S/PV.243 Security Council

ln reply to the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom, 1 wish to give him and aIl the members of the Security Council the assurance that the President and those associated with him in this task will give the most immediate consideration to the matters entrusted to us by the Security Couneil. The next meeting ofthe Security Council will be provisiona11yscheduledfor Monday, 9 February, at 2.30 p.m. ' The meeting rose at 1.25 p.rn. je TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY- THIRD MEETING Held at Lake Success, New York. on Tuesday, 10 Februâry 1948, at 2.30 p.rn. President: General McNAUGHTON (Canada) Present: The representatives of the following 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. The Palestine question: (a) Letter dated 30 January 1948 from the Chairman of the United Nations Palestine Commission addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting the fust monthly progress report orthe Commission to the Security Council (documents S/663, A/AC.21/7). 3.. India-Pakistan question: (a) Letter dated 1 January 1948 from the representative of India addressed to the President of the Security Council conceming the situation in Jammu ami Kasbmir (document S/628).1 (b) Letter da~ed 15 January 1948 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General conceming the situation in Jammu and Kashmir (document S/646).1 (c) Letter dated 20 January 1948 from the . Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan addressed to the President of the Security Couneil (document S/655).3 8. Adoption ofthe agenda 9. Discussion of the Palestine question: (a) Fjrst monthly progre§s report to the Security CoonciJ. of the United Nations Palestine Commission

As the members of the Security .Counci1 are aware, the Unit~d Nations Pàlestine Commission has rendered its fust monthly progress i'eport to the Security Counci1 as provided for in paragraph 14, section B, part 1 of resolution 181 (II) of the General Assembly on the future govemment of Palestine.. This report, as stated in paragraph 14," covers what is in effect the·preliminary and exploratory stage orthe Commission's work/' The report also says, in paragraph 13, that " the Commission is devoting most serious attention to the various aspects of the security problem, with particular reference to the possible need for an international force in the implementation of the recommendations of the General Assembly. This matter has not been dealt \vith in this first monthly report, but will be the subject ofa special report to the Security Council." 1 have been in touch withthe Chairman of the Palestine Commission·and have been informed by =Ibid., pages 67-87•. 3 Ibid., No. 6, 231st meeting. Therefore, unless l hear objections, 1 propose that at this meeting we should take note of this fust monthly report ofthe Palestine Commission, take note also that the Commission's special report will be circulated shortly, and request the Secretary-General ta include the special report in the draft of our provisional agenda as soon aOs it i!l practicable, having in mind that proper opportunity should be given to· members of th~ Security Council to study it before if is discussed in the Council. ~ Mr. EL-KHOURT (Syrîa): l agree 'Vith the remarks made lly the President, but 1 believe there are two points which ought to be mentioned and placed in the record now. As the fust monthly progress report has beeI1 presented by the Palestine Commission, the Security Council c;hould determme whether that Commission is entitled to make such reports and whether its composition and formation are legal. 1 contest that point and wish to say that the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 128th plenary meeting says: " A Commission shall be set up consisting " of one representative of each of five Member ; :! :~, ~~ ~ u 4' ~ ~, States. The Members represented on the Commission shall be elected by the General Assemf bly..." 1 stress the word " elected ". Now let us see how the word "elected" is defined in the " provisional rules of procedure of the General ,~ Assembly. Rule 82 states that t( u. al! elections ~ and aU decisions relating to tenure of office shall r~ ~~~~~~ion~:" secret ballot. There shall be no ! -1 ci o In this case, the five Members were not elected 'j by the General Assembly but were only nominated 1 by the President; the President nominated the five Member States and they were accepted as being elected. It may be said that the President of the General Assembly nominated these :live States at that time and asked whether there were any objections, and that, Bince no objection was immediately raised, it was considered that there was agreement. But 1 maintain that it was not at all proper in that case to have such nominations, since nominations are prohibited ·by the rules of ., i procedure. If nominations are made, they do not n give aIl the Member States of the General As- ;,! sembly freedom of action, because it is not easy for a representative to object to a nomination 1!j aIready made and thus to disappoint some Member State. As long as the rules of procedure clearly state that nominations should not be made at aIl and that a decision of this sort must be reached by secret ballot, and inasmuch as the Palestine Com- 1'here is another point whieh. the tnembers of the Seourity Council OU8ht to take into consideration now. 1 shall read the reoommendation adopted by the General Assembly at its l28th plenary l\leeting~ tl The Gèneral Âssembly tt Rèt{)mmemls to the United Kingdom$ as the m:a:ndatory Power for Palestine, and to a11 other Members orthe United Nations, the adoption and implementation, with reprd to the future govern" ment of Palestine, of the Plan of Pkrtition with :Economie Union. set out below;' The General Assembly recommended to the Member Nations the adoption of' the Plan. That stateme1l't may befound in resolution 181 (II). Butuntilnow,ha'Y'etheseMemherNationsadopted 'th1s PI~.n of Partition? It cannot he said that tbev-oting in the General Assembly constituted· adoption by Member Nations, because those who v-otedfor the resolution simply recommended that the Member Nations adopt this Plan. 1 wish ta ask whether auy or the Member Nations have adopted this Plan in acoordance with the cousUtutional prooesses of their own èountries, in the sam.e manller as other similar plans of great impôttanee which would engage theresponsibili~()rNations'in regard to their implementation. A.$ long as nothing to that effect has been done, l consider ibat th~ proceedings now are premature and t'hat !bis is not a. proper time to com-' mence them. ThePtœsm'ENT:1wouldassuretherepresentative of ~a that the rem3l'ks which he has just made 'Wl"O. 'he noted in the record of our proceedings. Mr.. G1t.mtYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) {t1'anslatedfrom RusSÙ'm): Am 1 right in understanding tbat the President proposes that t'big report.beconsidered simultanoously with the secondreportorthe Pal~tine Commission~which may!xl~ within the nex! few days? Ifthat is:SC., l:agreeto the Palestine question being considered· after we reœive the Palestine Commission~s second report. TheP1œsmEN1': 1 amentirely in·agreementwith t'be view ~essed by the repr~tative of the, Union of Soviet SOcialist Republics. We sha1l 1m.ve tbe special reportaf the Palestine Commission More Ils s1lottly~ and al that time we cm œmider both !bat report ;and tbis first monthly :repmt. 