S/PV.27 Security Council

The first item to he tonsidered is the report of the Sub-Committee 'appointed at the close of the twenty-sixth meeting of the Security Counci1. On this item the Frellch representative, who came to set me this noon on bebàlf of the Sub-Committeeappointed'yesterday, .hasrequested me. to inform. the Counci1 ~that despite bis great efforts, no arrangement was reached after otheir meeting this morr:ng. Therefore the Counci1 starts practic~y in the same position in which we ended belore the Sub- CollUlÙrtee wasappointed yesterday.' Members of the Counci1 will recàll that yesterday we devotedthe morning and aftemoon meetings, which lastedfor several hours, 10 a discussion of whether the Iranian representative.· should he given ari opportunity topresent bis casé on behalf of his Goveriunent. Various proposaIs have been put before the Counci1; 1 shàll give members of the .Council further opportunitY for comment if they desire. Otherwise, 1 shàll put the various proposaIs to the vote in the order in which they were 8gbmitted to the. Council. Mr.L\NPE (Poland): Iwant to express my dcep regret that .othe Sub-Committee did not ~chieveany positive.results and 1 tmnk the represëntativcsof tht· oth~r nations for which 1 speak will feel,the"Bame way~ . .'-.. Since ~o.agreementwas reached, we' are back !tyeste~4ay's. situation; and.1 want ta remind t11~Piresident ofaprQposa1 Imadey~terday, '\5?j~ely, that th.~ Austta1ian.pro~shoul~.beprésentée :. '-'put i~ the" Y9te second and not th,ird. 1 tJiink. &0 ,there m:e goOd reasons for following othis arder ".. rathcr ~aa the chronological arder in w~cl1the ~";'~:Pf9~Werepresented.: " qJlicl#l..1Jec.'P'dsot ~he SecurityCounçil,. F~tYeàr. ·'~!lP.p,éQaeot No. i. Annex.2a., ~~. . *,"J; ·2êÏ•.ç

1 ask the i.'ldulgence of Polish and Australian colleagues ü 1 appear be a litile inflexible in what 1 said a little while ago regarding the proper arder of the various proposals. However, 1 feel that aIl the proposals are equaIly important and that they should voted on according to the order in which they were made. 1 do not, however, wish to insist on this ruling. When the time comes for voting, 1 shaIl be glad to hear the views of other members on this decision. HASSAN Pasha (Egypt): 1 just wanted to that 1 do not wish to discuss the priority of proposals, because that is up to the Council decide. 1 know that our minds are confused with questions of priol'ities - that is a legacy of war. 1 merely wished to ask my Australian colleague whether bis proposal was that a third party, wmch is not a party to the discussion, should be asked to produce itrs papers and documents whùe absent from the discussion; whether it was that the Iranian representative should be invited to be present at the discussion and to produce bis documents. there. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): Not at fuis stage. HASSAN Pasha (Egypt): Does the Australian representative mean that he wishes the Iranian representative to produce by mail the documents he has mentioned? Colonel HODGSON (Australia): No,he can produce them within twenty-four hours. HASSAN Pasha (Egypt): Yes, that is what mean. They can be sent by mail to the Secretariat. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): Yes, but should J..ili:~' to amplliy my replies to the two queEJtÎons asked of me. It is very clear to us aIl that the representative of Iran is in this room. No doubt he has a complete statement in bis pocket at t1ilil moment. It is not a question of miles, or of taking a of time, or of holding up matters. 1 suggest that he could he asked to submit the statement writing, and ü it could be distributed to us for examination, we should. not be delaymg (traduit qui'ici uue l'usage, sitions Je que quelle règle c'est sinon, si quelques Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): We have not established lnany rules of procedure, but 1 thought there was one rule - or practicè at least - that had been established, and that was in regard to the order in which motions and amendments should be voted. 1 must confess 1 am not very clear what that rule provides. Could 1be told what the rule is, and if it is realIy fairly well established? If it is, do let us stick to it; we shaIl have frightful confusion if we start making exceptions to the few rules we already have.

