S/PV.262 Security Council

Inasmuch as the, Working Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission has postponed Us meeting which was scheduled for Friday, 5 March, the Security Couneil will meet on that date at 10.30 a.m. TWO HUNDRED .AND SIXTY-SECOND DEUX MEETING Heid at Lake Success, New Y(J'K. on Friday, 5 March 1948, at 10.30 a.m. President .. Mt. T. F. TSIANG (China). Present.. The representatives of the following coul1tries: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombis, Frânce, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socin" list Republic,UniOfiof SûvietScciAlist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. . Argentine, France, soviétiques, s. Provisional ngend4 . (doéument SjAgenda 2(2) 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. 2. ne Palestine question : . (a) .First monthly progress repott to the Secu- rity Council of the United Nations Pales~ tine Commission (document S/663). (b) First special report to the Security Coun- cil : The problem of security in Palestine; submitted by the United Nations Palestine Commission (document 8/676). 6. Atlôption of the agenda 7. Continuation of the discussion of the Palestine question On the invitation of the President, Mr.Lisicky, Cha/rman afthe United Nations Palestine Com- sidont mission; Mahmoud Fawzi Bey, the repreSentative la 01 Egypt,' and Rabbi Abba Billel 8ilver, the representanve of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, took their places at theSecurity Council table. The syst~m of simultaneous interpretation was imroduced at tbis point.. . Rabbi SILVER (Jewish Agency for Palestine): The Jewish Agèncy if; grateful for the opportunity 1 lestine) to make some additlonal observations on the subject whieh is DOw.before the Security Council. Wc should like ta give our reactions to the draft resolutions [documents 8/685 and 8/6881 which In the first place, we should like to comment on .the statement which was. made by the repre- sentative of Egypt [255th meeting], to ~$e effect that " ...itmust be admitted that so far. the United Natj.ons' .efforts in the :study of solutions·0ther than partition have been less than casuaI. The G~eral Assembly hardly gave any of those solu- tions acursory look... The General Assembly did not, either in' committee or in plenary session, give any reasonable scope for discussion of any plan but partition". It should be recatIed that the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine submitted to the General Assembly two solutions for' the Palestine problem, a majority.and a minority solutîon.1 The minority solution found no support.· The' Arab States put. fOl}Vard their own proposals. In order to consider aUpropo!!als, the Ad Hoc Cominittee on.the Palestinian Question.'2ppointed· tWo .8ub- committees, the OIietoconsider the majori,ty report.whicQ- proposedpartition, and the o~er tô consider the proposals of the hab States. Both sub-committees worked for weeks and both sub-' mitted separate reports to the Ad Hoc Committee. The representativesof the severa! .Arab States had the fullest opportunity, ·of,which·they fully availed themselves,. ~o advocate .. the proposaI which they favoured: Many' days'~" the members will recall, were consumed in thjs di~çussion. Whenthe vote was finally tzken, the report of th~ minC?rity,was decisivèlY·rejected. .' Wesubmit,therefore~'thatit isquite inaccurate to state· that cc the "G:eneral 4;.ssembly did not, either in 'committee9r in. ple~ary ,session, give any reasonable scope for discussion of any plan but partition". The .Ad Hoc.CommitteeoIl. thePalestinian Question appointed still a third st.b-committee-a Conciliation Sub-Commîttee composed of three members comprising the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee,ffJ,e Rapporteur of. tpe .Commîttee (the representative of. Iceland) and. the Vice- Chairman of the'Committee, the representative of Siam. This Sub-Committee.was given full powers to undertâke·. efforts at conciliation between the Jews and the Arabs. Efforts were made by tbis Sub-Committee to find a formula, other than those of the majority· and minority proposaIs, whîch would be lÎlutually acceptable. According to the testimony of the Chairman of this Sub- Committèê, Mr. Evatt, the ground Was eXp'lored nom every possible point of view and ft we l'eached,the conclusion that right up to the present time no more could be done n. Mr. Thor Thors of Ièeland,a member ofthis Committee, address- " The Arab Higher Committee was approached by the United Nations Speèial Committee' on Palestine (UNSCOP) on· more than one occa.sion and was invited to assist in the work of UNSCOP but it refused.... "Nowat the eleventh hou!', just when the vote is to take· place, there'are criticisms of the work of the conciliation Sub-Committeeandvàgue suggestions concerning the posslbility of concilia';' tion.' Actually. .the conciliation Sub-Conïmittee med .everything possible, but in: vain. Moreover, up tothe last fewminutes therehas been no concreteor specific offerof·.conciliation .or ·com.~ promise." . ., . moment In a similar vein, the representative of the United States, Mr. Herschel Johnson, speaking at that same meeting,2 deêbired: . .. This Palestine problem'has.,been ofconcem to thë' world now,for the .past thirty years. ~Ith.lJS been the sl1bject of innumerable inquiries and cemmissions and aIl conceivahle types of solution have been proposed. - " As you knoW', the Peel Commission, in 1937, recommended th~ partitionpfPalestine. However, subsequent events prevehted definitive .action al that tùne.' Since the conclusion of the. Second World' War, renewed atteD1pts have been made to solve the Palestine·problem. .~ The work of the Anglo-American.Commis- _ sion of Inquiry of 1946 was followedby confe';' rences in London in which'the socalled Grady- Morrison·. proposals were' evolved.· There·· weté further conferences in London last winter. .. Finally, in May of 1947, an inquiry wa~ tindertaken under the auspices of the United Nations. During all of these studies the varions solutions of the Palestine problem. hadbeen'given careful consideration. 1 knowfrom my study of the report of'the' United Nations Special Com- IllÎttee on Palestine tbat. jt made every effort'.to arrive at a solution wliich would be acceptable to both the Jews a.nd the Arabs." :L See OfficialRecords of.the se,~ond session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 128th meeting, page 1414• . "Ibid., page 1416.- untractabl~ p:roblems •. facing .theP~estine Com- mission· are .rapidly .bec()~g insolu!,le as delay is furtherproti,.'~cted.an(;lhope rececies that the COmmisSi()Il'wP1, be adequately equippecl to tak~ up the, immense.·responsibilities. imposed upon it ", The United,States proposaI for new consult;:l- tions introduces anew an element of.'uncertainty . which invariably inhibits' ccnc1l1sive. action. 1t will be sèiZed upon. by the opponents.,of the United Nations decision as' another opportunity to reopentbe whole question, to force· through those solutionswhich were rejected hy the United Nations' or whieh ·failedof 'acceptance timeand again~on otheroccasiôils; or,failing in a11 this, to attempt to' entangle and prevent âll action. ~ 8I'a.veintemation~problem cannot be solvedby .indecisionor postponement. 'It. was indecîsionand lac::k of forthrïghtness on the part of ,the Mandatory Power ofPaIestine, .. the irresistibleoperation of feèble cOllnsels", to use a phrase of "Burke, whicli ·led tothàt grave deterioration in the country which:finàllyfotced the Mandatory P()wer to turn totheUnited .N"atiol1$ for.a fiilal solutiol1 of the problem. The United Nations aeèepted that:s()lemn respollsibi- li!Y andproceeded,e~estly and deliber~tely,tQ investigate the problenl"de nova, to. study its historyandâll of its pre,gen.,t irrJ.plicatfons. Il appointed ..a. c0mmittee, the. niembers 'of .which were sCJ.'UpuIously selected fortheir iriJ.partiality ,and n~utrality, to make the investigation and to bring..in reconpnendàti0lls;After prolonged and serious dÎ$cussion of their recommendations, the United.Nations. oVerwhe]mingly' acCept~d, in rese}. lution 181 c.:œ.. the plan. to set up two~depen­ dent States in Palestine,. one Jewish and one Arab,within the ,framework ·of an economic union, and an intemationai regimeïn Jerusalem. The nations which voted for this plan fully reâlized 1hat what they were doing was not just endorsing. sorne abstract îdea,.