10.CœtûmatÎOIl of the discussion of the fnIIia-;Pakistan qœstion At 7t1Je ifwitfl'firm f}ftheP.res'iàen~ MT. N. Gopa- 1aswrmiiAY.}'.allgtl1'" Tqresen.tatiye of India3 and Sir Mribœ:rm:zeà Zqfn4l.tth K1JJzl4 representative of PJikîst~toTiktheirplaces oi1t the Cozmcîl table. 'The :PRF.sInEN:r: The membersof the Security Connè.i1 will IeCa11 the statem.ent which 1 made Council~ and in collaboration with the Rapporteur endeavoured to bring together into one comprehensive proposaI the varions constructive suggestions expressed by members of the Security Council. after which we would once again get in touch with the representatives of India and Pakistan in an effort to advance the case by way of agreement between the two parties. ln accordance with the foregoing. the Rapporteur and 1 met on Friday afternoon, 6 Feb· ruary. and we then prepared the draft proposaIs which are given in document 1 circulated by the secretariat yesterday afternoon [document 8/667]. At 6 o'clock on the same day. the Rapporteur and 1 met the heads of the lndia and Pakistan delegations. as well as certain of their coUeagues. in the office of the Belgian delegation. The proposaIs cont~ined in document 1 \Vere then submitted to them. !t was e~plained that the text had been so drafted that. if the prix: 'oles contain~d. therein were agrecd tn by both parties. the Security Council could confine itself to takin~ote oftheir agreement. If. alternatively. the two parties could not so agree. the text could be used for the purpose of enabling the Security Council to express its opinion and commend the principles çontained in the text to both parties; hence the alternative text for paragraph 4 ofthese proposaIs. In the course of the discussion which followed. the representative of India said that the proposaIs in sorne of their aspects were not in accord with the submissions and suggestions made by the Indian delegation to the Security Council. and that in consequence it would be necessary for him to consult bis Government. Speaking without prejudice to bis Government's view. the repre" sentative of India went on to refer in particular to the proposaIs suggested as a basis for discussion by the Indian delegation. wbich contained, he said. a concrete plan; and he thought that. as· the difficulties between the Indian and Pakistan delegations r~lated more to implementation tban to a statement of principles, he would prefer discussion on the basis of concrete items. . The Rapporteur and 1 explained that the draft proposaIs now submitted to the. two parties represented an effort. pursuant to the mandate of the Security Council. to produce a comprehensive framework of principles based upon suggestions made by members of the Security Counci1. within wbich the discussion of detailed specific proposais might usefuUy proceed. p..J'ter some discussion. it was understood that the representative of India would consultbis Government in regard to the proposaIs. ~ 1 would DOW draw the attention ofthe Security CouDcil to the "letter wbich 1 received from the My letter to the head of the IndÎt!.n delegatiot1 in reply to bis commutlleation to me, a letter which olltlines the arrangements agreed to, has betn distrlbuted in document 3 [docm»enr 8/668). 1 shomd like uow to request the views of the members of the Se<:urity Council with regard to what further steps the Sè,Curity Couneil should tak~ in this case~ ha'Ving regard to the new factor Whièh has been introduCèd into the case by the request of'the IndlàD Go'Vernment for an adjournment~ 1 eaU upon the representative of Belgium~ who aèted as Rapporteur. Mt. \l'AN LANGBNIlO'VE (Belgium) (lranslated (M1t't lFenth): l 'Can only confum the account the 'President bits Just given of our consultations with the representati'Ves 'Of lndia and Pakistan in aœordance with the decision reache<! at the last meeting ofthe Security Couneil. 1 agree with bim. and think it would now he desirable for members of the Cowcil to teU us whether we ha'Ve interpretM theÎ!' ideas correctly, whether we have sOOèeeded in reoonciling them~ or whether the new evtn'ts ofthe past few days make itnecessa.ry for us tu re\lise them. Mr~A1lœ(Argentina)(trans1atedJrom Spanish): 1 su.ppose the President, like the other members ofthe Cowcil~ will havè received the same document t'hat 1 reœived yesterday. l must say,at t'he outset that 1 was a little smp~~d in defence of the Counci1's jurisdietio~ 1 sha1l say tbat in my opinion it should not be usedto support coI1Ù.llgsand goings which do notmake forany pFaCtica1 solution of the tind for wlùch the Charter established this body~ Buttbere are two aspects oftheissue béfore us; thefust, onwhich1wish tG ïnsist, is thedocument or draft :resolution mawn up by the President in collaboration witb the representative of l3elgium. Inthisconnexion 1 mould like tosay that it sums up the v.aOollSopinionsexpressed by theCounci1 and :frilm tlmt point 'Of view ft bas my complete apprmœl. It will serve as ,a basis for anyfuture àiscussion therc may he in theCounci1 on the question with wlùch we are now dealing. The :second question, which I~lsoconsiderto 'he:veryimportant., is the l'eguest for adjournment made by the œ1e,gation af Jndiaon bebalf ofits Govewment In the te1e,gram wmch we have a1l :read, the NewDelhi Government asks ils repre- Ben:tati:ve 10 .request theConnci1 to defer considemtion of tbis question inorder to allow .hi.m §I Aa ~ ~ ij il ln summing up, 1 should. like fust to express my approval of the steps taken and of the draft resolution drawn up by the Prtlsident in collaboration with the representative of Belgium. 1 should like also to say that, as 1 understand it, if tms question is to be postponed wc must know approximately until what date, and we must have an assurance that the delegation ofInwa wiilleave a sufficient number of members at the disposaI of the Couneil so that the discussion of this question may he continued whenever the Council thinks it advisable. ~ n J ;~ ~~ tj / Mf. LOPEZ (Colombia): Before 1 submit my remarks concerning the matter under consideration, 1 should like to ask two questions: First, can the President give us any information' as to whether, aeeording to the resolution adopted here on 20 January 1948 al' the 230th meeting [document 8/654], the Commission of the SeclUrity Council on India has been appointed; and, if not, why not? Second, in. the event that the delegation of Colombia desires to submit for the consideration of the Security Council, as a formaI draft resolution, the memorandum presented by it at the 241st meeting, on 5 February. ~ it be sufficient to ask the permission of the iSecurity Couneil to have the memorandum considered as a draft resolution, or will it be necessary to have the memorandum circulated again with the title of «Draft resolution submitted by the ddegation of Colombia "?

