S/PV.242 Security Council

The time has now come for the Security Coc.ncil to adjourn. As there is no objection, the Security COlll1cil will meet again at 10.30 a.m. tomorrow, and it will meet again after lunch, if necessary, in order to advançe the important matters under consideration. The meeting rose at 6 p.m. TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY- SECOND MEETING Held at L4ke SUCCé: rs, New York, on Fridily, 6 Febr:.'ary 1948, at 10.30 a.m. President: General McNAUGHTON (Canada). Present: The·representatives of the .following countries: Argentina, .Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, .Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Uriion of. Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom~ United States of America. . 4. Provisional agenda (document S/Agenda 242) 1. Adoption· of the agenda. 2. India-Pakistan question: (a) Letter dated 1 January 1948 from the .. representative of lndiaaddressed to the .President of·the Security. Council concemÎI'~ the situation in Jammu and Kashmir (Qocument S/628).1 (b) Letter dated 15 January 1948 from the .Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan addressed. to the Secretary~General concerning .tbe situation. in Jammu and Kashmir (document 5/646).2 (c) Letter dated 20 Jantiary 1948 frem the Minister for Foreign Affairs of P&kistan addre~sed ..to the . President of thi: SeCtir!ty Council. (document S/655).8 50 Adoption of· the agenda 2 Ibid~, pàges 67-87.

When the 24lst meeting of the Security .Council adjourned last evening we had just heard a member of the Indian delegation, and it was understood that the leader of that delegation would have some further remarks to make in connexion with the discussions which had taken place. Accordingly, 1 now caU upon the representative of India. Mr. GoPALASWAMI AYYANGAR (India): 1 am very grateful to the President and to the Security Council for their indulgence in extending to my delegation an opportunity of intervening in the debate at this stage. It is a matter of embarrass- ment to me that 1 should have been obliged to ask for such an opportunity. 1 wish that it had been my lot to beable to foUow the exa,mple of the representative of Pakistan, and to claim that such interventions as 1 am obliged to make are neces- sitated by happenings in the Security Council which were not anticipated, and that, left ta my- self, 1 should have been a good boy in accepting aU the suggestions that have fallen from the lips of representatives during the .disqussions which have taken place here. . Unfortunately, the interests of my country have demanded that 1 should ask permission to make these interventions, because 1 considered it my dutYto guide the debate in the right direction from my·standpoint if 1 possibly could..1 am glad to be able to say that my intervention at the 237th m:eeting, followedas it was by my speech at the 239th meeting, has· produced a change in the attitude of the Security Couneil as a whole to- ward the solution of the problems with which we are confronted. Yesterday we had some very helpful suggestions from different members of the Security Council. and',in this connexion, 1 wish particularly to refer to the remarks .of the representative of China, and to the observations that were made .and the memorandum .that was submitted by the repre- sentative of Colombia at the 24lst meeting. Before 1 deal with these, 1 should liiœ to refer only.to one or two matters which arose from the speech which the representative of Pakistan made at the 239th meeting. A good many of his points have been answered by my coUeague whospoke yesterday. There are a few other points-not many-to whichl should like to refer. There has been one particular matter to which the representative of Pakistan has made frequent reference, and that is the number of raids that have been made upon. Pakistan territory from beyond the. Kashmir borqer. He fust referred to 130 such raids, a number which he flaid later -:>n had risen to about 150. 1 hàve been at sorne pains to ascertain the cor- rectness of this allegation, and 1 shall read to the Security Couneil an extI:act from a telegtam which 1 am sorry that 1 have not been able to get more definite information about the details of individual raids, but the allegation has been in· vestigated partly and an investigation is being made with regard to the rest. . Passing on to sorne of the remarks of the re- presentative of Pakistan about statements made by the Prime Minister of India at various times, it seems to me unnecessary that 1 should go into any detait. This matter has. beeil discussed between us on several occasions. 1 have referred to a good mtlny statements made on the other side, and the tepresentative of Pakistan has referred to state· ments made on our side. At one stage the repre- sentative of Pakistan began to speak about our complaint that there had been a breach of inter- national obligations, but he immediately lau .ched himself into a detailed account of the manner in which the State of Kashmir was acquired by the present dynasty. 1 really do not think that this particular matter is of any special relevancy in connexion with the issues now before the Security Counoil. 1 would pass tbis account by for the reason that, even if the great-grandfather or.the grand· fatherof the present ruler was a man steeped in iniquity, it does not follow that the powers or the authority exercised by the present ruler cannot be recognized in international or even in Indian society. , 1 would pass on to the remarks of the repre- sentativeof Pakistan as regards the question of accession. These remarks appear in bis speech to the Security Council duringthe 240th meeting. The representative of Pakistan·said: If 1 may explain the position a little more in detail, the law bearing on the facts is as follows. Under section II of the India Act, any Indian State is at liberty to accede to either Dominion or to remain independent. If aState did accede to a Dominion, it could not withdraw from that ac- cession except with the permission of that Do- minion. What India had said was: "Kashmir offered her accession at a time of peril to her, and we shaH not hold her to this offer. We shall accept it now, but we shallleave it to her and her people to change their minds and ask to withdraw from the accession to India and to accede to Pakistan or remain independent. If Kashmir does change her mind, then we commit ourselves to the posi- tion that we shall give our consent to her with- drawal from the accession to India." That, in effect, is the position involved. There can reaUy he no provisional accession, though that expres- sion has been loosely used in the course of speeches, broadcasts and newspaper comments in regard to Kashmir's accession. The instrument of accession is a document complete in itself. To the best of my memory, the instrument, in the case of Kashmïr, does not contain any cOllditions. It does not state that the accession is provisional. The commitment which the Government of India made for themselves on the question of ascertaining the wishes of the people was contaill!l~d in a letter accompanying the accepted instrument of accession, The Govern- ment of India is certainly bound by its com- mitment, but it would be wrong to caU the acces- sion itself a provisional accession. With regard to this <J.uestion of accession, we should remember that 1t became complete and operative on 26 October 1947. The effect of the Government of India's commitment in regard to the plebiscite was that if, on the plebiscite being taken, the vote went against accession to India, India would release Kashmir from the accession. Upon such release, the accession, which up to tbat point must be considered to be valid and effective, would, as it were, "ease. 1 now pass to anotber point raised by the representative of Pakistan. At the 240th meeting of the Security Council the representative of Pakistan quoted a telegram from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of Pa- kistan in which the Prime Minister of India made three proposaIs, namely: " 1. That the Government of Pakistan should publicly undertake to do their utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw from Ka~hinir; "2. That the Government. of India should repeat their declaration that they will withdraw their troops from Kashmir as soon as raiders have withdrawn and law and "Order are re.atored; and "3. That the Governments of India and Pa- kistan should make a joint request to the United Nations to undertake a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date." The quotation made by the representative of Pakistan is taken from a telegram dated 8 Novem~ ber 1947. ~n the same telegram there are other passages of a revealing characte:. 