S/PV.2483 Security Council

In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table. Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe. At the invitQtion of the President, Mr. hsQkQ (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table. Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2483)

In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite Mr. Mueshihange to take a place at the Council table. 1. Adoption of the agenda 2. tie situation in Namibia: (a) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to. the President. of the Security Council (S/l 6048); (b) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (s/16051); (c) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943) At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mueshihange took a place at the Council table.

In accordance with the decisions taken at the 2481st and 2482nd meetings, I invite the representatives of Angola, Botswana, Canada, Cuba, Ethiopia, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber. The meeting was called to order at II.30 a.m. At the invit&ion of the President, Mr, de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Legwaila (Botswana), Mr. Pelletier (Canada)), Mr. ROQ KoUn (Cuba), Mr. Wolde (Ethiopia), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Krishnan (India), Mr. Treiki (Zibyan Arab Januzhiriya). Mr. dos SQntos (Mozumbique), Mr. Fafowora (Nigeria), Mr. Koroma (Sierra Leone), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Rupia (United Republic of Tanzania), Mrs. Coronel de Rodriguez (Venezuekz), Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Kunda (Zambia) took the places reservedfor them Qt the side of the Council chamber. Adoption of the agenda The agenda WQS adopted The situation in Namibia: Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (s/16048); Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051); Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943) (Q) (4

I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Algeria, the German Democratic Republic, Kenya, Kuwait, Mexico, Sri Lanka and Tunisia in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the ite? on the Council’s agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure. (4

In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the representative of Senegal to take a place at the Council table. 1. At the invitation of the President, Mr. S~rr6 (Senegal) took Q place at the Council table. I 12. We are now informed by the Secretary-General mat, during hi consultations, agreement was reached with the South African Government on those two outstanding issues. Thus, the last remaining hurdles were cleared. But, in characteristic fashion, the South African Government now says that in spite of the resolution of all outstanding issues pertinent to resolution 435 (1978), further progress on the implementation of the Namibia independence plan on the basis of resolution 435 (1978) is no longer possible without the prior withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. ‘It is South Africa’s precondition which now makes it impossible for the Secretary-General to fulfil his mandate on the implementation of the Namibia indepcndence plan. “I have the honour to request the Council to permit me, on behalf of the Special Committee against Apartheid, to participate, under the provisions of rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, in the Council’s consideration of the item entitled ‘The situation in Namibia’.” 7. On previous occasions, the Security Council has extended invitations to representatives of other United Nations bodies in connection with the consideration of matters on its agenda. In accordance with past practice, therefore, I propose that the Council extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid. 13. Quite rightly, the Secretary&neral promptly rejected the injection of this extraneous issue as not only outside the scope of his own mandate, but of resolution 435 (1978) as well. We are not surprised at South Africa’s injection of a totally irrelevant issue into the resolution of the Namibian question. Year after year, South Africa has found one pretext or another for obstructing the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). Since 1978 it has consistently reneged on its commitments. Its record on Namibia is one of broken promises. The plain truth is that South Africa never had, and does not now have, any intention of cooperating with the United Nations in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). Any claim to the contrary is false and will not stand the test of South Africa’s appalling record of broken promises on the Namibian question. After wringing concession after concession from all the parties concerned, including the Security Council, the racist regime of South Africa has simply asked for more concessions. First, it was the so-called impartiality of the United Nations; then South Africa later demanded the participation of the so-called internal parties; then it raised di!Eculties regarding the composition of UNTAG and the electoral system. Now, after agreement has been reached on all those issues, South Africa is demanding a further concession-this time, one that it knows is well outside the scope of resolution 435 (1978), and that it is not within the power of either the Council or the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), to give. It was so decided

The frst speaker is the representative of Nigeria. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

First, I have much pleasure in extending to you, Sir, my delegation’s warmest felicitations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of October. We also join the preceding speakers in expressing our deep gratitude to your predecessor for so skilfully and ably,guiding the deliberations of the Council in September. _: :: ;:: .:: IO. My delegation has read with great care and interest the report of the Secretary-General [S/15944 on his visit to South Africa and his contacts there. It was a courageous mission for which we are extremely grateful to him. The Secretary-General’s visit, it may be recalled, was undertaken at the request of the Council in its resolution 532 (1983) which also required South Africa to make a firm commitment regarding its readiness to comply with Council resolution 435 (1978) on Namibia’s independence. 