The representative of Colombia has asked me two questions. ln ms mst question, he asked whether 1 had any information as to the appointment of the members of the Commission of the Security Couneil on India, which the Security Council set up under its resolution of 1 am sure that the Indian delegation would take such a request into consideration. On tms condition, we could grant the respite requested by our colleagues with an easy mind. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): 1 believe that the Pre:! sident and the former President, Mr. van Langenhove, have very weIl complied with the views which were presented during the last meeting on this subject by trying to meet together with the parties and to reach some agreement on the points which have been expressed. 1 believe that this draft resolution which has been prepared by the President [document 8/667] is certainly worth our consideration. It is in full conformity and harmony with the views expressed by the members of.the Security Council during the last me~ ·ings. For fuis reasan 1 think~ if tms draft resolution is Mr. PARODI (France) (trallslated Jrom French): As our colleague, the representative of Argentina, has just done, 1 thank the President and the Rapporteur fOl' their efforts to reconcile the points of view submitted to us and to facilitate our consideration of the dispute before us. This work has aIready produced some results and has led to certain decisions, since a commission of conciliation has now been set up, at least in plinciple. 1 think it essential that we should take into account the request for adjournment submitted by the Indian de1egation. At the present stage, our task is to reconcile the points ofview and to bring about a rapprochement. This means that we must have sufficient patience to leave the delegations concerned time for a complete study of the proposais submitted, and to enable them to ensure that they are indeed expressing the views 01 their respective Govemments. In these circumstancP",s, 1 think it is oruy right that we should accede to the Indian delegation's request and give it the time it needs to consult its Government. Here again, however, 1 share the views expressed just now by our Argentine colleague; perhaps we should ask the Indian delegation to leave a representative at Lake Success, so that in case of emergency, if events made it necessary for us to resume the debate on the question at short notice, we could dea1 with a qualified representative of the Indian Govemment. As ta the request for a defennent of the proceedings for the Indian delegationts consultation with its Government, 1 think that every person has a rig!lt to consult his government and to wait for definite replies from that government. This is quite naturaI. But, in this case, it was strongly emphasized and stressed during the last me~ting that there was urgency in tbis matter. Bath parties -India and Pakistan-were pressing us to hurry our work and to find a solution very soon. 1 should like to know· if the situation there has changed to sucn. an extent that there is no urgency in the matter DOW and postponement would have no effect upon the security and peace in Kashmir and other States, so that snch a deferment would be easy to accept. When the Security Council is seized of a positioQ. which concems the maintenance of international peace and security, the matter of defennent concerns three parties-both parties to the dispute and the Security Council. We have not heard the opinion of the Pakistan representative on this defennent. Does he feel that it would affect the .peaceful situation there, that it would create more disturbances to the peace than previously, andaggravate the matter, or that it would appease it? We should understand that. In addition, the Indian delegation has said nc-thing in its letter as to what it believes in regard to the situation there, although they said fust that any defennent or postponement of the matter would aggravate the situation. We do not know now. We shall be glad to hear if it is true that the situation is lighter and there is no danger of any aggravation of the matter there, so that we may accede to their roquest for a deferment. These matters, I think, ought to be understood. and we should hear both parties on this point: What do they think of the urgency which they emphasized at a previous time'l ;1 ~1 Mr. NOBL BAKER (United Kingdom): The President and the Rapporteur, the representative of Belgium, have asked "he Security COUTIcil-- and tbis is the fust thing they put to us-whether, in the draft resolution wbieh they have circulated, they have adequately translated the general thought of the Security Council on the right solution for the problem which is berore it. The representatives of Argentina, Syria and, if I understood him, France, have auswered tbis question affirmatively. They think that tbis resolution does sum up the views of the Security Couneil as they have been expressed in our debates hitherto; that we ought now to intimate to the President and the Rapporteur our gratitude for their work, and our approval ofwhat they have done; and that, ~n the phrase Qf the representative of Argentina, we ought to consider that such a resolution would be a useful basis for further discussion. 1 have 'Come to the conclusion that, while of course the statement of the President is not more than M outline, nevertheless, it is a t'aithful translation iuto broad principles of the way. in which the Security Couucil thinks-that we ought to proceed towards a settlement of the difficult, dangerous and immensely impol.'tant question of Kashmir. When 1 say that it is only an ouiline, perhaps 1 may illustrate what 1mean by reference to sub.paragraph (a) following Alternative B of the document submitted by the President, which stlttes: ct Acts of violence and hostility must end." Under that heading, the representative of India has asked-and 1think, as 1have said more times than one, with justific.ation-for a decision that when a settlèment is made, Pakistan must take drastic action to bring the fighting to an end, and to keep order and peace thereafter. Pakistan must fuUy co-operatc in many ways. But that one line evidently needs a good deal of elaboration. That leads me to say that if we are to have an interruption of our debates here on this matter, 1 think that interruption might be put to userul purpose by the President and by the Rapporteur, in consultation with others if they so desire-but 1 think. they could certainly do itif they were to study tms ouiline of principies in order to see if they could work out a more complete scheme. That would prejudge uothing. It would prejudge none of the difficulties which the delegation of India now fools about the principles themselves. But if, in fact, when they come back to us very soon, they could indicate certain changes that May be made, but that they were able to go forward on this or on some broadIy similar kind of basis, then, if the thing had been more worked out, we migh.t be a good deal fmther forward.. Therefore, 1 hope that the President and the Rapporteur may be able to do that in the intervening time. 1 think it would be of general advantageifthey could. 