S/PV.256 Security Council

As none of the representatives seated at the Security Couneil table have indicated that they wish to speak today, the meeting will rise at this tim~. and we shall fix a d~lte for the next mèr,-cing of the ~ecurity Couneil on the Palestine qUl'.stion. . The Security Council is, meeting tomorrow morning on the Indon~anquestion and tomorrow aftemoon on the India-Pak.istan case. There is to be a meeting of one of tht~ committees of the Atomic Eilergy Commission on the morning of 27 February. Therefore, the fust date available forfurther discussion of the Palestine quec;tion is the aftemoon of Friday, 27 February. ,As therè are no objections, the Security Council will accordingly meet on the aftemoun of Friday, 27.February, at 3 p.m. to continue its consideration of the Palestine question. . rwo HUNDRED AND FIFTY- sam MEETING , Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 26 February 1948, at 10.30 a.m. President: General McN,AUGHTON (Canada). Argentine, France, d'Ukraine, soviétiques, rlque. Present: The representatives of the following countries: Argentina, Belgium, Canada.. China, Colombia, France. Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Social- ist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republios, United Kingdom, United States of America. 42. 42. Provisional agenda (dO'cument S/Agenda 256) 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. The Indonesian question: (a) First interim r~port to the Security Council of the Committeeof Good Offices on the Indonesian Questi<?n (document S/649).1 1. 2. 43. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was ~d0p.ted. 44. Continuation of the discussion of the Indonesian question . 44. '..On the invitation of the President, Mr. Justicè Kïrby, member of the Security Cauncil Committee of Good Offices on the IndonesJan Question,' Mr. Sen, representative of India; Mr. E. N. van If!effens, representative ofthe Netherlands,' General .t\omulo, representative of ihe Phiiippines,' Mr. Ali Sastroqmidjojo, representative of the' Republic of ln~onesia,· and Mr. William 1J. Forsyth, represen- tatm ofAustralia, took their places at the Council table. Mr. Ali SASTROAMlDJŒO (Republic of Indone- sia): There lemain a few matters which are of s~ch great importance that they justify taking the tinte of the Security CounciL The fust problem today merits the earnest attention of the Security Council is that of West Java, a subject upon which 1 dwelt in my stato- ment of 21 February [252nd meeting]. At the same time, 1 have neither the desire nor the intention to cast a damper over the atmosphere of good will and conciliation which we have taken such infinitJ') pains to bring about. In fact, it is my earo.est dellire that conditions will be created which will safeguard the existence of this atmo- sphere,. andmake it a practical, living reality. When 1 stressed the fears which have distressed us in' our negotiatiotls with the Government of the Netherlands, 1 found that some of the repre- sentatives around this table feh the same way as we of the Republic feeI. Indeed, when the repre.. sentative of Cbinavoiced his sentiments, he very aptly phrased oUr own thoughts. When 1 stated that the artificial creation of the State ofWest Java through the procedure adopted by the Netherlands-sponsored conference was contrary to the. spirit of the eighteen political principles, the representative of the Netherlands made the following reply [252nd meeting]. His contention was: .. ... we do not want to foment, artificially, on our part, popular movements in West Java or anywhere else; but much as we are Continuing, he said: "We leave these 'people cOll1pletely free OOcause we want freedom of expression in those areas now and forever more. 1believe that is true demooracj>." This statement by the representative of the Netherlands poses c~rtain questions: The tirst question is: What is the procedure for "free expression of popular movements" ~nvisaged by appendix XIII, point 2 of the report of the Committee of Good Offices? Here 1 would likè to state in the plainest possible terms the standpoint of my Government. The Republic agr~s tbat " neither party has the right to prevent the free expression of popular movements looking towards political organizations wbich are in accord with the principles of the Linggadjati Agreement." 1 But my Government has the strongest objections to "free èxpression of popular movements " when unilaterally promoted by the Netherlands Government. For that reason the Republic abides by point 3 of appendix XIII of the report of the Committee of Good Offices which states: . tl It is understood that decisions concerning changes in administration of territory should be made only with the full and free consent of the populations of those territories and at a time .when the security and freedom from ccercion of snch populations will have been ensured." 1 should like to invite the Security Council's particular attention to the last seventeen words of that sentence. It is notnecessary for me to point out that "the security and freedom from ~oerci~n '~ .mentioned there can be guaranteed only when the territory in question is free from martial law and an army of occupation. i, ~urther, wh,at is th~ significance .of the words, .Wlth thé full ,and free consent of the popula- tions"? A healthy democratic interpretation WQuld be one that gave full and free consent to the will of the majolity. And, from that, we ~utomatica11y come to the question of just what 18 .