S/PV.257 Security Council

1 have two more speakers on my list, and it is now necessary to adjourn tms tp.eeting. The Security Council is due to meet at 2.30 p.m. in reference to the India-Pakistan question. 1 propose that tbis meeting should be deferreduntil 3 .p.m. . . , 1propose tinit the SecurityCouncil meet agam on the Indonesian question .at 10.30 a.m. on Saturday, .28 February 1948. As there is no objection, it will be so arranged. teurs devons de examiner de de le n'y nécessaires TWO HUNDREDvAND FIFTY- SEVENTH MEETING .Held at Lake Success, New York, ()nThursday, 26 February 1948, at. 3. p.m. Preside~t:General McNAUGHTON (Canada). Président: :Present: Therepresentatives of the following (lountries: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Argentine, ~olombia, France, Syria, Ukraînian So~et Social- France, lSt ~epublic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, . d'Ukraine, Umted Kingdom, United States of America. soviétiques, ,rique. 45~ 45. Provisional agenda (document SIAgenda 257) 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. I~dia-Pakistan question: .. , (a) Letter dated' 1 Jlln.~.I:';l.!y 1948 from the representative of Indk 3ddressed to the President ot'the-Securiti C>')unci1 concerning J. 2. 46. Adoption of the agenda 47. Conduation of the disèussion of the . India-Pakistan.question . The PREsIDENT: The members of the Sëc1.Îrity Counci1 will rf. -1]1 that when we' adjourned the discussion of·~; matter at our 250th meeting, we were engaged in the consideration'of those .aspects of the India-Pakistan question I!>ther than the situation in the Jammu and Kashmir State, and,inpartic~ar~ we' bad agreed to consid~r the question of Junagadh. si!. Mohmnmed .ZAFRULLAH .KHAN (pakistan): When Ilast addressed the.Securïty Council, 1 drew attention to the matter of 1unagadh and plac~d thé facts relating to the case before it. 1 wish to add a· few remarks to what 1 said then with regard to the development tha~ has taken place smce that time.· . . 1 invited attèntÏonat·thaftime to the fact that· on 6 Febroa'ry-we prefeireda request to the Indian delegation, tbi'ough the Pri'5ident, that it should present' to its·Govemment the request tbat the question of·the plebiscite in. Junagadh sho1.!ld be postponed pending the consideration of -the matter by. the ~~urity Council. You will recall that the headofthe ltidian delegation very kindly consented to do so. In fact, he stated tOOt he did not antici.p~te,·anY difficulty. over .th~ matter with hisGovernment. 1 recaU tOOt Mr. Setalvad remarked that it ·shQwdbe 'allright; thpt the matter was, in a. sense, sub jwJfce; and that there- fore the~e should·oe. no difficulty in .poetponing the holding of the plebiscite in Junagadh. Latt~ronwhenthequestionwas mentioned jjY'. m~ ill the. SecurityCouncil [24S~h meeting], thehead of the .Indian delegation statecithat br. ~a<1. conveyed that -request to his (Jovemment and that he anticipated. ~o ~c1.!lty ,over the matter, .bt:lt he W8S aWaIting bis Government's tëply.' . " Since then f~e pl~biscite in Junagadh .hasbeca held. Istated to 'i,he Soourity C()uncil at th.: 2SOthD1~g that, on myinquiry, Mt~ VenoêJi:~50eséance,qu'àmademande, hadinformed methatheOOd received a com.° munication from his Government on the subj~t dl 1bid.,'.Supplement for November1948, .pages 67-87. "·Ibid.} "NO., §,< 23.1stIi}~ijng. l'extéri~·it'. l'égard parties, susceptible le qui tion question. dem2.nder Les forces les 250 n~ment l'administration musulmane, terreur. ditions premier fait du voudrais est nous parviennent de règlement. ~. VELLODI (India): 1 had not anticipated tms Particular statement of the .representative of Pakistan, because so far .as the plebiscites in Junagadh andthe,'adjoining States aœ concerned. m'attendais.pas ~~adep.deavouredto explain toJùm that although It IS perfectly true that the Indiau. representativè agreed. to .communica:te his desire to the Govem- ment of India, neither the Indian r~presentative nor. anyone else,in the Indian delegation under~ stood for. a moment that thiswas a kind of direction from. the Security Council. 1 trust that eve~ now itis. not.held by therepresentative of Pakistan. that thatis .;0. .' ' So far _as the plebiscite is concemed, the facts are ex.actli as .Gtatedby hïm... When this request frOID Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangat waH received mNe~ Delhi, the position waS tliat. the arrange- janvier, ~ents ln connexionwith the plebiscite which had , eenannouncedafiearly as the .:lirst week in 1 was not present at these meetings where :Mr. Setalvad and Mt. Gopalaswami Ayyangar are reported to have made various statem~nts, but the President was present, and 1 have no doubt that the statement made by the represen- tative of Pakistan. must be entireiy correct. But that does not obviate the fact that due notice rcgarding this plebiscite had been given to aIl concemed and,administratively speaking, it was found inconvenient to postpone the plebiscite. As far as 1am concemed, Ithinkthat that disposes of this qùestion of the plebiscite. 1 may' have to revert to it later on in my statement. . RegarClÏng the extension of theconflict area in Kasbmir and the urgent need,for the leader of the Iodiandelegationta retum to the Security Council, the position is that 1 have received a telegr~ from Mf. Gopalaswami Ayyangar in which· he has informed me-and 1 had intended to say this to the Security Council and to the President -that he certainly will be back in New York about the end of the fust week in March. 1 regret that 1 have no other information on this point and 1 believe that is, perhaps, the soonest that Mt. Gopalaswami Ayyangar can be expected to retum to. New York. When the Security Council last met on the Iodia-Pakistan question on 18 February 1948 [250thmeeting], the Security Council heard Pakistan's complaint·against India in respect of Jnnagadh and certain other minoI States in the Kathiawar 'Penninsula of the Indian Dominion; but as sorne time has elapsed since that ,date, perhaps it would be useful for the Security Councilif 1 were· to refi'~h the minds of the repres~ntativesin regard to this particular comp1a4tt. . BD,.e.ftyt~.'ted" pakistan,..'s.case is that the; States of Junapdh and Manav!1da:r have lawfully acceded to the Dominion of Pakistan;that sub- sequenUy,with()ut anyjustification, the Govem- ment of Iodia. S!i'nt its armed forces into these States, unlawfully occupied the States and took over the administration; and that it is still in occupation.of,these 'States. ln ·.