1 wish to read to the Security Council sorne of the passages of the telegram from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Paragraph 5 of this telegram. states: "Lord Mountbatten, on his return from Lahore, gave me a full aecount of his talk with Mr. Jinnah, in particular of two important suggestions which had been discussed, namely: one, the withdrawal of Indian troops and tribesmen from Kashmir; and two, the holding of a plebiscite at the earliest possible date. " As regards the fust proposai, Lord Mount- batten told me that Mr. Jinnah desired that the withdrawal of the Indian Dominion troops and tribesmen should be simultaneous, but that he, Lord Mountbatten, had pointed out that it was clearly impossible for the Indian troops to with- draw from Kasbmir. Valley until the raiders had left Kashmîr soil and law and order had· been restored in Kashmir. Lord Mountbatten had also madeit quite clear toc Mr. Jinnah that the Govern- ment of India had no desire to retain troops in Kashmir for a moment longer than was neces- sary. " As regards the second point, Lord Mount- batten reports. that Mr-. Jinnah had expressed the view that,therewas no hope of a fair plebiscite under the present Kashmir authorities. To meet . tbis point, Lord Mountbatten had suggested that it should, he conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. Mr. Jinnah had put forward the counter-proposal that the two Governoi's General should ,. be .given plenary powers to settle the matter.,. Lord .Mountbattèn had pointed out that it would be constitutionally improper for him to u.ndertake this duty," PanditNebru went on tosay to Mr. Liaquat Ali J(h,an: "A~. regards your'.proposaIs.one and two, armeq raiders haveentered Kashmir ,to the accompaniment of massacre. arson and loot. Our troopshave been seut there to .drive Otlt these raiders and protect Kashmir.. So long·. as these raiders remain there and law and order have not been established,. our troops must discharge their dutY. Afterwards,' they .will be withdrawn, .as 1 have ab:eady undertaken.'! . There is nothing in the proposaIs tbat we have placed bcfore the Security Couneil which can he considered to be inconsistent with tbe attitude tbat our Prime Minister took from the very he- ginning. While saying t11is, 1 should also draw the attention of the members of the Security Council to the fact that a great many things happencd between the beginning of Novem- ber 1947 and the end of January 1948, and the fighting has continued. There has been no attempt on the part of Pakistan to co-operate with India in trying to stop the fighting. On the other hand, the fighting has become more and more intensified, and the conviction has been borne In upon both the Government and people ofKaslunir, and upon the Gov3rn.ment of India, that it would he a very risky undertaking, from the standpoint of defend- ing the State against aggression and preserving law and order in the State, for the Indian troops to be witlldrawn in any haste ftom .the soil of Kashmk. In the proposais tbat we have submitted, we have said '.that the strength of the Indian'troops in the State would he reduced progressively after the stoppage of fighting, and that we would retain oruy such troops in the State as arerequired for protection against external aggression and in the discharge of the Indian Govepunent's obligation for defence of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In this connexion, inasmuch as reference has been made to proposaIs of the Prime Minister of India which did not materialize, 1 invite the attention of the members of the Security COUDt'U , tb certain other. tentative, provisional und...~ takings arrived at between the representatives of the two Governments which we had hoped would materialize in a final agreement. 1 shall read from a document which is headed H Revised Draft Kasbmir Agreement", a draft which was cir- culated to the Ministe:rs· of the Government of Agood deal has been said about the other part of the ::Ofoposals that we have made, namely, that the function of the reduced strength of troops tbat we'shall maintain in· Kasbmir would be not only defence against external attack, but that those troops would be available to support the civil power in the maintenance 'Of law and,order when an' emergencyrequired sueh aid. 1·only wish to point out that this is the normal function of any armed force in any State in the world. Primarily, the armed forces are required to defend the country against attack from outside. 'InternaI law'and order has to be maintained by the civil power primarily, with the aid· of the police and such armed militia as it may raise for the purpose. But occasions do arise, and emergencies do occur in internai administrations, when these forces at the . disposaI of the civil power do not prove adequate. In those cases, the army has to go to the aid of the civil power. This is all that was meant by the poition of our proposais whi,ch referred to giving aid to the civil power.' " The Government of India, for their part, have undertaken, as soon as fighting has ceased, ta withdraw the bulk of their forces from Kashmir territory. Both Governments recognize, however, that, following on the upheaval in Kasluiùr, the resources of Kashmir State are not at present adequate ta maintain law and order. They further recognize that the maintenance of law and arder in Kashmir during the period which will elapse between the witbdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces and the holding ofthe plebiscite is essential if the plebiscite is ta be free and unfettered. Ac- cordingly, both Governments have agreed that small detachments of Indian troops of minimum strength ta deal with disturbances in K ~shmir, whether from outside or inside the State, will be established at certain selected points. .. Full information as ta the strength and com- position of these detachments and the points at which· they are to be stationed, will be made available by the Government of India ta the Government of Pakistan." There are other clauses ta this draft agreement. 1 have already said that, at the conference in Lahore which followed, it was found impossible ta arrive at an agreement on this basis. India and Pakistan were unwi1ling ta agree to the whole of the proposaIs which were contained in this docu- ment. At Lahore, Pakistan insisted ibat Indian troops should he·entirely withdrawn. On the other hand, India questjoned the right ofPakistanta be kept informed of the strength and location of the detachments of troop·s .which it would have ta maintain in this State. There were other differen- ces, and the scheme failed. It is Quite significant. that, at on~ stage of the talkS, thisquestion of retaining Indian troops- ln regard to the risks and dangers involved in withdrawing Indian troops from Kashmir, my colleague who spoke· yesterday gave the Council a full idea. The representative of Pakistan said that our proposaIs left a gap between the stop- page of the infiltration of the tribesmen and the stoppage of the figbting. 1 do not know if he was serious in making this charge against us. Our first objective, we stated, was the stoppage of the fighting and the termination ofmilitary operations. Our llext objective, wc stated, was the restoration of peace and normal conditions. 