S/PV.2688 Security Council

X should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the reptesentatives Of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey in which they request to bo invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council’s agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I proposer with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the debate, without the right to Vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter an% rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rulea of procedure. There being no objection, it is ao decide%. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Uoushoutan (Cyprus), Mr. Dountae (Greece) and Mr. Turkmen (Turkey) took places at the Council table.

I should like to recall that in the course of the Council’s consultations, members of the Council agreed that an invitation should be extended to Mr. Over Rotay in accordanca with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure. Unless I hear any objection I ahall take it that the Council decides to Invite Mr. Roray in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. There being no objection, it is so decided. At the appropriate time I shall invite Mr. Roray to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. MemLoro of the Council have before them the report by the SWretsry-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period 1 December 1985 to 31 May 1986 (S/l8102 and Add.2) and for the period 10 Decembsr 1965 to 11 June 1966 (S/lSlO2/Add.l). Members of the Council also have bsfore them a draft resolution, contained in document S/18151, which was prepared in the course of the Council’s consultations. I draw the attention of members of the Council to document S/18149, which contains the text of a letter dated 12 June 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Cygnus to the united Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. It is my understanding that the Council ie ready to vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection I shall now put the draft resolution to the vote. There being no objection, it is so decided. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Australia, Bulgaria, China, Congo, Denmark, France, Ghana, Madaaascar. Thailand. Trinidad and Tobaso. union of Soviet Soci;list Republics,-United Arab Emirat&; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, united States of America, Venezuela

There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has therefore been adopted unanimouely as resolution 585 (1986). The first speaker is the representative of Cyprus, on whom I now call. Mt. MOUSWXJTAS (Cyprus) : Allow me at the outaot, Sir, to congratulate YOU most warmly on your assumption of the high office of President of the Security Council for the month of June and to express appreciation for the skilful manner in which you conducted the consultations on the draft resolution just adopted unanimously, renewing the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (IJNPICYP) for another Period of six months. It is a source of satisfaction for us that the presidency of this body is in the talented and experienced hands Of a distinguished diplomat from a friendly country with which we share the closest of diplomatic relations, especially within the united Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement. (Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus) I extend our warmest cargratulations also to your preducessor, the President of the Security Council for the month of May, a seasoned diplomat, Ambassador James Victor Gbeho, whose wise leadership has already been acknowledged by this WY. I thank the members of the Council for the renewal of the peace-keeping mandate of UNPICYP, to which my Government had given its prior COnEWnt. The resolution that was just adopted meets the approval of my (iovernment because it cartains the basic provisions for the stationing of Vlited Nations troops in Cyprus made necessary in light of the continuing lWkish occupation of part of our territory and the ongoing initiative of the United Nations Secretary-General. The Government of Cyprus expresses its deepest appreciation to the Gectetary-General, Mr. Javier Perez de Cudllar, and his collaborators for their Untiring efforts in seeking a peaceful and just solution to the problem of Cyprus. Our appreciatia, goes also to Major-General G. Greindl, Commander of UNPICYP, and to his officers and men for the dedicated manner in which they have performed their duties. Last, but not at all least, we extend our warm appreciation to the friendly Ciovernments which, through voluntary contributions of personnel and funds, have enabled UNFICYP to continue rendering its services in Cyprus. In this regard I wish ti inform the Council that the Government of wprus has decided to increase its cartribution to UNPICTP to the sum of $550,000. The problem of Qprus, seen in its right and only perspective, is one of foreign invasion and continuing occupation by Turkey of approximately 40 per cent of the territorv of a small non-alianed countrv U+IP+~ nf the r_mitp;r %ilF~sa 5~4 - a the Commonwealth, the usurpation of lands, the inhuman expulsion of thousands of people from their ancestral homas and the massive violations of the human rights and fundamantal freedoms of all Cyptiotn. (Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus) On 20 July 1974 - almci5t 12 years ago - under various pretexts, such as that Of protecting the Turkish Cypriot community, or preserving t.be constitutional smtue quo mder alleged treaty rights, Turkish troops brutally invaded the island, UprOOting and expelling one third of its indigenous population and forcing them to become refugee5 in their own country. This naked aggression, which left thousmds dead, missing or enclaved and caused vast llpater ial losses, was repeatedly cuadermed by the international co5daUnify and by world organ&&ions, including the United Nations General &sembly and GecUrity Council, a5 well as the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth and mmy other war Id bodies. solemn Security Council resolutions - such as resolution 365 (1974), which endorsed General Aeaembly resolution 3212 (xX2x) of 1974, adopted unanimusly and calling inter alia for the withdrawal of the TXarkish troops and the return of the refugees to their home5 and lands, as well as for non-interference and nasl-illtervsntial in the internal affairs of Qpru ad for respect for the human rights of all wpriots - remain unimplemented. P.B recently as 1983 and 1984, the Security Council again, in resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) , called for an end to the occupatiar and condemned the attempted Unilateral declaration of indWen&n~ and all illegalities perpetrated in the occupied areas of Cyprus, such a5 the holding of so-called referendum and presidential and parliamentary elections. lrbst importantly, these resolution5 demanded the withdrawal of the attempted secession and called %pOn all States not to recognize the purpixtad g~t+ta & the '%rlci& mnahlit- --F--- --- of Northern Cyprus’ set up by secessionist acts . . . [and] not to facilitate or in any way assist the aforesaid secessionist entity”. (resolution 550 (1984), para. 3) (Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus) It is heartening to note that no State other than Turkey has eeoogniaed this illegal ooncoction of attempted secession. Yet this puppet regime continues with further illegalities, the most recent