·regard. ta the .,.~ther States-Mangrol, Sardargarh, Bantva' and the territories there concemed-Pakistan contends tuat these States, being feudatory Statesattached to Junagadh; could not independently accede .to India· or Pakistan, and, tb:erefore their aécession to India isinvalid. 'Pakistan bas,thereforerequested the 8ecurity Council to arrange for the evacuation from these States of the military forces and civil administration of the Indian Union" torestore these Statestotheir laWful rulers, and se.;ond1y, toassistin the restoratio'n to their homes, lands and·' properties ,of the ,.,esidents .of the·States referred to who havefied fromor :who havebeen driven outofsucl'tStat'Js, al1dalsu for theclaiming ofcompensatiofi .\ron. tne Iilmll.l1 Union for the' 10ss ordamagecau~'~d bYQlila'i"d'~üactions and activitiesof the..militprfl f:"rces~ civiiotilcials and nationals of the Indian Union in. t1,.ese. States. 1think the representative of Pakistan did men· tion the fact that Junagadh, at any rate, had a seaboard with one or two fairly good·sized ports, the intended inference being that Junagadh was in that way connected with Pakistan by sea. The representatives nere have before them maps ofIndia, as Pakistan and India used to be known, and they ca, easily see tbis matter ofthe seaboard. As a matter of fact, if we were to consider or recognize tbis affiliation on aecount of the sea" board, we might just as weIl say that tbis seaboard e!tends right across the Arabian Sea; Iran, for example, is on the same sea; so is Mrica and so is Arabia. The other factor is that these States'lie in the middle of a very largo number of Indian States on the Katbiawar Peninsula, wbich have aIl acceded to the Indian Dominion and to which these States are bound by ties of race, religion. culture and historical tradition. As a matter of fact, as lQng ago as' 11 April 1947, long before the partition of Inma, long before Pakistan and India were separated, the Dewan-that is to say the' Prime Minister..:-of Junagadh, issueda press note in wliich he explained the attitude of Junagadh 'vis-à-vis the future constitutional set-up of India. n is a very brief note, and therefore 1 shall take the liberty of reading it.U reads as follows: "A certain section of the Gujrati Press"-- G';jrati, by the way, is a language spoken by the majority ofthe population of Kàthiawar and large parts of the Bombay Provinc~" has of late beèn induiging in various imputations and speculations regarding the attitud(J of Junagadh in the future Constitutional set·up of. India. These imputations and speculations Me incorrect and misleading. What Junagadh pre-eminently stands for is solidarity of Katmawar, ànd Junagadh would welcome the formation of a self-containedgrouo of'Katmawar States. Such a group, whileproviding for autonomy and theentity of indiwdual States and their subjectf;, would be a suitaJle basis for co·Opération in the matters of common concem generally, and co-ordination whëreVt~r necessary. In view of tbis clear attitude of· Junagadh, the newspaper. fJurmises are without foundation." le la partie "'- età l'État sation tionsetspéculations indu.re avant le groupe tél vidualité constitUerait une pour échéant, parfaitement des , contraire toùtefois·· temp'oraïre du Junagadh les cônstitué Junagadh tiLinement membres hi:The,. s:ubse9uent.conduct ~f tbis I!ewan be~ed Gongmal mtentlOn, although 1 nnght mtlntion herethat,in spiteof the temporaty defection ~fJunagadhaIidthe oth~r smal1 States, thelndiaIi tates of Kathiawar have recently formed them- selvesinto a solid union, in w.mchJunagadh 1Uld.the. others will no· do'ubt beèome partners m due course. " exercis~d by the British Govemment ceased, and the Indian" States were free to accede to either P9minion. It hll.d, however, always been under- stood that in exercising this option the Indian State concerned would not take an arbitrary oecision bùt would, on the contrary, pay due regard to such matters ~,S geographicà1 contiguity. In,fact. this matter of geographicà1 contiguity was çonsidered so important that at a conference of the Rulers and represeJitatives of the Indian States field in the, Chamber· of Princes in New Delhi pn Friday, 2S JuJy 1947-again, some weeks before partition-Lord Mountbatten, the then Governor General of India, including what is DOW Pakistan, ~eferr~d to it in the following words: t< But when 1 say'that ,they "-,-that is, to say, the Indian States-:- u are at liberty to link up with ~lthèr ,o( ,the Dominions, n.tay 1 point out fllat there' are certain geographical comp~sions that çannotOOevaded?Outofsomethinglike565"States ,he ,yast màjority are irretrievaoly .linked geo- graphicà1ly' with the Dominion' of India." ~,;, That.was the position atthe time ofthe partlti<,n ~f India"and it really could not 00' otherwise. It :was bad enoughthat, as the result of partition, th~ Dominion of Pakistan h~d itseJf to besplit into,two parts, one ,in the east of India and one ~ tbewest.It was certainly consideredunnecessary and.. ·in, faet, ,undesira~le,:,JO cQmplicate this (urther'by,permittingor' tnaJdng provisions for -Indian States to. adhere or affiliate,themselves to e,ith!=f Dominion irresp~tiveof,an considerr.tions. <O~:v1ously, the justifi~tion':fçr,;'a; federation, .I:lIl,afliliation,orfQr acçessioll, is merelya,dministra- ~ye, convenienc.e •subject, ,of,.course,' to. con- slc:ter@,tions. suel1 a~ ;geographical.coIJ,tiguity, cul- twal, racial· aJl.d.;reli.gious affi.ni~es", and so on. 1: think that tb.e 'repre~~ntative •of Pakistan will ag,;ee that it was not, the int~ntion9f theOovern- ment of Indja in.thosedays that IndianStates sho,u1dOO PermiUedtoacce4e to either Pakistan 9r Indja;.iq-espective ofa,ll considerations of this kind. , . . . ", 'TheattentionoftheSecurityCouncilhasalready been drawn to the faet that Tunagadh and the other. ~mall 'States;' r~ferred to ..in ~akistan's eomplaint are surr()'unded by other Indian States which; likeJunagadh, are also predominantly 110n..Muslim al1dh~veacc-ededto India.The so-called accession ofJunagadhtoPakistan must, the:refQ:re, be regarded as· deviating· fro~ the very çJear, understanding that geographical considera.. ~io~~ .