1 do not know whether any gap can be discovered between the two objectives. If the idea was to suggest that we did not make :my proposaIs which were Iikely to lesd to the subsidence of the revoIt in Kashmir, 1 think the· the representative of Pakistan has done us an injustice. In our proposaIs we have always made definite suggestions for bringing about the restoration of pesce and normal con- ditions. ~ In my previous remarks 1 have aIready referred to the steps to be taken for the establishment of a responsible Govemment in the State, and to the fact that, when those steps were taken, then the reason for the revoit, which in sorne parts of the State now exists, would be removed. Naturally, when the offending cause, from this point ofview, is removed, the inducement for continued revoIt ceases to exist and peace must necessarily be restored. 1 can see no gap at all. ~ 1 1 ~ ~ " We were talking of the interim period; we said that these troops have to remain there during the period between the cessation of hostilities and the taking of the plebiscite for the two purposes which we have ÎDdicsted in our scheme. If, when the plebiscite is taken, it results unfavourably for India, our troops, of course, will withdraw to a man. If the plebiscite results favourably for India, our troops will ..remain there, and they will perform the dual func:tion which 1 have indicated in the scheme tbat has been placed before the Couneil. 1 shan not refer to the. other parts of the Pa- kistan representative's renarks. We listened with 1 say we are grateful to'him because it is dif- ficult to disagree with much of wl1at he said. :But there are one or two aspects of his remarks to which l beg leave to draw the attention of the Security Council. Defore doing thf 'j l would refer to his observation wherein the following lan- guage appears: "How is it possible to induce the tribesmen to retire from Jammu and Kashmir without warfare and without driving them out? That is the only way it can be done, unless the tribes- men are satisfied that there is·to be a fair ple- biscite assured through aIl- interim government that ~s in fact, and that has the appearance of beiD.g, l\on:-partisan. Only by that metbod could one h~pe to have that retirement on a peaceful basis." l wish ta place before the members of the Security Councila somewhat different point 'of view. What is the status of these tribesmen,in relation to ·the State of Jammu and Kashtnù~ which enaiJles "them.to demand that a plebiscite, tobe taken for the purposeof deciding theques- tion of .accession to India .or Pakistan, shallbe taken in such a manner as will 'he considered satisfactory by them? l, for one, am unàble to see the 'Strength'behind a position of this character. These tribesmen are separated from'the Stateof Jammù and Kashmir by intervening Pakistan 'territory. They invade Kashmir for purposes which it is"unnecessary to repeat. They come and fight;· theyloot; ·they commit arson; they do all sorts of things, and then theY'retire to their'owncountry'with all this loot. ""Are people of this descriptiô~, who invade Kashmir for criminal puri:loses~ to be given the nght to demand that something shall be done by Kashmir State authorities which will be accept- able to them; and to say, if it is not acceptable to them, that they will not retire? Of course,'they will not retireso long as they see the prospect Cf being able to go to this beautiful'land for the commission of crime. But if they have to be sent away, and they will not retire of their own accord, the proper policy in relation to these tribesmen is cne· of driving them out from the State of Jammu and Kashniir. That is one point of view whichI would ask the Security Council seriously to consider. 1 come next to the other"interesting point in international law which was referred to by the representative of the United States. He states: "What· the Security Council, is faced with is the fact that two Members· of the United Nations have'come before it with an inter. national problem. That problem involves the extemalsovereignty of Jammu, and Kashmir." l agree that,except indiséha:rge of its .respon- sibility fotextemal affairs, "India could not have 'come to the Security Council." But the further point that itattemptèd to make,. namely, that the problem relating to accession was also" a matter The result was that they laid down, the doc- trine that when· they parted with power in India, every Indian State-every one of the 562 States- became independent, so that after 15 August 1947 the Indian States were no longer protectorates under the paramountcy o( a suzerain. They became entirely independent of auy other autho- rity. If they did not accede,. they continued to be independent; if they acceded to either of the two Dominions, they became member States of a federation in which certain named subjects were ceded by the States to the federal Government. The sQvereign powers with regard to. those sub- jects were exercisable by the federal Govern- ment; the sovereign powers in regard to every- thing else continued to remain with the Indian States. 1 have already quoted to the Security Council statements made by all' leaders of opinion in India, including Mr. Jinnah, to the effect that the question of the accession or of the future govern- ment of any Indian State is a matter entirely for the people of the State concerned. This will be so even after accession has taken place, because'accession gives to the federal centre control only over the subjects of external affairs; defence and communications. Control of aIl the rest, barring some minor ancillary matters, re- mains with the In<ljan States. That being so, the decision on the question of accession and the taking of a plebiscite are matters which come within the ambit. not of external sovereignty, but ofinternai sovereignty. That is where 1have found it somewhat difficult to follow the point· made by·the representative of the United States. . The fact that the Government of India agreed to a plebiscite's being taken for the purpose of deciding the question of accession does not make the matter one which cornes within the ambit of external sovereignty., In.. this connexion, let me quote the ;lctual words used by Lord Mountbatten in bis letter, which was referredto by the represen- tative of the United States. They read as follows: " ... it is my Government'swish that as soon as law and.order have been restored in Kashmir ° Ofcourse, the other point is perfectly maintain- able; namelYt that if the person in whom sov- ereignty rests chose to delegate a portion of it to somebody else for a temporary period, that delegation would be perf~tly valid. 1 concede that position, and the authorities quoted by the representative of the United States are quite apposite in that connexion. Howevert the point that 1 have tried to make is not about the legal competency of the Maharajat his Government and people to invite an outside administration to come and run the State for a definite period; it is rather about their willingness to do SOt and the propriety of a body like the Security Council asking them to do so. Sheikh Abdullaht who spoke yesterday, also had something important to sayon that point which should have indicated the wishes of the people and of the Government of Kashmir. . If accession itself cannot be considered to faU within the sphere of external sovereignty, then the question of the proper internai constitution of the State can much less be said to faU within that .sphere. It is for those reasons that we have maintained tbat both the question of the future goverIlÎl1ent of Kashmir and the question of its accession to either Dominion are matters requiring decision by the people of the State. Having said that muclit 1 now come to some of the statements which were made yesterday. In this connexiont 1 Diust acknowledge the helpful attitudeowhich was taken by