also a Ka~hmiri, and blood is thicker than water. If JéOwaharlal gives me that honour, 1 cannot help it. He is my friend. But that does not mean that, because of bis friendsbip, 1 am going to betray the millions of my people who have suffered along with me for the last seventeen years and sacrifice the interests of my country. 1 am not a man of t~.:'.t calibre. 1 was explaining how the dispute arose-how Pakistan wanted to force this position of slavery upon us. Pakistan had no interest in our liberation or it would not also have opposed our freedom movement. Pakistan would have supported us when thousands of my countrymen were behiud bars and hundreds were shot to death. The Pakistani leaders and Pakistani papers were heaping abuse upon the people of Kashmir who were suffering these tortures. Then, suddenly, Pakistan comes before the bar of the world as the champion of the liberty of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The world may believe this, but it is very difficult for me to believe. When we refused the coercive tactics ofPakistan, it started full-fledged aggression and encouraged the tribesmen in tbis activity. It is absolutely iD?-possible for the tribesmen to enter our territory Wlthout encouragement frOID Pakistan, because if is necessary for them to pnss through Pakistan territory to reach Jammu and Kashmir. Hundreds oftrucks, thousands ofgallons ofpetrol, thousands of rifles, ammunition, and all forros ofhelp that anarmy requires, were supplied to them. We know tbis. After aU, we belong·to that country. What Pakistan could not achieve by the use of the econom!c blockade if wanted to achieve by full- fledged aggression. ~erted on the people and they should make the free choice as to the State to which they wish to accede." Not only is this the offer tOOt was made by the people of Kashmir to Pakistan long, long ago, but it is the offer made by the Prime Minister of India at a time when, 1 think, he had not the sllghtest need for making it, as Kashmir was in distress. We realized that Pakistan would not allow us any time, that we had either to suffer the fate ofour kith and kin ofMuzaffarabad, Baramula, Srinagar and other towns and villages, or to seek help from some outside authority. . Under those circumstances, both the Maharaja and the people of Kashmir requested the Govern- ment of India to accept our accession. The Government of India could easily have accepted the accession and could have said, CI AlI right, we accept your accession and we shaH render this help." There was no necessity for the Prime Minister of India to add .the proviso, when accepting the accession, that " India does not want to take advantage of the difficult situation in Kashmir. We Will accept this accession because, without Kasbmir's aceeding to the Indian Dominion, we are not in a position to render any military help. But once the,country is free from the raiders, marauders and looters, this accession will he subject to ratification by the people." That was the offer made by the Prime Minister of fudia. That was the same offer which was made by the people ofKashmir to the Government ofPakistan, but it was refused because at that time Pakistan felt that it could, within a week, conquer the entire Jammu and Kashmir State and then place thefait accomplihefore the world, just as happened some time ago in Europe. The same tactics were used. But, having failed in those tactics, Pakistan now comes before the bar ofthe world, pleading: " We want nothing; we only want our people to be given a free band :in deciding their own fate. And in deciding their own fate, they must have a ple- biscite.." There is no dispute as to that. After all, ibis is theoffer that was made by the Prime Mînister of lndiaand by the people of Kashmir. Therefore, Pakistan's position cornes down to this: that the 4 million people of that State should have no hand in running the administration of their own country. Someone else must come in for that purpose. Is that fair? Is that just? Do the members of the Security Council wish to oust the people of Kashmir from runni&g their own administration ·and their own country? Thereneed be no fear, since the Indian Army is there, that this al'my will interfere in the exercise 'of a free vote. After aU, a commission of the Security Council will be there in order to watch. The Indian Army does not have to go into every villàge. It will be stationed at certain strategic points, so that in the event of danger from any border, the army will be there to proteet that border. The army is there to curb disorders anywhere in the State; that isall. The army will not· be îneach and every village in order to watch each and every vote. It is thensaid: "Can we not have a joint control? Can we not have the annies of Pakistan' and India inside the State in order to control the situation?" This is an unusual idea. What Pakistan could not achieve through ùrdinary means, Pakistan wishes to acbieve by entering through the back door, so that it may have its armies inside the State a.nd then start the fight. That is not possible. Mter aU, we have been discussing the situation in Kasbmir. 1 should say that we have been playing the drama of HamIet without the Prince 'I greatly for the people of Poonch as weIl as for the people of Mirpur. There is no difference on t1rls issue ofinternaI democratization ofthe administra- tion between me, my party and the. people of Poonch. We are one; we want our own liberty; we want our own freedom; we do not want au"')- cratic ru1e. We desire that the 4 million peuple in Jammu and Kashmir-Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims-shall have the right to change their destiny, to control their country, and to administer it as best they cano On that point there is absolutely no difference. However, it is not a que~tion of internaI liberation. The Security Council should not confuse the issue. The question is not that we want internaI freedom; the question is not how the Maharaja got his State, or whether or not he is sovereign. These points are not before the Security Council. Whether Kashmir has lawfully acceded to India-complaints on that score have been , broùght before the Security Council on behalf of Pakistan-is not the point at issue. If that were the point at issue, then we should discuss that , subject. We should prove before the Security Council that Kashmir and the people of Kashmir have lawfully and constitutionally acceded to the Dominion of India. and Pakistan has no right to question that accession. However, that is not the discussion before the Security Council. Indiah and Kashmiri forces are ready to deal with the tribesmen, to come to an understanding with the people of Kashmir, and to establish a democratic form of govemment inside the State. We shall do aIl that. We do not want Pakistan to lend us support te' ~uppress an internai revoIt or todrive out the tribesmen. We do not seek any support from Pakistan in that connexion. Smce Pakistan is a neighbouring country, we desire to remain on the friendliest possible terms with this sister Dominion. But we do ask that Pakistan shall have no hand, directly or indirectly, in this turmoil in Kashmir.