S/PV.249 Security Council

The information which 1 have with regard to the meetings of the Interiœ Committee is that meetings· are planned both for Thursday and Frlday in the momings. Whether they will continue in the aftemoons is something Ido not know. It sooms to me that because of the fact that members of the Security Council are committed also to being present at meetings of the Interim Committee, and because it is important that we should get on both with the Indonesian question and with the India-Pakistan case, we should accept the disadvantage, if 1 May say so to the representative of France, of meeting tomorrow moming on the Indonesian question and contiquing in the aftemoon on the India-Pakistan case. 1 am told that the meeting in the aftemoon will commence with a statement by the representative of Pakistan to be followed, very probably, by a statement by the representative of India, and that those statements may well take up most of the meeting. Accordingly, and with. great deference to the representative of France, 1still suggest that we should meet tomorrow on the Indonesian question at 10.30 a.m. and continue with the India-Pakistan case in the aftemoon. renseignements conceme les séances les ~t"~ndredi suivront sont que indonésienne Pakistan, puis la nous question indonésienne, de mencera Pakistan, déclaration fort grande toute tant nous de pour tions, As there ar.e no objections to that procedure, it will be considered as adopted. The meetfrlg rose p,t 5.15 p.m. TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY- NINTH MEETING .Held at Lake Success, New York, c.! Wednesday, 18 February 1948, a~ 10.30 a.m. .President:. General McNAUGHTON (Canada). Argentine, France, d'Ukraine, tiques, Present: The represen.tatives of the foUowing countries: Argentina, Belgium,. Canada, China, ~olombia, France, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Social- 18t Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 23. Adoption of the agenda 24. Continuation of the discussion of the Indonesian question At the invitation of the President, Mr. Justice Richard C. Kirby, member of the Security Council Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question, and the oth,er members of the Committee,· and Mr. P. P. Pillai, representative of India; Mr. E. N. van KlefJens, representative or the Netherlands," Major Antonio Chanco, represen- tative of the Philippines,' Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, representative of the Republic of Indonesia,· and MT. William D. Forsyth, representative ofAustralia, took their places at the Council table. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translatedfrom Russian): The United Nations has been considering the question of the situation in Iûdonesia aImost since its very beginning. We know that the Security Council consideredtbisproblem at the beginning of 1946 iuLondon [l2th meeting], at therequest of the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. 2 It was clear even then that the situation in 11ldonesia was. fraught with serious. cOI;lSe- quences and that the Security Conncil should therefore takc effective steps to improve it. Even then the representatives of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR.were .drawing the attention of the Security Couneil to the fact that military operations were being conducted in îndonesia by the· Netherlands and the United Kingdom with a view to throttling the nationalliberation move- ment of the Indonesianpeople, and tbat Nether- lands, British and even Japanese troops were being .used for -these purposes against the Indo- nesians, ·a fact·which, in itself, called for serious actionby the Security Council. It was also pointed out that the situation in Indonesia might become even more serious for the whole cause of main- taining peace and security, unless urgent and effective measures were taken. The USSR.repre- sentative drew the Council's special attention to the fact. that, according to information widely publicized ID the world Press, the Netherlands Government was preparing to take military action on an evenwider scale in Indonesia to crush the Indonesian· people's struggle for its independence. It was clear even then that the Netherlands was preparing large contingents of armed forces to be sent to Indonesia, and that these contingents were being issued with the most up-to-date démo~ratiques saisi demandaient: Unies se tous la de cipale prendre les mesures adéquates. lie ments miner Indonésie, Conseil saires landais Des question, de que gouvernements préoccupaient sion les intérêts·légitimes d'une Unfortuuately, these hopes werenot fulfilled. From the beginning ofthe Council's consideration -of this problem after receipt of the communica- tions in question from India and AustraJia, it became clear that the Couneil, or rather, some -ofthe States represented on the Council. were not at all concerned to put a stop to Dutch aggression in Indonesia and to safeguard the legitinlate interests of the Indonesian people, which had become the victim of unprovoked armed aggres- :sion. We allremember that at. the fust meetings at whieh the Security Couneil discussed the Indian mières and Australian request, --serious divergencies rité became apparent between