S/PV.253 Security Council

Before the Sccurity Council commences discussion with regard to the item on the agenda, there are certain matters of procedure which,.1 suggest, should fust be settled. In order that the Security Council May take advantage of the fullest information, 1 believe the Security Council would wish to extend to the Chait-man of the United Nations Palestine Commission an invitation to attend those meetings of the Security Council at which the Palestine Commission's reports to the Security Council aie .under consideration. . In addition, applications have been received by the Secretary..General from the Governments ofEgypt [document 8/617] and Lebanon [document 8/618] .to participate in the disoussions of the Security Couneil at .the time that the question of Palestine is under consideration. There is aIso an application from the Jewish ment ont vue de la l'Agence juive qui tous question examin.e statue des Conseil. suivrons d'indiquer. Age~cy for Palestine [document 8/619] to be admitted and tobe heardin any discussion with regard to the Palestine question which may take place in the Security Council. 1 would suggest, therefore, that the Security ~ouncil should consider these questions' indi- Vldually and.should decide upon thern before.any ofthese parties to whom1 havê referred are invited to take their places at the Security Council table~ lherefore:,> ifthe Security Council coneurs, we s~a1l ollow this procedure~

1 have indicated the procedure which 1 think should he foUowed in this case, namely, that the Security Council should give its attention to and make its decision on the question of the individual members to be represented before they are invited to the Security Council table. This is a procedural matter which is the business of the Security Council. The Security Councilis engagedin the consideration oft",o reports ofthe United Nations Palestine Commission [documents S/663 and 8/676]. assume that the S~curity Council ,vill wish to have the benefit of any supplementary information or comments which the Chairman of the Palestine Commission May wish to offer. Therefore, as there are no objections, 1 take it that the Security Council has agreed· to invite the Chairman of the Palestine ComDûssion to participate in the .discussion of these reports. The Security Couneil, as has heen mentioned by the representative ofSyria, also has applications from the Governments of Egypt and Lebanon. Theseare set forth in documents S/617 and S/618, which have been distributed to the members. 'With regard to these two applications~the Security Council will reca11 that when the Palestine question was fust put on the-agenda at the 222nd meeting .of the Security Council which was held on '9 December 1947, the'Security Council concurred with the President that there was no objection to the participation _of these two Governments -which had already submitted requests. _.Asthere is no objection to the proposal of the 'representative of Syria to accept the applications .ofthe Govemments ofEgypt and Lebanon, 1 take it theSecurity Council concurs. The Security Council also has an application 'froin the Jewish Agency for Palestine, set _forth in a letter dated 11 December 1947, whieh is befare the Security Council as document S/619, to be admitted and to he heard in any discussions which may take place in' the Security Couneil on the Palestine question. Members of the Secririty Council are aware that at the second session of the General Assembly, the Jewish Agency for Palestine was granted the opportunity to participate in the workof the Ad Hoc .committee on the Palestinian Question and of :Sub-Committee 1 of thatCommittee; Moreover, the United Nations SpecialCommittee on Palestine .ànd the present United Nations Palestine Comwssionhave found it advantageous in the p~r­ formance of their functions to maintain liaison ·with thé Jewish Ageney fQr Palestine. Rule 39 ofthe provisional-i'ules of procedure .of. the Security Couneil permits the Security Council to -invite " members of the Seèretariat or .other persons, whomit considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to mission représentants le tine, 3.']. The Palestine .Question . On the invitation of the Pres~dent, Mr. Lisicky. Chairman of .the United Nations Palestine Com· mission, Mahmoud' FawziBey. the representative al Egypt, and MT. Horowitz, the representative oft!le Jewisk Agencyfor Palestine. took their places at the 'Counci/ table.. sident la de l'Agence juive pour la Palestine. prennent place:à table d'aborder suel àinsi Commission. actuel espoir ceux l'examen lourdes seulement bien·être d'enfants l'Organisation situation sérieuse, et d'insl'irer . des ne gées' dant, fait verneinents re.commandation.soumet, aspects de saisis consiste cette moment craintes actuelle rations de dications. profondes The .PRESIDENT: As wc commence discussion 9f' the fust monthly progress report and the speèial report. of the United Nations Palestine Commission, may 1 be permitted in my capacity as President at.· this tÎlne to express the earnest hope that every member,of th~ Seeurity Couneil, as weIl as those who may.be cailed upon to assist us in the consideration of these matiers, will bear in mind the grave responsibilities which wemust discharge, not only in regard to the safety and the well·being of the multitudes of men. women and clùldren in Palestine, but also to the United Nations. We have been given the task of dealing with asituation which has ·been a difficult and serious one for years and has now deteriorated to.a point which arouses the most anxious fears. No solution ta the problem involved in this situation hàs been put forward which meets the wishes or the.objectives ofall those concemed; nevei:theless, a recom.. mendation eoncerning it has .been made by the Generai As~embly of th~ United Nations. 