1 say that with more confidence because my Government adheres very strongly to the view that much the oost chance of getting a real settlement of this matter-and by that 1 do oot mean ·a temporary stoppage of hostilities; 1 mean taking thisout of the politics of the subcontinent so !hat India and Pakistan are never againin .difference about the probl~mofKashmir, but that on the oontrary. full confidence and cooperation areestablished betwoon them.-is, as 1 have said before, that we should make a plan herein the'Security Council itselfand make it the primarydutyofthe Commission, which1 hope will sid~ration of the question. 1 hope that whatever interruption we bave now may be very short. 1 confess that 1 agree with the view that whoever from the Indian delegation may have to go home -and 1feel sure the head of the Indian delegation will have to g(}-we should have an Indian delegation left here with whom we can deal ifserious developments should oceur. Mr. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR (India): 1 should like to express myapologies to the SecurityCouœil for having felt compelled-both for my own part and under instructions from my Government in :ndia-to apply for a postponement of the consideration of the Jammu and Kashmir question. Let me at once give an assurance that we are not by any means now withdtawing this question from the consideration ofthe Security Council. We have reached a stage in the consideration of this matter when we.think that certain trends of opinion in the Security Council have developedin such a way that they raise points which my Government and 1feel we should discuss in detai! between ourselves before our final attitude towards those trends can be shaped. 1 say" trends" advised1y. 1 am free to say that in the draft resolution which the President handed to us on the evening of 6 February, he and the Rapporteur had done their best to translate these trends of opinion into words as they found expression in the speeches of members of the Security Council. There are, however, one or two matters to which 1 should draw attention before anyone runs away with the impression that those trends represent the opinion of aIl the members of the Security Council. or even that what is contained in the draft resolution represents the final opinion of those representatives who have spoken during the debate. , 1 havebeen assured time and again, both in the Security Council and outside, that there has been no prejudgment of any of the issues arising for consideration. That is why 1 was careful to describe what has been translated into this draft resolution as merely an expression ofthe trends of opinion so far voiced. At that stage 1 found that we had to fonnulate our views in relation to those trends, and to take note of the resolution in aU its a,spects andimplications. But before such fonnulatIon, the Indian delegation feel~ "oound to· discuss the matter fully with its Govemment. Pakistan.~ashelped the raiders .and the ·rebels in Kasbmir. But even if that requites proof on the spot, Ivent1L~e to say that there isenough material-which l attempted to prove to the members the other day--to show that the raiders and rebels have received assistance and encouragement from theterritory of Pakistan which no Government in charge of Pakistan, as a friend1y neighbour, should a1low to 'be given. . 1 have asked that this assistance. shou1d he stopped. That main issue of ours, .the issue with which we came hereon 1 January, has been drownedina Bea of other issues, many of which are irrelevantto the COllSideration ofit, and others of which certainly can afford to wait till fighting equipp~d army like the Indian Army at something like a cantonment, as Naoshera is. These happenings are self-revealing. There have been raids on the lines of communicationwhich are occurring every day. In spite of a11 this, 1 found it impossible to persuade the Security Council that the first step to take was to stop the assistance being given the raiders. There has been a breach of international obligation, and yet an international body like this will not issue the directive which anybody would expect it to issue. In the circumstances, that conviction having been forced upon me, what was left for me to consider in the Security Council were the long-term issues. Under the long-term issues, propositions have been put forward which, as we are at present advised, it is impossible for my delegation or my Government to accept. 1 shall give an indication of these basic points. For example, one of the points that hav,; been suggested in this trend of opinion is that the Administration which is now running the State must be replaced by an outside and neutral adminïstration. 1 shall not proceed to argue this point at this stage, but 1 am only indicating the points which we arc unable to accept at the present moment. We are not prepared to agree to the existing Emel'gency Administration's being replaced by another, either at once or after being converted into a council of ministers with Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah as Prime Minister. That Adminilltration has to be there ti11 a national go~ernment,b&sed upon a nation8< !!ssembly-for which our scheme provides-has ..le into existence. It is under thatnational government that we said the plebiscite should be taken. That is one point. . The seèond suggestion that has been made in sorne of the speeches is that the Indian Army should withdraw as soon as the fighting ceases. That is a matter which we are not prepared to Let us take even a case like Palestine. British forces are there and the Mandate will continue until some time n~t May. When a proposai is made that the United Nations Palestine Commission should go there and recruit a militia sa as ta be ready to take over when the British Army departs, there is objection. Why? 1 believe it is because the United Kingdom thinks that as long as. it is the mandatory Power no one else should sbare with it the right and obligation of the defeIice of Palestine. Is it wrong for India ta ask that when Kashmir is part ofits territory, India should he responsible .for Kashmir's defence and, therefore, its armies should remain there unill a plebiscite is taken and that plebiscit~ goes agaiD.stIndia? Ifthe plebiscite goes against India, the Indian Army will no doubt he withdrawn to a man. That is one point 1 wish 10 make. Then, latterly-and that is one of the pomts which have found their way into this draft' resolution-it is suggested that for the purpose of maintaining law and order in the State of Jammu and Kashmir after fighting ceases, and perhaps even in helping ta drive out raiders from Jammu and Kashmir, the artnies of India and Pakistan should combine and take joint action. It is being solemn:Iy suggested to India that it should invite Pakistan ta send their forces into Kashmir to co-operatewith the Indian Army in the main- .tenance oflaw and order. The Indian Army went there on a request from the people of Kashmir because raiders, helped by Pakistan and Pakistan Army personnel, .were coming from outside and \vere trying ta destroy their country, and therefore, India went to their aid. Now it is solemnly