1 am informed that no such rule has been adopted so far. dit jusqu'ici. socialistes doute. constatent Comité, du une celle de Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian) : 1have no doubt that the members of the Security Council have noted with regret that the Sub-Committee appointed at yesterday's meeting of the Security Council has not enabled us to make any progress in our endeavours to find an agreed solution to the question under discussion, namely, the question of postponing consideration of the Iranian statement until 10 April. Today 1 have little to add to what 1 said at yesterday's meeting ofthe Security Council. 1 have already explained .the reasons why the USSR Government is asking for the postponement of the consideration of the Iranian reprcsentative's statement until 10 April. 1 consider that the fact that direct negotiations exist between the USSR Government and the Government of Iran is proved. It is precisely these direct negotiations between the two Governments which have led to. the understanding which 1 officialij announced at yesterday's meeting of the Security Council. 1 refer to the understanding as the result of which the USSR Government has decided ce que les l'URSS déclaration 10 de de maintenant ciations qu'a officîellement d'hier. Gouvernement sL1ll0 Stalin, to a question put to him by the Presiden.t of the American news service, the United Press. 'lne reply was as follows: "1 thank you for your kind suggestion. 1 cannot consider Mr. Churchill's arglh"Ilent convincing. With regard to the question of the withdrawal of USSR troops from Iran, it is common knowledge thatthis has already been settled in a positive sense, in accordance with an understanding between the USSR Government and the Government of Iran." This reply was given by Generalissimo Stalin a question put to him by the President of United Press, which ran: "1 should like to draw your attention to the declaration made by Mr. Winston Churchill to the United Press. If you desire 11:0 reply to Mr. Churchill's argument favour of speedy action by the Security Council of the United Nations in the Iranian question, the United Pr~ will be glad to transmit your opinion to the whole world." . Generalissimo Stalin's reply to this question has uow been published in the whole of Amerkan Press and, 1 ?SSume, not only in. Amerii:an Press, but alsoin the Press ofother countr:ies. This reply is very clear. Finally, 1 wish once again to calI attention the reply given by the Iranian Prime Minister, Mr. Ghavam, on 23 March, to a question as his attitude towards the proposai that the Security Council should postpone consideration of Iranian statement for a period of two weeks. Ml'. Ghavam said 'that it did not make the slightest difference to hiin. Thus the Iranian Prime Minister does not object ta having consideration of the Iranian question postponed for two weeks, that is, till 10 April. The Prime Minister stated that did not matter in the ·least whether this·question was deaItwith on 25 March or a fortnight later. If the question of the withdrawaI of the troops and other problems were· not solved before,·the Premier declared, the Iranian question should included in the agenda of the Security Council. In reply to acorrespondent's question regarding the note addressed to Mr. Trygve Lie; Secretary-GeneraI of the United Nations, by Mr." Hussein Na, Iranian Ambassador in Washington anlbepresentative of Iran.tothe United Nations, the Iranian Premier emphasized. categorically,..-. 1 repeat, categoricalIy - that this note was wrïtten and despatched by the Iranian representativewithout the knowledge and sanction the IranianGovernmènt. Mr. Ghavam informed cotrespondents that he had sènt strict instructions to Mr. Hussein AIapointing out thenecessity avoÎdÎIlgany repetition of such arbitrary actions in the future. Mr~· Ghavamexpressed the assur- With regard to the question of Azerbaijan, Mr. Ghavam said that the question was relatively unimportant and could be solved by negotiation as scon as an understanding was reached regarding the withdrawal of USSR troops from Iran. 1 have taken lhe substance of Ml'. Ghavam's statement from the communiqué of the official USSR agency, Tass. In view of the cÏrcumsta'l1ces 1 have pointed out, and in view of Ml'. Ghavam's statement, it is incomprehensible that t.\e membe.rs of the Security Council should not be able to agree to the fully justified proposal of the ÙSSR Government to postpone the discussion of the Iranian statement until 10 April. d'indiquer, vam, ·on membres tûmber complètement l'URSS déclaration Ml'. BYRNES (United States of America): There èan he no question that the USSR representative has presented to us infonnation he has received. The difficulty is that there is apparently a r 'Junderstanding between ,the officiaIs of the USSR Government and the officiaIs of the Iranian Government. The information which the United States Government has received reg..u-ding the attitude of the Iranian Government derives not from the Press but from the official United States representative in Teheran; and it is to the effect that there has been no ·settlement of the dispute between the two Governments. According to information received by the representative of the United .States Government not from the Press or radio, but from the highest officiai of the Iranian Government, proposaIs have been made but have not been agreed to; consequently, there has been no change in the Iranian Government's instructions. to its representative. de ['anglais): ;;entant communiqué La ment Gouvernement du que ce l'Iran de et, ment deux qui mais ment représentant des pas été acceptées. Dans tions rent Therefore the position of the United States Government is that we have here, before the Security Council, a representative of the Government of Iran who, in ëompliance with the provisions of the Charter, has fcrmally and in proper form filed a complaint charging, on behalf of hisGovernment, that·there is a·continuance of intederence with his Government by USSR agents and armed forces of t.