being the so-called municipal elections in which thousands of settlers, including officers of the lbrkish army of occupatioo , took part in a parody of democratic process thwarting the free will of the Turkish Cypriots. It is self-evident that no lawful or adequate expression of free will can take place in the oocupied areas because of the massive Turkish military presence and the uprooting and expulsion Of the lawful inhabitants amstituting 82 per cent of the population in those areas and the im&mtation in their homes of settlers from Turkey. The Reuters ennounwment of 7 June of the intended visit of the Prkae Minister of Turkey to the occupied areas of Cyprus from 2 to 4 July this year constitutes yet another proof of Ankara%? affrart to the United Nations. It is a contemptuous violation of Gecwity Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (19841 and demonstrates the hypocrisy of Turkey, which, on the one hand, states that it supports the initiative of the Secretary-General and, on the other hand, ViOlateS the very resolution6 upon which the gecretary-General*a initiative is based. Fur thermore, disregarding demands contained in United Uatious resolutions and non-aligned declarations for the complete demilitarization of the Mplblic of Cyprus, Turkey, acting in violation of specific provisions of vnited Nations res@Vations demanding the withdrawal of its troops, prooeead with the recent construction of a vast military airport in I;efkonico and a naval base in Kyrenia. These actions, which connote its intentions to perpetuate its military stranglehold wer our people and the occupation of our territory , ace in stark Contrast to Our written acceptance of talks for the demilitarizaticm of Nicosia as it appears in the Secretary-General’s present report in brcument S/l8102 dated 31 h y 1986. (Mr. Moushoutas, 8pr us) The issue therefore, in addition to the main acts of invasion and occupation, is also the contemptuous disregard of solemn United Nations resolutions and decisions, for to date, notwithstanding a host of mandatory security Council rerolutione the Turkish troops and settlers have not been withdrawn, not a single refugee has been allowed to return to his home and land and, irarically, after l2 years of occupation, the people of Cyprus have not had an opportunity even to discuss troop end settler withdrawal and the question of international guarantees. As a oonsequence of the mrkish invasiar and continuing accupatfm and the non-implementation by Turkey of United Nations resolutions, the lofty principle of the n&m-use of forts in international relations, enshrined in Article 2 (4) of the Wited Nations Charter, is still blatantly and contemptuously disregarded. The principle of respect for the sovereignty, indepsndence, territorial integrity aa . unity of States and that of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms have been violabad by Turkey. The principle of the inadmissibility of the amuisition of territory by force is severely drallenged and the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness8 is no more in that beautiful island. (MC. t’bUBhOUta8, *PC UB) The right to mwe freely in one% country is being suppressed and denied to our people under the yoke of the oocupation trarpe. The tragic question of the cnffdng - a totally humanitarian issue - rendns unraaolved, the %teof lwed ones unknown, while the misfortune of the enclaved cmtinues unabated as their nuabers dwindle resulting from violation6 of their maat basic human rights. Cyprus, the historic and beautiful island in the Weditorranean destined to be a bridge of brotherhood between the three cartinente Which eurround it, continues to be a source of conflict endangering peaoe and stability in that strategic and sensitive regicn. Segregation, 80 reminiscent of the deplorable eystes of auartheid h South Africa, has been impam as the policy of Ankara in its effort to partition and annex to mainland Turkey the occupied part of Qprus. Divisiar of the territory through artificial boundaries of separation, such a8 the abominable and disgramful Attila line cutting our island in two, and the segregation of our Deople are the official policy of the invader in Cyprus, carried out before a bewildered world oomuniW that has repeatedly declared its abhorrence of such policies. With such separatist actions Turkey hoges, in vain, to deal a final blow to the traditional unity and co-operatiar between the Greek Cypriot and lUrkish Cypriot cwmunities forged by a canmw corntry and destiny. Thus, 200,000 human beings uprooted from their anoeetral hms and lands watch across the fences their usurped homes and the familiar mountaina and valleys, denied to this very day their inalienable right to return. These unfortunate people are indeed going through a un igue tragedy. They are close to, and yet far away frw, belwed places. They witness the daily importation of Anatolian settlers brought in from TUtkey in thousands to usurp and colonize the occupied areas, furthering Ankara’s atte;apts to change the demographic character of the island. Historical names of towno and (Mr. Moushoutas, Qpr us) villages embodying the legends and wisdom of our people are changed to Turkish place-namaa; hietoric monuments which are central to our cultural identity are l-ted by the invader, in order to destroy the age-old cultural heritage of our people. These acticns are another plot in Turkey’s history and constitute a crime against humnity recorded in the timelens book of history. Because of this grim state of affairs in the occupied areas of the &public, the Ministers of non-aligned countries, meeting in New Delhi in April of this year* %ondemned all effort6 or actions aimed at altering the demographic structure of Cyprus. and noted that these abhorrent and criminal acts aaguired recently even more alarming propor tiono. The settlers are not only usurping the homes and lands of the expelled indigenous wpruz population; they are also desecrating holy places, plmdeting what was created with the sweat and tears of our people, and adulterating through so-called elections their free will. These colonists from Turkey even form “political partien”. A settler and former Colonel of the Turkish Army, Mr. Ismail Tezer, who became a so-called minister in Mr. Denktash’e regime, has openly declared that the aims of his party .are to achieve the partition of Cyprus and its annexation to Turkey . ..