14. The response of the Council to this arrogant demand should be swift and clear: it should be rejected outright as a further pretext to obstruct Namibia’s independence. The demand represents a serious affront to the authority of the Council. It is time for the Council to call South Africa’s bluff by invoking punitive measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Failure by the Council to act swiftly by telling South Africa that enough is enough will only encourage the racist regime of South Africa to persist in its intransigence. 11. But from the outset, even before he went to South Africa, it will be seen from the Secretary-General’s report that the South African Government tried desperately to introduce extraneous and irrelevant issues to the primary question of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). Nor was South Africa willing to give the necessary assurantes regarding its fm commitment and readiness to comply with that resolution. Instead, representatives of the South African Government told the Secretary-General :_ _-: :_- _-_” . .-_-_ _-_-_ -_-_ :-k.-. ::_- -_-_-. :;:I:‘ 2 ::. .‘-‘.:, . . -. 20. What has the response of the Council been to South Africa’s arrogant defiance of its authority? Every effort by the Council to act decisively against the racist regime of South Africa has been repeatedly blocked by some of its own members. In 1974, a resolution to expel South Africa from the United Nations for its failure to cooperate with the United Nations was defeated by the triple veto of some permanent members of the Council. The following year, a resolution for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa was again blocked by the same Powers. In 1976, another sanctions resolution was vetoed by the three Powers. The failure of the Council to act decisively has only served as an encouragement to South Africa in its persistent refusal to cooperate with the United Nations over Namibia. Persistent obstructions by some permanent members of the Council to the application of international pressure and sanctions against South Africa have strengthened the racist regime’s resolve to pursue an internal settlement in Namibia, contrary to the provisions of Council resolution 435 (1978). 16. Over the years, the United Nations has tried in various ways to get South Africa to accept a Namibia settlement plan through negotiations. But, using one pretext after the other, the racist regime .has obstructed all such efforts to, secure Namibia’s independence by peaceful means. Council decisions and General Assembly resolutions on Namibia have been flouted flagrantly and with complete impunity by the racist regime. South Africa’s open defiance of the decisions of the Council has inflicted serious and perhaps irreparable damage to the moral authority and prestige of this body. The persistent refusal of the Government of South Africa to respect the decisions of the Council is not a matter to be treated lightly, for it touches on the whole foundation of the United Nations as the primary instrument for the maintenance of intemational peace and security. . 21. It is sometimes conveniently forgotten that resolution 435 (1978) was itself the result of intensive negotiations initiated by the Western contact group with South Africa, SWAP0 and the front-line States. But since then, South Africa has proved only its commitment to avoiding implementation of that resolution at all costs while proceeding with its efforts to impose an internal solution. 22. In May 1978, the South African army and air force attacked a SWAP0 refugee camp at Cassinga, in Angola, killing some 700 people, mostly women and children, and injuring another 1,500. That action was clearly intended to prevent SWAP0 from accepting the settlement plan. But in July 1978, despite its reservations, SWAP0 accepted the settlement plan. South Africa immediately raised new objections about the size of the military component of UNTAG, the powers of the United Nations police and the dates for the elections. In December 1978, despite the objections of the United Nations, South Africa held its internal elections in Namibia. Yet the failure of the Western initiative and the attempted internal solution still did not persuade the contact group to put pressure on South Africa through the imposition of sanctions. There was little or no response from the Western Five to South Africa’s obstinacy. It was the crucial failure of the Western Five to contemplate sanctions seriously that encouraged South Africa in its delaying tactics. From that point on, they lost the only real leverage they had in getting South Africa to co-operate. 17. The story of Namibia is a tragedy not only for the people of Namibia but also for people of conscience throughout the world. It is the tragic story of a peaceful but proud people who have been subdued by force and subjected to institutionalized racism. It is the story of a racist colonial Power that has failed to live up to its trust and to accepted norms of international law and behaviour. 18. It is perhaps necessary to bring to the attention of the Council the magnitude of the suffering that racist South Africa’s rule has inflicted on the Namibian people. The system of apartheid transplanted to Namibia not only represses the legitimate rights of the people to political participation, freedom from detention without trial and from summary execution, and their inherent right to participate fully in the life of their country; it also creates economic and social disparities which make the indigenous people of Namibia among the poorest in the world. . . :\. :. .*. :\ 19. The story of Namibia therefore must focus on the legitimate rights of its people. It is not simply the tragic story of diplomatic manoeuvrings and protracted negotiations. Since the termination in 1966 of South Africa’s legal control over Namibia, the Territory’s future has presented a relatively clear question of self-determination for its one 23. In the intervening period all collective efforts by the Council, the contact group, the front-line States and SWAPO, and, more recently, by the Secretary-General himself, to achieve an agreement on implementation of 24. Later, South Africa suggested that the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) bandits, being openly funded by South Africa, be included itithe negotiating process. Throughout all these South African stalling tactics, the United States and some other members of the contact group defended their opposition to sanctions against Pretoria by arguing that its objections could be overcome through negotiations. However, it was usually SWAPO, and not South Africa, that made concessions on several of these issues, in hopes of actually moving forward on implementation. South Africa consistently found new issues to raise as obstacles to the settlement plan, until the pre-implementation meeting at Geneva, in January 1981, when South Africa, after assailing what it alleged to be the partiality of the United Nations, walked out, refusing to sign even a declaration of intent. South Africa’s disgraceful performance at Geneva was not surprising to many who had rightly anticipated another dilatory tactic by Pretoria to impede Council resolution 435 (1978). 