S/PV.2525 Security Council

Once again the Security Council has been called into session to hear a complaint by the Government of Nicaragua against the Government of the United States. By now the Council must be quite familiar with the thrust of the Nicaraguan complaint, it having been put before this body in one form or another on some six occasions over the past two years. The details change, but the substance of the complaint remains essentially the same-that Nicaragua is the peaceable, innocent victim of an aggression that is orchestrated by, if not carried out by, the United States. Previously it had in fact been suggested, last year and the year before, that the United States was just on the verge of a massive military invasion of Nicaragua. That charge is absent this year, but the essence of the complaint has changed little beyond that important specific. 74. It is probably not surprising that the Nicaraguan complaint comes before the Council in the wake of the elections in neighbouring El Salvador-that happened in March 1982 as well. It happens virtually every time we have a debate on Central American policy in the United States Congress. 75. The Marxist-Leninist Government in Nicaragua cannot have been happy with the election in El Salvador. Indeed, we have just heard the representative of Nicaragua suggest that the elections in El Salvador only make the situation more difficult and complex. One must ask: difficult for whom, complex for what? 76. The Nicaraguan Government itself promised democracy, national independence and self-determination to the people of Nicaragua before that Government came to power. Its members made those promises in writing; they made them in public arenas; they made solemn pledges as they sought help from the Organization of American States (OAS), from the United States and from their neighbours. And, indeed, Sandinists received help from the OAS, from the United States and from Nicaragua’s neighbours in their efforts to overthrow the dictatorship headed by Anastasio Somoza. It is interesting that today, as last year and the year before, the Government of Nicaragua, which sought and received help from those regional groups and those neighbours, does not appeal to those regional groups and those neighbours in the hemisphere to help it with its current problems. Could it be because they are too well informed? 77. Nicaragua began the process of militarization and the introduction of foreign advisers in Central America. Nicaragua began the process of destabilization of its 78. I would mention in addition to the process of militarization that Nicaragua began the process of introducing foreign military personnel into Central America. Today it maintains much the largest contingent of foreign military advisers in the area: some 3,500 or more Cuban and other military and security advisers, more than 100 Soviet and other Eastern bloc advisers, Libyan advisers, PLO advisers, some 5,000 to 10,000 Cuban and other civilian advisers, an increasing number of whom are young males who have completed military training. 79. Nicaragua began the process of destabilizing its neighbours in the hemisphere. Again I have no desire today to give the Council a comprehensive list of Nicaragua’s efforts. There may be time for that in the course of this discussion. I would simply remind the Council that Nicaragua continues to assist guerrillas in other countries, principally, but not exclusively, the FMLN and FDR in El Salvador, through shipments of arms and other supplies, through training and through the provision of command and control centres. 80. Nicaragua comes before this Council once again, as six times in the past, seeking to prevent its neighbours from defending themselves against Nicaraguanbased efforts at the subversion and overthrow of neighbouring countries. 81. It cannot be, as we have said before, that one country has the right to destabiiize by violence its neighbours and that they have no right to defend themselves. It cannot be that one country, Nicaragua, has the right to introduce foreign arms and advisers to destabilize its neighbours and that they have no right to defend themselves. It cannot be that one country, Nicaragua, has the right to the most advanced technical material and that they have the right to only primitive weaponry. 82. The Government of Nicaragua continues its efforts at internal repression as well as external destabilization. Again I have no desire today to take up the time of the Council with a full description of Nicaragua’s internal repression in the last year, since we last discussed this matter. I would, however, bring to the attention of the Council and others who are interested the fact that at this time, as we meet here, several 83. The Government of Nicaragua has apparently still not learned that those who wield swords against their own people and their neighbours risk having swords turned against them. 84. Nicaragua comes to this Council to seek protection while itundermines and overthrows neighbouring Governments and represses its own people. It comes to the Council speaking of mercenaries who attack the Government of Nicaragua. We have in our time heard from totalitarian Governments many examples of the efforts of Governments to dehumanize their own people, to declare their own fellow citizens non-people. Totalitarians regularly define those who oppose them as non-people. The counter-revolutionaries described by the representative of Nicaragua are Nicaraguans. They are Nicaraguans who today, as in the past, are seeking the democratic solutions that they have so long sought. They are seeking democracy and freedom in their Government, just as they sought democracy and freedom when they overthrew the previous dictator of Nicaragua only to see him replaced by new military dictators. 85. As I said, we can understand that the elections in El Salvador cannot have been a happy occasion for the Government of Nicaragua. The spectacle of hundreds of thousands of Salvadorian workers and peasants voting enthusiastically in a closely contested election represented a repudiation of the Nicaraguanbacked guerrillas who had denounced and tried to sabotage the election. It represented a repudiation of the Nicaraguan style of democracy, which substitutes the will of the Government for the consent of the people. It represents an embarrassing contrast with the Sandinist dominated and controlled election process, so-called, now under way in Nicaragua. 86. Indeed, the nature of the conflict in Central America is illuminated by the policies of the Govemments of El Salvador and Nicaragua as they search for solutions to the conflicts which afllict their countries. In response to the declaration by the armed opposition in Nicaragua-that is, the Contras, the famous counterrevolutionaries-that they were prepared to lay down their arms if they could only participate in peaceful political competition in Nicaragua .and settle Nicara- 87. The Government of El Salvador, to the contrary, took exactly the opposite position and actually invited the armed opposition to participate in the election on condition that they laid down their arms and agreed to peaceful political competition. The Government of Nicaragua continued to provide arms, supplies, training and other forms of assistance to Salvadorian guerrillas dedicated precisely to sabotaging the political process and imposing a dictatorship in El Salvador. 