S/PV.2484 Security Council

In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table. Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Bouguerra (Vice- President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation tookpZaces at the Council table. Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2484) 1. Adoption of the agenda -3. The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Arabic): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite Mr. Mueshihange to take a place at the Council table. 2. The situation in Namibia: (a) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the .Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048); (b) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051); (c) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943) At the invitaiion of the President, Mr. Mueshihange took a place at the Council table.

In accordance with the decisions taken at the 2481st and 2483rd meetings, I invite the representatives of Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Canada, Cuba, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Kenya, Kuwait, the Libyan. Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber. The meeting was Called to order at 4.05 p.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sahnoun (Algeria), Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Legwaila (Botswana), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Roa Koun’ (Cuba), Mr. Wolde (Ethiopia), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Krishnan (India), Mr. Wabuge (Kenya), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mr. Treiki (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Muiioz Ledo (Mexico), Mr. DOS Santos (Mozambique), Mr. Fafowora (Nigeria), Mr. Koroma (Sierra Leone), Mr. von Schimding (South Africa), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka), Mr. Slim (Tunisia), Mr. Rupia (united Republic of Tanzania, Mrs. Coronel de Rodriguez (Venezuela), Mr. GoIob (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Lusaka (Zumbia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber. The situation in Namibia: (a) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048); (b) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051); (c) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

-In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the representative of Senegal to take a place at the Council table.

The first speaker is the representative of Botswana, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement. At the invitation of the President. Mr. Sarrt! (Senegal) took a place at the Council table.

Sir, I should like to begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the 7. The Secretary-General has faithfully and diligently discharged his mandate pursuant to Council resolution 532 (1983). He has, as enjoined, been in consultation with all the parties directly concerned, and, as evidenced by his report [S/159&l, all the parties are agreed and have confiied that all outstanding issues pertinent to Council resolution 435 (1978) and its implementation have been resolved. We have been assured that South Africa will in due course-at any rate, before the Security Council convenes to adopt the enabling resolution-announce its choice of electoral system. Even the nagging issue of United Nations impartiality is said to have been given the quietus it has so richly deserved for so long. 8. In other words, five long and frustrating years since the adoption of Council resolution 435 (1978), we are at long last able to pride ourselves on having achieved what not long ago could be regarded only as an impossible dream: the creation of a workable plan for peaceful change in Namibia. Never before have we been so close to finding a peaceful, lasting solution to the problem of Namibia. A plan designed to realize such a solution is in place and we have a golden opportunity to implement it without delay. 9. And yet, sadly, we are gathered here not to effect the implementation of the plan, but to debate the reasons why it should be implemented. We are gathered here, as we were four ,months ago, to debate an artificial impasse created by those who, for reasons best known to themselves, have sought to hold the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia hostage to the resolution of issues which have been judged to be totally extraneous to the right of the people of Namibia to self-determination. 10. Let us face facts. The Secretary-General’s report carries a message which can be described only as extremely ominous. The report makes it clear, particularly in paragraph 25, that to South Africa the linkage is a permanent reality which cannot be ignored out of existence-or can be ignored only-with risk to Council resolution 435 (1978). The representative of South Africa confirmed this in his statement to the Council. He stated, with all the arrogance of the power at his country’s disposal, that “the Government of South Africa is irrevocably committed” to linkage [2&M meeting, para. 1493. ::. ::. -_-_ :. _..‘. :_-. :.-. ::. - . -:: -:.’ . . . ::: ::: . . . ~ -::. 11. So we must ask where we go from here, particularly since neither the front-line States nor the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) are prepared to allow themselves to be drawn into the negotiation of an issue they not only hate but regard as totally irrelevant. Having listened to South Africa’s statement, does the Council need any other reason to be persuaded to accept the fact that the United Nations plan for Namibia, which it adopted with so much hope and promise five years ago, is 12. We have steadfastly rejected every argument that has been advanced in support of the linking of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. No amount of cold-war slogans and fabrication of facts pertaining to the situation as we see it in southern Africa will convince us that there is any organic relationship between the right of the people of Namibia.to self-determination and the presence of foreign troops in another country. : 13. We have also rejected, not without contempt, the theory or view that the independence of Namibia must of necessity be predicated on the existence in advance in southem Africa generally of a political. and security climate specifically tailored to give comfo.rt and confidence to South Africa, while leaving the rest of the countries of the region destabilized into submission..We cannot accept the insinuation that the onus is on the majority-ruled countries of southern Africa to demonstrate their peaceful intentions towards South Africa. We reject the suggestion that it is incumbent upon South Africa’s neighbours to make southem Africa safe and secure for South Africa if South Africa is to be expected to cooperate in the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978). The onus is on South Africa first to abandon the violent politics of racism inside South Africa itself and create in that country conditions in which conflict will find no fertile ground on which to grow and I flourish. The onus rests squarely on South Africa to demonstrate to the countries of southern Africa that it seeks nothing but peaceful relations with them. 14. We dare not forget that we are talking here about a country whose troopshave been ensconced,uninvited and unwanted, in the southern part of Angola since 198 1, about a country whichnow insists that its victim, Angola, must, in addition to being occupied, also allow itself to be stripped naked and exposed to the vagaries of Pretoria’s politics of intimidation. It is Angola which has every right to seek redress from this Council, because it is Angola which, since the very eve of its birth as a free and independent country, has never ceased to be the playground of South African troops. 