·' or making a recommendation which would then be left sus- pended in mid-air, They were, deciding upon a .'The United Nations Palestine Commission has a1ready done an enormous amount of effective wOlk in connexion with flle execution of this plan. The preparatory steps have neady all been taken. The Commission is now on the eve of taking over its responsibilities in Palestine, as the date of the termination of the Mandate on 15 May rapidly approaches. The United Kingdom Colonial Secremry stated before this body at the 253rd meeting that the Palestine Adnûnistration is takingaU practical steps toterminate its control by 15 May andthat t..1te withdrawaI-of United Kingdom forces and stores isalready wel1 under way. He further declare9. at the 26Qth 1lleeting that .. The date oftermination .of ,our responsibility isirrevocably fixed." To raise at this late hour the prospect of. new negotiations and consultations between Arabs and . Jews on the nature and character of the future government of Palestine is,. in. our judgment, to endanger the very abject which the United Na- tions, by its action last November, sought to achieve. In that.direction lies neither hope nor promise. Tha~ road l~ads toa quagmire of indeci- sion and inaction. There is but a brief time left, and t:1rtle is fast running,out io chaos and anarchy. We should like· to comment .also on the state- ment which wasrepeated here by·the· Egyptian representative, to theeffectthat the decision taken last November wàs .. a Mere, recommendation to the Egyptian Government ... The action takenby the·General Assembly was action. t~en in response .to the request of the Mandatory'Power, theonly Member State of the United Nations ~aVÎ!lg any authority to act in Palestine-a: coun+,ry placed under an, intemation- al trust. The request was for the solution of the- problem .of. •the. future government of. P~estine. IJefore taking any action, the General Assembly took note of the declaration by the Mand@.tory Power that it plans to complete the evacuation QfPalestine by 1, August 1948. Tbeaction takenby the General Assembly was the adoption of resolution 181 (II). which set ;orth recommendationsto the United Kingdom, ~s, Mandatory Power for .Palestine; and to .all QtherMembers of the United Nations, for, the . adoption.· and· implementati.on, withregard to the future government of Palestine, of the plan of partition with economic union. ' .While the United Kingdom has refusedto accept special responsibility for the implerilenta:' tion of.thè plan, it has-not, as ·Mandatory Power" rejectèd the recoI111riended plan. On the contrary, the United Kingdom liaS' officially stated thatit accepted the decision of the General Assembly ~istra~on.inPalestiIîehavin~,anYinte.rnational stand,mgwill'b~ .·the,United,.'Natipns Palestine Ç0Jl1llÛssl()n;If.it$~\lthori,tyJaU~ t.h~re ,wiUb~.no regime()~ lawinPaiestiileat "all,and .anarchy D1~'llrevail. '. . . . . . .,.Jtis' lqrthatreason thatthe, Jewisli Agenêy Sttongly.urgesimmediate. action•on the proposal c::ont8ined'inthe.·United·· States·maft resolution that'the<Security'GoUl1cil'accepCthel'equests addressed .by .• the···. General' Assembly"to it.in ~olution181(lI),soa$ to avaid the unwar.. raD.>1.'rd'ass..·.um .... Ptt.'o.nlha.'.ttherèisno leg.al ba.s.'is onl whièhlaw andordérmay ·be<maintained" ID Pàlestineafter'lSMay. "'.' , .. It,is~gretta~lethatthenec~ssity. elÏsts to remind'som~MemberStatesthl;lt it is'conttaryEtatsMembres. to~e'Charter'ofthe .1Jmted:Nàt.ions.for. any MeDl})ef StateJo useforcepr the .t.1u'eàt of force, ol'toenc0utage the use of fOl'Çeorthe·thrèatof force,to.obstl'uctthecarryingout of thepl1m reç0ttlInenÇ{eci. <bythéGellerâl ·.A~seillblyandd.u a,ccepfedb'y Jhe~andatol'Y Po\Ver:Utiless'the ~ember St~tesacc~pttlte Qyerwllelliûri~1ll0!al authoriti0f adecisi9n'wwchderiv~~frotnthe collectivejudgment<QftheUnite~N~tions,thecollectif greathope which .inspired its''organization is ·tnigiÇall,fJJoomed.• Wbat.is(involvedJiere cÏs '.,far moreJhana-techtlical:Jegal question. It is a qu,estionwhethetthê.UlÛted'.Nàtions is to'be ml effeçtiy~t instrullient for· wor1d~aceandthe ~~vationof:niankü1d;-orwhether it:is to be·:bùt an'ÏJilPress.ive. stag~seumgf()f:actorsan(l super~ numelJlfÏes,QusUv: engâg~ Ïtla m.eamngless play OfJo~g-w.ùided.futility.' . -' '~cte~;eifi~8J1tss'em'ploient. .. . . . .'. .'. ,,,/ lsub~ft1latthose< w~()"wouideD1ptyJthe concept •of~'lJnîted Nations'resolution 'of -an· COlIlpelling>lIloraIauthorityare the eneînies, nôt aloIiè'of.~partièutardecisionoftJieUnited ~~~n.c;,b~t;~~nsclC?uslr.,Ofthe tJnitéd Nations~c::::~ent Tbisl~dsUS toanobservâtlon<o~th~reiati&n 'ofithe'seclïiitYcouncll tothe ~pi~men~tiOliofâu the'Vnited ·1iatiOllSdècis.ion~'l:'echnically"the posi1ionwhic~ w~:takeiLbYJherepresentative of 1helJ~tedStatesandbY--Q.thersi~that'the~Sêtmrity CoîJn~ .é3'!!'.otûseannéd fQtce·for. theimple-ne. meiltatio~ôf~ydêciSibn0f~eUnited Nàtions, lillt-ônly' ÏJi'case~ ··where it,.îs. de(ermined .. thatétqu;n there exist threats ta peace;bteaehesof the pe~ce" m:âctsofaggresson aftec::ting intemation.al peace, mayb-eCOti'eCL ItmaybeBan impbrtant legal and teéhnica1dist.il1ctioil:tomake. and we assume ,thàt ft W~'~ino.tder'tokeep the action. requestedet (Jf. the'Sércurity~~CouÎlcil fullywithin the terms deJined bytht.Chartet•. ·" 'pQlla th~ Commission, in maûltaining Qrder and security in Palestine, and thereby enablingthe Commis- sion to. carry .out. the recommendations of· the General Assembly." This,' we believe, i&a·. fair aIld pragmatic statement of the issue and,one.in keep~g~th th~ legal.requirementsof the $ituation. ., The role of the Security Councilis·'an integrâI part of the phn adopted by the United Nations in November 1947. In adopting it, the GenerâI Assem.:blY·of.the United Nationsrelied.upon the fullest ·co-operationof.the Security Council.:Pt should not tak'e long for the inembers of the SecuritY Council to'detèrmine"thef~ct that a breach of the·peacê '.exists' in Palestine and that actsQf aggressionbave tâken place. Arab aggres- sion is pâtent; it 15' self-confessed. The measute of support 'whichthe Security· 'Council .will give to decision ofthe UIiited Nations ID its e1Iortsat . implementation ;will· he evidenced by the urgency withwhicb it approaèhes its. task, and· by ,the.e1I~tive measures .which it will take tore-establish a, conetitiOltofpeace ÎIl Palestine in whichthe United,Nations Palestine ·Commis-· sion can carry out •the . responsibilities which wereentrusted toit. Here again the action of the Security Council onthis issue will have far- reaching implications for the effectiveness of the United Nations actions ,on other issues and for thebuttressirig .of. the . authority and prestige of tlü~~eat wodd Organization. Failure of the Security, Council tocomply with the· request of the General Assembly to take the neéessary measures toempower the Commission to exercise inPâIestine 'the functions which are assignedto,it ifa threattopeace develops there during'the transitiona!'period" and to determine as a tbreat to the peaee any attempt to alter by forcethèsettlement envisaged in the resolution, wouId, in OUI judgmentbea seriousmatter which goesfar beyond the .Palestine coniroversy. It concerns the co-()1'dination and the effective fune- 'We' the''seCUrity 'Çoùnpills d~liberatÎ11gÔn therequest·'sûbmitted.to. it by·the· United~àtioI1S ~alestineCommission, wc are. pl~asedto 'note that..the.CoÎmnission mtendstocontitiue'with suchoftb~prëpàratory,w/rkes~eiltialto'the implementation .of" tlu~ •••recommendatiogs.as "C!l:Jl bè under.taken' witbottt thàt assi$tance of the Security. '.Côuncïlwhichtbe 'CoIllDlÎssioi( hàS requésted~We shouldIike ~o .awthe.llttention of' .the' Security·· Councïlto th~ .. fact'thattlîe JewïsbrqiUtia, .whose. organizaûQÎl, Is,câlled for' 1?y the pl~ whiéh \Vas ad9ptedand.wbic~ will h~vethe respopsibilit}rofmaintàiniliglaw and oJ;'qer in tHe Jewish 'Stateafter15 ~ay,h~not ~~tbeen organize,I; tbâti~.org~atioJ'ris ijdt perni.ittedby.the Man~atoryJGovenûnentpriorto the termiriatiori of the MaJ1date<;~d.tl,tatthe request of the United Nations Palestine Commis.; sion." to. permiLtheprep~atQryworkfo~'the, organizati9n ofthis militia; has, llke\VÏsebeen denie,d. " In itsteport [documênt<S/676], the United NatioDS Palestine CAAJ1lÜSsion :cal1S· thè attention ofthé.SécUrlty· ,CoUncil tO the ,fàct ·that,U:the refusâl·-"of. thé '. MaildatoryPower <to .