88. Since the beginning of this year Nicaraguan-supported terrorists in El Salvador have assassinated three members of the Constituent Assembly, a military judge and a campaign organizer. Under the slogan “Electoral farce no, popular war yes**-how is that for a peaceful solution?-the armed insurgents in El Salvador have done everything possible to disrupt the elections and reduce voter turn-out. They disenfranchised thousands of voters by seizing and destroying their identity cards, which are necessary for voting. They mined roads, threatened drivers, threatened gas-station owners selling fuel. In some places citizens were told there would be lots of bombs going off and that they had therefore best stay away from polling places. 89. On election day the guerrillas attacked the towns of Jucuapa, Chinameca, El Triunfo and Santa Clara as the voting was taking place. On election eve they killed soldiers stationed in Tejutepeque and prevented voting. Guerrilla sabotage caused about 80 per cent of the country to be blacked out over 12 hours immediately preceding the opening of the polls. This loss of electrical power severely disrupted the final sorting and dispatch of voting materials and obviously had an effect on the timely arrival of voting materials to some polling places. 90. None the less, despite all that, some 1.4 million Salvadorians, over 75 per cent of all eligible voters, cast their ballots. According to scores of firsthand reports by election observers, they voted in freedom, with genuine enthusiasm. The observer delegation from Colombia called the election “an impressive demonstration of the will of the Salvadorian people to find a democratic solution”-and its view was shared by most observers. 91. A democratic solution is also the chief, indeed the sole, objective of United States policy in Central America. Nothing more clearly illustrates the seriousness with which the United States has approached the problems of Central America or the commitment of the American people to finding a democratic solution to those problems than the report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. That Commission, chaired by former Secretary of State Henry Kis- 92. Its conclusions and recommendations are the product of as careful an examination of the problems of Central America that we are likely to have for some time. They form the basis of the Central American Democracy, Peace and Development Initiative Act of 1984, which President Reagan has submitted to the United States Congress. This bill represents a farreaching attempt to address the problems in Central America comprehensively. It identifies the United States firmly and unequivocally with the aspirations of the peoples of Central America for social and economic development, for democracy and human rights and for a peaceful solution to the conflicts now plaguing the region. 93. The fundamental conclusion of the Commission is that the roots of the crisis in Central America are both indigenous and foreign; the discontents are real and, for much of the population, conditionsof life are miserable. While these conditions invite indigenous revolution, they have also been exploited by hostile outside forces -specifically by Cuba, backed by the Soviet Union, now operating through Nicaragua-which will turn any revolution they capture into a dictatorship, threatening the peace and stability of the region and robbing the people of their hopes for liberty. 94. The interrelationship of these problems is such, the Commission concluded, that neither the military, nor the political, nor the economic, nor the social aspects of the crisis should be considered independently of the others. Without progress on the political, economic and social fronts, peace on the military front would be illusive and fragile. But unless the externally supported insurgencies are checked and the violence curbed, progress on those other fronts will also be illusive and fragile. Progress in any one, therefore, is not enough. All the sources of the crisis must be addressed, and be addressed simultaneously. 95. The distinguished President of Costa Rica, Luis Albert0 Monge, has characterized the report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America as “an intervention against misery and ignorance”. That, surely, was the intention of the Commission: to call upon the United States Government and the American people to become fully engaged at the side of our Central American neighbours in the struggle against misery and ignorance. 96. In order to combat injustice and poverty, the Commission has proposed a series of bold measures 97. A programme of substantial assistance is proposed to revitalize the Central American Common Market and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, which made a major contribution to the region’s rapid economic growth in the 1960s and early 1970s and which today could stimulate increased intraregional trade and economic activity. To give structure, consistency and continuing direction to this sustained effort, the Commission proposed a high-level meeting of United States officials with their Central American counterparts to consider the creation of the Central American Development Organization (CADO). This organisation would provide guidance and review, as well as assistance, for economic, social and political development programmes of those Central American nations eligible to join by reason of their commitment to internal reform and democracy, as well as to external non-intervention. It is envisioned that other democracies outside the region would participate as well in this major effort to channel external assistance to the region. 103. I believe the election just held in El Salvador 98. The ,Commission also squarely confronted the dangers created by the unprecedented military buildup in Nicaragua, the regime’s ideological commitment to the export of revolution and its military ties to the Soviet Union and Cuba-dangers which weigh heavily on the neighbouring countries. I will not on this occasion, as I have said before, describe in detail this military buildup or demonstrate the extent of Nicaragua’s intervention in neighbouring States or its militarization and military ties. All those points are thoroughly covered in the Commission’s report. 