S/PV.2567 Security Council

(Interpretutfo~pOm Iteneh): Members will note that the chamber has been equipped so that they can view documents on video tapea. I owe them an explanation. I have been informed by the re~ntative of Chad that he intends during his statement to show certain documents on video tapes. In keeping with paat practice, as President of the Council I have decided to authoritc the presentation of those documents, and I have given the necessary instructions for the technical arrangements to be made.

(tnterpretution from Fke#&): As this is the first time the Council has met this year in a public meeting, I should like to extend my kst wishes to all the members here. I hope that we will all pursue our work in a spirit of mperetion and thus contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security. 3. It is with special pleasure that I extend a welcome to the new non-permanent members of the Council that have been elected for a ~wc+vear term. namely, Austratta, Denmark, Madagascar. Thailand and Trinidad and Tobago. I am sure I express the views of all the members of the Council when I say that we welcome their participation in our work. We have no doubt that they will make a useful contribution to our search for solutions to the complex problems facing the Council within the framework of its important responsibilities. &tre&enofthattkstotbemtlrhtgPresident

(interpretution from French): On behalf of the Council 1 should like to pay a special tribute to my predecessor, Mr. Ahmed Tawtik Khalil, representative of Egypt, who conducted the Council’s work in I&ember with great talent and etfectiveness. A&ptiat of the agenda TRe agenab was adopted Letter dated 28 January 1985 from the Char& d’affdresaLoftbePennanmt MkwhlnofchadtotheUn NPUorrP~totbePreddeatoftheSedtyCoue dl (Wl6911)

(interpretatton from French): I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya requesting that they be permitted to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose. with the consent of the Council, to invite those repmsentatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure. At the inviratiun of the Frestakwt, Mr. Lassou (CM) and Mr. Azmouk (Libyan Arab Jamahirtya) took places at the Cound table.