some of the speakers. The representative of China made suggestions wIDch, Irespectfully suggestt deserve serioùs consideration at the hands ofthe Security Council. The representative of France made one suggestion whicht 1 think, tried to steer a middle course between establishing an outside administration during the interim .period andcontinuing the present administration. His suggestion was that perhaps the most satisfactory. course would be to include reptesentatives of both the National Conference and the Muslim Conference in that Interim government. In that connexion, 1 would draw the attention of the Security Council to our own scheme .set forth at the 236th meeting. Our scheme provides that before the plebiscite is takent a national government. based upon a national legislature eleeted on the basis of adult suffrage, should be established. The national govermnent formed under·those circumstances must be.a government which isacceptable to the people as. a whole. If, in the formation of such. a national. government, and for the purpose of taking· an impartial·ple- biscite, the legislature should consider that an aU-:party govermnent shoUld be establishedt it wiU be for those who will be in the legislature at Sheikh Abdullah indieated yesterday that it would be his. endeavour to draw aIl the people together in forming a strong government and conducting the adnlÎnistration in an impartial and efficient manner. However, what 1 particu- larly wish ta stress is that the scheme which we have placed before the Security Council contem- plates alternative methods of forming a govern- ment before the plebiscite is taken which should he satisfactory from aU points of view. . l'come now to the document submitted by the representative of Colombia at the 241st meeting. Until that document was presented 1 thought that ours was the only comprehensive scheme which would cover practi~ally all points of con- ~roversy which the representative of the United Kingdom was so anxious that the Security Council should decide upon before we disperse. In faet, however, the Colombian scheme is also a com- prehensive one, and tries to tackle aIl the points of controversy. While my delegation cannot agree with every one of the proposaIs contained therein, there are many with which we are happy to filld lIJurselves in accord. 1 should like to indicate what are our initial reactions to tms comprehensive scheme. 1 shall deal first with the points mentioned under the word " finds ". 1 do not wish to examine meticu- lously the wording of the preamble; that can come at the appropriate lime if we do in fact decide to adopt a proposaI of this kind. After the word " finds ", paragraph A speaks of the cessation of fighting and other acts of hosti- lity as being of a particularly urgent character .in the Jammu and Kashmir State. We are entirely in agreement with ihis, and 1 hope that the Se- .curity Couilcil as a whole is in agreement with jt. Paragraph B speaks of the question ofaccession lbeing referred to the people. Darring verbal :amendments which, if necessary, 1 shall propose at the proper time, it seems to me that the sub- stance of this paragraph is worthy of serious examination. It speaks of a plebiscite to be held under international auspices. Paragraph C seems to go rather beyond the jurisdiction of the Security Council. It refers to the plebiscite as being a method of determining the future government ofthe Jammu and Kashmir 'State, but 1 do not think any suggestion has been made that the future government of the State 'should be determined by means of a plebiscite. Our own proposal is that a national assembly, elected on the basis oradult suffrage, should frame ,the constitution of the State. Paragraph D refers to ~the interim administra- tion, and in this connexion 1 should like to re- move ,one possible cause of misunderstanding. In our scheme we contemplate an interim ad- ministration that would function in the period hetween DOW and the convocation of a national .On the question of the strength of the Com- mission which was decided upon on 20 January [document 8/654], 1 should like to reserve my opinion. If the Security Couneil is prepared' to take up that matter, it can be discussed at greater lèngth .Iater on. The delegation- of lodia accepts, of course, paragraph .2 of'the proposed resolution wbich reads, "The Sècurity- Council recommends to thé Govemment of Pakistan to use all its efforts to persuade the tribesmen and all trespassers who have invaded the territory ofJammu and Kashmir State to withdraw therefrom",. but we would amplify it in the direction we have indicated in our scheme. .Paragraph 3-of the memorandum speaks of the reorganization of the Emergency A9ministration on the advice of the Commission. We are unable ta agree that the Commission should have any jurisdiction with regardtothis matter. The further rider that adequate proportional representation should be given to the Muslim and non-Muslim groups of the population in the ihterim govern- ment is. altogether unnecessary from our point of view. In Jammu and Kashmir we are trying to eliminate this communal division altogetller, anQ while, with a view to achieving smooth.- ness and. giving satisfaction to the uneducated masses, the head of the administration who is called upon to form a government will·give weight to the proportion of Muslims and nan-Muslims in the State,· th.e essential principle.which 1 know will guide him will be adequate representation of different areas and interests wj.thout reference, necessarily, to communal divisions. Paragraph 4practical1y repeats portions of our scheme. Paragraph 5 says: "The plebiscite... shall be organized un4er the advice of, and supervised by, the Commission ofthe SecurityCouncil." Our.own scheme was that.theplebiscite should be organized andheld under the advice and observation of personsapl'''inted by. the Security Council. Wecan have "...~ oc' ~tiou.to the Com.;, missionof the Security C", lDëu')vilig tr<s advice andmakingthisobservat.ioL We wDuld not even · Sir Mohamméd ZAFRULLAH KHAN (Pakistan): 1 am very gratefut to thè Security Council for affording me tbis opportunity to comment on such of the points raised in the two speeches made on behalf of India yesterday afternoon and tbis morning as might require further clarification. 1 shallnot try to repeat matters that have so far been made sufficiently clear to the Council, except in so far as it may be necessary to invite the attention of the Council to any aspect of the matters which might help to prevent any' con- fusion arising as the result of what has recently been submitted. For instance, Sheikh Abdullah, in bis statement, appeared again to take the position that nothing of any momenthad taken place of an objection- able character in the State until. the raid of 22 October opcurred. One would have thought ithad been. made sufficiently clear-and was, in- any case, within ,bis personal knowledge-that.a good deal ofthàt kind.Qf thing had gone on before that particular incursion took place. Sheikh Abdullah even went so .far as to.say- or, at least, very clearly to imply-that the distur- bances in West Punjab in the months of August and,. September of last year started the trouble between West Punjab and East Punjab, another matter which, one.would havethought, had been made sufficiently clear in the contrary direction. Of that, he himselfwould have had no personal knowledge, as he was th@, unfortunately, in gao!. But. there .can be no question that the August éLturb~mces,. so far as- East and West Punjab 'Nere concerned, started with the massacre of Muslims in Patiala State and with the dynamiting of special trains carrying Government of Pakistan Let me return to the events in Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah said that he suddenly woke up one morning and heard that there had been a raid at Muzaffarabad and that Iater on these distur· bances spread to Baramula. That would have been the mornïng of 22 October. The