99. What I wish to emphasize here is the Commission’s call for a vigorous diplomatic strategy and a negotiating effort designed to resolve the conflict and to include Nicaragua in a regional settlement that would ensure lasting security guarantees, as well as national independence for all the nations of Central America. Such a settlement would be squarely based on the principles contained in the 21-point proposal of the Contadora Group [see S/16042, annex]. They include: respect for sovereignty and non-intervention verifiable commitments to non-aggression and an end to all attempts at subversion; limitations on arms and sizes of armed forces; prohibition of all military forces, bases and advisers of foreign nations; no‘military forces, bases or advisers of non-Central American countries; commitment to internal pluralism and free elections in all countries; provision for verification of all agreements; and establishment of an inter-government council, to meet regularly and review compliance. 100. In drawing up those recommendations the Commission drew heavily on its consultation with the leaders of the Contadora countries. It declared that the Contadora countries are engaged in a bold, new experiment; they deserve the gratitude and encouragement of all the nations in the region. These are also the views of the United States Government. 101. As the Commission repeatedly emphasized, all elements of the crisis must be addressed simultaneously. No short cuts were discovered, no gimmicks, diplomatic or otherwise. Thus as one element of the broad programme the report recommends increased military assistance, under proper conditions, to the Governments of El Salvador and Honduras. That assistance will reinforce the diplomatic effort by helping create the conditions under which peaceful settlements may be reached and the objective of a better life in freedom and national independence for all Central Americans successfully pursued. 102. In discussing Central America, there is a tendency sometimes to succumb to despair, especially by those who know little about the region. But the Commission found everywhere “a hope for a democratic future and a readiness to sacrifice towards that end”. demonstrates as clearly as any single event could that the people of that country have not succumbed to despair and that they are ready to sacrifice for a better, brighter, democratic future. The Commission’s report stated: “The people of Central America have lived too long with poverty, deprivation and violence. The current turmoil must not be allowed to shatter their hopes for a brighter future. They have endured too many generations of misrule to let their aspirations for democratic political development be dashed, in this generation, on the rocks of fear, division and violence. “Not least, their own security and ours must no longer be threatened by hostile Powers which seek expansion of influence through the exploitation of misery. “The crisis thus poses an urgent challenge to the United States, but that challenge in turn presents us with an opportunity, an opportunity to help the people of Central America translate their dreams of a better and freer life into a reality.” 104. That is our wish. It is our only wish. The rest is hard work, good will, fortitude and uncompromising commitment to democratic values and practices and a respect for the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. 106. Mr. FLORES BERMUDEZ (Honduras) [interpretation from Spanish]: Mr. President, allow me on this occasion, on behalf of the delegation of Honduras, to congratulate you on your wise conduct this month of the debates in this most important forum. Your broad experience as a statesman guarantees a successful outcome of the Council’s work. At the same time I should like to thank the members of the Council for allowingme to speak as it begins its consideration of the item on its agenda. 107. The Council is meeting forthe third time at the urgent request of the Sandinist Government in order to consider another repetitious montage of national political propaganda, resorted to by that Government almost as a matter of routine, notwithstanding the negative and fruitless experiences of the two previous occasions the Council met on the subject. 108. Honduras has once again had to request the Council to allow it to participate in the meeting on this item, because it feels obliged, out of respect for the Council, to provide it with as much information as possible in order for it to see how one of its members is trying to distort and make use of this body for purposes that do not best servethe re-establishment of internal peace in Nicaragua or the maintenance of peace and security in Central America. 109. With the same lack of decorum, the same strategy of diverting attention from its crisis at home, the same purpose of preventing the process of bringing real democracy to its authoritarian structures, the same aim of continuing to attempt to deny on the one hand the internal struggle being waged against that Government by anti-Sandinist rebel forces based in Nicaraguan territory and on the other the presence of thousands of foreign military technicians and advisers who direct the Sandinist troops and distort the very identity of Nicaragua, with the same objective of covering up policies of extermination that have caused the mass exodus of ethnic groups and the lack of respect for religious freedom, with the same intent of hiding the progressive frustration of Nicaraguans at the Sandinist Govemment’s lack of respect for the fulfilment of the objectives or the bases of the revolution-political pluralism, a mixed economy and non-alignment-with this same strategy, these same intentions and purposes, the Sandinist Government has come here once again to denounce dangers and imaginary attacks on its territory from the neighbouring States, trying to draw attention to the region, to turn Central America into an area subject to confrontation between the two major Powers and, finally, to frustrate the diplomatic efforts that are being made within the scope of the Contadora regional peace process to build a climate of security, peace, democracy and economic and social development in Central America. 111. The facts have once again demonstrated that Honduras was right and that the Nicaraguan charges were irresponsible. Today we are faced with another series of charges just as invalid as all the preceding ones. 112. In the message from the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction to the people of Nicaragua and the world of 13 March of this year, distributed on that same date as a Security Council document at the request of the representative of Nicaragua [S/16413, annex], among other slogans and groundless assertions there appears the fanciful interpretation that they give to the training activities that the Honduran armed forces are carrying out in co-operation with the United States, and reality is falsified once again by alleging certain designs aimed against El Salvador and Nicaragua. This argument has been repeated here yet again. 