S/PV.269 Security Council

The unQ~rstallding of the representatlve of France is correct. The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m. TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY·NlNTH MEETING Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 18 March 1948, at 2.30 p.m. President: Mr. T. F. TSIANG (China). Present: The representatives of the following countries: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Syrla, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 22. Provisional agenda (document SIAgenda 2(9) 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. India-Pakistan question: (a) Letter dated 1 January 1948 from the representative of India addressed to the President of the Security Council conceming the situation in Jammu and Kashmir (document S/628).1 '(b) Letter dated 15 January 1948 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Jammu and Kashmir (document S/646).2 (c) Letter dated 20 January 1948 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan addressed to the President of the Security Council (document S/655).3 IIbid., Supplement for November 1948, pages 67·87. DIbid., No. 6, 231st meeting. At the invitation al the President, Mr.. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar" representative of [ndia, and Sir Mohammed, Zafrullah .Khan, represénta·, tive of Pakistan,took their piaces at the ,Council mbk. '

' 1 have the honour, in the name of the Çhine,se delegation, to place ,before the members of the Security Council adraft resolution on the Kashmir question [document S;699]. 1 wish, first ·of aIl, to' make a few preliminary remarks about this draft resolutioD. Thedraft resolution is very tentative. Although during the .past week 1. have had conversations with the delegations of India and Pakistan, and witli severallllembers of the Security Counci1, the pressure of work has prevented me from seeking thesèconsultations to the exent that 1 would have desired, The problem is very complicated. 1 do not presume to have that degree of knowledge necessary to propound. a solution that would cover all aspects andcover them satisfactorily..Therefore, in considering' this draft resolution, 1 certainly would welcome sUgg~stions, amendments and' changes. The draft resolution is placed before the members of the Security Council for discussion. In the course of the discussion on the Kashmir question, although the .delegations Qf Indià and Pakistan have .•strongly, eloquently, and sometimes passionately asl?erted their claims, l have noticed that there hasal['ays been a current of fratemal feeling betwee the two delegations. Both delegations regret at such a dispute has arisen between them;the~ regret that the dispute has been brought to the Security Council, and they earnestly' wish that a peaceful solution May be found. In f.raming this draft· resolution, 1 .have kept the;. spirit of the ·draft strictly' within that spirit of fraternity. Therefore, the language and the methods recommended here are all relatec1 to Chapter VI,ofthe Charter of the United Nations; there is no hint of Chapter VII. In the earlier discussions of this question, it was pointed out, and rightly, that.the plebiscite is of. strategica1, central importance. 1 remeinber the representative of the United Kingdom telling us that the plebiscite should be free aild impartial, and even more, should appear manifestly and obviouslyfree and fair to everybody. That observation, emphasiz"d ·later on by several other representatives, bas always. been kept in my mind in preparing tbis draft resolutlon. Sa much for the preliminaryremarks on this draft resolution. Themain body of tlie--maft resolution co~sists of articles of settlement. 1 have divided. the articles into .three parts. Part A relates to the restoration of peace and qrder ; p~ B relates to the plebiscite ; .and p&rt C consists of general provi.. sions which haye togo aIso with both the. plebiscite and the restoration of peace and order. In pa..'1: A, relating to the restoration of peace and order, we have bilateral undertakings. The Government of Pakistan undertakes to use its utmost endeavours to bring about (a), (b) and (c). So far as the concrete details in part A are concemed, 1 think there can be no objection. if we are ta achieve our objective of the restoration of pel:l.ce and order. 1 shall not proceed to read the materiaI contained in that part, since the text of the draft resolution is before the representatives on·the Security Council. Conseil Pa;Iit A, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a), is an lO.dertaking by the Govemment of India to withdraw its troops from Ja1l!mu and Kashmir prC)- gressively, consi~tent with their fonction of malntaining defence and security. It might be asked why we should not provide a time-table in regard to the withdrawal. 1 thought that, at such a distance and without an intimate .knowledge of the local situation, it would be Iffiwise for the Security Couneil to place a time- , ta~le in the resolution. 1 th~k tbat matter might 1 well bè left to the good faith of the Govemment of India, as well as to the discretion of the Commission of the Security Couneil on this question. As the representatives will see later on in this draft resolution, the Commission which the Security Counell provided by its earlier resolution1 has authority to investigate and· mediate with regard to all terms of settlement. In this matter teront résolution, lution procéder· médiatrice règlement. mission, au Gouvernement ment fidèlement dispdsitions des défense ment retirer toutes Cachemire. to~,.our Commission, when it is on the spot, can legItimately make repres~ntations to the Govemment of India as to whether this draft resolution is .:dghtly interpreted by that Govemment· and whether it is faithfully carriod out. J!te.draft resolution goes on to provide for the statlOnmg of the remainder of the troops. ·It may ~e !bat th~ purposes of defence and security make It. unposslble for the Govemment of India to Wlthdraw itsarmy entirely from Kashmir. Perhaps a certain portion must· be left there~ In that case, this draftresolution provides that the sta- 1 Document 8/654. See Official'Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for November 1948, Annex 1. du novembre 1 shal1now refer ,to part B, which relates to the plebiscite. In: this part,. the representatives will 'see that 1 have attempted to work in ,every possible .guaralltee that l can think of in .arder. to 'make' the ,plebiscite free and impartial, and obviously free and impartial. Paragraph 3 of part B says: "'The'Gove:tru:nent of India undertakes to establish in Jan$Luand Kashmir a plebiscite administration,with the sole and full authority to administer the plebiscite on the question of acee'ssion of'the Stale." Therefore thére, vvillbe a specîal, independent rlePartment of the Government charged with this one task alld given full authority to admillÎster this one job. , Paragraph 4 is divided into sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c). Sub-paragraph (a) reads as follows: •••The Government of Indiaagrees to appoint 'sixnominees of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to be the director and assistant or regional directors of tht. plebiscite administration." , The top officers of theolebîscite administration shalI aU be neutral intemationalpersonalities. They are to be. noniina:ted by .flle. Secretary- General of the United Nations. In this respect, of course, we have several alternatives: the Security . Council mîght nominate; < our Commission might nominate. After careful consideration, 1 .have decided it would best serve the purposes of the administration to ask the Secretary:General of the United Nations to nominate the six top officers. The work of the proposed Plebiscite Administration is envisaged,as heing of a strictly technical and administrative nature. It has nothing to' do 'with politics or war, and 1 felt that the Secretary- General of the United Nations, with the large exp~rience he has had in forming an international Secretariat here, could well he' trusted with the task of selecting the topofficers in. building up 'a really independent and impartial administration to administer the plebiscite in Kashmir. Sub-paragraph (b) reads as follows: .. The Director, acting as an officer of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, shaU have aUJthority to llomina.te bis subordinates and to draft regulations governing the plebiscite. Gl1fh nominees should he formally appointed and such draft regwations shouId be formaUy promulgated, by the State of Jammu and Kashmir." Paragraph 5 says : .. The Government of fudia