~hould be ~ll~ofthe ~ostimp0I!antcoJlsi- e;terllt~ons,goveJ11Ing, acceSSIon of. InclillnSta~es~ ,-' , .. " ~'In the course ofhis:speech on Junagadhreferred to above. Sir. Mohammed Zafrullah. Khan'said: • Q The various officiai pronouncements ofthe Ruler -and ofthe Prime Minister, the Dewan ofJU'D.agadh, had Ied the people of Junagadh and the adjoining States concerned to believe that the Governments Qf those States fully intended to follow the wishes of the majority of the people and accede to the :Dominion of India, to which the States were contiguous. When, therefore, it was announced bythe Nawab' of JUilagadh that bis State· had acceded to Pakistan, tbis news came as a shock to the people of the State,' and the Provisional GoverdIllent, referred to by the representative of' Pak,gtan as having been forined with the active assistance of the Governmentof India, wasmerely the natural protest of the people of Junagadh against the arbitrary action taken by the Nawab-who' was, for 'ail practica!. purposes, éompletely .under the infiuence of a clique of, adVisers 'who were not themselves resid~nts. of 'Junagadh. . .One of the complaints of Pakistan i8 that the. ,Government of India not only pernûtted the .formation witbin its territory of' the so-called ProVisional Government' fOl' Juilagadh, but in nenient fonnation nement par trouve date de cité coursqû'ila sécurité. In the same speech, Sir Mohammed zafniIlah Khan referred to a statement alleged to have been Zafrullah made by Mr. Samaldas Gandhi, the organizer auraît of ,the ProvisioDal Government, ÏJ:i. wbich he is provisoire, . ppOrted to have expressed .~s gratitude to.Sardar il~~rimaitau :~any ways encoüraged tms Goverriment'sactivi- tles. This has been refe:rred to in the telegram of the Prime Minister of Pakistan to the Prime 'Mïiùsterof India, dated 2 October and quoted by . ·therepresentative of Pakistan in bis speech at the . 25Qth ~eeting of the Security Couneil. . '. a~e!,·D.eputy ,.prone Minister of India. and adJomt ~.finister-m-Chai'ge of States, for the gUidance avec '~:f~~~e;~t~pe:~:~~~o:e~~~ rili:iv:~i~ti:1~~~ér;:O~ca~té~l:~ci :0 the so-calledP!'0'Iri.8iomdGovernment. '. . ;provisoire;,: f~Iing against thec a.dministration of the Nawab, and-the Dewan,'the Prime Minister of Junagadh, did not lose much time in following his master to Karachi. Presu'll1ably, all the otber principal advisers of the Nawab also accompanied the D~cm. Lar!c.mg popular support, the administration soon coThwsed, and the so-called economic blockade was nothing more than the chaos result- ingfrom the breakdown ofthe civil administration of- Junagadh. The members of the Security Council will r.emember that the question of this blockade was referred to by the leader of.the Pakistan delegation in his spewh.The Dewan, who was in Karachi, realiZing the futility of resisting the people's will, sent one of bis ininisters, Major Harvey· Jones~ to Rajkot, where the Provisionsl Govern..tI1ent's representatives were actually holding office, to negotiate with.· the leaders: of the so-caned Provisional Government. Wiser COUfise~ however, prevailed, and on the - adw,,;z of·the Nawab and the Executive Council of Stàtes,. and inaccordance with theexpressed will ofthe popularleaders in Junag&dh, the Dewan, who was then in Karachi and no doubt in very close touch with members ofthe Pakistan Govern- ment, addressed a letter to the Regional Com~ m~sioneroftheStatesMinistryoftheGovemmzîl\; of India in Rajkot on 8 November 1947. Inthis Ietter 'the Dewanreferred to the fact tbat a public m~g had been held in JH,nagadh at which prCo>&DÏnentresidents ofJunagr.dhhad un&nimously expres~d the view that the administration should be given over tothe Indian 'Omon through the Regional Commissioner of the Governmeut of InCilit a1l Raj~ot. The Dewan therefore reque~ted the Government of India to assume responsibility for admiJrJstering the State in order ta save it from chaos. It is worthy of notice here that, though the State aœ-eded to Pakistan, the Government of India was theonly Power ID. a position torender prompt and ei"ective assistanœ in maintaining order. Th;" illl îtself~. sufricient to dem.onstrate the tack of wisdom· of Junagadh's .. so-called. accession to Pakistan. The forœs 01 the Government of Indià didnotl The impartiality and the efficiency ofthe present administration of Junagadh bave elicited the admiration of aU classes in Junagadh, and when the Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Patel, visited the State on 14 November 1947, he was welcomed ata huge meeting of the public, who acclaimed with one voice the action taken by th~ Domrcion of India. 1 may explain here that the Admimstrator .of Junagadh is a member of the Indian Civil Service with il very distingvlshed record of ability in administration. 1 amnot surprised myself, belong- iüg to the same ser.vice, that the impartiality and efficieney of thv.t ndministration have elicited the admiration of aIl c:'asses. ~..pposed to have been shot, Mr. Koka was Cachemire, found alive and uninjured. Heis still alive, and, M. with sixother Muslim leaders of Junagadh,he has. de been givlen eVery facility to verify what actually qu'à happened. These persons, after satisfying them- toutes selves about the situation in Junagadh, publicly ce stated that most of these allegations were mêmes groundless. gadh) ces personnes la·plupart des fondement cipaux télégraphié cet nistration maintenir seulement, télégr,amme vadar, Pakistan. Khoja importante Before Mahatma Gandhi died, the leading Musfuns of Junagadh had telegraphed to him that the position of Muslims in Junagadh State was perfeetly -safe, and that the administration. had made very sincere efforts to preserve law and order. Qnly a few days ago the-following telegram wa& reeeived by the Governnrent of lnma from !heKhoja Ismaili Jamait of Manavadar, which 1S one ofthe States which had acceded to Pakistan. .~ ~Y explain ~ere that the Kht?ja Ismaili referied o Is.avery nnportant Muslim- commumty of Kathiawar and Bombay Province generally; and, ~·,l rèpeat thaî this telegram was receivoo from :â hi8b1Y' respected .religious organizationof 'Muslims.in thatarea. :nat':fini~hes Junagadh; .. Wè mightas well disp'Dse of the complaint of ·Pakistan in regard to othet States; namely, .Mangrol, Babria~'Î'ad, Sardargath, and Bantva. 