15. Yet we are told that before we can be allowed to implement Security Council resolution 435 (1978) an agreement on “the fundamentalrequirements of Cuban withdrawal” [ibid] will have to be reached. Nothing is said about the fundamental requirements of -withdrawal of South African troops from the territory of Angola. 16. In any case, how long are we expected to continue the permissiveness with which we have in the past five years treated South Africa’s addiction to negotiation by 22. I should like also to express our thanks and appreciation to your predecessor, Mr. Noel Sinclair, for the wisdom with which he conducted the work of the Council last month. 23. At first sight, it might seem to any observer that it has not been a long time since the last meetings of the Council to consider the question of Namibia, after which the Council adopted its resolution 532 (1983). But, as far as we are concerned, this is not a question of time-whether long or short-but rather one of a problem that, unsolved for too long, has become exacerbated, with all the negative develop ments which that entails. The delay has also opened the way for the introduction of new,‘extraneous and irrelevant elements into the question. These elements stem from the escalating conflict between the two super-Powers and from the state of relations between them, which is approaching that of the cold-war years. 17. Right from 25 April 1978, when Prime Minister Vorster declared South Africa’s acceptance .of the plan, Pretoria’s track record shows unmistakably a persistent penchant for bad faith. How else can we explain acceptance of the plan by South Africa in April 1978 and the brutal massacre of hundreds of innocent Namibian refugees at Cassinga the next month, in May, followed in June by a proclamation setting the stage for the holding of provocative, nonsensical internal elections, followed from then on by endless ftivolous arguments about the size of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), monitoring of SWAP0 forces in Angola and Zambia, followed by persistent casting of aspersions on the integrity of the United Nations and its chief executive on the question of impartiality, and insistence on the adoption of constitutional principles incontravention of the plan? And now we are told that in further supplication for South Africa’s co-operation we should acquiesce in the linking of Namibia’s future to the fate of Cuban forces in Angola. Where will it end? 24. But we believe that the question of Namibia is a question of the illegal occupation of a Territory for whose administration the United Nations is responsible. That occupation by South Africa is a breach of international law, of the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations and a glaring act of defiance of. the international will. 25. The question of Namibia is and remains also a question of the racist regime’s insistence on pursuing a policy of repression and terrorism against the indigenous population, against the true owners of the land and of the power. It is, furthermore, a question of aggression carried out against neighbouring African States, which poses a threat to international peace and security. 18. The Council is called upon to reject the intrusion of the linkage issue into the United Nations plan for Namibia, for the issue poses a provocative challenge to the authority of the Council. As the Secretary-General says, “we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)” [S/15943, para. 24. And we agree. The plan is ready for implementation. It has been ready since 1982. 26. It is on that basis and on that basis alone that this issue must be considered, and it is in the context of those premises that all efforts must be focused. It must be recognized that this respected Council and the great majority of the States of the world agree on the same diagnosis. But it is a source of disappointment-nay, of grave concern-that, despite the clarity of its vision, the Council has been unable to take practical steps towards the implementation of its resolutions. That is because certain quarters, which are able to bring effective influence to bear on the Council’s ability to act, are insisting on the inclusion of elements that are extraneous to the essence of the problem and insisting on discussion of these elements as a pm-condition for the resolution of the problem of Namibia. 19. The attempt to hold the future of Namibia hostage to South Africa’s continuous excuses, somersaults, contortions, fabrications and distortions of reality must, we have reason to.expect, also confront our colleagues in the Westem contact group with a very frightening, if not sobering, moment of truth. Throughout the five long years of the existence of the United Nations plan-which originated as the Western plan-we have never ceased to remind thi. Western nations that within their grasp lies a golden opportunity to play a meaningful, constructive role in the decolonization of Namibia. Today, I must submit, we cannot but expect them to watch in horror as this golden opportunity disappears into the sunset. 27. The Secretary-General’s diagnosis of the situation we are facing is correct and was set out clearly in his report prepared pursuant to Council resolution 532 (1983) and after his visits to the parties concerned. In that report the Secretary-General stated that “the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan.” [ibid, para. 25.1 Elsewhere in his report the Secretary-General added that he

The next speaker is the representative of Kuwait. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

The delegation of Kuwait is pleased and proud, Sir, to see you presiding over the Council this month, for in that high post you do honour to sisterly Jordan and to the entire Arab world. We are confident that, with your well-known 29. The United States must realize that forcing this new element into its strategic equations runs counter to the responsibilities it has assumed together with other Western States to resolve the problem in accordance with Council resolution 435 (1978). 30. The price of that strategy is great indeed. It is being paid by the Namibian people because they are being subjected to racist policies of oppression and inhuman measures of repression. They are deprived of the most fundamental human rights. All this is taking place because of the competition between the super-Powers for zones of influence, as though the destinies of peoples, in the opinion of those States, were not worth a grain of salt. . 31. My delegation believes that linking Namibian independence with the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola is in contravention with the letter and spirit of Council resolution 435 (1978). In our opinion, such lin- ‘kage is an intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign State, a State that has of its own free will decided how to defend its territorial integrity against South Africa’s repeated attacks. It is therefore necessary at this critical juncture in the Namibian question to emphasize strongly again the total responsibility of the United Nations as regards Namibian independence. 