~e USSR Government and that this constitutes a threat to internationalpeace and security•. donc la l'Iran sécurité une plainte en bonne et due forme. plainte, vemement, la rence de Gouvernement First aproposal was.made in the last meeting to delete the whole subject from the agenda. When that was riot agreed to, a proposal was made topostpone discussion until 10 ~pril. In lors entièrement Celle-ci 1 say again what 1 said yesterday; and United States Government deems it of vital importance to the future of the United Nations. Ifthe Government of a small State, not a memher of the Security Council, properly and in compliance with the Charter files a declaration that foreign. troops are on its soil and are interfering with thatGovernment; and if any of the Governments represented here can say: "We think there is an agreement", or "Our information is that there is an agreement"; and if, because of this, non-member Government is denied even the right to present its case, then all confidence in the effectiveness of the Security Council will disappear. We are being asked to act upon Press statements. That cannot be done because in any case we should want to have such Press statements before·us. My friend, the representative of the USSR, refers to an interview given to the newspapers by Mr. Ghavam. Before leaving the hote! 1hurriedly wrote down the text of that interview, which as follows: . "It makes no dir..lference if the Council meets now or in fifteen days. If by the time it does convene we have not solved the fundamental problem of evacuation of troops br other means, then our case will be included in the· agenda under SecurityCouncil regWé\tions." That is a statement that anyone could make, for it amountS to saying: 1 do not care when Council meets because if by the tb-ne it meets have not solved this problem of the removal troops from our borders, we are going to submit our case to the Security Council and ask for· its consideration. We cannot act on such grounds. If we going to say that when an official representative of the Iranian Govemment is here, he cannot even be heard upon the request for a postponement, 1 do not see how a non-member will evèr get to this Council. If the proposal of the USSR reprec;entative were adopted and discussion were postponed without the representative of Iran being given . even a chance to be heard before 10 April, then on that date the USSR representative any other member of this Council could move that discussion should be postponed until Oct()ber; and if the Iranian representative occu~ pies then, as he occupies now, a seat in the front row of· this hall, the proposal could be made that he be·denied the opportunity to speak; and Now as to priority of proposaIs. Would it be logical, in view of the proposals hefore ~, to vote first upon the USSR proposal for postponement until 10 April, in preference to voting upon the proposal that the Iranian representative should be heard on that postponement? Suppose the USSR proposal were carried and discussion were postponed. The Council would thus have taken action to postpone consideration of a m?.tter which, according to Iran, constitutes a threat to international security, without giving Iran the right ta say a ward in defense of its plea. Should we vote fust on a postponement and then on the question of whether Iran should be heard? The answer is obvious. . Obvious1y, when the proposal for postponement was presented, several proposaIs were made, in conformity with the Charter, to give Iran a chance to present its views. As between these proposaIs, 1 think that the Chair has acted perfectiy correctly. They should be voted upon in the arder in which they were presented. The Egyptian proposal should be voted first. If it is carried. and Iran is given a chance to say a word as ta whether or not this case .should be postpcned, then, if the Council sees fit, we could vote upon the Australian proposal, and the Iranian representative could be asked to file a written statement in addition to bis oral statement. Certainly we must vote on the question of whether we should hear the representative of Iran before we vote on the question of· whether we should postpone the matter without giving him a hearing. .

Did 1 understand that the U~ted States representative wishes ·to have the Egyptian proposal put to a vote first? Mr. BYRNES (United States of America): Thatis my request. 1 suggest that the representative of Egypt might clarify bis proposal. As 1 understood it, it was, to 1IlSe bis language, that Iran should be permitted to come to the bar of the Council and make a statement.