(interpretation from French): This meeting has been convened at the request of the representative of Chad in a letter dated Zs January to the President of the Council [Wl69fI]. following another letter he had addressed to the Presideni daicci 25 janwry ~S~‘iGi?i$ E. I should also like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/16912. containing the text of a letter dated 28 January, addressed to the Resident of the Council by the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. IO. Mr. LASSOU (Chad) (i, vpretotion from French): Before deali:.: with the item before the Council, I should like on behalf of my delegation sincerely to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency for January and also to thank you for having kindly convened the Council so promptly. My delegation is pleased to see the representative of France. a country with which Chad enjoys fruitful and cordial relations, presiding over the Council at this important time of year. We are sure that under your wise and dedicated leadership, and thanks to your outstanding ability as a veteran statesman and diplomat, the Council will be able to discharge properly its heavy responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations. I I. I take this opportunity also to pay a well-deserved tribute to your predecessor, the representative of Egypt, a fraternal and friendly country, for his competence and dynamism. 12. I should like also to extend a cordial welcome to the newly elected members of the Council. namrly, Australia, Denmark, Madagascar, Thailand and Trinidad and Tobago, and to wish them all success I~I the important work awaiting them in the Council, 13. Lastly, I wish to express the profound gratitude of the Chadiatr people as a whole and of its Government to all the members of the Council for responding so promptly to the appeal which my country, Chad, addressed to them, and thus authorizing me to address the Council. 14. On 27 September l9M, a plot aimed at physically eliminating President H&in Habre and all the members of the Government was foiled at N’Djamena. That plot was part of a process that Qaddafi has been engaging in for nearly 20 years now in order to fulfil his annexationist goals concerning Chad. A White Paper has been issued on that plot. So as to facilitate understanding of the main purpose of this White Paper. which I have made available in order to have it distributed as an official document of the Security Council, it may be helpful to draw briefly on the background of the ChaCLibya dispute. We have already discussed it at length in the Council in 1983, but it is fitting to recall its main features. 15. Everything began in 1970, only several months after the coup b&~r against King Idris. Indeed. Qaddati published an of’icial road map of Libya whose legend indicated that the international frontiers contained therein should not be considered as definitive because thev could be changed. 1 would point out that that map already included as part of Libyan territory the area which the press was later to call the “Aouzou Strip”. 16. In 1971. Libya’s actual military presence in Chadian territory was dctecled. It was to be intensified in 1973. and 17. Qaddali’s secret dream is the occupation and subjugation of all Chad and the Chadian people, in order thereafter to destabrlize the rest of Africa. From the very beginning, the Chadian authorities have tried, in vain, to negotiate with Libya. 18. Qaddaffr’s Libya has committed aggression against Chad, occupied it and interfered in its internal affairs. The Libyan screen for the occupation of part of Chadian territory was the stillborn Laval-Mussolini treaty of 1935. called “Treaty of Rome on the settlement of the interests of Italy and France in Africa” [S/0649, amex VIIJ. That treaty never had any legal validity, since there was never any exchange of instruments of ratification between France and Italy. Moreover, when France and Libya later signed, on IO August 1955. the Treaty of Friendship and Good-Neighbourliness between the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Libya [ibid, annex XJ, they saw tit not to mention the abortive Laval-Mussolini treaty on the list of international instruments recognized by the two parties concerning, among other frontiers, that frontier sepprating the territories of French Equatorial Africa, that is, Chad. which was still under colonial administration, and indspendent Libya. 19. Qaddafi’s tigime tried to improve its image by claiming that between 1951 and 1969 Libya was not truly free and that, accordingly, all decisions were dictated to it by imperialism; that the 1955 agreement was, in Qaddati’s eyes, replete with hypocrisy, its articles ambiguous and. consequently, Libya did not recognizc it because it had caused Libya too much harm; that the conventions prior lo 1955 did not respond to the aspirations of the Libyan people and that, if one were to take history into account, Libyan territory would extend well beyond its current limits. 20. This most unusual manner in which Qaddati interprets international law should be a source of grave concern to all States Members of the Organization. 21. Why is it that the Laval-Mussolini treaty-which we have described as stillborn-never entered into force? It is because, as I have already said, the exchange of the instruments of ratification never took place nor was ever to take place because of the wars in Ethiopia and Spain. Indeed, the first article of the title of that stillborn treaty made its entry into force conditional upon the conclusion ol’a convention concerning Tunisia, 22. Count Ciano. then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy. &clad nn 17 &ccc&r 10~ *I.-* IL- T---A*. -I- I,-.” .I.“. .11& ..b”b, vi Rome “was neither ratified nor completed and has been overtaken by history”. 