S/PV.2539 Security Council

My delegation deeply regrets that, as in the case of resolution 541 (1983) on 18 November 1983, we have little choice but to cast a negative vote on the draft resolution in document S/16550. 24. We opposed resolution 541(1983) because in our judgement it fell short of the minimum requirements of a document expected to serve as a basis for promoting a fair solution of the Cyprus problem and preserving the unity and territorial integrity of the island State. Our 28. An appropriate resolution, in our view, would reaffirm the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus, call for the resumption of the intercommunal talks on the basis of the high-level 25. We do not like to sit in judgement of the authors of resolution 541(1983), who promoted it, no doubt, with the best of intentions. However, even the best of intentions do not necessarily ensure a journey to salvation if they do not originate in realism or if they neglect historical imperatives. As all members know, resolution 541 (1983) has remained moribund because one of the two recognized principal parties to the Cyprus .problem; namely the Turkish Cypriot community, found it totally unacceptable. Thus it failed to promote its intended objectives and only resulted in the further disenchantment of the Turkish Cypriot community, as reflected in its recent actions, which have been the subject of the current debate in the Security Council. 26. During the Council’s deliberations this time, we emphasized that the Council had an opportunity to turn the course of events on the island in the right direction. We did not look at the situation in a hopeless vein; we saw a silver lining in the clearly stated desire of both sides to maintain’the unity and territorial integrity of Cyprus. What was required was to. move away from resolution 541 (1983) and to mount a constructive and positive effort by giving an open mandate to the Secretary-General to bring about conciliation between the two communities and to put back on the rails the hitherto interrupted intercommunal negotiations, which remain the only credible process for a just settlement of the Cyprus problem. 27. Little can be accomplished through yet another censure of the actions resorted to by the Turkish Cypriots, who for 20 years have felt deprived of their legitimate national rights guaranteed to them as a cofounder community under the 1960 Constitution, the bedrock of the independence of the island. I may recall the words of the representative of the United Kingdom, who this morning said that no party to the Cyprus problem has the monopoly of virtue. All parties have made mistakes, all parties have acted in contravention of agreements. Accordingly, a fresh approach needs to be built on the positive and promising elements which still survive in the situation and in the attitudes of the two Cypriot communities. 29. The draft resolution in document S/16550 does not accord with our perception of the issue or what we consider to be an appropriate response to the delicate situation in Cyprus. In most of its aspects, this draft resolution is cast in the image of resolution 541(1983), only it is harsher in tone. It makes no reference to the resumption of intercommunal talks or the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979, which are fundamental to any search for a just settlement of the Cyprus problem. In ourjudgement the draft resolution is likely to become yet another obstacle rather than a milestone of progress on the difficult road to intercommunal reconciliation. It may indeed intensify beyond retrieve the divisive tendencies which are currently asserting themselves on the island. 30. Besides being one-sided in character, the draft resolution attempts to redefine the mandate of the Secretary-General to entrust him with what could be a “mission impossible”. The Secretary-General is being requested to undertake new efforts to attain a solution of the Cyprus problem in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the pertinent United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolution 541 (1983) and the present draft resolution. Efforts based on such a mandate could have little chance of success. 31. However, we are not entirely despondent; we have trust in the personality and prestige of the Secretary-General and the confidence the two sides repose in him. We hope that despite the complications inherent in the flawed mandate he will be able to renew his contacts with the leadership of the Cypriot communities and present comprehensive proposals which could promote a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem. We also have confidence in the good sense of the leaders of the two communities to refrain from any further actions which would irrevocably frustrate the objective of a united Cyprus. 32. The PRESIDENT [interpretationfrom Russian]: I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution in document S/16550. A vote was taken by show of hands. Infavour: China, Egypt, France, India, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Upper Volta, Zimbabwe. The draft resolution was adopted by 13 votes to 1, with 1 abstention [resolution 550 (2984)]. 33. The PRESIDENT [interpretationfrom Russian]: I shall now call upon those members who wish to speak after the vote.