undertakes toprevent any threat, coercion, or intimidation' of the 'Voters in the plebiscite and shall cause this undertaking to be known toall concerned as an inter- 'national obligation binding on a~ public authori- 'ties in Jammu and Kashmir." In this paragraph the Government of India accepts an obligation to free the plebiscite from 'any threat, coercion or intimidation. It undertakes, 'more than that, to make this tindertaking known to the public authorities in Jammu and Kashmir 'as an international obligation binding on them, \vhich they cannot disregard. Paragraph 6 sa.ys : .. The Government of India shall themselves andthrough the Government of Jammu and Kashmir cause it to he known to all c~ncerned that an inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir, regard1ess, of creed, caste, or party, ~ be safe and free in expressing their views and in voting on the question of the accession of the State:' Whereas paragraph 5 is addressed to the public authorities, paragraph 6 is addressed to the people of the State, to assure them thaï they will be perfectly safe to express their preference for this State or for that State and to vote for accession ta fudia or to Pakistan, and that the Indian Government and the State Government of Jammu and Kashmir undertake to mâke this widely known among the inhabitarits~ Paragraph 7 ~ays : .. The Government of India shall use, and ~hall request the Go'V~mment of tlfe State to use, their best endeavours to effect the withdrawal from the State of snch Indian nationals, not normally resident therein, as haye ent:ered it for an unlawful purpose on or sinee 15 August 1947." . , Raragraph 8reads a~ follows : .. The'GoV'êmmentofIndia, shan ,urge ,upon the Governmentoj; the Sta.teto takeaIl possible .steps to .ensure .that : ... (a}A1lcitizensof the State who haV'eleft it on account· of 'disturbances are invited, and are frée, toreturntotbeirhomês and'to exercise all theitrightsas 'such citizens; , "(b) There is no victhIlizatÎon ; •• (c) AIl', palitie'al prisoners >of thê State are released; . •• (d) Minorities in all p~s of the State are aCêorded,'adequateprotection;" , Thà.tP~graph ic;,Itiùnk, self-explanatory. . .". ." 0 Paragraph 9,reads: •• TheComnllssion of the Security Council, as providedjn itsresolution.of 20 Ja.nuary 1948 [docu1j'Zent Sl654]shallatthe .end ofth€? plebiscite certify to the.,Council, whether 'the plebiscite has been really Jr~e and,impartial." l regardthatparagraphasbeing .quite imp01- tânt.' AIthOugh we 'have in earlier paragraphs piled· guarantee on guarantee that,the plebiscite shaIl'be free'andimpartïal,nevertheless, at the' • end of it, the Commission has the right to' tell the,. Security Council whether .the Dlebiscite has been really free' and" impartial. Thât places the final wordin thehands of the Security Council. Anybodywho. med to run the plebiscite or part ofit,in hi.s()Wl1 way againstithe provisions which have beensêt,wou!d be undermining the validity of the Dlebiscite. That is aserious'matter of which l cannot imagine that the Government authorities or the people wouldthinklightly. FiIIally;-we bavepa.rtC, dealing with general provi~ions., Paragraph 10 states : "The Government,of India undertakes to use ifs bestendeavo1.1rstoensurê thatin the co~posi­ lion of the IntèrimGovernment of Jammu and Kashma- .piovisioilîs made for adequate· reprë- sentation of 'aIl major politicaI groups in the State.'" .' i admit thatpat:agrf,lph10 hasbeen the };:ost difficult phase ofthis problem. We have to consider anxieties on the part of Pakistan as to the infiuence of the' InterintGovernment on the plebiscite and :as to the general confidence that the Interim Government 'mightinspire in the population in the State.We have aIso to consider the sovereiganghts., ,of Member States and their constitutionalstructures.•After careful consideration of this.pIoblem; l'haveplaced before the members of the Security Council the present Paragraph Il states: .. The Government ()f'India agrees to appoint an official of high standing to· be stationed in the State during the interim period, who shall have the power to cause to be fulfilled by the State Government all international obligations arising out of the present articles of settlement." It 1S the Government of the Dominion of India which' cOJJ~acts this international obligation. The execution is on the spot in one of the States. To give the execution of this international obligation sufficient weight and importance, 1 thought it weIl for the Security Council. to ask the Dominion Government itself to designate an official of high standing with whom. the commission·G?n deal and whom the Commissioncan·hold responsible for the fulfilmentof these international obligations. Fb.ally, the Idst paragraph states : .. The Security Council mstnIcts its Commission to offer its good pfiices and mediation in the implementation of the present articles of settle:.. ment." The meanirtg of this paragraph is that our Commission is concerned with the .implementation. of all the articles of settlement. That concludes my commentary on the articles of settlement. From the preliminary conversations which 1 have held with the parties, 1 know that this draft is not satisfactory ta both sides. l beg them to consider that, in a ç.ase of this type, the very nature of the problem does not permit a solution which would be one hundred per cent satisfaotory to both sides. 1 aIso request that the representatives of India and Pakistan shouldkeep in mind the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. We cannot ~ett1e these problems in any arbitrary manner ; it 1S necessary that we should observe the Charter. The Security Council, while endowed withgreat powers, bas .limitations in regard to both procedure and substance. . 1 have satisfied ntyself that under the present circumstances we could -rrot do more for either side than is presente.d in the articles OL settIement. At this point the·system of simultaneous interpretation was adopted. Sir Mohammed·ZAFRuLLAH KHAN (pakistan) : J. iind myself in a somewhat embarrassïng position, but as it is the President's desire that 1 should at tliis stage submit some vlews on the draft resolution that he has placed before the Security C{mttcil, 1·shaIl proceed to do what 1 can in that respect. . . peu présentant sur 1 do not know how long a time the Indian delegation bas had to consider the draft resolutian, but 1 did submit to the President that perhaps he might find it convenient-it would certainIv be more convenient for me-if 1 were called upon to make my submission to the Security Council on this draft resolution after the Indian delegation had spoken, bùt the President expressed bis preference that 1 shouId spealr fust and, as 1 have explained, 1 therefore proceed ta do so. My very fust reaction to the draft resolution is one of bewilderment that 1 should so utterly and singularly have failed to convey and interpret ta the Securit'J Council the point of view of my Government on this matter as to leave the President under the impression that a scheme of settlement of the kind that is embodied in this draft resolution is likely to meet with my Government's approval. But 1 have, ~s 1 h'éive said, no authority at the moment to speak on behalf of my Government 1 shall submit the chaft resolution to them and ask that their reactlons be transmitted ta me at the earliest nossible moment 80 that 1 can submit them to thè Security Couneil. But as 1 have aIready stated, on the basis of the instructions 1 have received and on the views of my Govemment with which 1 am familiar, 1 shaIl be very much surprised if their reactions are any different, or at least materially different, from what 1 have aIready led the Security Council to believe they would be. It strikes me as a· curious thing that, when there was brought to my notice a message that, was sent out fram New York by Reuters on either 7 or 8- Mareh and that was printed in The Statesman of New Delhi on 8 March, 1 sbould Keeping that in mind as the main proposition, it is not necessury for me to,say much, even on my own personal reactions, to part A, paragraph 1 of the articles of settlement as set out in the draft resolution. 