* He admitted that the settlers came to Cyprus with Turkey’s approval, that they were preeented a8 l agricultural force”, that almost all of them became citizen6 of the so-called Turkish Federated State, and that their purpose was to stay for ever in Cypr-. V&at lofty aims indeed and, may I add, what silencing evidence against thme who try to deny it. The Council will recall that, parallel with the crimes of aggression and the importation of Turkish eottlern, in 1974 Turkey proceeded with the setting Up of a bsgue entity in the occupied areas to 8ervr as a puppet of the inva&r. ThiB fictitious entity is not recognized by any Gtate, except Turkey; it hae no (Mt. noushoutas, Cyprus) trrrftory other thau thhoee occupied areas *iA cmtitute an integral pact of the Wsmblic of Cyprus, as reaffirioed by General ~saembly resolution 34/30, and, as mtated before, it has been ccodeamed by Security Council resolutions 541 (1583) and 550 (1984). It is used by Ankara as a propaganda channel aimed at clouding the burning issue of Turkish aggressiar, by attempting to present it as an iuteraormmal difference, and hoping to cover up mr key’s grave ct imes against Qprus md its people. The so-called Prism Minister of that puppet entity, Mr. Eroglu, on 8 Hay of this year called .fOr the official transformatiar of the occupied area8 of Qprua into the mventeenth province of Turkey and for the Turkish occupation. to be extended to the southern shores of Oypru~~ a8 the only way for the abolition cf the abominable Attila line. It is obvious from the aforementioned that Ankara’s tirget is the perpetuation of its stranglehold wer ~prua and, as a cohseguence, it is paying only lipwrViO8 to a negotiated settlement of the problem, using the talks as a ePdtcrroreen aud a shield to mislead the international caunumity aud silence its CritiCiSrp and also to gaih time to Cmplete its insidious aimS. Instead of wof king for a oolution of the Cl(prus problem on the bnsia of United Nations resolutions, the %W’kish Government is consolidating the results of its aggression by speedily inaorQorating the occupied areas into the State of Turkey. Instead of strengthening age-old bands that link the people of cyprus together, it strives to eliminate them to aerve its expansicmist and snnewticmist goals. The mrkiah allegatiaw that these serraratist actiona are neeeaeacy POC the security of the Twkish Cypriot community are not only absurd but are fabrications to serve it5 expneifmiet goals. The allegatim of security needs for the ‘=trr kish (Mr. Mtmshoutas, Qpr us) Qpriot cunmunity was originally aimed at paving the way for the Turkish invasion, and nar that the nrrkish occupation has dragged cn for 12 years the allegation is still being used to prwide the pretext for the continuation of occupation, in ViOhtion of a series of United Natians resoluticms demanding the immediate withdrawal of the Turkish troops. similarly, the so-called mistreatment of the mrkish Cypriot cmmnity in the pre-invasion era is another Turkfsh fabrfcaticm used in a vain attempt to justify the unjustifiable military occupation. To prove the falSiw of this allegation one can &B no better than revert to the highest independent source on this subject, the late great secretary-General U Thant, whose silencing pertinent paragraph 106 of his report in document s/6426 reads: I . . . the hardships suffered by the Turkish Cypriot population are the direct result of the Peadettehip% self-isolation policy, imposed by form on the rank and file.. & the other hand, Ankara’s expansionist aims for invading Qprus were clearly expressed QI 10 July 1980 by Mr. T&wan Gunes, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tiarkey at the time of the invasion, who statid that *Cyprus is as valuable as a right arm for a country interested in its defence or for its expansiariet aims’. (Hr. Moushoutas, Qq~ue) Hr. Gums further admitted that t %any States to a certain extent, because it suits their interests, want to see the Oyprue problem merely as our desire to protect the Turkish comsunity in the Island, whereas the actual problem is the secur Sty of the 45 millim Turks in the mtberland.’ More recently, on 3 December 1983, the present Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Oaal, called Wprus .an Island which pierces the middle of Turkey like a dagger, being extremly vital to its secusity”, and only a few days ago he eiabarked on a campaign of falsification of history to suit: Turkey’s sihister aims against CjlprtuB. The continuing oooupatian over the past 12 years and lWkey*s unending divisive and expansionist actions in the occupied areas, as well as the prwocative and highly revealing statements made by the ‘XWkish side, constitute insuraaountable obstacles to the free search for a just and viable solution of the Cyprus problem through amstruetive and meaningful negotiations on the basis of United Natiars resolutions ahd the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977 and 19 823~ 1979. It is a cardinal truth that the success of negotiations depends on their being free ahd on their being based on the solemn provisions of Security Council resolutions. The very presence of the mrkish troop3 rules out any meaningful freedom to decide on the part of the Turkish Cypriot couummity and has the effect of a gun pointed at the Government of Cyprus. On the other hand, to judge from the actions and statements of the Tf?rkish leadership, there is no change of mind vi th regard to the objective of the Turkish Government , whictr obviously remains the perpetuation of its occupation of the Island. We are cornflitted to a just and viable solution of the Cyprus p~cblem aa a tlmtter of urgency, in accord&m?? with the United Nstions Cherter and resolutions. (HP. lbushoutao, @pr us) (3nly through EN& a aolutiar can the people of ~prua find peace, security and happiness. FOP that reaficm, we have co-operated with the SacretaPy-General in the discharge of his mission of good offices. The GPeek Cypriot side has made many painful conceoeione in order to reach a solution. It ic because we want a solution that we have indicated a willingneS5 t0 accept many - even unortho&x - prwiaicns relating to territorial and con8titutianal issues. A couple of examples should suffice: We have shown Our willinwnes~ to accede to a demand for 50 per cent representation in the t&vpper Rowe and 30 per cent in the Lower House for the 18 pet cent Turkish Cypriot mUlitY* It iS Decause we vant a edution that we agreed that the regia under Turkish Cypriot administration might be in the order of 29 per cent, and not becauSe we were agreeing to pay a premium for aggression. It ia entirely legitiarste for us to be concerned when we are faced with unworkable conetitutisnal ot~uctu~es and decieiamnaking processes or other inequitable propositions. A viable solution ie what we owe to our popte. our primary consideration wet be the future of our oountry. We hsve always been rem?y to m++perate with the secreiary-General. It hae always been agreed that the Cyprus problem ie to be sohad at~ a package of interrelated and interdepembnt elements. we have always expected and have UmsiStently demanded that the importmt iesues should be resolvedl as a matter of priority and at the appropriate high level. The fact tSat the constituti~al questim8 have been diocussed for several yeapa ip, indicative of our mnciliato-cy attitude and of our willingmae to co-operate with the secretary-General. cm the other hand, over the em petfed the n\pki& ai& h(Lp refused to enter in&~ any meaningful discussion on the crucial issues. As the Secretary-GeneraL himself has often explained, his mission of good offdcso neither is, nor purports to be , a misston of mediation OP a~bitratia. % (Mr. Houuhoutaas, Cyprus) still recall the Security Cowcil debate in thy 1984 that teaulted in the adooption oE resoluticm 550 (1984) , when Mr, mnktash shouted to all that the Secretary-General was anly a Ygood-officer” and, therefore, could not submit any documents of his own. When the Secretiry-Cener al submitted his April 1985 documentation, canposed of two documents, Mr. Denktaf&k, in the same spirit, again wrote a voluminous letter of cements on the 8ecretary-General~s B-or-ao pages. One needs to read it to appreciate how negative his attitude was to that attmpt by the Gecretary+encral and, since many of Mr. Denktash’s demands are reflected in the draft framework agreement of 29 March 1986, one might also be tempted to conclude that intransigence , regrettably, pays after all. At the end of last year, the Secretary-General invited the two sides to lcwer-level meetings and had other oontacm with them. We told the Secretary-General our position on the various elements his team raised during those meetings. Thoee positions were sumaar ized in writing cm 20 March in President Kypr ianou’s aide --=?