23. Taking note of’ this statement. Mr. Francois Poncet. Ambassador of France to Italy. said. on 23 Dccembcr 1938: 24. Moreover, if there was a dispute, it was definitively settled in due course between France and Libya, on the recommendation of the General Assembly on IS December 1950 by its resolution 392 (V). Pursuant to this resolution, France and Libya concluded the Treaty of Friendship and Good-Neighbourliness of 10 August 1955 to which 1 have referred. Article 3 of that Treaty provides that: 30. Faced with numerous failures and setbacks in the war in Chad, the international terrorist thought he would succeed t\r using his favourite weapon: international terrorism. “The two High Contracting Parties recognize that the frontiers between the territory of Libya, on the one hand, and the territories of Tunisia, Algeria, French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa, on the other hand, are those resulting from the international instruments in force on the date of the establishment of the United Kingdom of Libya as defined in the exchange of letters as appended hereto (annex I).” 31. Political terrorism, which respects no morality. no frontiers, no principles and no international norms, should be a source of deep concern to all States Members of the United Nations. Each Member State must do its utmost to oppose, annihilate and render harmless those responsible for international terrorism. I realize that a great deal of effbrt has been made by countries which cherish peace and justice, but much still remains to be done. 25. Annex I specifies that the international instruments in force were the France-British Convention of 14 June 1898; the Additional Declaration of 21 March 1899 to the aforementioned Convention; the France-Italian agreements of I November 1902; the France-British Convention of 8 September 191% and the FranceItalian Arrangement of 12 September 1919 [i&f. utvrexes 1. II, III, v and vrj. 32. Often, the victims of political terrorism are caught 00 guard, while the criminals, for their part, hide behind the mask of anonymity, thus protecting their own identities and that of their backers. In most cases when the terrorists are identified it is too late to be of any help to their victims. However, thanks particularly to the steady improvement of international cooperation, it has been possible in some cases to prevent the perpetration of acts of terrorism in time. Fortunately for Chad, the suspects were caught rcdhanded before they had a chance to strike; and that has made it possible to find out who was the true criminal. 26. The France-Libyan Treaty cf IO August 1955 was ratified by the two High Contracting Parties. The exchange of the letters of ratification took place on 20 January 1957, and the Treaty entered into force on 26 March 1957. It should be borne in mind that the letters exchanged on the day of the signing cf the Treaty constituting annexes to it contain detailed and indisputable stipulations concerning the path of the frontier between Chad and Libya. 33. A long and careful inquiry, conducted with the greatest discretion last September by our security services, made it possible to foil a plot to assassinate President Hissein Habre and all the members of the Government of Chad. 27. With regard to the foregoing, it is easy to see and understand that Libya’s warmongering attitude towards Chad is dicldted principally by the annexationist aims of the Tripoli r&me against Chad in particular and the rest of Africa in general. Consequently, it is Qaddafi who has been creating frontier problems between Chad and Libya. 34. The testimony of loyal Chadians who pretended to collaborate with the suspected assassins and a thorough analysis of the explosive device have enabled the Govemmen1 to establish that Muammar Qaddafi, the leader of international terrorism, is truly the person behind this ignominious plot. 28. Chad, which is a poor, land-locked country, hard hit by famine and drought and battered by war, has priorities for its economic and social development and the wellbeing of its people. While Chad’s civilian population is suffering the hardships of drought and dying of hunger, the Government of the Third Republic has heen obliged to Use a large part of the meagre resources availab!e to Chad a,. -- . . . ..I. ^ . ..^_ :-----.a -- .-- a 35. What 1 am about to say summa:& the results of the inquiry by the Chadian Security Services dealing with the human and technical methods used by Qaddafi to satisfy his desire for political hegemony by carrying out a series of ------:--r:--- I- #-L-J -mauum 188 ~uowiiii k~~~XGiiji -L'eL Le L -- *uIcII ,,e ,,dJ proved unable to achieve by military action on the ground. The Government of Chad hopes that this preliminary report, which has been made public while inquiries are actually continuing, will serve as a warning to other potential victims of Qaddafi as he presses on with acts of terrorism in the world. 29. Despite everything, the Chadian people. fiercely determined and aware of the need to oppose this aggression. under the enlightened guidance of President Hiss& Habre, coumgeously continues a struggle on two fronts: 37. After considering the results of the analysis of the bomb to which I have referred, President Hissein HabrO and the members of his Government decided to keep that information secret in the hope of luring the Libyan agent Senoussi to N’Djamena, where he and his accomplices could be arrested. 38. Meanwhile, the security forces were instructed to press ahead with their inquiries, which made it absolutely clear that this murderous conspiracy had been fomented by the Libyan Government and its leader, Muammar Qaddafi. Moreover, it proved that several Libyans and experienced foreign technicians were accomplices in this attempted assassination. If successful, that gruesome endeavour was to have brought them a net return of a mere CFAF 30 million, or $67,ooO. 39. The contents of the attach6 case. which were to all appearances so harmless, consisted of six sticks of Semtex- H plastic explosives of Czechoslovak manufacture. Each stick. wrapped in wax paper, contained two and a half kilograms of poweful explosives. The total power of IS kilograms of plastic explosives would have been enough to destroy a truck and any human being within a distance of seven and a half metres in the open air. Inside a conference room, however, the power of the same explosive charge would have been greatly increased. In fact, a IS-kilo charge of explosives is more than enough to destroy a 6.COO-cubic-metre conference room and burst thr lungs of cdy &i.xu: hi iiiai rtifii. Tlic ChxiiubbtiaL rrpitiike Semtex-H is widely sold .