25. Since 1981 nothing positive has happened to give anyone a glimmer of hope that South Africa will ever co-operate with the United Nations without punitive measures being taken against it. In the intervening period, the contact group has sought to prod South Africa to move forward by accommodating it, through concession after concession. It is this new policy that has become known as “constructive engagement”, which maintains erroneously that it would be far easier to exercise influence on South Africa to co-operate on Namibia by building a closer friendship with the white minority regime. This is the logic of the close amity between the United States and South Africa, a situation which has been denounced by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as an extremely dangerous development. 26. There is no longer any doubt or question about the abject failure of the policy of constructive engagement. It has done nothing to restrain South Africa. Rather, it has encouraged South Africa to be even more intransigent than ever before. In 1981, following the massive invasion of Angola by South Africa, the United States cast the only veto against a mild Council resolution condemning the invasion. It instead blamed SWAP0 and Angola for the South African raid. The policy of constructive engagement is nothing 27. The front-line States and Nigeria have worked in good faith with the contact group in the expectation and hope that their initiatives would continue to be balanced, But recent events have been most disappointing to us and call into serious question the utility of the contact group, for its uneven diplomacy is certainly detrimental to the attainment of a negotiated settlement in Namibia. 28. In the summer of 1982, formal negotiations between the contact group and the front-line States led to an agreement on virtually all outstanding issues. All that remained was for South Africa to choose between the two electoral systems. A letter was in fact prepared that would call on the Council to pass an enabling resolution to begin implementation. But that letter was never sent. Instead, we were confronted by a new demand, orchestrated by both the United States and South Africa, that implementation of resolution 435 (1978) could not begin unless the Cubans first withdrew from Angola-a demand that is now also being made to the Secretary-General by South Africa. 29. It is not necessary to identify the paternal origins of this gratuitous demand,as this does not alter its unacceptability. The Government of South Africa has simply embraced it as the most recent in a long list of objections to implementation. This issue of linkage or parallelism is neither part of resolution 435 (1978) nor within the mandate of either the contact group or the front-line States in negotiating the United Nations settlement plan. Angola has stated consistently that the Cuban forces would, be withdrawn once Namibia. became independent and the South African threat to its security was removed. On 4 February 1982, Angola and Cubaissued a joint communique that Cuban forces would withdraw as soon as South Africa withdrew its troops from Angola. The communique further recalled that the Cubans were first invited to Angola after South African troops and mercenaries invaded Angola. Underscoring Angola’s security concerns was the third massive invasion in August 1982, deep into Angolan territory, by South African forces and the continued occupation of southern Angola by South Africa. Instead of meeting Angola’s security concerns, a despicable attempt is being made by allies of the racist regime to portray Angola as the uncompromising party and an obstacle to Namibia’s independence. They now seek to place on Luanda the responsibihty for the failure to impiement resolution 435 (1978), while seeking to legitimize the South African occupation of Angola. 39. The Cuban issue is simply a red herring to buy some more time for the.racist South African regime. It is simply being proposed as a diplomatic curtain behind which 31. In 1935, when Fascist Italv invaded Abvssinia. Emperor Hailk Selassie’s plea to the League of Natibns for action was treated lightly. It was one of the events that led to the demise of the League and to the Second World War. Nearly half a century later, the Namibian people now make a similar plea to the Council for action against an aggressor. If it fails to act, it will have lost all its moral authority. It will be a tragic omission, the full consequences of which may not be foreseen today. The Council must not repeat the mistake of 1935.

The next speaker is the representative of Algeria. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. President, your accession to the presidency of the Council affords me the pleasure of addressing to the representative of a fraternal country the warmest congratulations of the Algerian delegation and to tell you, an experienced and able colleague, that I am convinced that you will guide the work of the Council in a calm and skilful manner. I should also like to congratulate your predecessor, Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana. 34. The impasse with respect to the question of Namibia that some insist on describing with a bitter feeling of impotence is not really an impasse at all. An impasse is a dead end. That is what South Africa, which has created that situation, would have us believe in order that it can perpetuate its domination over Namibia. The Secretary-General, to whom we express once again our appreciation for his unceasing efforts pursuant to the mandate entrusted to him by resolution 532 (1983), .has correctly assigned responsibility in the conclusion to his report, in which he stated that “the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a precondition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan.” [Z&i., para. 2.5.1 35. The question, therefore, is how to compel South Africa to implement the United Nations plan. It will soon be nearly 20 years-it was in 1966, to be precise-since the General Assembly terminated South Africa’s Mandate over Namibia. It will soon be nearly 10 years since the International Court of Justice declared South Africa’s occupation of Namibia to be illegal.