'AU these States have acceded to India. They had 'hem attached to Junagadh State under the attllch- 'ihent scheme createdby the Govemment of India in 1943. pn 13 AUgUst 1947-that is, tWo days -before the official partition of India and the :formation of the two Dominions of India and "Pakistan--the Govemmeut oflndia announced :tbat, withthe passage of the Indian Independence' ;Act and the cessation of paramountcy, the 'attacbrn.ent scheme would automatically lapse; tbat is tosay,' the States referred to-nalIlely, ·Mangrol, Babriawad, et ,cetera-wouldregain the stiltus whichthey had. held prior to 1943, and they ,wouldcease to OOStat~s attached to Junagadb. ,That is still the position so far as these States ar~ ,cQncerned.. ., :'··Pakistan's contention""""7namely that these States 'could .not legally or, constitutionally aceede to Pakistan Qr to India as tney were dependencies ;ofIunagadh-is,·in theciicumstances, untenable. ..The representative of Pakistan bas. statoo that Mangrol, .one of these States; bas subsequently ietraeted and·has 'acceded to Pakistan. If it bas doneso; thiscould '~oh1ybe 'attributed ·to the pressure. that was brought to 'OOar on' its Riller ;by the GQvemment ofPakistan. As in the case of .Tunagadh, :and,.'.'in, fact, all. theother States in .K!athiawar, the majority of the population. of ,these States isnon~Muslim. Geographically, these :States, like··, Junagadh, arenot. contiguous to :Pakistan, and the belàted accession of Mangrol to ;Pakistancan have no, greater···v.alidity .than the -accession of Junagadhitself. . . :Muchconcem was expressed bySîrMohammed Zafru11ahKhanr~garding the w'hereaboutsof ·the Sheikhof'Mangrot· It will.perbaps comfort ,him.toknow that this gentleman is now living, in ;Porbandar, the capital of·a neighbouring lndian State, as. the guest of its Ruler. Nothing. has .happened to hinl. .. .. '; >As,regards Manavadar,anattempt has been :madebythe spok~sman of Pakistan to discuss thisState as ·if the case of Manavadar were ·totally.differentïn character from that ofthe other :Statesconcerned. The .accession of Manavadar ;toPakistanis open to the same objections as the .accession of Junagadh,.but in the case of ,Manavadar tuere Wa,s. this .pecullar, additional ofeature; namely,. :hat the Khan of Manavadar ,.....~tbat i8 tb say, the· head of the State-:-bad Jent .himself .to ya6>us intrigues that might have imminent~ Faced with this situation, the Govern- . coirmlUnautés ment of India was presented with twoalternatives. Itcould either allow the situation te deterioraœ further, with the certainty of a repetition in the .state. and in the neighbourhood of the violent .èommunal dis'')rders that had taken place else- where in India and Pakistan, or inte.iVene in time ,and prevent such a development. The action {)f t1:e Government of India in taking over the .administration of this State has effectively pre- -vented the spread of communal trouble in this part of the country, and hasb.een welcomed, by .aIl.sections of the people of the State. cla4'em!3nt du avec missaire dès renseignernents du 6 .au dafe· .' In other words, as early as 21 August, aImost ,a month before t)le formaI notification of.the un .ltccessionofJunagadh, State to' Pakistan, the {iovernment ·of·India had asked the High Com- The Khan of Manavadar is now living in Jamnagar, the capital of the State of Nawanagar. .as the guest of t!le Jam· Saheb of :Nawanagar. The· Govemmeilt of India had from the first .apprehended that Junagadh's accessionto Pakistan would result hi undesirable, ifnot serious, con- 'Seqùences. It is for this reason that, as'soonas the Govemmènt of India -heard 'runiours of Junagadh's· iinpending accession to PakistaJ!, it tôoksteps to ascertain from the Pa:kistàn UovernmeJit thé true facts of the situatiolÎ.. In the very fir~t telegram sent by the Prime Minister ofIndiato the Prime Minister ofPakistan, <tated 11 September 1947, and -quoted in his ~pèechby the representative ofPakistaJll~ thePtime Minister of India had c1ea:dy brought to the notice ~f tilePakistan Government the followin'g: . . :'~Ôn21Augustour Ministry'ofStates adaressed '~Jetter to the. High Commissioner. of Pakistan i~Delhi, asking for· an indication of policy in r~pect of accession of Junaga<th, State.The High :Conimissioner was subsequently. rerL,t'df..d.on 16 September..."__and on the..date ofth;',ifé'1.<: l'ain, 11 September, no reply had been·teceiveJ, - Î.-· ~ssioner for .Pakistan,.in Delhi, for informa.tion -In :regard· 1'<.> . the accessionoi' Jll1nagadh State; and'Do reply'had been received from-biin. ,.The' policyof the Govern~entOf India: with regard to .all cases of disputed acêession in regard '~o Indian.Statesis that in sucbcases theqtiestion IS tobefuially determined. byascertaining -the définitivement verdict of the people. Members'of the Secqrlty Couneil will no doubt recollect that· in the case of Kashmir, white the Go"Vernment of India . nement agreed toaccepttheaccession ofthat State in theCacheD;).ire peculiar circumstances of the case, they had made lières, lt qui~e clear'that the accession would be subject les' conditions Jn ratificationby popular· vote as 'soon as cir-. sérait Now anyone reading this statement woùld think tha~. it was· Pakistan that had aU along been suppo~g a plebiscite, and that the Gov~mment of India were very unwilling to agree. However, thefactis.that, apart from thissolitary stateptent, thé Pakistan Government had not expressed any wiUingness to ascertain the wishes of ~he people of .Junagadl1 ,in regard to accession until, on 18 Feb~ary, that is to say the Wednesdaybefore last, towards the end ofhis spe&Ch before the Security Council, the represelltative of Pakistan stated:" Whàt is desired in respect of Junagadh is' that the Government of Indla should of their ownaccotd, or through some request or recolIl- mendation .' or agency of the Security Council, Withdraw theirforces from occupationofJunagadh ~d restore 'bath the Ruler of Junagadh and the Ruler of.Manavadarto. theit States, so that: normal,'admitristration will be,restored. And ...,....thisîs,therelevant·part-.-" if then iUs insistf:Q tb,atthe wishes orthe people of Junagadhshould ~·ascertau,.ed by, means .()f ...a plebiscite. in the matter of/acccssion,à freeand unfettered pIe- .. biscite' shoul4be held:' . Itseemsodd,tome, at any rate, that in' the case of Kashmir" when India' asks that normal adniinistrationshouldberestored, Pakistan should sa~" .. Oh no, .letussettle .thisquestion of the' plébiscite fust "; b\Jt, in the case of Junag~dh, ultérieure Junagadh ma.ns. montrent ont le 8 . 