The President, of course, is not ina very good position to judge of the importance of each proposai, but ta vote upon the Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): 1 think that after what 1 said yesterdaY3 nobody willbe surpri..sed that 1 wholeheartedly side with, the views MI". Bymes has just expressed in regard ta the question as to whethet or not Iran should he enabled 'ta sit hue at the table and present its views. 1 tlùnk it has a perfect right, under the Cha.t1:er .to do sa. . , . However, with regard to the question of de1ay, ,1 think it is fair ta say that the naturaI interpretation to be placed on the Charter is that, when question is submitted by any Member of the United Nations for discussion, that question should come up at the earliest opportunity. If there is to he delay, that delay should be granted only for very substantial and compelling reasons. 1 am wondering whether these are realIy compelling a:.là substantiaIl"easons. ,.' If the President'will permit Ille, 1 shoUId like to ask the representativeof the USSR whether perhaps he could tell us a little more a'Qout this. Is he în a' position, for instance, ta tell us what are the terms of what he has variously ca.lled the "agreement" or "understanding"? Why does he want this discussion to be delayêd? And finally, what determines the choice, which ta many of uS, 1. am sure, must seem a little arbitrary, pf the date, .10 April? 1 should very n'luch like ta h.e enlightened on these questions before making up myminddefinitely as ta how ta vote on the q.uestion of delay. HASSAN Pasha (Egypt) : .J shouldlike ta stress a point which \\Tas raised. by the Mexican representative yesterday and which was on my mind all the time when 1 askedL that therepresentative of Iran should come ta ill~ bar explainhiScase. 1 :tlünk'.that theworld ~tthis moment,. and .~pecially ~all" COu..'1triêS like ours,. is waiting fOf you,r decisiontoday. 1feel personalIy that the San~'rancisco Chartêl' has. given to the big f,bwers certllÎll privileges. and l hope that they Will use them in the right way. 1 want ta stress the fact that the small cOuntriestoday are waiting fqryour qecision, because we want to see the big, P'owersxespeot treaty obligations., - - Mr. CASTILLO NÂJERA (Mexico): 1 should Iike to have the text of the proposal before us, since there is a Iittle confusion in the discussion. Th~ representative of the United States said that the Iranian representative should come to the Council table te, be asked whether of not the question should b.e postponed; and he said that this was the sense of the Egyptian proposaI, which was seconded by the representative of the Netherlands and by myself yesterday morning. The Netherlands representative and 1 supported that proposai on the basis ofArticle 31 of the Charter, and 1 think that what the Egyptian representacive had in mind was that the' Iranian representative should be called to the Council table not orny in order to state bis views on the postponement of the discussion, but in order to. explain the Iranian case and present further infûrnultion. .d'entre de tant mière donc qu'elle sée, l'URSS. représentant raisons 10 que prête que pourra ment There are really three proposaIs, but two of them coincide, in that both the Australian and the USSJ. proposais advocate postponement. The Egyptian proposai shouid thereforebe put ta the vote first because, ifadopted, it would rule out the other two; and if it is rejected, we can proceed to vote on the USSR proposai. The Netherlands representative has asked the USSR representative 11:0 give us the reason for bis choice of the date 10 April. The Australian representatïve assumes that the Iranian l1'epresentative has aIready in bis poeket the originaI sta.tement and he thinks that tomorrow, within twenty-four. hours, he can produce this. Let us ask him officially to come here first. de de que à Nous avons sur tant la celle le de 1 wish to know.the text of the initial proposaI· in order that we may continue the discussion.

1 think we have allowed this discussion on the question of procedure to continue long enough. We now have a new proposaIon the order of voting. The Polish represen~ative has proposed that the Australian proposai should he given priority over the Egyptian proposai. 1 think the bestway to settle that questionis to put bis.proposaI, to the vote. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): 1 wish to make afew' remarks :regarding the.speeches of severaI members of the Security Council. socialistes désire des Conseil The representative of the Netherlands, Ml'. van Kleffens, said that the substance of the understanding between the USSR Government and the Iranian Government was n.ot clear to him. What is this understanding? It see.illS to me that there is no obscurity on this point. Direct negotiaJtions are taking place between the Iranian Government and the USSR Government. As result of these negotiationsan understanding has been reached regarding the withdrawal of USSR troops from the territory of Iran.within five or six weeks, providing that nothing unforeseen happens. 