S/PV.2591 Security Council

I should like to recall that in the course of the Council’s consultations members of the Council agreed that an invitation should be extended to Mr. 6zer Koray in acco&mz withruk39ofthe provisional rules of procedure. Unkss I hear any objection I shall take it that the Council decides to invite Mr. Koray in accordance with rule 39ofits provisional ruks of procedure. At the appropriate moment I shall invite Mr. Koray to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement. 3. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them the repon of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period I3 December I984 to 31 May 1985 [S/17227and Add.1 and 21. Members also have before them a draft resolution contained in document S/17266. which has been prepared in the course of the Council’s consultations. 4. It is my understanding that the Council is ready to vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection 1 shall put the draft resolution to the vote now. A vote was rakn by show o/hands. The drdt resolution was adopted unanimously [resolution 565 (1985)].

The firs: speaker is the reptescntative of Cyprus, upon whom I call.

Allow me, Sir. to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the higliofti~ofthepre~eacyoftlte~cQuncilfrw themonthofJusetutdtooxpreesmyepprcciationfot tions on Uto draft mandateoftheUnitedNatioasPcPcduapsp wdtbepeopkofCypmsthattbcprrridencydUtis impoltantorgelloftheullitedNatioasisinthetpb friendly cauncry with Which we’share close bolhbilalemUyaadwithintheffameworkoflhe Movement of Non-w -t&s and of the Commoltwealth. our collmtuktions PO also to lbe ResidcntoftheCouncilf~thrmonU,kMay.Mr.~- SriOfTh8ikDd.flWlhCilll~mprmct inwhichhe con6uc!ed the Coumi!‘s Lliberatii on a number of importrnt issues. 7. IshouldliketothankthemembersoftheSecurity Council for giving me the opportunity to address them and for the decision to renew the mandate of UNFICYP, to which my Government had given its prior consent. The peace-keeping functions of 8. In this respect 1 should like to express our deepest appreciation to the Secretary-General for his untirhtg efforts in seeking a peaceful and just solution to the Cyprus problem. I wish on behalf of the Government and people of Cyprus to assure him of our full co-operation and continued support for the successful conclusion of his ongoing initiative and to reiterate on this occasion that our hopes for vindication and justice rest on the United Nations, which constitutes the comerstone of our foreign policy. 9. A special tribute is also due to Mr. Holger, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, for the exemplary manner in which he is pursuing hisdifficult mission. We commend warmly the valuable and significant contributions of the Under-secretary- General, Mr. Urquhart, and of his able colleagues in the Secretariat, Mr. Feissel and Mr. Picco, for their continuous efforts to advance the cause of peace in our country. 15. As the members of the Council recall, at the end of the third round of proximity talks, on 12 December 1984, the Secretary-General made the assessment that sufftcient progress had been achieved to justify the convening of a high-level meeting and had proposed that it take place on I7 January. Both parties agreed to his proposal. The President of the Republic of Cyprus 10. MY Government’s deep appreciation xoes also to M@or-General Greindl, dm&der of UNFICYP, and to his offtcers and men, for the efficient and dedicated manner in which they continue to discharge the duties entrusted to them by the Security Council. In referring to UNFICYP, I should be remiss if1 were not to express our warm feelings of gratitude and appreciation to all the friendly Governments which. throttnb voluntary contributious of personnel and Muds, ha;e enabled UNPICYP to continue rend&g its indispensable peace-keeping services in Cyprus. the outcome of the-high-level meeting, while rei&rating that he would continue to strive hard for a just and viable solution to the problem and that he would fully co-operate with the Secretary-General for the successful fruition of his endeavours. 16. Referring to the high-level meeting, the Secretary- General stated in the course of a press conference on the occasion of the conclusion of the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly on I9 December 1984: “As you can imagine, I do not see the meeting as 11. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus, following the fkaetuy-Geneds appeal, has already a mere formality. What 1 expect from the meeting is a decided to increase its voluntary contribution to constructive discussion in which the parties will pre- UNPICYP to the sum ofS5OO,ooO. This b in addition to its contribution for the maintenance of UNFICYP sent theii views on my presentation. That is how I see it.” uttd&paragmph19oftheagreementconcemingthe status of the Force [see S/5634, olu1414, antounting to 17. This crystal-clear explanatory statement by the SlO.ooO for the present year. In other wotds, the con- Secretary-General concerning the nature end purpose tributionsofthe RepublicofCypnrs to UNFICYP, both voluntary and for the maintenance of the Force, will of the high-level meeting, which was repeated both privately and publicly on other occasions as weli, became necessary following certain statements by exceed the sum of %1,OtXl,ooO for 1985. Mr. Denktt between the conclusion of the third 12. The Security Council meets today to consider the ODcTptions of UNFICYP and as a conseouence to review developments since its last meeting-on this topic 12565th meethal ia December 1984. I believe the members of the Council would justlfmbly expect an assessment of developments that have ensued since then, on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General round of the-proximity talks and the day of the highlevel meeting. According to Mr. Denktap, the highlevel meeting would be a mere ceremony for the signing of the draft agreement, which would be put on the negotiating tableon a “*ke it or leave it” basis. without any possibility of dialogue. 18. Despite the repeated assurances given by the Secretary-General and by his spokesmen, as well as by various Governments in a position to know, regarding the purpose of the high-level meeting-which coincide with the interpretation of the Greek Cypriot side, that . 13. Iamsurethatallofusrecalltbecautiousoptimism which prevailed in the Council at its last meeting, held after three rounds of proximity talks in New York between the President of the Republic of Cypnrs, 19. For four days intensive but futile efforts were made to salvage the high-level meeting, but Mr. Denktag did not agree to discuss anything at all and left New York aBer rejecting a proposal by the Secretary-General to fix a date for a new high-level meeting and after hastening to state that none of the documents prepared in the three rounds of talks, not even the non-papen, which included the shifts in Turkish positions, were any longer valid. 20. It is obvious from what was said earlier that not didwe have the repeated &surances of the Secret& General, but the document in question bore the title “Preliminary Draft for a Joint High-Level Meetid Agreement”, and, in its pamgraph 6 on territory, it envisaged, expressio uerbis, negotiations al the hi&- level meeting. 21. To elaborate further. in the “Preliminary Draft for a Joint Hi&Level Meetinn mment” it was stressed that l *terAorial readjust&G3 in addition to the area8 reflected in the Turkish propo8alo of 5 August 1981 would be agreed at the hi&-level meeting’* and &at the extent of these readiuatments and UK numkr of retbgee8 who would ret&n to their homes would b8 defined in the agreement that would emerge from the high-level meeting. Even on the question of the working group8. paragraph I3 of Ihe text provided that the working group or group8 might be 8ec up in liit ofthe political decision8 agreed upon at lhe hi&-level meeting, in O&r “to elaborate the detail8 of the WtS involved”. 22. lnordertoaveti thedeadlock which wosemerging as a result of the rejection of any didqgue ad the retusal of any discussion by the Turkirb 8ide. the Pmident of the Republic of Cyprus and the Secre(ary-General himrelfpropo8ed a number of ideas and fonnular to overcome the impasse. 