1 That ~ecommt'ndation is made to the Governments of aU the MemblX States. It aIso submits.certain aspects of thepl'Oblem to the S~curity Council. The problem of Palestine, which is before us and before the nations of the world. is how to bring.peace to that Boly L~nd whichis now torn and. terrified by strife. how to reconcile the anxieties of those who are now· its inhabitants \Vith the aspirations of those who feel its c1aims. dThe. consideration of. this .problem provokes cep and conflicting emotions. strong and con· ~~~ See.0J!lcial Records oJthe seccmd session ofthe Genèral <1!!elllbly, Resolutions; No: 181 (II)'. . .., ' de Mr. LISICKY(Chairman,UnitedNations Palestine Commission): The United Nations Palestine Commission. ove; which 1 have the' honour to preside, was set up by the General Assembly in order to implement its resolution on the future govemment of Palestine, known as the plan of partition with econoInic union. As an executive organ of the General Assembly created for tbis specific purpose, we are bound to exert our efforts strictly in conformity with' the provisions of the resolution. We have no liberty to deviate from the will ofthe General Assembly as expressed in the resolution,nor are we free to modify its tems. We are an executive and not a polîcymaking body. Any political moves wbich May prove necessary in th~ course of the implementation, and wbich are not provided for in the General Assembly's résolution,' have to be decided by the political body under the guidance of which the resolution has put the ComInission: the Security COUReil. That is why 1 have the honour tG sit now at this tabl,~. The security aspect of the problem is not confined to the difficulty in the way of implementing the partition plan of the General Assembly .:......far froni it. That aspect, however, commands al1 the reste If tbis major obstacle can be surmounted, then the other. difficulties can be tackled \vith greater hopeofsuccess. Should this obstacle prove insuperable, indispensable prerequisites'for the possible realization of the plan under present circumstances will .bè lacking. What use, then. would there be in considering other difficulties still in store? . Only fools may boast of being ablè to erect building on shifting sands. No constructive \Vork of any'value canbe performed in chaotic condi,;, tions ofvïolenœ andlawlessnèss unless responsiblè people possess effectivemeans of pacification and are able·tore..establish a régime oflaw and ensure an adequate measure of order and safety for thosewho would be willing to follow. them. Our special reporton.security tries toestablish and~ 1 believe, does demonstrate that in the circumstances which are now prevailing in Palestine -and still more so, in those circumstances wbich l have put some stress upon the words "plan of par!Ïtion as it has been envisaged by the General Assembly", since it is with the implementation of this plan that our Commission has been entrusted. It is quite natural and legitimate for interested parties to concentrate their efforts preponderantly,if not exclusively, on such parts of the plan as are intended more especially for theirsake. The Commission is not in such a position; its duty, according·to its terms of reference, isto provide for the implementation of the whole plan which has been conceived by the General Assembly. In fact; the plan of the General Assembly, while partitioning the present mandated territory of Palestine, entrusts the Commission with the responsibility for establishing' not one but three territorial entities: an Arab State, a Jewish State, and an international ter.ritory of the City of Je:rnsalem. AlI of those partitiQned territories are, however, to he lir.ked together and to remain strongly interdependent through the regime of economic union, which is to pr6vide for a unitary customs regime; a joint currency system; a common operation of railways, interstate highways, postal, telephone and telegraphic services, ports and airports involved in international trade and commerce; and other common functions. sous générale une, un par ainsi et régime surer monétaire dans de phones des national un d'une considérable, "des partie sacrée s'élève bien musulmans. Jérusalem, voisines constitueront qui- Ce Pour' Since the plan has been envisaged as a whole, the reaJjzation and sound functioning of one part of the plan has been made, in a substantial degree. dependent upon the establishment and functioning of its other parts. Let us exàmine, for instance, that part of the plan which concerns a ground hallowed by so many millions of human beings, the Roly City of Jews, Christians and Moslems alike: Jerusalem. The plan of the General Assembly establishes Jerusalem, with Bethlehem and sorne other surrounding 10caIities, ,as a special international territoryunder the administration of the Ufiited Nations. This territory shall'be demilitarized and declared neutrat For the protection of the Boly Places in the City, the Govemor, to be appointed by the Trusteeship CouDeil" shall organize a special police force of adequate strength,the members of which should he recruited outside of Palestine. Such is the plan. Now what is the ~li~? ' Jéru~alem, le spéciale 'de dont la quelle venant sécurité l'heure de par celui puissantes jours sinats tensifie comme hAceording to, an official communicatioù from t.e. Mandatory Power, securityservice in the City of Jerusalem is now providedby meansof 900 United Kingdom and 350 Palestinian police, ~lported by more than a brigade of United l\.1llgdommiIitary troops. Even with this support o{strong military forces, we witness daily cases of s ®ting" .bombing' and indiscriminate kilIing becoming intensified to such an extent as to make Possible the kind of outragesperpetrated two days ago in the very centre of modem Jerusalem. &vertheless, according: to •the estimate of" the , .The following suggestion, .allegedly providing for the future safety of Jerusalem, has been heard in recent days: Let the Governor, to beappointed immediately, proceedwithout delay· with 'the recruiting of this'special police force in order that it