~he procedure by which we are to a.cquaint ourselves with the will of the majority of the PO]iulation. Regarding tbis, 1 should like to draw th, .attention of the Soourity Council to the d(jmocratic principle outlined in the report of th~ Committee of Oood Offices, appendix VIII, tomt 4. This principle obtained the consent of oth .parties to the dispute and laid down the pro~dure for gaining the " full and free consent of the populations" through "a plebiscite... to det~rmine whether the populations of the various te~ltories. of Java, Madura and Sumatra wish theIr terntory to form part. of the Republic of Isndonesia or of anotlier State WÏthin the United tates of Indonesia.". -- Nlthseel '1~ Polit/cal Ellellts lit the Republic of Indones/a, e er ands Information Bureau, New York, page 34. publié York, The question hefore the Secu...<ity, Çouncil is now: Is the creation of' States in what is still disputed territory in. accordance with the letter and spirit of the politicaI principles which 1 have just-outlined? 1 emphasize the 5pirit rather than the letter of. these politica1 agreements, because it is the proper spirit that will-even as advocated repeated1y by the Netherlands representative- keep alive the fiame of conciliation and good will which, 1 feel, is far more important than the letter of the principles themselves. .It is a matter for regret that the creation of new States not only by-passes, but is in direct violation of, the letter and spirit of these political principles. Not only bas there been no plebiscite, but tl1ere has been interference by the Netherlands authorities in popular action for a plebiscite, and, to cap it an, the Netherlands radio stations are .pouring out a stream of propaganda on behalf of the projected State of West Java. Forty-seven delegations to the West Java Con- feren~.:wereappointedby the Netherlands East Indies.fGovernmeJit, while the remaining fifty- three· were indirectly fi elected" in two stages. These Il elected " men, however, were often ap- pointees of village headmen. The Netherland!>i Government in Indonesia has openly stated: Il Direct elections are not possible within a period of such limited preparation, and it will therefore be necellsary for the headman to decide upon the candidates for election." In the Netherlands governmentaI system, village headmen are officiaIs of the civil administration; and it canconse- quently be realized just how much value should De attached to the headman's choice of electoral candidates. The Netherlands Government went about the creation of the State of West Java by calling a conferencein October 1947. There was no response from the population and many of those attending raised objections, but the Netherlands Govern- ment followed up yJith a second conference in December 1947. Both these conferences were held while the Netherlands Govemment was in the midst of its military actic,IU against the Republic of Indonesia and at a time when a rigorous martial law had been clamped down an West Java. It is evident that, at a time when a state of war ~btmned, there could have been no g-aarantee of " security and freedom from coercion "; when the secDnd conference was being held in December 1947,· thirty-two students 'who staged an orderly demonstration were arrested by the Netherlands military police and set free only after the news- papersexpressed their disagreement with such anti-democratic measures. Furthermore, 1 want to submit to the Security Council the fact that, in West Java, opposition against the formation of a so-called State oi West Java has become stror..ger every day. This oppoliltion started on 20 December 1947, after the second West Java Conference was postponed because a unanimity neither of' opinion nor of agreement could be reached. On the aforemen- tioned date, twenty prominent Sundanese leaders issued a statemerl chaIlenging the proposed for- !!!Ittion of a so-called State of West Java. which sta"'~ment has aIso been submitted to the Com- mittee of Good Offices. The appeal of these twenty persons evoked such a favourable reaction from aU groups and classes of the people in West Java that even within a period ofless tban one month the Kôdlito Pombela Djawa-Barat (Lommittee for the Defence ofWest Java), which was formed as a result ofthat appeat, received from aIl parts of West Java up to .14 January of this year, ample evidence of support in 35,000 letters. This movement of the people in West Java, who rallied so spontaneously, demanded that the status of West Java be d~cided bymeans ofa plebiscite according to the pr.tD.ciples of the Renville Agreement. The politicaI parties, too, such :as the National Front in Jakarta, as weU. as other social organizations, gave their support to this movement challenging the West Ja'\la Conference. . Besides, 1 must bring to the attention of the Security Council the fact that thousands of resi- dents ofWest Java had been compelled to evacuate to other Republican territory on account of this Thent war. They, too, expressly protested against t ,e formation of a so-called State of Wes.t Java WIthout bavm.g the opportuqity to vote according to, dem.ocr.atio principles. What should likewise be known by the Sec1ll'ity Council is the fact that most~f the leaders of the popular movement princi~s doit mouvement ordre moment ~ere elther still detained in jail