the various States de represented on the Council, bothon the question entre ·of appraising the situation which had arisen in Conseil, Indonesia and on the mcans which the CouDeil créée 'Should use to rectify that·situation. The USSR le .and Poland pointed out at the .time that the Dès Netherlands action constituted aggression and déjà that the Security .Ccuncil should talce urgent agression measures to put an end to such action, although prendre. des the representative of the USSR never doubted fin.' ~hat the Netherlands would find supporters even cependant 1ll the Security Council. In its ânxiety to maintain trouver peace,. the Govemment of the USSR then put de forward [172nd meeting], as a minimumrequire" . la ment, the withdrawal of the troops of bothparties muléuneexigenceminimum to the positions they had held before military des operations in Indonesia began. paient. en ,It would seem obvions to anyone Who did not ~lsh deliberately to close IDS eyes to the position proposition mIndonesia, but· ~$hed to improve .it, that this ceux. pro~osal was well founded. ~It shouldsurely be la 01bVlOUS toeveryone that the proposaI was the very liorer. east which, the Security Council should have représenterait adopted immediately, before deciding to take le further steps tosettle a number of other important adopter, Organi2'.ation~ that it would aet as it saw fit, and that any decision of the Security Council with which the Netherlands Govemment did not agree would be ignored. That is what Mr. van Kleffens toldus in the Security Council. These statements by the Netherlands represen- tatives and the sympathetic reception given to them by certain States in themselves constituted a dangerous situation. They gave serious food for thought to those who genuinely respected, and still respect, the authority of the United Nations as an instrument in the struggle for peace. It was becoming evident, even then, that the Security COlmcil might not have suffieient courage to put a stop to open aggression by one State against another, and that tbis might reflect seriously upon its authority as an organ responsible for preventing breach~s of the peace, and putting an end to them if they did occur. We all remember the results of the conflicting stand taken on this question by the various States represented on the Security Council. As a result of this difference of opinion, the USSR proposal for withdrawing the troops of both parties was not adopted. The rejection of this proposaI, apart from proving the Security Council's inability to take effective measures against Netherlands aggres- sion, had the effect that the situation in Indonesia not only' did not improve but, on the contrary: deteriorated, since Netherlands troops continued to occupy more and more territory in Indonesia, annexing economically and strategically important regions and dealing increasingly heavy blows to the Republic. The situation became even more complicated when the Couneil failed to adopt another impor- tant USSR proposaI [194th meeting], namely, to set up a Security Council commission which would ensure th: implementation of the Council's cease-fire order of 1 August 1947 [document 8/459]. This propQsaI secured the requisite majority but was not adopted because France, a permanent illember of the Security Council, voted against it. Thus, the Security Council failed to adopt any of the minimum, but nevenheless effective, propo- saIs which would have secured the enforcement During the discussion of the proposaI to set up that 'Commission, the representative of tùe USSR pointed out that we could not place reliance on that Commission, whatever might be the individual qualities of its various members. It was not difficult to realize that the very fact that among the members of the Commission were represen- tatives of States which had, in one way or another, taken a pro-Netherlands position in this question, p:1yed into the hands ofthe Netherlands. Irrespec- tiyt; of how conscientious an attitude a particular member of the Commission took towards enfor- cem.ent of the Security Council resolution, the Netherlands exploited this circunstance in its own interests, confident that the Commission would nat particularly object. The subsequent course of events justified the hopes of the Netherlands. .' .Finally, the situation became even more compli- catedbecause of the fact that the Security Council, again as a result of the stand taken by certai'l States, failed to take any decision whatever on ~he setting up of a Security Council organ, which would investigate the situation in Indonesia,· ensure the enforcement of the cease-fue order and settle other problems arising out of the Indonesian situation. ' . ,'The so-called Committee of Good O'ffices, or Committee of Three, as it is otherwise caUed, is not really an organ of the Secu.city Council, even from the point of view of the principle on the basis of which it was set up. Two of its members, Belgium and Australia, were chosen by the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic respec- tively, and the third, the United States ofAmerica, was chosen as a result of an agreement batween the fust two members of the Committee. The decision to set up this Committee [document 8/52511] provided