will he Jully organized by 1S May and be able to 'take over the security duties on the relinqmshing by,the'Mandatory Power ofits responsibilities for the safety of Jerusalem; thus, ail would he right. . .. ~ Is it really so simple asthaU Daes this reasoning rest on, realistic ground'l 'As aIready stàted, one brigade of troops is rèquired for the maintenance of some kind of order iri Jerusalem, while the whole çountry is still under t1J.e administration and ,:esponsibility of the Mandatory Power, disposing, •to this end, very strong military forces of oçl}upation. Let us suppose that, rather surprlsingly, after the 'evacuation of .Jetusalem by the Mandàtory administration, acconipanièd by an unavoidable distuption of administrative services, troops in the strength of one brigade would no longerbe necessary and order in the City could really be maintained .'by the special police force alone, iila strength indicatedbythe Mandatory Power. Furthermore,in the \iew,'of '·the 'Mandatory Power, major considerations of security are strongly opposed to the arrivai ofom Commission in Palestine earlier than a fortnight before the ~ermination,ofthe Mandate. Le~ us suppose·that those same considerations of security would not 9Ppose .the immediate arrivaI ~d acti\ities in ~erus~~m ofthe representative.and administrator of the plan .of partition for Jerusalem, namely, ibe.Qovernor of the City. . ' Let usstillsuppose-rather in,sharp contrast to the attitude in regard to the formation'of a Jewish militia-that the "sàme, reasons would not be opposed to the immediate recruiting of,the police force by the Governor while the Mandatory .regime still endures. ., . ' r.. ' ._.,"". ... .."\ t" •••. 1 .. ' ..Tbere are some complica.tions jn cOÙ11-exion.with iécruitiilg volunteers'froÙ)..the·' United Kingdom members. of ,die prés~nt Palestine police force, about wbich jnformatioh, from.the Mandatory administration'isas follows~.. . " '. . . -;,'''";'.", -" ..... "There 'are' indications tbat "a fair nuttlber of British police would volunteer,after the terminatian oftheircontracts witbthe pr-esent administration, for'service WÎth such a force, but it-is impos~ sibleto give a reliable estiI1late until 'further information:is .available as to·th~ proposed tenns of.service which would' be offered,' atid ·whether such .serVice.w()uld be,underBritish: tommand. Most,of. the British police who: might he likely to voluroeer ,:would be Gf jQiÛor rank andrather inexperlenced, "and it is 'probablë .thatvery, few vo1unteeJ;'s of the ranIcor Inspectorand upwards would.:he.forthèoming." . \' Q. Let us suppose that these complications will also he successfully surmountedand that, at the time of the termination of the Mandate, the Govemor will have at ms disposaI a highly trained, competent and efficient police corps, its strength, as indicated by the Mandatory, being sufficient for maintaining law and order in the City. Given a lucky realization of this entire list of favourable features, would the' necessary prereguisites then be provided for enabling the internàtional territory of the City to be established and maintained'? 1 deeply regret having to say "No'\ Look at the map. The planned City of Jetusalem will he an inland enclave surrounded on aIl sides by Arab territory. l'hat is one point. The second point is: For all its necessities of life, Jerusalem is dependent upon the outer world. 'fliat applies to food supplies in tlie same degree as to fuel both for generating heat for warming and cooking and for producing electric energy for lighting and motion. That applies to the water supply as weIl. prac~èRlly no wood, fuel is provided by oil and ne possède pas de charbon is coriduçtedby the pipeline from Iraq to Haifa le and tbence distributed across the country. Hence le the dependence UpOIl the unbroken functioning il est of the pipeline, in the sector of it which runs dépend through the territory of the Arab State, and upon partie the maintenance of traffic between Jerusalem l'État and the coastal belt. du The electric energy partly is produced in Jerusalem on the basis of oil-hence the same électrique situation of depèndency as for fuel oil generally est -and partly issupplied across the Arab area le carburant from TelAviv. There again, the energyis produced de In part on the spot OIl the basis of oil, but in des greater part if is supplied from .a. power planton centrale the Jordan River south of' Lake Tiberias. The'· de plant is situated outside the territory of the dehors Jewish State and the current has to be transmitted transporté across the aI'ea ofthe Arab State. The watersupply of Jerusalem comesfrom wells in the coastât plain situated inside the moyen Jewish State, but it isbrought to Jerusalem dans through threepumping stations (the difference différence oflevel between.the coast and Jerusalem being la nearly 2,500 feet}-whicll aré all in the area of d'acheminer theArab State.· stations le AlI communication WÎth the coast and the outer ~orld by railway and road goes thrQugh the Arab l'extérieur, que ce soit tate. • doivent emprunter le territoire de . The airfield for Jerusalem, Lyddà, also accessible 1D!Y across. the area oftheArab S~ate,is sitliate.d, ,. Jérusal.em, 1 lstrue,. m the area of the JeWlsh State. It IS, arabe. however, on its very frontier with the Arab State, est-il These facts-and 1 apologize for having elabo~ rated them in some detail-each separately and all jointly, force upon one who is unprejudiced an unavoidable conclusion: It would he utterly inadequate, in order to estabUsh the special international regime for Jerusalem, to provide only for the appointment of a Governv.' and, for the recruitment of the envisaged_ special police force, ~yen if it were strong,enough to proteet the Holy Places and the Governor's residence. Without freecommunication withthe outer world and Without assured supplY of the primary necessities of life, Ierusalem would be doomed even with United Nations GovernQr at its head. Free