âllowthe formation of such 'militiauntilthetermination of the Mandate ..:' \VillentaiHféïayin theJmplemen,- tation of the Assembly's plan, and tendersmuch more diffiêultthe problem'of the securityof tÎle JewiSb State· when the Mandate is relinquished;" . 1 draw the attèntion ·of the$è"cûrityCouncilt~ this statement of the Commission in order that·it ~ghfsetve as â comme~tary, to ~è stat~nient made by· the represen~tive of the Y~ted~g- dom al 't1;te,é269th mee~g~ in whicbherejected the ~ccusa~ons ft!àt bis G,overnmentwas mak!ng. ,thetr~er of· authorlty· in Palesiine asdiffi.~1t· aspossjblè, an4\vas' 4en~g assistanc~·~.• th~ ,United Nations. U~ortUnately, J't9tonly inthis most vi~ ,question' ·of· the ntmtia, but aIs,o" in· other essential matters wbicn would have facili- taled the coming of the new regime in Palestine, the Mandatory Govemment has been unco- operative" and obstru@v1'.. '':('0;obesure, it:has fumished information of a, kind, and it has discussed wlth the United Nations Palestine Com- mission "anous prob1ems. But· the .test is not willingness ta discuss, but willingness ta comply with the urgent requestswhich were made b.y the Commission and the United Nations. , l'hus, the Mandatory Governinentrefused to opeJia port ta JewiSh immigratiOn on 1 Febtuary. as càHed for by resolution 181 (II) of the United Nations. It hàs refused '10 pétIilit the United The representative ·of the United ;IGngdom asserted at the 260th meeting that .. om fervent bope is that tllè~urity Council vill now find a way·to·secure eft'ectiveassun.iption of.a:uthority.ID Palestine by the United Nations when· the Man- date is tenninated." But we mast regretfully note that aImost every way which is suggested by the responsible agf;ncy of the· Unite'd Nations is effectively blocked by the. MaJJ,datory Power. The representative of the United Kingdom declared, aIso at the 260thmeetin.g, thathis Govemment cannot .. participate in any way in the' implementation of a scheme which involves the coercion of one of the commUllÎties." One is forced to recall that fOI 'years the United Kingdom has împlemented a scheme in. Pa1estin.e which was of its own making; which was disapproved by the League of Nations; which was condemned by its. own leading statesmen, including the distinguished British. Colonial Secretary .himself; which quite definitely involved. the cQercion of one of the" communities of Palestin.e. When is cOercion not coercion ? And under what condition is conscience to be invoked to approve or disap-, prove of a political policy ? . . The Jewish Agency, for Palestin.e appeals to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations to make earnest representation to the preseht Mandat0l'Y Government of Palestine tl) permit the inmiediate organization of an adequate Jewish State militia, and the preparation for its equipment to .protect th,e lives of the inhabitants of the new Jewish State who are being threatened by' forces inside and outside of Pa1~s­ tille, and who have proClaii:ned their resolve to defeat by violence the .décision of the United Nations and the new JewishState which the decision envisagés. This, we maintain, is an elemental'ymoral obligation of the United Nations in ~ew· of the decision which 11: has taken. It is likèwise an elementlU'Y moral obligation, on the part of thosenations. which ,have approved the plan, to remove aU·embargoes on the shipment of atms to 'the Jewish people of Palestine who have l~y~y accepted the decisi~ of the United Na- tions, .and to'deny snch arms to those who are violently resisting it. Surely this is not an unrea- sonable request. The organizanon, recognition aM equipment of the Jewiilh militia is for us of greater 'i1rg~ncy than the sending of a non-Pales- (-' 4' Weare stiUhoping thatthere miy be no need forprolongedand serious contlict in Palestine. Th.e Jews'do notwisb. wàr with. theirneigb.bourg.,..,.- .only peace -andc(H)per~t1pn.Within-the-frame-.... workofthe plali câ1lîngfot tWo independent States joined in al1 economic union, there is definitêly the possibilityforsuçbpeace -and co-operation. The national status àJidindependence ofeach people is guaranteed, and-their ·--economic co- operatioll forthego()(f of both,is provided for. Partition-·was-not the Jewish. solution. It fell far short of the jûst rights and aspirations of the IeWisb. people.ltwasa grievous abridgement of these rights. Nevértheless, reluctantly but loyally, we accepted the decÎSion whichappeared fair and reasonable to the._ United Nations.· We still hope that the Arabs_ of-Palèstine willlikewise accept it and thereby put ~endto the scourge of strife ~d bloodshed which can only do incalculable harm to both peoples. Butin the face of the mounting threats and the incursion of armed bands across the !rontiers bent· on Wetr, -thé Jewish people of Palestine -are compelled ta makeall necessary preparations for self-4efenc~. We plea~ with the United Nations ta remove _aU obstacles in the way. We are tarrying eut thePurposes of the UnÎted Nations. We shonld not bepen~edfor doing so. We feel underthe ·obligatiqn 'to make our position unmistakaQly clear.AS far as the Jewish pec;>ple .are concemed, they have accepted the gecision.of, theUnite4Natiôns. We. regard it -as J>inding, -an4-we.;ite resolved to Jtlove forward in the·spiritofthatdecision.Underthe plan, there are dates to be met.We must assume that these dates.will· be met. WefullY-respect the _authority cf the Unite4Nations, but ifit isunable to carry ()U.t lts owp, decisions _and, as aconsequence,the .. Jewi..sh community of Palestine isconfronted with <; ". ~etbreat'ofmpùhilation,it wn,. be compelled by the considerations of sheer survival, not tospeak of _the ..• preseIVati~Il of lts rights, ta take alI Î1ece~sary· measures which .the situation Will calI for.. In conclusion, \\Te should like t~comment on theserious _s~ctures .which the representative of the .UllÎte~ .Kingd01'l!.1ll~deag~st. the Jewish Agency· iliJusaddress· delivered. during.the 260th ineeting..He3:CCUSedthe. Jewish ·Agency _of ~" sub0rttinating 1Il()!'lÛ. c()nsiderations to political -eXpediency ".