dramatic description may weIl he true, but it is necessary to add that Sheikh Abdullah woke up that morning not in Kashmirbut in De1bi. Hé may have heard of the raid in that manner. But he should have heard, and 1ater on should have known, that the whole of Poonch had been placed under martial law in August by the State and thatthe atrocities by the State troops in Poonch had started in September; and he should not have forgotten at least bis own statement' of 21 October made to the press in Delhi at a rime berore he could have wakened on the mornlng of 22 October to the news of tbis raid. A newspaper report of bis remarks states: « Sheikh Abdnllah said that the present troubles in Poonch ... were caused by the unwise policy adopted by the State. The' people of Poonch, who suft'ered undér their local ruIer' and again the Kashmir Maharaja, the overlord of the Poonch iuler, had started a people's movement for the redI:ess of their grievances." This statementwas made on 21 October, before. the raid, and rcareTs to themovement ashaving been in progre3!l for sorne rime : "... had starteda people's movcm.ent for theredress' of their grieviillCt:'s" The article then goes on to report Sheikh Adbullah's remarks as ,follows: "ft \Vas not commuD.al. Kashmir State sent ,its troops, an.d there was panic in Poonch.But most of theadult population ,of Poonch, he explained, were ex-servicemen in t!te fuman. Army with close connexions with the people ofJhelum and Rawalpindi. They evacuated their women and children,crossed the {rontier, and returned witharms supplied them by willing pt(ople. The ptèsèntposition was that the Kashmir State forceswere forced· to withdraw in certain areas." The whoÏe matterwas between the people of Kashmir,and·the forces of the Maharaja and hae.been going on for some time. f'hêikh Abdullal. h,~~; tned to make the, whole D1atte!appearastb.~'U;~, '. ;,ve.ything arose as the resultof theraid~i, '!2~ O';.J'ber. 1shan not.d~a1witL@very one ofthe allegations ·Sbeïkh. Adbullahmade. or the, pIcas thathe,put forward. It "'\Vae.q'lJl~clear from: ,bis statement that he was puttingforwal'd a desperate plea, on msownbehalf; thathewas thehead of the Sheikh Abdullah did givc expression to some sentiments which would indicate how much iJ.n- oartiality and neutrality might he expected from an administration of which he eontinued to be the head. He also tried to give a picture of the rnilitary situation in Kaslh'1lir which is somewhat different from the picture the Security Couneil had hitherto been invited to contemplate. For instance, the Security Council had been told that the movement inside Kashmir had received a certain amount of support, strentsth and stiffening from the tribes- men who had Joined the people who were fighting in Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah asked the Security Couneil yesterday to believe that these tribes~ men cOllld not he adequately dealt with by the Indian forces for this reason. They made raids and incursions into State territory-their number sometimes being as large as 5,000- but as soon as the InJian military arrived to deal with them, they ran back into Pakistan9 at .which point the Indian armed for~es, being very scrupulous with regard ta preserving their good relations with Pakishn and not desiring to trespass across the border, were unable to follow them. That the Inman troops, particularly Indian airmen, have not been scrupulous in .this matter, 1 have placed sufficient material before the Se~ curity Council in my earlier speeches to demon- strate. Several attempts were made from the air to bomb the Kohaia Bridge, which IS the property of the Pakistan Government and which cone tts the K.tlsbmir State with Pakistan over the Jhelum River. Several bombings of Pakistan villages by the Indian air force have been made. With regard to some of th~m the Indian Government explained that the action had taken place by mistake. What treatment May such people expect from Sheikh Abdullah and from an administration of wbich he is the head? Whether that treatment would be just, fair, neutral and impartial, is for the members of the Security Council ta. deter- mine. 1 shall not comment upon the degree ta wlllch he went in trying ta demonstrate that, if he were not at the head of the administration, it would be impossible to secure any administra- tion wbich would be neutral and impartial. In bis zeal in bis own behalf, he committed- 1 would not say deliberat~ly;perh?ps he Cell into it-what every, Muslim and, as a matter-of fact, every right-thinking person, would only describe as ablasphemy. It should bequite possible ta ensure that, during the short interval which May be necessary betweell the cessation of violence and disorder,. and the· holding'of the plebiscite, the head of the administration in Kashmir should be so neutral and impartial an authority. that he would .be so considered by everyone concerned. After aU, since when has Sheikh Abdullah become thehead of the admiIiistration?Roughly, oilly since the beginning of November. ·Even now, as 1 pointed out the other day, the Prime Minister is not in Kashmir. Sheikh·Abdullah has made tbis plea: IWould the Security Council wish to deprive 4 million Kashmiris of their due share in the administration of their own country? No one has. expressed au.y such desire. AIl that is suggested is that during the interim period,the authority of the administration should be in im- partial h~l'lds... In any case, how much of the sbare in. th.e running of the administration has been given bitherto to the people of Kashmir by the Maharaja? .He hasalways hnported people from.outside and placed them at the head of the administration., If, in the·very attempt to secure that henceforth,. permanently a,nd forever, the people of Kashmir themselves shall take into their own hands the running of their own State-,-if in the attempt thatthat shall.be fairly and impartially carried out, and that the foundations .of such a system shan be so laid that it shall notbe subject ta frequent earthquakes-the devicehas. to be resorted ta, let us say for another three months, to have a person at the head of the administration not. connected with either political party in Kijshmir, then obvjously, that deyic~ would re- present no nc;>velsuggestion at aIl. Sheikh Abdullah, however much in bis own ~sti.mationhe ma,v .be· the' quintessence of.· the representation of ms own people, 'has . not been Whatever representative character Sheikh Ab- dullah may, in his own estimation, or in fa~t, occupy, until that character has been demonst:rated through the exercise of the will of the people, he is today only the handpicked instrument of the Maharaja and is just one person ami no more. In that connexion, document i'.Jo.2,presented by the Indian dèlegatiaiJ. to the President of the Security Council at the 236th meeting, not only assumes but definitely makes the proposaI that, in order to set up a representative interim govern- ment, the Maharaja shall immediately appoint Sheikh Abdullah Prime Minister-again, hand- picked--and appoint a council of ministers on the advice of Sheikh Abdullah;' a",:d that that govern1i1ent, so selected and so appointed, shall proceed to take measures as a resultof which a national government shall be set up. The whole scheme is split up into stages, the object,of it being that no plebiscite shall be held until the power and authority of the government headed by SheikhAbdullah have been consolidated over the State of Kashmir. 1 submit that no flcheme of that kind is likely to satisfy the people who are fighting for their liberty in Kashmir, nor will it have any influence over them in the way ,of persuaillng them to lay down. arms, which should be, and is, the fust declared .objective of the Government of India-and, j"'deed it is the objective of the Government of ~akistan and of everyone who is concerned with this dispute. r shall DOW make brief comments on sorne points whbh have been raised this morning on behalf of India. The representative of India stated that, after 1had made reference to theinternational obligations that might or might not arise over the present situation, 1 went on to deal. with the originof the Maharaja's fule and with the origin of the rule ofhis dynasty over Kashmir; and then 1 went on to quote from letters of the Agent to the Governor General and of the Governor General, himself. 