for only a formaI connexion between it and the Security Council. The Com- mittee was to inform the Couneil of its work and !l0 more. As we know, the Committee did not (Jarry out even this requirement. Since the decisions taken by the Security Council On the Indonesian question, consisting in the setting up of the Consular Commission and of the Committee of Good officês, and other actions, ~e absolutely unsatisfactory, the problem of the Sltuation in Indonesia cannot even now be regarded as solved. This may be deduced also frOID the Committee's report submitted for the la ledit plume, le blique, du avant générale Bas cours sécurité négociations, fourni de [document mission un ressort travaux de une mandement systématiquement insuffisantes rité s'agit suspension mandement décision ses Dès Hollandais pratique. Informé Conseil a sur une suspension deuxième changement troupes d'cccuper à eux-mêmes fi tenaient but propre d'affermir 70 rapports Commission de tion dans certains œ"er du hostilités. tions rapport munications - groupe Frankly, before we received the report, did we really know how the negotiations between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic, with the Committee's participation, were being con- ducted? The Security Council knew practicaIly nothing of the course of these negotiations, since it' received no reports from the Committee until these negotiations ended in the so-ealled Renville Agreement of 17 January 1948 [document S/649, appendices XI and XIII]. The Cemmittee con- fronted the Security CouDeil with a fait accompli and, as the report shows. is now attempting to represent the results ofits work as a great achieve- ment in solving the question of the situation in Indonesia. This is obviously an interpretation which we cannot accept. Secondly, the report shows that the Netherlands military command in Indonesia systematically ignored even the inadequate and rather ineffective decisions which the Security Council managed to adopt. This refers, in the mst place, to the cease-me order of 1 August. The Netherlands Military Command disregarded tms decision from the very beginning and continued military opera- tions against the Indonesians in a number of sec- tors. The Security Council was aware from the very outset that the Netherlands was not carrying out that decision. When the Indonesians informed theCouncil of tbis, the Council issued a second cease·me arder [documellt S/512] on 26 August 1947 [195th meeting] on the proposaI of the Polish representative. -It is well known, however, that even after this second order the situation remained unchanged for a considerable period of tllne. Netherlands troops continued to advance and to occupy more and more of the territory of the Indonesian Republic.. The Netherlands authorities them- selves made no secret of the fact that they were disregarding the. Security Council's decision and \Vere pursuing only their own schemes, the purpose of which was to force upon the Indonesians their plan for settling the situation in Indonesia with a view'to strengthening Netherlands domination over the population of 70 million Indonesians. ln this connexion there is very interesting material in the reports of the observatioll teams set up by the Committee of Good Offices to investigate the situation in certajn areas of Indonesia in order to discover how the Security Council's cease-me order wqs being carried out. As if,by .chance, the communications of these groUps have not been inc1111ded in the Commit- tee's report. And yet, these communications -for instance, the report of the observation team which investigated the situation on the ci By 9 September 1947 ... the Netherlands forces... had greatly extended their control beyond the territory occupied by them on 4 August 1947." This means that Netherlands troops continued to annex Indonesian territory on Madura Island ~er the Security Council's cease-fire order. This fact has been proved and frequently confirmed. It \Vas confirmed also by the investigation made on thesp·ot. In the joint report made by the United States andAustralian observers of that team it is stated: " Thus, subsequent t04 August 1947, each party was contending that the actions of the other party justified continued fighting on its part. It is clear that tbis situation could not have developed save for the faet that after adoption ofthe Security Counci1's resolution of 1 August 1947, and after the Netherlands authorities had full knowledge of the adoption of that resolution, Netherlands troQps were for thefirst time landed onMadura... it is equally clear that... Netherlands forces in Madura were never ordet~d to stand fast ..... . It is emphasized in tbe report cf these observers that, even after the Netherlands troops landed on. Madura, Republican troops continued loyally tocomply with the cease-fire order; and this is proved. bya statement madeby General Spoor, himself, the Netherlands officer commanding. when he reported thatbetween 150ctober and 9 November Netherlanos tr90ps on Madura suffered no losses. It is obvious that they suffered no losses merely because the other party, the Indonesians, offered them no resistance, since they werecomplying with the Security Council's oider to stop military