23. The la8t propo8al of the Resident of the Republic ofC~oru8 contained aPain the element ofreconciliation ofol&skte views. aii-it8 r&&n served ondy to confirm Mr. Denkta8.s bad faith and ill-intended schemes. In that proposal it wa8 suggested lhat a new high-level meeting with a fixed date be convened to deal with four basic iswes: the withdrawal ofnon-Cypfiot m, the territorial issue, the fundamental freedoms and the guarantees. The propod al80 suggested the immediate setting up of a working group on the constitution. lo 24. Had there been the slightest trace of good faith on the part of Ankam and Mr. Denkm, there could have been no question of aniviRg at a deadlock. Furthermore, (hey would have agreed to a second high-level meeting as set by the Secretary-General. But the Turkish aide wa8 bent on wreckiq3 the meeting for its own sinister purpose. This explain8 its outright rejection without even a counter-proposal or comment on it8 part. Ankam and Mr. Denkm bad huther divisive deeds to perform and schemes to carry out. 25. lfconfhnation of this duplicity were needed, the Turkish side, soon after it rejected the invitation ofthe Secretary-General for a new high-level meeting to take place by the end of February, announced its illegal decision to hold 8o-caUed parliamentary and p&dential election8 in the oceu&d area8. a8 well a8 a ‘*referendum” on the 8o&ed con8tit;tioo of the illegal ScCeSSiOIliSt e&y. The sCelli%iO WBS thUS unfolded for the world to 8ee and to admire the extent of Ankara’s arrogance and double dealin@. 26. Itshouldbestnssedinchlsreapoctthotcbceencw Turkish illegalities, taking place at a most delicate phase of the Cyprus problem, show, annmg other thiI@8. utter di8regaId of the &C~4elterPl’8 initia!iveandofhi8appealtoaUtho8econcem&toensure thatm%hingi8doneinthei8l8adorel8ewherethat would tend to make the search for a solution morr duiiMlt. 27. Theao4ledrefaendumandelectiona~Uy violatetheletterandthespititdtbeUnitedNatiotts re8olu+m8 on cyplua, pwleulorlv skcttrity council cons 541(1983) and Su) (1984). 1 quote from the , II . . . “3. R&mtes th8 call upon au states not to reco@liZethepurpCWdStrtedthe’TurLirhRepuMic of Northern Cyprus’ ret up by secessionist acta and calls upon them not to faciiitale or in any way a88ist the aforesaid wS8iOlli8t entity”. “It is the position of the United Nations, as reaffirmed by the Security Ctiuncil, that it recognixes no Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus. It follows that the Secretary-General cannot condone any development or action at variance with that position”. 33. But beyond these violations of principles, the results of the so-called referendum established beyond any doubt that without the “votes” of the settlers imported by the occupying P lwer from Turkey in order to change the demographic character of the country and to adulterate the will of the Turkish Cypriot community, a majority in favour of the new “constitution” would not have been secured. 29. The so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a bogus entity, set up by Turkehy as its puppet in the occupied area. Legally, this entity has no territory of its own, except the areas occupied by the Turkish troops, the latter having uprooted the whole indigenous Greek Cypriot community constituting 82 per cent of the population in the area, and having implanted thousands of settlers from the mainland of Turkey in the homes and lands of those expelled. The true meaning of these expulsions of the Greek Cypriots from the occupied areas is to rob them of their ancestral homes and country throuah a series of abhorrent crimes which 34. The assessment is also reflected and confirmed by Turkish Cypriot newspapers and by statements of Turkish Cypriot leaders. The Turkish Cypriot newspaper Ortam of 7 May wrote, for instance, that “without the settlers, the constitution would have been rejected”. Yeniduzen of 6 May adds that, according to voting results from villages, the Turkish mainlandcrs have played an important role in the “referendum”, whereas in the many villages where the Turkish Cyg riots live the “no” voters were in the majority. _ _ recall the very da& ages of mankind and which should not be tolerated in a civilixed world community of a 35. Moreover, on9 May inan article in Yeniduren. the United Nations era. leader of the Republican Turkish Party, Mr. Ozgur, said, inter ah, that “there is a sham democracy in the 30. Turkey’s arguments that these secessionist and occupied areas”. To visiting foreigners, he continued, “it has been said that there are no political prisoners, partitionist moves are “internal democratic processes” of the Turkish Cvoriots livina in the occuoied areas of but while artificial imoressions continue, citizens have been tortured in prisons. strikers have been banned and partisanship has run havoc”. Mr. Ozgur added that the people did not say “yes” to this “constitution”. He said the “constitution” went into force with the votes Cyprus receive t& intemati&al scorn which they dcserve. The Turkish Cvoriots. beinn themselves under occupation, cannot f&ly exercise~emocratic processes. It is Turkey, in line with its divisive policy, that conceives and dictates these separatist acts against the of those who are not Cypriots, just as the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denkhq. was elected in 1981 with the votes of those who were not Cypriots. “We are territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus. unable to be the masters of our own home”, he con- 31. The Turkish argument, on the other hand. that the Turkish Cypriot community in the ama ean exercise separately the right to self-determination. is untenable. First, it distorts the principle ofselfdetermlnatlon embodied in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), whichirtobeelrercisedbva~~~asawhole.andnot on the basis of factional. &ioub, communal or ethnic criteria. Secondly, the reality is that the Turkish Cypriots cannot exercise such a right on an occupied part of the territory of Cyprus, on which they have all along been but a small mh&ty of 18 per cent; while the large majority of82 per cent. as aheady explained, have only recently been expelled and supplanted by Turks from Anatolia and the Turkish military occupying forces. cluded. 36. Apart from the above serious fairs accomplis, the Turkish side resorted recently to a number of misleadirq Jnd provocative statements. These statements revcal, fnter alia, that there is a serious retrogression from the past positions of the Turkish side, despite the fact that essentially these positions were to a great extent unco,mpromising and that now conditions are imposed for a dialogue and solution. 37. For almost I I years the people of Cyprus have been the anguished victims of a ruthless Turkish policy of invasion, aggression, military occupation. expulsion, uprooting, intervention, attempts at secession and massive violation of human rights. For almost I 1 years 32. The so-called referendum for a new “constitution” of the secessionist self-nroclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus wadheld in the occupied we have come before this My and other intematkwml territory of the Repubhc on J May 1985, and the soforums to seek justice and vindication for the unacceotcalled Presidential elections on 9 June. It is obvious able injustices and crimes perpetrated against our from what we have stated above that these new illecountry and our people. On the other hand. for almost galitier, carried out on the notion of a “Turkish Cypriot I I years the drama of the enclaved Greek Cypriots people”, constitute a mockery of all democratic princicontinues and their number is decreasing, due certainly pks and a contempt of all internationally recognized to the refusal of the Turkish side to honour commitconcepts of human rights. The principle of selfdeterments undertaken with regard to their living conditions. 39. Numerous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions also call for intercommunal negotiations between the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to reach an agreed solution to the internal aspect of the problem of Cyprus. Not only has the Government of Turkey done nothing to implement the provisions of those resolutions, it is violating them outright. 