%oughout the world and is especially favoured by terrorist groups, which use it for boobytrapped letters. For example, Eduardo Mondlane. the Mozambican patriot, was killed by a booby-trapped package containing Semtex-H. The detonators for the plastic explosive were connected to an ignition device put together 40. The transmitter described by the Libyan Senoussi Abdelsalam as a “receiver/tape recorder”, and which was subsequently conficxated by security forces, was to serve as a remote control system. Roth the transmitter and the receiver used for the bomb are made of ordinary, commercially available electronic components to be found in any communications system. However, sophisticated modifications converted these intrinsically harmless components into instruments of death. 41. In order to achieve detonation, the components of this bomb were cleverly modified in a laboratory and skilfully assembled. The bomb was made in such a way that it could be set oft’ from a distance of several kilometres. The duped Chadian. Ali Hassxn. would certainly have been blown up along with his so-called “eavesdropping device”. which he was supposed to have placed in the meeting room in the Chamber of Commerce. thr.rby also wiping out the chief witness against the terrorist Colonel. 42. The provenance of the operational parts of the Libyan device has been traced to a commercial source in Western Europe that has over the past six years supplied several such parts to the Libyan Government at Benghazi. From the ongoing investigations. it appears that IS or more sets of such components have been delivered to the Ot7i1 of Military Security, Post Ot&e Box 724, Benghazi, Libya. The M-or more-missing sets or components could therefore still be assembled for bombs already planted on the African continent, or elsewhere, by the arch-international terrorist Qaddafi. 43. I would point out that the specific technical details of the bomb have been deliberately omitted in order not to facilitate the manufacture of similar devices by other terrorist orga4izitions. 44. Based on the evidence provided by depositions of the witness and technical analysts, the Government of Chad accuses the Government of Libya of having fomented this act of cowardly terrorism in order to assassinate the President of the Republic of Chad and members of the Chadian Govemmcnt. AC . . . -a_ a* I_- . 8)) tuc ctpc cii' iiic i'ulcguitiy. iiir Guvrlliiiltii 0; kd appeals to all the States Members of the Organization resolutely to condemn this criminal plot fomented by the international terrorist Qaddali. 46. I wish to take this opportunity to alert all nations to the fact that Chad and its leaders are not the only targets 47. At the request of the Soviet Union and through the aegis of the First Committee, the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session has just held a very lengthy debate on State terrorism. The United Nations now finds itself confronted with a concrete case of terrorism. What will the Security Council decide? 48. For its part, the Chadian Government hopes that by pr0vidirl.g this data, supported by photcgraphs, it will have made seine modest contribution to the efforts of the international community to foil acts of international terrorism in general, anti those of Qaddafi in particular. 49. The disarmed weapon I have described is available for examination to those having a legitimate interest and to accredited media representatives. We did not bring the plastic explosive itself because it would have been dangerous both to us and to the aircraft, but we do have the detonator with us in the attach6 case I am now placing at your disposal. But there is no need for alarm-you will not be blown up. However, before opening the case, 1 would ask the technicians to start the videotape screens so that we can all see what this bomb would have done had it gone off. Of course. this is a simulation, since we are not ourselves terrorists. SO. This is the attach6 case, which looks like one for a businessman or a diplomat. apart from the murderous device it contains. T&e following is an interpretation of the ttafratiotk in French, of the videotapes shown in the &c&y Cotmd chamber at the request of the delqation of Chad, “Last autumn President Habri was to have held a meeting with members of his Government. senior oflicials and other prominent citizens and foreign diplomats in the meeting hall of the Chamber of Commerce in downtown N’Djamena. At that time, a Libyan agent calling himself El Senoussi Abdelsalam contacted a Chadian businessman who had free access to the building in question. The Libyan instructed the businessman to place this harmless-looking attach6 case inside the conference room of the Chamber of Commerce. He said that the attach6 case contained only an eavesdrop ping and recording device that would enable the Libyan to follow these very high-level discussions. Instead of an eavesdropping device, however, the attach& case in fact contained six sticks of Czechosiovak-made Semtex-H plastic explosive. For some years Semtex-H has been the preferred explosive of terrorists. particularly in the manufacture of booby-trapped letters. Eduardo Mondlane. the Mozambican patriot. was killed by a boobytrapped package containing this type of explosive. The I5 kilos of explosives in this bomb could have com- “Here is the detonator in a dismantled state. Its receiver, cleverly modified thro?rgh equipment that is easily obtainable from commercial sorrrces, functions with ordinary batteries. When the position of the test button is ‘On’ or ‘Testing’, the mechanism picks up a radio signal which detonates the explosives hidden in the plastic sticks. The remote control can he situated several hundred metres away from the target. It is contained in this ordinary attache case, which has been ingeniously transformed for the purpose. It has been d&covered that the transmitter in this attache case. apparently harmless in appearance, was capable of sending signals to detonate five separate bombs. The transmitter is powered by a rechargeable battery and has a collapsible aerial. The Libyan agent Senoussi prcsented the attache case to his presumed accomplice as containing eavesdropping equipment. All that had to be done was to press the button on the transmitter and the signal would have been given to the detonator of the bomb, thus killing President Hissein Habre and other high-ranking persons in the Republic of Chad. This is what would hnve happened: [EXPLOSiOhfj.”