~:ae~barged lt-with"" politicalinep- titudeand moral weakness". The Jewish Agency has not had thee-xf~ ~ènce of running aworld empire,andso may be pardoned fornot having the .political aptitude which is-.po$sessed bythepresent .politicalleaders of the United Kingdom,· although itisrumoured 1hat·there is.consi4erableheresy abroad m the worId andin the Pritish Islesthemselves, which,. -qui le .. This Conference endorses the stand taken by the Parliamentary Labour Party against the Go- vemment's Statement of Policy on Palestine. It declares that the White Paper, by imposing mino- rity status on the Jews, by departing from the principle of econ..:>mic absorptive capacity govern- ing Jewish immigration, by making Jewish entry depertdent on Arab consent, .and byrestricting Jewish land settlement,violates the solemn pledges contained in the Balfour Declaration and the Man- date. The policy of the White Paper represents a further surrender to aggression, places a premium on violence and terror, and is a setback to the progressive forces among both Arabs and Jews ... This Conference caUs upon the Government to rescind the White Paper policy and to reopen the gates of Palestine for Jewish îmmigratioIi. in accordance with the country's economic absorp- tive capacity." This was in 1939. Later,' the BritiSh Labour Party reaffirmed its internati~nal policy nf ., build- ing Palestine as the Jewish National Home". This was in 1943. In December 1944, the British Labour Party, on theeve of its election to the Govemment of the United Kingdom, declared: CI There is surely neither hope nor meaning in a Jewish National Home unIess we are prepared ta let the Jews, if they wish, enter tbis tiny land of Palestine in such numbers as to become a majority. There was a strong case for" this before the war, and there is an irresistible case for it now, after the unspeakable atrociti~ of thecold- blooded calcu1ated Genmtn-Naz'. plan to kill' aU the Jews of Europe. ft This resolution of tIie Labour Party went fur- ther, even beyond the programme of the Zionist movement. 1 quote further !rom it : justes soigneusement installation de •• Here,· too, in Palestine surely is a case on human grounds to promote a stable settlementfor transfers of, population. Let the Arabs be encou- raged to move out as the Jews move in. Let them he compensatedb.andsome!y for their land, and let theif·seftlement elsewhere be carefully orga- nized and generously financed. The Arabs have many wide territories of their OWD; they must not c1aim to exclude the Jews from this smaU area tioIll~ .that have been imposed with regard ta the devf,lopment of the National Home during recent yeats must go; that fue gates oÎ Palestine must be opëned. Il How is this to be reconciled with the brûtal enforcement of the restrictive measures of ~ WhitePaper which have been carried on by th.e Unîted Kingdom Colonial Office ? - Mt.Creech Jones further stated: .. We are ~rilcouraged by the fact that American . opinion l1asmade ïtself heard in regard to the Palestine ·proolcm.That will fortify us in our advocation in the House of Commons. Il But in the House of Commons, public opinion in the United States in regard ta the Palestine problem is contemp- tuously derided by the spokesman of bis Party as ettlimating from polîtical pressure in New York City. Mr. Creech Jones concluded by saying : .. It 'will be.for us in.London to carry on our work in PâI'liament and elsewhere so that there is no misadventure, so thatthe White P.aper poliey is reversed, sa that the Jews can be sure mat at last their National Horne is bcing esta- blished firmly and seeurely and th~ycan realize their own Commonwealth, a free nation which cari. con.tribute fully and freely ta the general life of the whole of mankind." Was there, 1 ask, a single echo of aU fuis m the declarâii.()risoft~e'spokesttIan of the Unîted Kingoom delegation at the 260th meeting of the 8ecurity Council or in. any of the recent declara.. tions of bis Goveniment ? Who, thèn, should be charged with .. moral weaknesi} Il an~ with Il sub- ordinat!ng moral GOnsidel'~thIDstopolitisal expe... _diency Y. ? . The Jewish Agency has ntiVer condoned ter- rorism. It has deprecated it and denounced it Il1 cannot accept the .view that His Majesty's Govemment is doing anything other than coun- terfeiting this business, or that it is doing other tban breaking·its promises and acting dishonour- ahly.before the whole of the civilized world... This lawless policy, which was imposed upon the Jewish people in Palestine at a time when their brothers and sisters were seeking to escape from the heU of Europe where they were threat- ened with extinction and where 6 million of thèm ultimately perished, aroused the bitter resentment of the entire population of Palestine. They came to regard such a. repressiV'e Govemment as· hos- tile. Resistanceflared up. The sharp' injustice of seeing thousands of their unfortunate feUow-Jews tumed away frQm the shores of Palestine and sent back to concentrationcamps to resume a life of despair .and homelessness infiamed the passions, especially those of theyouth, of Palestine. Is ·there anywonder, then, that some of· the· mostintem- perateof" them resorted to acts which no .one condones,which the authoritative organs of' our movement haverepeatedlycondemned and de- . nounced ~s harmful to the Jewish people, but which everyone in aIl faimessmusttry -tounder- stand? It is amazing. to find not a.single word in the statement of the representative.of .the United Kingdom, not a single humble word which would indicate that the policy of bis Govemment was in .any way wh~tsoever. directly or indirectly a contributory factor tothese tragic acts which. we aIl deplore. '. . . It .is amazing, too, ta. note thàt.not a single word of condenm.ation.waS'. uttered· in that state- ment againstthe acts ofviolence perpetrated by the Arabsagainst whom no White Paper was ever enforèed, who faced-no desperate .problems of refngeeiSin al1d homelesimess, and.who are now. perpetratingacts of terror in. Palestine in an The Palestine issue which isbefore the United Nations. is. a. test case'which the whole world _is following with utmostconcern, for much indeed depends upon its final outcome.Whether justice will fina1Jy be" done to, a sorely tried p?ople whose 1fionunwntal·.. spiritlIR't, ~chievements .made. that little l~d.ofPaIestinethe Roly Land of mankind, whether sole1l11l mtema'donal pledges aretruly. to beredeemed and whether this' international orga- nization wbichhas ~ç~enbuiltupon the ruins of another such peace organization, wrecked by the failure of the great Powers to maintain its autho- rity, will shm:e a similar fate, or whether it will, in' truth, become the tree whose fruit will be for the healing of the nations-all this,in my humble judgment, is involved in this issue which is now before the Security Council,. and which is quite discernible to aIl who can see beneath the surface of $lgleeven+s into the sweep of great historie processes. We confidentlyàwaitlheaction of the Security Council. ~. Mr. PARODI (France) (translated from French) : In the course of. the •Security Council debate .On Palestine we have heard several state- ments raising general questions, andoften, or at least sometimes, legal questions, to which the COUTIcil should devoteall its attention. Such questions were raised in particular by·the Syrian representativewhenhequestioned the- eir- cumstances in which the United Nations Pales- tine Conimission was set up, and proceeded to dispute the bindin'g force on Member StateS' of General Assemblyrecommendations [260th meet- ing]. Another legal question is that of the Secur- To my mind, these variou:; questions will require careful ,consideration and 1 reserve the right to make, at subsequent meetings, the com- ments they appear to me to demand. After some refl.ection 1 have decided that at the present stage of our work it would be better not to delay consi- deration of the two proposaIs before'us, namely, the United States draft resolution, [document 8/685] and the Belgian ameUdnlent [document S/688], by another general discussion. When he·spoke a few days aga [260th meet- ing]. the United Kingdom repr~sentative warned us that the situation in Palestine was grave and threatened, in another few weeks, tobecome tragic. Frankly, 1 think. aIl the membersef the Security Council are aware of the situation. We know that in asking us a year ag(), to,take up the Palestinian question the PnitedKingdom Govem- mentplaced a ,very