40. With regard even to the provisions for negotiations, Turkey pays lip-service to them and uses them as a means of mollifying the international community anxiously awaiting progress on the question of Cyprus, which has been descrikd as one of the major international problems. By its deeds and policies Turkey seeks to destroy the agreed pattern for a solution based upon United Nations resolutions and on the high-level agreements of 1977 [see S/12323, pore. S] and 1979 [see S//3369, pura. 511. thus making any hope for ttegotiawould be left to n&otiate short of askitmthe Gove& ment of Cyprus to a&pt the participatio~attd disatetnberment of the Republic of Cyprus. The tragedy of Cyprus consists of, one, the unchecked and ongoing Turkish aggression and occuuation and, two. the nonimplemeni&ion by Turkey b the ntandato~ resolutions of this body and its systematic undermining ofthe negotiating process through fits accomph aimed at consolidating its stranglehold over its victim, the Republic of Cyprus and its people. 41. Turkey’s rejection, in toto. of all United Nations rese!utinns on !k qwsthn of Cyprus anA i!s cnntemp tuous disregard of the expressed will of the intemational community should be a matter for primary and grave concern to the Security Council. Determined and concerted action by the Council in accordance with the Chatter remains an imperative requirement and an historic duty ifjustice is really to prevail. My Government reserves the right to come before the Security Council fate of their loved ones is traced ana-accounted for? 43. The total withdrawal of the foreign troops of occupation forms the backbone of the United Nations resolutions and is a sine qua non for any viable and just solution. On the issue of the withdrawal of the Turkish occupation troops from Cyprus, the President of the Republic said the following on is May 198% “The first and primary demand, for which the international community has undertaken obggations and commitments, is the withdrawal ofall occupation troops. We have repeatedly declared that there eatsnottteasohttionoftheCyprusprobktu,andweshmU not sign a solution, without the withdrawal of all occupation troqm from Cypaus and all settlers. We ate not chauvbtists or extrernkts; them am the ektttentary prerequisites in order to seaue peace, trauquiility, security, cnltn. freedom and the buman rights of au eitizeM.” 44. Adanilitari&Cyprusas~bymyPmident.withoutamtiesofoceup&onaedbarbeflwirr. wiRbringforthagain,stnmgerattdwarorer,theage-oki. ueachlandami~ecaxistenceoftherteoukof &prus now divided by artificially imposed &fan. WillCyprusagainbecomcanisfandaCpaaeeattd harmony? Will its people-all its people: Gtoeks, Turks, Armenians, Marortites, La&+-be allowed to live peac&Uy together and enjoy the fits of cotntnoncountryanddestiny.asitistheirbumingdesire and longing to do? The answer tests squarely on the SboukIers of the members of t&e secwity cmI!cil. 4% I wish that Ankara’s record was such that it would allow me to believe that it would share these as&&ns ofourpeq&forpeace.~ionandhapp&ssina Federal Republic of Cyprus, in accodance with the relevant United Nationsresolutions and the high-kvel agreements. 47. We maintain our readiness and dedication to achieving a solution in accordance with the United Nations resolutions and the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979. We have full trust in the Secretary-General and firmly believe that his statesmanship, his vision and his dedication to his mission, as well as his affhtity to Cyprus, make him a unique personality for achieving the long-expected, just and lasting solution of the Cy- PNS problem. 48. We are ready. Is the Turkish side ready as well? For that is the CNX of the matter. Let us work togetber to make Cyprus the little paradise it was meant tobe. by rebuilding the bridges of co-operation that were blown up by fo&gn interference atid chauvinistic forces of division. 49. Let us here and oow solemnly pledge our earnest commitmeot to abide in word and deed by the provisions of these resolutiooe and the high-level agreements. Let us listen eveo at this late hour to the ~MOY of the at&shed people of Cyprus who cry out foi peace withluatice and fmedom. Let us look history warely io thi face and say we have done what was e&&ted of us.OnlytheowillCypNsasainkan~sndofpeace and harmony, contributing to the linking in co-operatioubfthetbreecoutineotsthat8urrotmdit. SO. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the repreaeotative of Greece, oo whom 1 oow call. 5 1. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): I should like to thank you, and through you the other members of the Couocil, for acquiescing to my request to participate in the Council’s debate oo the renewal of the UNRCYP mnndate. J2. May ! take this opportunity to congratulate you, Sir. on your assumption of the presidency of the &IO- CU for the month ofjune. It give8 me particular pleasure to see Mr. Mahabir. the Foreim Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, presidiig at this meeting. 1 rhotdd aiso Iike to express my appreciation ior the way in which the represeotative of Trinidad and Tobago conducted the consultations which led to the present resolution. On 53. The Greek Government fully supports the resolution that hasjust been adopted by the Council extending the mandate of UNFICYP for six more months. In supporting this resolution we took note of the fact that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, the only legitimate spokesman of the sovereignty of the Republic, has already given its consent. We consider that it is, unfortunately, imperative that the Force remain further in Cyprus in its present strength. The Force has indeed become a very important component of a highly delicate balance consisting of a wide spectrum of factors. Without the Force, 1 am afraid that this balance might be gravely disturbed, to the detriment of peace in theregion. UNFICYPis cartingout itsdifftcult taskina very effective manner. I should like to express in this respect our appreciation to Major-General Greindl and the officers and men of the Force, as well as to Mr. Holger, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary- General. Our particular thanks are also addressed to all the friendly countries which have been contributing troop8 and funds for many years in excess of those originally foreseen, thus making possible the continued existence of UNFICYP. 54. 1 wih not at this juncture address the substance of the Cyprus question. The facts are well known and the members of the Security Council are fully aware of the prevailing situation and its background. Rerides, the representative of the Republic of Cyprus has just given us a lucid account of the situation on the island. 55. 1 would, however, be remiss if I did not stress in this context the positive attitude ofthe C~PNS Govemmeot with regard to the initiative of the Secretary-General. lodeed; in its desire to contribute to a climate conducive to the suc&ss of the efforts of the Secretary- Geoeral, the Government ofCypru8 hasdisplayed great political restraint and statesmanship. Not only did it accept, with onerous sacrifices. all of the ~O~SfdS of the Secretary-General, it also did not bring to the Council the recent violation8 of the sovereignty of the Republic by the Turkirh side. I am referring to the promulgation and canyiog out of so-called referendum, electioos, and so forth. They are violations that run counter to and defy the relevant United Nations resolutions and the unequivocally and repeatedly stated position of the totality of the nation8 of the Organization-with the exception of Turkey. 56. My Government has consistently and sincerely, from the very beginning. supported the recent initiative of the Secretary-General, whereas others have only paid lip-serviceto it while at the same time underminhtg its substance with their actions. My Govemment -&nestly hopes that the untiring efforts of the Secretary-General will finahy succeed and bear fruit. 57. It is the sincere wish of my Government that a solution to the Cyprus question be found soon-a viable solution that will secure the territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus, based on justice, internationally accepted democratic principles and respect for human rights; a solution which will entail, upon agreement, the withdrawal of all occupation troops. In the view of my Government any solution would be totally incompatible with the presence of any troops of occupation on the island or any other fareign troops in the Republic. 58. I further earnestly wish that the Turkish side will respond positively to the proposals of the Secretary- General, so that in the months to come, we shall he able to witness progress on the question of Cyprus for the benefit of all its people and peace in the area.