* It was exactly five years ago that the Council, this important United Nations body, adopted resolution 435 (1978) that clearly paved the way for the attainment of the objective hallowed by the 36. The Secretary-General, on the one hand, and SWAPO, on the other, have diligently carried out the tasks assigned to them. The front-line countries have given the Secretary-General their support with the exemplary resolve to do everything in their power to assist the United Nations in carrying out its work of dccolonization. 37. Only South Africa continues to put forward new pretexts to perpetuate its occupation of Namibia. First, there was a so-tailed partiality on the part of the United Nations; then there was an undesirable voting procedure. Today, there is a supposed linkage between the principle of Namibian independence and the attempted limiting of the rights and sovereignty of a neighbouring State. It would be utterly ridiculous were it not so serious. What is even more serious is that the representative of Pretoria stated, in this very chamber a few days ago, that the position of his Government was irrevocable and that it enjoyed support within the international community. 38. Drawing a lesson from the experience of two world wars, Arnold Toynbee wrote in 1950: “What the situation manifestly demands is a voluntary association of the peace-loving peoples of the world in sufficient force and cohesion to be unassailable by any who reject their pact of collective security or who break itr’.2 39. Indeed, that minimum cohesion is lacking, since South Africa is able to come here to defy our institution, Allowing the process of the decolonization of Namibia to be worked out through the distorting prism of East-West relations and permitting it to be viewed within the framework of conflicting power politics deals a severe blow to the collective effort towards Namibian independence that the community of nations has organized with faith, patience and perseverance. 40. Hence the enormous responsibilities before history that have been assumed by those who, by their role, their influence and their position in the contact group, have a particular duty to participate in collective action to see that in Namibia force may give way before legality and justice be meted out in the struggle for freedom. 41. This situation has fuelled Pretoria’s intransigence and ’ abetted it in its defiance. It furnishes it with reasons for persisting in its rejections and excesses. Clearly, the responsibility of linking the decolonization of a Territory, upon which the international community is in unanimous agreement, with the national sovereignty of another State is a heavy one. The establishment of such a linkage distorts all the enshrined and accepted facts with regard to the question of Namibia. It is a dangerous change of course. It is illegitimate, groundless and unnatural. 42. Have we forgotten or is there an attempt to conceal the fact that the real problem is the illegal occupation of Namibia by force, and that in order to continue that occu- 43. In fact, all of this is part of a vast plan aimed at destabilizing all the countries of the region. On I7 October last-on the eve of the convening of this series of meetings of the Council-more raids were carried out against Mozambican territory; and Lesotho is courageously confronting similar acts of aggression committed daily against it, in the face of the passivity and indifference of the international community. ‘_ 44. The armed forces of the racist @me of Pretoria announced just a few days ago that powerful defoliants would be used along the border between occupied Namibia and Angola. Thus; while defoliants and chemicals are prohibited by international conventions, South Africa continues cynically to use them in areas that are inhabited by civilians. Given this situation, we can agree that the countries neighbouring on South Africa have every right to invoke Article 51 of the Charter, which stipulates, inter alia, that: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if 45. It is therefore up to the international community, and first .and foremost the Council, to demand that South Africa put an end to these acts of aggression and to take the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security. If South Africa can come here before the Council and claim support within the international community and defy the Council itself, it is because it has observed elsewhere, in another region, how, thanks to that same support, the archetype of that same expansionist policy could with impunity perpetuate illegal occupation and commit massacres and acts of destruction. We might therefore reflect on this further quotation from Arnold Toynbee: .“Like other evils, War has an insidious way of appearing not intolerable until it has secured such a stranglehold upon the lives of its addicts that they no longer have the power to escape from its grip when its deadliness has become manifest.“3 Racist’ militarism is well and truly doomed everywhere. 46. The preceding speaker, the representative of Nigeria, recalled how the various initiatives taken with a view to the adoption of sanctions against South Africa have failed because of the opposition of certain Powers that enjoy the right of veto. I shall not take up this point. I shall simply say that in Namibia a struggle for national liberation is being waged and strengthened; and it is bound to be successful, whether we like it or not. Elements foreign to the Namibian national liberation struggle are being introduced. That struggle is ours and, in the first place, that of the Council, which has proclaimed Namibia’s right to independence and defined the modalities through which it should enjoy that right in an accepted framework of resolutions and decisions. The Council must work towards the unalterable implementation of those resolutions and decisions. Let the Council speak clearly of legality, the conditions of its reinstatement and, above all, the means to restore it. 47: In this wide-ranging action, the Council plays an essential part. Its resolutions are too often ignored, its authority too often defied and its roie as the primary guarantor of international peace and security yet to be assumed, and, if this continues, the Council runs the risk of losing its credibility and its greatness. 48. In Namibia, it is the very raison G&e of the Council that is at stake. The Charter has provided the Council with every measure that should be taken against Pretoria in order to restore legality and to have the rule, of law triumph in Namibia.