operations. The United States and·Australian observers refutetheNetherlands arguments as set forth in the memoranduin of 13 December 1947, alleging that the Netherlands command was obliged to send its troops to Madura Island in order to re-establish order there and put an end to the· persecution of the localpopulation by the Indonesian authorities. The ·observers point out in their communication, in refutàtion of these Netherlands assertions, that the officiais and privateindividuals interrogated by them on Madura testified that there had been no disorder on the island and no cases of perse- cution of the population until the Netherlands began militaryoperations. Thus, the Netherlands assertion was a fabrication. How much real importance can be attached to the statement even of this one person is shown, for instance. by the following statement made by the observers about another such person: " The observers receivedhighly credible evidence that, following the occupation of Sumanep. Netherlands officers ~!)licited, from a person who had mad~ !Ml such request, a letter stating that hft had requested Netherlands forces to OCCUPY Sumanep. Upon bis refusaI, the matter was dropped." As we see, the situation is aImost like that in Greece, where the Greek authorities supplied false witnesses. Bad examples, they say, are contagious. leg~nds of the " humanitarian feelin~'S "cherished fausse by the Dutch for the Indonesians~ by PQinting out· néerlandaise that the actual rationing difficulties snifered by vateurs the population were the fault ofthe Dutch and the ravitaillement result of the economic blockade of Republican été territories which they had instituted. Thus, the les Netherlands authorities fust of all created the soumis rationing difficulties and then made these diffi- que culties a pretext to justi(y their action in grabbing difficultés additional Republican territory. pour justifier nouveaux tiOJ;l forces néerlandaises, après avoir occupé Madoura, ont utilisé les l'UNRRA cains. troupes faiteurs lie rations glément Ds sur des ment: l, '" We cannot join in the flat firiding [of the Belgian report] that the residents of East Madura donnée. welcomed Netherlands troops... Thepecple were 1belge, etselon laquelle afraid of Netherlands troops. AlI the indications aurait accueilli arethatwhat was welcomedwas food and ciothing, Le As regards the promised improvement of the food situation, the Committee's observers found tbat the Dutch, after having occupied Madura, used for this purpose UNRRA funds and the Republican sto.cks of food seized by Netherlands troops. Thus, they turned out to be benefa-.;tors mostly at the expense of othe! people. .Further, the United States and Australian observers decisively refute the statement of their Belgian colleagues, who blindly repeated an the assertions of the Dutch and submitted their own separate report on the results of the investigation. The United States and Australian representatives write as follows: The Australian and United States representa- tives aIso refute the Belgian assertion that the health care ofthe population on Madura improved with the advent of the Netherlands troops. They point out that the situation with regard to health bas not changed: " As before the war, there are now seven doctors on Madura for a population of 2 million or more," The Australian observers in tbis team should be given their due, since they describe in detai1 what they saw and make the following statement in their report: " '" beginning on 9 November. Netherlands armed forces, by hostile action, extended their control over territory... not occupied by such forces on 4 Ailgust 1947; and it sooms therefore ... that the occupation ·of Sumanep Regency by Netherlands forces was inconsistent with the Security Council's Resolution of 1 August." Those were the very words of the report: "... was inconsistent with the Security Council's Resolution of 1 August". Such are the results of the investigation of the situation on the Island of Madura made at the request of the Govemment of the Indonesian Republicby an observation team of the Com- mittoo of Three. .Here is the· report of another observation team sent bythe Committee ofThree, also at the request of the Govemment of the Indonesian Repùblic, ta the village ofRawahgedeh, in Java. The Nether- lands authorities sent a punitive expedition to this village when a Netherlands agent, who had formerly been a Japanese agent, was captured there. As a result of the punitive expedition conducted byNetherlands troops, 150 Indonesians were killed, a,ccording to the Netherlands report, but according to the evidence of local inhabitants, thenumber of persans killed was three times greater thari that figure. .The observation.. tea~ points out that this Netherlands opèration, apart flom " cleaning up " the partisans in the region," aIso aimed at serving as a severe deterrent for the future in "the area ". They writethat this operation was conducted witp. deliberate ctuelty, which is confirmed. by the follow'...ng statement: "There were no. Dutcb casuaIties, either killed or wounded... not one weapon . (firearm) was found on Indonesian prisonersor casualties (eitherdead orwounded)... IlO medical facilities were left,in the\illage for