32. Since the Council has a moral responsibility to implement its resolutions, and since the Council is the main organ responsible for maintaining international peace and security, it must carry out its commitments: it must take the necessary measures within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. We believe that Pretoria’s racist regime will not grant independence and justice to the Namibian people and will not respect intemational legitimacy unless it is forced to do so by the intemational will, the source of legitimate rights. Only the imposition of strong sanctions against the regime will force it to do so. 33. Kuwait believes that, at its present meetings, the Council should take a step forward in implementing its previous resolutions by setting a reasonable time-frame for the implementation of its resolution 435 (1978) and ensuring that forces are joined to ensure its respect. In this we are encouraged by the Secretary-General, who in his report stated that: “However, no one is more aware than I that we cannot claim real progress until an actual date is fixed for 34. Kuwait avails itself of this opportunity to renew its full support for SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, in its, legitimate and just struggle to achieve independence. Kuwait supports the front-line States in their stand v&&is the problem. Kuwait condemns all acts of aggression against them by the Pretoria racist r&ime. . 35. Kuwait calls upon the Council to confront the challenges to its efforts to defend the principles and achieve the objectives set by the international community. 36. The PRESIDENT (in&rcrazion from Arabicj The next speaker is the representative of Sri Lanka. I invite him: to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement. _ -_ .-

Mr. President, at the outset let me thank you and through you the other members of the Council for affording me this opportunity, of addressing the Council on the question of Namibia. Sri Lanka extends its sincere congratuIations and good wishes to you, Sir, on your assuming the presidency of the Council,and its thanks to Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana for his guidance of the Council in September. 38. We are meeting at the bidding of the African Group of States and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. It is good to remind ourselves therefore that this debate, then, is not a casual occasion. It was not the intention of the sponsors of this debate that it be conducted for debate’s sake or prolonged unnecessarily. I shall therefore be brief. 39. The visit of the Secretary-General to southern Africa in response to resolution 532(1983) was a major event and an opportunity for the United Nations to ascertain through the person of its highest executive the true situation regarding the question of Namibia. We are most grateful for the Secretary-General’s excellent report .(S/15943$ Even the representative of the Government of South Africa was constrained to concede that the report represented the correct position regarding the state of progress towards Namibian independence. If the report is in its final analysis rather pessimistic, it has the virtue also of being realistic and will therefore enable us in the present debate not only to take stock accurately of the situation but also to identify, without illusions, what precisely is hindering movement towards Nami.bian independence. 40. Council resolution 435 (1978) was an unusual show of unity on a major issue. It promised much because ali the permanent members of the Council acquiesced in the independence plan it outlined. SWAPO, the national liberation movement of Namibia, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the non-aligned countries-indeed, the entire international community-accepted, at least for a time, 41. The Secretary-General reported that his prolonged and intensive consultations have resulted, so far as’ UNTAG is concerned, in resolving “virtually all the outstanding issues”. He came to the conclusion that, in fact, “we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)” [ibid., para. 24. Suprisingly enough, the representative of South Africa said just as much at the 2481st meeting. What is, then, obstructing Namibian independence is clearly something totally out of the context of, if not irrelevant to, resolution 435 (1978), upon which the entire international community, including South Africa, predicated Namibian independence. 42. South Africa talks of securing the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition to be ful-, filled before it gives the independence plan a real chance to work. The South African representative told us on 20 October that “the South African Government’s position on the question of Cuban withdrawal is acknowledged and has support within the international community” [S/PV.2481, para. 1491. Perhaps we are entitled to ask whom South Africa has in mind when it speaks of having support within the international community. Cuban troops were present in Angola well before the adoption of resolution 435 (1978). The question of these troops did not figure in negotiations leading to the resolution. It is difficult not to question the South African Government’s bona tides when time and again we find that whenever the Namibian question is on the verge of solution the South African Government invariably finds a fresh excuse to defer its co-operation. 43. South Africa has also cast doubt on the impartiality of the United Nations and its capability of supervising’ Namibia’s march towards independence. Now we find that South Africa’s complaint is confined to this: that certain United Nations bodies are biased in favour of SWAPO. It has been South Africa that has reneged on all its promises. The United Nations can do no more than create conditions under which an act of self-determination can be exercised as a pre-condition for independence. The imputation that the United Nations is biased is an insult to all its Members as well as to its Secretariat of independent international civil servants. The United Nations truly cannot tilt in favour of South Africa-for it appears to be this that South Africa wants. 44. The Council’s message to South Africa should be 49. clear and unequivocal: that-a linkage cannot now be made It is for these reasons that the United States especialiy welcomes this opportunity for the Council once between the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and again to exercise its responsibility for Namibia and to implementation of resolution 435 (1978). That resolution is review developments in the negotiations being conducted self-sufficient and the provisions in it are all that is pursuant to Council resolution 435 (1978) since the Counrequired for the exercise of the right of self-determination cil’s last discussion in May. On that occasion, the Council for the Namibian people, the creation of appropriate conwas able to hear directly from the principal parties to the 5 1 45. If I keep my assurance to the Council that this statement would be brief, that does not imply any less a commitment on the part of Sri Lanka to the Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO. I should like to reiterate Sri Lanka’s solidarity with the struggle of the Namibian people for the establishment of a free, unified and independent Namibia. We appeal to those States that are of greater consequence than we to prevail upon South Africa to heed not merely the voice of the international community but also the voice of reason by permitting the full implementation of resolution 435 (1978) without delay and without the imposition of extraneous pre-conditions and obstacles.