The next speaker is the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial _ 50. Mr. KOROMA: On behalf of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, I wish to express my appreciation for this opportunity to address the Council in connection with its consideration of the critical situation with which the Organization is confronted in respect of Namibia. 55. In condemning the repeated acts of aggression perpetrated by the South African racist minority regime in Pretoria against sovereign neighbouring States, the Special Committee recommended that the Security Council, in the light of the serious threat to international peace and security posed by South Africa’s actions, respond positively to the overwhelming demand of the international community by imposing comprehensive mandatory sanctions against that country, under the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. 51. For the second time in five months the Council is meeting specifically to consider the question of Namibia. This series of meetings of the Council, however, comes at a moment of deep crisis. This is so, not only because the efforts of the international community to bring about genuine independence for Namibia by peaceful means have been at a standstill owing to the intransigence of the aggressive minority &me in Pretoria but also because of the deteriorating international situation in southern Africa brought about by the repeated armed attacks, acts of aggression and destabilization by the South African racist regime against the neighbouring independent African States. This policy of aggression obviously entails the potential for a wider conflict in the area with indeterminable consequences. 56. That, in brief, is the principled position of the Special Committee with regard to this all-important matter of Namibia. South Africa’s continued defiance of the will of the international community, as exemplified by the recent blatant breach of international law against sovereign independent Mozambique, underscores the validity of that position of the Committee, which is based on its conviction that the United Nations is duty-bound to do everything possible to terminate South Africa’s illegal occupation of Namibia. Indeed, all that has happened during the five years since the Council unanimously adopted resolution 435 (1978) reveals a consistent and calculated policy of dissembling and delay-indeed, a policy of fraud. All of these manoeuvres have, clearly unmasked the true intent of the Government of South Africa. This has been, under the guise of negotiations, to earn time to consolidate its domination over the Territory through the proxy of a puppet regime and to deny the Namibian people their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. South Africa’s attitude throughout has been characterized by inflexibility and confrontation, by broken promises, false assurances and outright duplicity. The developments since 1978 are ample proof that South Africa is not prepared willingly-I repeat, willingly-to accord the Namibian people their right to genuine freedom and independence. 52. In Namibia today there is open military conflict and repression. South Africa’s illegal occupation is maintained only with the aid of tens of thousands of South African troops. The Council cannot ignore this serious threat to international peace and security in the region; nor can we-except at our own peril--continue to remain inactive in the face of so much injustice and human suffering. We must be equally mindful of the fact that the open defiance by South Africa of the will of the international community is a damaging affront to the Organization, since it calls into question the very principles on which the United Nations was founded. 53. Guided bv its mandate to ensure that the neooles of I 1 colonial Territ&ies and countries are enabled to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, the Special Committee has given high priority to the important question of the decolonization of Namibia. In a decision adopted at its 1248th meeting, on 13 October,’ the Special Committee condemned South Africa’s continued illegal occupation of Namibia, its brutal repression of the Namibian people and its persistent violation of’ their human rights, as well as its efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia and its persistent refusal to comply with the related resolutions and decisions of the United Nations. 57. Throughout the ensuing negotiations, the leadership of SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia, has conducted itself with outstanding statesmanship and dignity as clearly demonstrated in its sincere willingness and steadfast commitment to effect the full and speedy implementation of the United Nations plan. The Special Committee pays a warm tribute to the SWAP0 leadership for its manifest spirit of accommodation, patience and responsiveness. In the same context, the Special Committee pays a particular tribute to the leaders of the front-line States for the crucial role they have played throughout, in support of the cause of the people of Namibia. 54. The Committee deprecated any attempt to undcrmine the international consensus embodied in Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and other relevant United Nations resolutions, which constitute the acceptable basis for a peaceful transition of Namibia to independence, and it rejected the persistent attempts by the United States of America and South Africa to establish any linkage or parallelism between the independence of Namibia and the 58. In his report, which is before the Council, the Secretary-General states that his recent consultations “have resulted, as far as UNTAG is concerned, in resolving virtually all the outstanding issues’*, and concludes that: “In fact, we have never before been so close to finality

The next speakersis the Acting Ch&rnan oi the Special Committee against Apartheid, Mr. Uddhav Deo Bhatt, to whom the Council extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement. 60, Mr. BHATT: Since its inception in 1963, the Special Committee against Apartheid has been dealing with the question of apartheid in South Africa and the ramifications in the region of that country’s racial policies. The.Council itself has been seized of this problem since 1960. Since 1966, when the General Assembly terminated South Africa’s Mandate over Namibia, both the Council and the Assembly have adopted numerous resolutions declaring South Africa’s presence in Namibia to be illegal and calling on it to withdraw. 61. Ignoring all these resolutions, including Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), which provide for general elections and self-determination for the Namibian people, the South African regime has continued its illegal occupation of the Territory and prevented the United Nations from carrying out its responsibilities in this regard. 62. As is well known, the Secretary-General held ‘discussions last August in Cape Town with the South African regime, only to find that the racist minority regime had come up with further excuses to protract consultations and deny self-determination to the Namibian people. The apartheid regime now demands the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978), which that regime itself had accepted. 