The next speaker is Mr. dxer Koran. to whom the Council has extended an invitation in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement. 60. Mr. KORAY: Mr. Resident. I should like to thank you and, through you, the other members of the Security Council for affording me this opportunity to speak ahd put the views and the position ofthe Turkish Cypriot side on the matter before this body and on the various aspects of the Cyprus problem. The right of the Turkish Cypriot side to speak and be heard becomes ail the more indispensable when-as was predictably demonstrated once a8ain by the previous two speakers-the world is being subjected to a constant barrage of prevarications and distortions on the problem of CypNS. 61. Daspite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the Greek Cypriot side still pretends to be the iqjured party and audaciiy tries to divert the Council’s attention from what has now come to be the cntx of the Cyprus problem. That crux is the i&t. conclusively proven only six months ago, that the Greek Cypriot side, led by Mr. Kyprianou. does not want a solution to the Cyprus problem, that solution, of course, being on the basis of a bicommunaJ. bi-zonal Federal Republic of Cypnts. as envisaged by the dratI agreement painstakingly prepared through the efforts of the Secretary- General aRer five months of ardous negotiations and presented to the two sides for conclusion on I7 January 1985. 62. By his prompt and total rejection of the draft agreement, in the negotiation of which he himself had taken part, Mr. Kyprianou. egged on by his certain mentor, was sending a clear message to all concerned that he was intent on hanging on to the seat of govemment which his predecessor had usurped in 1963 and 63. In the exercise of his mission of good ottices. the Secretary-General presented to the two sides, at Vienna on 6 and 7 August 1984. what he called working points, as an indivisible. integrated whole aimed at reaching a comprehensive package settlement of the Cyprus problem. Both sides, having agreed to enter into negotiations on the basis of the working points, were invited to New York to engage in proximity talks. 64. The Turkish Cypriot side, right from the start, gave the Secretary-General NL and unstinting support in his efforts to bring about a just and lasting solutrort in the island within the framework of the Vienna working points, which guaranteed, infer aliu, the qual political status of the two communities, which is a prerequisite in any fedetation and which was considered as such by Mr. P&z de CuCUar. 65. The fht and second rounds of proximity talka. held in New York in September and October respectively, helped towards developing the Vienna working points into a draft agreement. 66. It should k noted here that the attitude aad pasture of the Greek Cypriot delegation. headed by Mr. Kyprianou, had dready hqun to ~vcal its real intentions about the whole exercise, which was in marked contrast to the Turkish Cypriot delegation’s positive aad forthcotrtiag attitude. “thorough’~ and “busittesslfke” &em usedby the Sac- 67. At the end of the first round of talks. words Bke retary4enerd to describe the pmceedittgs. The Tutkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Rauf Dtalrrap. iu his tutn. expressdopfimkmlnhisown stemeat. Mr. Kyprknou, bowever, true to Ms vaciWug attitude, stood alone in his pessimism and in his tmwatranted attack on the Turkish Cypriot side. Mr. Kyprianou’s former Foreign Minister, Mr. Rolaudis, however, issued a statement in Nicosia on 25 September, accusing Mr. Kyprianou of footdragging. 68. Attheendofthesecondround,theWretary- General issued a statement indicating that the parties had “agred to hold a final round of high-level proxiniiy t&h”, beginning on 26 November. Thi Secretary-General, sINssing the finality of the third round, requested both rider to come to the final round not with their bargaining positions but with their final positions. in order to be abk to take m&r political decisions. 69. Heeding the call of the SecretaryGeneraL the Turkish Cypriot side took CNCid political decisions 74. Both the Secretary-General and President Denktag underlined their adherence to and acceptance of the nature of the draft agreement as an integrated whole. Their positions were clear as to the task which lay ahead, to be tackled at the summit meeting. What remained to be done at the joint high-level meeting was to agree on three dates which had been left blank, to decide on setting up a working group or groups which could elaborate the details of the agreement and to endorse, as an integrated whole, the draft agreement. In order words, the summit of I7 January 1985 was to conclude the agreement negotiated during the proximity talks, which had lasted for five months. 70. Even the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Andreas Papandreou, known for his systematic opposition to peaceful negotiations, could not deny the constructive aDDrOaCh of President Denktas. Accordinn to the Aihkns News Agency’s report of-2 January l?Jt?S. Mr. Papandreou said that “the Turkish Cypriot side had undoubtedly made significant steps in the direction of a viable and just settlement of the Cyprus problem”. 75. However, Mr. Kyprianou disagreed with that viewpoint, a disagreement which, as we have all witnessed, led to the collapse of the joint high-level meeting. 71. Faced with the moment of decision and truth, Mr. Kyprianou was once again engulfed by his customary indecision and hesitation. He asked for. and got, a lo-day grace period for consultations in Nicosia and Athens. 76. On the morning of 17 January, the very first meeting of the summit, the Secretary-General reiterated to the two leaders that the meeting was to conclude an agreement aimed at establishing aFederal Republic of CYDNS. Mr. Denktas, concurring, stated that the adoption of the agreement “will markthe beginning of a new era in the relations between our two peoples, and we wholeheartedly hope it will lead to the early establishment of the Federal Republic of Cyprus, which will be a legacy to leave to future generations of Turkish and Greek Cypriots”. 72. The Secretary-General, in paragraph 50 of his report to the Security Council of 12 December 1984 [S/16858], stmsmarixed the important developments of this final round, stating that the Turkish side had conveyed to him its favourable reaction to all elements of his presentation, and that, in the course of further discuussions. he had received from the Turkish Cvoriot delegation understandings that were helpful in f&ther narmwing the gag. BY 12 December it was the Secretary-G&eraPa -assessment that the documentation for a draR agreement could be submitted to the joint high-level meeting. He expected that the interlocutors would, at the high-level meeting, conclude an agreement containing the necessary elements for a comprehensive solution ofthe problem, aimed at establishing a Federal Republic of Cyprus. 77. Mr. Kyprianou, however. as of the very first meeting on the morning of 17 January, raised fundamental obje.ctions to each and every pamgraph of the draft agreement. He dented even the existence of such an agreement. He questioned basic concepts. such as the quai pulit&al status of the two communities and bixonalityt which were already in the Vienna working tits and which were agreed unon until then. He was -~tpreparedtofiRin~blank-datesandagreetothe establishment ofworking groups. He &e&d the Turkish guarantee and opposed the establishment of a transitional federal Government. While Mr. Kyprianou was carrying on with his antics inside, his spokesman, Mr. Christofides, was calling the draft agreement a ghost document outside. - - 73. Speaking at a meeting of the Security Council six months ago, on 14 December 19&t, President Denktag stated in the clearest terms his stand vis-d-vfs the SetretaryQeneraPs package. He said at that time: “We attended all three stages with good will and with an ardent desire to see the end of the artificially created CYDNS problem. which has threatened my people for-two-decades and which continues tb threaten them. We helped the Secretary-General at all stages and accept&i his draft agreement for a comprehensive settlement of the problem. 78. That seemingly inexplicable behaviour of the Greek Cypriot side, which was tantamount to the total rejection of the d&t agreement i was the sate reason for the failure of the summit, and it did not go unnoticed by the world press. The Associated Press reported on 21 January: “As the Secretary-General underlined on many occasions and as has also been explicitly and clearly specified and stipulated in the text itself, the draft agreement constitutes, with all its components, an integrated whole. By its nature, this draft agreement is not open and does not allow for the introduction of reservations of any kind. With good will, J am sure “P&et de CUelIar’s statT was de&bed as baf?led by what was seen here as a marked ‘change in tone’ on Kyprianou’s part since the indirect talks . . . The Wuskin~tun POSI wrote on 21 January: “U.N. and Western officials said afterwards that one motive for Kyprianou’s stand was that the Athens government had discouraged an agreement on Cyprus.” 79. Such wrcentive observations as to the resuonsibility of Mr. Kyprianou and Athens can be endlessly extended. The fact of the matter and the CNX of the problem is that Mr. Kyprianou and his certain mentor did not then, and do not now, want a settlement in Cyprus which envisages guaranteeing the equal political status of the two communities. embodies the basic principles of bi-communality and bi-xonality and ensures the continuation of the Turkish guarantee, which is indispensable for the Turkish Cypriot side. Mr. Kyprianou admitted as much in a statement he gave to the Tar&g press agency of Yugoslavia, which was reported by the Greek Cypriot press on 11 February. In that statement Mr. Kyprianou justified his rejection of the dratt agremeent by pointing out that his acceptance would have diminished and weakened the Greek Cypriot propaganda. 