(interpretationfrom Rettch): I call on the representative of Chad.

We have here some brochures we have prepared containing various photographs we have taken. We would be glad if ;ou. Sir. could kindly arrange to have them distributed as ofkial documents of the Security Council.

(intetpretation from French): l%e next speaker is the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. on whom I now call.

It gives me great pleasure at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your accession to the presidency of the Council for this month. I am conf&nt that your diplomatic experience and your widom will assist the Council in its deliberations. 55. I also wish to express my appreciation to your predecessor, our brother the representative 0i Egypt, ior the exemplary manner in which he conducted the work cf the Council last month. 56. The position of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya with regard to the situation in Chad has been made clear in the brief letter we addressed to the President of the Council on 57. In this connection, I wish to assert that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya rejects all the allegations included in the letter of Chad [S/16906]--and all that has been said by Mr. Gouara Lassou in the last few minutes. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya does not intetiere in Chad and has no presence whatsoever on Chadian territory. What is described every now and again by some hostile circles as a presence of Libyan forces is only the presence of forces of the legitimate Government of National Unity which are stationed in the northern part of Chad. 58. Therefore the purpose oi the rebel Habr6 in convening this meeting of the Council is as follows: first, to slander the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, to depict it as an aggressor and to cast doubt on its intentions towards Chad; secondly, to belittle the military importance and power of the Govemment of National Unity, under Oueddei. which controls the northern part of Chad and whose forces are present throughout the country; thirdly, to create justification for the rebel Habre and his clique to obtain more weapons, foreign forces and mercenaries to use in acts of repression and mzssacre against the Chadian people and to exploit the situation by attacking the forces of the Government of National Unity in the north of the country; fourthly, togive legitimacy to the rebel r&me in N’Djametla, a legitimacy which it cannot obtain through the people. 59. His&n Habre and his representatives talk about security, peace and stability in Chad and try to convince world public opinion that they are in favour of that while the facts indicate the opposite. Hissein Habrt has always been P source.of disturbance and instability in Chad. and he is primarily responsible for the plight of the Chadian people over the last seven years, that is to say. since $he coming of the Chadian National Liberation Front (i%OLINAT) to N’Djamena. 40. Hissein Hat& history from then on is replete with acts of insurgency and crimesand massacres committed against the Chadian people. It is dificult to give an account here of all the breaches of peaa?and security he has committed. I will merely refer to the fact that he plunged thecountry into a period of long civil war by his rebellion against the Government of F&ix Malloum. after having signed an agreemen’ through which he was able to enter the Govcrnment and assume the post of Prime Minister on 31 August 1978. He also violated the Kano Agreement of 16 March 1979. He also tried to usurp power, and this led to the continuation and escalation of the civil war. Finally, he riolatcd the Lagos Accord on National Reconcilintinn in Chad. of I8 August 1979 [S/14378, mvlex fJ by rebelling against the legitimate interim Government of National Unity headed by Goukouni Oueddei, the result of the Lagos Accord, after he assumed the position of Defence Minister in that Government. the only one set up as a result ot agreement among all factions in Chad and after strrnuous 61. It has not been enough for Hissein HabrO and his clique to subvert security and cause instability in Chad whenever they realize that the country has attained some kind of stability and embarked on construction. They have also impeded all efforts by the OAU and African countries to achieve national reconciliation and restore peace, stability and legitimacy to Chad. a country which has been torn apart by civil war for two decades. Famine and the crimes of Hi&n HcbrC have eliminated many and prompted some to seek asylum in neighbouring countiies, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, which hosts tens of thousands of Chadian refugees and gives them all humanitarian assistance. 