suggested to us that we should invite' the Pakistan army into the State of Jammu and Kashmir for the purpose of maintaininglawand order. Is it reasonable that we should be asked ta do that at this stage? In the cour~e of the remarks that followed from those members who have spoken, it was suggested that this item ~hould continue on the agenda of the Security Council. Of course it will. We are only asking for an adjournment. If 1 am to indicate the time we shall probably require in order to return and reaume the discussion, 1 should suggest, if the members of the Security Conncil are prepared to accept it, that we might adjourn to a date between 15 and 20 March. A statement has been made that perhaps it would be unnecessary to have the whole delegation go back and that it would be desirable to have sorne members of the delegation left behind in arder to deal with emergent questions that may crop up in connexion with Jammu and Kashmir during the interval. As long as this item is on the agenda, India is under an obligation to see tf..at any inquiries made in regard to any emergent situations are answered by someone who has full authority to speak in the name of India. If it so happens that the Security Council holds a meeting for the purposeof discussing any suchemergent situation, India certainly will make .arrangements to be properly repre3ented at such a meeting. [ We have at the Headquarters of the United Nations a permanent representative of our own, and we shall clothe him with sufficient authority .to speak with full responsibility for India when such a situation does arise. The question ofwhether any one of the present members of the delegation should be left behind, or somebody else should represent India at such meetings. or on such occasions, is--I hope the Security~Councilwill agreean internaI matter to be settled by our Government. We shall do the best we can in order to see that the Security Council's work in connexion with the Jammu and Kashmir question, should ,fj . What we are hereto consider is: How are theseaetsofhostility and violence to be made to end? Wiihrespectto that, the oilly guidance wehave in this resolutionstates that the two Govemments "...in seeking a solution by negotiàtion underthe auspices of the Council, have agreed to co-operate with each other and with thè Council in developing "....-that is to say, in the future--" specific proposals, and, to this end, to apply.the following principl~s.:.". On the occasion when the President handed this draft resolution to me, all 1 tried to persuade him of was that we had spent about amonth in talking about generalities. Let us come to brass tacks; let Ils conJider concrete proposals;·let us sitdown from dayto day, hourafterhour for thenext four· or five days and formulate con- <-Tete actionto be taken. That would be time well spent. However,if wenoware going to discuss merelygeneral principles ofthis sort, get them tbrough the Security Council,and lateron begin. to sit in order·to consider concrete step~in theinseives matters which willinvolve points of controversy-lsaid that after spending the montb, we should look forward to spending another one or two months before vie could.arrive at anything reallyworth doing.That was my main objection. Thebther point-in connexion with the same thing, 'to which the representative of the United Kingdom made reference-is that even in reg~rd to this matter about stoppage of violence and acts of hostility, India herself has been insisting upon that, and·saying that when a·settlement is made, Pakistan should take steps·· to end the fighting. My whole .difference with the representative of the United Kingdom. bas been that the steps to he taken· for· the stoppage of the Apparently, 1 cannot get anything done here for the purpose of stopping the fighting that is going on from day to day. 1 have only to discuss with the Security Coutl.cil· those aspects of the question which will require' time to settleand which will really have to be commenced, before being put into action, months after the fighting has stopped. Tperefore, in dealing with questions of such a leisurely character, there is no harm at aU-and, in fact, there is everything to be gained-by taking an adjournment and trying to solve those problems in the most satisfactory manner possible to both parties. That explains my request for an adjournment. Mr. TSIANG (China): My delegation finds that the request of the delegation of India for a temporary interruption in our discussion of the India- Pakistan question, is a reasonable one. We are glad to support that request, especially since the head or the Ind\an delegation has assured us that, in case of an emergency in which the Security Council may find it necessary to resume the discussion, the Government of India will find,it possible to be represented in our mscussions. délégation estime que de de raisonnable. puyer Chef de si de discussion, l'Inde However, 1 was a little surprised that·the re· presentativ~ of India asked for such a long period représentant of time. 1 had thought privately that, with the 1Personnellement, j'avais pensé qu'avec modern means of communication and transpormodernes. de tation, two or three weeks would,be sufficient for deux. the purpose that he had in minet 1 stillhope qu'il that in case of seriou.. developments in Kashmir, où it might be possible for the full delegation ofIndia Cacb.emir~, to. returnat an earlier time than Mr. Ayyangar l'Inde has inàicated. indiquée Of course, it is understood that the question of India and Pakistan remains on the agenda of tionde the Security Council. Under our procedure here, l'ordre any member of the Security Council may ask the mément President to put it on the agenda of the day. Any du request by the Indian delegation for a temporary dent postponement does not alter our rules of pro- Une demande de la délégation de l'Inde tendant à cedure. That is an 1 have to say in regard to the ajourner postponement of discussion on this question. ne tout de au et l'Inde [document nécessaire Afin sans posée ti(ln des conditions nécessaires à je tion de ce genre de l'Inde dans de 1 should now like to say a few words with regard to the draft proposaIs w~ch our President and the Rapporteur submitted to the delegations of India and Pakistan on the evening of 6 Feb· ruary [document 8/667]. 1 do not think it is necessary for me to go over the whole document. In order to make the record clear, 1 should like to say unmistakably thatmy delegation is not ready to ask, or to recommend, that an' interim administration should forro one of the conditions. As 1 stated at the 241st meeting, such a recommendation might. place.the Govemment of India in great constitutional difficulty. For thatreason, we could recommend in sn "\g terms, as it is recommended hère, in regard to conditions directly' concerning the plebiscite. There is no reason why we should go out'of our way to. ask. for a new dêpartment of education or a new department of health in the' State of Kashmir, just because we are interested in the plebiséite.I think that in this matter it would be well for us to'practice· a little economy in the means wbich we propose to use to reach the aim which we desire. Therefore, 1 should like to put on record c1early that my delegation' would not Wish to seethat idea ofan interim administration pushed with vigour.Lasttime 1 did say that the President .could· well explore the possibilities; 1 meant by that, if the two· parties to .the dispute could aceept.thatwillingly. However, 1 feel that it is well for us to concentrate on those instruments of govemment·which have to do with the plebiscite and to leave the otherpart alone. 