8.436 Il parties je déta.ils. montrent inscrits, pour tandis faveu!' sentant ment, d'autre, toutes les élections de je raisonnablement se plaindre ait nement Pakistan tous les détails d blement Le vue Gouvernement déclarer, dans cite, Mais, connaissant de plébiscite devait.donner des résultats.différents. du loin nement ~lectoral roUs, 8,436 v~ted for accession to India, and 11 for accession toPakistan. The saine story is repeated-I do not want to weary the Security Council with these .details -m aU other States andparts of States where the plébiscite has been held. The to~ results of thé plebiscite held show that oùt of a total electorate of2~6,898 persons. who voted for accession to Indianumberoo 22?,184, whereli.s only 130 voted for accession to Pakistan. 1 suppose the represen- ~tive of Pakistan will say, .. Of course; that was ,tobe expected. What eIse can you expect when the Govemment of India and aU its forces are Ï!1. control, andelections are held atter al! the ,Mùslim inhabitants of thèse States have b~n tërrorized'1 ". . . . In regard to the postponement ofthe plebiscite, there.is one thing 1 would like to submit. Pakistan .could not reasonab!y complam. about the holding oCtbis plebiscite because India had repeated,ly invited Pakistan to a conference at which its •details could be settled by agreement, and Pakistan had consistentlyevaded this issue. The plebi~cite ~as therefore held mainly wit~aview to stabilizing Jil!ltt~rsin Junagadh. . ,If,. however, circumstances neceasitate such !lC()11l'se, tllle Government of Indiâ. .has authorized m~to say that itwill have no objection whatsoever t9holding a freShplebiscite in each one of these S~tes,.under syitable.auspices, though"1 .should .,~ yery much surprisoo indeed, knowing the com- position (lf the population, if such a plebiscitè wereto yield very different-results. : In. regard to Junagadh, therefore, the position Ofthe GovernmeJ;ltof India is that, far from unlawfully, occupying this State, itendeavoured· ,frOnt thebeginning to settle the q~estion ofacces.. Before 1 conclude this statement, 1 should like to advert to one very· important point. In aU these matters relating to the accession of Indian States, the Government of India has throughout followed a very consistent policy, which has been eriunciated bath here and outside on a number of occasions. 1 shall, however,restate this policy. The Government of India, while accepting the position that with the cessation of paramountcy Indian States are free to accede to either Domi- nion, bas a1ways insisted t'hat this option showd he exercised by aState with due regard to its geographic position in relation to either Domi- nion; and, what is, more important still, with due regard to the wishes of the majority of the people of the State. It has followed the same prlnciple bath in respect to Kashmir and in respect toJunagadh' and the other smaU States whose accession is in dispute. In the case of Kashmir, it w~s only when the raiders invaded Kashmir territory and started wholesale I()Dting and murder, and Pakistan refused to fulfil its obligations undet: the stand- still a.greement and took no, ~~eps to prevent the incursion of the raiders into Kashmir, and the' Maharaja appI'oac}1e4 tJte Government of India for, assistance, that the Government of India accepted Kashmir's accession. Even so, it would not haveaccepted the accession had it not been satisfied that: in the fust place, it had the support of.the most numerous political party in the State;, and, ~ndly, that it would,.as soon, as peaceful conditions were restored. be submitted for Iati~ ficatiô~ by popular v"te. ' Sjmilarly ,in the esse of Junagadh, the Govern- ment of India did noi intervene in the administra':: ti{'Jl· of the ,. State unill it '. was officia11y requested ta •do .so by the Dewf11l,' and as soon as it Wa8 possi1?le.for the Government to do so, it. arranged for ,a'plebiscit~ for ascertaining the yiishes of the people in. 'r~gard to the .question Gf accession. ~e this policy is elltirely in accord ~th the democratic princlpleson the basis of which the Indùm.. National Co,ngressand the present Govern- ment>of ~dia .have always ta'ken their stand, the Pakistan (,Tovernment-and if 1 may sayso. the MuslittLLeague Party itselÎ--have in the past a1ways appeared to takethe View· tbat matters affecting the States, including the question of acceSsion, were within· the sole. competence of the R.u1ers of the Statesconcerned. Very lately, tiowever,' the Pakistan Govèmment'sattitudeon thîS. question fuis. varièii according.to ·poJitical exigencies;Thele· is no ·other explanation as to why~ in the case of'Kashmir, they dispute< the . validity of,.the accession 'brought about '.,at .- the instance of the Maharaja, whereasinthe case of Junagadh, they, req*stthe, Security· Council·..to Sir Mohammed ZAFRULL\H KHAN (pakistan): 1 do not think it is necessary for me to make a long ~peech in reply to the submission which the representative ofIndia has justmade to the Sezurity Council. It is, nevertheless, necessàry to correct éertab of the facts stated by him since, in the àbsençe of suchcorrection, there would be a danger of the situ;ition being misunderstood. 1wish first to dispose of one or two pleliminary matters. Mr. Vellodi seemed to imply that he had ~n placed at a disadvantage by my raising'tbis quèstion of the plebiscite in Junagadh having l)een held in spite.of the request made by us and conveyed by the leader of the Indian delegatiQn t'o bis Govemment. In fact, 1 think that if Mr. Vel- lodi will refresh bis memory by referring to my submission to the Seçurlty Council on 18 February [250th meeting], he will find that 1 actually raised IDe matter theri. It is the fac::t that the plebiscite has been held sinee then that has made it necessary for'me to draw attention to the mattèr again. \ . l did not state or imply that any dir~tion in this connexion had been given by. the President -much less by the Security Counci1. AIl 1 said was that the request was conveyed,through the President. Mr. Vellodi said that the plebiscite,had been anno~ced as carly as January and that, therefore, in sorné way, the request had come tQO late. The leader of the Indian delegationand bis eolleague, Mr. Setalvad, were eqUally aware at the date of our request that the announcement with regard to the plebiscite had aIready' been made, but they felt that there would be no'diffi- culty in' the Government of'India accediiig to tbis very reasonable request.