treatment of Indonesians possibly wounded and in hiding." ' . Thus, the operation 'was conducted with great cruelty aild m:;ulted in the brutal extermination of the .population merely ..on suspicion of sym- pathy with or assistance to thé partisan movement. How do .these methods differ from the reprisaIs which the Hitlerites carried out against. peaceful populations, inCluding that of the Netherlands, on suspicion ofhaving helped the partisans? Apparently, the.only differenceis that of magni- tude~ 0' This .report by the second.obserVation team is also: notincluded in the Conunittee's report: There is one important conclusion to be drawn from this. These facts show that the Netherlands authorities, realizing that they would not suffer for their actions, gave practically no heed either to the SecurltyCouncil's decision or to the presence of the Committee of Three in Indonesia. This enabled them to continue military operations virtually unhindered, until all the most important regions of the Indonesian Republic were in their bands. Thirdly, a study of the report and aIso of,the supplementary documents, including the afore- mentioned reports of the observation teams, shows that the Committee of Good Offices failed to exert any real influence on the Dutch. The course of the negotiations between the represen- tatives of the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic under, the auspices of the Committee of Thr~ shows that the Netherlands authorities paid aImost no heed,to the Committee and that the Committee's main functioD was that of liaison between the Dutch and the Indonesians. The report also shows that, whereas the Indone- sians made proposaIs which would have safe- guarded the elementary and legitimate rights of the Indonesian people and protected their interests against the Dutch militarists, the Netherlands authorities regularly used the Committee as a medium for sending ultimatums to the Indone- sians. ~ The proposais of the Netherlands authorities are only a series of ultimatums on which they virtuaUy made no concessions. As an the docu- mentsrelating to the negotiations show, the Committe~'s main funetion was to exercise ,pressure on the Indonesiansinorder to force them to accept these Netherlands ultimatums. Objec- tively speaking, the Committee became the tool of Dutch militarists, who!ie aim'was, at an costs, to break the resistance of the Indonesian peopîe, who were stubbornly trying togain their indepen- dence. 1 could point to a number of factors in support of tms conclusion; For instance, on 10 January 1948, the N.,therlands Government sent an ulti- mahim to the Indonesian Republic demanding that it should adopt' the Netherlands proposaIs, supported by the Committee, on the question of fixing the demilitarized zones. These proposais provided that tlle Netherlands should.1œep aIl the territories it nad occupied, including those be.hind the front linesof Netherlands tl'OOpS still lteld by the ,troops of ,the Indonesian Republiç. The Netherlands military command kept on "èl~ning u~ :' this territory !)f Indonesians and conducting military operations un.der the very nose of the Committee which had b~ninstructed by, the Security Council to see that military operations ceased. As a result of the pressure exerted by the CQmmittee, the Govemmentof the Indonesian Republic was forced to comply. with the Nether- Fourthly, the negotiatj.ons between the Nether- lands and the Indonesian Republic, which '\Vere conducted for several months through the agency of the Committee of Good Offices, ended with the signing of a number of agreements. Let us see what kind of agreements .these are, and whose interests thèy proteet. The truce signed on board the USS Renville on 17 January 1948 [documentSf649, appendix XI] provides "that a stand fast· and cease-fire order he issued... by both parties immediately upon the signing of this agreement".. At first sight it May seem !hatthe Committee hadfinally succeeded in getting the Netherlands authorities toagree to cease military operations and to relieve the posi- tion ofthe Indonesians. In actual.fact, however, this agreement, signed when the Netherlands had alrea,dy' 'achieved its fundamental aims, entirely sQited the inter~sts of -the ,Dutch 'and left the Illdonesian Republic at theiF" merey. In the' first place, the Agre~1ne~.tpro'Vides that the so-ca1led "van Mooklille"; weU known to the Seeurity CounciI, sha11' be reèognized as the frpntier dividing the'territories ofthe two parties. Thus, the Netherlands gotw.hat it wanted. First ofa.ll, it ignored the Seeufity'Counci1's ceaseafire ordèr and annexedmôre and more territory. When it had occupied nearly all the temtory ofthe Iildonesian Republic, except·for some regions of secondary 'eeonomic and strategic importance, it forced on the Indonesians a'Crontier which leavesin the hands of, the Netherlands all t\1e territorf'ithasseized. The Agreement, even pro- vides for Indonèsian troops to evacuate regions far behind the front lines of the Netherlands forces. ,As wesee, the Dutch not on1y forced the Indonesians out of their oWn house, but also forced them to c1ean up thathouse and put it in t>r.operorderso that thenew occupants should suffer ,the least possible discomfort. The acceptance, of the "van Mook lille" means that the Netherlands controIs the richest oil andrubber regions of Java arid Sumatra, wmch'had been seized by its troops. the year bëfore. The Netherlands controls the whole of theeast~m and ,western parts of'Java, thenorth of central Java, aU themostimportantrubber p1l:!