May I begin this our first intervention this month by cbngratulating you, Sir, on your accession to the presidency, and by expressing my Government’s confidence in your judgement, integrity and objectivity-all of which we know have already been and will continue to be evident in your conduct of the Council’s business. I would also express our approval and gratitude-already abundantly expressed here-to the representatives of Guyana for their most expeditious and excellent conduct of the Council’s affairs last month. 47. The tragic events in Beirut yesterday testify to the dangerous point to which international issues can grow if left to fester unresolved. Unfortunately, the people of southern Africa are no strangers to such unhappyindeed, tragic-scenes. It is our special responsibility as members of this august body to confront the problems of our world in a timely, realistic and responsible manner. This is not easy, for many factors work against anyone who assumes seriously the task of peacemaker. 48. Certainly the members of the Council and the leaders of the front-line States, as well as those of the contact group, have expended great effort in the search for a way to bring Namibia to a peaceful independence. We have come very close to our goal, but we have not yet succeeded. Meanwhile our frustrations mount, and the call for violent solutions grows louder. In times like these I believe that a special value attaches to clear assessment, to the skills of diplomacy and statesmanship, of our political leaders. It is our responsibility to help the people of the world to see better where we are and how far we have come so that they will renew their commitment to the goal of a prompt and peaceful settlement of this terribly troubled and important issue, and not from despair cast aside the agreements already so painfully reached. 50. The Secretary-General’s achievements have been ‘noteworthy. My Government welcomes his interest and his continued involvement in our efforts to reach our common goal. In his report to the Security Council [S/15943], the Secretary-General described in detail his discussions in South Africa, Namibia and Angola, underscoring both the very significant achievements of his trip and the obstacle that still stands in the way of a settlement. The United States attaches the highest importance to the results of the Secretary-General’s discussions with the South African Government. In the course of those talks very real progress was made on issues that had until then remained unresolved over the years. Notably, all questions regarding UNTAG that had a direct bearing on the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) have now, as we understand it, been cleared up. The South African Government has also affirmed its commitment to indicate at an early date, prior to implementation, its choice of an electoral system. We regard this as important forward progress. The South African Government has also stated unequivocally that it now has no question or reservations regarding the impartiality of the United Nations in the settlement process. These are significant accomplishments which have contributed in important ways to building a climate conducive to a peaceful settlement of the Namibia conflict. 51. Similarly, my Government welcomes the Secretary- General’s report that SWAP0 President Nujoma, in his meeting with the Secretary-General in Luanda, reaffirmed that his organization was ready to sign a cease-fire and to move forward on implementation on the basis of the agreements that have been reached [ibid, pura. 24. 52. Although the Secretary-General’s initiative in southem Africa measurably advanced the negotiations, hi report to the Council also made clear that there does remain one issue standing in the way of implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978): South Africa’s position regarding the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. This put into focus the frustration widespread in Africa, felt most sharply among the front-line States that have worked so hard and so long on the Namibia process. That an issue outside the scope of resolution 435 (1978) is delaying our common objective is obviously a matter of frustration. The United 53. The problem of cross-border violence in southern Africa is of deep concern to us all. We are working toward a peaceful resolution of the region’s differences and have urged and will continue to urge military restraint. We do not believe there are military solutions to the conflicts afflicting the States of this troubled region. Our policies are premised on the belief that negotiated solutions are both possible and essential. As we have said in the past, cross-border violence cannot be condoned, whether it be in the form of a bomb placed in a crowded square in Pretoria by externally-based organizations or in the form of the continuing violation of the territorial integrity of Angola by South Africa’s forces. 54. Many speakers in this debate have stated their concern over the amount of time it has taken to move the negotiations as far as they have come. The truth is that the complex issues directly relating to the United Nations plan have required the most delicate negotiation. With the results of the Secretary-General’s trip there is today virtually complete agreement on the basis for implementation of resolution 435 (1978). It is also equally clear that there can be no final resolution of the Namibia question without the co-operation of the parties most directly involved. 55. During the May debate, the position of my Government regarding these negotiations was made clear to the Council. There has been progress since then. As the Secretary-General’s report makes clear, at the same time our basic position has not changed, and I will restate that position today. 56. The United States neither seeks nor desires any special advantage or position for itself in the negotiations. It is not our intention, nor is it within our power, to impose our views or wishes on the parties whose interests and aspirations are most directly involved. We fully respect the fact that the political decisions needed to proceed with implementation of the United Nations plan are sovereign decisions that can be taken only by the Governments most immediately and directly concerned. We further recognize 63. The international community’s concern for the delay in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) was very strongly stressed at the Council meetings last May, which resulted in the adoption of resolution 532 (1983). The mandate given to the Secretary-General by the Council in its resolution 532 (1983) was in response to that international concern. 57. While Namibian independence is not yet within our grasp, it is within our sight, doubling our impatience but also redoubling our commitment. The United States is convinced that the will for a settlement is present on all sides, in no small part based on recognition of the imminent dangerous alternative of an escalating cycle of destructive violence. The future of the people of Namibia, for which the United Nations and the Council bear unique responsibility, depends on our working together to keep the negotiating process firmly on track. The United States continues to stand ready to work closely with other members of the Council and with other parties to hasten the day when an independent Namibia can take its place among us as a sovereign State. Until that day, it is to each of us to think how best we can contribute to that achievement. 64. We note from the Secretary-General’s report on his visit to South Africa, Namibia and Angola that all outstanding issues relevant to Council resolution 435 (1978) have virtually been resolved. That statement by the Secretary-General was confirmed by the representative of South Africa in his statement of 20 October 1983 before the Council. In his statement, the representative of South Africa clearly stated that his Government had agreed to hold discussions with the Secretary-General in order to attempt to resolve “the remaining outstanding issues to be addressed in the context of resolution 435 (1978), namely, the choice of the electoral system and some problems relating to the composition of UNTAG.” [2#8Zsl meeting, para. 146.1 Referring to the report of the Secretary-General, the representative of South Africa confirmed that those two issues had now been resolved as far as South Africa was concerned. He added that certain outstanding matters regarding the agreement on the status of UNTAG had also been resolved. [ibid., para. 147.1

The next speaker is the representative of Zambia. I invite him to take a place at. the Council table and to make his statement.