'What is there obscure in that and why is it so difficult to understand? Mr. van Kleffens wishès to know whether this understanding is a yerbal or a written one. But it is evident that it makes,no difference whether the understanding is verbal or· whether it has been set down in writing; its validity is not affected on that account. Several official statements h~~ve been issued regarding this understanding. The first statement was made two days ago and was published in the USSR Press, in the United States PiéSS and in the international Press generally. A second statement was made by myseif at yesterday~s meeting of'the Sécurity Council. A third sta:/'ment was made today, when 1 quoted Generalissimo Stalin's reply to the question put ta him by Mr. Baillie, President of the Uriîted Press. 1 aIso fail to understand why Mr. van Kleffens is ur~able to comprehend the nature of the,question ~n which an understanding has been reached. . At the present time everybody knows what that question is. ' 1 have aIready nad .occasion to mention tliat the USSR Government is not preparcd to take la aujourd'hui soit tranchée je sion, sécurité, œuvre, Qu'il second('·ire. ment en ponde cédure au de mise première. sécurité 19 du été de l'Iran I,e m'opposer aux l'Egypte. The representative of Egypt aIso considers that l'lis proposai should be voted upon fust, 'Ùthough this is not in confonnity with customary practice or the usual rules of procedUre. A few words on the question of procedure. 1think it is self-evident that my proposal should be voted upon fust, because it was the fust to be submitted. Let me remind the members of the Security Council that 1 submitted this proposai on ~9 March and confirmed it at yesterday's meeting of the Security Council. Thus it was submitted before th~ representative of Egypt moved that the Iranian representative should be invited to make bis statemenif: immediately on the substance of the question he has raised. 1shall categoricaUy oppose the motion that the Egyptian proposal should be voted upon fust. 1 very much regret that Mr. Bymes, today as yesterday, ignores the accepted rules of procedure in demanding thaJt the proposal of the Egyptian representative should he voted upon before my proposai. The representative of Mexico, Mr. Castillo Nlijera, stated thatthe Egyptian proposal should he voted upon fust fu view of the fact that, if accepted, it would rule out the other two proposais. But 1 wish to draw Mr. Castillo Nâjera's attention tQ the fact that each of the proposals, if accepted, would rule out the other two. Tilus the argument purt forward by the representative of Mexico in favour of putting the Egyptian' propos;;l.1 to the vote fust is unconvincing. The PRESIDENT: 1 declare the discussion closed. d'hui de insistant de Nâjera, doit elle trouvent exclues. de propositions les invoqués sont pas concluants. déclare motion l'ajournement question socialistes time la m'oppose pas à régler question. son qui We shall proceed to vote fust upon the proposai submitted by the USSR representative~ advocating postponement of the consideration of the Iranian' case until 10 April; Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics) (translated trom Russian): 1 thïnlç that the Council' should come to a decision on the procedure for closing discussions. 1 am not opposed to closing the present discussion, but 1 think that we should clarify the procedural aspect.of this question. Can the' President close , a discussion when he wishes or is a decision of all the members of the' Council necess~? 1 repeat that 1 am not opp~edto closing the dis-

Mter ~ vote has heen taken on Ithe fust proposal, the French representative may have the fIooro Is that agreeable? The French representative may speak after a vote has been taken on the USSR proposal. Mr. BYRNES (United States of America): make the same resen-ation. 1 have no objection to proceeding to a vote. The PRESIDENT: Then it is Ithe opinion the Council that we shQuld proceed to vote upon the USSR represmtative's proposal to postpone consideration of the Iranian question until April. A vote was taken by show of hands. There were 2 votes in favour. No furthsr voting occurred. The U$SR proposal was not àdopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative votes of seven memhers. The PRESIDENT: We come now to the question on which 1 want to ask ~e Council's views, ~pecially as1 promised the Polish and Australian representatives that the Council's advice would be asked for, namely, whether we should vote fust upon the Egyptian proposal or upon the Australian proposal. So far es 1 have been a.ble to ascertmn from the various remarks of the representatives, 1 take it that a majority of the Council is in favor voting upon the Egyptian proposal fust. Mr. LANGE (Poland): 1 have made a formal motion that the Australian proposal should voted upon before the Egyptian proposal and have the right to demand that this proposai should be voted upon first. Mr. BYRNES (United States ofAmenca) : my previous statement 1 eXpressed the view that theproposal submitted by the repreàentative Egypt constitutedan amendment to the original proposal submitted by the representativeof the USSR. 1 realize, however, that the Chair is acting wit~lOuthaving fonnal rules~andwhen the Chair declded to give preference to the USSR proposai because it was made fust, 1 gladly acquiesced.