-ntations on the east coast of.Sumatra, the oil tegions or southern Sumatra, and the, west coast of Sumatra in the Padang area.. The Indonesian Republicholds on1y a sma.ll part, of central Java and thehilly interiorof Sumatra. ,'" J'his is the Agreement which the Conmlittee of Three is trying to represent as a serious ac~eve­ ment in settling the Indonesian problem. If any m~sure wbich favours the Netherlands is con- sidered to be an achievement, then the Committee bas,indeed achieved a great deal. ~ut if byan achievement is meant measures taken in the interests of a people wbich has suffered from aggression, in. the inteJ;'ests of re-establishing peace and security in the East, and, finally, in the interests of. maintaining the purposes and prin- ciples .of the United Nations, which provide for protection of the independence .and sovereignty ofllll States and peoples, great and. sma11, and for preparing tqe peopl~s Qf Non-Self-Goyerning Territories for indep~ndence"thenthis agreement represents a document wbich should·rest in the archives of the United Nations to demonstrate hôw little there is in common between the actions of certain States Menibers of theÔrgatrlZation and these lofty purposes and principles. Thesame may be said of the Agreement on the principles goveming further political discussions between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic. The twelve principles accepted by both parties· [document 8L649, appendix XIIl], wben signing the truce already referred to,provide for (1) the continued assistance of the Committee c ofGood Offices in preparing a political agreement between the t'wo parties; (2) a guarantee to each party of freedom to set up poUtical organizations, In.addition, the twelve principles aIso included four fondamental principles from the so-called Linggadjati Agreementl : (1) independence for the Indonesian.peoples; (2) co-opeiation· between the peoples of the Netherlandsand Indonesia; (3) a sovereign IndonesianState on a federal basisundera constitution wbich will·be arrived at by dem9(:ratic processes; and (4) a union betw~n the "United States of Indonesia" and other parts of the Kingdomof the-Netherlands under the authorityofthe King ofthe Netherlands. .In addition to the twelve principlesmentioned, sixso-ealled Ir additional principles >.' were adopted on ·19 January 1948 by both parties- [document S/649, appendix VIII]. These repr~entan e1abo- ration of the twelveprinciples mentioned which is favourableonly to the Netherlands. -Th~e principles·provide for· the cntry of the Indonesian Republic into -the United-Sta~es of Indonesia, which, it is said, is 10eing established atthe"instance of the United States of America. Thus~ uilder Nethertandspressure, the RepublicdesPays'-Bas, la République is bemg forcedto adopt the Netherlartds:plan to establishthèse States, with all the relevant conse- qUèilèes both.forthèRepublic itself andforall· thetetritories offudonesia. The Netherlands views thisplanas one that is to becarried mto effect unde1' itsdictation, which is, .in fact, already takingplace.TheNetherlands hasalreadytried to'set l!pa so-~a1léd interim. government of the territorie~ ofthe.future" United States of Indo- nesia". Nethèrlandslluthorities !lre now ttying to·force the Indonesian RepllbUc to join this ·jn.terim·government;to desist·from its attempts to aêbieve its independence, and to tbrow itself on themercyof tbe'Netherlands Crown. An idea .of how the· Netherlands Governm.eilt :conceives the estaplishmentof the" United States of Indonesia u may be obtained from the faet that, in t.he eastèm territories ofIndonesia where the Netherlands· has already· begun.to carry this planinto effect, Netherlands protégés are being placedin power,people who havealready long scrired the 'Netherlands ·authorities anddo.not, of course, refiect the aspirations of the Indonesian pp..oples. -- - , ... ·lSee Political Eve1Jis in the Republic· of Intionesia, Netherlan~s Information Bureau, New York, page 34. A large sector of Indonesian public opinion protested. against this disastrous Agreemenf:. as they' fully realized where it· would lead and in whose interests it hadbeen made. As a result of disagreements among politica1 circ1es in the Republic, changes have, as 'we know, been made there inthe Cabinet. It is saidthat the Government now contains Dersonswhose attitude towards the Netherlands, ând their supporters·in the Indone- sian venture, i8 less hostile. This maybe so. .Regardless, though, of what political tendencies predominate in the present Government of the Indonesian , Republic, we here in the Security Council·should say .outrightthat .in sanctioning theaforementioned Agreement, the Committee of Good Offices betrayed the interests of the Indonesian. people. The purpose of the Agrl;}ement was to set back the ,movement for national,1iberation which had années, developed in Indonesia byat least several years. riationale>qui AU this is being done