1 admit 1 may have beenremiss in concluding that portion of my re- marks, without reference to the relevance whlch those letters had to the status of the Maharaja, thx position that the Maharaja occupied, the naTure of bis sovereignty and what remedies were available against misrule, if it should continue. My C"l1ject in quoting Lord Lawrence'sletter was to show that, under the suzerrainty of the para- mount Power-the British-it was an essential condition of such protection and help as was given by the paramount Power that the ruler should behave properly towards his people and should discharge bis obligations in ~ _,~t,and fair manner. That letter leave') no dO,ubt that, if theruler failed in any of these respects, he could be set aside~as indeed 'has :oftenhappened in the bis- tOry of British' tule in India and in the history It is also clearly indicated in that letter that, when the paramount Power took up the obligation of rendering assistance to a ruler against distur- bances in the State,it had to insist upon the ruler's behaving~ because, by the very fact that it had to insist upon the rulcr's remainhg in power, it was taking away from the subjects of the ruler the ordinary normal remedy wbich would have been open to them-that is to say, to rise against acts of tyranny and to set aside the mIe of the Maharaja. It is clearly so indicated in that lette!. The conclusion from that is that, paramountcy having been withdrawn-and aImost simulta· neously with the withdrawal of paramountcy th~ Maharaja having started a campaign of atrocities and extermination of bis subjects-the validity of bis rule l.ad ceased, and those subjects were now entitled, since there was no paramount Power there to make the Maharaja behave, to settle matters by themsel",,~s.The movement in Kashmir was a movement of that kind. These people had succeeded in breaking completely the forces of the Maharaja. As a maUer of fact, quite large numbers of them have gone over to the insurgents and they are today fighting among them. The Maharaja's forces split. The Dogra troops were defeated and ran away. The Muslim troops joined the freedom movement, and the Âzad Kashmir Govèrnment today exercises authority over eight of approximately tbirte.en districts of the Kasbmir State. The Maharaja's authority has ceased to run Muzaffarabad, Poonch, Mirpur, Riasi and Giïgit, wbich is divided into two or three districts. They have set up a Provisional Government. They have asked for recoglJition of tho Govem- ment as such. They are exercising de facto autho- rity. That being the state of affairs, it is a very delicate question-as 1 set forth in an earlier submission to the Security Councîl-to deter- mine what, if any, international obligations arise out of the situation. It was for that reason that 1 said it was profitless to enter upon academic discussions of international obligations. ~oday, tomake a m,<~~kl.;:!o~;,,~ examinationofwhat are. the internationû Jlù~~:akl::\s. That was my object in bringing iD ;-h~ flNice of the Security Council the basis l:>~ :h\~~~Y:~ of-the Maharaja to the State of Kashmir, th~ tyranny that has always continued, the warnings which had been given to Rajah Gulab Singh and the conditions of sovereignty that were laid down and explained in the letterof the Govemor GeneraL However, 1 do. apologEze because, after l.had quoted these th~ proposaIs contained in our draft reSJolution of 27 January [23i5th meeting] and in SUli.fl0rt of the proposaIs that have been made by severa1 membe,rs of the Security Council. Therefore, 1 beg to draw the Security Council's attention further to the contents (lf that telegram, and more particularly to the portions which have been read by the representative of India thi~ morning. Paragraph 4 of that telegram says: Il ln the last paragraph of YOl,r telegram, you say that Lord :Mountbatten promised to let you know the views of the Indian Government to the proposaIs discussed between the two Governors General, but that you hr 1e heatd no more about them." Here again, it is necessary to set at rest oue doubt that migh" have arisen as the result of Sheikh Abdullah's submission yesterday and the sta~ement made today· by the representative of India. The proposaI first to settle the situation in Kashmir came from Pakistan, aÎLld 1 am not ref~rring here to the attempts made before the situation had been clarified, but to those made ~ven after the accession had been proclaimed. The accession was announod on 27 October. On 28 October, the then Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, flew over from New Delhi to Lahore, where both the Governor General of India and the Prime Minister of India then were, both being i11; and he consulted with the Gover1l0r General of Pakistan as to whether there was any means of settüog this matter amicably between the two Dominions. The Govemor General of Pakistan tirst toid the Supreme Commander that Pakistan not only had not been consulted with regard to this matter of the accession, but that no notice or indication had .been given to Pakistan that this accession was under contemplation, was being offered, or had been accepted; but that, nevertheless, he was quite willing·to make proposaIs on the basis of which the whole matter could even now be ami- cably settled. The proposaIs in question were the ones which 1 haye already read to the members of the Security Council, namely, that the two Governors General should he authorized by their respective Dominion Governments to issue a proclamation calling upôn everyone who had come in from the outside to withdraw, and asking for a cessation of hostilities, giving 48 hours' notice that fighting should stop. d'emblée ment le Pakistan concernait même reçu aucun av qu'un offert à mettraient mêc positions donné et respectifs riser une à et fin This suggestion was made on 28 October 1947, and it was requested that Lord Mountbatten and the Prime Minister of India might come over' to Lahore in order' to discuss the details of how to put tbis'sc1ieme·into .effect. It·was 'communicated ta Lord Mountbatten over the telephone by the Sup~eme Commandèr, and he said he would be quite willing to c'ome over and that he had no doubt the Prime Minister also'would db so.'Later on, however, iriformation was serit over the tele- phone to the effect·tliat the' Prime Ministerwas ill and was unable ta travel ta Lahore, so that the proposed m~eting, wbich was fixed for 29 October, was postponed to 1 November. Again on 1 No- vember, the'Prime Minister being unable to travel, the Governor General of India, Lord Mountbatten, came alone to Lahore in order to preside over a meeting of the Joint Defence Council. But wbile he was in Lahore, tbis proposaI was communicated to .him. He said that he would place it before bis Government and would se.nd a .reply. It was because a. grievance was raised by.·the Prime Minister of ·Pakistan, to, the effect that no reply had so far been received and the situation was delicpte, that this telegram deals .