62. Hisscin Habr& impeded all efforts at conciliation between the warring factions in Chad; for example, he foiled the initiative by President Mengistu, then Chairman of the OAU, to hold a reconciliation conference at Addis Ababa. as well as the initiative of the President of Ango!a to hold a reconciliation conference in Brazaville, by insisting on his recognition as Head of State by the other Chadian factions and by the legitimateGovernment ofChad. headed by Goukouni Oueddei. That is something that was rejected by Hisscin Habr& himself previously at theKanoconferena on national reconciliation, when he insisted on the resignation of F&ix Malloum, then President of Chad, as a condition for the holding of that conference. His insistence on a condition that he had previously rejected confirms his lack of desire to achieve peace and confirms that his objective is to continue the civil war and to eliminate the Chadian people in order that he may remain in power. 63. The army. headed by Hissein Habre. who has sent a representative to address us here, represents only one of II factions that signed the Lagos Accord. Therefore, the international community should not be deceived and cannot give legitimacy to a Government formed of only one faction, which came to power through rebellion and force of arms, with the support of mercenary and foreign force. 64. It is no wonder that such 2 Government, in view of the way in which it came IO pc-ver, Faces such resistance by the Chadian people, under its legitimate Gorrmment. Ir is no wonder either that there is an attempt on the life of Hissein Habre and his clique. which had previously rebelled against legitimacy and usurped power, especially when that clique does not control the majority of the country. faces armed opposition and continuous military operations in the south and has no influence in the northern pdrt of the country. which is controlled by the legitimate Government. This confirms that the allegation that the 1 ihr,ln bc=~ *~~o~;.;..- ,--c--r-~ -- _..^--. .^ ----- “yJ”.. , ..“” .,“l”“.,l.~J” .,“I&C”CL~” “6, cw\LII+A L” rwsQJsinate Hissein Habr; is without foundation. What is more likely is what was said in the statement issued by the legitimate Chadian Government of National Uniiy. published at Brussels. that the assassination attempt just mentioned by HabrC’s representative was made by 3 group in His.sein Habr& personal guard. The note that was presented a 65. The rebel Hi&n Habre and his clique have no legitimacy and have no support among the Chadian neople. What is going on in Chad is t. civil war, which ’ 5 been raging for 20 years, due to elements such as Hissein Hab& who put their personal aspirations before the interests of the Chadian people. The attempt to divert the attention of the international community from what has been going on in Chad, by levelling allegations against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya at the instigation of the imperialist forces, will not solve the Chadian prc)blem. The only solution is to seek national reconciliation In accordance with the Lagos Accord, under the supervision of the OAU and with the participation of all the parties that signed the Accord. The continuation of support for the rebellion headed by Hissein Habr& and the disregard of legitimacy can increase the tension, bloodletting and destruction in Chad. 66. The present situation in Chad is shown by the presence of a legitimate Government of National Unity under Goukouni Oueddei, which controls the majority of the country and which has its seat in the north, and there is a Government of rebellion-if we may call it a Govemmenta-which controls N’Djamena, with the support of some foreign forces. That should be taken into consideration when a solution to the Chadian problem is sought. 67. The Libyan people is linked to the brotherly Chadian people by historical, geographical, cultural and spiritual ties. The two countries have a common history of struggle against colonialism. When the two peoples were subjected to colonialism at the beginning of the present century they fought together. The Libyans fought against colonialism in Chad and the Chadians fought in Libya against the Italian Fascist colonialism and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has been keen on maintaining this special relationship, which ties the two peoples together. It has consistently endeavoured :c maintain the unity, security and stability of the Chadian people. It was the first to strive to achieve national reconciliation in Chad and put an end to the plight of the Chadian people since the early 1960s; the first national reconciliation conference was held in the city of Sebha in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in February 1978. The Libyan efforts resulted later in the mutual recognition of FROLINAT and the Chadian Government at the conference of Sebha and Benghazi in the Libyan Arab Jamahinya, on 27 March 1978. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has also participated in all conferences held in Nigeria since then with the objective of achieving national reconciliation. which resulted in the Lagos Accord and the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity, which comprises all Chadtan tactions, under iioukouni never will mnoni7e it ;.. 0 .* ’ Oueddei. and which has been recognized by th\: OAU. i%e meeting rose at 4.45 p.m. 68. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. as a sister neighbouring country, is ready to contribute. as it has already done. NOT I. to any elrorts made within the framework of’ the OAU to achieve peace and security in Chad. ’ SCC O/jiciat’ Records 01 the General Assembly, Ff!h Session. Sup. pkcment No. IS. document A/1340.