63. Regrettably, the South African regime finds support for its new extraneous demand in the so-called linkage, parallelism and “constructive engagement” policies of the United States. The rest of the world has expressed dismay at this so-called linkage that makes the Territory’s independence a captive of the strategic and economic interests or demands of a couple of countries. 64. Earlier this year, the Special Committee conducted a fact-finding mission in southern Africa, where it verified that South Africa’s acts of aggression and other efforts at destabilization in the region had shown a marked increase in the last few years. Only last week, South Africa attacked the office of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) in Mozambique, causing a number of deaths and injuries. And only about 10 days ago it displayed its military might in a huge military parade at Pretoria. Recently, it has expanded the export of its military 65. Moreover, South Africa has recently opened a new road in the northern part of the country near the borders of Zimbabwe and Botwswana for military use. The road can also be used as a landing strip for military aircraft, and it is reported that similar road/airstrips are scheduled for other parts of the country. 66. In Namibia, about <O military bases and over l&$OO South African and South African<ontrolled troops are used to suppress the freedom struggle and to commit acts of aggression against Angola and Zambia. In fact, a large part of Angolan territory is under South Africa’s occupation. Also, according to recent reports, soldiers and police in Namibia have commited untold atrocities against the civilian population. 67. Recently, South Africa has brutally oppressed Lesotho and caused much hardship to its citizens and economy. It demanded that Lesotho return South African refugees on the alleged grounds that they posed a security threat to South Africa; Lesotho was obliged to appeal to the United Nations and international community to persuade South Africa to desist from such inhuman demands. 68. While in Namibia the South African regime intends to impose an “internal settlement’* through a so-called Council of State, in total disregard of the United Nations and world opinion, in South Africa it is fomenting civil strife through constitutional changes propagated as constitutional reforms. These sham reforms, which have been passed by the unrepresentative Parliament, are going to be the subject of a referendum to be held on 2 November next, that is, in about 10 days, among whites alone. 69. Briefly, the constitutional changes propose to give limited representation to Coloureds and Indians in a racially segregated Parliament, with the exclusion of the Africans, who constitute 72 per cent of the country’s population. Basically, it is designed to entrench racial discrimination in the Constitution, to preserve white minority rule and to’ perpetuate apartheid. 70. It does not seem that the South African ‘regime intends to eliminate apartheid or to withdraw from Namibia peacefully. On the contrary, that regime seems bent on military solutions to preserve white minority rule both in South Africa and in Namibia. Even political decisionmaking at the highest level in South Africa has of late been greatly militarized. Indeed, several recent studies have concluded that military considerations have become central in political decision-making and that it is the inner cabinet, composed of military men close to the Prime Minister, that makes political decisions, rather than the Cabinet of Ministers. Faced with a growing crisis at home, the apartheid regime is trying to extend the conflict to the whole region. 71. No doubtthe situation created bv South Africa in the region is a threat to, and even a constant breach of, international peace and security. Because self-determination and decolonization in Namibia and peaceful transition to 72. Therefore we strongly urge the Council to reject the socalled linkage or parallelism, to impose comprehensive sanctions on South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter and to strengthen the existing arms embargo in order to compel South Africa to withdraw from Namibia and to establish majority rule in South Africa itself. 73. The Special Committee firmly rejects all manoeuvres and attempts to defer the independence of Namibia. In its report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session and to the Security Council, it states, inter alia: “The persistent attempts by the United States and South Africa to establish the so-called linkage or parallelism between the independence of Namibia and extraneous issues, in particular the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, represent little respect for the resolutions of the Security Council. The socalled linkage or parallelism was resolutely rejected by the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement and various United Nations organs, including the General Assembly itself, and was qualified as an attempt to retard the decolonization process in Namibia and as interference in the internal affairs of Angola.“6 74. While pledging the Special Committee’s solidarity with the heroic and struggling people of Namibia and their national liberation movement, SWAPO, I congratulate the United Nations Council for Namibia, the legal Administering Authority for Namibia, on its tireless efforts towards achieving the independence and freedom of Namibia and its people.

Mr. President, first of all it is my pleasant duty to extend to you the congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of October. Many previous speakers have emphasized your wealth of experience as a diplomat, your probity and your skill, which augur well for the success or -our work. My delegation willingly associates itself with that ’ appreciation and wishes you every success in your important and delicate task. 76. I should like to take this opportunity to pay a welldeserved tribute to Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, who so competently and efficiently conducted the proceedings of the Council during the month of September, which was a rather difIicult month. 78. My delegation would like, in passing, to pay a welldeserved tribute to the Secretary-General for the manner in which he carried out his task on this occasion. He did not confine himself to establishing contacts from his office on the 38th floor. He went to the lion’s den in person, both in Pretoria and in Namibia. Furthermore, as a subtle diplomat and a faithful servant of the United Nations, he was able to avoid the traps that South Africa set for him, trying to induce him to stray from the terms of his mandate. 79. As was the case in May, the report he has submitted to us deserves praise because of its clarity, its conciseness and its impartiality-so much so that South Africa, a country which over the years has constantly accused the United Nations of partiality and partisanship, was unable to find fault with it. 80. After the adoption of resolution 532 (1983), the African and non-aligned members of the Council, and with them the vast majority of peace-loving and freedom-loving people, entertained the hope that, this time at least, South Africa might heed the message of history and the voice of reason. In other words, they hoped, without really believing it, that South Africa would be able to implement resolution 435 (1978) without too much procrastination. This proved to be only one further illusion, 8 1. Of course, South Africa did declare that all the problems had been resolved and that it would henceforth no longer oppose the independence of Namibia. However, that assertion was soon contradicted by South Africa making it conditional on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. 