under theaegis ofthe United s'opère sous Nations~ which is specmcally obliged to promote Unies. therealization of the aspirations towardsinde- peuples pendence orthe peoples ofcolonial and dependent autonomes countries andterritories, andnol to place obstaCles dépendance in' thepathof its achievement. Thatis the OIDY ne 'Correct·interpretation· of the Committee's· aecel'- par tance of the Netherlands plan to establish the la création des !' United States ofIndonesia ", and of the general de agreement enforced. by the Netherlands. This geste, action means that the Committee has sanctîoned tend aplan designed toextendthe Netherlands colonial sur system over aU Indonesia (Java, Sumatra, Borneo et andother islands). This plan has been worked étouffer, outinor~rtothrottletheeffortsoftheIndonesian a. people.toachieve national liberation in thase nationale t~tones where it had developed farthest, and prendre, to~troduce all "lver. Indonesia the political aI:i.\.. politiques ~driûni..strative measures which are being adoptedl pratiqtr.ent, ln the very backward eastern regions, where' the arriérées de l'Indonésie, les autoritésnéerlandaiseg Furthermorc~ several United States monopolies have invcsted large amounts of capit.::.-. '.n indo- nesia.Oetalls of.these.investments May be found in mimerolJssources, inc1uding official United States sources. Is it surprising" therefore, tOOt inftuential circ1es in the United States should sympatbize not '.with the Indonesian people, but witr the .Netherlands, since they consider that Thus, while the representatives of the United States in the Security Council are shedding crocodiletears over the fate ofthe Indonesians. the United States is in fact doing aU it can to help the Netherlands to settle the fate of the Indone- sians and the Indonesian Republic, to draw the noose of colonial persecution and exploitation still, tighter round the neck of the Indonesian people~ and to crush this povarful centre of the struggle that has blazed up for the freedom and independence of the many millions of Eastern· peoples. What 1 have said about the United States could be said also about certain other colonial Powers, but it is hardiy necessary to dwell orr this in detail. The position taken with regard to the Indonesian question by such States as the United Kingdom, France and Belgium speaks for itself and hard1y requires lengthy comment. . The representatives of ali these States will doubtless, as before, make speeches-some of them, for instance, the Belgian representative, have a1ready done so-on their sympathy with the Indonesian people. They will extol the results of the work of the Committee of Good Offices and, quite possibly, will even ask for approval of its report and of the measures carried out with the assistance of the Committee, which have beell expressed in the agreements l de'..scribed just now. None of this is new to us today., We heard such declarations made when the Security Council began its consideration ofthe Indonesian question. Just because such declaraticns are not new to us, we can see the difference between them and the real posltions of certain States in this question, As for the position of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republies, it has been expressed frequent- Iyinthe speeches made by the USSR representative in the Security Couneil, and especially in the USSR proposai for the immediate withdrawal of the troops of both parties to the positions they occu- piedbefore military operations in Indonesia began. We consider that only the adoption of sJlch a proposaI would create suitable conditions for the proper solution of the problem'cf the situation in Indonesia, in. the interests both of the Indonesian people and of the United Nations.

1 have consulted the representative of France, who has agreed that we might defer the French interpretation of the speech made by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics until the commencement of our next meeting. This courtesy, for which 1 am very grateful, has been extended in order that 1 might introduce the draft reso~ution which has been circulated in the name of the Canadian delegation [document S/678] to all the members of the Security Council, the members of. the Committee of Good Offices, and the representa- .TWO HUNDRED AND FlFtIETH MEETING Reid at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 18 February ·1948, at 3 p.m. President: General McNAUGHTON (Canada). Present: The representatives of thefollowing countries: Argentina, Belgi~.· Canada, China, Colombia, France, Syria,Ukrainian Soviet Socialist·Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republies, United Kingdom; United states of America. 25. ProviSionalagenda (document . S/Agenda 250) 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. Indiao:Pakistan question: (a) Letter dated' 1 January 1948 from the represel1tative of India addressed to the President·· of .the Seeurity Couneil conceming the situation. in Jammu and Kashmir (document 5/628).1 (b)Letter ~ted 15 Janl.lary1948. from the Minister for . Foreign Affairsof Pakistan addressed to the .Secretary-General con- --~- '. .:! S~ Officia/Recordsollhe Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for Novembér 1948, pages 139-144. .