S/PV.258 Security Council

When the Secïinty Couneil deferred the discussion of the Palestine question nous séçurité [255 rapport Nations sécurité rapport problème S/676]. lution, ~n .25 February [255th meeting] it was engaged ID the consideration of the mst monthly progress report to the Security Council [document S/663] and the fust special report to the Security Council on the problem of security in Palestine [document 8/676] of the United Nations Palestine Commission. • h Two dr&ft resolutjons,have been submitted to t e Security Council: one by; the representative The General Assembly adoptcd a compromise solution. It did so after ellitaustive deliberation which absorbed two of its sessions and the wo:r1r. of a special eleven-Powercommittee-altogether a process of eight months' continuous discussion. The compromise, as is w~ll known, was to !!let up two independent· States in Palestine-one Iewish, cne Arab; to place Jerusalemunder. international rule; and to lIlaintain'the over-aI1 unity of Palestineby linking together the three units in an economic union. . This solution entailed MOSt far-reaching sacrifi,ces for the Jews. Twenty-five years ago, the closing of Transjordan to. Jewish se~tlement had reduced the area of the Jewish National Home to about one-quarter of its original size. The Jews werenow expected tl) part with nearly one-half of the remainder. Moreover, Transjordan having in the meantime become an Arab Kingdom, Jewishconsent was now sought for the establishment of a second independent Arab State in .the country which the Jewish people had for thousands of years regarded as its national patriw.ony and historie heritage. The separation of Jérusalem from the Jewish State was a particularly painful wrench. . Yet.the Jewish Agericy, with the support of the overwheImirlg majority of Palestinian Jews, decided, however reluctantly, to accept the compromise. It bowed to the imposed verdict of the international tribunal. It was able to do so because, though only in one"eighth of the area promised in the Balfour Declaration, the new solution satisfied the Jewish c1aim to statehood and a place in the family of nations; also because even that limitedarea contained possibilities of development wbich opened the way for large-sèale settlement; and because, though sovereignty was to be curtailed by the economic union, the freedom of What has happened in the course of the three subsequent months and what is happening today is a determined attempt, in open defiance of international authority, to deny to the Jewish people even that minimum and to reduce them to a state of political subjection, if not actually te confront them with the menace of physica1 annihilation. The Arab Governments, Members of the United Nations, are endeavouring to defeat the General Assembly's resolution by force of arms..The Mandatory Power is thwarting the United Nations plan by a policy of non-co-operation and is tolerating the active obstl'Uction of its implementati\\n. The Security Council is faced with an open attempt to alter by force the settlement decreed by the General Assembly, which the General Assembly requested the Securlty Council to determine " as a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or act of aggression." The attempt is directly sponsored by the Govcrnments of Arab States, Members of the United Nations. This assertion hardly stands in need oÎ evidential pioof or investigation. It rests on the free admission of the parties concemed. Nor is any research or intelligence work necessary to bring that admission to light. It is shouted from every public platform in the various Arab capitals and blared through all the trumpets of their official propagânda machine. The endeavour of the Arab Govemments is not limited to the defeat of the United Nations plan; they aim at imposing their own solution, the one which the General Assembly has rejected; and they are trying to achieve both ends·-the negative and the affirmative-by methods of aggression and violence which are the very negation of the letter and of the spirit of the Charter. The threats of force to resist the partition plan, which were voiced by practically every Arab re1>l\1Sentative te the General Assembly, are still vivid in memory. The Governments concerned are now making every effort to live up to the words oftheir spokesmen. Even before the session of the General Assembly in September 1947, soon after the recommendations of the Uhited Nations Special Committee on Palestine were . publishedl, the six. Arab .Governments, Members of the United Nations, met inSofar, Lebanon, and adopted a resolution expressing their deterlIlÎil.ation "to resist the implementation of these recommendations" and undertaking to assist the Arabs of Palestine in "a relentless war" against them, " supplying them with men, funds and annnunition." Soon after tùe General Assembly's session, the Prime Ministers of the Arab -States held a consultation in Cairo, as a result of which an official AISee Official RE!cords ofthe second session ofthe General . ssembly, Supplement No. n. . l'Assemblée ~urmight and money." On' IS January 1948, the Press officer of the Arab League-comprising seven Arab:Govemments of which six arc Mem~ bers of the United Nations-disclosed tha~ the League" hàd recommended that the Arab nations occupy a11 Palestine with their regular a..'1D.Ïes when British troops leave Palestine." The stage of action had, indeed, arrived. Tirne win not permit a full enumeration of all the activities which reœived publicity. Members" of the Security Couneil might refer .to the Jewish Àgency's memoranduril .on Arab aggression,of which they will receive. co);.ies.. Here only some pf the most salient factswill be mentioned. The Arab Govemments have jointlyproceeded to the formation ofwhat is called an cr Arab Army of 'Liberation JI. They have appointed itshigh colÎmland.In most Arab coun.tries recroiting offices foi"volunteers have been opened with official sanction of the Governments. In Syri~ recruitment and training are underthe direct charge of.the Ministry of Defence, which issues official notices to· regulate it. The Ministry bas announced, inter.alio; its acceptance ofthe resignation .of army. officer&. volunteering for service in Palestine to fight agaïnst' partition. Similiir "'resignations" are réported from Egypt and lraq, where the' oflicers were placed·în charge, of training volunteers~ When thé fust incursion of an al'med force from Syria via Lebanon into Palestine 9Cc~ed on9 January,.the Press reported that the Ministers of Defence of bothcountries personally l~d the convoy, and that the Syrian Defence Ministe.r~s car headed the column,. the car flying theSynan flag.Subsequ~tly,on 14 January, the :J..eb~ese Defence Minister.