The Chair thinks that it is clearly the view of the Council that we should now consider the Egyptian proposal, and we lili~ vote upon the Egyptian proposaI. . HASSAN Pasha (Egypt): 1 move that thf; Conncil receive the complaint of the Iranian Government embodied in its letter daJted 18 March, addressed to the Secretary-Genera1, and ask that the Iranian representative appear at the Council so that we may hear bis point of view concerning the question of postponement re- Quested by the USSR representative; and subsequently that the Council take SUGh measures or action as it deems fit. rÏi'~n adressée sentant exprimer ment que, qu'il maintenant procédure J'espérais, d'accord Mr. BONNET (France) (translated [rom French): We are now involved in a procedural pre',lem which 1 wished to avoid yesterday evening. l had hoped that we should find ourse1ves in agreement on the f!>llowing points. Article 34 of the Charter 1ays down that "The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order. to .determille whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is like1y to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." . Conseil férend un différend, de menacer internationales." ArtiCle 35 lays down that any Member of the United Nations may draw the Council's attention ,to such cases. l'Organisation sur Yesterday's discussion s!:.i:/welI that the Council, on the sn-ength ofthese Articles, wished to hear the representative of Iran, and this at a time wheu it had just received extreniely immontré était l'Iran, de informations position informations par officielles. portan~ information from the USSR representative regarding the attitude of the USSR Government. Hitherto such informaJtion hâd been received only·through the Press: now it was official. 1 h?cl hàped·that on this OOt point, namely, the interpretation of Articles 34 and. 35 of the Charter and their implications, we could have agl'eed. Ihad hoped that we could have agreed on a second p()int. It seemed to me that the Council could, at the same tinie, express the tation leurs J'espérais semblait la 1 deeply regret that is impossible to reach unanimous agreement on this interpretation. Nevertheless, 1 shall vote in favour of the Egyptian proposal because, although it does not inèlude all that 1 have just said, neither does exclude it. Even after we have voted on this proposal and even aDter we have heard the representative of Iran, the Council will still have the duty to obtain as much information as possible. The Council might even ask certain of members to secure such information before . embark on a discussion of the substance of the question. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): For rea.c;ons which 1 explained clearly enough at yesterday's meeting of the Securhy Council and again today's meeting, 1 am not in a position, as the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, ta take part in a discussion of the Iranian question alter the rejection of my proposal. For these reasons 1 am unable to take part in the Council meeting and 1 am leaving the Council chamber. At thispoint Mr. Gromyko and the other members of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics left the Council cle 3mber. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): 1 should like a little clarification on the Egyptian proposal that we actuaIly know what we are voting for voting against. 1 have been trying since S.SO p.m. to get tht) text of the actual resolution but without success. 1 have a written one before me which differs from the offidal record of yesterday and 1 have a supplementary one which is also different. says that the Council received the complaint embodied in the letter of the Iranian representative dated 18 March. 1 suggest we have already done that in adopting the agenda. The second point is that we asked the representative of Iran to appear at the Council table so that we.might hear bis views. concerning the S'il vient tion car et non exactement voter? HASSAN Pasha (Egrr.i.): 1 wish ta apologize to my Austra1ian colleague for the delay. It is in fact my fault, 1 think. 1 was not rem.inded that 1 should have handed in the text of my proposaI before this meeting, and 1 should have thought of it myself. HASSAN glais): australien moi devais séance; However, to come to the point, 1 think the matter is very simple, and 1 want to make myself c1ear on that point. 1 said yesterday in my explanations that it seemed to me that the matter is divisible into two parts, namely, the question of postponement and the question of substance. Pour simple, dessus. se divisait question Now 1notice, if 1may read again the proposal which l made) cl1at it ends this way: ce. • • and subsequently that the Council take snch mcasures or action as it deems fit". If we ask the Iranian representative to come here and if he does not agi'ee about the postponement or if he pU~l; forth solid and valid arguments against postpcming the case, then the Council is entitled ta ask him to produce documt>..nts concerping the substance of the matter. If wc reject bis arguments and decide to postpone the case, then 1 think the substance would not have ta be touched lllpon and the case would be closed. Permettez-moi cette prenne Si le pas contre le toutt",s fond. décidions aborder close. 