80. For his unscrupulous wrecking of the summit Mr. Kyprianou was roundly condemned, not only abroad, but in southCyp~sas weU.TheGteekCyptiot press and the leaders of the two tnqjor Greek Cypriot political parties, mustering 67 per cent of the Oreek Cypriot votes and 23 of the 35 seats of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives, openly blamed Mr. Kyptianou for torpedoing the sununit. Again exampies attesting to this fact abound, and I am sure 911 members are aware of them. SutIiee it to say Uttu the climax of this round eomkmn&on of Mr. Kypr&enu by an overwhelming tn@rity of Ms people came with the adoption on 22 February of a resolution by the Greek Cvwiot House of Regresentetivea eeus&m Mr. Kyp&tou for his hand@ of the Cyptus proMe and calling on him to abide by the views oftbe m&rity or proclaim early presidential eleethms in the Greek Cypriot wne. 81. Calls and demonstrations for Mr. Kypriands resignation slill contimre uttabated. The eonelusion of the AKEt Seeretary-Generat. Mr. F&mioanttou, clearly expressed in his statement during the censure d&ale. applies to most ofthe Greek Cypriots. This was his conclusion: “Kyprianou never adopted the basis of federation which was agreed upon by Makarios and Denkto(. and Kyprianou never exerted any efforC for the solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of a federation. Kyprianou never respected the summit agreements.” 83. At a time when the internal political climate on the Greek Cypriot side is. to say the least, in a state of confusion and uncertainty, it is difticult to understand why theGreekCypriot Administration, instead of trying !o put its own house in order, tries to raise questions about the internal democratic processes that are taking place on the Turkish Cypriot side. Those are purely internal matters for the Turkish Cypriot people, who are in the process of electing the organs and the people who will be authorixed and mandated to represent them in all matters of State, including the negotiationsaimedattindingajustandlastJngsohttiontotbe Cyp~s problem. Elections in Cyprus were always held separately by ttte two cottunuttities, and there never was any question of the two communities casting ballots in the aame eketion. That baa always been the order of things in Cyprus. 84. If the Greek Cypriot Administration, which is devoid of any legality or kgititnaey and to which the Turkish people of Cyprus owe no a&ianee, eontittues to exploit and tttistepreaent the democratic processes in northern Cyprus. the Government of the Turkish Remrblic of Nor&em Cyrmnt will be fuU~ ittstiRal in doubting whether them i&yone on the C&&k Cypriot sidewitlttbeRtllmattdatedthe~Cygeiotpoopk to enter into negotktiuns with the TurkHIt Cypriots. 85. OnlytbeotherdeythatA~iaUne tions in the Tttrkiab Rep&lie ofHortkm Cyprus. We hOpCthBtthClrsqucncYOfrucb3UiOllS,WhiChcrpmple upontlteprincipkofRe&tttofthepreas.willbe comzetJyev~uatedbyworldpublicophtionatuikseen -oflackof~wiuoathcpartofthe ~Cypriotride. 86. t-tvmiectauthe-ofthe GteekCy$ots&&ttheTurkish&riotsJdeis impM&gsettkrsfiomTutkeyintheTurkishRepuMic of Nor&cm Cyprus, and I dmw the Council’s attention tomyktter~~l2Junel98JtocheSecrrtorVOcnersl [SIIi261. annex]. 87. We have studied with the utmost WC*& contents ofulcaddMdumlorkrcpoltofthcscc~taryGeneml pcrtahing to his good o&es and observations 88. First. the draft agreement of 27 November presented at the New York summit, which constituted. in all its aspects, an integrated whole and which the Turkish Cypriot side had accepted in rofo. could not be changed-without the consent and agreement of the Turkish Cypriot side. This vital and central aspect of the Secretarv-General’s annroach and of the draft agreement had been stressid in the Secretary&eneral’s previous repcrts of I2 December 1984 [S//&358 and Add.11 and 2 February 1985 [i&id., Add.21. 94. Since it is now reported in paragraph 8 that “the obstacles which had stood in the way of the acceptance of the documentation by the Greek Cypriot side” have been removed, it is imperative for the Turkish Cypriot side to be informed whether Mr. Kyprianou now accepts the basic concepts and principles embodied in the original documentation, such as equal political status of the two sides, bi-zonality. international guarantees, security and the regulation of the three freedoms in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Denktag-Makarios agreement, or whether he continues to reject these, as he did at the January summit. The Turkish Cypriot side should know whether Mr. Kyprianou now accepts the documentation of 27 November as it stood. 89. However, it was ascertained as a result of the preliminary study made by the Turkish Cypriot side that the new text. as compared with the original documentation, contained substantial differences as regards both the substance and the procedure to be followed. These differences run counter to the Secretary-General’s “integrated whole” approach. The Turkish Cypriot side has already informed the Secretary&eneral that it will communicate to him its views and proposals as reGards the substantial differences atIer the elections on 23 June. 95. Statements by Mr. Kyprianou since the January summit demonstrate that he has not changed his previous position on these basic concepts and principles. Partic&rly since mid-April. he has-availed-him&f of all opportunities to reafiii that he did not take into acwih the legitimate security concerns of the Turkish Cypriots, that he did not accept the concept of bi-zonalitv and that he had no other nreoccuoations than r&ing the unilateral and dis&mh&g interests of Hellenism in Cyprus. We hope the Greek Cypriot leader can explain first to his community, then to the Turkish Cypriots, his genuine position on ti&se points. 90. Furthermore, it is misleading to speak of a “single consolidated text” since, as we understand it. it does not cover all of the substantial elements of the original documentation, which constituted an integrated whole. 91. Besides, the or@ and status of certain newly introduced elements, as well as their relationship to the new text, remain ambiguous for us. 92, Paragraph 3 refers to contacts with the two sides and may lead to the impression that, following the collapse of the January summit, the exercise of con- 8oUdathtg the texts ha8 been initiated 8nd carried out with the eD%ent of the two sides. This would be nlirleading, since the Turkish Cypriot side has not given its consent to such an exercise, which has been carried out through contacts and consultations with the Greek Cypriot side only, in mid-March and early April, as stated in paragraph 4. The Turkish Cypriot side was informed of the conclusions of these contacts for the first time in mid-April. 96. The Turkish Cypriot side, aRer going through the experieuce of the summit meeting in January, has indicated to the Secretary-General on more than one occasion that it feels the strong need for a renewed mandate in order to enable its elected organs to iake up all the substantive questions with the Secretary-General. In the meantime, the Turkish Cypriot side has officially reconfirmed its constructive position on a bi-tonal federal solution. 93, With regard to pamgraph 5. I have the following observat~. First of al!, the prob!em cannot be presented as a sin&e Dhenomenon. as if the Greek Cvoriot 97. As regards the comments of the spokesman of the Secretary-General referred to in paragraph 5. I should like to o&t out that these are eritireiv irrelevant. and 1 must say they cast a shadow on ihe basis oi the mission of good oflices. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus came into being in November 1983 as a manifestation of the right to self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot people.;nder circumstances known to us all. It is as legitimate an entity as the Greek Cypriot in January. Mr. Ky$anou indulged in interpretations in January which would invalidate any subsequent “a!%mative reply” on the same basis. Furthermore, his public statements following this reponedly at?%- mative reply clearly reveal that he continues to reject 98. As IO paragraph 7 of the addendum. we should like to state that the appointment of a third member of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus was unduly delayed by the foot-dragging tactics of the Greek Cypriot side with a view IO exploiting this humanitarian issue in international forums. We very much hope that the Greek Cypriot side will finally let the Committee carry on with its well-defined humanitarian task. 99. The resolution adopted by the Council contains elements that are unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriot side. 100. The resolution refers to an illegal entity as the Government of Cyprus, which is abhorrent to us. Need we say that that reference is devoid of any constitutional, legal or moral basis? The bicommtmal. legitimate Government of Cyprus was destroyed by force in I%3 by its Greek Cypriot wing and ceased to exist from then on. The entity which replaced it is a usurping, masquerading entity to which no allegiance is owed by the Turkish Cypriot side. 101. In the fourth preambular paragraph a reference is made to “other relevant resolutions”. Since the Turkish Cypriot side has either rejected in toto, or accepted subject to reservations, the resolutions in question, this reference too is unacceptable to it. 102. In paragraph 3 a reference is made to thr “present mandate”. We have to stress that the mandate in question is not compatible with the radiclllly changed conditions. 103. Notwithstanding its unavoidable ejection In fore of the oresent resolution. the Turkish Cvmiot side is nevehheless prepared to accept the P&ence of UNFICYP on the territory of the Turkish Republk of Northern Cyprus on the same basis as that stated in December I984 lsee 2565rh meefinrr. ooro. 57l. Thus our position coutinues to be that Ihe principles, the scope, the modalities and the procedures ofco-ouemlionbetween the authorities dthe Turkish Repubik of Northern Cyprus and UNFKYP shall be based only on decisions which shall be taken solely by the Govemment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. 104. Lastly, I should like IO reiterate our wpporc for the mission of good of&es of the Secretary43enetal emanating from Security Council resolution 367 (1975). and, as I have stressed in the foregoing, the Turkish Cypriot side will be ready to contact the Secretary- General within the context of his mission of good oftices after the ekctions on 23 June. IO5 At this juncture I think it would be proper for me IO point out a fact of which I am sure all members ofthe 106. Before concluding. I should like to take this opportunity, first of all, to express our profound thanks for the efforts of the Secretary-General within the context of his mission of good offtces. We are grateful to him. Our sincere thanks and appreciation go to the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-Getseral in Cyprus, Mr. Holger, for the manner ht which he has been carrying out his duties. Our thanks go also to the Commander of UNFICYP, Major-General Greindl. and the men under his command, for the way in which they have been carrying out their duties. We thank also all the memkrs of the United Nations Secretariat who are dealing with the question of Cypnts. To the new third member of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, Mr. Wunh, we convey our wishes for success.