·gave to the Chamber 9f Depu~es.in Beirut. an eye-\VÏtne~ .accountof the attackwhich the force had made on Jewish YIDages, and in which, incidentally, it suffered a crushing defeat•. He added that "aIl activities, such ~s the co1le9tion of funds, registration and t~aining()fvoluntlèers;assembly of arms~et cetera, ~re beingsupervisèdby. himself' and.the Syrian Defenee·Minister in accordance with the resolu- ,tions orthe PrimeMinistets' Confer~ceinCaïro." Sincethatdate severalsuchcolumnsllavecrossed the frontIers into Palestine, as reported by the Mandatory Power.to theeommission,-:.allproviQed with motor transport· and. all properlyequipped The representative of Egypt must be complimented on the extreme moderation and restraint of bis expressions [255th meeting] when he attempts to describe these aggressive acts, to whichbis Govemment is a party, as being merely a matter of "non-compliance" with a recommendation ofthe General Assembly.,Open and active defiance are the words indièated. Moderation is, indeed;' a relative notion. To the Egyptian representative, the Arab solution for the Palestine problem, which expects the Jews of Palestine to put up Withthe fate ofa crystallizedor dwindIing minority and to console themselves with a paperguarantee ofreligious toleration, is the very a.cme ofmoderation. Such imperviousness to arguments from the other side and such refusa! to understand the essence of the national movement of another peoplemake thec.ontinuation of political discussion futile. It is high tivne for the tepresentativè of the Arab Govemments to realize that the ~eWish people in· Pal~stine will' never submit to the status 'Of a minority on sufferanée, which is the lot of the oriental Jewish communities; that the urge for independence will never~e eradicated ftl)ID Jewish hearts; tOOt the yery logic by which OIJe Arab country after anothel'" in the Middle East has achieved its national sovereignty makes theJewish claim to statehood in Palestine indis:' putableand its realization irresistible; that as long as Arab States continue to reslst by force the attainment of the Jewish naidonal goal, there can be no peace. or stability in the Middle East; and that the long-term interests of aU concerned can 'be' served oilly by mutual adjustment basedon equallty of status rather than by attempts at Suppression aud obliteration. ' " ,. " The Jews repudiate, as fantastic and grotesque, the allegation which the Syrian representative saw fit to ~epeat here [254th meeting] that for the Jews, Palestine is a mere springbo'ard for imperialistic expansion into the whole areà of the Middle East. The.assertion is fantastic rinderany circumstances, for 1t is the very essence ofZionism to concentrate .on Palestine and not to create a new dispersal. The assertion is grotesqueat a timè when all the ~ountries around PàlestÏ!:.eare poised to swoop d0wn. on it tocrush the budding Jewi::;h State out of eXistence. . The Syrian representative's speech was un.. doubtcd1y animated by the higbest ideals ofinter.. religious peace. The speech will, probably, be widely read in the Arab countries, but there will be no footnote to inform theuninitiated that Jerusalem and Bethlehem are in the intemational zone; that Hebron-incidentally, holy primarily tcthe Jews-and Nazareth.are in the Arab State; and tbat tbroughout the area of the Jewish State tbere is hardly a single Moslem or Christian sbrine in the true sense ofthe.term. As to ordinary chmches and mosqu~, the representative of Syria gave. the. impression that there were. many cases of their desecration by Jews. Actually, not a single suchcase is on record anywhere in the world. This .is to be compared with the riots in.Aleppo in Decembei' 1947, when a11 the twelve Jewish synagogues of the city were sacked' and bumed. practicallY .tothe . ground, Û1valuable ancientscrolls being consumed in thèfirè; .or witlitbe riotsin Cairo in Noveniber 1946, where synagogues and.churches alike were the target of mob violence. While the Syrian representative was makîng bis speech, the newspapers of the day carried a picture showing Arab rifiemen at the Wailing Wa14 the greatest sanctUary of the Jewish people, to whichthe accèss of Jewish worsbippersis now barred. Such incidents serve'as a rlleasme of the degeneration of the proverbial Ar&b chivaIry. Other manifestations of it are~ on one plane, the forcible extortion of contributions from the Jews of Egypt, l ~banori. and Iraq in support of the anti..partition campàign-that is to say, in support ofthe killi~goftheir kith and kin in Palestine and the liquidation of the national hope of their people wbich they so fervently share-and, on another plane, the. horrible mutilation of the bodies of the Jewish fallen in Palestine and the parading through Arab towns of the cut..off heads of Jewish victims stuckon spikes. The Arabspokesmen have invested much effort in the contentio1\ that the resolution ofthe General Assembly is a mere recommendation. 1hope that, though not privileged10 represent a Member State, 1 MaY be permitted to malee a few comments on tbis aspect of· the problem which specifically C01lcèms, perbaps, the United Kingdom.When the'United Kingdom proposed'and other Powers agreed that the problem of Palestine should be referred to the General Assembly, they were fully aware of the powers of thisbody.They were also fully aware(,>f the fact that Palestine·had for twenty..five· years beenan .intemational trust. In the face of the announced decision of the Mandatory Power to termiJ:1ate the Mandate, the This recommendation of the General Assembly, which was addressed in the fust place to the Melldatory Power, was acceptedbythe Mandatory power as a decision of that body. Speaking in the Rouse of Commons on 11 December 1947, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies; Mr. Creech Jones, said: "The decision of the Ass.embly is regarded by His Majesty's Government as the decision of a court of international opinion. This isnot a grudging aèCeptance... we wish our authority transferred to our successors iIi an orderly manner. We can onIy express our hope... that the greatest respect will he shown this decision of the international authority." . On 12 December, the Secretary of State for Foreign AfIairs, Mr. Bevin, declared': " 1am not going and His Majesty's Government are not going to oppose the United Nations decision... There ~s the United Nations decision . Ifmy colleagues or 1 cau rendèr any assistance . we shall doit."" It may be recalled that'when the United Kingdom Government fust referred the question of Palestine to tbe United Nations, it made no stipulation as to whether and under what tenus it would.comply with therecommendation. It seemed reasonable to assume at the ,time that, whatever *e verdict, the United Kingdom would accept it and, as a loyal Member of ·the United Nations, co:'o~rate·in. its exe.cution. Later, when con.ditions were indeed pu,tÎorward,every effort w~s made to meet them by those responsible for the drafting of the partition plancin the session Qf the Genera~ Assembly. Yet the attitude of the United Kingdom Gowmment has developed and hardened into one of non-co-operation bordering on obstruction. The Unit~(,i. Kingdom Government declared that it wouM,take·no part in the·implementation ofthe plan. Actually, the plan was not based on its enforcement .by the Mandatory Power.. On the other hand, it insisted that, as long as the Mandate lasts, it cali suffer no rival authority .in Palestine, but must alone be responsible for the maintenance of law and order. It has not discharged that ocesponsibility. . 