\Vith the matter. The telegram states: " In the last ·paragraph. of your telegf~tM you say that Lord Mountbatten promised to let you know the views of the InJian. Government [with regard] to the proposaIs discussed between the two Governors General but that you have heard no more about them. On this point there seems to have been a misunderstanding. Lord Mountbatten on his return from Lahore gave me full-account .of bis talk with ·Mr. Jinnah and in particular of .the two important suggestions wbich had been discussed,. namely : "(i) The withdrawal of Indian Dominion troops and ·men from Kashmir; and " (ii) The holding-of a plébiscite atthe earliest possible date: . , " As regards fust proposaI Lord Mountbatten told me that Mr: Jinnah desired that withdrawàl of. the Indian Dominion troops' and tribesmen should be made simultaneously but thathe (Lord Mountbatten) had pointed out that it was clearly impossible for the Indian troops to withdraw from. Kashmir Valley until the raiders h.ad left Kashmir soil and law and order had been restored in Kashmir." There wasne objection raisedwith regard to the principle of withdrawal; it 'was acceptable. The· dispute was withregard ta .the arrangements as to the timing. U Lord Mountbatten had also made it quite clear to Mr. Jinnah that the Govemment of India had no desire to retain troops in Kashmir for a moment longer than was necessary. As regards the second point, Lord Mountbatten reported that Mr. Jinnah had expressed the view that there was no hope of a fair plebiscite under the present Kashmir authorities..." That was the second point, wbich is also under discussion here, namely, that Lord Mountbatten reported Mr. Jinnah had expressed the view that there was no hope of a fair plebiscite under the present Kashmir authorities. The telegram continues: "To meet tbis point Lord Mountbatten had suggested that it should be continued under the auspices of the United Nations." The objection on behalfofthe Governor General of Pakistan was that we could not hope to have an impartial and fair plebiscite under the present Kashmir authorities. The answer to tbis was: U Very good; then let it be cbnducted under the auspices of the United Nations." No question of domestic sovereignty has been raised here. No question has been raise4 here as to whether it will be for the Maharaja to decide. As a matter of fact, all these developments are very reeent, having occurred during this past week. The telegram then contlnues: " Mr. Jinnah had put forward t!le counter-proposai that the two Governors General shovld b~ given plenary powers to settle the matter. Lord Mountbatten had pointed out that it would be ~onstitutioi1ally improper for bim to undertake tbis duty." There was no constitutional impropriety or lack of jurisdiction so far as Kashmir was concerned. Lord Mountbatten said: ulam a constitutional head of a responsible Govemment, like the Governor General of any Dominion under the Commonwealth System. It would be constitu- Honally improper .for me to take on duties oÎ this character." à désirait Cachemire plus En qu'on mire discussion de actuel This was the only objection raised with regard to the two Governors General dealing with the 1 valoir matter. However, the answers to the two solutions put forward by Mr. Jinnah were: (1) " As regards th~ withdrawal of troops, we do not wish to retain them there a moment more than necessary. However, we must be satisfied that those who have come frOID outside, and have joined in the trouble in Kashmir, have left Kashmir soil," (2) Mr. Jinnah said that there could be no fair A plebiscite under the present Kashmir anthority; and Lord Mountbatten said, "Very good. Weil, then, let the plebiscite be conducted under the auspices of the U!'ited Nations." Mr. Jinnah said, " Vv"hy not under your authority as Governor General, provided the twe Dominion Govern- ments would vest us with that authority<! J' Lord Mount1Y,(tten said, "No, that Is 110t feasible because, constitutionally, it is incompatible with ' my position." It was in the course of tbis 'telegram that, in paragraph 13, the following was said: " As regards proposai numb:"lr 3 in your tele- gram of November 6 "-that "uS with regard to the faimess of the plebiscite-" we entirely endorse Lord Mountbatten's view (vide p&ragraph No. 7 above)." So the Prime Minister of India endorsed Lord Mountbatten's view. He agreed to that. Then he stated the following : " Ii will thus be &oon that our proposaIs, which we have repeatedly s~ted, are: " (1) That tbe Government of Pakistan should publicly undertaice to do their utmost to compel tue raiders to withdraw, from Kasbmir." ':"'he Govemment of Pakistan, since 28 October '1947, has repeated1y and publicly stated that it will do its utmost to persuade the raiders to withdraw from KashInir provided a settlement hau been arrived at. If persuasion should fail, it will do its utmost to compel the raiders to with- draw. " (2) That the Government of India should repeat their. declaration that they willwi~hdraw tbeir troops from Kashmir soil as soon as raiders have withdrawn and law and order are restored," Well, now, if;t is only a question of the timing of the withdrawal 0:& either side, that is one of the functions which the Commission, which has aIready been decided upon by the Securi~y Council, will perform. That Commission can formulate provisions on the details of the .with- drawal. " (3) That the Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to the United Nations to undertake a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest .possible date." Here are three elements in thisproPQsal which clearly indicate what was then contemplated. In the first place. there is a joint request to be made by India and Pakistan to the United Nations. Tl),ere is no question ofjurisdiction in thatrequest. In the second place, the request is that.the United plebiscit~ so that there is no question of its being fair and impartial. It shall not be held under the present Kashmir authorities, but shan he under- taken by the United Nations." The two things are in juxtapositioJl. In the tOOd place, this plebiscite is to be he1d at the earllest possible date. Now in respect of an these three matters, difiiculties are being raised-there are questions of sovereignty concerned·; there are questions of jurisdiction concerned; then, we .can agtee to somebody watching or supervising, but we cannot agree to the plebiscite being undertaken by the United Nations. Yet, the suggested solution solved that very difiiculty: that if a plebiscite were held under the present Kashmir authorities, h would not be fair and ÏQlpartiaI. The answer is not, "Why should.it not be? Arrangement will be made that it should be. The authorities will be neutraI." The objection is admitted as fair, and the answer is that the plebiscite shall be under- taken by the United Nationf>, and it shan be undertaken after the trouble has ceased. After the trouble has ceased, the Indian troops will not remain on Kashmir soil for a moment longer. Indeed, the proposals go together. Now the suggestion is: "WeIl, even after the trouble has ceased, in order to aid the civil authority, troops must be there during the plebiscite." How does that accord with what was being discussed then? As I have already mentioned, the tOOd provision is that the plebiscite shall be held at the earliest possible date. It is recognized that tbis provision is the main matter in dispute between the two parties, and, therefore, it must be settled at the earliest possible date. Now we are told, fust, that Pakistan should do tbis and that; next. that we shall deal with the trouble inside Kashmir and terminate hos- tilities; next, the restoration of law and order lis called for]; and, finally, an invitation to ptlople to retum, which may take six months. .s'aceorde-t-il Then, the Maharaja would immediately set up a g<.i vt; i'Tlll1ent with Sheikh Abdullah at its 1 un head, a'-'~ '",' uld form a council of ministers appointed ::'.11 the recommendation of Sheikh Abdullah. That govemment would take steps to have a national convention summoned. It would then be the business of that national convention tO,set up a national government, and it is that national government which wculd proceed to hold the plebiscite. Does that accord with the "earliest possible date ", or with the anxiety to settle this matter as soon as possible so that tension and suspicion should cease, or with the whole cluster ofproblems and questions which give rise to daily friction? par. The whole object is to set up an administration i.i with Sheikh