communication and assured· supplies necessarily require an effective control over a subsiantial part of the area of the Arab State. Such a control can he obtajned only through an efficient pacification ofthe area ID one way oranother. The Commission isperforming iis primary duty in insisting on the grave danger for the Baly City, because of the sc.ar~ly calculable consequences if provision is not made in a really effective -and satisfactory way for· its .safety ~nd its very being. In· section V of our special report we have expressed .our deep apprehension about the fate of the. City in the coming months. .1 have now supplemented that ,chapter with. some technical c0nnn.ents. May 1 be allow.ed to close them with a cry from myheart: li Lestwe forget Jèrusalem, lest we forget Jerusalem'l " Taking another example, ,it is.hard1y necessary to :elaborate on the impossibility of establishing the regimeof economic union and running its services without indispensable voluntary. co· ,Qperationof _aIl three tefritorialentities or, in the • bsence of such éo-operatioil, without an enforced and effective control oyer the recalcitrant part. AILthat is pretty ob,vious, Therè is, however, oile.accompanying feature, connected with this regiDie which, in the.èÎICUlllStances as. they. have deV'èloped afterth~adoption of the resolution by the Gent>::aL Assembly; 'has assUJ]leda rather threateI1ing importance.. Asitscoro11ary, the i'egime of economic union introduces a mutual freedom of transit between, a11 entitiesin partitionedPalestine.Withrelianceupon this freedom, the respective areas of Ar~band Jewish States havebeenshapedin arather unusual form which, during the discussion in the Ad HocCommittee of the General Assembly, inspired thedistinguished representative of Pakistan to make compatison with a li tapesti'yof cra;zy design ~~, and, mor~ recently, the representatlve of Iraq in the Trustel;lship Couneil, to areference to picturesby ,Pablo Picasso-without stating ta whatperiodofthis disputed artist'sworkhe was alluc:lmg., Ifmembèrs·,of the Council will'look at the mal' ofpailitioned Palestine theywill realize that these references relatetô the faet that both States There is no need toelaborate upon' what farreliching conSequences and what entanglements, legal and otherwise, mayderive from sùch a situation in the present state of mind of the communities concerned, unless, in time, such developments could be obviated by a peaceful arrangement or by inlposing an effective .control , on those highly inflamtrtable spots by sufficient outside forces. In the Council's futuredelibera.;, tions on our conclusions upon the necessity of proViding for an international security force in orderto inlplement the recommendation of the Assell1bly, thissituation also caUs strongly for due consideration. No mi1itia could provideany remedy for it; on thecontrary, what is called for is to preventexactly the clashes between two !fiilitias taking the, right, as they may see it, In their hands. and.~heauthority and effectiveness of the United ~atlonsare deeply involved," Nodoubtthe 11llplicat~oIl.s of ~hept~sent issue for the future .of the United Nations will be duly considered. Representing .a Commission entrusted with. ,t~e concrete. task of inlplementing the resolutt9n .181. (II) of the General Assembly dealing \Vlth.partition,l haye, however, felt it more be- CODlW.g for me to keep inside the framework of the resolution. In my presentation 1have confined my~elf, therefore, to technical aspects. Of aIl the policies of which. the Commission cannotallow l clôse by quoting the last paragraph of our report: «The' Commission submits this report WÎth a ptofound appreciation of Îts duty to th~ United Nations. The solè motivation of the Commission Is to. obtain from the Securîty CoUlicil tbat·effective assistance without which it is fumly convinced it cannot discharge the great responsibilities' entrusted to it by the General Assembly." . ~. Thê «five 10nelypilgrims" lcannotbe permitted t~ remain lonely if their pilgrimage is to have any effeét . On behalf of the Palestine Commission,. 1 have the honour to submit.to the deliberation and decision of the Security ü)uncil our special report, on the problem of security in Palestine. Mr•. AUSTIN (United States of America): The Sec~ty Council is now çonfronted with the complex problf)ni of Palestine as presented to us in·. General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of Z9 Novçmber 1947 and the two reports from the PalestinèConunission. ·The ~ecurity Council now has before it.a num~r of important questions conçerningPalestine for which it must endeavour ~o find ..~ answer. The situation does not permit any,.Iurther delay. .. ~e;problembas been before.the United Nations àsamatter.ofspecial concem;since 2 April 1947. :rhe,United States,:asa Member of the United Nations, bas supported since that date those United' Nations pro.cedures which we.considered best,adapted ta obtaining a broadand impartial explession:of world opinion on the problem, Which would tesultma justand workable solution conimending itself to the Mandatory Power and to the people of Palestine. " ASta result 'of the ·recommèridattons of the GeneraIAssembly of 29 November1947, Palestine is .now before'several' of the principal bodies of the .United' Nations'forvarious types of action under the Charter. The United States, as a-Member of the United Nations and of those bodies, will continue to deal with the" question of Palestine aS'aMemberofthe United Nations in conjunction With·other Members., The United.