1ive~ and Jewish property. Its main target was the simplement policy of the United Nations. To defend Jews objectif againstArab attack meant, by implication, to Unies, defend the policy of the United Nations against Arabes those trying to subvert it. Frôm this implication, politique fume. Mandatory Administration found itself inessayaient blted. It therefore could not fully maintain law l'Administration !Jndorder.To say the least, its will was paralysed, 1 gênée ItS springs of action were braked. At, the very la , Intrying to esc.ape the dilemma, the Administration evolved a theory of its· own neutrality in a confliet between the Jews and the Arabs, and in ju~tificationof the.theory it proceeded to conjure up a spurious ea,uality of guilt as between the attackersand the attacked-between those upholding and those defying the authority of the United Nations. " The Jewish story that the Arabs are the attackers and the Jews the attackedis not tenable", said -Sir Alexander CaQogan in bis statement to the·Commission [documènt Sf663, sub-paragraph 7 (c)]. "Elements on each side ", he wellt on, " are... eng'dged in attacking or in making reprisais indistinguishable from attacks." But this artificial equality, in the further endeavour to rationalize the behaviour of the United Kingdom, becomes again an inequality, this time somewhat in favour of the hab and to the discredit of the Jew. For, so runs the official United Kingdom account, «The Arabs are <J,etermined to show iliat they will not submit tamely to the United Nations plan of partition; while the Jews are trying to ,consolidate the advantages gained at the General Assembly..." The fallacy of this analysis was, we beUeve, fully exposed in the Jewish Agency's Memorandum on the poliey of the Mandatory Power in Palestine since the adoption of the. 'General' Assembly's resolution" with particular' reference to· security. Copies ofthis memorandum, which was submitted tothe United NaH"ll3 Palestine Commission on 2J February 1948, were sent to the membersof the Sêcurity Council. Itwas the. Arabs who launched the attack. The Jews 'aeted in self-defence. They expected à strong reaction·from the Govemment, in. accordance with its undertaking. This was not forthcoming. On the contrary, Jewish self-defence actiVities·were hampered and disrupted. Searches for arms ~mong the Jews, arrests of Jewish defenders aImost under the, fire of Arab attack, prohibition of the useby Jèws of more effective defence equipment, were the· order of the day. ,It was only then that isolated acts.of indiscriminate bloodshed on the part ofdissident Jewish grolips occurred. Although even these came by way of. reaction to Arabviolence,. they were unreservedly condemned by the organized community, but were seized upon by the authorities injustification of tneirneutrality. On the other hand, the organized· Jewish defence organization, the·Haganah, found itself constrained, by official inaction, or by lack of official action, toassume the counter-offensiveby trying to attack and elimimtte every enemy stronghold. Its counterattacks have been·limitedin number. and.aimed at selected targets. No action of the Haganah was ever motivatedby the desire"·to· consolidate the .advantages .gained" from the partition plan, .though ,if therewere suchactiofi, itspurpose would have been tÇ) uphold the United Nations decision, andnot to resist it. The only act which - Were the facts to conform with Sir Alexander Cadogan's theory, there would have had to be cases of large crowds of ~nned Jews converging from aIl sides to wipe out an isolated Arab village, or crossing into Syria, there to disrupt traffic or attack peaceful settlements. Then,and ihen only, would the acts on both sides indeed become "indistinguishable". " There are questions arising from certain aspects of' the Mandatol'Y Power's policy and practice .towhich it is inder4 difficult to findan answer. Why are arms distributed·to units of the Arab municipal police and withheld from the Jewîsh? Is it not clear that those arms will be used against the Jews and the lJmted Nations plan? Why are units ofthe Arab Legion so stubbornly maintained in or near Jewish areas after thei( murderous attacks on Jewish traffic and passers-by? Must the Jews be continually subjected to this extreme provocation? Why does the United Kingdom Govemment continue to supply arms to the Arab States? Representatives of the United Kingdom Govemm.ent, it is true, have denied that these a..rmp. ;:Ie being used for fighting in Palestine. How can they be sure? Even if this were true, is it not clear that ,the' supply of arms to Arab, States, at this junctw:e, releases otherarms for' Palestine'1 1 should like to add: Why is the domination· of armed Arab bands over the entire area ofthe Holy City of Jerusalem tolerated '1 '~uthorities forty-eight hours in advance of an A unpending crossing. Yet notbing was done to autorités The Administration' now admits that certain parts of Palestine àre under the virtual control of the commanders ',of these. foreign forces. They are increasingly active Ïil offensive operations. How, then, can the general public resist the impression that preparations areopenly tolerated for the proclamation of Aral> rule, local or foreign, over large parts ofPalestine, in completedisregard oÎ the United Nations decision. and undi}r conditions of mortal peril to the Jew.i.sh population concemed? The situation is further aggravated by a process of rapid disintegration of authority which' is destructive of discipline. Latent hatreds are given free rein. There have heen clear cases ofinclividual Jews bein,,, shot in cold blood'by British troops and police, and worse excesses are helieved to he possible. The very fact that the state of feeling is such, creates,an untenable situation and contributes an 'additional reason why the United Kingdom Mandate must he tenninated as saon as' possible and should certainly not be prolonged beyond the fixed date of 15 May 1948. Despite aIl the bitter disappointment bom of thé WhitePaper of1939, the Jews had hoped that the winding up of tI,.e United Kingdom Mandate would produce a détente iD their relations with the MandatoryPower, and make possible a friendly' separation. These hopes have been tragically falsified by experience., As long as the Mandatory Govemmentinexorably pursues its presentpolitical course,even the slightest revival of mutual confidence seems unthinkable. On the crucial issue ofimmigration., policy has reDlllÎned unchanged,and even aclear recommendation