We wish sincerely to congratulate you personally, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this *month. 35. We have already said, and we wish to reiterate now, that the United States condemns the so-called exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, as well as other announced actions which seek to reinforce the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of 15 November 1983. Additionally, we agree that the Council cannot accept faits accomplis contrary to its resolutions. We agree that these actions are without legal merit and hinder efforts to find a solution to the grave problems confronting Cyprus. 36. Despite these agreements with the draft resolution, however, we have abstained because we also recognize that strong feelings exist among the parties to this issue, and in view of this we seek to avoid any possible exacerbation, even if unintended, of the conflict. 37. We will continue to give the strongest possible support to the continuing good offices mission of the Secretary-General, and we earnestly hope that the parties concerned will do the same.

My delegation voted in favour of the resolution which the Council has just adopted. We did so because wrong has been done and it is important for the Council to condemn it. In its resolution 541 (1983) of last November, the Council deplored the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus. That wrong has now been compounded by the purported exchange of ambassadors, and that the Council has now rightly condemned. 39. Although we voted for the resolution we do not regard it as ideal. It has several drawbacks, which I will come to in a moment. 40. First, however, I must re-emphasize the main points I made in my intervention in the debate this morning. The fundamental and long-term aspects of the situation in Cyprus are complicated. We shall not make them simpler or easier of solution by over-emphasizing the particular wrongdoing which we are now condemning. No party to the dispute, as I said earlier, has a 41. Indeed, it must be reversed. We must create an upward spiral. The way to do this is first and foremost through the Secretary-General’s good offices. We applaud that part of our present resolution which calls on all parties to support this. We will judge the merits and the degree of support which is due to each party by the extent to which they obey this injunction. We are confident that the Secretary-General understands the problem in all its complexities and we expect him to strive his utmost to secure agreement, but he cannot do this without the co-operation of the parties. We have a proverb in English that while you can bring a horse to water, you cannot make him drink. It is essential that the parties to the dispute should express their readiness to drink. I would observe in parentheses that the consequences of not drinking are drastic. If the parties would put aside passion and think of their own future in realistic and unemotional terms, we believe that they will find acceptable and indeed sensible the principles which I enunciated at the end of my statement this morning. 47. Mr. van der STOEL (Netherlands): During the Council’s debate this morning on the question of Cyprus, I said that the Netherlands would extend its full co-operation to any effort by the Council that would strengthen the mission of good offices of the Secretary- General and provide him with the necessary political support. I also said that the recent developments have made it necessary for us to reaffirm forcefully and in accordance with Security Council resolution 541(1983) the Council’s opposition to and non-recognition of the November 1983 unilateral declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. However, we also recognize, as the representative of the United Kingdom pointed out this morning with great clarity, that it is necessary to make a distinction between the immediate problem of the purported exchange of ambassadors and the more fundamental long-term problem of the situation in Cyprus. 42. I now turn to the drawbacks we found in the present resolution. 48. Having listened to the debate and taken into account the long and difficult history of the Cyprus problem, we felt that it would not be an easy task for the Council to give due consideration to the immediate and more long-term aspects of the situation in Cyprus and to agree on a constructive course of action which, while rejecting the regrettable recent developments, would at the same time have promoted conciliation, understanding, confidence and trust between the two separate communities, thereby reviving the hope for a peaceful and just solution to the Cyprus problem. Confronted with ‘the present resolution, we would have liked to have seen these aims more fully reflected in its 43. The first is that it seems either to go too far or not to go far enough. There is a certain confusion between the short term and the long term. We regret that it does not say some of the things contained in my speech this morning. We regret that it looks forward in some respects and not in others. 44. We are not sure that in a practical sense it is politically helpful to include in this resolution paragraphs 5 and 6. We also have reservations about paragraph 10. text. 45. As for paragraph 8, we regard its correct interpretation as of crucial importance. We are much concerned that misinterpretation of it might worsen the situation. I have voted in favour of the resolution on the understanding derived from the co-sponsors that paragraph 8 means that the Secretary-General’s mandate set out in Security Council resolution 367 (1975) remains wholly valid. It is our understanding that the Secretary-General has a free hand. He will of course take account of the principles of the Charter and of relevant resolutions, but that is all. The Secretary-General is as free after this resolution as he has always been in the past. The latter part of this operative paragraph is meant to relate to the eventual overall solution of the Cyprus problem, not to the Secretary-General’s mandate. 