Sir, when I addressed the Council at the 2481st meeting, I conveyed to you the congratulations of the United Nations Council for Namibia on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. I now have the pleasure of conveying to you the congratulations of the Zambian delegation. We are pleased to see you presiding over the Council because you represent a country, Jordan, which is a staunch sup porter of the cause of the people of Namibia. 65. It is significant that the representative of South Africa made it clear in his statement that the remaining outstanding issues, in his words, “in the context of resolution 435 (1978)“, had been the choice of the electoral system and some problems relating to the composition of UNTAG. Equally significant and welcome was the confirmation by South Africa that these issues had now been resolved. 60. May I also, on behalf of the Zambian delegation, pay a tribute to your predecessor, MF. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, who presided over the work of the Council last month with distinction. 66. The South African reuresentative also said that his Government remained filly committed to seeking a peaceful settlement of the question of Namibia on the basis of Council resolution 435 (1978) “within the framework of the understandings reached with the United States and the Western contact group”. He added that it was in furtherance of that commitment that his Government had agreed to hold discussions with the Secretary-General. [ibid., para. Z46.1 61. My delegation is grateful to the Security Council for allowing us to participate in thii important meeting on Namibia. We do so subsequent to important statements made by eminent African and other non-aligned spokesmen. Those who preceded me, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia and the Secretary for Foreign Relations of SWAPO, the sole and authentic rcpresentative of the Namibii people, have ably articulated the is& at hand and indicated what the international community in general and the people of Namibia in particular seek in this debate. I do not intend to repeat in detail the ground already covered by them. 67. We do not know what the “understandings” referred to by the South African representative are. Whatever they are, if they are outside the framework of resolution 435 (1978), they certainly cannot commit the United Nations. In any event, it is gratifying that the Secretary-General’s visit to South Africa resulted in resolving those matters within the framework of resolution 435 (1978) relevant to the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia. That indeed is our interest. We are concerned with and must deal only with matters that are within the scope of resolution 435 (1978) leading to the attainment by the Namibian people of their long-delayed independence. 62. The point of departure in this debate is the report of the Secretary-General [ibid], which he submitted to the Council pursuant to paragraph 5 of its resolution 532 (1983). That Council resolution was yet another attempt to accelerate the independence of Namibia through the imple- 69. Prior to the commencement of the plan, however, it is only logical that South Africa should be asked to indicate, without delay, its choice of the electoral system to be used in Namibia. The position of SWAP0 on the question of the electoral system is well known. It has shown great flexibility in this regard, all in the interest of the speedy implementation of the United Nations plan. 70. On the other hand, the South African position on this matter has remained a secret. As it is necessary that the electoral system should be known before the Council adopts an enabling resolution for the emplacement of UNTAG in Namibia, South Africa’s hitherto secret choice should now be revealed. It is only fair that all the Namibian people, and indeed the United Nations, should be informed of South Africa’s preferred choice of electoral system. South Africa should no longer keep the international community guessing as to what its intentions are on this matter. The secret must be unveiled without any further delay. 71. This brings me to the disturbing question of the linkage being insisted upon by South Africa between Namibia’s independence and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. While South Africa states, on the one hand, that i&ues “in the context” of resolution 435 (1978) have been resolved, it insists, on the other, “that it will not be possible to put into practice any settlement plan unless a clear agreement is reached on Cuban withdrawal’*. South Africa tells us that it is “irrevocably committed on this issue” and that its position on the question of Cuban withdrawal “is acknowledged and has support within the international community*’ [ibid.. para. 149.1 72. This position of South Africa is self-contradictory. It is a. graphic demonstration of the mentality of the South African regime. As my Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Goma, stressed in his statement in the general debate at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the claimed linkage being insisted upon by South Africa is unquestionably illegal, irrational, irrelevant and diversionary.’ .’ 73. It stands to reason, therefore, that Zambia finds the South African position totally unacceptable. Moreover, the claim that the position of South Africa enjoys support within the international community is ridiculous. It is well known that the overwhelming majority of the world’s countries and peoples have rejected the linkage issue with the contempt it deserves. Only one country is known to share publicly this position of linkage with the racist regime of South Africa. It would appear that the South African regime has a distorted conception of the term “international community*.‘, which it evidently defines 74. The continued stress on linkage between Namibia’s independence and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola in fact raises serious questions concerning South Africa’s sincerity in its purported commitment to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). Linkage may well turn out to be a treacherous negation by South Africa of its professed commitment to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). 75. Zambia maintains that the insistence on the nonissue of linkage, or parallelism, constitutes blatant interference in the internal affairs of Angola. It is highly ironic that this linkage, which was not envisaged in resolution 435 (1978), should now be introduced in order to stall further progress towards Namibia’s independence. As is well known, the linkage issue was not the brain-child of South Africa; rather a member of the Western contact group, which initiated the plan for the independence of Namibia under resolution 435 (1978), contrived the linkage issue, the effect of which has been to prevent the implementation of that plan, thus delaying the independence of Namibia. By actively colluding with South Africa on the linkage issue, a member of the contact group has worked to prevent the implementation of the United Nations plan it had helped to initiate. 