of thé·General Assembly fot the freeing of a pon toallow a substài1tial. immigration has proved of no avail. Only 750' permits pet mohth' are available for immigration from Europe, the balance ofthe quota being devoted to the evacuationof Cyprus. In these circumstances~ is. it surprisin,g4hat groupsofsurvivors of the European mas$acrescontinue ta cross. the Mediterranean on their own'1 What is surprising is that the arrivaI of thesetransports" a11 intercepted, should be set forth by .the. spokesmen of the Uni~ed }Gngdom as a disturbing factor, in' the security situiltion, equlll in itsdamaging effect to thatof the incursion.of 'armed Arab forces· across .the land frontiers-=and this at atime when all recent refugee transports let.themselvesbe diverted or p-ans-shipped toCyprus, without the slightest (tisturbance or the least resistance. , The Mandatory Government has aIso so far opposed steps being taken in preparation of the Jewish state militia. The United Kingdom Secretary of Statefor the Colonies, in hisstatement to the Securlty ·Counci1 ,[253rd· meetingi. said that his Govemmentcouldnotagree U to the'formation of a militia undérthe control of the" Provisional GO'lemment,of,. the· futureJe~h :State"•..But notbing ofthe sort was requested attms stage by. This question of the militia and of the forces required for the implementation of the plan in general calls for a clear definition of the Jewish Agency's attitude. We have throughout maintaïned,fust, that the Jews of Palestine are ready to shoulder far-reacbing responsibilities in their defence and in'the defence of their temtory under the plan; and, secondly, that, in view of the fact that the authority of the United Nations may be tfueatened by aggression from outside, an international force is vitally necessary. This attitude remains unchanged. Ourexperience as a result of the operation of the Haganah in the last three 'monthshas been definitely encouraging. We have held our .ground throughout. Every single' attack has been beaten off. Wehave been assisted by the United Kingdom forces mily ':ln special occasions, more often than not after the,baille had already been decided in our favour by our oWn'action. In general, we have been hampered and impeded in our defence activities,by the limitations imposed by the Government. Granted adequate equipment and full freedom of action. we feel hopeful ofbeing able to build up an effective defence force for the Jewish State. To a.chieve that, we require assistance, certaiIlly in arms, possibly in. funds during the initial period; but not in men. On the other hand, there is the problem of the enforcement of the Charter and of the prevention ofaggression which is essentially a United Nations responsibility. We have nevcr set the formation of an international force as an indispensable condition for the·implementation ofthe partition plan. In view of the fact of outside aggression, an international force is clearly indicated. Yet. if the international force is not established, we shall still be r.eady to· discharge .our responsibility; but in that eventualityour need for assistance would be correspondfugly greater. Whatever ..happens, however, and even if the worst comes to the worst, the Jews of Palestine will fight in defence of theirlives and of theit politica1 rights.Their spirit and their ca.pacity have been revealed by the experience of the last few.·months. .. Time is of the most vital essence. Since we must b~ re~dy to assume responsipility upon the ter- ~atlon of the Mandate, naturally-under the direction of the United Nations Commission-our preparations must begin at once. We have asked the:Commissio~ for theimmediate provision of supplementary arms for our present defence The representative of the United States aiso proposedthat the same committee should consult with the Palestine Commission, the MandatoI-Y Power andrepresentatives of the principal communities of Palestine conceming the implementationofthe General Assembly recommendatioil. In the passage ofhis address which bears on this particular .proposaI [253rd meeting] heexplained thatthe purpose of the Security Counci.l in undertaking this consultation should be to " make every effort to achieve. an agreement on the haS1s..:. ~ ~he General Assembly's recommendatioJ!,concernmg th~ underlying political difficulty." In 'recommending tri the United Kingdom Parliament the submission of the question to the United Nations, representatives of the United Kingdom Government themselves expressed their conviction, based on long experience, that a solution acceptable to both parties was outside the realm of practical politiés. Thus, Mr. Bevin, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, declared in the House of Commons on 18 February 1947 that there was no prosç;:ct of reaching any settlement in Palestine " which would be even broadly acceptable to the two communities in Palestine". 'This view was aIso expressed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr.Creoob Jones, in the House of Commons on 12 August 1947, and by Sir Alexander Cadogan in the General Assembly on 26 November 1947. 1 The United Nations through its various orsans has worked hard in grappling with the Palestine problem. The resolution of the General Assembly represents the collective wisdom of th" international community on this burning issue. Ours is a historic pr.oblem, and its constructive solution will be a distinct contribution to the success and the "itality of this new greai: international Organization. We appeal to the Security Council and to aIl its members to take such actions as falI within their province to translate the General Assembly's plan into a reality. 1 should like to thank the President for the time allotted to me. 1 hope 1 have not abused the time of the Security Council; and 1 should like to say that, although it is a little lengthy, we regard this as the preliminary statement of our case and we should like, ifthe necessity should arise, to request permission for a :representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, Rabbi Silver, to· make fUrther contribution to the debate. At this point the system of consecutive interpretation was resumed. Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (translated from F>ench): The United States draft resolution set forth in document S/685 [255th meeting] provides for the èstablishment of a committee, comprising the live permanent niembers of the Council, the functions of which, among others, will be: (1) to study the situation in Palestine with a view to establishing whether it constitutes a threat to international peace and security;and (2) to consult with the Palestine Commission, the Mandatory Power and representâtives of the principal communities of Palestine on the implementàtion of the General Assembly recommendation of 29 November 1947. If 1 understand it rightly, the United States draft resolution thus aims at creating a Security Council committee which will be simply a working body of the Council, te wilich it will report and submit proposaIs.,· The purpose of this committee will therefore be to facilitate the Council's work and pro"ide it with intormation relating to the decision it will have to take. Up to this point the Belgian delegation is in full agr('.ementwith the United States draft resolution; indeed, we think it wise that,befon~ taking the important decision incumbent on it in this case, the Security Council should obtain aIl the relevant information, and should .appoint a committee, following its established practice, to·proceed with this initial task of establishing the facts. 