Abd11llah at its head; to enable that 'admWstraüOD' by various .teps, to consolidateSIle Then the argument was advanced that there was no question of whether any accession was provisional or final, and that " provisional " and " final" were terms which had been used loosely by the newspapers. As a matter of fact, it was contended, all accessions are final, but as tbis one particular accession took place in the face of an emergency, "We announce that we shall be prepared to release Kashmir from its accession should the verdict ofits people not ratify accession to India." In tbis connexion 1 would again dl'aw attention to paragraph 15 of the telegram to wbich 1 have already referred, and wbich reads: " The above conclusions relate only to Kashmir, but it is essential in order to restore good rela- tions between the !WO Dominions that there should be acceptance of the principle that where the ruler oÎ aState does not belong to community to ·wbich the majority ,of bis subjects belong, and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion whose majority community is the same as the State's, the question whether the' State has finally accededto one or other of the Dominions should he ascertained by reference to the will of the people," To get d.:>wn to rock bottom and away from any kind of camoutlage-although 1 do not imply that tbis. paragraph attempts any-'-I should cxplain that the situation was tbis. In the case of by far the greater part of the Indian States the majority ofthe population and the ruler himself belonged. to the same community, so that tlis partieu1ardifficulty was not foreseen. However, in the case of some States...,,-quite importa.nt ones among them-the ruler belonged' to one commuoity and the people to another. Kashmir is one such instance where the ruler is a Hindu and the majority of the people Muslims, but there are other States, Junagadh being an example, .where the·situation is the same. Obviously it was States such as Junagadh, and others like it, which were in the mind of the Prime Minister of India when he said, "We accept tbisprinciple with regard to Kashmir but we also ask thatit shall be applied to other States"-in other words, States where the ruler is. a Muslim and the maj()l'ity of bis people are Hindus. It is obvious that in such éases· they did not recognize the accessions wbich had taken place or Whiéh might take place. The question of the final. accession must depend 'apon the expression of the will of the people. That is a clear interpretation of the ~egram. . Mter that telegram it is pointless to pretend today that the necessity for troops must continue, on tbis, thal and the other pretext, until after .the plebiscite has been held. "If," it is said, "the result of. the. plebiscite is a decision that Kashmir shall accede to Pakistan, we shall, of necessity, withdraw our troops. But if the ple- biscite goes in favour ofInma then.that is a matter between Kashmir and ourseJves, .because defence will·be one of the questions coveredby the a~ssi~n,and if the troopsale necessary they can bem.aintained thete,"Nc-thingofthe ,kind con- The Indian alternative~ however, Is this. They reply, "You say that the plebiscite should not beheld under the authority ofthe present Kashmir Government but under that of the two Governors General. That is difficult and we cannot accept 1 the suggestion. What we propose is that it sb.ould be held under the authority ofthe United Nations, .and that we should both request the United Nations to undertake the task of holding a ple- biscite." Where is there anl room for doubt'1 The representative of India went on to express bis feeling of satisfaction that some progress had been made during yesterday's debate towards a settlement. 1 am glad that he feels that pr\>gress is being made. He voic~d the 'hope that a settle~ ment might possibly be reached by mutual agreement, and 1 joïn in that hope, but bis ana~ , lysis of the memorandum presented by the representative of Colombia-at least, as far as he has gone, because he reserved bis opinion on some points-indicates that the only features in it which he considers satisfactory are those which are in accord with the document wmch he himself submitted to the President on 27 January [236th meeting]. 1 do not quarrel with that. Obviously, those were the parts which were bound to be satisfactory to bis delegation, but the whole question has to be settled Oil the basis of the considerations which have already been stressed by various members of the Security C01IDCil. peopl~ of Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah and the people of Kashmir, and whoever else may be interested in this matter. We reserve such commentS-as may b('l necessary, with regard to the various proposaIs that are under the consideration of the Security Conncil, until such time ils the proposaIs themselves are nnder discussion, either between the parties nnder the guidance of the President, or when they are being taken iuto consideration specifically by the Security Council. The system of consecutive interpretation was resumed at this point. 1 would propose, therefore, if the Security Conncil agrees, that I, with the help of the secre-

In the ~bsence of forther comment by members of the Security Council, perhaps it would be useful if I, as the President, should briefty sum up the situation. As 1 see it, the member~ ofthe Security Council desire that the representatives of India and of Pakistan should make a further effort to resolve their ditTerences and reach an agreement by direct negotiation under the auspices of the Security Conncil. Snch an agreement can only take place by mutual concession. It is also the wisb., as 1 und~rstand it, that these direct negotiations between the delegations of Indilt and of Pakistan should he resumed without delay. It is obvious, I drink, that the continuity of these discussions is of the fust importance, and accordingly, in the talks which l have had with both parties, 1 have ventured to suggest that it would be of great advantage to them and to the Security Counci1 if we could retain the good offices of the representative of Belgium, who made such a helpful contribution to these negotiations when he was the President of the Security Council, to act now in the capacity of Rapporteur. 1 am happy to say that the parties have agreed to this and tbat the representative of Belgium has expressed his willingness to undertake this most important task. The President of the Security Council will, of course, hold himself avaiJ.able to attend these meetings and to help in any way within bis power. Unless there is objection, I shall take it that the Security Council concurs in these arrangements. The discussion which has takeriplace in the Security Conncil on the resolutioris submitted by the representative of Belgium [documents 8/661 flnd 8/662], including the statement~ of the representatives of India and of Pakistan, has, I am sure the Security Council will agree, brought out a number of important considerations which it is clearly necessary that we should take into aecount in any further development of this case. In this connexion, I would say that we are particularly grateful for the comprehensive memorandum given to us by the representative of Coloinbia during the 241st m~eting ofthe Council. r

ln reply to the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom, 1 wish to give him and aIl the members of the Security Council the assurance that the President and those associated with him in this task will give the most immediate consideration to the matters entrusted to us by the Security Couneil. The next meeting ofthe Security Council will be provisiona11yscheduledfor Monday, 9 February, at 2.30 p.m. ' The meeting rose at 1.25 p.rn. je TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY- THIRD MEETING Held at Lake Success, New York. on Tuesday, 10 Februâry 1948, at 2.30 p.rn. President: General McNAUGHTON (Canada) Present: The representatives of the following