1 also see in this draft· proposaI a paragraph on the armed forces. That section-section (b) under paragraph 4--came to mealso as a surprise. It seems tome that, in all our proposais, it would be well for us to avoid any impression that we are questioning the right of the Indian Army to be in Jammu" and Kashmir. 1 should makethat statement a little more conclusive and inclusive. It would be well for· us to avoid any impression that we are questioning the legitimacy, constitutionality or legality of any steps whichhave been taken so far by the Govemment of India in handling this matter. That is. aU that 1 have to sayon these proposaIs which the President and the Rapporteur &ubmitted to the delegations. It was a pure accident that.the President caJ1ed on me to speak after the representative of India had spoken. 1 do not think the President had in mind that 1 ~esired to make a reply to the very grave and serious speech of the representative of India. However, 1 shouldlike totake advantage of tbispresent occasion to make one point, mainly to the delegation of India. Therepresen- ~ l quelque M. fitera avec ,pour qu'un lieu donner donner lecture adressée par· M. gation ment et " 1 have been directed to communicate' to you the folJowing message from the Prime Minister sage of India: r1.11.de; " 'In compliance with paragraph A of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on tion 20 January 1948, 1 have the honour to inform you vier that India has decided to nominate Czechosloque l'Inde vakia to the Commission of Inquiry. conime ~ ~

Before calling on the next speaker, 1 should like to read to the Security Council a letter which hr.s been handed to me by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, theheadofthe Indian delegation to theSecurity Council, addressed to the Secretary-Generai [document SI669]. It is dated 10 February 1948, and it reads as follows: .I " '(Signed) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU " 'Prime Minister and Minister of External Nfairs and CommoJlwealth Relanons~'" Mr. AUSTIN (United States): The Security Couneil is still working in the field. of solution de by negotiation. It has not arrived at the type encore of service which is described by Article 37 of the eiations. Charter. mesures Of course, we still hopethat it will not be necessary for· us to find that there has been a nous failure on the part of the parties to agree upon parties terms of settlement. We still have faith that one les of two possible conclusions may be arrived at la by them. . deux The fust conclusion would be the better; that is, actually to present to the Security Council elle consisterait en fait 'i;erms of settlement upon wb.ieh they have agreed. de sécurité les But that is not the only solu'don they could arrive convenues. at.They could, if they were, '"bIe to agree upon laquelle terms of settlement, arrive al; an attituc'le toward 1 si recommendationsmacl:} by our President and d'un The Security Council is reluctant to take action that will indicate that it believes that there is no hope in negotiation. Such would he .the case, 1 believe. if we should pass a resolution different from those now pending. The instant business before the Security Council is represented by two short resolutions [documents 81661 and 81662] wbich were proposed by the representative of Belgium during the time that he was President of the Security Council.They have not been disposed of. Until they are finally disposed of, they hold the control of the voting in the Security Council, subject to those procedural votes that have priority or preference. We have not come to a decision on those resolutions because we have continuously debated the situation from the time they were introduced [237th meeting] until the present, .and we have invariably concluded our meetings with the sug~ gestion that the parties get together and try again. Therefore, we are now in the situation in wIDch we formerly were. What 1 have tosay about the memorandum presented by the representative of Colombia at the 241st meeting and the appeal contained in document 1 [document 81667] submitted by the President today, should not be understood to indicate that the United States favours the adoption of a resolution containing these' principles. My remarks constitute an attempt to bring about further consideration by the parties of those principles. If 1 were to judge the situation by the record, 1 should'think that it was very promising and certainly not so hopeless as would seem to be indicated. Taking the memorandum submitted by the representative of ColQmbia, and the verbatim record of the remarks bf the representative of India, at the 242nd meeting, and referring specifically to parts of it, 1 would really consider that the means of agreement are contained there. Mention is actually made of principles to govern the parties in leading to specific propositions or proposaIs) of settlement. On the subject of urgency, about which the representative of Syria inquired, 1 noticed that the representative ofIndiavery eloquently characterized aIl that we have presented thus far leadihg towards harmonious settlement of tbis matter as "trends of opinion", and observed, if 1 understood. him aright, that urgency is. not recognized in those " trends" which, in bis view, seemed to .disregr:_" the. urgency of the situation and to put the emphasis upon a long-range settlement. That. is not my understanding of the situation. In fact, the very fust sentence in the findings. stated. in .. the. memorandum submitted by the representative of Colombia reads: If the represent'itive of India refers to that in saying that his delegation has no hope of getting the Security Council to stop the fighting, then the Jndian delegation has certa!nl.y made an appraisal of trends that is correct, because the trend of opinion in the Security Council is against war. In fact, it is the special function of the Security Council in a situation where there is a threat to ~he peace or, as in the present case, actual aggression, to make every effort in the first place to bring the matter to a peaceful conclusion by pacific methods and not by means of force. No party coming here to discùss a case like this can expect trends in the Security Council towards the application of force, or towards a solution which would ally the United Nations with one side so that it could be successful in a military attack or defence. What wc are dealing with here is a situ.ation which both parties have declared to be one that threatens the peace of the world, and one which, therefore, the Security Council has jurisdiction to consider. Our view, as indicated thus far by trends of opinion, must be clear. 