1 might, however, submit the general observation which 1 have already intimated to the Secmity Counéï1-anâ which l' believe 1 have repeated-'t1lat once the essentials of a fair settlement are agreed upon between the parties or are laid clown in a manner that would make them obligatory upon the parties, the Govemment of Pakistan will bind itself to do its utmost in every possible way to achieve the objective of the restoration of peace and order, even unto the taking of joint military action with the Dominion of India if, unfortunately, such action should he.. come necessary. It is therefore not necessary to make any further observation on part A, paragraph 1. Part A, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (b) contemplates stationing the remainder of Othe armet! forces of the Government of Indi&. at such point,:, in Jammu a."ld Kashmir State as not to afford any intimidation or appearanee ofiptimidation of the inhabitants of the State. The Securlty Council is aware thât'troops have been fighting a section of the people 'ôf the State; that, ,though the Govemment of India has categorically denied it, there have been allegations thrpughout of atrocities committed by these troops on the people of the State. The latest report on that is the statement attributed to Chaudbry Ghulam Abbas, President of the Muslim Conference, who has recently been released from prison. On ·10 March 1948, the Sind Observer, a Hindu newspaper, stated the fol~ lowing: le envisage vernement des blera un que population catégoriqu\~ tout à L'exposé tion dent récemment libéré on le déchaînée qui n'avaient il He: spoke of the iIîhuman reign of terror let loose by the Indian Dominion forces who were indulging in . . . rape, arson, and loot on a scale flir bigger tban ever attempted by the tribals in Kashmir. '1 challenge Pandit Nehru', he said, 'tG ~ppGint mlimPllriialçgmmission to investigate 1 1.he misdeeds of bis troops. r will prove it to the hUt that the people of Kashmir have been the worst sufferers at their hands.' " f~pt in Kasltmit a moment longer. :Ilwofild.perhàps,. be wotili whüe'to draw attention. again to thatlUldertaking.,ItJs contained in il telegram of 8 Novembel' 1947 from the Prinle MinisterofTndia to,the Prime Ministerof p'akistan. 1he'relêvantp0rtÎOll of that telégr~ reads as folloM'~ " , .. Lord MollIltbatten3 , on" bis retuin from Lahore" gave,me ,a full account of bis, talk with Mr.JiJmab, in 'particular, ,of ,two impor,~ant.sug­ gestionswmchha4 1?èen discussed" namely : ,one, thewithçIrawalof ,Iridian, Dominion tioops and tripesmenfrom Kashmir,andtwo, the holding of rlehisèi~~ at Otlie e~liest p~ssib~e da~. •h As ,regards ,th~ first proposai, Lord Mountbattentold methatMr. Jinnah desired that wjthdrawaI of theIridian,Pomilliontroops andtribesmen "should ,he ,siÙ1ultaneous, but thathe" Lord Mountl?atten" hadpointed,out that it was,. clearly ~possiblefor theIndian troopsto witlldraw from Kashmir Valley until the raiderShad left Kashmirsoil and law and order nad been restored in Kashmir. Lord Mountbatten had aIso made it q11ite clearto Mt. Jmnah thât the Governtilent of India'had'no desireto tetain froops in Kashmirfota moment longer #lan was necessary. Il As regards the second point, Lord Mountbattènreports thatMr. Jinnah badexpres$ed the Viewtliat thete wasno hope of a fair plebiscite under 'thepres~nt' Kashmirauthorit~ "s. To.,meet tItiS point, Lotd Mountbatten hadsuggestedthat itsllould,he conduc~d under, tb.e,auspicer. of the United Nations.Mt'. Jinnah had putforward the couilter-proposàl !bat the two, Govemors-GeneraI sh()uldbe~:ven,plenarypowers to sett1etb.e matter.Lord Mopntbatten hadpointed .out that it \Voûtd. he" constittttionally improper for", him ta undettàkethis' duty." , l.ordMo1lntba~n hadreference there ta bis position as' Govemor-GeneraI. At'a JaUt pOillt,the telegram reads : . il As,r~gards yom proposals one and IWo, ârmed "raiaérs J1àveenteted Kashinfrto ,.the'aecOmpâOjfuenf ot'~assacre,aisoii and 'loof. -dm troops havè'been sent theie to diivè 'out, these .-.raiders and protect Kasbmir. Sc lang' as thèse A subsequent paragraph of the telegram states: ," It Will. thus' be seen that our proposals, which we have repeated1y stated, are: ," 1. That the Government of Pakistan should publicly .undertake to' do. their·utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir; •• 2.That the Govemment, of India sh011ld repeat their .declaration that they will withdraw their troops from K~shmir as soon as raiders have Withdr.awn and law and order are restored ; •• 3. That the Governments of In~ and Pakistan should make a joint request to the United NatiollS to undertake a plebiscite iri. Kashmir at theearliest possible date." . 1 venture respectfully to submit that the Government of India, c1early and repeaiedly, even iri. the course of this single document, undertookto Withdraw itstroopsonthe, restoration of law and order-that is to say, before the plebiscite' could be held. The whole, controversy Was whether the withdrawal shouldbesimultaneous with the withdrawal of the tribesmenor should await the res- . manifestement- ~. tôration of làw and order. There was no questio~ at that time of the plébiscite's bemg taken while the State was occupied, although only at strategîc points, by Ind1?D troops. ' . , 1 beg to •submit that part A, paragraph 2, subparagraph (h) of the draft resolution clearly contravenés that undertaking. ,When·1 say !hat, 1 am not unmindful of the fact tbat since that titne the Gove1'llQ1ent of India, throughits representatives here, has not adhered 10 that position. However, 1 do wish to stress the fact that that undertaking was given. by the Government of India. With regard to the plebiscite, it is not n.ecessary for me to enter into MY discUssion of the paragraphs of the cltaft resolution whicn· attempt todeal with that subject. ,The President ba.s drawn attention to two or three it~ms which, in bis opinion, constifute a. safeguard. Perhaps, tél some extent, .they doconstitute. such a safegtiard, but they do not go far enough to èstablisn. those conditions which are, absolutely essential before a plebiscite thatcould be regatded as fair can be held. For, instance, the. Presid~nt has dtawn pointed attention to partH, paragraph 90f the cIraft resolution, which reads : ' •• The Commission of the Security Council'... shall at the end of the plebiscite certifY to the Couneil whether.the plebiscite has been really free and impartial." Itis true that to some exterit; and perhaps' to' , a large extent; that wOlÙd ensui"e that no pressure or c~rcionwouId he applied which would beofa physlCaland visible nature and which could,easily he assessedand cOlÙd èotne' tothe notice of the COmmission ot its observers. On·the last occàSion n(}t<been;è~el'Cised?AssUl11fu~<that'some evi" dence-of·suchpressuré weretocome totbenotice of the Commission,onwhat basis· woùld thè ~ecuPtyColglcil judgeWllethe~,th~plebiscite had orhadn9t.been Jairorim.partial't î\D.diff.unfOrt\tDatelYlthereshouId betw:o' viewson.thatmat~ ter in t.'te Commission,how far wotddthat help t() •.correctany pressure ",hi()h·mightin. fact have beene~ètPised1' . -- lthas. beeIisllggeste(t thaia.notllersàfe,guard is contaîIted in· Part:ç, :Paragr~ph 10 of.the .tl?solunon, whichrçâds; •.•... < -" ." '" .•.••... '..•' . "T!te Govemmentof''India .undertakes to. use itsbestendeavourstoensure thatin the.composition of the Interim' .GoV~.I'I1Il1~IitorJammuatld :K~shm.irprovisiQn is'" madt}~for adequate '. repres~~tàtionofa1!major1?6litièal,groups.ÎJ1:the State~··· .". .'" '.' _ .... .,.. ,... . .... ,., ., ',' .the .. SecuriUr.,CouncilJs "awate 'tliàt .,Sheikh AbdUllah,in?", happens.•to-. be ·the Prime .~ister of Ka$hn1ir.'SheikliA],dullah's·....0wn., declaratipns and.speeches were ~rotightto ..'~enotice .of the ~ec:lnity Co1lJlciUnorderto !!how~o what extent ~~co~<:J:1>~ re~ar~ed as inlpartialan~ wh.at <:J~­ ~eof illDPattialio/b.ewoù1dexercls~ mhis position;' -..., .' .. B,ut Sheikh,Abdullahhimseli$pokebefore .the Security Çogncil.[2418t .ineeti"g], ar1d.. ~ave. the rep~entatiye$i...aIl .. QPpo~ty .' of judS':ing. ,lUs JmplU"ti~tyfr()m1Jjsown '<:Jèclarations. S,inceh!$ returptO'India, he b~s made sO\nefurther deçJarati0n.s,ôl'le 01' two of which 1.shaIl ven~re '. to cir3w totheattentiori"of the'Sec1,U'Ï.tyColU1cil., . On9 March, Sheikb Abd:.illah deli'Vë~eda speeébat Gurdaspur, in the course of whicb he said:' .. .. . .' . i'We mu~tbind oursel'Ves ';~D1eaning .i{a$b.- mir;and Inditl"'77" bychainswhicb can never.be broken. I.Qelieve that,every •inch, of .~ashmir beloll8!! .to 1I11.Ü~.and.every inch •. of' India .t(), the Kasllmiris.JawaharIars.KasIunir willnever J~e On 16 March,'atJam.m.u; Sheild1, Abdullah' said: . ~parated frpDlJaw.aharlal's, In4~a~ Qur,answerto the.,questi0l1\Vllet1J.erKashmirwill cb.