@=* which was issued as a security Council docuJIIeut this mar ning and to which you, Mr. President, GO kindly made reference. We alao proved to the Secretary-General that further consultations be held in order to bridge the gap that was apparent to us and in order to clarify such terms as the “integrated cllhole-approach” cc+%Cept. Inetead of holding further mnsulwtions, the Secretary-General pro&mad a draft fremowork agreement that did not reflect Greek Cypriot rxmcerneb All political parties in Cyprus agreed that the draft franr jr k agreement could not be accepted as it stood. The constitutional provisions, an formulated, were found to be unwon kable. The forff,ulation of the territorial question had been changed 80 radically as to bear little resetilance to previous formulations. (Hr. EQuohoufiaa, Cyprus) In f8ct, 4% irplicationr of that toemulation was an outright CantraJiction of the 1984 Vienna wrking points, according to which the moat impotbnt factor in determining the territorfel quostisn war to be tha resettlement of Greek Cypriot diwlaced perocns in their h-5. (Mr. Ebushoutas, qpr ue) AR the content of the draft framework agreement did not satisfy previous undartikings, the integrated whole concept was not considered to be sufficient protection for the Greek qptiot side’s position. To put it simply, the Greek Cypriot Side muld have found itself bound by su unvorksble ctmstitutianal atrangemnt, without benefiting from corresparding commitments of the other side on isSUeS Of vital ooncarn I3 the Greek Cypriots. Pacause of the interrelationship of elements, our pnsition on some could not finally be formulated - not only because Qf the absence of any counafbaents by the Turkish Cypriot side on the remaining elements, but, even more, because Of contintms negative statements on the Turkish side. IS it surprising that we should be ccmcesned, &en in his reply of 21 April Mr. Denktash mocked the WeStiOn of troop withdrawals with his statementt *J&3 for the witbdrswal of non-*priot troops’ - end the follwing words contain the mockery - “excluding tncee that are to remin on the island . . . . (8/18102/Add.l~ Pm 21) The time has aone to establish a balance among the elements of the fraarawork. when balance is established, which will be possible cmly when there are di8cussiO~ on the outstanding basic issues, further negotiations on the other elements of the package can be justified and in fact greatly facilitated. We have proposqd negotiating the important issues of the Cyprus problem. Those issues that have never been negotiated nor even discussed before, as repeatedly indicated - the withdrawal of teosps and settlers, the guarantees and the three freedoms - constitute the cardinal aspects of the problem of *prUS. We have made proposals in good faith in an effort to maintain the negotiating process. We cannot accept that our proposal of 20 April 1986 was not viable shply because MK . Denktash might reject it. If that is the case we are in fact being advised to accept a victor ‘8 peacn in Cyprus. (Mr. Moushoutae I Qptus) The Secretary-General in his oral message sf 8 May 1986 invited us to express our Views on the content of the draft framework agreement. The procedure is part and parcel of that ccntent. We have given our views, as requested. This procedure will enable us “to assess t;ogether the joint results of the outcome of this high-level meeting or international conference and the content of your ‘draft framework agreement’: @/18102/Add.l, p. 30) We have noted with satisfaction that the Secretaryeneral refers to the proposal of the Soviet Union entitled *Principles of a Cyprus settlement and WaYS Of achieving it.. (S/17752, annex, and Corr.1) Three proposals are in conformity with the Charter and seek to implement the Mited Nations resolutions on Cyprus. The procedure envieaged is aOnscnant with are of our alternative proposals submitted to the Setcre tary-Genezal. In his report the Secretary-General speaks of the dangers inherent in the present situation. We are aware of the many dangers we face, as we still have on OUC territory Tar kish eupation troops and a secessionist IW kish Cypriot pseudo-State. That i8 why, like all 81~11 and &fenceless States, we have pit our faith in the united Nations, particularly in the Security Council. we remain confident that the guiding light of the Charter will shine in the Council's thoughts. Security Ccuncil resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) contain the canpass points that should chart a path for all of us here today, This body, as the guardian of United 3ations principles and resolutiarrs, has a solemn duty to see that Turkey abandons what was Obtained by force of arme# withdraws its troops and respects the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus , as demanded by a host Of United Nations re3Autions. It is Turkey that must implement 8;-xeity Council decisions and tceeLuti.ons upon which a just and lasting soluticxl can be based. It is not, and must not be, Qprus, the victim, that must be made to sign its surrender. It is the aggre8sor. mrkey, that must account to the Security Council for ite act of aggression and non-ccmpliance with Security Council deciaiOn8. It is regrettable that the tragic situation in Cyprus persist8 because the Council has not so far taken decisive and effective steps to force Turkey t0 cWPlY with solemn security Council resol,uticms. The tragedy of Oypru8 amply illustrates the plight of our Organization and consequently the plight of the small and militarily weak States, which rely for their security cm the United Natians. At the same time, it poses an agonizing challenge to mankind. If the United Nations amtinues to allow its ummimouely adopted resolutions and Security Couucil decisions to be cmtemptuously disregarded by ihvadere, the crisis nw facing it - a political, eummfc and social crisis - will oontinue and the world Organizatioh’s prestige will be further eroded. The credibility and ueefulneas of the United Nations depend on it8 ability to fulfil it8 mission, by mastering the means to implement its decisions arid by taking effective action when the situation warranm. It is our duty to restore that credibility to our Organisation and face positively and victoriously the agmizing challenge to mankind by implementing the Charter prwisiohs dealing with the establiglhgnt of the system of internati&al security provided by the Charter. The Government of Cyprus is striving to 8ecure the implemntatia, of the united Nations resolutions , to make Qprus an island without foreign armies or dividing lines and to rebuild the bridges of co-operation blwn up by foreign interference and intervention. In this task our hopes for vindication and justice rest on Me United Nations, whit% constitutes the cornerstone and mafn pillar of our foreign policy and the framework within which a just and lasting solution of our pro&km can be found. Until such a solution is found we feel that there can be no legalising of the CeSUhS Of invasion and occupation, as there can be no vindication of the of fender. SO larg as the violations of the Charter persist, so lmg as our lands are Occupied by an alien element, we shall, with determination, mrseverance, and faith, cartinue the struggle to safeguard our homes aud country.