76. The position of the United States on the linkage issue is disturbing, to say the least. It is most unfortunate that a super-Power should seek to inject its own strategic and ideological preoccupations into a purely decolonization matter. The independence of Namibia must not be held hostage to super-Power geopolitical concerns. The question of Namibia must be dealt with purely in the context of decolonization. It should not be confused with irrelevant and extraneous issues which have absolutely nothing to do with the Namibian people. 77. Zambia calls upon the Council to reject categorically the non-issue of linkage, as it is incompatible with resolution 435 (1978). We hope that, for their own credibility and, indeed, in the interest of justice and fair play, the members of the contact group on Namibia will have the courage of their convictions, m-examine their position on this matter and identify themselves fully with such a Council position. 78. The representative of South Africa in his statement had the audacity-nay, the arrogance and impudence-to declare: “Therefore, it would be futile for the Security Council to attempt to set any deadlines or time-frames for implementation until the matter of the Cuban presence in Angola has been resolved, and it should be understood that South Africa would not accept any such deadlines.” [ibid, para. M.] 79. What could be futile about setting a deadline or a time-frame for the implementation of the plan in view of the fact that South Africa has conceded that the remaining relevant issues have been resolved7 Is it not the next logical 80. in conclusion, I wish to reiterate Zambia’s condemnation of the racist regime of South Africa for the perpetration of a dastardly act of aggression against Mozambique on 17 October 1983. Repeated South African acts of aggression. against and destabilization of front-line and other independent African States in the region clearly demonstrate the threat to international peace and security that the upurzheid system represents. .The aggressive posture and designs of the Pretoria r&me cannot and will not be concealed by its often-repeated protestations against the so-called spread of communism in southern Africa. 81. The crimes of the apartheid r6gime against the oppressed people and sovereign and independent African States in the region only strengthen the resolve of our peoples to eradicate, once and for all, the scourge of apmt- .heid and racist minority rule. South Africa’s alarmist rhetoric about the spread of the communist bogey will deceive no one. The problems of our region do not stem from communism. The absence of peace and security in southem Africa is a direct consequence of the policies and practices of apartheid of the, South African r6gime. ‘_ - 82. The PRESIDENT (ihterpretation frum Arabic): The next speaker is the representative of the German Democratic Republic, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic would like at the outset, Sir, to express its congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of October. Your great diplomatic skills will no doubt contribute to discharging the responsible tasks facing the Council. 84. Our thanks go also to your of the Council for the month of sp redecessor, the President eptember, the representative of Guyana. 85. Once again the Council has to deal with the question of Namibia. We are confronted with the fact that no progress has yet been made in finding a solution to this issue. My delegation has closely followed the important debate held so far. The statement at the 248lst meeting by the representative of SWAPO, Mr. Peter Mueshihange, clearly demonstrated. the disastrous consequences for the Namibian people of the fact that they are denied independence and the right to self-determination. At the same time, the . dangers to the stability ot the situation in southern Africa as 87. As early as 1976, the Council, in its resolution 385 (1976), had proposed a programme for the solution of the question of Namibia. Resolution 435 .(1978), which was adopted two years later, was praised by Western States as a “%uccess” of the self-appointed contact group. However, the moment concrete steps towards the implementation of the resolution had to be taken, one member of the group, in conspiracy with South Africa, raised artificial obstacles. Suddenly, insurmountable difficulties seemed to come up as regards the election system and the composition of UNTAG, and the competence of the United Nations was called into question. The solution to the question of Namibia was made dependent on issues having nothing to do with the matters laid down in resolution 435 (1978)..The unjustified .linkage was almost unanimously rejected during the general debate of the tbirtyeighth session of the General Assembly. 88. There is no lack of attempts by the closest partners of Pretoria to block the implementation of decisive measures to be taken by the United Nations against the terror r&ime in South Africa and even to divest the Organization of its responsibility for finding a solution to the Namibia issue and confront it with a fait accompli. This fully accords with South Africa’s efforts to achieve so-called internal settlements. Five years ago there was the holding of pseudoelections. They were declared null and void in Council resolution 439 (1978) Today, when the “Tumhalle Alliance” has come to a shameful end, the Administrator- General plans to set up a Council of State, whose only function would be to maintain the currently prevailing conditions of exploitation and South -Africa’s hegemony over Namibia. The German Democratic Republic strongly condemns such attempts to undermine the United Nations plan for a solution to the question of Namibia. 89. All manoeuvres undertaken by the United States and other Western countries to delay the granting of independence to Namibia are determined by their wide interests in southern Africa. What matters to them is the preservation, and possible strengthening, of the apartheid regime as a bastion of imperialist policy in that region, as well as the continued exploitation of @human and natural resources of Namibia. This constitutes an open affront to world public opinion, and at the same time.does harm to the reputation of the Council, as the respective States act arbitrarily against resolutions adopted by the United Nations. 