()Ose .. uItima~1y to stay in IIidiais being given dailyby 'B.:ashmiris.withtheir blood.... '_... . Il We shall prefer death xatherthan ,joïn Pakistan. We shallhave nothing to do with such Il country·" .. ..... "". .., . ,à 'the gnevanceis not that a person •.belonginS': ". to 1'ashmir, particularly;a political-Ie,a<:Jer,shotdd e~ressbimself •in. favour'ofaceessioJl '\Vith pne Do~nort1ieother.Everybodyis freeto hold wh.at.yj~w~,1Jit,maI; chopse. JQ.c entertain on,a· U Inhis (Sheikh· Abdullah's) Cabinet, ·too, he proposed to include people of aU parties and communities, but they would be chosen according ta only one cnterion, their loyalty to the National Conference .and their country." This isa strange declaration. He is prepared to include, in bis ·Government,representatives of an political parties and groups, .provided these representatives ,satisfy one eriterion, their loyâlty to bis p'olitical party. Th~ press report goes on to say: U In answer to.a .question about therelease. of a Kashmir Muslim Conference leader, Sheikh Abdullah explained that the{e was no question of releasing aIl Muslim Conference workers..Thoee who werelikely to act as.the fifth columnists of a foreign State wouldremain in jail,' but if his Government· was· .satisfied .thatany one of them wouldremain loyal to bis .own country, he wculd beletout,". . Now what does the expression." fiftli columnists of a· foreign· State "mean in this context? Obviously not fifth columnistsof India, .because Sheikh· Abdullah·has· declared he would live 'With India, work ~ith fuclla andclle with·lndia. The expression .. fifth columnists of·a foreign. State " obviously meanspeople who favour accession to Pakistan, on. which question Sheikh Abdull2h expressed.himself here before the Security Councilin certain terros which 1 need not repeat, and on. whichhe has already expressed himself sufficiently.in.the press. ;ol'his . is the· manner·in which the safeguards embodied.in' this' draft resolution· will be carried out by the administration of Kashmir, because at the head of the administration is Sheikh Abdullah, and he has already fumishedthe Security Council with bis interpretation of such safegùards. .. The President was pleased to draw attention, further, ta the proposaI contained in parap~àctice operate to .the prejudice of PalQstan and in favo~.oftheDomini0noLlndia, .thé pârties b~ingat.vadarièe OVer this CJ.uestion.with regard to almosteverything and the situation being so very delicate.' ..' .. ' . .' . ItJl1ust. be .reco~ed that tIlls question of a plebisciteis nota mere question ofan electiop;in açohstitueIlcywhiçh, at.the worst, n,tight in- ~uencethereturn to the legislature ofa person belongmg to one. party. or .another. This is intended to settlefor aIl time the question of the accession of the State toone Dominion or the o.thêr,aJïdtosetaf ~~st not •only tbis contro\1ersy, but.alltheother·controversies which have either ·~en:from•.it or are 'Iikély to'arise 'on àccount of thisdispute. Thal beingthe case, the utmostcare iS neêessary tl;J.at the plebiscite should beheld under.fâir and·impartial co~ditions. 1· m~st eam~ estly s~bmittotheSecuritY CotniêiI that. a plebiscifehéld under the àuthoritY ofa Government wmch hasa man Iike Sheikli Abdullahât its héad, in aState occupied by the ttoops' of dne side;' to say the very leastis not Iikely to satisfy anybody thatit .was. 1:Jeing -held under fair and impartial conditiQns. ' But there is more than that .to this question. Thète.isalso the fact that, apart from any view thafthe PaIdstanGovemment mightti1keofthe tetms of this or of any other draft resolùtion; the resolûtion. must bring abouta, settfementor .recolDmend a settIementwhichshallapl1e-arso eminently fait and satisfactory to the. Aiad KashmirGovemmentthat ïtshall >put its faithin that resolution, thetermsof.the.· settlement and the machinèry set up, and that itshall beprepareq te) lay d9wn its;irms and 10 giveup théstrogglCi uponwhich it enteredsQme time in· September of lastyear. If the 1'esolution failsto achieve that objec~ then it will fail to .achieve anything. 1 doubt very gravely~ whether the termsofthis resolunon .coUld have..that effect upon the' Azad kaslmûr Govermneilt. What exaetly is the procedural position, so .far as the,Security Co'uncil sees it, withregardto the consideration of these·draft resolutions? 1 do not propose-even merely personally, on my own beh~, and tentatively-to add to rthe observations that 1 have just now .submitted. Mr. GOPALASW.AMI AYYA]iGAR (lndia): 1 desire, in the first place, to invite the attention of the Security Council to the fact that thelndian delega.tion, equally with the delegation of Pakistan, has not had the time necessary for a. thorough study of the draft resoluti0llt whieh the President placed before the Security Couneil this aftemoon. The draft resolution tries to deal with the important matters at·issue in this controversy, and these are of the greatest significance to us. Before wé cau formulate our final viewllon the contents of the draft resolution, it is necessary that we should '~.ave adequate time to study its tenus, to digest all the implications of its different paragraphs, 'and tocome a' eonsideredeonc1usion as ta how far it can be acceptable to us. 1 wish, at the outset, to express my deep sense of obligation and gratitude to the President of the Security Couneil for the .great trouble hé has taken to understand the respective points of view of the two delegations on this··controversial matter, and to place before theSecurity CQuneil a draft resolution, whieh, in my opinion, attempts -in spite of any suggestions for modification that we may have to make at a later stagea fair solution of the points in controversy. That does not mean that we accept here and now aU that is contained in tbis draft resolution. The President hashimself described it as being very tentative. The President has asked his colleagues to take this draft as a basis of discussion and has expressed himself as being willing to welcome amendments, suggestions and modifica- ~ons whieh could improve the draft resolution ID the direction of making it acceptable to both parties. The President is perfectly rigllt in painting out that, in spite of the differences between the That beingthe nature of the draft resolution that we have to considertoday, 1 wish, at this stage, only _to indicate .my initial reactions to it. po~ts ·of ·view ·of thetwo delegations on, matters whichhave been incontroversy, there has been, throughout, anundercurrent of feeling in what . has been said on beh3lf of both d~legations, that ,'. we should make every endeavour ta arrive at an h~"has,given its contents.,bis, fu1lconsid,eratiQn, he wilLsee more mit,to ~cceptandwillbemore able than hehasbéelltoday to ,see eye to eye with, the points of 'viewJ:bat the President" lias triedto stress. " ,,', '.. "' . T.1ûs draft resolution, tackles thethree, essential PQintson'\V1rlch j,t had.not beeIlPo~~~~I~Jor,both delègati9ns •to, ~,gree4t, the past.,'rhefirstof these refe:t:s to the question of the withdrawal'ofthe armed forces of Indla from the State; the second, to the suggestion for, the setting up of àn impar": tial,neutral govemment in "the •State;, and'the third, to ,the machinery thatis to be employed for the ,cQnc;l;Jct of, the plebiscite. . However, as a condition precedent to the consideration of what should be done for the taking of a, plebiscite, 'it is'necessary that" the Security Council should recognize that the first thing to do is not to blind its eyes to;the'obvious fact that those who nght the Gove11im.ents of Kashmir and India tociay have received assistance on Pakistan ~erritory, both material and otherwise, which, has enabled them to,carry on this nghting up' to the present moment. Tt, is still going on; it,will go on even in the future unless we take a decision here which will put an' end, to it. That firstfact has to be recognized, and 'beÎore the Security Council does anything in ~ w;îy of blessing agreements on the question of the pie.· biscite, it has beco~e necessary to 'fJbtain frOD1 the Govemment of Pakistan an undertaking thât it will.,do its utmost to prevent this assistanée from beingrendered on its territory ta people who are invading and nghting in Kasbmir. So far as the plebiscite is concemed, 1 have mentioned to the repr~sentatives on the Security Council thethree points on which there has been the greatest controversy. Inthe'matter of the withdrawalof troops from the State, ,1 take it that' the Security Council recognizes that 'even ailer fighting has stopped, and in' order to secure that maintenance of law and order which is so necessary for the taking of a plebiscite under proper conditions, the presence of an army in the State is absolutely essential ; and that anny, in the circumstances that exist today, can only he the Indian Army. The withdrawal of this Indian Army has been pressed in the debates on this question before the Security Council only for the purpose of ensuring thatno coercion, no intimidation, and no undue pressure is exercised upon those who are to cast theif v.otes at the time of the taking of the plebiscite. This draft resolution, therefore, apparently proceeds on the premise that, while the Indian Army has t(jremain, every precaution should be taken and ev~ry safeguard given for the purpose of ensuring that that army will not exert any undue aft~r,'fighnng stops and .normal peaçe. and ord,et have beenrestofed, the: troops of India would 'be withdrawn. .; . ,..... : ,'r . , :' . ',' ":.:", . " But we ,have to,take, account also of what,haPpenedafter .... 