(interpretution from Frewh): As President of the Council, I should like to remind the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya that the complaint we are considering comes from the internationally recognized Government of Chad and that its legitimacy cannot be challenged in the Council. It was at the request of that Government that the President of the Council, speaking on behalf of its members, made known in his statement of 6 April 1983 [243Oth meeting, puru. 4j the recommendations of the Security Council regarding the settlement of the dispute between Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 71. The repr.%rtative of Chad ‘&hes to speak in exetcise of Sis right of reply. 1 call upon him.

The delegation of Chad does not wish to exercise its tight of reply knowing full well that Libya’s response will be just a pack of lies and contain baseless allegations. However. we would simply say that the killer never admits his crime unless one really is dealing with a good loser-but that is not the case here. 73. The Chadian people has s&red far too much from Libya’s acts, as the Minister for Foreign AfTairs of my country has just shown. In tbis particular case, we should merely like to give the intemationat community an opportunity to judge for itself.

(thterpretationfiom French): The representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya wishes to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I call upon him.

Mr. President. with all due respect for the remarks you made a while ago, I should like here to affirm that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya does not recognize the government of insurgency ,in ..N’Djamena and HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICAI’IONS Unlted Nations plblicuianr may be obudced from boohorca and dktributora throughout ti world. Cauub your bookaWe or write to; United Nations, Sales Se&m, New York or Gawr. c(MMENT SE PMMNl?ER US PUULICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES Lu pMc~lonr da Nation8 Unka ION CD vente dana kc libraih a Iw agegcncee dCporitaim du monde Ntkf Idonnu-Vour ruprh de votw librrirr ou ndrruct-vow h : Nations UnieI. Sctiin cl0 vents, New York ou G&w. KM tlOJlk”UlTb H3mHkUI OPTAHH%UHH OEbeaHHeHHbIX HAllHf4 ~~~NIIK OprawIrIauaw 06bedm1eunux HauntI MOXHO xynmb 8 ~WIIIMX HPralHWPX H P~~HTCTMX no ricer paaonax pupa. Hamome CHPBOILH 00 mutnu B @auwM M~IROM IU~~~MUC UJU IIHUIHTC no &petty: Oprur~~uun O&easi~e~~ur HorucR, Cauwn no WOJINI~ HNtWUR, HbD-h&W UJIM #cnesS. COMO CONSEGUIR PUUS,XAC1O%..Il DE LAS NACIONES WlDAS hs puMicPcioW8 de Ias Nacionea Unidu, c&n en vema en librerka y casas dwnbuidoras en lodrc porter de1 mundo. Conwlte a su librero o dirfjasc a: NaAncs Umdac, Se&h de Venw. Nuevr York o Oirtcbm. P---m--- ___. . . - . . . . . - ._. __ - .._.___ - - . . . . ._ . . - .__._ _.- . . - - - - - - - - - - . - . - . - . . . - - Lirho m I’nd Nalwm. NW York mum 90114.~Y--Aprll l~?.M4)