· The Government of Pakistan has said, "We have had no hand in this turmoil." The only course left to the Security Council is to send out the commission and to see whether or not Pakistan has had any hand in this turmoil. If Pakistan has had any hand in tms turmoii, then the Government of Pakistan should. be asked to desist from such activity. If Pakistan has had no hand in this turmoil, then that can be proved. This issue has been c10uded by very many other issues and interests. 1 suggested at informaI talks that, according to my understanding, there are two points at issue: fust, how to have this neutral, impartial administration; second, whether or not the Indian Army shall remain. démocratique fait. It is not at aIl disputed that we must have a ple- biscite and that the accession must be ratified by the people of Kashmir, freely and without any pressure on this or that side. That much is con- ceded; there is no dispute about that. The dispute arises whenit is suggested that,in order to have the free vote, the admilÛstration must be changed. Tothat suggestion. we say, " No." 1 Pakistan should not encourage inside revoIt. Pakistan has denied that it has. In arder ta verify the statements made by the representatives of'India and Pa19stan, the Security Couneil must send a commission to the spot to see whether the complaint brought beÎore the. Security Council is valid or invalid. If the Security Council finds that .the complaint brought before it by India l'anglais): représentant parole: pour Cachemire? qu'il l'État sans Mr. NOEL BAKER (United Kingdom): 1 should like to ask a question of the representative of India who has just spoken. What are his proposais for stopping the fighting in Kashmir now, and did 1 rightly understand him to say that he was quite ready to suppress the revoIt in Kashmir and to drive out the tribesmen without anybody's help? le je répondre

Before the representative of India speaks, 1 should like to infonn him that he ïs under no compulsion to reply to any questions. Sheikh Mohammad ABDULLAH (lndia): 1 should like to answer the question. As far as 1 can speak on behalf of India, India <locs not want the help of the armies of Pakistan. What it wants from Pakistan is that Pakistan should not supply bases to the raiders on Pakistan territory across the border from Jammu and Kashmir State. AIl along the border on Pakistan • territory, there are huge concentrations of these tribesmen who are Pakistani nationals. We request Pakistan· not toallow its territory to be used by these raiders. de je des Pakistan, envahisseurs, Jammu en trations des ressortissants empêchéi" territoire. d'instructions droit Pakistan munitions térieur prévu devrait Pakis!.:an. je de repousser les pillards Si nous saurons résoudre nosdifférends intérieurs avec le cette guerre faire concentrés tière. bre sur les de tière. ni car conflit mains délicate et lui envahisseurs du traverser étaient l'avons férable situation. Pakistan should not provide ammunition, arms, , <lirection and control to these tribesmen. It should stop the passage of these tribesmen through its territory. Pakistan shouldnot supply arms and ammunition to the people who are fighting within the State because aU these matters faU under an international obligation. Therefore, Pakistan should desist from that practice. That is aIl. We do not want any armed help from Pakistan. If Pakistan does what we have requested, the Indian Arroy, 1 am quite sure, will be capable -of driving out the raiders and tribesmen. If Pakistan does not meddle in our afi'airs, we will be -capable of solving aIl, our own internaI disputes with the Maharaja of Kashmir. However, as long as this unofficial war continues, it is very difficult for us to do anything. Our hands are tied. What is happer<jng? The raiders are concentrated justacross the border. They enter our State ln large numbers-four or five thousand strong. They raid four or five villages, burnthem, abduct women and loot property. When our anny tries to capture them, they go back across the border. Our anny cannot·go across the border, and cannot fire a single shot across the border, because if it does, there is the Immediate danger of agreater conflagration. So our hands are tied. We did not want to create this difficult situation without informing the Security Council, and we felt honour-bound to inform it of the actual position. The Indian Army could easily have followed the raiders across the border and could have attacked the bases, which were aIl in Pakistan territory, but it desisted. We thought it would be b.etter. to inform the Security Council of the SltuatlOn. . ~he members of the Security Council so that they migh.t see who is fighting and who is not fighting. Therefore, somebody must go to the spot. Then at that time it woulèl be for us to prove that the charges we have brought before the Security Council are correct to the last· word. That is the only help we w'ant, and no other help.

The time has now come for the Security Coc.ncil to adjourn. As there is no objection, the Security COlll1cil will meet again at 10.30 a.m. tomorrow, and it will meet again after lunch, if necessary, in order to advançe the important matters under consideration. The meeting rose at 6 p.m. TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY- SECOND MEETING Held at L4ke SUCCé: rs, New York, on Fridily, 6 Febr:.'ary 1948, at 10.30 a.m. President: General McNAUGHTON (Canada). Present: The·representatives of the .following countries: Argentina, .Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, .Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Uriion of. Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom~ United States of America. . 4. Provisional agenda (document S/Agenda 242) 1. Adoption· of the agenda. 2. India-Pakistan question: (a) Letter dated 1 January 1948 from the .. representative of lndiaaddressed to the .President of·the Security. Council concemÎI'~ the situation in Jammu and Kashmir (Qocument S/628).1 (b) Letter dated 15 January 1948 from the .Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan addressed. to the Secretary~General concerning .tbe situation. in Jammu and Kashmir (document 5/646).2 (c) Letter dated 20 Jantiary 1948 frem the Minister for Foreign Affairs of P&kistan addre~sed ..to the . President of thi: SeCtir!ty Council. (document S/655).8 50 Adoption of· the agenda 2 Ibid~, pàges 67-87.