8. Noveinber. Ina previ,o:us :.speech [242ndmeeting] 1 drew attention ta negotiatiC):l1S w1ùch took placebetween the, nve Dominions d~g 'Which it was admitted an;dconcededtha,t the,.Indian ~yhad ta remain, but that'conditiOllS ,should be imposed Wbich would confine., it to certain places, and perhaps reduce its nllJl1bers, in order to see: that what remains in the State. is retained only for the purpose of discharging the constitutional obligations of 1;he·federal centre fQr thed~fence of a uilit of the federation, and fOI going to theaid of the civil :power .when, it wa:s absolutely necessary that anarmy should intervene in putting. down civildisorder. That"was'more or less conceded. Andwhy is it that in the S~urity.Council itself, on the occa.. siom; on,'which tbis. particular aspect of the mat.. terhas been debated, suggestions have been made that some other.. kind of armY ,might be. stationed there-British forces, Commonwealth forces, an international force, or· a sort·of combined· force consisting of both Indiàn'and Pakistan .units? AlI these suggestions are recognitions of the fact that an army has to remain because the State's integrityhas tobe protected alld law and arder have ta be safeguarded, in the last. resort With an anny available, whenever its assistance is necessary. That is the reason why the army should. stay, and, that armyin' the present constitutional position can be no other army than the Indian Arroy. So far as the Indian .delegation is concerned, 1 made its position' perfectly clearthe last time 1 spoke on tbis matter [266th meeting]; but 1 a~ded that,if ahY; member of the SecurityCouncil made any suggestions for the purpose of ~msuring ~at tbis army shall not improperly mterfere Wlth the voting,we should be prepared to consider suggestions, in thatregard. Here l , find, in tms particular draft resolution, that a suggestion has beenmadé that the Government of India should so arrange' that such portion .of the Army as has to be ,retained in tms' State should be staiioned at such points as would not permit it .to exercîse any kind" of intimidation or appearance of'intimidation of the inhabitants of the State. l,am prepared to give the assurance to the Security Council.today that the Government of India, which without anybody's prompting, offered a plebiscite and offered subsequently àlso ducteditselft()W'~ds the,p()pulation of Jammu and Kashmif,Partiçularly, ithas beenpraised for the protection it has given to the Muslim Population of tbeState. .' ' 1 challeng~ aJ)yiJpparti~ jnquiryin this matter. Chaudhry 'Ohulam Abbas is su.pposed to, have challenged the1Ildian Prime Minister to order.an inquiryintotbis matterby ~yauthoritywhich he Iqigb.tlloininate, fprtltepurpose. 1 ask tl1at the Corinnfssion which ,it is, prpposed, to send, to the StateofJammu and Kashmir should make the ·most. tho~pugh iDquiries .•,into this ,'matter' and report' to •. theSëcurity .Councilwhether there is even an iota..ofiustificationforthis, calumny 'on a force yiIDchnasnot orily won laUl"els in the fi~ld but hase~citedapprobationand praise as regards the màÎ1ner inwhich it 'has dealt with the local .civilian' pOPlIlatiol1 .'Ï11 this 5tate. Ido Dot w,ish .to.saymbre~on. this 'question of the station.. mgoftlie IndianArmy: • There i~only~itesmaJlmatterwhich l would lîketoprîngto the notice·ofthe PresicJent in paragt1!.ph2ofPart4~Sub-:-paragraph (a) refers totbe ,prQgres~ivewith~awalfroInJammu ~d Kaslunir. of"ucltQf ·India's ,troopsas ·arenot requirçd,fgrthe,pUfp.pse (}fd~fence and security. 1 wishpnlytosl1ggestthat"this ,particularsub.. paragraph, must ,be conditioned .by, one fact. naIiletythat thisquestion Qfthel'rogressivewithdtaw.alcan .ariseo;nIyafterfightirtg has stopped' and hostilitieshaveceased in the State. TheSecuti.tv '. Cpuncillistened tp the terms ·of theteregramôf8·November,·which the .representative/ofPakistanquoted a littlewbiJ,eago.In theocourseof=thattelegram,'1'eference was. made ta. a ,suggestion.madeby' the GovernorGeneral ofpakistânthat,the. wïthdrawal' of Pakistan .and Indian·troops,'should 'be .simultaneo»:;' .withthe withdrawal.of the raiders,and inva:ders., Lprd Mountbatten, the Governor., General of r....::~a" veryproperIypointed oufinanswerto this sug:- gestion that there couldbe 'no Question of the Indian·Armybeingasked to" Withdrawbefore the raiders had \Vithdtawnandthe fighting had stoi'Ped~ '.,That iS'.a 'very·neCi:ssarypreliminary .to the commencement c~the •Withdrawal ofsuch, of 0Ul" troops aS,may not berequired ·for defence and security. We, as a Gdvemment responsible for the conduct, of ~ose tr~ops, giv~, the. Security Co~cil the assurance tha~ not omyhas no' such thing ~appened .in .the 'past~ but that. we shall see to it that no' such thingtaki~S place in. the futitre. ' . Inanyçase" ifthere is IDisb~lilivïouronthe part of our troops,the ComwissJonofthe Security Council will be there to bri,ng it totheêlttention, of the SecurityCouncil. Itis the duty ofthe Commission to ..cerilly whetheror,not the plebis~ cite is conducted imPartially. It will be open to that Commission to bringany'acts 'of misbehaviour on, the' part of our tr()ops to the notice of tlle .Securii}' Council,at thetime ,it has ta judge thé nature of the plebiscite that has be~n held. In regard to the quèstion of impartial administration, we have debated it so many timés and in such fullness mat it, s~éms unneces~ary for me to go into detaila,gain onthis matter. '.. " After an,.AT{h~t i~ tbe gtOlnid' ~or asking that Sheikh Abdullah be ousted from bis position in the pr~sent adJninistration and~or..substituting in hisplacesQmeonewho .is. inipàrtial, neutral, colo;urless and so, on ? Isnot the main ground for makin,g thisdemandtbe argumentthat otherwise the plebiscite that "iU be taken under the auspices ofsucha govemmentcould not be held to be impartial ?Onthe last occasion that l spokê of .ibis 'matter, Ireferred to the èonsiderations that 'must be weighedin coming to a deci- , inispar sion~ l' begged .'of ~he Security Council not to·, press on us thissuggestion of pushing Sheikh Abdullah out of' an office in wbich he, at present, has 'the support of what wehold to be, the great majorlty of the people of th~ State, both Muslims and Hfuqus..On ,the sameaccasion 1 said that if the SecurityCouncil.thoug11t that bis possible influence in connexion with the nlebiscite should bel'educedpracticallyto nil, and if it hadany suggestions to makeforensuring this,weshould be quiteprepared to .consider suchsuggestions. l'statedthat, if any suggestions. were made for ensuring .thatthe ,administration of the plebiscite wasplacedin hands .which could .aet indepen- <lently,and .wbich would act with, authorlty derive~ ,front the Kasbmir Government,' W43 should, as a matter Qfcourse, be quiteprepared to consider them. In the draft resolution nlaced before the Security Councilby the Presiélent, the .suggestion is 1l1ade that theauthority to conduct the plebiscite shouldbe <headed by .a director with five assistants who will be the nominees otthe Secretary- Generll.1àt. the. Ç"nited Nations, but who will. he fonnally ç.ppoint~d by theKashmirGovernment. 'neme1rt 'T'bey.will ~~e .~e regulations for the ·conduct 1 This means that while Sheikh Abdullah will he PrUne Minis~r of the Councilof Ministers in the 'Jammu and. Kasbmir State and will run the ordinaryadministration of the State, the organizing, .conduct and completion, of the plebiscite will he in tbe hands of men who are ilOm;t1ees of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. j,'Thilt being so,.is it necessary for the Security Counci! to comnût an mcroac1nne:ntQJl tbesove r,:ign.ty ofa Statelike Jammu and Kashmir, and <1Iust the Govemment which is acceptable to the 1~ople of'the State, in ord,er mereÎy to appear 'Iaefore the world as having s~t up an administraltion in which Sheikh Abdullah has. absalutely no }influence ? We.are willing to, eliminate the influence of the Administration in ~otical1ya1lre~pectsinregard .to the conduct of the plebiscite. That is about t'be .utmolît that 1 ·tbink.the SecurityCounçilcan dord to reguest Îl1 tbiS respect."""'