· States policy willnot be unilateral. It· will.conform to, andbe inisupport of, United Nations action on Palestine. . .White we are discussingthe problem ofPalestine, it isofprit'nary importance to the future of the United Nâtions that the precedent tobe established by'theaçtion takenin' this caseshould be'in full ac.cord'with the termsof theCharterunder which weoperate.The interpretation of thé terms of the Charter given in the Palestine is.sue Willsepously Attempts to' frustrate the General Assembly's recommendation by the thrèat or use of force, or by incitement to force, on the part of States or people outside Palestine, are contrary to the Charter. Members of the Council may recaU that when the representative of the United'States expressed the views of my Government to the General. Assembly on the Palestine question on 11 October 1947, 1 he said: "We assumed that there wonld be Charter observance. The life oÎ tbis Union depends upon obedience to the law. If any Member should violate its obligations to refrain in its internationai reiations Îrom the threat or use of force; the Security COUDcil itself must act." The resolution of the General. ASsembly makes tlrree separate requests of the Security Council. The. fust is that the Seeurity Council "take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its imp'lementation". To determine what these measures are, it is necèssary to turn to the plan itself.Jt will be seen that theseare: To give ~daneee to the Palestine Commission; to take such action as the Security Couneil May deem prQper \vith respect to either the Jewish or the Arab State .if by 1 April 1948 a provisional coullcil of government cannot be selected for that State, or,' if selected, cannot carry out its funetions; to issue such instructions to the CommissiQn as the·'Security Council may consider n~ssary; to receive and consider 'periodic progress. ~eports,special' reports and the final 'report ofthe Palestine Commission; té) give sympathetic ~onsideration to the. application for membership mthe United' Nati6ns. made by either the' Arab ortheJewish State when a certain stage in the plan·has been achieved. :We believe it is clear that the SecurityCounci1 ca~ undertake the above-mentioned measures. It 18 further clear from the·terms·oÎ the resolution of 29 November 1947 that the Paléstine Commis- SiOIliS bOUDd by whatever instructions the Security Couneil gives···to it pursuant to' the General Assembly's requests. . We come now to the two following' requests of the. General. Assembly ..as set forth in the resolution of 29 Nover..iher. Theseinvoke the '---..iiI&:Pfficial Records oith1jsecondaession ~Ithe General llthm :P, .Ad Hoc'Committee.on the Palestinian Quèstion, is fr meehting. The quotation. in the iollowing paragraph Om t e verbatim ,"e.:J:'à uf tb.at meeting. l'Assemblée question palestilzienne, suivant The third request. of the General Assembly asks that the Security Council "determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peaee or aet of aggression, in accordanee with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the se~t1ement envisaged by this resolution ". 1 am sure that everymember of this body is deeply concerned with the tragic events which have taken place in Palestinesinee 29 November last. Our hearts are saddene.d t..y the internecine hostilities, the interracial strife, and the interreligioris conffict, which in these past three months have stained the soil of the Holy Land with the blood· of Briton, Jew and Arab. If these conditions continue, the Security Council must consider whetber·or not the sitùation in Palestine is a threat to international peace. The Security Couneilwould have to do this evenifthe resolution of 29 November had never been written, because lU: :~r the Charter it must take steps" to prevent or _~move any tbreat to the peace, .breach of the peaee or act of aggression ". . The second and. third requests of the General Assembly's resolution, mentioned above, ·raise constitutional questions orthe Security Council's .powers underthe Chart~r. What are the powers of the Securïty Couneil'1 . The Securîty Cetuncil is .gi\1en the responsibility :under the Charter to "dctermine the existence .of any threat tQilie peaœ, breach· ofthe peace or :actofaggression". Ifit makes sucha determinatîon .with respect te the. situation in Palestine, the SecurityCounci1 is required, by the Chal'ter to act. :Its:findingandsubsequent action might arise :either in connexion with incursions into Palestine from the outside or·from such internaI disorder as would itselfconsth.".tea threat to international ~fi». , If the Security COullcil :fu1ds thata threat to intemationàl peace or breach of the peace exists, the Charter authorizes it to follow variou~ liIles of action. It is empowered to make recommendations, or to. take .".provisional measures "under Article 4O,orto imposeeconoric. and other non-military sanctionsunder Articl~ 41, or to takemilitary.mëasûres under Article 42. The .Security Councilisrequire&tn follow· one or more .of these linesof a~tioii.; it may ~1urs~,m these 1in~,sof action in any sequence it J.ee'1E"ilfOP...'!'. Although· the. Soourity Council is empowered to .use, .and . would normally. attempt. to use, 'DleaSlJl"es .shO:rt o{a.rmed force tC1.maîntain the Peac~, j(js .autborj.ze4 under the' Charter .to .use .armed forceifitconsiders :other lIleas'iè1'p.s fur~~ dntain internation.al peace in connexion saire with 1"lU",..cine. the United States would be ready la te consult undel' the Charter with a view to such le& action as may be necessary to maintain intertations national peace. Such consultation would be la required in. view of the fact that agreement has seraient, not yet been reached making àrmed forces 1 qui available to the Security Council under the terms les of Article 43 of the Charter. Charte• The Security Council is authorized to take forceftù measures. with. respect to Palestine to des remove a threat to international peace. The Palestine afin.d'écaL Charter of the United Nations does not empower internationale. the Security COUReil to enforce a political settledonne ment whether it is pursuant to a recommendation d'imposer of the General Assembly or of the Security d'une Council itseif. ou What tbis·means is tbis: The Security Couneil, under the Charter, can. take action to prevent termes de aggression against Palestine from. outsidc. The