82. One does not have to be very clever to realize that that was nothing but a pretext. Indeed, ti has so often been stressed, the Cuban presence in Angola is an issue that has nothing whatsoever to do with resolution 435 (1978). What is more, the Cuban troops are in Angola, a sovereign country, at the request of the authorities of that country. Furthermore, the Cuban troops are not in occupation of either Namibia or South Africa. On the contrary, it is South Africa which has continually committed aggression against Angola and is occupying its territory. Also, as the representatives of Angola and the United Republic of Tanzania stated, the first attacks by South Africa against Angola began well before the arrival in Angola of Cuban troops. Similarly, when South Africa committed aggression against Lesotho, it was not to fight Cuban troops on its soil. 84. In the course of the Council debate in May on the same subject, as we recall, South Africa all but said, in effect, that all the members of the Security Council, in fact all the Members of the United Nations, were rogues. 85. Finally, with everything that we know, I affirm, for my part, that by dealing with South Africa as we are doing, we are wasting our time, for we do not speak the same language and therefore, obviously, we cannot possibly understand each other. 86. The proof of this is, first, that when the United Nations affirmed that the Mandate of South Africa over Namibia no longer existed, South Africa claimed, on the contrary, that it still enjoyed all rights over that Territory, that it did not recognize the term “decolonization” and that, in any case, the United Nations did not count in its opinion. It was only the contact group which had any importance for it. 87; Secondly, when we assert that South Africa was wrong not to grant independence to Namibia, South Africa shamelessly proclaims in the Council that it is not isolated and that, as a matter of fact, it is supported in this by friends. 88. Thirdly, as far as the United Nations is concerned, SWAP0 is the sole representative of the Namibian people, while South Africa claims that SWAP0 is a terrorist organization. 89. Fourthly, South Africa, furthermore, claims that it has the right to identify and destroy all those who, in independent African countries, issue hostile propaganda against it. 90. According to this logic, South Africa, which has proclaimed its hostility to certain Powers, should also therefore be attacked by those Powers for reasons of self-defence. 91. But ultimately, who is the true terrorist here? Is it not South Africa, which is occupying without any legal title thereto a Territory that does not belong to it? Who is acting in self-defence? Surely, it is the martyred people of Namibia, terrorized by a country which knows neither morality nor law. 92. In the view of my delegation, the present way of dealing with the Namibian problem is wrong and even contains an element of contradiction on our own part, because the position of South Africa in Namibia is like that of a thief, a usurper, a taker of hostages, at bay. 93. First of all, however, to avoid any confusion, it is urgent for the Council to reject categorically any attempt to link the independence of Namibia with the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. If we follow the present course, there is nothing to prevent South Africa tomorrow from asking African States or the United Nations not to recognize SWAP0 ar ANC any longer-or simply to stop. breathing. 94. Since South Africa believes ‘in and defers only to the contact group, which promised to convince the Pretoria authorities, the member countries of the group have thus lost face. But we are sure, nevertheless, that the members of .the contact group are jealous of their honour and their credibility, which has been so profoundly besmirched by the bad faith of their ally, which has exposed them. 95. The Council should call South Africa and the contact group to account. Indeed, we should be tempted to appeal for the enactment of coercive enforcement measures as laid down in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, were the Security Council not divided. Alas, however, it has neither the boldness nor the clear-sightedness nor the courage, to condemn acts of aggression, acts of force or even violations of the norms of law, so, if we did make such an appeal, we should only be indulging in wishful thinking to suppose a resolution of that sort could be adopted. 96. Let us not forget that ail the victims of the wars in the Middle East; Lebanon, Chad, Afghanistan, Namibia, South-East Asia and Angola, as well as those who lost their lives aboard the South Korean Boeing air liner, are members of our human race. 97. Who is to blame? All of us here in the Council, in a sense. I am not answering the question myself, but I should like to put this question to all the members here. What is sure is that the Council must also shoulder its responsibilities if it wants to retain a scrap of credibility.

The next speaker is the representative of Kenya. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. President, I should like, first of all, to express my thanks to you and to the other members of the Council for giving our delegation the opportunity to participate in this important debate on the question of Namibia. IOO. Secondly, Sir, I wish to congratulate you on your assumption of the hight office of President of the Council 101. This is the second time we are meeting this year on the question of Namibia. In May of this year, the Council once again took up the issue of Namibia [2439+ to 2444th and 2#46th to 2451st meetings]. The Council then adopted resolution 532 (1983), in which it condemned South Africa’s continued illegal occupation of Namibia and mandated the Secretary-General to undertake consultations with the parties to the proposed cease-fire, with a view to securing the speedy implementation of resolution 435 (1978). My delegation would like to pay a well-deserved tribute to the SecretaryGeneral for the way in which he has shouldered his heavy responsibilities. 102. In the 38 years of the United Nations’ existence we have acquired voluminous records of the sad history of South Africa’s brutal occupation of Namibia and the repressive administration it has set up to maintain its illegal occupation of Namibia. It is not our intention in this debate to dwell on the history of South Africa’s aggression in southern Africa. The records speak for themselves, and we do not see the need to labour the point. Even the friends and natural allies of South Africa agree with us about the sad history of events perpetrated by the racist @me. We have come here today not to recite the history of the illegal and brutal occupation of Namibia, but to examine why Council resolution 435 (1978) has not been implemented and what course of action the international community must take to fulfil the mandate of the Council. 