· As 1 have stated, ,Mr. Setalvad added that as the matter was in a sense sub judice before the Security CouncU. the plebiscite ought not to be held. When 1 said tuat the holding of the plebiscite under iliose circum- StanCès indicateda lack of. courtesy towards the Security 'Couticil~ and even towards., th~ 'other party, 1 was referrmg to the faet that this matter had been before the Security Counci1 for a long lime and was still being dealt with by the Security Counci1. Tnematter was an unsolved dispute between India and Pakistan. It was specifically raised :in our letter to the Prinle Minister of India dated 30 Decembcr in reply to bis letter relating toKashmir. It was raised here in our documents filed on 15 January [document 8/646] 'and was admitted by the otherside to be,;an urgent matter, consideration of which had' been postponed because Kashmir was aIready' being dealt with. . ~tqu'il différend pas encore résolu. La question avait'été spécifique- ment 'soulevée 30 l'Inde Cachemire. documents sécurité pàrtie urgente que l'on s'occupait déjà de l'affaire du Cachemire . . , There is a proverb fi Urdu which says that an è1ephant has two sets of teeth, one. for show and Qne for eating-an~it so happens that the symbol which indepen.dent India has. adopted is an ele- phant. : Coming to the case of Manavadar. 1 note that Mr. Vellodi again.appears to have fallen into a v.~ serious error, for 1 should hate even ta imply, Ç'luch less to state, that he has deliberately trie4 t.o· mislead the· Security Couneil on the facts. But the facts are. not as stated by h1m in a very iinportant respect. He has drawn apicture of the State of Junagadh having been left derelict by the ilight of the NClWab and the Prime Minister to Karachi, sa·'that the admitûstration therefore çame .to a standstill;and he said that led t() the économie blockade'and other matters which 1 had 1?rought tl) the notice of the Security Council. But the true state of affairs is exactly the reverse. The blocka4e started about the middle of Sep- tember. The letter of the Prime Minister of Juna- gadh, dated 16 Sèptember, addressed to the Prime Minister or Pakistan, from which 1 read last week,'cleârly draws. attention to the blockade as the result of which supplies intended for' Juna- gadh were stopped, and asks for. mili1tary aid in tJtat .respect. Mr. Vellodi went on to state that the Pmne Minister, .from Karacbj, went on doing certain tbings,· ·and .eventually, from. Karachi, in,ited' the Regional Commissioner of the. Government of India to lielp maintain .order inside Junagadh. That .is utterly incorrect. Mr. Vellodi must be misinformed on. that 'matter. Th~ Prime Minister remained in J!-lnagadh its.elf unill 8 November. The Govemmertt of India's forces. marched in Qn 9 November; there was no interval. As a matter of f~ what happêned was that ftom the middle of September onwarœ the Govermnent of India's investmentof·Jurtaglidh and its eèono- micblockade of Jurtagadh on the landward side made administration inside ]unâgadh progres- sivelydifficultand~ laterin tbis period, impossible. .ù~refore, what 1 want to correct is the impres- siOll sought to be created that the administration was abandoned try the Nawaband ,the Prime Minister, that this led to chaos, and tbat it was that chaos which the armed forces of the Govern- me!1t of India marched in to remedy. It is the other way about. Even the Ruler himself was in Junagadh till nearly the end of Ocwber. He left only when condition.s appeared to be impossible, and the Prime Mfuister did not leave till after he had rushed.that communication to the Regional Commissioner from Junagadh. It was not ad- dressed from Karachi. As a matter of fact, the Government ·of Pakistan did not become aware of that communicationtill 10 November. On 8 Novembef the Prime Minister flew to Karachi, ànd he called at the Foreign Office for the first time on 10 November. Since the middIe of Sep- ~ember he had not been out of Junagadh for one day or one hou\". ~ons with regard ~o the wherea.bouts of 'the Chief sur nf· Manavadar, and he said that, if it 'was any et satisfaction to me, ne. was pleased to ~9rm me il that the Ruler of Manavadar was .. the' guest-I du suppose he mermt honoured and welcomed-of entendâit the Jam of Nàwanagat in à neighbouring Hindu de SUite. The Jarn 'of Nawanagar is the Ruler who Jam has thrO\1ghout taKen the lead against Junagadh, long Mangrol and Manavadar in these matters of 'campagne accession, and if the Chief of Manavadar is the Manavadar, .et, guest of the Jarn of. Nawanagar" at Nawanagar, l'.hôte tlien he is a guestin the same way as many other de people whounfortunately sometimes find them- sonnes selves guests ofcertàingovernments under certain la conditions. That.shows the kind of treatment that circonstances. the Govemment of -India has been meting out dont to .these unfortunate Rulers. The Sheikh of heureux Mangrol is apparently similarly a gu~st of a ment, Hindü Ruler of a neighbouring Hindu State. souverain , Mr. Vellodi has. also said that Inma had,from the very beginning, taken the p'psition that these le ~tters could be settled by holding a free plebis- de c!te. On the other hand, he has said that the libre. attitude of the Pakistan Government and ·of the cerne Muslim League Party has been that in the matter Gouvernement ofaccession the decision must rest with the Ruler. musulmane; 'MI. Vello.J has triedto 'stress democrati~ principles. Democ~acy and democratic principles arçrather difficu1tto define today., But let us con- Pue ollfselves to this question of the plebiscite. Ile has made a qQmplaip.ttha~.up to 18 February, ~he~e was no resPQnse fromth~ Pakistan Govem- ment.over this·matter. As,a matter of fact, in his telegram of 5 Qctober, thé Prime Minister .of Paldstallsaid the follO'wing: "We shaUbe able further. to. discusscon<Utions and clrcumstances. in which,. ple'biscitesshouJ,d he' itaken by imyState or. $ta~~sat ,ournext meeting." Wè<Ud noftum th~ principle.down when that prinCiple wasput forward,namèly:that" in the cas~ of a .disputed :accession, the. dispute