1 think it appropriate that in the present case such a committee should be composed of the permanent members of the Council, inasmuch as. the possibility of coercive JD.easurc.'S has been menti(;med and the responsibility for. enforcing su<;:h measures would devolve, according. to Article 106 of the Charter, on .the five great Powers. It is therefe,re naturaI that the. Council should consider. their views on the situation and .the action it demands~ since they constitute a factor on which the Council should bequite c1ear before proceedingwith its deh"berations and .taking any· independent decision. If does not follow from this that in principle the acqua:Ù~.ted ,.with ~ the fac~s..' and the Belgian delegation lS not ln a posItion to express an opinion on it at the present stage. In so far as it eoncems the subjects just referred to, the draft resolution of the United' States has the support of our delegation. But the proposal goes further. It asks the Security Couneil to accept forthwith the requests addressed to it in para· grapns (a), (b), and (c) of section A of the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947. The Couneil is thus.required, for example, to say that (1) it àgrees to " take the neeessary measures às provided for in the .P;an for its iInplementation "; (2) that it considers " as a threat to peace, breach cf the peace, or act of aggression, in accordance ",ith Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to aIter by force the settlement envisaged" by. the Assembly resolution. If the Council accepted the United States draft resolution. it would be taking up this position here and now, consequently, before even knowing of the results of the work of the committee of the five great Powers which it was instructing, in the same resolution, to investigate the situation. But the very faet that it is proposed to set up a cornmittee of investigation shows that we are still in the preparatory phase, the phase of study; a phase, the outeome of wmch should make it possible for the Council to take its own decisio:uwith a full knowledge of all the tàct8. The Security Council has the primary responsibility of maintaining peace. The Charter makes it its duty to determine wJ1ether any situation before it constitutes a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace. Would the Couneil not be inviting the justified reproach of acting without a proper serise ofresponsibility and with undue haste, if it pronounced on the acceptance of the partition plan and its possible (lonsequences for the peace of the wodd without taking , into aecount the results of the studies of the committee which it would be creating, according to the United States proposaI, for' the specifie purpose of informing it on the situation? The Belgian delegation does not intend at present to express any opinion as to whether it would be expedient to comply with the Assembly requests. It merely wishes' to raise the question of method. In our opinion the question whether the Council should comply with the Assembly resolution or peler, l'assentiment pIojet sécurité lui!iont faites de 1947. ment: nécessaires sa mise menace d'agression, Charte, force l' États-Unis, dès connaître cinq même fait montre phase phase Conseil de se de responsabilitépriInordiale La situation à pas, légèreté l'acceptation dences préoccuper selon précisément, délégation exprimer déférer soulever son sens, Conseil de déférer semblée lorsque que d'autre d'une serait tations Je si que le point de savoir si, survenus 29 constituer de questions borne ~o~ can he settled only later, when the Council ~s ID possession of the data which its committee IS called upon to supply. Besides, 1 consider that the committee of five must be entirely free to !4ake up its own mind, and that it would be ill·advhed to confront it with principlesaIready a,"cepted by the Council. 1 do' not wish to question the soundness of the partition plan, nor to raise the question whether.' in view of the events that have taken place in Palestiri6 since the adoption ~f the resolution of 29 November, the plan lS or IS not calculated to constitute a threat to the peace or .a.bre~ch of thepeace. 1 am"not expressingany Oplmon on any of the questions of substance No one can he surprised at the elements that are ~ngagingour attention and which are adding new complications to the urgent problem of providing a home for the· Jewish people. l, for one, doubt whether anyone seriously expected the plan· for the partition of Palestine to be self-enforcing or whether anyone can truthfully clain\ that its failme may he considered'an unforeseen· resu1t 9f the lack of adequate provisions for enforcement, which were too cloody required. Our views on this problem have undergone tittle change, if any. The Colombian delegation feels rather, as 1 have stated, that the position we took when the resolution of 29 November 1947 Jas being debated, was entirely sound. 1 We are glad to have this opportunity to reiterate that we are very willing ta do our full share in helping to relieve the present plight of the Jewish people; mat, furthermore, we firmly believe that we now have in th~ record umnistakable proof, whereas before we could not claim tbat we had more than an unmistakable indication, tbat the proposal submitted to the General Assembly last November should have been carried a stage further, allowing the General Assembly the necessary time to work out a more satisfactory arrangement, preferably a Il compromise arrangement which would provide a more solid basis for the econolllÏc union of Palestine and would lead much sooner to a·better political understanding between Arabs and Jews." This may or May not be possible, but it should be ascertained. It should have been painstakingly ascertain~d before embarking upon the course of action that the United Nations is endeavouring to carry through with so much difficulty. Perhaps conditions at the time made the prospects of a mutually acceptable settlement negligible. It would be out ofplace to discuss this here. However, we were definitely of the opinion that such prospects were considerably brighter when Jews and Arabs alike had ah"eady become fully aware that the General Assembly would not adjourn without passing a re&{)lution on the Palestine question. Whether or notthey