113. The Government of Honduras has on many occasions contacted the Sandinist Government to deplore such systematic tactics that are at variance with proper international conduct. We have also done this on various occasions before the OAS, this Council and the United Nations General Assembly, where we have also provided well-documented replies refuting false charges of responsibility for past events and tendentious interpretations of actions carried out by Honduras in exercise of its full responsibility over its territory. All these accusations are being repeated once again today. This is all part of the pathological lies resorted to by the Sandinist regime. I14. Although Honduras has already submitted considerable detailed information, we believe it is necessary once again to make clear that Honduras has a constant and sincere desire for peace, as is shown by its invariable and constructive participation in the Con: tadora Group. We state again that the measures that have been taken to improve the professional level of the armed forces of Honduras-including the joint exercises carried out with members of the United States Army-are eminently defensive in nature and are designed to protect our sovereignty. This is in contrast to the unconscionable arms race engaged in by Nicaragua and to its policy of flagrant intervention in other countries of Central America, with the purpose of internationalizing the conflict in which it is involved today. The military manoeuvres in ,which Honduran armed forces are participating are not prohibited by the documents adopted by the Contadora Group-for example, in the first document on the measures to be taken to fulfil the commitments entered into in the Document of Objectives, the Contadora Group proposed that there should be a duty to report,to the other States on the 120. The fact that the Sandinist Government is seeking to jeopardize the peace efforts of the Contadora Group is reflected in these incidents. It is reflected also in the request to convene the Security Council, since the aim is to undermine the confidence of the other Central American countries in the regional peace procedure: It is trying also to maintain in its country a war psychosis by continuing to feed the voracious appetite of its arms race and by its desire to make the Central American region a scene of confrontation and ideological pressure between different blocs. This is of particular concern because of the unusual presence of warships from outside the continent in the Caribbean, where Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras have coastlines. 115. The achievement of peace, democracy, security and co-operation for development in Central America is the sole objective of the foreign policy of Honduras. That is why we are seeking diplomatic solutions that would eliminate the causes of the conflicts in the region. That is a fact. 116. The Sandinist Government has an unequivocal attitude: it seeks to create confrontation and thereby to undermine the order and respect that should exist when there are clearly delineated boundaries between the Central American countries and when there is a regional peace procedure under way involving the five Central American countries. 121. The fact that the Sandinist Government is intervening in neighbouring countries is confirmed by the support, so far unsuccessful, it gives to the promotion of subversion in Honduras, and of the guerrillas in El Salvador by supplying them with weapons. As part of this strategy, a week ago Commander Humbet-to Ortega Saavedra, Nicaragua’s Defence Minister, announced the possibility that local guerrilla fighters would mine the ports of the other Central American countries, from Guatemala to Panama. This statement is a new and very clear threat of the use of force against other countries, in open violation of the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, it is an open admission that the subversive groups attempting to destabilize Governments in the area are operating with the support and under the control of the Nicaraguan Government, as Mr. Edgardo Paz Bamica, the Minister for External Relations of Honduras, said in his firm message of protest [S/16444. It was precisely in application of Commander Ortega Saavedra’s statement that terrorist acts were carried out in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula: five bombs exploded, leaving one person dead and one wounded. 117. The many violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Honduras by Sandinist troops-as is clear from the many protests made to the Government of Nicaragua and communicated to the OAS and to the United Nations-demonstrate that that regime has no respect for boundaries. An even more serious example of this was furnished recently by the Sandinist Government when it unilaterally removed the monuments delineating one part of the boundary between Honduras and Nicaragua and moved them into Honduran territory, committing a series of abuses harmful to Honduran citizens. Notwithstanding this flagrant violation of the rules of international law and the principles contained in the treaty delimiting the respective boundaries, Honduras, in order not to inflame the situation still further, has proposed to the Government of Nicaragua that a committee of engineers of both countries be established to ensure that the monuments that have been moved are quickly and permanently put back where they belong. 118. The Sandinist Government has on a number of occasions also violated the territorial sovereignty of other Central American countries. As an example, I would refer to the note addressed by Costa Rica to Nicaragua and distributed on 2 March for the information of the States Members of the United Nations. In that note, the Government of Costa Rica protested against a “flagrant violation’* by Sandinist troops of Costa Rican territory and stated that this cast suspicion on the sincerity of the intentions of the Nicaraguan Government to promote a relaxation of tension in the area. Later, on 13 March, in the message of the Goveming Junta of Nicaragua already referred to, it was stated that there were anti-Sandinist bases of operation and camps in Honduran territory. Similar statements have been made today regarding other territories. 122. Honduras has been the victim of frenzied attacks by the Sandinist Government. Between 3 and 11 January, in only three incidents in Honduran territory, 11 of our compatriots were killed. Since 3 February, the Sandinist Government has gone even further. In its message of 13 March to the world, it appealed for technical and military assistance, thereby making clear its intention to continue to arm itself frantically, at the precise moment when the working Commission on security affairs established under the Contadora procedure was to study the methods for applying a policy for the control and reduction of armaments and troops in order to restore a military balance in the area, to establish international control machinery, to eliminate the illegal traflic in weapons and to put an end to acts of subversion and terrorism. 