should be .resQlvedby ascertl;\Îl1Î11gthe' wishes of. the peopl~cqnceme4.,. , : The .dispute, over that ma.tter centered 'around this principle: The Dominion of India demanded that this prin(.iple of plebiscite should.be applied to lunagadh, butwerellotwilling to apply it to other States. That matter continued to be clis- cussed, and was .still under discussion Îh that telegram of 23 Octoberwhich,Mr. Vellodi has quoted..So' that .when this so~caUed democratic principlewas put forward as·a matter of principle, it. was .not only' not turned' down by Pakistan, b;ut Pakistan was quite willing to discuss the con- (litions and the circumstancesunder which these plebis~t~ ~hould beheld so that theJ'should be r.r~,pleblscltes. ' , . Now, what was the democratic principle ad- vocated by the GovernmentofIndia.inrespect of these plebiscites'l MT. Vellodi said that at the Ther~ is no question of a joint supervision by Pakistan and India, both of which would be concemed in the resutt of the plebiscite. 'The plebiscite is to be held under the joint super- vision of thé Dominion of India and of Junagadh. That is what we disputed, and we said that it was not democratic. We did not dispute the principle of the plebiscite. Then, Mr. Vellodi said that on 18 February, when 1 cOllcluded my submission to the Security Council, 1 said that the Rulers and the normal administration should be restored to these States; andthat,if a plebiscite had to be taken, then 'a free .plebiscite should be taken. And he. said, Il WeIl, they demand one thing in respect of Kashmir, and they demand quite another thing in r~spect of Junagadh:' With all due respect to MI. Vellodi, that is not so. We do not demand one thing in respect of Kashmir and another thing in respect of Junagadh. That is not the' meaning w'hich can be read into my submission of 18 February. So far as the restoration of Rulers is concerned, that· would only put the position parallel to Kashniir, where the Ruler is aJready there. He has not been excluded. No question of the resto- ration of the Ruler of Kashmir arises. That is the fust point. .In the second place, so far as normal administra- tion is concerned, we did not say, we do not now say, and we do not wish to imply, that the admi- nistration should be one-sided. If the other side says that· the administration should be normal, but that itshould be neutrd in the sense that nobody should be at the head ofthe administr~tion or concerned with it who is committed to one side or ,the other, we at once and immediately and without reservation agree that that should be so. lt is only under •those circumstances thata plebisciteshould be held. Whatever we are urging withrespect to Kashmir, wenot only are prepared to .accept, but,.·with insistence and with emphasis, we urge in respect of Junagadh. True, Mr. Vellodi has stated that he thinks the r~sult \Vill ..lot be different. The figures of the ple- bIscite may be different ifa plebiscite is taken under those conditions, but the result willnot be diffe- rent, hesays, knowing the character of the popu- lation. That may be so. That very probably is so. We do not insist upon these conditions because we.areconvinced that the result in Junagadh would.be .different. We insist that one must not pretend to do one thing and do another; that, The 'representative·of India then wènt·on to say that with·regard to plebiscites 1·hadsaid, .. Do thesethings and we will see about the plebiscite laœr on." l bave nôwhere,said that; 1 have no- whereimpliedthat..l do not· say that we will see about,the plebiscite in Junagadh tater on. Let the conditions, tlie circumstances, ilie authority under whièll the plebisCit~,has tobeheld,be settledand agreeduponnow, here,and -let theui then 00 applied in practi~ as quickly, as eârly, as they cau possibly be applied. 1 ho~ that will satisfy the representa.tive of India. We ask for no more in Kasbmir; we- ask for no more or no less with regard to·Junagadh•. With re&"-trd tà Kashmir and Junagadh, Mr. VeUodi instituted a comparison. ·He said: "We went .into Junagadhat the invitation of the Prime Minister,when the.administrationhad coine to-a stantlstill, in order· to rescue it ·from chaos:' Butthewhole pointis thatthe administra- tion had been brought to astandstill, the chaos hadbeenbrought .abOut by the action of the Govemment ··of Indiain respeetof.aterritory whichwasup till theninaccession withPakistan, anaccemon·. that.hadtaken placenormally \vitho~tany kind of disturbance or attemptsat genocide,or pressure 'or coercion. ofany kind whatsoever. That 'was the whole point 'of my sübmiSsion \vith regard toJunagadb., .' When these' conditions wer~ btought aboutby the action· of the Governntent of India, it is idle for ·-them to -plead that therhave-not brought about certain'conditions',and that .theyàave mat:ched into tlieterritory morder to rem.edy c:erta.in .conditionsand that, therefore, their marchinginto theMea wasjustified. With regard to Kashmir they said: "Wedidnot g~ inuntil we, were J'çqueste~1:)y the.:Maharaja andby the lar_. pp1i~.party in. Kashmir, ami not uiltil thl':Mlillaraja!srequest. to .pa'kis~n to. -help'mm wi~l'egaJ;d""t9"tPis7infiltl!~tio..,of triOOsmen had bAAn-tuJ:Jled 4own/'- It,win.oo within, therecon~iionof the Securlt}' Couneilthat 1 detailedn01ess,thanseveD. attempts by thePalâStan: GOVernmenltto settle.these ma~ers amfcably with.the 'Maha.raja and. bis Govermnent, and'thatatlèàstfiveofthese attempts hadbeen made, long bèforé any incursioJ1 of.tribes- mên.intoKashmir taokplace .• at -aU.