are brighter today, it remains the dutYof the Security Council, in ~ur view, to explore the possibllity of bringing about an agreement between the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee which would enable the United Nations Palestine Commission to discharge its functions and responsibilities without the use of armed force. In this çonnexion, we should like torecallthat on many occasions representatives of the Arab countries have complained of the failure of.the General Assembly's committees to make a determined effort in favour of conciliation. The Colombian delegation tried in vain to fuduce the General Assembly to give the Arabs an oppor- ~unity to take a more co-operative. position. It 18 true that the General Assembly granted them twenty~four hOUlS to come forth with new suggestionsorproposals before the adoption of the resolution of 29 November 1947--obviously too short.,a time for several Governménts to reconsider their position on a fundamental question and ~o .reconcile their views. But ...Ile Security Council IS m no haste to forego theoppqrtunity to invite the.Arab Higher Committ~Q tO.meet with the J~w~h Agency and a committee of the Security Council in a round-table discussion of the pres~nt situation. • . problem~ . We. have not proposed, we have not even sugges\ed, that a special session of the General Assembly should be called-as has been profusely and erroneousl~: stated in the Press-to reconsider the resolùtion of 29 November 1947. AU we have done is to propose that the advisability of taking such a course be examined by the comriùttee of the SecutityCouncil mat will be appointed, if our draft resolution is adopted, to ascertain if it is not possible to bring about an agreement oetween the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee. However, 1 should like to submit on behalf of the Colombian delegation that even· if our éfforts prove fruitless and th;e Arab!l or the Jews are adamant in their determination to maintaffi an uncompromising attitude, or if the ptevailing conditions in Palestine continue to deteriorate, or if the Palestine Commission should definitely he found unable to perform its functions without undue delay, the General Assembly may be required to' make adequate provisions for the administration of Palestine at the termination of the United. Kingdom Mandate, or may have to discussother arrangements. We believe it is id1e to attempt to close our eyes to the possible need of a new session of the General Assembly. In our humble opinion, the Security Council would be i11:'advised in failing togive due weight to these eventualities, regard1ess of their politica1 repercussions .in any of the Member States of the United Nations. The Security Council cannot lightly ignore or underestimate the many evidences, the many solenmwarnings, which it has received from aIl directions, of in.evitable ch~os in Palestine if nothing effective is done.before 15 May tostave it off. When we hear· that attempts to frostrate the General Assembly's recommendati~ns by threats of or use of force, or by· incitement to force, on thç partaf.States orpeoples outside of Palestine are contra:ry to the Charter, we feel prompted to ponder on the iro~j of the predicament ih which oUr Organïzatîon is placed, if we look back at its record. We whole·heSl-rted1y agree, thatany and an attempts to frostrate the General Assembly's recommendationby the threat or the use of force, or by incitement to force, on the part of States or peoples outside of Palestine, are contra:ry to ihe Charter. B'.lt what shall we think, what shall we say, of the fact that any. Member State can delibèrately frùstrate the recommendations of the General Assembly without the threat of or the use .of force or without· any incit:ment to force? The recommendatïons of the General Assembly .·are·· ·not bindingupon the Members of .our Organization, and the recommenGations or decisions of the Security COUD.cil may ·00 In the present instance we do not wish to disclaim that the United Kingdom has been given, whether wittingly or not, a legal excuse for withdrawing from Palestine. Nor do we feel inclined to question the validity of some of its reasons for doing so; but we are not sure that such an influential Member of the United Nations , can or should give up a mandate to which interests of -such diverse nal.ùfe attach, according to its own time-table and conditions, showïng, in the closing stages of its trust. considerably less willingness to co-operate than we could have expected. The Govemment.ofthe United Kingdom has not seen fit to comply with the recommendation of the General AssemblY to use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the territory of th~ proposed J~wish Statç, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for substantial immigration, be evacuated not later than 1 February 1948. Nor has the Govemment of the Vnited IGngdom agreed to make gradual delivery of the territories to be adnrlnistered by the United Nations Palestine Commission. Furthermore, the United Kingdom Government has declared itself opposed to the organization of the militias and to the presence in Palestine of the United Nations Palestine Commission before it sees fit. Very fortvllately, we aIl now seem to have accepted the view that if force is to be used in Palestine, it must be used in accordance with Artic!e~106 of the Charter, and not otherwise; that 1", to prevent or remove any threat to the. peaee. breach of the peace or act of ,aggression arising from the implementation of the resolution of 29 Ndvember 1947. Article 106 of the Charter provide,s as folloW5: " P€"Jding the coming iuto force of sucb special spéciaux du mencer bant en application de l'Article 42, les parties à Déclaration le entre elles et, de du d'entreprendre en commun, Unies, pourmaintenir Charte ne discussion encore établi lective. tances d'entreprendre maintenir Palestine, premier chef aux membres de la rédaction actuelle de agr~eli.ts referred to in Article 43 as in the opi1lion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article'42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, 30 October 1943 and France, shall, in accordance with the provisioD.s of paragraph 5 of that Declaration. consult with one another and as occasion requires with other Members of the. United. Nations with a view to such joint. action on behalf of the Organization as May be necessary· for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." The special agreements referred to in Article 43 of the Charter have not come into force. Their ?is~ussion by the Military Staff Committee is still ln 1tS early stages. Not even the bases of a system of. collective security have been agreed upon. It 1S our considered view that, under the circumstances, if any joint action on behalf of this Or~anization is necessary for the purpose of mamt~g international peace and security in Palestine, that responsibility'devolves primarily ~pon ~h~ permanent members of the Security ounc~. We have worded paragraph 1 of the operatlVe part our draft resolution accordingly, because we have not been able to understand on 1have taken the liberty of drawing the attention of the Security Council to these brief comments, notwitlistanding our belief that the terms of our proposw.s are self-explanatory, in order to restate our ideas unequivàcally. We are not taking sides in the dispute between Arabs and Jews. We are simply making our contribution to the peacep.!l settlement ofthe dispute in the way we deemmost adequate, to the best of our knowledge and belief. Weknowour positionis apt to be misunderstood, and, naturaIly, we should like' to avoid being misinterpretedifwecan do so. Wehave notfound that any of the plsns developed so far meets the needs of the situation, and we must admit that we do not faIl in linewith several of the premises or preconceptions'from which those plans spring. t~ give the Jews the benefitand éoD1fort ofDloving from hostile surroundings tà a lànd wœ.