91. The people and Government of the German Democratic Republic vigorously condemn Pretoria’s most recent barbaric attack, against Maputo, the capital of Mozambique. 92. The diplomatic collusion of imperialist States with South Africa .k accompanied by otirt political, economic and military com@licity. Let me recall the fify-milliondollar deal that was concluded only a few weeks ago between United States corporations and Pretoria with the express approval of the United States Administration. That deal enables the racists in South Africa to step up further their plans to acquire nuclear weapons. We also notice with great concern that, as can be seen from documents provided by SWAPO, the puppets retained by Pretoria will be directly financed under the cover of so-called Western European development aid to Namibia. 93. Considering all the problems in connection with the whole issue, the question must be put of how the right of Namibia to independence can be exercised. We hold the view that, in its relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), the Council has provided a clear programme to that end. It is imperative that the United Nations-and particularly the Council-meets its full responsibility for the solution of the question’of Namibia and for the implementation, in letter and in spirit, of the resolutions, adopted. 94. In addition to this, the immediate termination of all collaboration with Pretoria, the strengthening and strict observance of the arms embargo, and the imposition of effective sanctions in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations would constitute decisive steps towards the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia. It is, furthermore, important to provide extensive assistance to SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, in its courageous struggle. 95. Furthermore, in the documents adopted at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non- Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March 1983 and at the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People. for Independence, held in Paris in April 1983, it was stated that it is not the few imperialist countries that will bring about a solution to &he Namibian problem, but the joint action of the Members of the United Nations. 96. In the communiqut of the meeting of the Committee of Ministers fqr Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the 97. That is a substantial aspect of socialist foreign policy. In the future, the German Democratic Republic will continue as in the past to side with the Namibian people and to provide political and material assistance to their liberation organization, SWAPO. The German Democratic Republic will, furthermore, continue to support all United Nations activities aimed at granting independerice to Namibia and-. the right of selfdetermination to its people.

‘The next speaker is the representative of Tunisia who wishes to make ‘a statement in his capacity as Chairman for the month of October of the Group of Arab States. I invite him to take a place at the Council tabfe and to make his statement. 99. Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) {interpretation from Arabic): Mr. President, I should like first of all to thank you and the other members of ihe Council for allowing me to make ‘a statement in my capacity as representative of Tunisia-and as Chairman for the month of Octobei of the Group of Arab States. 100. The fact that the Council’s ‘consideration of the question of Namibia-that is, of th.e fulfilment of the legitimate aspiratio-ns of a people to independence and freedom-is taking place under your presidency, Sir, is both reassuring and comforting to us. You are one of us: the representative of a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, of a fraternal Arab country which also finds itself on the front lines, faced by a colonial situation and supporting a struggle for right and justice. No one could understand better than you the struggle of the Namibian people or could better lead the Council to put a final end to the aims of the occupier, the designs of the oppressor and the arrogance of the aggressor. Your personal qualities as an experienced diplomat well-versed in international affa$s, as well as your reputation in the Council, reassure us as to the ’ outcome of the present deliberations. 101. Allow me also to convey to your predecessor, Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, our warmest gratitude for the exemplary way in which he conducted the Council deliberations during the particularly busy month of September. 102. In referring to the question of Namibia before the General Assembly on 28 September last, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia stated the following: “On the African continent there still persists an anachronistic problem which threatens ultimately to become the most .resounding failure of this Organization, of the principles it advocates and indeed of international tegality itself. This is the question of Namibia, which is still under the yoke of illegal occupation and’the worst type of colonialism. 103. It is in thii spirit that we have come to the Council today. It is not our intention to plead an unknown cause, because the cause of the Namibian people and their battle for dignity and freedom has reached everywhere and become known to everyone. We seize this opportunity to ask their sole representative, SWAPO, to convey to the Namibian people once again our admiration and our solidarity. 104. In his remarkable report, the Secretary-General, whose objectivity, clear-sightedness and courage deserve our praise, brought up an important point when he said that “the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a precondition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan.” [S/15943, para. 25.1 In the very same report the Secretary- General adds that he will not accept linkage of the two questions. That is clear and unambiguous. 105. Thus we find ourselves faced with a new obstacle deliberately placed in the way of the persistent efforts undertaken to implement resolution 435 (1978). What so far has been the reaction to this new challenge of “linkage*‘? 106. At the nineteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU, held at Addis Ababa in June 1983, Africa condemned that concept. The non-aligned countries denounced that concept at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government, held at New Delhi in March 1983. At its thirty-seventh session, the General Assembly rejected the concept. One of the members of the contact group and a permanent member of the Security Council, France, has categorically rejected it. We expect the other members of the contact group to put an end to the ambiguity that has been maintained on this extraneous element with regard to the settlement plan that they themselves initiated. We expect those who within the contact group have made the freedom of peoples a profession of faith to match words with deeds, and principles with realities. Freedom is indivisible and can never be selective. 