The next speaker is the representative of Greece, on whan I now call. Mr. WUNTAS (Greece): Allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the mmth of June. I am sure that, with your great experience, diplamstio skills and tact, you will successfully guide the Council~s deliberations. I should be remiss if I failed to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Gbeho, on the exemplary way in which he carried out his duties during May. For many years the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus WNFYCYPI has, within the limitation8 of its mandate, carried out it5 duties coneistently and has significantly contributed to the maintenance of peace in Cyprus. I should like on this occasion to pay tribute to all the men and officers of the Force wba have served in Cyprue these past years. In particular our appreciation goes to General Greindl, the officer5 and the national contingents under his command. UNFICW ie to play a further impxtant role in keeping peace in Cyprus. At this stage I should also like to express the sincere gratitude of my Government to all the countries that have in past years selflessly contributed manpower and material to UNPICXP and have made its continued existence possible. The Secretary-General, with the help of his able staff, has been untiring in hi5 long and dedicated involvement with the Cyprus guestion. I should like to thank him and to reiterate at this point that my Government continue5 to support hi5 miesion of good offices. It is now almost two year8 since the Secretary-General started his latest effort5 to find out whether possibilities exist for a solution to the Cyprus problem under the present circumstance& The United Nations has repeatedly dealt with this question, and a number of General Assembly and Security Council. resolutions state in the most unequivocal terms the sort of solution envisaged for Cyprus. Solution of the Cyprus problem has always been seen as being based on a package of eeveral elements. The interdependence of those elements is such that it ia impossible for either side to commit itself to part of the package without knowing the whole. Throughout the long process of negotiatione, both before and after the Secretary-General’8 present initiative, only one group of subjects has been discuoeed extensively, namely that related to a new constitutional structure for the Republic of Cyprus. The territorial issue has also been discussed, although (Mr. Dountas, Greece) at a much later stage. The questions of the withdrawal of the Turkish troops, of guarantees and of the three freedoma have never been explored. The Turkish side has been adaarant in its refusal even to expose its views, and least of all to enter into serious negotiations on the subject. Deeply preoccupied with this situation, President Kyptianou addressed a letter to the Secretary-General on 20 March 1996, which has been circulated this morning as a Security Council document. President Kyprianou conveyed to the secretary-General once more the basic position of his Government. I believe that it should have been clear from that straightforward communication that the positions of the two sides were still widely dive-gent on the crucial points of the dispute. Nine days after the dispatch of President Kyprianou’s letter, on 29 March 1986, the Secretary-general presented to the parties his draft framework agreement. As members of the Council might have observed, it deals mostly with the various constitutional aspects of the Cyprus problem while it refer5 only briefly - almost in passing - to the three major issues; nemePy the withdrawal of the army and settlers, guarantees and the three freedoms. It is therefore a text incomplete and consequently imbalanced. And it is indeed surprising that, despite the incompleteness of the draft framework agreement, a commitment even to initial acceptance is being sought from the parties. Paced with the situation created by the hasty preeentation of this incomplete document, the Government of Cyprus decided to propose a new approach in a genuine effort to save the initiative of the secretary-General. President KyprianQu, with the full support of the Greek Government, suggested to the Secretary-General that one of the following alternative procedures be adopted in order to deal with the major remaining issues, which had never been dealt with before: either the convening of an international conference or the convening of a high-level intercommunal meeting. After these three issues had been discussed, and in the light of the outcome of the discussions, the two sides would he in a position to turn to the draft framework agreement. In the opinion of the Greek Government this position of President Ryprianou is concepLually and politically sound, given the imbalances and the far-ranging provisions of the draft framework agreement. I do not intend to enter into a discuesion on the merits of the draft framework agreement, nor do I intend to go into the substance of the constitutional and territorial questions. My colleague the Permanent Representative of Cyprus has already dealt with the subject. I should only like to set out in no uncertain terms the position of my Government regarding one aspect of the Cyprus question, namely the Turkish troops in the island and the guarantees. Since Greece maintains a special relationship with the overwhelming majority of the people of Cyprus and is also a guarantor Power with specific and legal responsibilities regarding the Republic of Cyprus, it cannot remain indifferent to developments in the island and particularly the presence of Turkish troaps of occupation - particularly since that presence is linked with wider security considerations covering the whole area. I have already stated my Government*s support for the position of President Ryprianou set out in his communications to the Secretary-General of 20 April and 10 June 1986. For reasons I have already briefly touched uponr precedence should be given to the outstanding main issues of tne Cyprus problem - that is, the withdrawal of the Turkish army, effective guarantees and the three freedoms. Allow me to elaborate on this point. The draft framework agreement presented to the Greek Cypriots on 29 March is exhaustive in its constitutional provisions and takes into account all points of interest to the Turkish Cypriots. The questions relating to Greek Cypriot interests are actually bypassed. They are deferred for discumion to the ill--fief ined future, with no guarantees. At the same time the Greek Cypriot and (Mr. Dountae, Greece) the Turkish Cypriot sidea are asked to comit themselves, even initially, to all the provision8 of the draft framework agreement. However, it should be stressed that these provisions cover mostly points of interest to the Turkish aide. The Turkish aide is committed to nothing related to the issuea of major preoccupation to the Greek Cypriots. Paragraph 8.1 of the draft framework agreement, which deals with the military aepect, ia mainly of a procedural nature, aud it8 substantive part could be interpreted to the detriment of the Greek Cypriot side, In this BenBe the draft framework agreement is iu our view unbalanced. In order to redrese this incompleteness, this babelance , President Ryprianou presented his alternative suggest ions. I should have thought that President Kyprisnou~s proposals would have been accepted without any difficulty. They only indicate the obvious: that no agreement, particularly no far-reaching agreement such aa the one provided for by the draft framework agreement, can be achieved vithout full knowledge at least of the poeition of the other side on the remaining main aspects of the question - particularly since, in the case of the Turkish troopo and the guarantees, it was widely known that highly significant divergencies of opinion existed between the tva eidee. (Mr. Dountas, Greece) I am referring, by way of example , to the letter President Kyprianou addresSed to the Stcretary-General on 20 March - as I have said, nine days before the presentation of the framework agreement. That letter bears witness to the extent of the gap between the positions of the parties. By that brief analysis I have simply attempted to demonetrate that when the draft framework agreement was presented to the partiea their position on crucial matters was so far apart as not to justify, in our view, its submission for acceptance. I frankly wonder why, in view of that reality, the following simple Scenario could not have been adopted: A paper would be prepared which would reflect the positions so far agreed upon on certain points , as well as suggestions on how other, constitutional, questions could be dealt with. The Outstanding main iSSUeS would then be discussed and the poeition of the parties on them would be defined alien recorded. After all issues covering the whole range of the Cyprus problem had been dealt with, then the Secretary-General would be able to give a Sound assesement of the Situation, knowing the position of the parties on all aspects of the problem. Be could subsequently conclude either that the positions of the parties were not reconcilable or that the gap had narrowed considerably so that a draft agreement covering all the positions