by the Netherlands th~y were not even consult'ld befOl'e their repre- sentatives were appointed. The attempt has frequently been made to justify the separatiP" schemes by alleging that the people of the PasUùoan, which is the major part of West Java, fear possible oppression by other ethnological groups in the Republic. This is not sUbstantiated. by facts. No racial discrimination is exercised in the Republic of Indonesia. Evidence can be found in the fact that Many key positions in the RepublicanGoveriunent are occupied by Indonesian .citizens hailing from the Pasundan, •for instance, Mr. Djuanda,. Minister of Communi- cations; Mr. R. A. A. Wiranatakusuma, Presidc:mt of the Supreme Advisory Body; Mr, Kusuma .Atmadja, President of the Indonesian Supreme Court; Mr. Tirtawinata, Chief Prosecutor; and Commodore Surjadarma, Chief-of-Staff of the Indonesian National Army. AlI that 1 have just stated is being submitted for the seriousconsideration of the SecUrity Council, not with the intention to disrupt the ai:- mosphere ·of conciliation and good will, but ~ause 1 honestly feel that l must present the facts-I repeat, "thë facts"-to the Security Council. These facts, l fear, will· seriously imperil the possibility·of peace in Indonesia if they are not eliminated immediately. , 1 submit tms request because 1 am thoroughly convinced that the members of the Seeurity Council will consider it to be quite reasonable. Once again, l want to stress that my Government, too, agrees that the people of West Java should decide theirown status; What 1 challenge are the methods by which, and· the ·ways in whiçh, the formation of a so-calledState of West Java is being attempted in complete negation of the procedure already agreed upon,that is, through a plebiscite. 1 submit only the reasonable demand that what was expressed by the representative of the United States· in. the 2518t meeting of the Security Couneil should become a concrete reality in my cO'Vlntry. 1 quote from the record of that meeting: '''These political principles are a part of the great tradition of freedom and democracy. Their meaning is known of men. The guarantees of freedom of assembly,speech and the Press are ..unequivocal..A fair plebiscite means a·free ballot on a clear issue by the individual in security from 'Coercion or reprisaI. The opportunity for advance discussion ofthe clear issue should be free, full and open to the parties involved. With such other provisions forsafeguarding plebiscites, which experience has established for equal participation of the parties and equal guarantee oftheir political and civil liberties, there can be freé and fair self- deterinination by the people as to whether the populations of the various iterritories of Java, Madura 8ne1 Sumatra wish their.territoryto form irilpl~mentation has even been tried. 1 aSk the members of this Couneil whether, in iill honesty, they can share the opinion that the Republic will stand much of a chance of survival after the formation of .::ll kinds of so-cal1ed new states has been carried out without a fair ple- biscite. And there is the further grave issue that those States have been created by the Netherlands Government thrQugh a unilate~al interpretation of the Renville principles. It is clear that the Netherlands Govemment wants to present us with a/ait accompli, and therebyto nullify or prejudice Cree plebiscites. 1'0 give a picture of how·important West Java is, 1 feel obliged to mention that the acreage of this region is 10,500 square miles and that it has a total population of 13 million people. West Java produces each year about 2,880,000 tons of rire, 1,370,000 tons of cassava, 57,557 tons of tea, 9,842 tons of quinine and 36,215 tons of rubber. This area, which 18 cf so great importance, was, cefore 20 July 1947, stiJl recognized'as within the defacto territory oft.he Republic ofIndonesia, and did not know anyof the present seemingly separatist movements. These separatist move- ments started only after the occupation by the Netherlands .troops. It started in Bandung and the IllOSt notorious among the separatist group was the Portai Rajat Pasundan, the so-called Sundanese People's Party, under the leadership tif the not 1ess notoriousKartalegawa, a civil œrvant in the Netherlands East Indies Govern.;, ment. Without any obstacle or prohibition on t11e part of the Netherlands occupation arroy, this mOVement carried out a coup d'état in Bogor, after which it offered the civil administration to theNetlip,rlands Civil Service. Since then, strang~ly enough, nobody has heard anything either of the movt:.'ment or cf Kartalegawa. 1believe that what 1 have m:tid suffiœs io streng- then my Government's view that the formation of ,usoo.c:alled State of West Java is contradictory !o the agreed Renville principles. The populations In these areas should have a fair opportunity to determine whether their region will belong to the Ind.onesian Republic or to another State of the Umted States of Indonesia. . The considerations which 1 state are aJ~') Intended to support the amendments. proposed by the representatives of Colombia [document ~/682J and Australia [document 8/681], because ~ acknowledging the real fact of difficulties . tween' the two parties, one must he convinced What causes even more concem and misgivings is that this unilateral interpretation is already being implemented. 