1 think my proposai is clear. It is that we should first ask the Iranian representative ta come ta the Council table ta gi'le bis views on the question of postponement; then, if we 1hink. that postponement should not. be granted, the Council can take such action as it deems fit, which will be 11:0 ask him to produce bis documents concerning the substance of the matter. However, 1 have no objection ta anyamendment which any member of the Council might like ta put forward in arder to make my proposai c1earer, if the Council considers that it is not clear enough in its present form. Ma demandons de sur respousse mesures qu'il jugera nécessaires, demandera fournir fond. qu'un ment avis, forme M. de passer clos, sentant parole par représentant des l'Iran question l'ajournement. Mr. BYRNES' (United 'States of America): When the President stated, before the vote was taken, that the debate was c1osed, l,·together with the representative of France, reserved the right to make a statement afterward3. 1 was prompted to make that reservation because of the statement made by the USSR representative to the effect that the representative of the United States wished to have the Iranian representative h~re in order to speak upon the substance of the dISpute and not upon the question of 'postpouement. 1wanted ta caU to the attention of the Council the fact that in my statements today and yes~ Je Conseil Becauseof the decision of the Chairman, the vote was taken fust on the USSR proposaI. That does not change IllY view. 1 think that the representative of Iran, when he appears fore the Council, should be asked to state views with reference to any postponement, whether it be 10 April or 1 April, after he has made bis statement. As 1 hawe stated severa! cimes within the .last few days, it would then be proper for any member of the Coundl to move to make such disposition of the dispute as might appear wise to the Council in view of the statements made. Thus the' repœsentative of Iran snmùd, in opinion, be asked, in accordance with the proposai cf the representative of Egypt, fust to state bis views· concerning the question of postponement; then, if the Council desires to postpone further consideration for one or two days, or any (-ther length of cime, the Council can do so. uO one wishes a postponement, then wc shall proceed to the consideration of the substance the~pm~ . That is my idea of the procedure that should ,œ followed and that is the explanation 1 desired to make before the last vote was taken. The PRESIDENT: 1 thank the representative the United States. Now, before 1 put the Egyptian 'ProposaI ta vote, 1 want to ca1l the Council's attention to the fact that we have only ten minutes left. 1 understand that, since this a purely proceduraI question, a decision.can taken .even in the absence of the USSR representative. If that interpretation is correct, then weshaUproceed with the voting. Sir Alexander CAnOGAN .(United Kingdom): 1 suppose the President is referring to Article 27, which provides that "Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall he made an affirmative vote of seven members." It still . requires seven unqualified votes.

Yes. If there are no further observ~tions on the Egyptian proposaI as cÎl'culated,· we shall proceed to the vote. Colonel HODGSON (Australia): If it is not ruled out by this proposai, ! should still like to have a vote taken-. Mr. BYRNES: (United States of America): 1 must respeetfully submit ta the Couneil that the adoption of the proposal of the representative of Egypt would rule out the proposal of my good friend ,the representative of Australia. 1 tlrink he is rather of that impression.

Then will the Australian representative withdraw bis motion? Colonel HODGSON (Australia): No, 1shaU not do that. There has been a good deal. of confusion. My proposal rnould have been put to the vote first for this reason, that we had before us the USSR proposal for postponement, and my proposai was reaUy an amendment thereto sinee 1 wanted postponement only for a very limited time, nmnely, until we heard from the Iranian representative in writing. anglais): taine aurait fait proposition l'ajournement, qu'amender à à savoir l'Ira..TJ. vue This proposaI is an entirely different one. The proposaIs submitted by the USSR representative and myself were :::Gl'cect in respect of the matter we were discussing, wInch was a procedural matter. This proposaI is entircly different. That is why l think that mine should have been put ta me vote first, then the USSR proposai, and this one third. If it is thought that my proposal must be rejected because this proposai rules it out, 1 must disagree, because mine refers to a different matter; it is lit"lked with the USSR proposai, not with this one at ail. 1 différente. l'URSS est question présente pour aurait aurions l'URSS, Mais paree l'Egypte, c'est un tion l'Egypte Mr. HAssÀN Pasha (Egypt): With reference ta the pomt raised now by the Australian representative, my opinion would oe that sinee he agreed that ms proposai should be voted upon after mine, and sinœ he had no objection that bis proposaI should be put ta the vote after the Cauncil had passed judgement on my proposaI, he tacitly agreed to waive priority - if priority there, was - in respect of his proposai. glais) propos tant propos...,.Jn et que sa proposition soit soumise seil qu'il priorité, rieur position de l'Australie une Le droit It seems to me that it would be contrary to the rules of procedure ta put the Australian proposai to thevote now that my proposaI has been voted Upon and adopted. The Australianrepresentative, therefoI'e, is not entitled to bring up his proposaI The other proposai, clearly formulated by i"epresentative of Australia, is that the Iranian representative should be invited to present case. 