empêcher' Seeurity Council, by these same powers, can take contre action to prevent a threat to international peace Conseil de sécurité and security from inside Palestine. But tbis empêcher aotion must be directed sole~y to the maintenance internationales venant of international peace. The Security Council's Mais cette action action, in otter words, is direoted to keeping tien·de the peace and not to enforcing partition. l'action· paix que de le Conseil suite. demandes semblée, besoin, nationales agression, Charte. documents premier sécurité 2 témoigne la des Le des nées tantes résolution 'Vement refusreprésentants Commission; la la œlle-ci des avec arabes premier désirer -The United States Government believ~s that thefirst of the three requests maâe by the General Assembly to the S~urity Council under its resolution of 29 November 1947 can properly be complied with by the Security Couneil. With respect tû the second; and tBrd requests of the General Assembly's resQlution, the Security Councilmust aet, ifne.cessary, to preserve interllational peace andsecurity or to curb and repel aggression as provided in the Charter. We comenow to the second of the documents before us, namely, the first monthly report of the Palestine Commission ta the Security Council dated 2 February 1948 [document 8/663]. It reilects the seriousness and the diligenw with which the Commissionhas addressed-itself to its difficult taskinthe course ofits twenty-six meetings in January. The repprt contains a useful and practical analysis of the .tasks set l'vr the Commission by the General Assembly, and it lists the significant datE:S whichconstitute the framework. of implementation. Two elementsin the report are deeply dis~;urbing ,"0 my Government; the fust is the refusaI of th~Arab Higher Committee to designate represent~tves to consult with the Commission, anû the other is the continued deterioration ofthe situation in .Palestine.. The repolt shows the need for continued negotiations by the Commission with the Manqatory Power, and with· r1:lpresentatives pf the Jewish and Aràb cO!DIDunities cf Palestine, if the Commission is to pror,eed with its ."'1.sk. fItIy Government believes that,with respect to thiSfirst.report,the Security Couneil might wish to inform .ïtself.of the situationto det~rmine The third document before us is the fust special report of the Palestine Commission to the Security Couneil on the problem of security, dated 16 February 1948 [document S/676]. This report contains .an appraisal by the Commission of the security situation in. Palestine, as well as. the Commission's estimate of the security situation whieh it believes can be expected upon the terniination of the' Mandate.'This special report on security does not allege that a threat to the peace, breaeh of· the peace or aet of aggression has Oœurred in Palestineh It reports faets' which, if accepted or substantiated by the Security Council, wo1!ld appear to lead to the conclusion thata threat to international peace is present in that situation.. With this special report before it, tlle .Security Couneil must, in our opinion, look iuto the matter immediately to determine whether such a danger exists. The report looksahèad to what it .::onsid~rs will happeli' in the future, and clearly· implies that .a threat to the peace and a breach of the péace will·àccUI if the' Commission continues its effort to'carryout the General Ac;sembly's resolution. Perhaps thr, most emphatic illustration is found in the'cânèlusion ofthe report,.section VITI, pàragraph 5 of wlùch rends asfollows: <f It' is' the considered view of the Commission that the security forces of the Mandatory Power, whicb, at the present time prevent the situation from deteriorating completely into open wmare on an organizedbasis,rilust be replaced by an adequate non-Palestinian force which will assist law-abiding elements in baththe Arab and Jewish communities, organized under the generaI direction pf, the ~ Commission, in maintaining arder dnd security iQ.Palestine, and thereby enabling the CommissiOn tocarry out. the r~omQlendations pf ·the General AssemblY..Otherwise, the period hn.m..ediately following the. terminationof the Mandate will be a period ofuncontrolled,wide... spread strifeand bloodshed in Palestine, includiQ.g the City QfJerusalem. This \yould be acatastrophic concluSion to an era of international concern fPI dui.t temtory," , .. The Commission has reached the conclusion thatitcarinot fll1filits fûnctlons under theGeneral Assembly resolution unless armed forces are pIo~ded tothe Commission·by the Security Council; In the final sentence of its special report, the Commission refers to " that effective assistance Without.which, it isfirmly convinced, it cannot dis_charge thegreat responsibilitiesentrusted to it by .the .General Assembly". , Thethree documents before US raise the broad question. ofWhat action the .. Security. Cou.Ilcil should now tak~ with respect·ta Palestine. The United: State8 .'believe~ that sl.1ch: action should, be oftV';"'kit~s, The second type. of action should be directed toward giving effect to the resolution of the .General Assembly with the full use of, but within the limitations of, the powers of the' Security .Council under the Charter. While taking necessary nieasures to maintain international' peace, the Security Council should make every effort to .achieve an agreement, on thebasis of the 'General Assembly's recommendation,concerning the underlying political difficulty. For this purpose the Security Council should begin at once its ,consultations with the Paltistine Commission, the Mandatory Power and' representatives of the principal communities of Palestine. These consuliatipns should, we suggest, be held in New York in order that the Security Council. itself may be tept closely advised at aU stages. . né~sairesau le pour mandation problème Conseil ment la sentants Palestine. déroulent Conseil événements. débats résolutions que examiner 