1 feel that 1 must warn the members that this causes real danger of a repe- tition of the Linggadjati tragedy, out of which resulted a war that took such a heavy toll in lives and property. Not only in West Java, but also in Madura; according to an Aneta report from Jaknrta, Batavia, dated' 21 February, Madura has a1ready beenrecognized as a political unit to be formed as a so-called State. Such recognition was extended by decree of the Acting Govemor General of the Netherlands East Indies Gove.mment, MI. Huber- tus van Mook, on. 20 Febrnary 1948, at the very smetime that 1 raised my Govemment's objec- tions here to the formation of States by a proce- dure which is in complete contradiction of the plebiscite principle. . Ibelieve that the members of the Council can now understand why 1 repeatedly stated my Oovernment's concèm during tÎie foregoing meetings. 1 think that 1 was not less positive in my formeT statements when l stated that my Government has implemented the truce agreement \vith loyalty and Ut1L.rJt care, not only according to The spirit, bu~ also to the letter, of the Renville Agreement.· My Govemment thought that the position it hàs taken, which is in complete accord with the spirit ofconciliation and good will, would be met bysimilar steps and measures onthe side ofthe Netherlands Govemment. But 1 most regret- fully submit that tÎle steps and measures taken by the NetherlandS are dangerously harassing that goôd .atmosphere. 1 have JJ.oted here that the repre$entative of the Netherlands said in his statement before the Security Council at its 252nd meeting that bis Government was "firmly determined to abide by the principle regarding thepl~bis,,~te," and, at the same time, he said that bis Govemmentwas. firmly determined to abide by tbat othi:r principle stating that " neïther party hasthe right to prevent the free expression of popular .. movements looking towards political organizations\l,'hich are in accord with the prin- ciples of the Linggadjr.\l Agre'1nent. !ndeed, these two principles are not contra-· dictory to, eachother, because the principles of the ple.bi.scite detepnine the procedure by which tbe principle of free expressions of popular move- mentsmust becarried out. Bu~ appar..mtly the represen.t~tive.of the NetherJands holds another opinion·of tl:1e meaning of "free expression of popular movements," because he defended the procedure which is now being carried out by the Netherlands .East Indies, •.Govemment ,in West Javaail(1 Madura andwhich is in complete contra- diction'of theplebisciteprinciple, towhich he agreed. ' ,1. sincerelyhope·that 'tbese •.grave issuesraised by· myGovernnient will œviewed· wi~h .serious Mr. GROM\'KO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated. jram Russian): In my listes ~peech of 18 Febroary [249th meeting] 1 have déclaration .a1ready explained the point ofview ofthe Govern- ment of the USSR on the question under discus- sion. In that statement the USSR delegation gave Dans an evaluation of the so-called Renville Agrecnent a .()f 17 January 1948, and ofthe report ofthe Com- mittee of Good Offices whicT:1 we are discussing. le rapport qui nous avait été présenté I sha~~ not repeat what bas aIready been said mission on that report by the representative of the USSR que in that fust speech, and shall confine myself to mière déclaration. ,making a few remarks. chiefly in connexion with remarques the speeches eince made by the representatives faites of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Unis, Indonesian Republic and others. donésie As has now become quite c1ear, the Renville Agreement is nothing but a screen behind which, ne 'with the collusion of the Unit,::d States and a Hollandais, few other colonial powers, the· Netherlands is par taking steps to re-establish completely,or as prennent completely as possible, the old colonial regime gralement which existed in Indonesia during the lengthy colonial period of Dl'ltch domination there. No other longue période de domination des Pays-Bas. evaIuation of this Renville Agreement can be 'saurait interpréter autrement l'Accord given. As was expected, the representative of the United States praised this agr~ment and the work of the Committee of Three. He indicated that this agreement might be a possible basis for the settlement of political questions still outstanding between the Indonesian RepubIic .and the Netherlands. He proposed that the report of the Committee of Good. Offices, and hence the RenvilleAgreement, should be approved. The representative of the United Kingdom. and, unfortunately, the representatives of some other States, spoke in the same spirit. The adoptiQn '()f such a position by the representatives of these countries, and particularly the United States, does not astonish us. From the very beginning .of the consideration of the.question of the situa- tion în Indonesia, it lias been quite clear that the Netherlands is not alone in its adventure, and is being openly or surreptitiously supported by a number of other States, inciuding the United States and the United Kingdom. As 1 have aIready pointed out on 18 February, le. rapport représentants ment les États-Unis investi des pe.l'Indonésie, Pays-Bas, Puissance États-Unis tiennent eux aussi à ment Indonésie. tiques ' ,[251 The. tepnesen:tative of the United States lias ;state.d [251&t meeting], obviously Îl1 reply ~o the ~he United States bas its own special interests in Indonesia. It bas large investments in the Indo- nesian