çh they could cal1 their own. This was at a time when Jews and gentiles alike were free to travel ail Gver the worldwithout a visà, and to settle and thrive free .from the. restrictions, discriDlitiation and persecution which .weigh so heavily' upon' the former in our days. Half a century ago, the Jews could settle in any part ofthe civilized world. They had the alternative of going to the Holy Land if and when they so desired. Itis hardlyany exaggeration to say that they could make a choice-a choice that, to aIl intents and purposes, is being denied to them today. Part of Palestine is being offered as a refuge for the unfortunate thousands ofJews who have beendisplaced from their homes in Europe or who feel unvvanted in Europe and elsewhere, and who want to be free from the endless hardship and sorrow to which they have . been subjected during the past twenty years. In the last analysis, Palestine will eventuaIly. offer them an escape from discrimination or pe~secution in the democratic world. But we submit that it will likewise' offer an escape to the democratic countries fromtheir obligations to put a stop. to racial an<\ religions discrimination or J5ersecution and to restore to the Jewish people theirnatural right to share with others the opportunity to struggle for the joys of a peaœfullife. We feel strongly that the Jewish people should notbe driven to live in certain 'parts of Palestine only, but shouldbeaIlowed alsoto settlein the territories ofMember States ofthe Ufiited Nations according to a. prepared plan.of quotas, as hasalready been proposed.·We .do not relish the prospect of seeing an immense ghettocarved out of the Holy.Land so that the gentile portion of mankind may felieve it~ conscience of the wrongs that have~en infticted on the Jewish race at the behest of Hitler andhis cohorts. We want to see the end 'of tbis great human tragedy. Wc approach the solution of this/!problem free from racial and.• religious prejudices that may 1 ask to be allowed to review, as briefty as possible, the framework of our draft resolutioil. The. first part of the pre.amble presents the relevant views of the Palestine Commission as they appear in the first special report on the problem of security in Palestine [document 8/676]. The second part states that the General Assembly did not provide for the creation of a military force outside.of Palestine for the iJnplementationof its resolution of 29. November 1947, and that Articies 39 and 41 of the Charter do not authorize the Security Council to create special forces for·the specific purpose of enforcing the plan of partition. Unless we are very much mistaken, no disagree. ment with the preliminary portion of our .draft resolution has d~veloped so far. Its operative "part embodies :6.ve proposaIs which, at least to the mind of the Colombian, delegation, face the faets of ;'he situation squarely, however stem they may he. First, we coneur in the view that the partiesto the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow on 30 OctoQer 1943, and France should beinvited by the Security Council to consult with one another as to the action that ït m~y be necessary to take in order to prevent or remove any threat tothepeace, breach ofthe peace, or àctof aggression' arising from the implementation of the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947. Many acritic of this provision has l'emarked that;a iline Umit should befixed for such consultations, considering that action by theSecurity Council in this mattef is very urgent, and that heretofore its permanent members have usually held confficting views on every important issue that has come before this body. In thiscase it is well known that, while two of them supported the plan of partition, two others have not looked prés~nt~es cas nents ·deux ment, position n011$ limite, de gera mandations , eonseil de' deux membres permanents non que, mandé permanents ciale des NatiGns Unies de u~on it with great favour, and another has consistently withdrawn to an isolated position. But we have deliberately refrained from fixing any such mne limit,' takirig for granted the factthat the Wavity of the situation in Palestine will, of itself, Impress upon them the need of an early recom· tnendation to the Security Council. Next, we have asked the Security Council to ~ppoint a committee composed ofthe representatlv~s of two of its permanent members and three oflts non·permanent members. In this connexion, we should like to recaU that e on every'previous ocr.a~i?n we advocated the appointment of representatives of the five permanent m~mbers of the ~ec.uritYCouncil ta the Unit~d Nations Special ommïttee on Palestine and to the United Nations .We know well cmough that the United KingdomNous Governmentdaes not want. to de> so. Webelieve lc;ast~ we would have the See~tyCouncilrequest the Government, of the ,Fnited Kingdom to postpone the date oUhe terminationofitsMaJldate and, accordingly, its arrangements for the evacua-:- tionof its,troops from Palestine. that~ rather thaJl bow te> its decision, ,whatever the consequences in Palestine ,to the peac.e of the worldand to the prestige of the United Nations, the SecurltyCoUJ;lcil willbe expectedtocaU for a. mOfe co-operativeattitude on the part of the United Kingdom,if it is necessary, ,and weshall pe glad tojoin, in, thatrequest. ' , Beforeclosing; 1 should like to say onbchalf of the Colombian delegation thatwe do, not Wish in any way ta ,delay action' by the Seeurity CouncilonPalestine through the discussion of moreproposals thanare striGtlyneeessary in coMexion therewith. In due course wegave our reasons. for not,voting,in favour of the' plan of paJ.tition., The mote wè thirik about the outlook in' Palestine, the more convinced we feel that the resolution of 29 November 1947was adopted with utidue haste; and that itcouldhave been improved upon Without great difficulty or protracteddiscussions. But we labour under no misapprehension as tothe verys~ant weight tbat our opinions on thisquestion would carry. Therefore, we feel no embarrassment in givingpriority to ,the considera.