103. It is now five years since the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia was approved by the Council in resolution 435 (1978). At that time we shared the general optimism about Namibia’s independence, which we thought was just around the comer. But, to our dismay and horror, in those five years since the adoption of resolution 435 (1978), we have witnessed grave tension and instability in the region, resulting from South Africa’s continued utilization of Namibia as a springboard for aggression against, and destabilization .of, the neighbouring independent States. 104. As I said earlier in my statement, we have come before the Council with one objective-the implementation of the Council plan for the independence of Namibia, as called for in its resolution 435 (1978). We have agreed that the plan remains the only basis for a peaceful transition towards the independence of that country. Since the adoption of the plan, Africa and, indeed, the rest of the world have waited impatiently for the implementation of the plan. IOS. We were told by those close to South Africa and by those who had offered to negotiate for it that it was ready to accept implementation of the plan. On our part, we had no illusions about South Africa’s sincerity in the negotiations. Africa, together with SWAPO, has serious doubts regarding South Africa’s sincerity in all these negotiations. I06. It is very pertinent at this point to say that Africa welcomed the initiatives of the Western Five in their negotiations with South Africa. However, we stress that those who have assumed the responsibility of negotiating with South Africa and have received the co-operation of SWAP0 should do so genuinely and stop sending confusing and conflicting signals to South Africa. 107. In his most recent report [S/259433, the Secretary- General, pursuant to Council resolution 532 (1983), confirmed that all the outstanding issues relevant to resolution 435 (1978) had been resolved. In the same report, he stated that he had made it clear to the Pretoria rkgime that the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) did not include an irrelevant and extraneous issue-namely, the linkage of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola to the independence of Namibia. 108. The plan for the independence of Namibia was clearly outlined in resolution 435 (1978). The plan needs no modification or any other conditions. We therefore cannot and will not accept any notion of linking the implementation .of the plan with the internal affairs of Angola. Namibians are fighting for self-determination, to liberate their own country. Angolans are fighting to preserve the territorial integrity of their own country against brutal aggression by South Africa. We must concede to the Angolans the right to seek help whenever they feel they need it. 109. The Council recently witnessed the sinister arrogance displayed by the representative of the racist rkgime of South Africa, who claimed that the linkage of the withdrawal of Cuban troops and the independence of Namibia had the support of the international community. That is an absurd statement. To which international community is South Africa referring? It is certainly not the international community that we know. Maybe South Africa is a member of another community not known to us. 110. Kenyans are very familiar with such threats and intimidation. In our struggle for independence we were constantly threatened in such a way by a racist minority group that tried to block our independence. In fact, when we won our independence some members of the racist group ran to South Africa. Such threats will never stop the people of Namibia from struggling for their independence. 112. We all know that the destabilizing factor in the southern region is the racist apartheid regime. This racist regime is the source of all political unrest in the region, and it is this regime and what it stands for that must be changed if political stability is to prevail in the region. 113. Who is constantly attacking Mozambique, Angola, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana? Who is illegally occupying Namibia? Who is oppressing and repressing over 20 million Africans in South Africa? Not the Cuban troops in Angola. It is the racist regime of South Africa. We repeat: this regime is the source of most of the political unrest in the southern region. 114. The international community ‘is faced with a serious challenge and must respond to this challenge squarely. The Council should now move to adopt a ,resolution rejecting South Africa’s insistence on linking the independence of Namibia to irrelevant and extraneous issues that are incompatible with resolution 435 (1978) and other Council decisions on Namibia. The Council should, for the benefit of South Africa, once more reiterate that resolution 435 (1978), outlining the United Nations plan for Namibia, remains the only basis for the peaceful settlement of the Namibian problem. 115. In the same resolution, the Council should set a date on which the implementation of the United Nations plan will begin and ask South Africa to cooperate in the implementation of the plan as envisaged in resolution 435 (1978). In the event of non-co-operation by South Africa as regards the implementation of the plan, the Council should meet to consider the necessary measures to be taken against South Africa. At that stage, clearly, there 116. Before I conclude I must say that South Africa’s misbehaviour, arrogance and defiance of Council resolutions is encouraged by a certain relationship it has with certain Western countries. The South African demand for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola has the sup port and encouragement of some States that have been negotiating on its behalf. Despite Council resolution 418 (1977), which imposed a military embargo against South Africa, we find in reliable newspapers reports of military collaboration between South Africa and Western countries and, worse still; collaboration in the nuclear field. 117. We strongly urge those countries not to encourage South Africa in any way but to use their influence to induce South Africa to comply with the Council resolution and, secondly, to refrain from any attempt, through use of the veto, to protect South Africa in its non-comphance with the decisions and resolutions of this body. The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m. NOTES. l Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibii (South West Afrfci) notwithstanding SecurityCouncil Resolution 276 (19701. Advisorv OMdon. I.C.J. Reoorts, 1971, D. 16. . _ _ _ _ * Arnold J. Toynbee. War and Civililation (Oxford University Press, New York, 1950), prefa&, pp. xi and xii. ’ Ibid., p. viii. ’ OJj+iciaI Records of the General Assembly. Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23, chap. VIII, sect. B. para. 17. 5 Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983 (AKONF. 120/13), part three. 6 O/ficiaal Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 22, para. 252. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva. COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES Les publications des Nations Unies sent en vente dam les librairies et les agences dtpositaires du monde entier. 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