economy; it exploits the natural resources 'of Indonesia with the consent and blessing of the Netherlands. and llndoubtedly to the mutual 'advantage of both States. It i8 also anxious· to 'strangle the national liberation movement which 'has ~eveloped in Indonesia, for, from the point 'Of.Vl~W afthe general political interests 'of the colomal Powers, every success achieved by the Indo~esian people in its struggle for independence constitutes anadilitional blôw to the whole colo- nial system. It is precisely for that reason that the speeches of some representatives, including Ms.r. AustiJ;J., the representative of the United : tates, hav.e not at all surprised us. na~more, from the very time when the Indonesian question was first considereà in the Security Conn- éil in July and August 1947, it was already quite clear that the Indonesians had notLing to count on.in the way of assistance from this Committee, and that the Committee wo&1d do everything in its power to tic the noose tighter round the neck of the Indonesian people and to hand them over to the Dutch militarists. . It is, therefore, no accident that the represen- tative of France [2518t meeting]. speaking of the Committee's report and evidently feeling tfult everythÎng is not quite in order. morts us to avoid a generaIdiscussion hereofthe ~)~estionas to who got most and who got least out of the Renvil/e Agreement. and who got nothing at aIl. That is a very characteristic attitude. It would, of course, he very easy to consider the report of the Committee and the Renville Agreement without asking ourselves who got everything out of it that he wanted, and who got nothing. who was the victor in these negotiations and who the vanquished. If th" Committee's report is discussed in that 'way, the spirit of conciliation, about which so much is said here. will certainly be created. The representative of the ~etherlands i9 particularly fond of talking about thnt. If the report is discussed in that way, a spirit ofcomplete conciliation or, to use another word which is sometimes applied here, of compromise, will, of course, be created. But to act in that way would be to set contrary to the obligations imposed on the Security Council in connexion with the situa- tion which has arisen in Indonesia. Other States may perhaps think it appropriate to proceed in that way, but the USSR does not consider it possible to assocÎllte itself with actions of that kind. The USSR delegation considers it necessary to give the Renville Agreement. and with it the report of the Committee of Three, the evaluation which those documents really deserve. and to caU things by their proper names. Today we.have heard a statement by the repre- sentative of the Indonesian Republic. It is no longer merely a matter·of anxiety concerning the Rellllille Agreement, or even concerning its impIe- mentation. That statement, supported as it is by convincing facts, shows that before the ink of the signatures of the Netherlands representatives on these agreements has had time to dry, the parlant de la France compte sante, quels de ont rien reçu téristi9,ue. d'étudier Renville obtenu qui pour et rapport rait tellement sentant a cette conciliation, encore. de concerne autres attitude; associer. faut sur que les du n concerne qui ration, que voie de bas de compte propres pourtant, Républiqqe plébiscite, nomment arbitrairementaux importants temps Java, pendant de l'Indonésie bliqueindonésienne. se N~therlands has aIready begununilateral action mthout any regard whatsoever for the Indonesians, and has flagrantly violated, in a way calculated to sen:e its own interests,.even this Agreement which subJects the Indonesian Republic to such serntude. The Agreement mentions a plebiscite, but the ~ther1ands ignores the question of a plebiscite. J.ue Netherlands authorities are unilaterally appointing to posis of major and minor impor- tanc~ their puppets who "have long been sub- servlent to them; and they are 1l0W acting in western Java as they have long acted in the easternarea of Indonesia which is not a part of the Indonesian Republic.We are aware that the Netherlands boastsof having estàblished in Java ~ubmitted by the representative of Qmada. From what 1 have aIready said about the position of the -Govemment of the USSR with regard to this question, it should be clear that wecannot accept tllat draft resolution, .since to accept it would :m:ean to approve all the steps the Netherlands has tàkén in Indonesia, and would· give our,sanction to the Renville. Agreement, .which imposes con- ditions of servitude on the Indonesian: Republic. 1 therefore consider the Canadian draft resolution .complete1y inacceptable. \ . l, f The Colombian and .Australian amendments <l0 not substantially alter that draft resolution. The basic coiltent of the draft resolution remains unchanged. But it is quitecharactenstic that even these amendments,. which do not alter the sense :of the Canadian resolution, are inacceptable not .only to the authors of the draft resolution, but to the· Netherlands. Any allusion instatement!l or amendments to the idea that the Committee of Three should. have somekind of· voice in .the .negoti~tions between the Netherlands and the :mdo,qesian.Republicis deci~vely rejected 1>Y the Netherlands. Therepresentative ofth~ Netherlands 'has spoke]].decisively against even these hopelessl)' weak, inadequate •and unsatisfactory Colombian 'and Australian aniendtnents, and