- tion orthe opïnions of our colleagues or in leaving ours fudefinitely in abeyance. The' representativeof the United States,with a 'nllich .better understanding,of aIl the complex elements that have to be considéred'in fi. debate Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): 1 ùo not intend to make a speech at this time. However, 1 wish to refer to certaip. points which 1 feel it is necessary to mention now. References were made to Article 106 of the Ciî:rrter to the effect thataction will be taken under it. As Article 106 reads, it does not mean that the live great Powers would act under it at this stage of the matter.. Action by them would take place :under Article 106 only whep. the Secl.\rity Council decides that a case requires the use of armed force, under Article 42 of the Charter. There is nothing in the present stage of the case to imply suchaction by the five great Powers under Article 106. The amendm~nt presented by the representative of Belgium [document 8/688] to delete the tirst paragraph of the United States draft resolution [document 8/685] is certainly in order and is in conformity WÏth the functions and competenèe of the Security Couneil. We are not here to prejudge our futwe actions in this matter. Therefore,. 1 .agree with the amendment submitted by the representatives of Belgium as it applies. to the fust paragraph of the United States draft resolua tian. soumis ment du des amendement est fonctions rité. tion sui qui· graphe Another peint in the United States draft resolution to wbich 1 wish to call the Council's résolution attent~on, is that thè Security Council does not attirer l'attention use .~ny force to· implement. political decisions, pas :but, it mustkeep the peace. The. w9rd " peace·" décision~ haS be~n .used in reference to main..taining.public la arder in a territory or country, whilein the lan-- en guage of internationallaw and of the Charter, it· uniquement is only meant to apply to international peace and alors security; For this reason, l consider that the l'ordre attempt to establish peace in Palestine is Dot pays. within th;; competence of the Securïty Couneil. tative du Furthermore, it means tha~ we do not interfere,' .. as the representative of the United States has l'application wisely said, with the implementation of the partiavec tion plan. but. that we aré interested in establishing que peace in Palestine. Itwould appear tome, in this Palestine. Je case, th~t the United States delegation wishes to Unis SecUF0 indirectly what it could not secure directly. n'a . 1 consider tOOt the implementation of the partitionplan·and the tranquillity of Palestine are la 80 linkedtogetherthatthey cannot be distinguished qu'on ?ne from the other. The disturban.ce in Palestine Les lS a resultof the implementation of the partition plication plan". As long as the implementation is on the.list cution and IS to be acted upon, the people of Palestine . tra:indrt: caru:ot.becompelled to keep silence. If the imple- Si, men;atiQn were to be suspended,. or if the plan ou were tri be consider~unworkable and the Security C' This reminds me of the story of the Jew who once asked a friend of bis to lend bim ten dollars. His friend said, "I omy have sL"( dollars." The Jew said, " Give me the six dollars and you can (:Jwe me the four dollars." In the same Y-;ù-y the Jews feel that they have left the Arabs a part of Palestine and that the Arabs now owe that part to them. AU their arguments to substantiate their claim to Palestine depend, fust of all, on the promises ofoutsiders, such as the Balfour Declaration.On the basis of snch tieclarations they have been clamouring and arguîng for years. Now they are basing their claims on the resolution passed by the majority of the General Assembly.. They have no other basis upon wbich to substantiate their· claims or aspirations. Sometimes they pr~sent another proof of their c1aim to the effeet that they have been claiming Palestine andconsidering Palestine astheir homeland fOr twentycenturies, as ifsuch a fact could establish·any substantial or .material right to Palestin~whenthey have had no actual connexion with Palestine during an those years. 1 do not believe that in any int~mationallawor declarati~n ofhlhnan rigbts there is any statement wbich substantiates such a claim. These are the bases·on which their. arguments are founded. Then there 18 the other suggestion for establishing peace by asking the people of Palestine to be quiet an the time. That is like saying that iflooters or robbers enter a persori's tome and the u .mer resists them, the police coù1d. sayto bim, "1 do 'Dot admit that there is trouble here. Our duty 1s topre.vent &sorder." Then, as the owner of the house is resisting, the police could take bim off to galJt It would·Mean. that looting or robhing wouldbe allowed so long as there was nodisordér or disturbance. Thatis what woult1 happen if the Arabs did not resist. Their country· would be occupied illegally by others. To allowthe partition plan to be implemerited. in thatway· would be unjust. TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY- NIN1H l\'JEETING Held at Lake Suc..:ess, New York, on Saturday, 28 February 1948, at 10.30 a.m. President: General McNAUGHTON (Canada). Present: The representatives of the following countries: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Syria, Ukrainia.n Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. Argentine, France, d'Ukraine, soviétiques, rique. 51. Provisional agenda (document S/Agenda 259) . 51. 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. The Indonesian question ~ (a) First interim report to the Security Council of the Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian question (document 8/649).1 1. 2. 52. Adoption of the agenda 53. Continuation of the discussion of the Indonesian question 53. se discuté fois, eu d'examiner contenu amendements contenus 8/682 d'amendement doit tenir compte 38 peut des

The Security Council will reean that, whenitlast discussed theIndonesian situation at its 256th meeting on 26 February 1948. it was considering the Canadian draft resolution, which is set forth in docwnent S/678, together with the amendment .submitted by the representative of Colombia, which is set forth in document S/682, ~nd the am~ndment submitted by Australia, which IS setforth ID document S/681. Wit1;l regard to the proposaI of the Australian representative, the Security Council will recall that under rule 38 of the rules of procedure, th,at proposa.! may be put to a vote only at the request of a representative on the Security Council. l'anglais): du mistice GeneralR6MULO (philippines): From a reading of the proceedings of the Security Council, 1 :lind that the truce agreement. [document S/649, appendix Xl] has been higbly commended by