119. Honduras has formally appealed to the Govemment of Nicaragua to act with the wisdom required by the circumstances, in order to avoid spreading the inter: 123. The Sandinist Government called for a meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non- 124. The Co-ordinating Bureau also recalled General Assembly resolution 38/10, which reaffirms the overall regional nature of the Central American conflict, condemns “the acts of aggression against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the States in the region” -not just those cited by one of them-and notes with satisfaction that the countries of the region have agreed to establish or improve “democratic, representative and pluralist systems” through honest and periodic electoral processes. 125. There is no doubt that there is now a keener awareness of the facts of the situation in Central America, which is affecting a number of countries and which the Sandinist Government has been trying to distort with information prepared for that purpose, which it disseminates through its participation in the Non- Aligned Movement. We welcome the effort at greater realism in the analysis of the situation in Central America, and we hope that all countries will continue to be objective so that we Central Americans will succeed in solving our own problems in a propitious climate of trust. 126. One of the most recent steps taken by the Nicaraguan Government in this overall context was the release on 26 March of another communique [S/16440, annex], in which it called on the Contadora Group to withdraw its offer of good offices-good offices that because of their neutrality have brought about noteworthy progress in the search for peace in Central America-implicitly requesting the Group to take direct action and involve itself in the sub-regional conflict, to become a part of and to take sides in it. It would be a serious mistake with disastrous consequences if the valuable Contadora forum, with its five Central American member countries, were to lose its objectivity and good will. 131. For its part, Honduras reiterates its unchanging position: that of fostering and supporting the comprehensive, peaceful solution of regional disputes through the Contadora peace process and within the framework of the inter-American system. 127. These initiatives show us that Nicaragua is trying to blame other countries for its own internal conflicts and to relieve itself of all responsibility for the present crisis. The Sandinist Government is also obviously 128. The 26 March communique to which I have referred also demonstrates that Nicaragua is trying to stress the military presence in Central America of the United States and to minimize the Soviet military presence, especially naval, and the Soviet-Cuban manoeuvres to be carried out in the Caribbean. Looking at the communique in that light, it is clear that it is just another attempt by Nicaragua to justify in the eyes of the international community its acquisition of more weapons and the buildup of its military personnel. 129. We hope that the Council, in its wisdom, will continue to take a pragmatic approach to these problems and to play its proper role and that therefore it will not allow itself to be used to interfere in action by Central Americans and in the regional approach that we have taken to resolve our problems. In that context, no possible expression of opinion should disregard the imperative need to encourage the Sandinist Govemment to behave with consistency, good faith and great responsibility in what must be a serious position within the Contadora process and a responsible position as a member of the Security Council. 130. Nor should we forget the political expression of the 26 Latin American &es which met at the highest level in January of this year, stating in the Quito Declaration that “Latin America and the Caribbean do not resign themselves to being the arena of alien confrontation and firmly believe that the region’s problems should and can be resolved in our own sphere, thereby ensuring that the Latin America area will be a zone of peace.“’ 132. The PRESIDENT [interpreration from Spanish]: The representative of Nicaragua has asked to speak in right of reply. 134. Nevertheless, I should like to make some clarifications regarding the statement of the representative of the United States. It seems to me that she made use of a number of points which, aside from suggesting a little confusion on her part, might tend-at the least-to seek to confuse others. 135. The representative of the United States presented an apologia for past, present and intended United States support for the Central American region, for each of the countries of our region. She spoke-at great length-of United States support for the Contadora Group, and she spoke of the interest of the United States in promoting democracy in Central America. I think it is fitting for me to refer very briefly to the fact that the truth of the history of the United States in Central America is the exact opposite of what she stated today. It is not only my people which ever since its independence has suffered acts of United States intervention, although it has suffered such acts since 1854, following the first American intervention, when a pro-slavery adventurer from the southern United States proclaimed himself the President of Nicaragua and introduced slavery to Nicaragua. 136. It is not a case of Nicaragua alone; many Latin American countries-not just in Central America-in this century have suffered the grave consequences of the United States military presence. In addition to Nicaragua in 1912, 1925 and 1926 we can cite, among others, the case of the Dominican Republic and that of Cuba. The United States still maintains a military presence in the latter country, in spite of the opposition of the Cuban Government. There are the actions taken against Guatemala in 1954 and in Chile in 1973 to overthrow their legitimately constituted Governments elected in a process which, by Western standards, was democratic. 137. History shows us clearly what has been the United States attitude. If we look at what is happening at present, we can also see the consequences of events reported every day. 138. The representative of the United States has on various occasions in this Council said that Nicaragua’s requests for meetings of the Security Council-and 139. The United States representative also said that her interest had always been and continued to be the democratic development of the Central American countries. Again, we must refute her affirmations. In a recent statement I made in the Council in respect of the complaint of Sudan [252Zst meeting], I pointed out that the economic crisis has had a significant impact on the African countries and caused them great hardship and that everyone knows where that crisis comes from and how it has been brought about. The same applies to Central America. I believe that what is a fact of history is the abuse-I do not say the use-by the United States Government of the natural resources of our countries, our primary commodities, which they have always bought from us extremely cheaply for their convenience only to sell them back to us later as processed goods at extremely high rates of profit. 