heavy, responsibilityupon, us. We are well,aware that blopd is being:shed every day,,aneI,that much more blood may be shed in the future. We know that this dangerous situa- tionca11s for an urgent solutio;l1. Nor.can wedis- regard the fact that the United Nations has declared itself, and, that the matter now involves itsentire authority. The lirgent~eed for a prac- ticalexamination of the problemis therefore, to my min:d, the overriding' consideration, and, 1 donotwish atthistime,tosubmit àriyobservà- tionsthatn;rlghtresUlt ID a general discussion and delay the examinati()11-'of the practical proposaIs now before us. ' Theseproposals 'aim,in the first pillce, al orga- ilizing the work af,the Security Council and esta- blishing a methodof procedure. The solution pro- posed is 'toset up' acommittee coniposed, of ,a few members of theCouncil-Îli the United States proposlÙ, the five permanent members-tostudy the practioal measures that niight be ,contem- plated. There 'is no difference between the two drafts submitted ,to us-the United Stlltes draft resaIu:- tion and 'the, Belgian 'amendment-,-as to the set- ting up of this c01I1I1Ütl,:ee; the differencerelates oilly to the question whether the SecurityCoun- cil should first' formally, accept therecommenda- tion, of General, Assembly resolution. 181-(II). 'In this respect 1 believe that'theexplanations fur- llishedbythe represen,tativesof the United 'States [260 th meeting] and Belgium [258th meeting] have, consi~erablynarro\Ved down the differerices 15etweèn'lHê-~twoproposaIs-: new before us; Ac- cording -to the Belgian represeIitative, the~e is no suggestion ,that the Security Council doesnot accept the Assembly's recommendation. His amendment has only the'effect of reserving any decisien on the substance of the> question lintil âfter thecompletion of the consultations' whiêh When aIl is said; it therefore seems to me, after these explanations by both parties, that the dif~ ference between the two drafta before us is reaIly very small. 1 must say that·in our opinion it scarcely seems possible for the Security·Courlcil, at tms p!'elimi~ nary stage of its· work and without having first examined the question whether or not there is a threat to the peace, to decline to accept in prin- ciple the General Assembly's recommendation. The recotnnlendation is there, and it emanates from an authority which, at least in its composi~ tion, is the highest authority of the United N a~ tions. The binding effect of the recommendation on States may be open to question but it seems to us that the recomm:endation is bin(Jjng~ morally if not legally, on all other organsof the United Nations, including the Security Council. Nevertheless we see no indispensable reason why the Council should begin by announcing its acceptance, if it tltinks and decides that a preli~ minary study of ,the question is necessary. The only danger, it seems to me, which the Belgian representative's amendment might entaU would be that the. public might misinterpret this amendment if it understood it to mean that the Security Council did not accept theAssembly's resolution. But our Belgian colleague made it suÎ~ ficiently clear: 1 think, that that was not the inten~ tion of bis amendment. The Canadian representative, when he made hi~ statement the other day [261st meeting] inter- preted the Belgian amendment as an effort toward conciliation-an effort to wbich the French delegation cannot remain indifferent. l think it unnecessary to recall that, on the eve of the Assembly vote, the French delegation asked for the Arab States to be given some time to clarify the conciliatory intentions which some of theh representatives had expressed; and 1 still regret that the. time which the Assembly decide.d to grant was not more effectively utilized. . Thereis therefore no neM for me to repeat here that we consider it essential to miss no opportunity, however small, for effecting a recon- ciliation between the two parties. If therefore l propose in the lest resort to vote for the Belgian amendment, 1 do so not. so much becayse of fis content, which 1 do nots€:e~ bemg opposed to the legal content of the United States draft re- solution, as because of the conciliatory interpre- tation which the Canadian representative placed upon it the other day. Paragraph 2 of the United States clraft resoIu- tion establishes a committee of the five perma~ On the Arab side we have the avowed intention of opposing, even by force, an Assembly recom- mendation. 1 refrained, a few moments ago, from discussing the legal effect of Assembly recom- mendations. 1 shall, however, now state our view that, though recommendations made by the As- sembly, precisely because they are recommenda- tions, are not binding upon Member States that did not vote for them,. in the sense that such States may ab;;taîn from co-operating in their implementation, it is quite inadmissible that ~y State which is a Member of the United Nations should take up the position of opposing 'py force, on a territory not its own, efforts made by other nations to implement a recommendation. Such an attitude. goes much farther than simple' abstention from implementing an Assembly reso- lution, a right which we believe the Charter grants to States that do not accept a recommen- dation. Open revoIt against an Assembly recom- mendation is a much more drastic act, which the Charter does not authorize anywhere, and which is essentially contrary to the .Charter. 1must say that the attitude of the Jewish popu- lation in Palestine is hardly less disappointing. Every day we hear talk of a war ,of· reprisal in which the killings, increase. 1 am surprised that the Jewish Agency for Palestine has-not made every effort to put a stop to practices which, in end result, are sa akin ta plain mui:'der. 1 .know that we have just been told that the Jewish Agency has made SOJI!.e efforts to that end. That be~g,so, my surprise is that the. results have been so meffective. The monstrous crimes·of Germany and the feârful holocaust of wmch the Jews were,the vic.,. tims have brought them, tremendous sympathy throughout the world. But this reserve of sympa:' ~y has a1ready.been heavily etrawn on, and there 18a danger that it may gradually become exhausted Mahmoud FAW,zI Bey (Egypt): l, shouldlike t9 makesome short,offhand remark&. conceming a part' of whatwe have .heard thi,s morning.. 1 am taking into consideration the fact that the subject now under discussion is the Belgian amendment [document S/688] and this is one reason why 1 shall speakvery briefiy on points wJm.ch are of a generalnature. Among0ther things, 'we ~eard commentaries on two points..this morning" namely, ~e efforts at conciliation and the fact th/:ltthe Qeneral Assemb.ly's, resolution is merelya recommenda- tion. On'these two points 1 sincerely see no rea~ son, up to this moment, to add to or detract from what 1 have already. said. ,However, lam willing toenlarge onthesepointsif. necessary. . ~egarding theendêavour tO,establish a parallel with the status of Trieste, 1 would .say onlY that such a paralleLdoes 'notaçtuallY exist. Trieste is a ,conquered,. .ex-eneD1y , territory ..concerning which the. victorioùs~o\Ver$ 'have made arrange- Ib.;,nts.to.which Italy, the Power which had sover- eignty ovec.Trieste, acçeded~ lam wiiling to speak in '. mor~, ~~tâil :9n,this point ~o if the need arises.., The spokesmanof the Je~hAgency a(1mitted that it may ,be c()rrect to say that the Security eouncil c~ot ~e armeçI fÇlrce foI. the imPIe- DJ.entation of p~~on,. b~~ '~~' ,a4~~cl :. e. What the Commission asked for isnotanarmed force to enforcep~~9n;\l~t; anàgeq~a~~9,!-P@esti­ ni~ fo~c~ .W~c~ wilL ~~Î$t ,!a,\V-a,k!~g ,~*~P1ents inboth.theJ\.l'~~, and Jewislt 'çoWJt!Wûties orga- ~edlD,l~ef th~ g~qet~9k~oA Qf Jh~Ç()~­ si()D. in majnt;lining OJ;qeJ;,,;md ~e.çll1'Ïty in P~e~7 tine,and thereby 'enablingtheCommission to carry out the 'récommendations ofthe General Assembly."