wa$ immediately .supported by anumber of other States. i l ,cann.0terid this short statementWi.thout pointing ouîthatin tbc statementsof somerepre- ;:;entlltives. inthe~ecuP.tyÇouncilone 9~)Jninating , " Mr. TSIANG (China): l have already given r;"y appraisal ofthe Renville Agreement in my previOlls statement to th", Security Council [251st meeting]. In the considered opinion of the Chinese delega- non, the Indonesian Republic did not receive a square deal under that truce Agreeme'1t [docu- ment S/649, appendix XI]. From the point of view of the political principles which served as itsbasis, my delegation is of the opinion that the settlement is, on the whole, fair and constructive. , 1 do not wish to continue my statement this morning in that vein, partly because some of my càlleagues have wisely cautioned me not to spend the time of the Security Couneil in calculating which side is giving more concessions. That line of thought is not helpful and does not lead to any constructive result. Another reason why 1 do not propose to continue along that line is that at thisparticular moment 1 am worried nQt so much about the background of the Renville Agreement as about its future. . As 1 stated on the previous occasion, there are ~opossible sources of danger in regard to the futi.lfe. One is this very matter of new political entities coming up before the plebiscite takes place. Thismormng we have heard a statement by the representative of mdonesia. l feel that itwas a "ery grave statement, and 1 hopl~ that the representative ofthe Netherlands will give us a full reply to it, together with definite assurances regarding the future. If what the representative of In40nesia has said is true-;- it is a clear case of Violation of the Renville Agreement. . 1 also wish to note in passing that the stand taken by the representative of Indonesia on this matter is perfectly sound. The Indonesian Govern- ~~nt does notsay that there should not be a separ~te State of West Java or Madura; it says that if such separate States should arise, it must he~~e re~ult of a plebiscite, and that such political entit!-es. should not be faits accomplis before the plebls~lte, 1 caIitiot see how the Seclmty Council ~an fail to support thé representative of Indonesia In _the stand that he and his Government have ~aken. Th~refore, Iivery much hope _that the repr~sentative of the Netherlands, in the course :of hi~ reply, will gi,ve definite assurances to the S~unty Couneil in regard to tms matter; other- W1~e-we_may as well stop our proceedings at this POInt.,! .:. The last time 1 spoke 1proposed that we should have before us two possible types of amendments to the draft resolution submitted by the represen- tative of Canada. 1 suggested that we might wtill. incorporate the idea fust suggested, if1remember correctly, by Mr. Justice Kirby [247th meeting], that the Committee of Good Offices should have the right to malee positive suggestions to the two parties and aIso to publish such suggestions. 1.supported that idea. At the time, 1 stated that, although 1 was not submitting an am"ndment to the Security Council, 1might do so at a later time. The other idea sug~sted was to strengthen the draft resolution by incorporating a clause on arbitration in case of ditrerences in the interpre- tation of the Renville Agreement. In re~d ta the other sùggestion of mine-to eD1power the Committee of Good·Offices to· make positive suggestions, and to publish such sugges- tioÎls-I find thattheAustralian representative has presented such an amendment;and we were told tms moming by'the Presidentthat such amend- mentcouldnotbe put to a vote unless requested byaimemller ()f theSecurity Council.The sub-voix stanceofthe.amendment presentedby the repre- sentative of Australia' is ,in perfect. accordance wi.thmyown, line of.thoughLBut, during our discussions; several representatives have pointed out that it iswithinthe power of the Committec of Good Offices to determine its 'own procedure. There is no rule or resolution passed'by .the Security CounciLwhich preventsthe 'Co1l1ti1itteeadoptés froma(Joptingthe.procedurewhiehMr. Justice_ Kirby suggest~. Other representatives;ifI.r~emberco.rrec:lly, Sincethe time 1 made my· statement several other members· of the Security Council have spoken. On· the idea of arbitra~on 1 round.no support. On the contrary,serious juridical objee- tions were raised. In the interest of harmony, 1 ..dropped that suggestion· of arbitration. p~rticuIarly the repr~entatives of the. UD;1ted Kipgdomand of France, thought that the Idea was a good idea; that the Co~tteell1ÏghtweU' use tbatpro~ure,but ~hat It.was unnecessary for the ·Secanty· Cauneilto mcorporate that. ideain an amendment. 1think there is a great'deal: c la adopter. du Il pouvoirs culier, amendement de l'harmonie était tion canadien. There is another amendment before the Security Council which was presented by the Colombian delegation. Personally, 1 Jjhould like to sec that amendment adopted. It does not cllifer materially from the Canadian draft resolution. It slightly enIarges the power, and particularly the prestige, of the Committee of Good Offices. 