· .." It was suggested that thé placing of thisofficer in the State by :theAJovernmentot Iudia for the }lW1PCS@o pfJ_~~in8 that the obligations created by theseamcles' of sèltle.tnent are 'properly" impIe- Dlcented might even have the .reverse 'effect, the argumentbcingthat the officer concemed might advisethe Jammu and Kashmir GovemmeD.t to do somethingagainst the tecommendations of the Commission. What WouId haDœnthen would he thatll if it were mindedi·to'di the wrong thiBg, the Government of Jaoonuand Kashmir wouId have the &1lppDrt of an officer of the Government of India agaîD.3t the Cottunission sent out by the 8eGurity CouncÎl. 1 tbinkthat tbis is a' suggestion whiehllon bebaIf of the G0Vemment of India,I must'lepudiate with allmy might. As 'I1fu.veaIready said, 'the Govermnent of fnlfia is.as ben· as anyone With regard to the impartiâlity of theplebisGite. It coltceded the plèbiseite on.·its own, .and agreed ..·that·it sbould be. ~ènUlÏtiêr international auspices,. so that ~t is ôJilynatunllHiat it shotJ1d agree to the furtber gtlàtanteewbich. the President of the Security CounGi! has dcmané.1ed-namely,' that il J;'hould piaee an offieer.in 'the State with the dutynf secing that.impartialîty is ensured to the maximUDt ~ible. extent. Alter àU, the President is rl~t in ,denianding that tespomibility for seeing thatthe plebiscite is hêléil impattially shOUld be shaUldered by India, wliièhis a Mèmbor df the tfilitOO Nations, the mâte Sb sinee the 'Govethnient Whioh basto itiïptMnmt tBis pattïéUlât otmgationîs nt:lt a MeDibttf 8ndis oettainlyitt '8 PliJSitioo. totake and 1 say thisfullY'Tecognîzing1he factthat"'the proposaIs mean further concessiùns'froi:ùourside~. l donotbIind myeyes to that fast, J,ut Vie are anxioustqatwe'sho~ld reàç,h a setaement,'and we are yery,keen ~a,t 'fightiIlg in:}alllllluàn(,i Kaslnnir,sl1()ulcl ce.as~:at)he.'e~!iest ,pàs~~pl~ moment, If the suqstance ofthis draJ:t ~esl;>lution, êlot1ted .in .·'Iaq.guagesligll1Jy')llQre, açéeptalile,'to us :thaq. it iS!].9W, wU! pro.d,~ce thy efJectwpiçli, WêlIavein Jl$d, we;,shall;b~ glf!dto;welcoroe .i~ afteftbe, .DJ.odificati'OD..s,to :~:w1JicJi .I haye' ';e~erréq have been;effecteq. _ ;' J~- : Attfzis' polni:the .' 'SYstem;of .consecutive~;inter.. ptet~tionw(lsresUm~d~L '... '. .. . '. ; '. ..~M~}. ~~Ë~: BAKER.,(ÛriitéqK$gdoIIii;:} ~f~~t s~e.tl11lt I:spallJ:le,speakjrig .onhéhalf ,a~~y~[Y; m~DJ9.~r.()f·tpe,$ecurity .. C()ù~fi1in .. expr~~~ifÙ~ &!'atitude to .• the. Preskl~mt for the proposaIs.wmch h~has làid.'llefùreùs this afternoon.I!know:that itmusthave cost a'gteafdeal ofpatienfeffort, andàll: ofus-'--not theD~rtiesari1v; but the Secu~ rity'C0triicil as'a whole=--are' indebtedto lümfor t11~~ati~rice aiJ.djnd~stry,which he .b,asshownô; WIthgreàtrespectI think thâthe' wast].uitèright at tl1i~ ~tagetd'keep'his proposa,ls on' the ,b~l!iis of, .~greeïnent ." betwèe~ the .parties: .It is'evident fromwhaf ·has .been" said, by~ the '.spokesmert.'of those :parties this' aftemoon that 'there are still grâve'diffièi1ltiesto'bê'overcom.e, but 'il.evel'thèless 1 have ilie feeling. that we are nearer agreement than wbe!1,we separatedlll()retQa1). f01lr weeks ago. Ibelie:vetha.titi~ ourdutynow...,-much lllpre, J,U'gently tJtanitwas then...,-tQ (}btain agreemellt'ian.d. toobtain:.Ït with the least possibl~ delay. .,.,. '. .. It is the overwhelming intérest of both parties that the present nghting should 1?e ended, and that.theyshouldl'eturn'to the ways ofbrotherhood anr;Jfriendship in which they must livé in future if theirtwo cotmtries aretoprosperas w~chhas'bèenproposed~and I:think'thlIt other tep'tesentatives' \Vill-findthemselves in thesamè .poSition._, \ c " " ' , -Iventure"ûLthink;' agaiil~ith"great-res'pêèt~':Jemepel111éttrai that thèPtesident 'still hasa.'good deàlof 'work t()d():\Viththede~gatioris.I~inJdherèJl1aybeth~nèc~ssity for a gpQ4-'deal()f' sub-~oriuIll~ee work;; perhaps we~shall n~ed, a number of meetîngsQfthe,SecUJ.ity.,G.liùrièQ. }tseJf;'>Wl,1y-~ ~"ed to' spèàk now was Ws : 1 wàntto'asJctl1e President, and. the olhermémbersofthe Securltf Council t~con,si!l~rthèaJIoc~tion .of',the'Sec1I1'Ît1 COUncil'stime in the eâIIY~tl1re~ and lwantto exPress the ardent hopethatitWiJi oemade possible for realp~ogress to be.made on, the quèstionof~Jammu arldKashmir;,duting' the coOlingmeêtiJigs." .' ,~' ·AtthPu~;li;ëe)}fthem;~ nèverth~less~~wthe lteavy·burdens. of'othe~ wQrk'which faU on the l!resident'ssir" . rs 'and '011' the .sbaUIdersof qhter. memh~Q ; , ~'SecuiiiY';CoPncil.(know Atat'thiSb;9.dl,iS,' ,.. ', ,'g\VÏtll9~et"Ï$sue~w:hi(;h ~~po1'timt~ij,Ùrge*t, 'll!1a,w1iich·Ô1igltt,Cre.~t~ greàipuQUc '.mter~~~.,';IiiCleèa."J(is.(ruê"t1lat flie ~~qè"of Ia;~ni:u an.a 'Kaslûl'ûr'has creat~d-les~ 9iS~u~;SiQnJn.th.e ,; ~àiJy . pre~s·,t1lan.,. ,~pm~' 'oLtlie othêr matfêrs"vhièhthe,'~~urltYCouncilmust cQDsidçr. 1 shall not admjtthat the issuesinvolved 4sSUeS'" ûnporiant'toth(f~400'tnillion' "pèople" in tlie two countries whos~ representatives arehere witl( 118" jssuçs o!.no:Jes,s<:Ï1n.Pl»;'tanceto the,~est p! IJl~d-7aie.~t~âllys~bôxaw~tè,in any:"way tQ any ot1ïër'J}llilf1;er:W,ith·w~C?h.theSecurltY C~ppcil.~~,.ti),pe~~' ", '.:" '. _ _ . H"~ Ido;'not,mowwhethet'jt:isrelevantor,not, but.:it .,~. ar.faclthatêthisitem;.wa.s-,put on"the agenda a considetab1etime.,befoœJhe.,others'with :whicbthesecuntYf,Councilis-deàling. Jtis,a fact thatwhen:~é'separated~w.e,askedthe' delegation' of-India: tOiçome' back.withtbe least possible delay;>the, dàtè of'l,MarchwasmeJitipned. Ithad animriiëni;el~!. long'.and",Jatiguingrjoumey,t() :ondergo,but if retumedby 6:March.,.We'oweJt ta tlieIndiandelegation 'to.try tomake,asmue.Ji progress as .w.e èàn. .:'C~rtainIy,this 'questioncann9tbe regatdedas l~ssurgentthan any other 'whichthe-Security Çaùnclf Jias;~to~oiI~idèi;'Figb.tin& 18 rgoing on. I.!arge. nwn.~er.s 'ofmen' :ar~iri\l"ôlved."1'Derem.ay be;iemporary bills 'bécausethe lçOIiditibn'cof 'the wèà:thèrimakes .Jitin1possiblé'.~ocarrYOllt large:' • scaleû'perations, butthe weathermây change. The course of'thecampàigo. may.;take-a~avertum 'at·âny:. moment;,It is"alway.$ ;possible thatevents on the fieldo ofbattle'wilLniake-it,harder·to i'each agr~epreiit,thaJi.it-is1aday.: Ifthà't, should.lulpPen, a;.grave'responsibilitywpuld IieuPQn 'usaI!. Smce le 'du ,1' 1 end by asking't~at in,thè next'weekor.1en daysas muchtime as possible may, be kept for .all tqe differept kiI1~s of}vprk-.. private con~ulta­ .tions, subi;ommittee'and' security ÇOuncil ID.@tings~wbich are:neededto enablens ~oJ:'eacb..an earty 'settleIIlent .of .tl1i.slllattet. . .'. . • '.' -, ,. .' - ;~ >: , . '~ . :". ' ThePRESIDËNT :I,considèr~discussion. this aftenlQon comparable to thé mstreadingof a biIlinan oi'dinary'Parliament.'wneir 'V~ diScuss thisquestion"again, .l'shall Te'luest. âll-mèmbèJ.'s oftheSecurityCouncil to.<leal with'concrete, particular mattersand. avoidgéneraI éonsideratipns. -Ishall try.my 'best not to.allow:.thisquestion ..lObe. pushed toa position of less Înlpor1;ance Or .lessurgency, On the agenda 'of:theSecurit'yCoun- , .cil. IJ;eqvestthe delegationsof India. and.Pakistan,and.anyotherdelegationswbich May bèso minded,to sendmeinWtitingtheir. amendments tothe <kaftproposal· 1 .Jv.fr. '. L6PEZ .(Colbnibia)':I .. sb0u1tflike .to request sOD}e' c1arifif::ation on$e ..way, in ",hich the SecurityCouncil intendstoproceed. Apparently' ~hePr,e~ide~t's' idea . is •that we should .go ontodiscuss hiS draft.resolution.. Does thatD)ean that •the .oilier..'.clraft·'tesolutions'thatnavé'been :pres:ntedareconsidereda~.,indefirtitelipostPOl1~d or'dIscarded ?'Thatis'one'poin.. t: '.' .... -." .,.,< .- . .. -_.~ ;, .. AflPther l'omi is.this:l'believ'e it.wo~db'e \V?rth ,w.h.ilè for us. to dJ,scuss,)foDIY for a' few Illl,t1~t~s, thec.()urs~w~ have Qf:en PllIsuing.'TlJis cour~e seems to be substantially as follows: The ' PresIdent of the Security Council ..discusses .the questionwith the delegations of India and l'aki- 'stan. He•retums to. theSeCurlWCOU11.cil·.with ..a new PX:0p\Jsa1whlch,'as in the .prt~sentcase,'does "tt.0tTepresentagreementbetween .the'tw0:delega.- ttonsbut iS,in fact,a uew draftresolution stib- PIittéd t5' the,Securïty':Counèij.·to .-he .;çonsîd.èr.èd m the Qtdùlluy way; ,. '., ", ',' . ~âveCut;lenouvelle :'eiitre Jes .pour .i,~ould:understaii~rtheprocedure ifthe,Presidentof' the~e;CUii~ CouncU, .acting Qn]ts behalf, had '.conversations· vvith .the.,twodelegations; an,d theyreaçhe,d'agreementas fo. thetepns .of settleme.nt. .4- draft resolution .contâiningthosyagreed p.Oij1ts would naturallytak:e precedence over~the ,il. o~el' .0Iles.,BlJt.,as ithappens, aIl~w.:e.have becn domg is .. accumu'lating draft.resolunons.Dlesented by the President of the Secmity coooén which, as 1 said, do not represent agreement between the tw0 partiesconcemed. 1 do not.know if that ié :tbebest Waytôproceed. Although·theColombian .delegatioD..bas.presenteda·draft resolution [document S/6711'wbich~intheopiIÙonof theIndian discus~ the method we bave been pursuing and Çleci~e .\vh~ther it, is,', th~ •oost method. Following this method, we have so farheld twenty ta twenty-flve meetings of the Securit}r·Conncil on this subject without,achievingany' definite result. Mythird point is,that the Security èouncil bas several items on its agenda. One of them is the Palestine question. .It is true thatthe India-Pakistan question èam~ to the Security Council belote the Palestine qt~estion. On the othêr hand, it is true tha~ the Palestine question is very pressing because the Government of the United,Kingdom hi\-! set adefinite date for, the termination of its ~andate o'Ver Pale/itine and weare acting under the pressure ,ofthat date. 1 believe that mustb,e takeninto, consideration in planning the distribution of the timo :cf. the Security Council.