· But ,neither the MaharajanorbisPritne Ministerwould come to a conference. When wesent a representative of the Foreign Officeupto Iushmir, the Prime Minister refused to .discuss -the matter,with .bim.. Tiult is an-1 wish to sày so far ~s theattempts of tlle,M:ah,araia to settle tl;1ematter.amicablywith pakistan,are concerned. '.Withl'eference tothe·largest political party in Kashmir, they ,say that theyhave goneinto Kashnili: at .theinvitationof the Maharaja àn4 the largest -political'partyin Kasbmir; .Whatis 'It' Will he said that the Kashmir National Conference boycotted the last elections. They did. But'having 'boycottOO the, elections, what is there which can: forin .the basis of the claim that they are the largest political party in Kashmir? .There is no basis whatsoever.The request, ifit did come from Sheikh Abdullah at that tiI'ne, came from a single individual, who isno doubt. president of Il political pârty and no doubt posses:iles a certain amount of influence by virtue of hiS being president of thatparty; it is absolutely inaccurate to stàte t'hat the invitation came from the largest political party in Kashmir. It came from one'mdi- vidual, who has been here, and who has had al1"op- portunityofprescntingbis owncase[241st meëting]. The question with regard to Junagadh boils itself down to tOO: Whèn the accession of Juna.. gadh took place, the' Government of IIldîa found ît convenient ta put forward the prlaciple' tbat, whete the accession is in dispute,it should be settled by means. of a plebiscite. Iri. spite of the fact ,that tbis had not been the principle laid dOWn()r evenimplied in the Indian Independence Act~.in spite of the fact that the accession of a very large. number of. States-inc1uding, .for bstance, thatof.Kapurthala, where the Ruler \Vas a non-Muslim and the majority o~ bis subjects were Muslims-was .accepted by thë. Dominion of India without any reference to the Muslîm people or to.the total population'of the States"-in spité of al! these fa,cts, when the question of Junagadh arose, the Govemment·of India, for tbe first time,' raised the question of a plebiscite. We didnot tUm this down. AIl that we said was thatstlch a principle should be applied not only toJunagadhbut whêre'Verthere was a similar question to be Sflttled, and- to that we still adhere. Therefore, the c~ses,ri.ot in their details but in' their br~ad' outlliiesr .are' parallel. r' , . What we request is that both in Kasbmir and mJunagadh the armed forces of the Government 'of lo.dia should he withdiawn. Pakistan has no iUmed forces in either of these States. If Pakistan had armed force'.i ID eitherof these States it would equally ,lgree to withdra,w them; . In addition, as ftghting is going on in Kashmir., It,must bestopped. The S~urity Council hasbeen discussing the cÎJ:cumstances and. conditi~ltis, and theremedies and devices to put an end to the fighting. Thereafter, a normal admitûstration should be restored in eac!', State; but the head of the administration should~ be an impartial ,a!1dneutral person, and no': committed toeither slde. A free plebiscite shoù1d then be held in order to ascertain the wishes of the people in the matter of accession to Pakistan or to the In the fust place, the comparison is misplaced and misapprehended. There may he perfect peace inside the State and yet conditions with reference to that State may create a threat to the mainte- nance of international peace. What kind of peace there is inside Junagadh we ha.ve no direct means of knowing. However, we have received numerollîs appeals, prctests and accoUIits which show the misery of the Muslim population in Junagadh. But that is not the main question at the moment. The main question is th.at the occupation of Junagadh State by the armoo forcP...s ofthe Govern- ment ofIndia creates a !Iltuation between Pakistan and India which Is a threat to the maintenance of inremational peace. As early as 16 September, the Dewan of Junagadh-the Prime Minister- made an appeal to the Pakistan Government, saying: "1 eamestly appeal to the Pakistan Govemment for help. First, they should 10dge a strong protest with the Indian Goveminent to prevent any invasion of any areas included in Junagadh. The disputed rights, if any, may be decided by the two Dominions constitutionaIly on their merits. 1 submit that Pakistan cannot aIlow the Indian Union to take the law into its own hands. In that case, the consequences would be grave not merely to the Muslims in Kathiawar b~t in other parts.of the subcontinent. "Secondly, our morale has to be raised by actual armed assistance. It is necessary "-it says later on-" that a battalion equipped with modem arms shou\d be s~nt by sea to Veraval,"-that is the principal port of Junagadh-" and arrange- ments should also be made to keep aIl seacommu- nications steady and free from any interference." Here was a direct appeal to the Dôminion with which Junagadh wasin accession, the Dominion responsible for the defence of Junagadh, to come to the aid of Junagadh by sending armed forces. Pakistanexercised restraint and confined itself to appeals to the good sense of t,he Dominion of India, part of which l read out. That situation went from bad to worse until it culminated in the· Dominion of India's armed forces actually occupying Junagadh, which was an act of .aggression against Pakistan. That a direct war is not taking place today between Pakistan and the Dominion of India is due to the restraint of Pakistan in this matter. That consti- tutes a. threat to the maintenance of international peace. 'TIlat thteat has to·be resolved, and an appeal has been made to the Security Council to -reso1ve it. The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m. TWO HUNDRED AND FlFTY- . . EIGHTH MEETING Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 27 February 1948, at 3 p.rn. President: General McNAUGHTON (Canada). Present: The representatives of the following 'Counmes: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, ·Colombia, France, Syrla, Ukrainian Soviet Social- ist R~public, Union of Soviet Soeialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. tiques, 48~ 48. Yrovision21 agenda (document S/Agenda 258) 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. The Palestine question: (a) Pirst monthly progress report to the Security Councilof the United Nations 2. Pal~""'ine Commission (document S/663). (b) First special report to the Soourity Council: The Problem of Security in Palestine; submitted by the United Nations Palestine Commission (document ..8/676). ,:19. Adoption of the agenda 50. 50. Continuation of the discussion of the Palestine question .

When the Secïinty Couneil deferred the discussion of the Palestine question nous séçurité [255 rapport Nations sécurité rapport problème S/676]. lution, ~n .25 February [255th meeting] it was engaged ID the consideration of the mst monthly progress report to the Security Council [document S/663] and the fust special report to the Security Council on the problem of security in Palestine [document 8/676] of the United Nations Palestine Commission. • h Two dr&ft resolutjons,have been submitted to t e Security Council: one by; the representative