140. The United States renresentative also said that now as in the past the United-States Administration was interested in contributing to democratic development in Central America; 141. I do not know how one can consider contributing to the development of democracy in Central America when the whole world knows-all the members of the Council and everyone present in this chamber, with the exception of the United States representative-that, on the contrary, United States policy is characterized by its support for dictatorial regimes, such as that of Somoza in Nicaragua, which it not only created when it was obliged to leave Nicaragua after Sandino’s war of liberation but also maintained in power for more than 45 years. The case of Somoza in Nicaragua is not the only case of dictatorship the United States has created and fomented in various Central American countries. 142. The United States representative said that the Government of Nicaragua had a clear purpose in having recourse to this forum on various occasions, that the aim was not only to divert attention from its own problems but also to make sure that certain other problems of the region would not be given serious consideration. This is not the first time we have heard that assertion. She herself made it in the Security Council, and we 143. Among other things, the United States representative accused us and spoke extensively in this regard, that the problem of the United States is, from its point of view, that Nicaragua wishes to interfere and is interfering in the internal affairs not only of the other Central American countries but also of Latin America. It seems that various United States military strategists have gone so far as to say on various occasions that my country had the most powerful army from the Rio Bravo to Patagonia. 144. In this respect I should like to point out to Mrs. Kirkpatrick that my Government does not have a policy of interference. Indeed, we cannot have such a policy because we do not have the capacity to carry it out; we do not have the means to send arms to other countries, as does the United States, which supplies El Salvador and Chile, for example. With its economic and military might, the United States can and indeed does do this. 145. The example of our revolution is what we have and what American warmongering policy-makers fear, and that is why they seek to impede our consolidation. They know that that example could be harmful for the militaristic policy they are pursuing, not just in Central America but also in Latin America and other regions of the world. 146. The American representative stated that my Government was the one which started militarization in Central America, and if I remember correctly she said that we have 107,000 persons under arms. Let me correct her on that; she was in error. First of all, it was not my Government that started it. On 19 July we will have the fifth anniversary of Nicaragua as an independent Republic, ,and I think everyone realizes that the mili- 147. The problem for the United States now is that there has been a change. For the first time in history, Nicaragua under the Sandinists can claim to be a truly non-aligned country, one which for the first time in its history can determine its own future, and therefore the United States had to have recourse to another guardian in Central America, finding one in a general in Honduras named Alvarez. It is arming him to the teeth, as I mentioned, and unfortunately it has turned that country into one more “aircraft carrier*’ of the United States Navy. 148. I said I wanted to correct the representative about the number of Nicaraguans under arms. I can assure Mrs. Kirkpatrick that the day when her Administration, directly or indirectly, seeks to intervene more than it is already doing in Nicaragua, it will not be 107,000 Nicaraguans under arms; the entire people will be under arms in responding to that aggression, and for the second time in this century we will succeed in driving them out. 149. We take pride in saying that the greatest arsenal Nicaragua has is not made up of Soviet tanks or tanks of any other national origin that we may have, nor the French-built patrol boats, or boats of whatever other nationality, nor is it cannons and small-arms; rather, it is the popular support enjoyed by the Sandinist popular revolution. That is our strength. 150. They know better than anyone that we are the only Central American Government that can give its people arms to defend its sovereignty. Let me suggest to the representative that she recommend to the present Government of El Salvador that it give arms, the arms which the United States itself is sending, to its people to protect it from the intervention by Nicaragua in El Salvador. I believe that what would happen, apart from the fact that it would not take very long, is obvious: the . Government would be overthrown by its own people. 151. . The representative said also that our Govem- ‘merit in its totalitarian strivings chose to ignore the efforts and concessions being made by Nicaraguans friendly to the United States and proposed to us in respect of our elections. I should just like to make a point on this and perhaps she would like to reply. As a good academician, she doubtless knows the difference between a civil war, a national war and a war of aggression. I am not an expert in the military field; I will not delve into this, but the most elementary logic inclines me to believe that when a civil war is unleashed in a country there has to be popular support. Among other things, there is a need to have or to obtain in the course of that war liberated territories which both factions control, which, as we all know, is certainly the case in 152. If she wishes, I could bring a map of Nicaragua right now and she could show everyone where that piece of territory is that the counter-revolution and the CIA mercenaries have liberated, and in what part of that territory they keep the high-speed patrol boats, mines, arsenals and aircraft with which they have been attacking and killing our people and the foreign shipping that comes to our home. If she does not want a map today, I can send one to her Mission tomorrow so that she may consider it quietly and be able to pinpoint it at another time, next week when we continue the debate. 