The next speaker is the rep resentative of Turkey, on whom 1 now call. 108. Mr. TURKMEN fTurkey): Mr. President. I had the pleasure of congratulatiing you duting a prrviotts meeting of the Council. We are gratiRed to see you prrsidingover this meeting&he Council also. I wish to thank you and the other members of the Cotmeil for graating me this oppottunity of tnaMng a statement. 109. IthaskensixtnortthssinceUteCouneilme!for he extension of UNFICYP’r mandate. On that oceoskm Itmsli, meeringl, the Camcil had before it the secrelary.GelrcrPi’s pefiodic repm 6Jf 12 lkamber 1984 [S/J6658 and A&f./], which desctibed the outcome of the proximity t&s duritM the ft~ce&# five months, leading to hi6 call for awl high-level meeting ~gJ~W*~~xpnssad theaeceasary&rneutafora&&bansiveaoJuti& aimedatestablisMngaFederalRePubhcofCyprus wouldkeoaeh@iatthatnteuiag.Thiawaaahtothe expeU&oaoftbeTurkisbsideaodia&edoftheinter- MliDMlpUbliC,lVhkh.bDlhkforrdldlU~rumkaldeci&st&tbytbeTurkishCcypiotiuubn&s by acceptirtg in full. on 27 November 1964. the draft 4mement worked out by the secretary.GMeral in lbe proximity talks. 110. Attheopetdngofthesummitmeetingonl7JanuarytheSecretaryGeneraJtmderliaedthe(ilRiAfpIIce ofthenewstagethathadbeenreachedhltbesearchfor a camprehemive solaion in Cyprus. He stated: “If you are determined IO reach an agreement. a unique chance now exists. If the moment is lost, I am 116. One point should be extremely clear: whatever rights exist in south Cyarus for the Greek Cypriots, the s&e rights exist in fill in the north for ihk Turkish Cypriots. On no account are the Turkish Cypriot rights any less than those of the Greek Cyprio&: This fact should be well understood, since it is the heart of the whole question of Cyprus. Any other approach closes the door to a federation which must rest on the political equality of the two peoples in the island. 112. I do not believe it is necessary to dwell at length on the grave responsibility of the Greek Cypriot leader in deliberately wasting an historic opportunity for conciliation between the two peoples of Cyprus last January. The international public has already passed a clear judgement in this regard. For those who did not wish to apportion responsibility in January, the develobments durinn the following five months must have been revealing. fhey only hack to look at the internal crisis and turmoil in the Greek Cypriot side to draw their conclusions. We have witnessed how the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives censured Mr. Kyprianou’s actions in New York and demanded his resignation. 117. The Greek Cypriots never had and still do not have any constitutional, legal or legitimate right whatsoever toclaim to represent the Turkish Cypriot people and hence the whole-of Cyprus. In the abs&ce ofajdint federal government, it is the inalienable right of the Turkish-Cypriot people to be represented oily by the authorities and organs elected freely by themselves. They cannot be expected to live in a political vacuum. 113. In view of all this, I had difficulty in believing what I heard when Mr. Moushoutas blamed Resident Denktag for the failure of the January meeting. He should have at least read the latest report of the Secretary-General, which says: 118. I wish to place on record before the Security Council out appreciation for the way in which the Turkish Cypriot people have exercised their natural right to organize their political and legal life through popular mandate. Following the constitutional referendum on 5 May 1985, presidential elections were held on 9 June. The process of electing the people who will k authorized to noresent the Turkish Cvoriots in all matters, including ihe negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem, will k completed with the holding of general elections in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on 23 June. “As 1 Momted the Council in my report of 2 February [S/l68%?/A&f.21. the Turkish Cypriot side stated at that meeting that it accepted the draft agreenmt as combed in the documentation which 1 bad presented” [see Sll7227lAdd.l, para. 21. The Secretary-General further says: “My appmach since January has taken into R&QUIH tk fact that the Turkish Cypriot side had agreedtothedocumen tation” [Md., para. at. 119. We wish to commend the oflicial policy of the Turkish Cypriot side of leaving the door bpen-to a bizonal federal sohttion to k negotiated freely between tk two sides in tk island. The Constitueitt Assembly of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, on 12 March 19g5, while adopting the new draft constitution, passed a resolution stating that tk Constitution il has approved does not hinder the establishment of a partnership within tk framework of a bicommunal and bi-zonal federation. The commitment of tk Turkish Cypriot side to such a solution has been stressed on numerous occasions at the highest level. So what is unconditional acceptance for everybody else, including the Secretary-General, is rejection for Mr. Moushoutas. By this twisted logic, Resident Denktag will have to display real intransigence next time to earn the appreciation of the Greek Cypriots. 114. Mr. Moushoutas has also made some other bizarre assenions. In one of them he has mtrayed the Turkish Cypriots as martyrs because of& pres&ce of Turkish troops. TheTurkish Cypriots, who believe that the Turkish troops came to save them from tk onslaught and the oppression of the Greek Cypriots, will, I am afraid, not k touched by this solicitude. 120. In contrast to these developments with regard 10 the Turkish Cypriot side, the record of the Greek Cyp riot Administration during the past six months has indeed been far from giving any hope for conciliation between the two peoples of Cyprus. The Greek Cyp- I 15. We have heard More and we have heard today once again unwarranted allegations against the demo- 121. Naturally, the Turkish side has been watching T*ery closely the exchanges between the Greek Cypriot leader and the Greek Cypriot political parties which oppose his policies. The Turkish Cypriots will certainly wish to know what sort of a solution the Greek Cypriot side intends to seek and which of the Greek Cypriot positions is to be taken seriously. 122. If we search for some positive signs, we have to acknowledge first the efforts of the Secretary-General within the framework of his mission of good offices, which my Government continues strongly to sunnort. We recognize that his task has been difftcult and trying. but we hone it will not remain unrewarded. With his deep knowledge of the realities of Cyprus, the Secretary-General has acted with dedication and remarkable patience and moderation. I wish to assure him of my Government’s full confidence and support. 123. It is clear that the Turkish Cypriot authorities are positively and formally committed to the search for a genuine federation between the two peoples of the island. They will soon be ready, as stressed at the highest level, to pursue the peace talks with a renewed popular mandate. 124. The Turkish Government will continue to play its traditional role of moderation and will strive to facilitate the search for a bi-zonal federal solution in the island. 125. We have studied carefully the section of the report of the Secretary-General dealing with the good oftices mission [S//7227/Add./. seer. 4. Mr. Koray has just expressed the views of his Government on the points contained in this section. 1 should like also to make a few comments on our part. 126. First. after the collapse of the high-level meeting in January, the problem is no longer simply to en6ttre a change of heart on the part of Mr.zFutznt from him a delayed w In refusing to accept this documentation in January: Mr. Kyprianou had interpreted tbe substantive points it contained in a manner which immediately invaJidated and vitiated any expression of acceptance at a later stage. It is clear that what Mr. Kyprianou wants is to give the impression that he now agree6 with t&e doeumentation while continuing to reject its fundamental concepts. The latest statements of Mr. Kyprianou have once more shown that he is very far from being reeontiled to the concept of a bicommunal and bi-zonal federation. 127. Secondly, in agreeing to substantial concessions during the proximity talks, Resident Denktag has acted on the assumption that the documentation submitted to the January meeting formed an integrated whole, as repeatedly stated by the Secretary-General. 