1 thiuk the amendment gues in the right directiOii, and it will have the support of my delegation. However, Î11 the interest of harmony, if that amendment should fail of passage in the Security Council, ·my delegation would vote for the Canadian draft resolution. Mr. VAN KLBFFBNS (Netherlands): 1 am grateful to the Security Council for giving me the oppor- l'anglais): tunity to speak today in spite of the somewhat sécurité advanced hour, and, with the 'President's per- aujourd'hui mission, 1 should like to begin by giving the avec Security Council a completely factual statement commencer with regard to what this West Java Conference récit is about, of which the representative of Indonesia rence hlls made so much this moming. l'Indonésie 1expected, aCter the references the representative ofIndonesia made here last week [252nd meeting] ~ence to this conference, that it might he brought up la again, and 1 therefore asked for some information, question which is as follows. The West Java Conference donc which is DOW being held is the third of a series of sujet. what 1 think can best be described as private-in lieu other wordst completely informaI and unoffièial- conférences .politieal conferences. The fust met from privées, 12 October to 19 October, and the second from tant IS December to 20 December. The second con- lieu f6!ence, which consisted ofrepresentativf}8 hOÏding 20 widely divergent views, decided to hold the third assistaient des représentants d'opinions conference, which is app~reiltly meel.îng at divergentes, present. trüisième This.development-and this is a very important point-has taken place in its entirety outside of a any participation and direct or indirect inter- ingérence ference or pressure on the part ofthe Netherlands part Indies Governm~nt, whilst the presence of Re- et publican representatives is in itself sufficient proof, .d'Indonésie It sooms to me, ofthe very diversified and impartial sante" composition of the conference. . et The Netherbnds Indies authorities bave in- fonn~d me that. they feel very strongly that, most informé que, notamment en vertu ~peclally in.the light of paragraph 2 of the prin- des ÇWles forming an agreed basis for th~ political des diSCUSSIOns accepted at the fourth meetIng of th~ de Clommittee of Good Offices with the parties on offices ?January 1948; which are set forth in appen- l'annexe dix XIII of the report of the Committee of Good bons Offices, the Netherlani.s Indies authorities do not 'n'avaient ~ve the right, let alone the duty, to suppress or s'agissait t hwart this conference of representatives of the cette w ole populatioLt of a given area. Any sl1ch de attfeml pt would o~ a d{:~a~ure from their atti~ude tentative de o ~ ~ofness andnnpartiality, and would constitute réservée' a BIding with the Republic of Indonesia against équivaudrait people who want autonomy very strongly and d'Indonésie, hodnestly• For let it be remembered that healthy ment a~ spontaneous nationalism is not synonymous permis Wlth the. Republic. Consider, for example, East spontané The plans to have elected members, and, in juxtaposition, designated members, were prompted by the Conference, not by us, and by the wish to have both local representatives and representatives of a more general and functional nature. 1 would ask the Security Council: Is it possible to deal with a matter of this complexity without proper preparation and study? Local knowledge is essential. The Security Council has its Commit- tee of Good Offices on the scene; the Committee of Good Offices has its observers, who are also on the scene. That is the place, it seems to me, where this question should be ironed out. 1do not think that &nyone can prononnce an off-hand judgment on snch delicate and complicated matters. The Indonesian Republic, according to the statement .we heard this morning, .apparently wants no other utteranceon the part of the popu- lation except through plebiscites. But surely, if point 2 of appendix XIII of the report of the Committee of Good Offices .has any meaning at ail, surety then we of the Netherlands should not, and cannot be expected, to stifle in the meantime all politicallife in the region where we now have the obligation to guarantee freedom of popular expression because we are pledged to do so. There were, in the declaration made by the representative of Indonesia, certain statements of fact wmch 1 cannot leave unchallenged. Mr. Sastroamidiojo said .that thousands of residents of West Java already have been com- pelled to evaeuate.There has been nothing of the kind. 1 should be very happy if thiS question were put to the observers on the spot, because 1 know whatthey would report and 1 should be glad ~o have that report. . Then he said that most of the leaders of the popular movements were .either still detained in .gaol by the Netherlands East Indies Govel'ri1l1ent . It was said that there was i.'l1artiallaw. That is a half-truth. There is martial law, but there is martial law for our troops and for our troops only, not for the population. Citizens, the ordinary civilian elements, are subject to the m\dinary courts, not to military courts. Temporary courts-martial have no jurisdictionin the case ofcivililms; and, to give the Council ~n illustration, the ~erpetrato!s of the attack Wlth hand-grenades ln BataVia in December 1947 have appeared before a civilian judge and not befme the court·martial. As 1 sàid, only the troops àre subject to martial law, but not the population. Mr. Sastroamidjojo said that Banten was not represented, being the extreme west of Java. Apart from the fact that racially tliere are certain differences between Banten and the rest of West Java, there are four representatives .of Banten in the