might be presented for an overall solution to the problem. A procedure such as the one f have just indicated would be to the detriment of no one. The Positions of the two sides would be fully secured. A commitment of the parties at that stage would have been Possible. One really wonders who could have any difficulties with such an approach and why. We are therefore justified in askinq what the reason was that made it BO imperative hastily to present a document incomplete as far as the whole spectrum of the problem irs concerned and, furthermore, to seek a commitment to it. (Mr. Dxntas, Greece) Allow me to insist on this point. We reaily fail to understand the reasons behind that hasty submission of an incomplete document for acceptance, particularly since all the evidence surrounding the problem pointed to the fact that the moment was not c ips for an agreement. As I have just mentioned, President Kyprianou, nine days before the submission of the document, had made his wition abundantly clear, in a straightforward and candid manner. what was the reason for the haste? Why could not a scenario like the ane I have just indicated been followed - a Scenario SSCUring the in&!reStS of all the parties? Of course, it might be argued that Turkey was against it. Pair enough. Rut the framework agreement was not designed solely to protect the Turkish interests. What about the concerns of the Greeks? who was going to protect those ccmerns? Are we to assume that the doculPent was submitted hastily with the intentiar of expediting tie development of mstters, to bring pressure to bear on are sfde to induce it to make further conosssiars so that finally an agreement would be achieved? Frankly, I am not prepared to accept such &n interpretation. I have a very 8 imple reply to the question I have poeed: the has* submissia, of this incaaplete &M%ment was a mistake, an error of judgement. Even the most powerful and able secretarfats can, &spite the best of intention6, make mistekes. If we believe - as I do - that it was a mistake, then there is hope. Mistakes can bs redressed. I do believe that the proposals by Presfdant Kyprianou open the door to the redressing of this mistake. I wish to touch upon two oLher pointe. First, it has been mentioned that the Greek Cypriot side could accept the draft framework agreement under an integrated whole approach and in the context of an ultimate ComitmeM to a Solution, depending on the eventual outcome of negotiations on the major issues. I have grave doubts as to whether the inteynated (Mr. Dountaas, Greece) Jlolo and ultimata acmmitmant appmach described in the draft framework agtranant and tha aocoqranying letter could be considered as safeguacdfng, even remtely, the pOsition of the Greek ~priots. If, however, it could be so considered - if this clause of the integrated whole approach was a safe and sound approach - I would simply ask why it would not be possible for the Turkish side to agree on the smdalitiae of the withdram of the lWkish troops, subject to an integrated whole and ultimate ammitment appcaach~ namely, the subsequent acceptance by the Greek Cypriots of the draft framework agreeaent. Rave the Turks ever bean asked to aacapt that approach? I am afraid &at the integrated whole approach - 88 bwignod and dararibed in the draft agreement - would, if aver accepted, end up as a euphemism for Greek Cypriot carcessions thrargh salami tactics. That would ba the reality of the possible acoeptanoe of this so#isticated clause. I have already referred to a number of legitimate cancetns and fearo of my Government regarding the draft framwork agreement. The letter a&3reseed by ar. mnktash to the Secretary-General on 21 April 1986 and contained in documaat S/lUO?/Add.l increases tremen&usly these grave concerns of the Greek sids. Mr. Dmktash makes it clear in his letter tbat part of the Turkish troops will ~aoaih in Cyprus indefinitely. I quote his words: “except those that are to remin ou the islandm (S/l8102/Add.l, anxex V, p. 211. As to the timetable for the Cbgrture of those who might eventually actually daepart, his pmitim is also quib clear. First of all the Mvernxent of Cypfue will have to be dissolved. It will have to cormit suicide. It will be replaced by a transitional ~vernment paralysed by Turkioh vet-, as rpply provided for in the draft framework agreement. Then, the Greek Cypriots will have to disarm their Natimal Guard and it will have to k, disbanded. The Greek qpriote will have to abandon even the minimam of self=defsnm poossibi1fty prwi&d for by the Natimal Guard. Only then - a?tee (Mr. OOuntae, Greece) there im bo Governrent of Cyprus, after the Greek Qpriots stand naked before the tens of thousauds of mrkish axupatian trooptr - will the mrkish oocupstifm forcea begin their partial withdrawal. May I amk the nobers of the Security Council vhether they would be prepared to aocept such provisicns if their own countries veto concerned? I do not want to prolong my statement by elaborating QI the other points trade by Mr. Denktash. They are there for everyone to read. f have amAm point to make at this stage. I vish to touch upon the aantentim that the Caverruaent of Cyprus, by not accepting the commitments contained in tire framework agreement, ie supposedly backing down from its previous aoeeptmce of the documents of April 1985. I shall try to explain why this amtentian seems to my Gwernment totally erroneous. The Goverment of Wprus, guided solely by the desire to reach a negotiated eettlment, accepted in Rpril 1985 the draft statement and the draft agreement preaanted by the Secretary-general. In doing 80~ it sated its willingness to accept painful omxm&ns on the understanding that the way would thus be clearly opened to the withdrawal of the Turkish army from Qprus. (Mr. Duuntas, Greece) Indeed, there was a provirion in the draft st3tement according to which the TUC kish Cypriot side would not sxcluda a priori any timetable for the withdrawal of the Turkifih trcope. That provisia, which permitted the government of the Republic of Qprus to present at the negotiating table its consistently, repeatedly and forllially stated demand for the withdrawal of all Turkish troops before the foCPation of a transitional goverruWnt, has disappeared. That: clause was the only slia protection afforded the government of Cyprus and was perr.aps one of the pain ceasans that mvernmsnt accepted the pgr il documents. Furthermore, I invite particular attention to the fact that a series of events subeequent to the acceptance of the April doculaents led to a aharp deter ioration in the ccnditions vbich had prevailed when the Bocumente were accepted. There is a change in the environment which surroundsd the negotiaticns and the acceptance of the 1985 agreemints. I am referring to the so-called constitutional referendum and elections held in the occupied territories; I am referring to the n(mrfrous demands of Mr. Denktaeh for bangee in tbe April texts presented in his lettel: of B August 1985, which changes were lstec incorporated in the draft fralmwork agreement. Incidentally, I regret that that letter has not been circulated a8 an official document; it wuld have contributed to a better underetmding of the situation by weubere of the Council. I am referring also to the threatening statscsents by Turkish officials, and, last’but not least, 1 am referring to Mr. Denktaah’s letter of 21 April which, a6 X mentioned before, clearly and bluntly reveals Turkish intentions in Cyprus. In other words, since April 1985 A neu draft text has been presented depar tin9 frcm the original 1985 draft text; aLso, the political condition8 and the atmesphere that had surrounded the whol.e negotiating process and that were the baeia for the agreement, have changed dramtical1.y. The text of the draft framework agreement significantly departs from thhat r,f the docl=unent3 of (Mr. DountCla, Greece) April 1985, urd even the faint trust Jlich had led the Greek side to risk the aoCeDLanoe, with cer taih undarsotandings, of the Apt il 1985 documents, has been diuigmting ever l ince. I hopr that this analysis makes it abundantly clear that the positim taken by ~rufdemt Ryprianou WI) the only are for a responsible leader to take. The bve.rnWmt of the Rsgublic of @prus could have eventucrlly accepted trying to live Vith a constitution cfntaining grave shortcomings. But it could obviouely not UUpL sacrificing the Greek Cypriot oonmuhity, vhich represent8 80 per cent of the Dolrulation of Qpirus, to the permnent influence of Turkey, thus turning the whole of W?rus into a Bort of %Wkish protectorate. Z vish in ccmlu~ia~ to invite the attmtton of memhrs of the Council to the ulf-evidmt f&at that the question of the vithdrsval of the @lUrktell arw from ~prw ir not siapiy an aspect of a bicmmunal diBplte. It is related to a mjOr OffmU by a Wmber Stats againet the Char&r and the elemenbxy norma of intamationa1 law. Thus, vithdrswal of the Tuzktsh army from QpruB, apsrt from other ODnOiBsraeione, hea to be seen by the Council principally &I a questia, of the military imvasitm and occupation of a state Metier of this Osganieatim- In keeping with the epirit and lettez of the principlea of the United Nations, it should be dealt with as a aretter of absolute priority.