1 think that there is no confusion at aIl about the faet that the trend of our opinion, which is not yet in the form of a resolution, is towards a pacifie settlement of this matter-an arr.angement with terms of such character that they command the respect and the confidence of the parties to the dispute. As 1 have said, there seems to be no other way of bringing peace to that part of the world· than this specific method of agreement between the parties, which involves such management abd such control of the plebiscite-to which both parties have asse.nted-as to ensure that everyone interested will know that it is free, fair and just. 1 hope that whcn the Indian delegation retums to its country it v~ill make very plain the fact that the United Nations is not engaged in promoting war or taking sides in war, and that the Security Council's business is just the opposit~namely, trying to find a pacific solution of this problem. That is one assurance that can be given, and it is a trend properly appraised, 1 believe, by the representative of India. On the other band, 1 think that if the Indian delegation leaves this debate and retums home to receive new instructions, it ought to point out as weU that the trend of opinion is toward a fair consideration by the Security Council of aU the circumstances. There is no reason why the parties to this negotiation should expect favour, one as against the other, in a settlement. There is every reason to expect that the Security Council, if it should have to take this matter in band and act under Article 37 of the Charter, will make a recommendation calling upon both parties to play a corresponding part in effecting the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of conditions in which the plebiscite can he carried out. It is true that the drafts which have been submitted do not necessarily represent assent by every member of the Security Council to every single item. In speaking before, 1 have indicated my approval of many of the items whic'h appear in both the .memorandum of the Colombian delegation and the draft submitted today by the President ofthe Security Council. But the approval expressed is notfinal, and we have not closed our minds to a.consideration of new proposais and additional amendments•.Upon some of these matters the United States has not takenany position. But on the whole do they not clearly aim at a settlement of this matter in which the rights. andinterests of aIl parties are taken into consideration? If they do not, let us take care of that situation. For example, if it is complained that sub-paragraph 4 (a) of document 1 [document S/667] which was submitted to us today, is a meI'e abstract proposition, let us amend it and consider suggested changes. . 1 think that the Security Council trend, as .shown by our debate, is to make·these principles as useful and as applicable as possible to the situation so as to reach an agreement. If these principles are more acceptable when made less general thanthey appear in document 1, thep. the way to remedy that is to make them more specific. For examp'le, added to ~ub-paragraph4 (a) fol~ lowing alternative B, document 1, couId be the words "of any form. of a military charaeter", so that air bases~ territory crossing, . and the furnishing of weapons and other supplies could aIl be written intI) such a principle. There will 1 shaH read what was said by the representative of .India: "Paragraph C seems to go rather beyond the jurisdiction of the Security Council. It refers to the plebiscite aS G being a method of determining the future government of the Jammu. and Kashmir State, but 1 do not think any sug-I gestion has been made that-the future govem- 1 ment of the State shoulà. be determined by means The Security Couneil is seized of an issue of urgent importance. Nothing new has lessened the urgency of this case since we began the consideration of it. In'answer to the fust -allegatio1'\ in the memorandum submitted by the Colombian delegation at the 241st meeting-namely, that the cessation of fighting and other acts of hOl)tility is of a particularly urgent character in the Jammu and Kashmir State-the representative of India said at the 242nd meeting: " After the word ' Finds: " parègraph A speaks of the cessation of fighting and other acts of hostility as being of ft particularly urgent charaeter in the Ja.mmu and Kashmir State. We are entirely in agreement with this, and 1 hope that the Security Couneil as a whole is in agreement with it." We think the trend indicates that the Security Council does hold that opinion. Paragraph B of the Colombian memorandum reads: "That in eonformity with the policy of the Indian Government that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of a dispute, the question should'be settled. by a reference to the people, India and Pakistan have agreed that the question of whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir shaU accede to Pakistan or to India must. be determined through a plebiscite to be held under international auspices..." In regard to paragraph B, the Indian representative said at the 242nd meeting: "Paragraph 'B speaks of the question of accession being referred to the people. Barring verbal amendments whieh, if necessary, 1 shall propose at the proper time, it seems to me that the substance of this paragraph is worthy of serious examination. It speaks of a plebiscite to be held under international auspices." 1 Then we come to paragraph C, whieh states: « That the plebiscite as a method of determining the future status of the Jammu and Kashmir State is the most desirable and democratic, provided the will of the people is given free, fair and unfettered expression." There is an issue here, but it is not at aH hopeless. As res.a:rds parngrllph D, the rcpresentativo of India satd, among other things. the followin8, and 1 an\ not rea.ding it aU: Cl Wc should, thore tore, \le \villing t~ consider paragraph D if it Wère sa modified as to indieate that the carly cstabUshment of 8. govemment rcllectina the will of the peopleoftheJamnm and Kashniir State is essen· tlâi ta the attainment of the aims and purpose of this scheme.» Paragraph D stntes-and 1 do not know why it oould not be changed according to that doctrine and principle : .. That an interim. adtninistration whicll will command the full confidence and respect of the people of the Jammu and Kashmir State is essenti\Ù to the attaimnent of the aims and purposes of this resolution ... 1 repeat that so far as the Security Council's j\\risdiction oyer this matter is ooncemed. 1 have nover envisaged any control over the internai govemment of Jammu and Kasbmir longer than is neœssary' to aC\.'Omplish that much-desired purpose ofa fair and fœe plebiscite. 1 ha,'e taken a good. deal of time on this matter bccause 1 hope that if this delegation retums to India, it will go, not with discouragement and with.a feeling that it has been prejudiced by these trends that ha,'e been indicated, but that there is .actua1ly every hope in the world for achieving an. agreement that would be approved by the Secmity Council; it is really up to the parties, pro-vided wc do not have to get into Article 37 of theCbarter. 