Part of, the question raised by therepresentative of Colombia \Vas put to me by the representative of Pakistan when he raised the question of procedure. 1 shall answer fust the question asked by the representative of Pakistan. There are indeed a number of <iraft resolutions befote the Security Council beginning with those introduced by the representative of Belgium [document S/667]. AlI those resolutions will be dealt with according to our rules of procedure. In regard to the general handIing of this question, the members of the Security Council will remember that l, inherited the, present method frOID my two predecessors. At the, very first meeting tIJis month which" wil~ devoted to this question, ~ consulted the members of the Security Council as to whether or not they wished that procedure to be continued. So'far as 1 am concerned, 1 should welcome abandonment·of the present, procedure and adoption of the procedure wltich is used by the Security Cauncil in connexion with an other questions. c 1 should like to add, however, that the draft resolutipn which 1 have presented, today is the result of considerable consultation with'the delegations of Indhi and Pakistan. While it bas not been found acceptable by both delegations, 1 thjnk 1 am correct in.saying that the representative of Pakistan did not say that the provisions of the, resolution are llt;lacceptable as far as they go. If 1 understood liis criticism correctIy, he meant that those provisions do not go far enough and do not provide adequate safeguards. He was not in favour of dropping any of the' safeguards provided in the draft resolution. If my understanding is correct, bis position W~§'~lîe would accept the,resQJuti(ill ifceetrâmother provisions 'Were addéd to ie~'wishthat 1 could have produced a draft resolution entirely acceptable to both parties. . My forecast is this,: Whetherthe detailed w~ involved in this kind of preliminary,survey and consultation is carried nn ,by the President of Mr. PARODI (Françe) (translated from French) : 1 had not intended to speak tonight. The document which you have placed before us certainly calls for further consideration. 1 think however that it may be useful to make, at once, two observations w.hich have some bearing on the course of our later work. . First of aIl, 1 wîsh to join Mr Noel Baker in expressing our thanks to the P~sident for the work which he has accomplished. 1 believe that it is on the whole very helpful to the study which we make of any question, if the President, or the Rapporteur-and in the present instance he has been so good as to perform both these functionsinitiates certain hearil1gsand prepares the ground for the work of the Council de ma vail projets un désàccord ïionde Cachemire hensions moyens fera pas qui nent en partie As the' representative of Colombia reminded us a moment ago, we have at present before us a whole series of draft resolutions'. In my opinion, these draft resolutions do not differ greatly. At the first reading, at any rate, they aU seem to be in the same spirit, and 1 personally think that the President's draft resolution' represents, in a sense, â kind, of synthesis or extension of aU the draft resolutions aIready submitted. 1 venture to hope that when we resume discussion of the question we shall be able to carry on our work with a condensation of these' draft rescilutions; and that these draft resolutions will be brought more closely together, in order that any differences which may still exist between them may be expressed in the form of amendments rather than separate proposais. 1now wish to make a remark on the substance of the question. Inthis discussion there is a fundamentàl point, and whatdisagreement exists would seem to me to relate to that point. This is the question of the presence of .Indian troops in Kashmir during the periodof the plebiscite. Ican understand the anxiety which· the representative ofPalçistan may feel, and 1 realize that 1t would be desirable and preferable if we were ina position to calI uponanother authority able' ta provide us with a full guarantee that the plebiscite will take place under perfect conditions. But Ido not see any practical possibility of finding another force to replace the armed force which is aIready in Kashmir. Moreover, these are territories which have been ~evastated in a most deploraôle manner, resulting ID the loss of hUman lives and vastmaterial dest:uction ; the violence is.·in part the result of a tnbal invasion1 .. and in part due to the intrusion ofextenial forces. It is difficult toconceive that ~lli1ceof ordet~' the govemment'and ;the lifeof 'the countrY: :ILwe; 'tâ:kè'into,éonsideration thedupays.Sî. plèbi~cites'ofthe .. past; 'whèteverthey ·maY·'liavenisés·. .beenheld,llîaveno kiIowledgethat'it,was ever saidthilt these.pl~biscites'should ~. hèld.in m::eas prexiop~IY.~mp#ed 01.·aJlY" IQn4'~f ,f<>rc~ .capable ~~, Jl1~tmn'9g order, prof any. kinPQf goverD;~ .JJleJlt.,Exp~nellce prov,es .. that.,..,..subject tO guar-espèèe ~tees; ,~hicllCàD. be.e~sily 'imagined7 im.partlal .;pd s~tisfactorr..pleb~scl~éS.can. be.organized: in c9un~es contaunng .adnunistrative machinery and pr()Vlding the necessary. guarantees for public 'order. . .. : l'Y~t~d 10 ~tateiltoncemy opinion on this point; be~use.l think.tlt~tour further. deliberationsand,. ~ttempts tobringtb,e. two.partiestoge- .ther .shollld .~nd.iIi·this '.' direction;. we ~hould search :,forguarant~s to :ensure. theimp~rtia1ity .of the ··plebiscite. despi~e. the p~esence·of Indian troops,.r~ther than seek. a· soluti0Il .whîchseems .io·.me itnpossib~ ofreàlization.and..which. would eJeprive this trou1?l~d land ofany kind. o(force ç,a{la~leof maintaining. order. . . ' If:1 lÙlderstood hitncorrectly,'therepresentative of Indiawouldnot'objectfo'astudyinthis sense,or rtothe :search,' jf,necessary, .for other ·gUarantees,or tonew,and more precise provisions tègarding the guarantees<ali'eadymentionedin .thetext·bQfore.· us;.Twotypes .ofg1iaratttees .are ·provided: iIrthisdobument .::the 'progrèssive teducti<:fu .bf.. troopsand,their' cantonment,tlre n'lannei in whîch they are to be:stationed. At" .the mst reading it woUld appear that the ·proposëd >teXtshould be rendered more' preCise 'onoIiepoint;in mY'opihioit, 'a .moreprecise /pr~ Vision 'should bec addedê to the' 'effect that the àdmînistrationresponsiblefor ensuringindependence and impartiality of thé plebiscite shoùldbe einpowered tonegotiate with'the authorities concemed; and thisadministration shouldat1eastbe able to giv,eifsviewsand to .inform us concernmg thenumber of Indian ti'oops and the manner in whichthèyarestationed, tri. enableUstoverify whether aRthe guaranteesI ha.ve suggested have been furniShea.· 4.' Tt isin this airectionti}it dur work.shoùld. be ·contiIiued; and.·in:.my opinion 'tbis' is "a practical procèdure. . , ttis for .ithiS reasOnthat 1 desfred to make .these:suggestiÔIls' which. IcOJisi4er usefulat. the present· stage 'of .our work, ,despite the"late .hour 1 want to make it clear that 1 am simply discussing .a auestion' of procedure. It seemed pertinent to m~ that the President himself said just now tbat all the different proposaIs could be deaIt with according to'our IUles of pr~cedure; but, 1 respectiully submit, we are not\îealing with them according .to our rules of procedure, much less so whenthePresident requests the delegations of Indianand Pakistan, as well' as other delegations, to submit to him in writing whatever amendments they may seent to make. As far as my understanding of the roles goes, that does not quite confOrIn to the roles; and that was my purpose : not, as 1 say, that 1 do not think it would be useful. It is .useful to present proposaIs and amendmentsin order to reachan agreement. But that applies to every other proposaI: not·orny to the· President'sproposal, but to every one of thepro:- posaIs that bave been submitted here. That is why theroles of procedure provide fortheorderly ·discussion of ·the diffe!ent proposaIs that are submitted. Then everydèlegation has the opportunity to· say what amendments it thinks are necessary for the purpose of reachingan agreement and a satisfactory. solution. 