I thank the repzeeentetive of Gtaece for his k5nd words to me. The next speaker ho Mr. Ozer: Koray , to whom the Council has extended (~1 invitstion mdet tule 39 of its provisional oules of prooedura. z :nv:+e him to we a Plao8 at the Council table and to make his statenent. Mz. RORAY: Allow me to thank you, SIZ, and through you the other me&ib@te Of the CoUncii ~OZ having given mc this oFpoztunity to &dzess the Council on this eattar, *ich is of direct cencezn to the Tuzkdah Cypriot pmple. We vale these (Mr. Koray) opportunities to convey to the Council the views of the Turkish Cypriot side, one of the parties directly interested in Cyprus. OJe, the Turkish Cypriot aide , are trying to reach a just and lasting solution in Cyprus with our counterparts, the Greek Cypriots, through the mission of good offices of the Eecretary-General. The differences between the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot sides are evidently still too deep to be instantly resolved. But for the second time in the space of 18 martha we have had another canprehensive framework, in the form of a draft agreement cn a federal solution, presented by the Secretary-General, within whid~ the two sides could pursue the peace process with a chance of success. This necessitated some degree of moderation and sensibility, and that is what we would have wished to see on the Greek Cypriot side rather than an increased propaganda effort. Hwever, once again the Security Council has had to endure an acrimmioua presentation by the Greek Cypriot: side, in which the truth was intended to be the main victim, as in all similar situations. The Security Council, knows only too well how the Cyprus problem erupted in 1963 and how it has evolved wer the last 23 years. We strongly resent the content and the tone of the Greek Cypriot statement , but we have no wish to emulate that p5~fOWWX8. The allegations contained in that statement can all, without exception, be reversed and levelled against the Greek and Greek Cypriot side. The difference is that, unlike the unfounded Greek Cypriot accusations, what we say can be easily substantiated. We have been forced to do this on numerous occasions, either here before the Cou.ncfl or in OUT varioue letters circulated in response to these charges. Therefore, it is our intention not to allow ourselves today to be si&-tracked from the teal iooue by diversionary tactics. I wish only to place on reccrd our indignation in the face of the Greek Cypriot insistence on abusing our 4006rill. I have tc stress that this attitude is doing great damage to whatever chances we may have of lessening the distrust which exists between the two sides, as the Secretaary-General ha5 pointed out in his report (S/l8102/Add.l). @at mttera today is where the two sides in Cyprus stand with regard to the Peace process as cryatallized in the Secretary4eneral*s proposals of 29 March 1986. (Hr. Koray) After the rejection by the Greek Cypriot aids of his draft agreement at the 17 January 1985 summit and after further relentless efforts and many rounds of consultation8 with both parties, the Secretary-General, with his deep knowledge of the Cyprus prcblem, his sagacity, sense of fairness and patience, furnished the two sides vith a framework which, if concluded and adhered to in gocd faith by the two sides, could lead to a bicoxnunal and bizcnal federal settlement based on the equal political status of the two peoples of Qprus. The Turkish Cypriot side, alvays consistent in its approach to the United Nations &cretary-General’s initiatives, gave its reply to the Secretary-General on 21 April, conveying to him its acceptance in substance and in procedure of his *Draft Framework Agreement’ presented as an *integrated JlOle*= Baving seen Mr. Kyprianou’a reply to the Secrefery-General, President Dsnktash wrote a seccnd letter to the Secretary-General on 27 April in which he reiterated our uWualified acceptance of the draft agreement and expressed his readiness to sign the document after the envisaged filling in of the neceesary d%tes. Iie aleo etresaed the *integrated whole’ character of the -raft Framuork Agreemetnt” and the imperative need to abide by the procedure envisaged in it E without nttesWting to change the rules of the game , which would be unjustified and unaoceptable to the Turkish Cypriot side. Kt may be revealing to recall how the GPwk Cypriot leadership decided on their response to the Secretary-General’s framework agreement. Mr. Kyprianou, who never misses a chance to pay lip-service to %U3spendenceg and %overeignty’, dropped all pretense and appeared before the Greek Premier, MC. Pepandreou three times in the apace of just three weeks, from 29 Harch to 19 Apr il. During the last visit, his entourage included all the party leaders in south Cyprus. That fateful. meeting took place on 19 April and we are all aware of its end-product.. The Greek Cypriot leaders, auxious and uneasy about the widespread displeasure that met their reply to the Secretaryaneral, did their utmost to glaes over it. The Greek Premier, Mr. Papandrew, however, in a speech at Alexandroupolis on 14 Hay, boasted about that meeting and described it as an “historic one” in that it decided that the Secretary-General’s plan was unacceptable. On an earlier occasicn, in a speech before his parliament an 23 April, Mr. Papandreou had also declared that the Greek Cypriot side was not alone in its rejection of the united Nations plan. We are in no position to knaw whether Mr. Papandreou, too, was expected to inform the Secretary-General and the international community of his acceptance Or rejection of the .Draft Framework Agreement on Cyprus”, but at any rate we should like at this juncture once again to urge the Greek Prism Minister to withdraw his unhelpful shadow from over Cyprus. The international press reported widely QI both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Qpriot replies and converged on the conclusion that the latter was in fact a rejection of the United Nations plan. For example, The Guardian of 21 April reached thie conclusion under the heading, “UN’s Cyprus Plan Stalls*. T& PinaIICi-al Time8 of the 883138 date reported it under the heading, *Greek Cypriots Reject UN Plan”. These are but two examples of this widespread convergence of views. As stated in his report, the Secretary-General sent an oral message to the Greek Cypriot side advising it that its proposals %ere not viable” and that the Prccedure contained in the draft framework agreement .provided for these issues to be dealt with without delay at high-level meetings”. (~/18102/Add.l~ p. 4, Para. 11) On the same date the secretary-General, during a meeting with certain journalists in New York, felt the need publicly to urge L?e Greek Cypriot side to abide by the “inteyrated whole” character of hrs draft and tc, stay within +%e (Hr. Koray) realms of the procedure envisaged by it. He considered that the Greek Cypriot SUggeStiOitS were ‘not viable” and that he had asked for a formal “yes* or *no* on his -Draft Framework Agreement’. At last the lag-awaited reply of the Greek Cypriot side came on 10 June 1986. It is curtained in annex VII of the mcretary-general’s report in S/lSlO2/Add.l. As we can all 8se8 the answer of the Greek Cypriot side is a resounding and aggressive *no" to the *Draft Framework Agreement”. Mr. Kyprianou's letter is before the Council. It therefore needs no exteneive evaluation on our part. It must be pointed out, however, that for tactical purposes the Greek Cypriot side deemed it useful to create confusicn around three aspects ccntained in the .Draft Framework Agreement”. Ws do not intend to comment on this situation, which clearly indicates haJ inconsistent and untenable the Greek wptiot position is in view of the statement of the spokesman of the Secretary-Gsneral cm 31 March 1986, which reads as 2ollars: l wnile it is not possible at this stage - for reasons that you can understand - to enbr into the content of the Draft Agreement, I can say that the Greek qpriot and the Turkish qpriot sides are in agreement on the manner in which the questions of the withdrawal of the na+Cypriot troops, guarantees and the three freedom5 should be dealt with in the Draft Framework Agreement. ‘The text which the Secretary-General has presented to both sides has $ reoaained absolutely faithful to &at the twc sides have agreed to cn these questions.