128. Thirdly, the statement contained in paragraph 3 of the section on good off&s that the substance of the documentation has been preserved and that its various elements have been incorporated in a single consolidated draft agreement calls for some clarification. As Mr. Koray has pointed out, the text now presented does in the documentation submitted in January. We understand that some additional elements to the draft agreetheir connection wiih the draft agreemeht remains undefined. 129. Fourthly, again as stated by Mr. Komy, to the extent that they cover the same points, the draft agreement now put forward presents numerous substantial and tundamental diietences from the document submitted in January. 130. Fifwy, it is clear from the report of the Secretary-General that the new approach wa6 first discussed with the Greek Cypriots and that the drawl agreement was communicated to the Turkish Cypriot side only after the presumed agreement of the Greek Cypriots. Since, as I have stressed earlier, a new negotiating pmeess had to be initiated bcfaua ofthe faihtn ofthe hi&level meeting in January. eon6t~Itation6 with both sides Mote Snalii the new document were impaative. 131. Iwi6halsotorefertopamgmph6ofthe6ame seetion.~sMemeat r&rfedtoinlMsuamEmPb~ toIdyirr&vMttotbeinterMl&veIopm~hi~ emCypru6.Ttterefeten&tmandtheele&on6inthe Turki6hKepublicofNorthemCyprushavenotchanged thetuutttwoftheTttrki6hCypriotStategroclaimedon I5 Novembr IBL WbTirjltey-havethe bottom to raw&e the Turkish Kepublic of Northern Cypnts. GlIWMMtIiCSSfCffCCCi(hcrtO~otMttO recognbthisState,buttheyltaveno~tointafere in its internal &airs. 132. Thestatementdthesf&te6manplace6aJ6oin douktheba6isonwhiehthemiuioaofthegoodofftts of the Secretary-General is conducted. The Mute prerequisite of that mission is that the two sides in Cyptus6houbJbetmatedonastrictba6i6ofequaJitya6 the political wthoiities repre6ent.ing the two peoples of the island. Any departure from this basis cannot be reconciled with the mission of& offIces. Themfore. we regard the statement of the spokesman as unfortu- 133. Regarding the paragraphs containing the observations [ibid., sect. II], I will refrain from elaborating on these, because most of what I have already said applies also to them. I will only note that the Secretary- General expresses strong optimism for the future. There is nothing that would make us rejoice more than to see this optimism vindicated. He will have our full support in his future endeavours to revive the negotiations between the two sides on a basis and within a procedure which is acceptable to both sides. 134. Turning to the resolution just adopted by the Council. I wish to reafilrm our fundamental objections to its contents. As in the case of previous resolutions, it does not rest on a legally or politically sound or valid all directly interested parties. The pren&es on which it is based constitute major obstacles on the way to a negotiated solution in Cyprus. 135. The resolution is once again based on a so-called authorixation from a so-called governmental entity whose iuridical and de facto existence. as an authority capabl&f representing&d comprising the two people; of Cvnrus. has ceased since December 1963. It furthermore’refem to resolutions, in the fourth preambular naramanh. which were never accepted by two of the &r&gym interested parties and prolongs a mandate which fails to take into account the radical changes in the aetual situation. 136. This resolution has been r+eted in its entirety by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Turkey cannot aeeeut it for the same reasons. Taking into aceaunt the iccommtndatlon ofthe Secretary5&eral for the continued presence of UNPICYP, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cypnrs has indicated its wIRlngness to go along with the presence of this Force ln Northern Cyprus aad to umtinue to co-operate with it, sul&et exehtsively to the fieeisiotts taken by the Govemment of the Turkish Reoublle of Northern Crpnrs. 137. As previously stated and reconfhmed at this meethtg, the principles, scope, modalities and m Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and UNPICYP canonlybebasedondecIsionrtakenbytheGovemmerit of the Republic of Northern Cyprus alone. The Turkish Government wishes to neonfinn its complete agreement with this position. The contacts betwe& the Turkish authorities in Cyurus and UNFICYP will continue to take place on the basis of the Turkish Cypriot declaration. 138. With regard to pamgraph 2, I wish to confii our continuing supporl for the mission of gorxI oIYices of the Secretary-General emanating from Security Council resolution 367 (1975) and to underline that the Turkish Cypriot side has indicated that it will enter into 139. In conclusion, I wish to thank the Secretary General. to whom we are nrateful for his aood offices. I should like to express &r appreciatiin to MJor- General Guenther Greindl. Commander of UNFICYP. and his statf, as well as to Mr. James Holger, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, and to his colleagues. who all continue to enjoy the full confidence of the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish authorities. 1 should like also to wish Mr. Paul Wurth well in his task as the third member of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus. Turkish Cypriot authorities had agreed to his appointment nearly six months ago. We hope that his contribution to the humanitarian work of the Committee will not meet with the same impediments which delayed his appointment.

It is an indicationof the intractabilitv of the nroblems of Cvorus that UNFICYP has now entered ititwenty-first year of operation. The search for a durable solution of Cyprus’s problems has been a continuing effort, and hopes for a settlement have been raised and dashed on more than one occasion. The Secretary-General’s most recent endeavours have engendered an atmosphere of positive expectation, and the opportunity to bring lasting peace to Cyprus must not be allowed to slip out of reach. 141. Australia’s interest in and concern for a peaceful settlement on that island is heightened by the presence in Australia of sizeable communities whose national orlghts lie in Greece, in Turkey and in Cyprus itself. Lie all other Australians, they look forward to an early resolution of the islands problems. 142. It is the tlrm belief of my Government that this can be effected only through negotiation and diiogue. Au&alla supports- Secufiy Council resolutions-541 (1983) and 550 (19&1) and the path towards a just aad lasting settlement in Cyprus mapped out in those and previous Council resolutions. We are aware that treading that Path involves diicult choices for all concerned, but we must take heart from the Secretary- General’s view that there is a basis on which a just and la&g solution can be achieved. 143. We remain convinced that the eI%rts of the Secretarv-cleneral towards a negotiated settlement continue-to present the best means of progress. The sea-etary-General’s report of 1 I June 1985 on his mission of go&l of&es caIlS for the suppoti of the international community for the further diplomatic activity which is to take place. The Secretary-General’s activities should be given this support. Indeed, in adopting its resolution today the Council has indicated its continuing support for the mission of good o&es. The Australian Govemment appeals to all the parties to continue to cooperate with the Secretary-General in his endeavours. Equally. while these efforts continue, it is essential that no side 145. In the view of my Government, UNFICYP continues to play a valuable peace-keeping and humanitarian role. Australia has actively participated in UNFICYP by maintaining a contingent of civilian policemen in the Force. That SUDDOI? will be maintained. Yet my Government can only be concerned at the growing deficit in the UNFICYP Special Account. The rest& of this deficit is that the costs borne by the troopcontributing countries have been met only until June 1978. The international community, time and again, has renewed the mandate of UNFICYP. In the interests of fairness. and in the exercise of shared responsibilities, it is clearly time for the members of that community to reflect on and react to the financial burdens this creates. There is clearly a need for a very substantial increase in voluntary contributions to the Account, as well as in the number of countries making contributions, and we urge action to make up the deticit. 146. Let me conclude by looking to the day when a negotiated settlement of the diicult problem ofCyprus is achieved. That day will be a notable one for the cause of intemationai co-operation embodied in the organization. but its most signifkant result would be felt in a Cyprus whose people could all live in peace and stability. Our hope is that that is not far distant.