· ThisçnabJ~s u~tto'Qtlders~dmore clecirly the wotc:l$,11$ed at the, 2618t meeting 1:>Y the Presi- dent", fu'l$ c/:lpa~ity ml ,~epJ:~~entative, of Chin.a, when he, $aid 'thàt if, th~ distiric,tion between",en- fprèeme~t of parqtipnbYfo):~~4 the màin~e­ ~lJIlçe.9f peace·. by fptce, while l~gaUY valid ~d importaIlt,S~l11$to us·in tlte presçnt sitqation to beUttreal". , , The~P9~estnrp;1()fthe Je~h ~gçncy, a1sQ said tJ1at ~ t1tepl~pf-p~ti()p:~is~ot il;rJ.plemented, the tJmtêq N'~ti()11S will \le.4oomed. In tI1is ~()~­ nexion, 1 s1Wl~~dulge in' 'fOine,'stafistics. Ifl •• re- meInber çQrr~tlY, the, reçolllm~nd~tions ,wWch Jtave not '~~'" cQIDPli~d witb '~o~nt to ;~pprox!- If sorne Zionist leadors prefer to make it diffi.- cult to reach a peaceful solution, they must bear the responsibility for such an attitude. We, on our side, must never give up, must never abdicate to despair. We must continue to take our ~tand by peace,and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. .Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) : Time ând èircumstances give such urgency to this dl;lci- sion lÎ the Security COlJ.D.cil tlJ.at the vote on the Belgian amendment [document S/688] May have the effect not merely of postponing acceptance of partition, but of permanently failing t'a implement it. The United States strongly· opposes the Belgian amendmentbecause, in effect, it is a motion to delete paragraph l of the United States resolution [document 8/6851 which would accept partition as. a solution. Th~ United States delegation will abstain from voting on the Belgianamendment only because it does not· wish to raise any ques'" tion of a veto.. The Security .Council. must face the issue promptly because time is· short before the annOliliced date of termination of the Man- date. . . Mr. L6PEz (Colombia) : 1 believe wc are all agreed that this is a matte:.; of great urgency. We an regret that, in view of that background, we have· spent a1Dlost a month.in reaching this point of our discussion, at which we are going· to take a vote on the Belgian amendment. At the 258th meeting 1 withdrew the Colombian proposai. [do.,. cument 816841.for the purpose of expediting the :work of .the Security Counoil and not, as .Jame members· of the Press reported, for .thep1.!Ipose of challenging the great Power~. Such an attitude :would have had 11,0 j1,J,stification.. Slnce with- drawing the .Colombian proposai, l have.listened to the statements made in the Seçurity C~uncil with the utmost attention. 1 wish to say, with a very open mind, that one of the two thing& which have impressed me niost is·this declarationby the President [261st meeting] : .. The distinction between enforcement. of p&rtltion by force .and the maintenance of peace by force, while legaJly vaUd.and important, seems to u~\ in the present situation to be unreal; and,. theretore~ ~bat is. an additional r~ason why my· .del~gation. WL'uld like to see this committee, however constituted,. start . dois . i~ task withouta bindingcommitment or instruc... tions from the Securlty Council. ,. . 1 thoroughly agree wÏth that stf>.tement, and. 1 wouId even go a step further.~d say tbat T aIso agree.with the position takyD.. by the representa- tiveoftbe Union. of Soviet Socialist'Republics It js, not uncOIDlb.onfor 'the fivepemlanent membersof .the Security Collncil·to .disagree. That is_ why, Ioomg t0ward èfficiencyintms ma!tè~,.1 ~adethe proposalthat· this· committee ~lloùldbe composed of.two- permaDent members aD() thr~e non-pérmanen~m~mbers of- the Secu- rity'eouncil.Jtdid notaJlpearto Ille wise orgra- ciou~ to.lçavethe non-petnianent membersof the ~tyCQUllcil()utof account, because the nôn- 'pennanent members()fthe Security Council, .who aIso rep,esent th~ Ol"gamiation, havebeencon- liistenny invitedbythelZI'eai Pe;,wers tQ participate Yery_aetivelyin,th~J?at~stinesituation.,.. ' .' The smallPoweJ,"s.were invi~to compose exclpsively the United NatiônsSpècial Çommittee onPaJestine, and they,~xclusively, areworking on •the . present United Nations Palestine Ç0mmis:' sion. It wouldseem.to meonlyconsistent. logical an.d na~ othat they •. shouldbe appointedas membersof,and invited ta -participalê' iD, the proposed COlIImitteê.But;as 1 said. that isnow besidethe poitlt. .The point now is thatthe 'Secu- rity Council seems to bave agreed thàt this com- In the meantime,if the Arab Higher Commit- teereally has any concrete or.specifie·.new· pro- posalto submit for our consideration, it cando either of two things. It can go to the fiveperma.. nent memb~rs aUhe Security Council andworm them ofits 'proposaIs, or it canprepare thesepro- posaIs for submission to the Securlty CouncR. at its next meeting. . .. Therefore, with these brief considerations .and ' wjththat understlinding, 1 ask that the President put to the vote the proposaI that we adjoUIl1..until 11 March.

The'representative ·of ColoÏllbia has moved that thediscussîon be adjoumed to 11 March with the understanding that, in the meantime, the five permanent members of·· the Security Council should hold consultations on· the question. . 1 should like to point out that such a motion for adjoumment to a definite date has precedence over other motions. 1 shouId also like to say that the suggestion for consultation is only a suggestion; it cannot be binding on the members, one or more, who may not wish to join in consultations. Therefore, the motion nowbefore the Security Council is a motion simply for,.adjo.umment tO l1'March. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) : If 1 am in order, 1 should like to make a comment on this motion. 1 assume that, 1· am in, order beca~ the motion"does not·fall withinone of those priorities which isundebatable. .. The United States considers th~t the' situation is urgent, that it will not bear deIay from. now until 11 March, that the representatives on the Security Council.ought not to act like vagrants wandering about without any objective or destination, and tbat the Security Council should act DOW. The Security Couneil has··discussed tbis n.atter fully. The time hascomè for a ·vote. At this instant, a motion to· adjoum in orcler to do tbe very thing·that is menti()ned in both of the prop~sals seems to the United States .a very grave mlStake which would result in· confusion, doubt and hesitation. It makes no difference which one of these proposaIs is adCipted on this point .of conslfltation. The Security Council will at least have advanced somewhat and taken·some .direc~ tian .ifit.takes a vote on one of these proposaIS. 1 think It would be a grave mistake for us to postpone this vote. Therefore, the United States will vote against postponement. . .. Mr. TARASENIW (U1crainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated trom Russian) : 1 do not in principle object to an adjourmnent until 11 March as mis proposed by the representative of Colom- IIlere~y beJlpostpQn. ,lent·.of.the discussion of the questionatissue, nQtàD attemptto<seekitssett1ement. '" ltJ:1~refor.e:r~peat':ilti~~"llOt-~.object Jo. the mee.ting'~'b13ingadjQUIIledAAtill1March.providedthat8.lJ.~Ilfl'y.is ma4e~~e r~cordto. the ~ffect tbat,:the1iyepeI1Ilanent~embersof the Security Cowcilhaw.be~nreqpestedto.cons1,Ùttogether on the substan~.()f.tljequestion at'issue,' Jo assume a definite undertaking to that effect. Mr.Lôp~-(~()16D1biâ):t règretverY 'much havingtosaY"lIlorein supportaf.nty,proposa! thaJ1lhadintended"l'àrtic~~lysinr~it migltt appear thatlamnot helping t~e~ediœ Iriatters•. Inthis. veJYseriousiBatterLw~havetirIhesit.;. ,a@1g1y .recqggize<ltb,e leadership oftlJ.e .United ~tatçs... an~.tPeY~R,. ,and.·it isJjeyQnd, questiQn Atat tlte. p'1ilD,Qfp~t,ion-eWasad()Ptedp~arilY as the,re~ult;oftlJ.e~action,SuPPQrt,wor:l<:and prestjge.~o,!"'e .