49. In voting in favour of this resolution, which also contains many elements withwhich we wholeheartedly agree, my delegation wishes to express some reservations as to the wording of the resolution, in particular paragraph 10. 50. As far as paragraph 8 is concerned, we consider the language of this paragraph as in no way restricting the freedom of action of the Secretary-General in initiating any new efforts he might deem appropriate to revive the intercommunal dialogue within the framework of the existing mandate of his mission of good offices, as entrusted to him by the Council. 51. In conclusion, we earnestly hope that all parties directly concerned will heed the call expressed in paragraph 9 to co-operate with the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices. 46. On these understandings and without believing that the resolution is perfect, we support it, because it 53. Mr. DENKTAS: My belief in. the powers and intentions of this body is that it can make enslaved, colonized people free, but it cannot make free people enslaved or colonized. 54. The resolution, in the way in which it will be interpreted by the Greek Cypriot leadershipand we know them well-will become a tool for the harassment of my community and for the destruction of its bicommunality. I wish it were not so, but it will be so used. Therefore, I shall not take much of the Council’s time. 55. The resolution, which refers to the Republic of Cyprus, or to the Cyprus Government, without regard at all to the co-founder, partnership status of my people and the fact that we have been rejected and ejected from the partnership State, looking at those who have occupied the seat of government by force of arms for 20 years, those who have denied my people all its natural rights and liberties, cannot be accepted by us as helpful to the solution of the problem. 56. I know from my contacts with some members of the Council that their Governments’ decisions bind them. I hope that in time their Goveinments will see that we do not want to be a pawn between two or more Powers; that we are a people fighting for our independence and liberty; that we are, with our sacrifices, the party which has maintained the independence and nonalignment of Cyprus. 57. Representatives have said that they have listened to the statement of the President of the Republic of Cyprus. I have heard the statement of the President of southern Cyprus, and I have pointed out to the Council how he uses his powers and his authority against us. 58. I deny, and shall continue to deny, that we have seceded from our State. We were thrown out of it by a violent act and not allowed back in. I reject any suggestion of the idea of secession. I deny it, and shall continue to deny it, for and on behalf of my people, who are living as part of Cyprus, but separately, because they managed to stop the attacking forces at the right time and saved themselves from annihilation. 59. I have made no “threats for settlement of Varosha”. I made an offer on 2 January this year about Varosha [see S/16246, annex]. Varosha is part of my State. I have said within the offers I have made that I am prepared to discuss it with the Secretary-General. It is regrettable that the Security Council, the highest authority on earth for settling international issues, has seen tit to dwell upon a small quarter in Cyprus without regard to the properties abandoned by my people for years and years. 61. The Council declares the exchange of ambassadors illegal and invalid. We have taken notice of its views. We do not agree with them, because the Council has not taken cognisance of the true facts of the Cyprus case, because members are bound by directives from their centres, which have not heard the realities of Cyprus and which for years have been misled with misinformation. 62. The Council, in the resolution just adopted, calls upon all States “not to recognize the purported State of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ set up by secessionist acts” and “not to facilitate or in any way assist the aforesaid secessionist entity”. I thank the Council. It has decided that my people, because they are fighting for their liberty and do not accept colonization by the Greek Cypriots, should be isolated in this world like lepers. I thank it for this, and I am sure history will record how a community fighting for nothing but its liberty has been treated by this body. 63. In any case, for 20 years all our economic activities were stopped. We were under a blockade by the Greek Cypriot side, because they regarded themselves as the legitimate Government of Cyprus. Now, on their behalf, you are asking them to squeeze us out economically. We have lived on bread, on onions, on beans, for years. We shall continue to do so if necessary, but we shall not accept those who occupy by force the seat of Government as the Government of Cyprus. 64. The Council “Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and nonalignment of the Republic of Cyprus”. I hope Greek Cypriot leaders are also bound by this demand, because it is they who attacked independence in the name of enosis; it is they who divided the territory of Cyprus by trying to destroy us; it is they who destroyed unity by ejecting us from the Government; it is they, not we, who used and continue to use non-alignment for the purpose of hellenising Cyprus. 