107. The present deliberations of the Council present an opportunity for decisive clarification of the responsibilities of each party. 108. For our part, we wish to restate here our total rejeo tion of this form of bargaining whereby an attempt is made to establish a link between the legitimate accession 109. In this respect, it is important to note that this artificial concept of linkage has cropped up after other equally artificial pretexts have been used long enough to delay settlement of the Namibian problem. This stems from the now well-known delaying techniques used and recognized in southern Africa, as also in the Middle East, which, under the pretext of some strategic role, enable the occup ier and the aggressor to act with ever-increasing impunity and to side-step or neutral& any criticism that may appear in the West. 110. In passing from hand to hand the well-known recipes that guarantee the connivance if not the blessing of their allies, the Tel Aviv and Pretoria regimes every day increase their oppression of the Palestinian and Namibian peoples under the pretext of fighting against what they call the terrorists, meaning the Palestine Liberation Organization and SWAPO. They try and outdo each other in their aggressions against the peoples of southern Africa and the Middle East, striking in Angola and Mozambique at one time, in Lebanon and Iraq at another. Using the pretext of security, they occupy parts of the territories .of sovereign States Members of the United Nations, as, for example, Angola, Syria and Lebanon. Yet again, within independent countries, they carry out manoeuvres aimed at destabilization by fanning antagonisms and handing out arms to their rival factions. Both regimes have used the same combat, the same strategy, the same techniques and the same language of force under the fallacious pretext that their security has been threatened. 111. This is a curious concept of security invoked by the very ones who in their respective regions seek and boast of military supremacy, who receive from their allies massive amounts of armaments and who even receive assistance in the manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons. This eccentric notion gives rise to the question: Why is this concept of security not to be applied to the other countries which maintain a peaceful attitude in both regions? 112. The report of the Secretary-General, which is now before the Council, among other things draws our attention to the critical economic and social situation of the Namibian people. One must therefore ask oneself if this is one of the reasons behind the delay of Namibian independence. But where are Namibia’s natural resources? While it is known that Namibia is the world’s fourth largest producer of uranium and the sixth largest producer of diamonds, that its land holds immense reserves of petroleum, lead, copper, zinc and silver, and that it has an agricultural surplus, we also know that the gap between the gross domestic product and the national income in Namibia stems, inter alia, from the outgoing capital in the form of profits. This is the most apparent indication of the extent the pillage of this Territory has reached, despite Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, enacted by the United Nations Council for Namibia.4 Can one not then say that the delay in granting 113. How many violations have we seen committed? How many violations of principles and of law7 How many violations of the rights, resources and territories of human. beings? How long will we go on tolerating this situation? How long will it take for the Council-the guarantor of peace and security and the guarantor, according to its own resolutions, of Namibia’s independence-to shoulder its responsibilities and adopt the necessary measures? 114. After the failure, in January 1981, of the Geneva pre-implementation meeting, caused by South Africa’s fallacious pretext about partiality by the United Nations, angry Africa turned to the Security Council in April 1981 and called for sanctions and refiaration. At that time, the Council demonstrated particular partiality by using the veto under the pretext that Africa and the non-aligned were seeking confrontation. ” . 115. In Mav 1983. at the reouest of both the Seventh Conference of Heads of State-or Government of Non- Aligned Countries and the OAU, recourse was again had to the Council, with the fullest possible sense of measure and moderation and with the hope. of being heard.’ It is true that the Council adopted resolution 532 (1983). But what has South Africa’s reaction been to that show of moderation? The Secretary-General’s report clearly shows us that there has been no change whatsoever in South Africa’s attitude. 116. Today we come back to the Council, with the Secretary-General’s report in hand. That report says, among other things, that “we have never before been so 117. What will the Security Council’s attitude be this time? Will it make the necessary effort to bring South Africa to the negotiating table? What will be the attitude of the various members of the contact group? Will some continue to support the untenable? Or will they bring to bear the required pressure that we expect from them-if necessary, resorting to the only methodof taking away from South Africa the means by which it pursues its policy of defiance and arrogance, meaning the imposition of sanctions provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations? 118. In reaffirming once again our endorsement of resolution 435 (1978) and in calling again for its implementation without any further delay, we expect the Council to reject categorically any artificial element that is extraneous to this resolution and to set a clear and tinal time-limit for South Africa to begin co-operating sincerely in the application of the independence plan for Namibia. Once that time-limit had run out, the Council would automatically have recourse to the sanctions providedfor in the Charter. . l%e meeting rose at 6 p.m. NOTES ’ Oflicial Records of the General Assembly, Tirirty-eighth Session, plenary Meetings, 12th meeting, para. 112. * See A/C.1/38/6, p. 7. ’ Offia[ Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings, 10th meeting, paras. 221 and 222. ’ Ibid., Thirtyfifth Sessioh. Supplement No. 24, vol. I, annex II. 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