153. There are many other things in her long speech to which I could refer. I could refer to the apologia that she presented for the Kissinger report. The only thing I will say about that is that for Latin America Kissinger is an unhappy memory. Moreover, I think there was a minority report submitted by one of the members of the Commission concerning military and security aspects of the report, and it seems to me that in Congress certain politicians are not very contented with the militaristic contents in that report as a complement to the economic offers made in it. 154. Before finishing, I wish to refer to two more aspects. Mrs. Kirkpatrick said that Sandinism had failed to live up to its promises, including public promises, made in regional organs. It is not the first time she has said that in this Council. I think she referred to that when certain countries which are no longer members were in the Council. I remember the first time was when the Co-ordinator of our Junta first addressed the Council. She brought a letter sent by those who were going to represent the Junta to the OAS. 155. I merely wish to say to Mrs. Kirkpatrick that in order to guarantee elections we do not need to send bullets, as President Reagan requested of Congress. We all know that two weeks ago, when he was trying to obtain the additional $93 million for military aid to El Salvador, President Reagan was reported in the United States press to have said that bullets ‘were needed to guarantee the elections. That is a strange way to guarantee elections, a curious way to support democracy* -, 156. ’ I can assure Mrs:Kirkpatrick that we will carry out the process of democratic iristitutionalization that has begun in Nicaragua, though not because of United States pressure. I can assure her alsc+-and it is necessary for .the American ,Administration to understand and analyse this fact-that it is not as a result of American pressure that Nicaragua has been taking positions in international forums, adopting policies with respect 157. Perhaps Mrs. Kirkpatrick could be invited to visit Nicaragua as an observer of the elections as we intend to invite representatives of other Governments of friendly countries with which we have relations. But I say it would be to observe and not to supervise, as the Americans did in 1928, when Sandino’s war of liberation started. I can promise her that these elections, which will take place two days before the United States elections, will be an example of elections in Latin America. I am sure that Mrs. Kirkpatrick, President Reagan and his principal advisers are fully aware that Sandinism will win the elections, and not through fraud. We could put a United States Marine at each ballot box to supervise, and the same thing would happen. They know, because they have their own means of espionage-not just by aircraft and radar in the Gulf of Fonseca and on Honduran territory; they have CIA agents inside Nicaragua and they know the majority feeling of the Nicaraguan people. It is precisely because they do know it that they are trying indirectly to prevent the holding of elections in Nicaragua; that is why they are trying to make sure that our Government will retreat from its already announced commitment. But I can assure them that we shall not do so. We shall withstand United States pressure. 158. Unfortunately, we shall continue suffering the loss of the best of our sons. It will be difficult for us to continue providing our peasants with bread, because the Americans have cut off the loans for wheat purchases which they granted us at one point. But they did not realize that despite that cut-off, Sweden, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, France and many other countries of the international community would send us the wheat that the United States cut off, and we were able to give bread to our workers and peasants. What we did then, we shall do again. 159, We shall continue our process of institutionalization. We shall hold elections, as people in the United States are accustomed to doing. We intend nothing ‘else. We shall show them that in Nicaragua the President will not win with the support of only 25 or 27 per cent of the eligible voters. 160, Unfortunately, I have gone on for too long, but there is one last point I wish to make, with regard to ,Mrs.- Kirkpatrick’s grave concern about the minorities and the Miskitos in Nicaragua. I shall not refer to the extermination of the American Indians, nor shall I point out that her concern for the Miskitos is recent. I have never heard her mention the percentage of unemployment among the Indian population in the United States -that is, among the small number of them that man- 161. Regarding the Miskitos, I wish to point out to Mrs. Kirkpatrick that in December 1982 my Govemment discovered-and publicized, because some of those involved were captured-a plan which the CIA had sought to carry out on the Nicaraguan Atlantic Coast. The plan, called “Red Christmas”, sought to use the Miskitos-in other words, to manipulate the historic ignorance of the settlers on the Atlantic Coast, for which the Americans are responsible, because Somoza was responsible internally in my country and they supported him. Somoza was not at all concerned for the indigenous inhabitants of the eastern sector of Nicaragua. Logically, the blame lies with those-perhaps Mrs. Kirkpatrick, or some in the other Administrations in the United States over the 45 years of Somoza’s rule-who could have brought in roads and telephones, improved literacy and provided health centres. But they did not advocate those things, or Somoza ignored them; In fact, they obviously did not, because Somoza certainly listened to his American advisers. Through this “Red Christmas” plan’ they even tried to take possession of this isolated and under-developed.area. “Under-developed” is not the right description for it, because Nicaragua is under-developed generally. Mr. Treiki said earlier that he had been astonished by the levels of poverty in Nicaragua. It is true, and those to blame are right here in front of us. 162. But within the poverty existing in Nicaragua the poverty on the Atlantic Coast is really astonishing and disturbing. It is with the revolution starting in 1979 that something has been done to try to improve the minimal, subsistence living standards of the 270,000 inhabitants of that Atlantic Coast. That figure includes the Miskitos, blacks and persons of mixed ancestry. In a television programme a year or so ago on which Mrs. Kirkpatrick appeared with the Nicaraguan Minister for External Relations-I do not know whether it was in good faith or for some other purpose-she charged the violation of Miskito rights in Nicaragua, saying that there were 270,000 Miskitos. 163. Actually, there are 90,000 Miskitos in Nicaragua, of whom perhaps 15,000 have left for Honduran territory. We cannot deny, nor do I seek to deny, that we may have made certain mistakes in our treatment of the Miskito minority. We are an honest and revolutionary Government. We are proud of our achievements, but we are aware of our shortcomings, and we try to overcome them. 164. The 15,000 Miskitos in Honduran territory are people who have been manipulated by the United States and are being used now. Some of them are involved in military activities against my country. They are even being prevented from returning to Nicaragua. 166. I think it was in December of last year moreover, that we announced broad amnesty without exceptions for Miskito citizens. On instructions from my Government, I personally requested the Secretary-General to ensure that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) participate in repatriation efforts -repatriation being one of the objectives pursued by Contadora-and facilitate the measures needed to carry out the repatriation of the Miskitos. Unfortunately the CIA mercenaries have been preventing that repatriation from being carried out totally and satisfactorily, although I can assure the Council that quite a number of Miskito Indians in Honduras have started returning to my country, thanks to UNHCR. That can be corroborated by UNHCR. Certainly the Nicaraguan Government is not removing them, and we have not asked it of the American representative, because she has confirmed that they are leaving. Itjust could be that her Government is moving them. 167. I have already taken up too much of the time of the Council, and I apologize to members. If the need arises I may wish to speak again to supplement my replies to some of the observations made by Mrs. Kirkpatrick. 168. The PRESIDENT [interprektion from Spanish]: I call on the representative of the United States, who has asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