The representative ofcyprus has asked to speak. 1 now call upon him.

I was hoping that the new representative of Turkey and my new countryman-who is here under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure as an individual but speaks in reality for Turkey-would not come up with the sama worn-out. faded and overstated argument about the legal standing of my Government. my President and my delegation. I was hoping that they would be or&al by is ;eG well known. 1 waswrong. i49. However, I will not spend my time in trying to argue the point he chose to belabour. since the Council, all countries and the United Nations and other world organizations recogrtize my Government. I will simpiy brush it aside as another Turkish argument timing from a country which for the past I 1 years has been kneeling on the neck of a small, non-aligned country and, with a big-bully mentality, wishes to imagine that it has exter- 150. We heard with amazement that the preliminary draft agreement had only three empty spaces to be tilled in. It is not so. As I stated before, this document provides that the tetritotial aspect-a very important aspect-and the creation of working groups were to be discussed and agreed upon at the high-level meeting. The document is still contidential; I cannot possibly circulate it. 15 I. 1 highly appreciated the representative of Turkey’s pointing out to me. in the report of the Secretary- General. the reference to acceptance by Mr. Denktag, but 1 should like to draw his attention also to the fact that, according to the report, Mr. Denktag accepted the draft agreement. In fact. it was a preliminary draft for a high-level agreement. For the draft to become an agreement there must be discussion and negotiations. That, Mr. Dettktag failed to do, and by refusing to discuss at atI, he wrecked, in reality, the high-level meeting, as he intended to do. 152. The CNX of the matter with regard to this highlevel meeting is that the Turkish side and Mr. Lb&tag were forced by an international outcry to make some concrete prqmak towards a negotiated settlement, but under no circumstances were they then, or are they now, wiBing to negotiate on the withdrawal of the occupation troops and on adequate international #lIarantes. 153. Through misrePreaentation of facts the Turkish aide tmught. and for a while at leaat. I must admit, succcedcd. in cxeatha miskadii imRtessions as to Mr. De&q’s actuil conduct-at -the hi&-level ntcatina and his s&me of tomedoiap the !krem~- even on matten thst express& verbis bediscuasedand~atthe~,whlkatute same time try@ to transfer the nsponsibUity for the faihm of the meeting onto the President of Cyprus. 1 could not eottceal Born the Council the disappointment felt at the distorted and orchestrated picture given after the above high-level meeting in some quarters that tbclne&ngfaikdbecauseDuraidedidnotsignpapcrs wtlicheuntainadbknksonvit8lkslleswhkhwe.m spceifldy agreed to k eonstnluively discussed, as tbe&retary-Generalsaid,withaviewtoachieving ll~ during tk higb=kvcl meeting. 154. These ad&ding impressions skilfully created by Turkish propgad are being reversed. One afler the oIher. impartial observers increasingly recognize that the new series of ilkgal cessationist actions by tbe Turkish Cypriot leadzdtip, with the connivance and titll support of Ankara, strongly attests to the insin- 156. I can only reply that in Cyprus there is. in law and in fact, genuine democracy, and that freedom of expression is an essential element of these genuine democratic traditions. As 1 stated before, I was not at all surprised by the exploitation of these differences. I was, however, impressed by the fact that the Turkish side knows in detail the positions of our leaders in Cyprus. That is admirable. Allow me to ask the representatives of the other side that standard question heard on a United States television news programme: does it know-or does the representative of Turkey know-where its party leaders are? 157. An eminent and objective authority such as the Secretary-General said on the subject of the outcome of the high-level meeting, “I think it would be unfair to blame the Greeks.” 158. The current report of the Secretary-General, contained in document S/l7227 and Add.1 and Add.2, is before the Council, and his views have more we@ by far than those of the Turkish representative. Furthermore, the Secretary-General’s statement that he expected a constructive discussion at the high-level meeting speaks for itself. lJ9. There was a denial as to the existence of settlers, thousands of settlers, in my little country. There are so many of them that they h&e even cm&I a political party, and its leader, Mr. Ismall Texer, who became a secalkd minisier in Dmktags r&ime, in a press conference held on 22 December 1978 openly declared that the aims of his party were “to achieve the pa&on of Cypnga and its annexation to Turkey”. On 17 August 19gl he admitted that “the settIers came to Cyprus with the approval of Turkey; that they represented an agriculturalforce;thatalmostallofthembeeamecitixensof the so-called Turkish Cypriot State and that their purpose was to stay forever in Cyprus”. 160. In November 1979 Mr. Gxgur had this to say to a Mr. Curler, a member of the DenktaI regime, when the latter trkd to hide the fact that settlers had been brought to Cyprus: “Do you think we come from the Moon? Do YOU try to deceive us too by saying things you say to the foreigners? Re a little bit serious when you are talking.”

1 call on the representative of Greece. 163. A reference was made to a statement of the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Papandreou, who early in January stated that he was delighted to see that the Turkish side had made serious concessions. 164. The statement is true, but allow me to present it in favour of the Prime Minister, in the sense that it attests to his good faith. When the statement was made, Mr. Papandreou was genuinely convinced that the Turkish side had made serious concessions. He could never have conceived or imagined that Mr. Denktag would later say, on 17 January: “1 came not to negotiate”-as was clearly foreseen in the preliminary draft agreement- “but I came only to sign”. 165. In his earnest desire to see an early solution to the problem, Mr. Papandreou had the political integrity to state and to reconnize certain concessions he thouaht had really been made at the time. but after 17 Jam&y. he felt deceived and disillusioned, along with many others.

I should like to place on record the appreciation of the presidency for the untiring efforts of the Secretarv-General in oursuance of his 167. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda.

As we annroach the end of the period covered in the annual report of the Security Cot&l submitted to the General Assembly in aceordante with Artkle 24, paragraph 3, of the Charter, that is, from 16 June 1984 to I5 June 1985, the Council has agreed that I place on record that since 16 June 1984 the members of the Security Council have been engaged ln raisedinthea~ualreportsoftheSecretary-Generalon the work of the organizaton presented to the thirtyseventh, thirty-eighth and thirty-ninth sessions of the General Assembly, during which members have explored possibk ways and means of enhancing the efYectiveness of the Council in accordance with the powers entrusied io ii under ihe Charter. These consultations are b&g pursued informally. The Council presented an interim account of the progress of its work in the note by its Resident circulated as document S/l6760 of tB September I%%+. The meeting rose LII 6.40 p.m. ti~ha in United Nations, New York oo400 90.6143~March 1992-2.050