65. The Council “Considers attempts to settle any part of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants as inadmissible and calls for the transfer of that area to the administration of the United Nations”. I am sorry to say that the Council does not even know what Varosha means, what it is. The Secretary-General knows it; I know it. We have exchanged documents and maps on it, and I undertook in my offers of 2 January to talk about this part of the town with him. With this resolution the Council makes it extremely difficult for me to keep my promise and continue to do so. 66. In spite of my statement this morning about the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus 67. Then the Secretary-General is requested “to promote the urgent implementation of Security Council resolution 541 (1983)“. I trust that the Secretary-General will find a way parallel to this request and will not attempt to comply with it, because that would kill the intercommunal talks and any prospect of negotiations. 68. We are not a herd of animals; we are a people with a history, with 20 years of struggle for our rights behind us; we are a people entitled to the same consideration as the Greek Cypriots. We cannot accept a position in which we are disregarded in this fashion. 69. In paragraph 8 the Council reaffirms the good offices mandate, but ties it to resolution 541 (1983). Thus it is giving the Secretary-General a duty which has nothing to do with good offrices. If the Secretary-General is unable to find a parallel way of approaching us and comes to us under paragraph 8 it is this Council that will have closed all avenues to a negotiated settlement. I regret to say that this will be the result of this resolution, which I look upon as an utterly Greek Cypriot resolution, supported by people who do not even know where Cyprus is. Members voted on it in good will; I have nothing to say about that, but they have done a disservice to the negotiating process. 70. The Council then calls upon all parties to cooperate with the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices. If that refers to the powers given to him in paragraph 6 of Council resolution 367 (1975)--which is how I understand it-and if the Secretary-General can satisfy me and my people when I see him in a few days that that, and nothing else, is the meaning of his good offices, then, of course, we shall all try to help the Secretary-General as much as we can. We shall consider it our duty to do so, because we too believe that the Cyprus problem can be settled only through intercommunal negotiations. 71, Paragraph 10 is unacceptable to us. I must point out that there is no mention at all there of summit agreements or high-level agreements, in spite of the fact that today I forced out of the representative of the Greek Cypriot side that he is all for those agreements -or at least he had to pay lip-service to them. Why, then, behind closed doors, did they object to a wording which would have put us at ease? 72. So again, it is up to the Secretary-General to satisfy us that the agreed procedure and formula, the summit agreements and the Secretary-General’s 1980 and 1981 efforts are in effect, and that the aim is a bi-zonal, federal solution. If we are satisfied, after we have reported the whole affair to my people, to the Parliament 73. For over a week the Security Council has devoted its time to the Cyprus question. I thank the members for that. Although the decision lacks our support, we are sure of their good intentions, and we look upon the Council as the body that will help to ensure the settlement of all international conflicts by peaceful means. 74. The PRESIDENT [interpretationfrom Russian]: The representative of Turkey has asked to speak, and I now call on him. 75. Mr. KIRCA (Turkey) [interpretation from French]: Turkey is sorry that it has been obliged once again to reject a Security Council resolution on the question of Cyprus. We must state that once again we are faced with a text that by no means satisfies the criteria of impartiality, historical objectivity and a desire to uphold the supremacy of the rule of law. This text does not serve the cause of reconciliation and understanding between the two communities of Cyprus. Therefore Turkey rejects the resolution in its entirety because it is based on resolution 541 (1983), which we have already rejected in toto. Resolution 550 (1984), adopted today, is based on a fundamentally erroneous concept. It recognizes as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus a team of usurpers who can claim only to represent the Greek Cypriot community. Fortunately, that team does not govern the island’s Turkish community, even by violence. It has no authority to represent it. It resulted from a coup d’e’tut against the unalterable Basic Articles of the Cypriot Constitution of 16 August 1960, which was put into effect and guaranteed by international treaties of the same date duly concluded and implemented. 76. The Security Council, instead of bolstering the illegal and illegitimate claims of that team, might have chosen to adopt a more just, more balanced position, more in.keeping with the principles of the inviolability of treaties and the primacy of the rule of law. Turkey repeats this once again today. It hopes that circumstances will not compel it to repeat it yet again. 