1 hope we shall not ha~-e to do that. SBoold the Security Council, being seized of tJm VfC!i mri.ons and urgent question, adjourn S ~nof the item? Whether or not wc ~ .aàjoom. consideration of the item is a ~ ~ We might he required to take 13p ail emer~ situation that will come to us ~ow~ If'We haB. adjo~ what would he 'PlII' ~1 If the who1e delegation. returned te IB.dia ~'Ïthout any IWtiœ that we had the mte.a.til:mœ hDld. ~Yei able Ut a.ctin an emerpey" ,.cooJd we act; would wc act'1 l thIDk we ~ mah '&dl an arrangem,em of tbis matter We wish to accommoclnte the Indian delegation, but 1 think we should say, without equivocation, that in their mUch~regretted absence the Security Couneil hoMs itsolf in a position ta aet upon any emergency that might arise during the tinte they are neeessarily absent. My own view ls that the Secul'Îty Council would make a better record if we would fecognize the necessity and convenlence of the delegation of India to return home for the purpose that is stated in the letter from the Government of India, but if we would not adjourn this matter, and would hold it in statu quo and keep it there for two weeks, which ls long enough, or perhaps three week!J. 1 tbink that asking the Seeurity, Couneil to hold tbis matt~r in abeyanee, subject to emergency, until 15 March or 20 March, is too long, and perhaps has more significance to the outside world than the delegation of India would like to give it. 1 am sure that India wishes to have everyone who knows about tbis transaction uuderstand that what they are about to do is in the direction of a pacifie settlement of a situation that threatens the peace of the world. , i '! ~ 1 conclude by expressing the urgent wish that ~ we can arrive at this accommodation by an agree- ~ ment to the effect that tbis item will remain on the agenda without consideration by the Security Counci1.for fifteen days, unless there is a situation that requires the Security Couneil to aet. Mr. NOBL BAKER (United Kingàom): 1 wish to make rather prolonged observations on the debate we have had tbis afternoon, and 1 believe that 1 shall not he the last representative to desire to speak. As there may be other representatives, besides those of whom 1 know, who desire to take further part in the debate, 1 should like to propose that the Security Couneil should now adjourn and should meet again tomorrow morning at 10.30 a.m. Mr. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGf\R (India): This is not, of course, a matter in which 1 have the , right to c1aim anything, but 1 wish merely to place one or two matters before the Security Council for information. In order that the con- ' sultations with my Government might take place in good time, we have arranged to leave New York by air tomorrow afternoon, as 1 informed the President yesterday. r It would help us a great deal, and would give us a littletime to preparefor ourjoumey tomorrow morning, if ., could put the Security Council to the inconvenience of sitting it out this evening. If that is too much for me to ask 1 can quite well understand the Security Council's thinking so, but if it is necessary that we should adjoum now and meet again at 10.30 tomorrow morning, 1 shouldlike to' add, this: 'if the representative of India really feels that it is imperative for him, in the light of the instructions which he has receivedJrom hisPrime Minister, to leave tomorrow aftemoon, Will it be possible for him to pack tonight so that we may meet at 10 a.m. and he can still catch an aeroplane in the afternoon? I, myself, have done iton more than one occasion while engaged in the work of thé United Nations. 1 offer the representative of India my deep persona!' apologies for making this speech. 1 hope he will understand. 1 would do anything 1 could to meet'his ,convenience, because-and this is in no way a valedictory messagewe have aIl come, to have, a very warm and affectionate regard for .the leader of the Indian delegation.

The question before the Security Council now is the revised proposaI of the representative of the United Kingdom that we should adjourn until 10a.m. tomorrow.- Mr.LOPEZ (Colombia): 1 am strongly of the opinion expressed by the representative of the United Kingdom in regard to the suggestion made by the Indian representative. 1 venture to go a little further and stress the point that the Indian delegationshould try to remain a little longer for this discussion. 1 think it is. very discouraging to find that it has made its arrangements to leave before, we haveconc1uded consideration of the India-Pakistan question. If 1 may beallowed to speak my mind rather frankly,I wouldsay that this situationworries me a great deal, because at a certain stage in our deliberations the Indian delegation made it distinctly c1ear that the suggestions they had advanced to the, Security Council were the maximum they cou1d accept.' The members of the·Security Council should bear in mind that we are discussing tbis question at the request of the delegation of India. We should bear in mind that we have been diseussing the matter for six weeks, and that seems to give the representative of India good reason to say that the Security Couneil is fiddIing wbi1e Jammu and Kashmir burns. Now they wish to leave. 1 therefore believe it would be more appropriate for us to say that after having insisted that tbis question is of a great urgency, they cannot wait any longer andwant to drop the matter now. The delegation will then be travelling while Jammu and Kashmir bÙfns. , Today, we have been disCllSSing what seems to me a rather extraordinary situation. 1 believe, in the firstplace, that it is entirely within the discretion of the Indian Government and of the present personnel of the Indian delegation to go , back to India if they so desire, and that it is not really for us to say when they should return. The question is rather whether it is usuaI for any Government to submit a matter to the Security Council, as the Government of India'has done, andrequest it to take action, and, after the Security Couneil has shown a11 willingness to hear their leligthy repetitions of their casewe have to be clear on that; we have not spent six weeks listening to the members of the' Security COl.mcil, but.we have spent that time listening to the representatives of India and Pakistan, their claims, counterclaims and allegations-and to act, as Senator Austin very properly indicated,in the oost spirit of conciliation, because that is our duty and our task, whether it is usuaI for such a Government to inform the Security Council that the delegation of India isgoing back to India. Before actually finishing discussion oftheir request for adjournment, we have also been informed that they have .already made arrangements to leave tomorrow. 1, 1 submit that that is' a most extraordinary situation. 1 submit that under the circumstances we would do more to uphold the prestige of the Security Council if we simply went on with our business tomorrow at 10.30 a.m., as the President has already indicated. ,comme

The Se~urity Council has ~efore it a proposaI submitted by the representabve of the United Kingdom to the effect that we . par should adjourn the meeting at tbis time and meet tomorrowat 10 a.m.