* In the face Of this rejection of his draft by the Greek Cypriot side, the Secretary-General expressed his sentiment5 in his report. The secretary-General r egr ettec\ that (Hr. Koray) “since one side is not yet in a position to accept the &aft framework agreement of 29 March 1986, the way is not yet olpen to proceed with the negotiations I have proposed for an werall soluticn”. (S/18102/JUd.lr P. 6, para. 19) We join him in expressing the same sentiments. It is thus clearly evident that, as in the 17 January sumit, another golden opportunity has been loat awing to the non-accuPtance by the Greek Cypriot side of the Secretary-General*8 *Draft Framework Agreementm. Indeed, it is a pity, as the Secretziry-Gmeral stresses in his report, that the Greek Cypriot side refused to c-prehend that this document, if approached and elaborated in good faith by both parties, would be “the right framework for negotiating a just and lasting solution to the Wprus problema. (8/18102/A1El.lr para. 18) (Mr. Koray) It has once again been proved that the constructive approach and the political will of one of the parties to any question would hardly be sufficient to resolve the irrsue at hand to the satisfaction of both parties involved. In this context, we welcome the appeal contained in the statement of 12 June 1996 made by the ttocp-contributing countries to UNFICYP. In pondering on the situation we should all perhaps hope for the day the Greek Cypriot side will assume a positive attitude towards a negotiated solution. until then the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will continue its independent existence. Turning now to the resolution just adopted by the Council, I cannot but state that the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus tejects it, firmly and unequivocally, for the following reatins. The Turkish people of Cyprus and ito Government cannot acquiesce in the reference in the thir8 preambular paragraph to a *Government of Cyprus’ as if such an entity exists today or ever existed since 1963. The portrayal of such an illegal, unconetitutional entity a8 the legitimate mGovernmenL of Cyprus” is, was and will always be abhorrent to our people and its democratically elected, legitimate representatives. It ie reference8 such as that one that encourage and enable the Greek Cypriot Administration to reject and render fruitless SUCCeSSiVe initiatives for a just and lasting solution in Cyprus. Reference is made in the fourth preambular paragraph to ‘other relevant resolutionsa. Since the Turkish Cypriot Side has either rejected in toto or accepted subject to reservation@ the resolutions in question, that reference, too, is unacceptable to u5. In paragraph 3 a reference is made to the Opresent mandate*. We have to etrees that the mandate in question is not compatible with the radically changed conditions and citcumetancee of today. We believe, therefore, that a reappraisal of UNFICYP’s mandate is long overdue and neceossPy. (Mr. Koray) De8pite its unavoidable rejection in tato of the present resolution, the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is nevertheless disposed to accept the presence of DRFICYP on the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern CYpfue, on the same basis as that stated in December 1985. Thus, our position continuee to be that, the principle, the scope , the modalities and the procedures of co-operation between the authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and DRFICYP shall be based only on decisions which shall be taken solely by the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. It is, however, imperative that the troop-contributing countries display and be seen to display a neutral stance in the dispute between the two peoples of the island and respect the principle which lies at the core of the Secretary-General’s mission of gcod Offices and hia Initiatives. After all, that is the foundation on which a bicommunal, Sizonal federal structure is sought to-be built and it is the only foundation that can support such a structure. It is vitally important, therefore, that the tepreeentativee of euch countries visiting the island should take care to establish contact with both sides on the island and thus not only acquaint themselves with both sidee of the story but also demonstrate their resolve to respect the all-important principle of the equality of the two peoples. By doing so they will, most certainly, be helping the efforts for a negotiated settlement. Concerning the reference in paragraph 2 to the “mission of good offices* of the Secretary-General, the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus understands that mission to be emanating from Security Council resolution 367 (19751, and with that understanding pledges Its full support to it. My Government is also avare of the other side’s attempts to misinterpret, fffstort and paralyse that mission, and is determined to see such attempts fail. (Hr. Roray) Before concluding, I should like to take this opportunity to extend to Mr. Javier Perez de CL&llar, Secretary-General of the United Nations, our profound appreciation and tbanks for his efforts within his mission of good offices. The Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus hopes that his efforts will one day be given a chance to succeed. Our goodwill and gccd wishes are with him. I should also like to convey our thanks and appreciation to Mr. James Rolger, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General; to Major-General Gunther Greindl, the Force Commander; and to the military and civilian staff under his command for the efficient way in which they have approached their respective tasks. Our thanks and appreciation go to Under-Secretary-General Mr. Goulding, Mr. Feissel, and Mr. Picco for their untiring efforts in pursuance of their duties. The PRRSIDERT (interpretation from French): In view of the lateness of the hour, I propose to adjourn the meeting now. The next meeting of the Council to continue consideration of the item on its agenda will be held this afternoon at 3 o’clock. I shculd like to remind members that the Security Council will consider the question of South Africa later today, after we conclude consultations - which, I hope, will be brief - that will take place following the meeting devoted to the situation in Cyprus. The meeting rose at 1.19 p.m.