77. I should like now to make some comments on certain paragraphs of the resolution. On 3 May [2532nd meeting] I had occasion to explain my Govemment’s point of view on the acts and actions referred to in the sixth preambular paragraph and in paragraph 2, and I shall not repeat it. Moreover, we have on several occasions explained that the Turkish armed forces in Cyprus are not occupation troops but protective forces present on the basis of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.’ We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the content of these two paragraphs. 78. It is difficult for those who are thoroughly conversant with the situation concerning Varosha to understand the meaning of the seventh preambular para- 79. Turkey also rejects paragraph 3, which is no more than an expression of policy of ostracism that certain circles wish to apply against the Turkish community of Cyprus. That policy is neither just nor realistic, and it can only have consequences incompatible with the quest for ultimate reconciliation between the two communities on the island. 80. This morning Mr. Denktag reiterated the position of his Government vis-d-vis UNFICYP. That position is undeniably positive, welcoming and co-operative. Turkey does not therefore understand the reason for the inclusion of paragraph 6. 81. With regard to paragraph 10, it has no meaning. It has no legal basis in the Charter of the United Nations. 82. Paragraph 8 is quite unacceptable to Turkey. That paragraph is not only untimely, but dangerous. It is obviously going to make the Secretary-General’s efforts, as well as the resumption of the intercommunal talks, extremely difficult. I listened with close attention to the comments made by Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands on this subject. 83. Mr. Denktas offtcially stated in the Council that the Turkish Cypriot community will not allow the continuation of the good offrces of the Secretary-General on the basis of this paragraph and that the intercommunal negotiations cannot resume on that basis. The good offtces of the Secretary-General cannot be linked to Security Council resolution 541 (1983), and the Council has no right to set aside the high-level agreements already concluded between the two communities . 84. Mr. Denktas has unambiguously stated that the pursuit of the Secretary-General’s mission of good offtces will be acceptable to the Turkish Cypriot community only on the basis of paragraph 6 of Security Council 85. The PRESIDENT [interpretationfrom Russian]: The next speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, upon whom I now call.

It is rather late, Mr. President, and you have had a long day. You must be tired by now. I only want to express my gratitude to the members of the Security Council for the adoption of this resolution. In particular I should like to express our appreciation for the most constructive and effective role which the members of the Movement of Non- Aligned Countries played in preparing and presenting to the Council a resolution which contains the elements necessary to proceed to a just and principled solution of the problem of Cyprus. 87. The grave dangers which prompted my Govemment to have recourse to the Council are clear and current, and it is my earnest hope that this resolution will remedy the situation, contributing at the same time to assisting the Secretary-General to undertake new efforts to attain an overall solution to the problem of Cyprus in conformity with the principles of the Charter and the provisions laid down in the pertinent United Nations resolutions, including resolution 541(1983) and the present resolution. 88. Resolution 541 (1983) and the present resolution contain all the essential elements for, and are a sure way to achieve, progress towards a just and lasting solution. They are a direct and natural result of the fact that the Council has appreciated the dangers to Cyprus emanating from recent illegalities. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus will do its utmost to promote an atmosphere conducive to the success of the efforts of the Secretary-General and to promote the implementation of the resolution the Council has just adopted, thereby opening the road to a just settlement of the problem of Cyprus not only in the interests of the people of Cyprus as a whole but in the interests of international peace and security. 89. We feel that the Council should, as warranted by the gravity of the situation in my country, consider urgent measures, in accordance with the Charter, for the implementation of all provisions of resolution 541 (1983) and of the present resolution if the need arises -and I sincerely hope that it will not arise. In the first place, it is necessary for all Member States to exert The meeting rose at 4 p.m. NOTE I United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 3C ?r’o. 5475. United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section. New York or Geneva. COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans la librairies et les agences dcpositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous aup& de votre libraire ou adressez-vous a : Nations Unies, Section des ventes. New York ou Genew. IZAK JIO.-I.Y’CHTh NSAAHHH OPrAHNBAI[LIH OKI.E;~MHEHHhtX HAlCUR R3na~m Oprauuaauun 06~enu~euuhrs Hauuif luloxoio tcynnrb B roi~mktbtx Sara- JWHLX H aremcreax BO BC~X pafiortax slwpa. Harronuee cnpaexu 06 ~anan~nx B aautesr KHI~KROM neat-aatnre W~H nutuure no anpecy : OprannaauuR 06%e~tnneuubrx Hauwii. C~KUHR no nponawte nananrrH. HLIO-Moprt HIGH Xeueea. COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas esdn en venta en librerias y casas distribuidoras en todas panes del mundo. Cons&e a su librero o ditijase a: Naciones Unidas. Seccibn de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra. Litho in United Nations, New York -- 00300 96613134anuay 1993-2.050