~e ijlYoJ"e4ma..vety difiicuAt situation c{)nceming. ~e..implemeutation of·$1t plan,Jlll~ we;~eèende~vo~gtofirt4whichway woUl~betbeoest oneJ)f,~gi~thr()ugh;._ , .......• -;; ,"-."'._ ,'.-,".c';:.,", .. ,_0,;', .._", ·.·f.':··>.·.. . "',-"',. _,_ •• ' '," ',,', .. -',' JJl .discussmg thése -two PIQp~risafS;='Îh~ mt tlDingthafappeàt~veIj(;Ie~1S·th*p.êitherof them .iselithusià$ti~~yisuppCJEted.by.thc,Security CounciI,. aJ],d,tllat they.reBect exacUythe. same situatioil,a.s.,we, fpld .inth~,Gén~r~ ~s,embly , wiilitheorigüiai<pliln"o{ t>a#!tion. Tfie original PIan hadt(j~e.steerëd tôadQption. with some diffictiIty'~~use'it.ai411ot.r~Pl'e~ent.theseasoned opinioil,of.•th~·Genéral'!\ssetD.blY.That is.pro'- bablYthereas()Ds()IIianYri1é~ti.J1~swerereqtiited befote'airlving' ~t:~'C()nclusioii'(ln this ll0int.I submitthis •OPiniOl1 ;véry''respeètftiJly, as l did atthe;Gen.étalAS~J11blyinNovelllber. .•'·1t'isaqeadY'evi~l1t tôus thatthè'fivè per:- manent. iJ;1embers()f. tlJ.eSe~ty:CQtinèp ·ate~ot in .agr~mellt aS;·to_'J1(),!~y;shouIdapprQâch r~ probletn. Onè(}fthe things>thatlbelieve weshouId do,if wesincerelYDlean toface pns issuejn~teadoFtryingto;eva<lei~' ~some.way, D,: '~•. detennil1efihetb.eri~rn()tthereis any PQSsibüjty ofsuc~agteement. ii.•ii.' .. ·.i••·••·.· .••·.•••· ' " .. .Th~Relgian 4D:1endnient ~es'ÏlQtinudijnitfor tl!efivep~rilÏanent-'.member$ '. of the 'Sécurity Ço1Ü1cllt~:r~turnwith~rep9ît,1111t.·Inyproposal f~~adjoUl1llIJ~ntdQesfiX a>~me ·.•li""Ït, Jtl>~ci" ficallYSta~sthatbYtJ. ••Marclfweshâll expect.the perm~entmeinbers ofth~. ~'Urity Council to retûm\vid1a~eport~'ThatiswhyIthint itis unnecessaxyt6 .saythat~bey···shouId ··.açè-ept·. ·.lit ~tme:Qt to JIlêet for the purpose of conSul~­ tion.· Açc<JrdmgtoArticle J06 of 'l~he Charter,Jt isspecifically their duty t6 do sa. Article 106 states.:.. . ···p~ding-theçomingint6 force of suchspecial ~agreelllents.referred< toinArticle 43. as. in the oPitnon:oHbeSec1nity COMeil eaab1e it to begin ~the.exer.ciseof·its .resportsibilities :wu1erA:rticle That is their clear obligation. 1 agree wifu the President that we cannot go any further and impose on them any obligation to get together before 11 March. However, by adjouming, in accordance with my proposai, we sball know on 11 March whether or not the permanent members are wilIing to get together to discuss this matter and to return to the Security Council with a definite proposai. 1 believe we shall have made very definite progress in our discussions if, by 11 March, we know where we stand vis-à-vis the pos'" sible reconnilendations of theive permanent members of the Security Council, to whom, according to the draft resolution and amendment, the Security Council wishes to give the initiative in formulatîng a proposai. Mr. EL-KHoURI (Syria): 1 agree with the representative ofColCiill.bia that we should adjoum until Il March with the understanding that the permanent members of the Security Council will convene in the meantime. They will convene only as members of the Security Council-not as envisaged by Article 106 of the Charter-to advise the Security Council as to .the action and procedures which they propose should be followed. If we refer to Article 106, we find that action by the permanent members under that Article will always be in order when the Security Council decidesthat a situation exists which endangers international peace and security, when other methods and means have been tried and proved to be inadequate, and when action under Article 42 of the Charter is necessary. Then, as long as Article 43 is' not implemented, the five permanent members would convene to determine' what action to take. Article.106 refers to Article 42. Article 42 reads : ' • "Should the··Security Council consider that measures .provided for ~ Article. 41 .would ,-be inadequate or have . proved to. be inadequate, it may takesuchactiml by air, sea, or land forces ..." and sa forth.,. Whén'itis ~ecjdedto apply this Article, then AttiClel06'will be.in force and the permanentmembers of the Seèurity Council éan (convene among .thémselves 'and consult'as to the action·tobe taken. . '. .1.•agreewith "the .... motion .subnrltteet. by' the delegation of Colombiato adjoum untilll March, with theunderstandingthat. the pèi'nlanent inembers of the Seéurity. Councilshâ11imeetsd ~sto·advisètI1eSe~tyCQ.llllcilitlwhatway it 18 ~ç)~proçeed in tbiS matter, and not.toaPl'ly &tlc1e 106. ' " , . MI.,GRQMYKO (Union 'of "Sovièt .Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): 1 Wish to listes . 1 ]utVe stated that 1 should be glad to participate in n committce 'Of in ft consultaf;on of tite fivepermanent rnem.bers. 1 would de that not byvirtue of Artiole 10ô. 1 consider fuat such consultation or commîttee action atthe present moment is Dot related ta Article 106 of the Charter. As Pll'E8IDENT of the Secudty Council. 1 shouId like to saythat the objective behind the motion for adjoumment unm Il March can be achieved easily witbout tbat motion being putto a vote, because, if one of the two draft resolutions should be adopted, the five permanent members of the Security Couneil wouId go ioto consultation immediateIy. and 1. as President of the Security Couneil. would wish ~hem to make an early report to the Counoil. 1 cou.~d not specify that the report must be made on Il March. but, at any rat~ 1 would insist on an early report. The five permanent members cao report on success or fallure, or partial success or partial fallure, so that the' Security Councn will see whether that line of approach is a fruitful one at all. 1 suggest that we do not spend any more time, discussing this matter of an adjoumment. The motion is for an adjoU1't.dI1ent until next 11 March with the understanding that thê' ive permanent members of the' Security Councn should in the meantinie consult each other on this problem. The motion was rejected by 5 votes to 2. wU" 4 abstentions. The PRESIDENT : We now have the Belgian amendment [document 8/688] belore us. Unless tbere 'is further discussion, J'shall put the Bélgian amendment to the vote. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Soclalist Republiçs) (tranilated Irom Russian): ,We, are disçussing the Belgian amen/ment and the UIlit~d Stâtesdraft resolution [document 8/685]. l,have 'à1teadylladA)çC~S!O.ll t(), explain the position of the delegation of the, SoViet uniOll ..wi1h, ~gard to consultation. , , ' '- , As the reprçsentative 'of, the United States is Ilware,the, UnitedJ{ingdom refuses to take, part in, the. work of the committee whicll the,former hasproposed;he is aJso aware of" the .USSR representative's negativéattitude'to the '.proposaI for<establisbinga committee,and of the ,fact,that the USSR representative considers it obligatory that direct consultationshould take l1 placebetween the permanent menibersofthe· 8ecllrity Councll outside of any committee. . . .. We also know whal: China's position on the Palestine question ia. Even if China takes part in the consultations of the committee, and maintains its position as explained here in the Council, its participation will not promote·the implementation ')f the Assembly's resolution 011 Palestine. Tt appears, then, that the United States and France zealously support the ideu of a committee for consultations among five permanont membel's. But·to insist, in such cil'cumstances, on a committee as the only appl'opriate channel for COllsultation can, it seems to me, be the policy only of thbse who have insufficient respect for ther.r own proposaIs. 1 have thought it necess,ary to draw tne Council's attention to this point, and once more to express my opinion as to the desirability and llccessity of direct consultation between the permanent members of the Security Couacil. l'égard Chine au qU'elle facilitera l'Assemblée sentants à entre I~s la pour les tention d'exprimer doivent consultations nents Je passera projëts m"nt, rentes, votent autre. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : 1 request that when the Security Council proceeds to vote, the paragraphs of both of these proposaIs be divided and voted upon separately, because they contain different lllatters, and sorne members may 'Vote on one and not vote on another. de avant sion ·amènep.Lla que, pour du à tations conformer de paragraphe projet suivante: du demande fication Mr. AUSTIN (United States of Aml...ica): May 1 make an observation before there is any fUl'ther ruling ? The remarks of the representative of the USSR 'cause the delegation of the United States to say that in this situation, in which it is so important for us to act in harmony, so far as we can, th~ United States delegation would pe willing to amend that paragraph relating to the consultation by the Security Council to conform to the wishes expressed by the representative of the USSR. Tt could be done in this manner. On the pending matter, paragraph 2 of document 8/685, the United States draft resolution could be so amended as to read : .. To invite the· five permanent members of the Security Council to consult and..... l ask the representative of the USSR if that moo18 bis Views. Mr.GROMYKo(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics .(tl'anslated jrom Russian): Does the statement of the representative of .the United States mean that the. proposaI for the establishment of acommittee is withdrawn, and that, instead, he proposes that the permanent members should carry out direct consultationamong themselves? - listes tion qu'il comité tions Mr. Atr~TIN (United States of America): My . answer is "Yes ", if tllat will establish· harmony O!l~ tlùs point between the t:JSSRandthe United ~tates. Ido ti,()t wantto change the drafttesolutlon unless it will!l,ccomplish conciliàtion ·on that point. But if itwil.tdo that, then that is exactly what lam willing· to dQ, It relates to the de point réponds projet l'accord, traire, ~uLa 'p~Çlposa1 tothe effect !pat we should agree' on the need for direct consultation among the permanent members,· 1 should ·like to move the following nmendment : thàt the permanent members of the Council should inform the Couneil within ten days, or fifteen at the most, concerning the results of the consultations. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): 1 assume that the members of the Security Couneil recognize that what 1 said éonceming· paragraph 2 is on the same condition on which the· repre" sentative of the USSR bases his statement, namely, that we accept oaragraph 1. That is the beam which supports the, whole superstructure of this effort to place the great power of the five permane-nt members at the disoosal of the. weakest l'·four Members. It gives gtûdance toour actions and settles the direction in which we are· going; it fixes the destination of our interviews and consultations. Therefore, if 1 understand correctly, 1.think we are in complete agreement. 1 have no objection to the suggested amendment. With the permission of the Presid~nt, 1 shall incorporate this amendment as an added section to my draft resolution. Thus, it will notbe neces- 'sary for the Security Council ta hold discussions upon ît. 1 believe that itis within mypower··to .. (a) After consultation among themselves, to infol'm the Security Council ..... Sub·paragraphs (h) and '(cl would reroain the snme. Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (translated jrom French) :Yes, 1 accept them. Mr. L6PEZ (Colombia) : 1 do nat want to raise any objections, but simply to request some clarification. The representative of the USSR has BUggested that a time-limit should 'be fixed for the five permanent members to report to the Security Council, say, within ten. or fift~en days, and if l.remember correctly, he made "the.suggestion 'as ~n amendment. ln.,the way in ',which 'they 4ave ooen presented, a series of amendIllents hâve been, ~\1ggested.to ditf~ent proposal!l, and l' sn'-l!uld like to have someclarification regarding tb,e a.mend~ ment suggested by L'le representative of the USSR, first, as to whether 'that 'amendment applies to the United States draft resolution or to the Belgian amendment, and next, as to whether the t!me-limit, il' ,ten or fifteen.,days, beeause it cannot be left indefinite, either way. 1 am very glad to see, otherwisc, that we have come t9 the point ofaçceptïng .the idea of an invitation of the five permanent members instead of constitu,tingacommittee.That is a point which we ,have been trying tQ, make,., and 1 am very glad. to .,s:ee tha~. i~ hll~ ftnallY pecn ~cçepted, with a, tm~e-limit, Which wasa1so theldea of the ~djournment. ' , Therefore, 1.should he very, glad to support the ideaof the invitation and ~!..:;() the time~limit. 1 think we ha~e madesome re~lly' ,good progress. Mr. GROMYKO (Union Of Soviet Sociallilt ~epublics) (translated jram Russian): 1 should hke to"make,~l·emark. W9uld the representative of the United.~tates· agree that we should confine ourselves to adopting only a general resolution to the,effec! that the', Security Couneil· irlvites or <lalls upon· the States which are permanent mem- 'bers' of the COÙDcil to consult'together as·has l.'ra~tically been agreed' upon between'u;, and to 'Ûmltall thesub~paragraphs (a), (b) and (c)? It 'Would bebettet ta provide the States with the ~pportu!1ity of ,cons1.llting together on,those ques- 'flO~s Wlth regard to which they consider consultatIOn necessary, and which arise from the reports of, the ~alestine. Commission.Wouldit not he ~e~er not to, bind th0se States'in the course of ihelr consultation by any kind of terms of reference, but to 'provide·th~ ~th 'the'opportunity to ex~hange?pinio~sfr~elYJllld ,fully on aU tbese "'lueS~?l1S1!W.l61out"b~ing bound by any kind of ~oD;dltiQns laid .down, in advancc 1, . whe~ler or not representatives of the United Kingdom, the Jews and the Arabs should be invited for purpos~s of consultation to some kind of conference, of the five Powers. It therefore seems to me that it would be better to confine ourselves to a general formula to the efIect that the Security Council calls upon the five Powers to carry out direct consultation among themselves on matters arising out of the reports of the Palestine Commission. That is the question which.1 should like to put to the representative of the United States.

On the understanding that the representatives of the USSR and the United States will in the meantime consult with a view to producing, if· possible, .an agr~d form, the Security Co~cil.will now adjourn, to meet again at 3.30 this afternoon. The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m. TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY·TmRD MEETING Beld atLake Success, New York, , on. Friddy,5 March 1948, at 3.30 p.m. . ·····c· ...., . . President: Mr. T.F. TSI-ANG (China). Present.: The representatives' of the following cOUlltties :. Argentina, .Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; United Kingdom, United States of America. . ' , The agenda was that of the 262nd meeting (documentS/Agenda 262). '8. Contilluation>ofthediscussion ,\ orthe Palestine question On the invitation of the President, Mr• .Lisicky, Chaifman .o/the' .United· Nation PaleStine ·Commission,' Mahmoud Fawzi Bey, -the representative o/liEgypt,'andRabbi Abba Rillel Silver, the represd~tative 0/ theJewish Agency of Palestine, took t/ieir places at thirSecurity Council table. r' The.PREsIDENT:BefOl'e this moming's [262ndJ tqeetin,g WaS adj()urI1ed, .we ·were. about to, •vote on the draft resolution of the United States delegation [document S/685] and the Belgian amendmentthereto [document S/688]. Suggestions were made'with regard to changes in the text of the United States draft resolution, and members now have an amended draft of that resolution' before them.I shall ask either the representative of the United States or the representative of the Union