conference that is. beingheld now. It was further stated that there was no response from the population~ The fact is that it origin:ated jn t1).e population. It was said that there was opposition to the West Java autonomy movement. Certainly there wasopposition, and the conference, being a very liberally-minded conference, has seen fit to give a place to Republicans in t1.1e conference. itself. . We' definitely want to have a free plebiscit~~ becaus(~ we have accepted the proposition that there should be plebiscites1 but they should be truly free and not.. on the basis of preliminary supprtession of geriuine. popular movements. Just as we stand by piebiscitës, we stand by the agreed principle that there should be no sup- pression of public opinion and freedom of expression. It is interesting, and this is my last remark with regard to this matter, that MI. Sas- troamidjojo said that " these separatist movements lstarted only arter the œcupation by the Nether- ands, t~oops." That is j;.-.irfectly true in the sense; that 1t 1S not a refiection on our occupation,.but on the fact that under the Republic there was no fr~d~m of expression, but repression and inti- I?dation, f<;lr t~ese people who wanted ~utonomy. ~he question 1S ask;;:d ofthe Committee of Good v lll'7s and their observers on the. spot, that is preclsely what they will have 1'0 repo~. The Committee of Good Offices, it goes Without saying, has aIl the rights and prerogatives a committee ofgood offices has, but we are definitely not in favour of an extension of thoserights because we want the Committee ofiGood Offices lo remain a co:annittee of good offices and not to become something. different. If the Councilgave tlle Committee of Good Offices rights which it does not a1ready possess as a committee of good offices,.it wQuldcease to·be a·committee· of good offices, e'V'en if the Counci1 were.then,. however Wrongly, 'l:o retain the name. We do not want that. . . '. For. that same reason, we are, in particular, àgaiitst incidentalpublieation of any suggestions which the Committee of Good Offices as a whole, from time to time for good reasons, and only arter maturedeliberation, ~ay feel that it should make within the limit~ of itsproper activities; 1 setforth belore the' Security ,Counci1 ourviews on the question of publication on 21.February [252nd ~eeting]. If and insofar' as the' Committee is to be·con.,. ~dered as baving the rigqt to mak~'suggestions, 1 further think that'it would be .:very ~ngerous if the Securjty.Couj),ci1 gave th~.C9nunittee.a.sort of general directive to do so.lfthe Committee asawhole is ever tomake any suggestions ata11, inostespecially with regard to.the·political settle- ment, let it do so wit~ the greatest ca~tion and only in the most favoUrable ofcircuJl1Stances, that is to say, ifit isperfectly satisfied thata suggestior" is witbili its juriSdiction; that itis helpful, that it willbewe11 receivçd byboth parties, that it is, in otherwords; conducive to vol11ntary agreement. If the Committee of Good omèes' is not pe#,ectly satisfied that it is helpful tô make suggestions, let it abstain. Elementary good sens~ . would seem to commend thiscourse, for there is 'a1ways the danger that an untimely or llnwel- come suggestion might alienate the parties instead ofbrlnging them together, a,nd would plaCe the Committee of Good Offices in an invidious position if the impression' were created that the Committee favours a course of action which is not agre'eableto both parties; As a rule, therefore, responsabilité. conséquences membres devons et de que et perfection. accepter ment Colombie rédigé culier au cherche à Commission de qu'il voit ce That points to the desirabllity of not accepting either the Colorilbian or the Australian amend- ments. The Colombian amendment has the added Inconvenience of being couched in such vague terms, especially in its second paragraph, that i .do not know exactly what it m:eans or what commitments itseeks to impose on the Security Council and on the Committee of Good Offices. ifit contributes nothing new it is superfiuous, but 1have the impression that there is more in it than meets the eye at fust sight, and 1 do not like that ldnd' of proposaI.

1 have two more speakers on my list, and it is now necessary to adjourn tms tp.eeting. The Security Council is due to meet at 2.30 p.m. in reference to the India-Pakistan question. 1 propose that tbis meeting should be deferreduntil 3 .p.m. . . , 1propose tinit the SecurityCouncil meet agam on the Indonesian question .at 10.30 a.m. on Saturday, .28 February 1948. As there is no objection, it will be so arranged. teurs devons de examiner de de le n'y nécessaires TWO HUNDREDvAND FIFTY- SEVENTH MEETING .Held at Lake Success, New York, ()nThursday, 26 February 1948, at. 3. p.m. Preside~t:General McNAUGHTON (Canada). Président: :Present: Therepresentatives of the following (lountries: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Argentine, ~olombia, France, Syria, Ukraînian So~et Social- France, lSt ~epublic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, . d'Ukraine, Umted Kingdom, United States of America. soviétiques, ,rique. 45~ 45. Provisional agenda (document SIAgenda 257) 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. I~dia-Pakistan question: .. , (a) Letter dated' 1 Jlln.~.I:';l.!y 1948 from the representative of Indk 3ddressed to the President ot'the-Securiti C>')unci1 concerning J. 2.