1) demandé résolution Palestine, sous réserve des pouvoirs que de un du question nationale,. menaces tion mission et population ete tous notamment. dâns· Plesmes sordres . blème présentera seil de sécurité avant plus ment· parce bilités égard. qu~tous que tâçhe 'M. Althollgh we do not wish to place specific resolutions before the Security Council at this .carly stage of the discussion., my Government believ~' we should have in mind the desirability ·ofthe following specific steps which the Security ü)up.cil might take at once: (1) to accept the tasks which the General Assembly asked· the .Security Couneil to accept in its resolution of 29. .November 1947 on Palestine, s.ubject to the .authority· of the .Security Council under the Charter; (2) to establish a committee of th~ Security Council,comprising the five permanent Members, to look· at once into the question of the possible threats to international peace arlsirig in connexionwiththe Palestine situation and to .consult with the Palestine Commission, the Mandatory Power and representatives of the principal commUnities of Palestine concerning the ÎJ11plementation .of the General Assembly resolu- ~ioni (3) to caU upon all Governments and pe()ples, parttcularly in and around Palestine, to take aU possible action to prevent or reduce the disorders now.occurring.in Palestine. . ··There.is no reaspn to.·beEeve that the Security Council will· find this cproblem any less difficult than .others have found it. But there .is also no reason forexcessivepessimism merely because the question is complicated and involves violence. The responsibilities .of the SecurityCouncil in this sittÏationare great. We feel.confident that all <lfthe m.embers are ready "or the Securlty Council ~o ~4dFess itself a:t once tO its. t~sk. Mr.CREECH JoNES (United·Kingdom): It isnot ~y purpose at·· this stage of .the. proceedings·.to l'ar~'.lsk de itt;.;il6itante le effet. le ~scuss the importantstâtement and proposaIs Just made bytherepreseiltative of the United ~tates.forthey caU for the mast careful êonsideratl~nrnor do 1 propose tcr ·deal. with the great difficulties·of:theimplementation oftheresolution It i~iessentially because of the difficul1ies of security f.nd the.dangers of divided re~ponsibility in. pa.les.tin·..e.in .. pre.sent...condi.·ti.·o,..nstbat th..è. ~.ll.'.n<1a-1 tory Power, fa..ced Wlth· specifie threatf 1:')' ~h~ Arabs, could not agree to open a port 1:0 .~c~Wl.:St) immigration, t~ ~he progre~s~ve tr:'lnsfer ,::[ &.t'i::&l> to the ComwsslOn's adtll1Illstratlon, ot:.... :116 formation·ofamilitia under the control ,-,f 1;C Provisi())lGI Govemment of..the future Jewish State; •.Nor could myGover1llnent safely· extend theperiod .ofoverlap during wbich the ,United Na~ons Com.missioJiwouldQe present in Palestine whilethe responsibm~forsecurityandadministra.., tion stilt~)wi~th~;Maridatory:Power. -His Jndeed, the genetal securit}i position in Palestine has .degenerated veryseriously since the resolutiôn of the General Assembly was adopted on 29 November last year. This deterioration, due to outrages·and lack of restraint by sections of both coinmunities inside Palestine, has also been aggravated by activities of groups beyond the borders as, for example, the intrusion of armed Arab bands, and, on the Jewish side, the continuance of illegal immigration. In endeavouring to control tbis situation, United Kingdom: civil andmilitary personnel have suffered a heavy toll of life and property. Nevertheless, United Kingdom forces have onfrequent occasions kept the contendmg factions apart, havesup~ pressed much violence, have·controlled the coast and frontier~, and haveprevented open civil war. Since the adoption of thê resolution of 29 November my Government has provided the Palestine Commission with a large body of,information to enable it to takè up the responsibilities assigned to it by·the United Nations. My Government has strivencontinuously, as tar as lay in its power~ to'ineet the wishes of the Commission in its prepdt~tions for the assumptioll of authority in Palestine. The. various phases of the transfer, and the subsequent exercise. of authority and the maintenance of security by the Commission, have beenmscussedin sOinedetai1. In addition, my Government has played a full part in the work of the Trusteeship Council·preparatory to the formation of the· Jerusalem Special International Regime. Notwithstanding aIl these obstacles, the Mandatory Administration has made Rome progress in the devolution of powers to local Jewish and Arab authorities, in the creation of police fotces drawn from both communities, and in the transfer of control over some of the important services. AIl. these measures have been designed to secur.:: the maximum of law and order at the time of the traDsfer of control to the United Nations Commission. The United Kingdom, above aIl, has no wish to wreck the work it has accomplished in Palestine since the assumption of the Mandate more than a quarter of a century ago. 1come now to the principal problein before the Security Couneil. It will be remembered that the United Kingdom Govemment declared at the meetings of the General A~sembly lastyear that not-only was itunwilling to implement any United Nations plan for Palestilie which was unacceptable toeither the Jews or the Arabs, but also that it coUldnot accept responsibmty for the enforcement of a ilisputed plan-either alone or in the major part. P~cipation by the United Kingdom Government with others in the task of implementation' would depend on its conception of the inherent justice of the plan adopted for Palestine by the General Assembly, and the degree of force required togive effect to it. ~abi1ité, d'un Uni de du semblée jusqu'auquel force délégatirD bien avant que ait mon en une l'emploi de troupesbrimnniques une tio.n rité raIe, fréquemment finalement·adopté de vital était manquer Alexander .Cadogan ·blée générale que, mandations, risques de penrlant la troupes utilisées As to enforcement, the United Kingdom delegation made it clear, long before the General Assembly's decision was taken or could even he aecurately foreseen, that my Government was not prepared to accept any responsibility under the General Assembly's recommendation which would involve the use of United Kingdom troops as the means of enforcing a decision likely to be resisted by Jews' or· by Arabs.. 