First, in the interest of accuracy, I may say that I never suggested that Nicaragua had the most powerful army in South America; I only suggested that Nicaragua had the most powerful army in Central America, which of course includes, conventionally, the five small nations of Central America that are well known, presumably, to members of the Council. 170. Secondly, with regard to the Miskitos, who I do think long to return to Nicaragua, if only they could live in peace on the north Atlantic coast, as they have for centuries, with just decent respect for their right to freedom and self-determination. Unfortunately, they continue to flee. It is normally estimated that there are today approximately one half million Nicaraguans who have already fled the beneficent ministrations of the new dictatorship. Some 25,000 of those are Miskitos now in Honduras. More than 1,000 Miskitos are, as I have already said, fleeing Nicaragua this very day towards the Honduran border, suggesting that the practices that have made these very peaceable people, who seekonly to be left alone to live their lives, flee have not in fact improved. 175. Mr. CHAMORRO MORA (Nicaragua) [interpretation from Spanish]: I see that you are concerned, Sir, perhaps fearing that I will consume more time than I already have. I mentioned a moment ago that there would be another opportunity to expand on’what I have already -said; therefore I shallnot even refer to how an American President-Mr. Roosevelt, I think it was, during~ the 1930s+described Somoza. The representative of the United States said Somoza too was a Nicaraguan. On the next occasion. I have to speak I shall tell the Council what Roosevelt said-will all due apologies’ to the ladies in the chamber. 172. I do not deny in this Council that my country has from time to time made mistakes in our policy vi.s-d-vis Central America or the world, or Nicaragua quite specifically. It may even be argued that we have from time to time been material accomplices to the rise of a dictatorship in Central America, or even in Nicaragua. I fear in fact that a close examination of the record would suggest that in 1978 and 1979 the United States Government, acting in the best of faith, did in fact assist in the rise to power in Nicaragua of a new military dictatorship which has consolidated a new and highly repressive power in that society and governs today, creating hundreds of thousands of refugees among Nicaraguans, who flee their country still seeking the freedom they were seeking when they overthrew Somoza. 176. What I do wish to d-since it would perhaps be obsolete by next.week-is to make one point about the United States Administration’s fear in the face of the triumph’of the Sandinist revolution. It fears not only .our internal actions in Nicaragua but also,our presence in the United States. 177. Renresentatives know full well that on various which we heard about f&m colleague who likes to &ad The New York Times. I too would like to read a piece from The New York Times, written by one of his former colleagues, Arturo Cruz, who was-as I am sure many members of the Council know-a member of the Governing Junta of the Nicaraguan revolutionary Govemment and its Ambassador to the United States until he resigned out of dismay, disillusionment and disappointment with their Govemment..He has since lived in exile and works for the establishment of democracy in Nicaragua, as indeed ,he .did before he left. He wrote a column in The New York Times titled “Sandinista Democracy? Unlikely” about the proposed elections in Nicaragua, which appears on page A 27 of the issue of 27 January 1984, and in it he said: 173. Finallv. conceminr! those elections in Nicaragua L occasions Nicaraguan leaders have been denied visas to come here at the invitation.of institutes. I shall not go into details. I just want to say that a’trip scheduled by a member of the Governing Junta-not an official tour, obviously-could not be made because the United States Governtitent .was not interested; The trip was planned to begin on 23 April. Mr. Sergio Ramirez Mercado was to travel to Kansas City, Washington, New York, California, Boston and I am not sure to what other cities. He had been invited by various American ‘intellectual organizations, universities and the like. In addition to being a memberof the Governing Junta, Mr.” Ramfrez Mercado is a ,distinguished Nicaraguan intellectual, who lived many years in ‘West Germany and many. of .whose books -have been translated into German. “the revolutionary commanders’ statements about the voting process foreshadow a mockery of elections. The Sandinistas are determined to exclude leading dissident personalities like the former guerrilla leader Eden Pastora Gomez and former junta member Alfonso Robelo Callejas, who is also the leader of an important political party. Under these 178. Following democratic procedures, and because of fear of the Sandinist revolution, whether inside or outside Nicaragua,’ the State Department decided to give Mr. Mercado an eight-day visa only, allowing him to go just to Kansas City, between 29 March and 6 April. That is just one example of the United States Government’s fear of the words of the Sandinists. It is 179. The PRESIDENT [intetpretatiun fram Spanish]: There are no other names on the list of speakers for this meeting. ,With the consent of the President of the Security Council for the month of April, the next , NOTES ’ See A/39/1 18-E/1984/85, annex, para. 3. z United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1144, No. 17955. . r HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLlCATTONS United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstorcsand distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations. Sales Section. New York or Geneva. COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES Les publications des Nations U&s sont en vente darts la libtairia et les agenm depositaims du mondecnticr. Informcz-vous aupr& de votre libraire ouadressez-vous P : Nations Unies. Section da vmtes. New York ou Gentve. HAK lIO.lYiH?h H3JXAHHII OPl-AHHZAI&HH OG-J.E;tHHEHHJ*JX JJAJWH Wwtanm OpranrC3aunn 06sc~micn~b~s Haut@ YO~~KHO Icynarb B twwwib~x xaraantia% n arenrcraax ao aeex panouax rapa. 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