1 stated before'that, so far as we are concemed, it would be perfectly agreeable to us' to leave our proposaI indefinitely .·in .abeyance. 1 do not think it isnecessary, but 1 would. be as willing to withdraw my proposaI aItogether,if that i", the way to expeditethe work of the Security Comlcil, as the President has propased. But otherw$se, 1 do believe it is necessaryto have the procedure more clearlyestablished, becau.se the· proper. waythen would be ta agree to leave all either proposaIs out of account,andthenwe knowthat wc have agreed to dispose of them in that way. · " , , We. woulC1 tàkethel'resideni's proposaI as a basisof disçussioninthe Secm:ity Council; then, instead ,ofsublriitting amendments.in w.citing, we woulddiscuss .them here, 'Wbich isthe usual way, and Ibelieve it is the most satisfactory way. Everytime we depart fr.om our roles, we come to the same result. That' has be.en my experience here, and, 1 rnay say, in other bodies aIso. When the rules of procedure are disregarded, tim is lost. Thatds why 1 very r~speètfully m.ade the remark that, by depatting .from oùr roles, we havehad twenty ortwenty-five meetings and spent three· Illonths Ù1 the discussion of this Illatter, and we aresubstantially at the same point where we were, beéause theprimaryobject of the conversations of the .President of the Security ·comme.base . senter, des règlement ThePRE8IDENT : .1 have two morespeàkers on my list, '1;>ut as 1 considerthe statement of the representative of Colombia ta bein the nature pf a point of order, 1 shall inakea few remarkscoricerning it., . 1 am not in a position to judge whether 'ot: not themethod'adoptedso far 1;>y.the Security Council i8 efficient, and 1 do not wisq ta defendthe present procedure. However, .-$0 far as 1 am aware, .the procedure adopted has notviolated any particular rulecf procedure. There is· another minor difficulty.which the representatives shouId keep.m mind;' Naturally, in thisquestiolf·the' represetitatîvesof India and Pakistanaremostdirectlv concenied. Our rules 9f proçedure Iimit theirri~tto.submit draft resolutions tothe Security Cotulcil, since theyare not members of this' body. Unless a member of the Security. Council sponsors'their resolutions, they ~annot be Dut to a vote. It is for this reason that 1 thought ii mightbe useful for our present proceduretobecontiDl~.ed.,When 1 stated tltat 1 should appreciateit'ifthe representatives of India and Pakistan. would give me tbeir ideasin writing, it wa~i" of course, for, the simple purpose' of improving our ~oik. ,ialso: stated 'fuat if·1l1embersof.the'5ecurity , Cà1ll1cll had: anyideas in regardto the inlprovement of mydraft resolution, 1 shouldwelcome -tli~m: Tdid' notmean by, that statement that members should not sübmit theiramendments to the SeduritySowcil Û1the usual waY:~ Thatrlght ·a:lways exi~t:~, 'and .l'certailily .did' not:-intend ta -'a.~ridge't 'm ·thèleast:'·; , ·Mr•. IGNATIEFF' (Canada). : Iasked to be heard bn.· the qüêstion ,à~ !,J;q.c~tIl11ré;thath!isjustbeen QiSc,ussed bêcaüsé rçfe.reriç~ W~~ Ipadéto one of .thedra,n proposaIs,·,[docûrjzen.t ~1667] su.bmitted by the.t;epteseq.tative .of Canada in association with tliereprèsen~tivé.of J3elgium in.theiJ: capacities as .presidenfand.JlapP0rteur, re~pe.ctively, düring the çO~versations w1J.ic9' ,we.re. held, prior .to Jh~.dePartuie· of)h~.Indian.deI~ga:ti9n. . 1 hâveo;Uy two p~intStomaie. F.'irst, 'the Preside.nt saidaiew mOlllentsagQ·that the procedure wbich he proposed: to,Jollpw'l@dbeenfollowed 'Previously by bis. p,re4ecessorsand'was •inspired ,by the conviction that·an.agreedsettlement of t~is dispute, if it were-l'ossible,: woul4 b~ tnore lik~ly ta be implementcdeffective.ly: :a~d proD;lptly and . .articles c~tion JO .cpntinue to ;s.llPpoûthe.:VÎew that ·the ;procedpl'e ,:suggesteclbythe .president '" shouJ,c,l.'lle followe4 at this stage. 1tis, of course"Qpen'to the ' ,5eo\lrlty,' Ç011Ucil·~1l.4er appropriate >,articles,'of the,CharteJ:to, >reQommendtenns of. s,ettlement .to bothparties, ~-ejtb.eJ: with pr without.thejr request.' Risour;opinioll.thatthatstage, of the discussionhas notyet,.perhaps, beenreached :at .eastjt is a question ,which, wouldnecdto ,be considered separately on. its merlts. .My. second, point cori~erns the dispos~l of ,the particular proposaIs submittechby the" Canâdian delegation in association WÏth the delegation of Belgium which werecontained in document Sj667. It is ourview that those proposaIs might weIl be held in abeyance. Any part of their contents which would help to narrow tl\e diffe.rences which exist between the NO narties on the three main points-the holding of â plebiscite, the presence of .outside troops and intruders in Kashmir, and arrangements for an impartial interim administration-would be available at the "discretion of the President and, presumably, any member of the Security Council could makeuse of the material contained therein. Mr. EL-KHoURI (Syria) : At this late hoU! 1 shall, 1imit' mys,elf to two very brief points. One of them is the urgency to which Mr. Noel Baker has,referred in saying that fighting is_now going on in Kaslunir, ,which. point was aIso'referred to by the representative of Colombia, who compared this case withthat of Palestine. In this respect, l would stress the point ofurgency in the Kashmir question and complement the statements il1ready made by saying that thecasualtiesin Kashmir in one day exceed those in Palestine in one month; and this has been going on for the last six months. For this reason, 1 consider that the question of Kashmir is very urgent and that we ought to find a peaceful solution which will settle and bring to an end the deplorable state of things which> existl) tbere. The second l'oint is the question of a plebiscite. We know that the ole1;Jiscite in Kashmir would be directed towards choosing one of the NO Dominions : accession to fudia or to Pakistan. It wouId resemble the election of one of NO candidates in any constituency. In thiscase, .besides the other points which have been referred to and widely expressedby the representatives, especiaIly the representative of France, about impartial administration, 1 draw the Security COlmcil's attention to another uoint '~ich is to be considered in theplebiscitë-that is, faimess between the candidates in the election and the avoidance of any uoint offavouritism or discrimination or d!stinction between one and the other. Any pri- Vllege or advantage accorded to one of the ,canm'tbis'case'equal,privileges'sboUldbe,~vento: both·partiesm,the.sup~rvisIQn and<conttol'Qf tbeplebiscite,;so'tli~t"the'fairnesstowbicb.the President;of·,the>:Secinity'Councit bas referred ,severalÛllles,willbeestablishedandmaintaineden. andb<>tb;patties'wiqlia,ve equaladvantages and :privileges:' . 'Thê"PRESÎD~wr : ,î'pt()pose~at weadjourn tbediscussiononthe.In~ia-I»'àkistanquestion lÜltilTuesday,23 Marcli'àt3 o'clock. ' The 'PRE~~Î>~NT : Any member of .the Security CounciI is fteé to discuss' any oftbe 'proposais. 'befotethe'secuntY eouncllatanytiIne; 1v!r. N"0ELBAKER,(United Kingdom) : As ûndêtstafid it,~iritbe'interïrn'ÙI1til'23 •Marcb, the ~esidentWilI:ê~n~ue'liiscons:uJtationS(with the itelegations·of rn.diaànd Pakistan). Thatis,'a1l of -tbetùîleiaf'tlieSèêu,ritY·Gouncilandtbe Presi- âellt;;mcludiD~SùIlday.'hasnotbeen allocatedto ,'otbei'é.sribjëCfs?·Thatbas 'bêenmyexpeiience'in 'thè lasttteft days. '..',,' ."', , ", ,. 'C o. • ,. • ._ Beld at Lake Suçcess, New York, " " OTff!riday.·1P,"J4afchi~948; ,atlO.$OIl.m; , Pt:is{Jent;: Mf. 'T.'P.'T~IAN:G.{Chinai ; ,.. :.: .. - .;-, '"", ,,-": --.;) ": ' "Preseitt':"'The' r~re~etitatiYes~f~efol1owiÎig countries:,> Argentiua~J3élgi~~ ,Can*da,Cbitta, ,p>lombia,Francè;,Syna, t.Jkrainian Sovi~t S~cial­ ist;Republic,'UmonafSoVÏetSQCialistRe9ùblics, 'U~~'~Kingd~,Umte~:~fâtesôf'Atnerica~'. --' -. ., tZ5.P..~\riSid~al~g~~dà.' ,(d~lIiDentSl~ge~da.210) ·.l::Adopti~n:,iof t1I~'agérida. .2....~'hê'~al~tine,q1J~o~; ,,'.(a) 'FifstmontblyCprogr~ss" repartio'the Secur-