1 must aIso renûnd the Security Council that, during the meetings of the General Assembly last year, my Government frequently stated·that, whateverscheme for Palestinemight be adopted, the~eans ofimplementing it was a vital consideratIon, and enforcement was an aspect of the problem whichcould not be ignored. On 20 November,l Sir Alexander· Cadogan urged that the çre~eral Assembly, in drawingup its .recommenaations, should" take fullaceol!D.tof therisk of strife'~Palestine a!ld the need to provide a means of :filling the gap ID the process of enforcement ;ft by the decision of·the present Mandatoty .ower that its troops could not be used as the Instrument of the. United Nations for this purpose''', '. As 1 See Offi~ial Records a!the secondsessiono!the General ,1. 2Sthmbly,.Ad HocCommitteeon the Palestinian Question. 1l'Assemblée meetlDg. The quotation is from the verbatim record ol question , du p~ople." .That statement. has subsequently been endersed by the United Kingdolü Parliament. The position of my,·Govemment is,;therefore we!! known. In December last, it was stated in Parliament by the ForeignSem:etary,Mr. Bevin, and oY'me, that His Majesty's Goverinnent " has no intention ofopposing the United Nations' decision, but it cannot itself undertake, either individuaUy or' collectively in. association with othe,rs, to impose.that decision by force". . 1 have aIready saïa that, in accordance. with its declatations, ·my·Govemment hasJoyally accepted the·recommendation ofthe General Assembly and has assisted the United Nations Palestine Commis;. sion in preparing for its ·assumption of authority when the Mandate isterminated and the Ullited Kingdom security. forces are ''withdrawn; My Government is:-bringing t\) :an end tlie dischârge of its .responsibilities towa1:ds Palestine Ulider the .Mandate and is leaving the' future o~ that coUlitry to .intemation&1, authority_ ' In the past; my "Governineilt has tried hard· to secure the co-operation of the Jewish, and Arab commullities inéfindinga solution to the Palestine problem.· Reviewiilg the efforts we have made, ourexperience both in the General Assembly ~st year and during the confiicts in Palestine &èe; and the fierceresentment ofthe ArabStates, weare,'1 thihk, entitled to say thatall these'events andexperience deinonstratethewisdomof our, attempt!>' t6 :findas~tle'lI1entacceptable'to both Jews and Arabs. We had hoped byourwith,;, draY/al ,an$1relinqm,Slmlent, '.of,authority that· the na~d .r~lilitiesof~he situation woulq be better ~ppieciatedbyan con~med. par:ticu1arly the two çODlDlunj.ti~in Pale~tine" an.d· that~OIJle new atWID.pt a! cOIJ,ciliationmigllt ;00, ID.!lde.·Unfor:- tCA~te~ythe' situation, bas, ift;tnytlûng., .grown W9r~e.Violen~ is the order,of~hedayand op~n çïYU'.w.armay break out· in .P-al~stine ·at ,any mQDJen~, . , o . The Ullited Kingdom has ,playedan honourable part·al! a M~b~r:ôf thèUmted Nations.It bas made the,'WnitM.' Nations the fundamentahprin"" ciplndn. its' intemationatpolicy. '.It cares much .,. "',1 See OjJi;;iàl Recordsolthesecondsessionofthe General A'ssembly,'Plenary M~etil1gs; Volume TI; 124th meèting. ' .-< -f -. "' ' . For more than a quarter oi a ceniury, the United Kingdom fias never ceased to contribute men, experience and resources to thé end' that Jè\v and Arab'alike may prosper in Palestine and tlie. Jewish National Homê be established thère. Public opinionln the United Kingdom will permit no more expenditure of life and treasure. It will acquiescen010ngerinthe use of United Kingdom forces and the squandering. of British· lives to. impose a poliey in. Palestine which one or other of the parties is detennined to ·resist. We have already' used force enough in, Palestine in the interests of our international' obligations. It has brought to my Government,infinite anxiety.·and trouble; it bas cost us dearly; it has brought down on our heads the execration of the Jews and the bitter resentm~nt.of the Arabs; it has made l'expéri~nce a~ Palestine du publique, de· sacrifices matérielles. forces niques à à forces' tions mon troubles amené ressentiment nous. sommes veillantes notre dans ,l'histoire puisse obligations Palestine 11&:the,..butt of malicious criticism throughoùNhe world. We have played o~;' part to the :limit of o~,resources. The United Kingdom is,too deeply involvœ.in thepast history'of Palestine to,be called upon to shculder any further commitments. Neither. party in, Palestine regards the United· Kingdom·· as impartial; its actions there have seldom escaped susl>icionin thé eyes of the·world, and,all nations' seemed relieved to know· that·,its intention was çOD;1pletely to withdraw and completely to disentangle. itself from Palestine. We cannot now ttake a course whièh may entangle lis ,again. . impartial;sesactesontirarement~cha:ppé·à picîon paru était. dégager pouvons conduite sécurité donner la en In· short, whi1e the. Security Council must determine the nature of any support tobe given tothe United Nations Falestine CoJD.UÜssion, IllY Govemment, for its. part,. beçause of its .past rel~ions,with Palestine, because pf. its position, whi~h.ha!\ Jong bcen c1earto aIl, must stand on ~ts .many. declaratiQns, withdraw the last part of; the United Kingdom,forces by 1 August of Pal~stine apparaît tenir retirer riiques refuser, 2,vec Unies de voter de à jJ tjris year, and refuse. either individually or in asso.ciation with others, to impose the United ~atlOns.plan by force. The logic of. our course 18 .. te abstain. from voting on this question of ent:0rcement. .

The Security Councîl will meet again this afternoon'at 3 p.rn. , . .