'Therefore 1 think that his proposai shauld be voted upon as an independent one. It is rather strange, 1 May say, that the two proposais have come from two small nations- Australia is a small nation too - and 1 think small nations have the right ta the same considf'.ration without any favouritism. T'ne PRESIDENT: My good friend the Australian representative has been kind enough to cept my ruling and his proposal will automatically be dropped as a result of the adoption of Egyptian proposai. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Hussein Ala, representative of Iran, took his place at Council table. 'The PRESIDENT: As the time is nearly 6 p.m., 1think we shall adjourn this meeting until tomorrow afterncon at 3, when the Iranian representative will be able to make bis statement. Mr. BYRNES (United States of America): .respectfully add that the Iranian representative, who has been invited to the table by the Council, should be allowed to make a statement on question of postponement. Mter this has beell done, l think it will be proper to adjourn. However, 1 hope the Chair will not adjoum at time but permit the representative of Iran make a statement. 'The PRESIDENT: Then the meeting will continued and 1 shroI call on the representative of Iran to make a statement. Mr. ALA (Iran) : 1-consider it an honour to invited to the Council table. It is, 1 assure you, with emotion that 1 take my seat before the highest tribunal on earth, wherein lie the hopes aspirations ofmankind. 1 wish you success in your arduous labour for the restoration of harmony and security and respect for internationaIlaw a distracted world. Iran firmly believes in the principles underlying the Charter and means steadfastly abide by them. We have faith in the United Nations and desire to the utmost of our ability to strengthen it. We confidently expect, on the.other hand, have our rights upheld 'by the Council. Our case Of course, 1 am not unaware of the reports which have appeared in the Press during the last few days, regarding the withdrawal of USSR troops from certain parts of Iran. Yesterday we heard the same statement from the representative of the USSR. Nor am 1 unaware of the news reported in the Press this morning, to the cffect that my Government has issued an official announcement denying that the proposed evacuatian of troops is the result of any agreement entered into between the Iranian Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. l do nat know whether any conditions are being attached to the withdrawal of these troops. May l say once and for all that 1 know of no agreement or understanding, secret or otherwise, bctween my Government and the USSR Government with respect to any of the matters involved in the dispute now referred to this Council. No one would welcome more warmly than 1 a just settlement of our difficulties on die: basis· of respect for Iran's completeh independent sovereignty and territorial integrity. Je au firmer, à ma secret l'URSS sur attirée. siasme difficultés dance territoriale cialement données, des Conseil d'autres inamical. The Prime Minister of Iran, in his instructions to me, has particularly requested me to emphasize the point that the bringing of a dispute by one Member of the United Nations before the Security Council should not be interpreted by other parties as an inimical act. et ceci est une sorte pouvons à des We are members of the same family, and this is a sort of family council where we can freely air our troubles and reach satisfactory solutions. The representative of the USSR bases his proposal for delay first, on alleged surprise, and secondly, on the -contention that negotiations pursuant to the resolution of the Security Council, dated 30 January 19461 are in progress and are not yet completed, although he states that an understanding has been reached· 9n one phase of the matter. 1 cannot discuss either of these grounds adequately without first giving you the facts reported to me by the Prime Minister of Iran with respect to the negotiations pursuant to the resolution adopted by the Council on 30 January 1946. tion y a entreprises vier fois, particulier. Je de senté à la le niqués My report is as follows: It will be recalled that the Security Council passed a resolution on 30 January 1946 directing the Iranian and USSR Governments to deavour to solve their differences by direct negotiation. In conformity with this· resolution, Iranian Government decided to send a delegation ta Moscow to discuss the matter with USSR authorities. The Iranian Prime Minister, Mr. Ghavam, animated by a sincere desire promote friendship' between Iran and the USSR, headed the deiegation. The delegation arrived in the USSR capital on 19 February last and remained for approximately sixteen days. A number of meetings were held with Mr. Molotov and other USSR authorities; in two of the meetings Marshal Stalin himself participated. The Iranian Prime Minister, anxious to move any cause of misunderstanding and feeling on the part. of the :USSR authorities, threw in his whole weight to dear the atmosphere for a frank discussion of the matter. The issue between Iran and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was that the latter was interJering the internal affai.rs of Iran through the medium of USSR officials and armed forces. Therefore the tiSSR Government was requested to refrain from these activities; furthermore, there being no compelling reason for the continued presence of its troops in Iran,the USSR Government was asked to withdrawthem from .Iranian territory without delay. The USSR authorities, while receiving Iranian delegation with cordiality and respect, would not agree to withdraw USSR troops from Iran or to refrain from inte~ering in the internal . affairs of Iran. Instead, they made the following proposals: 1. USSR troops to remain in sorne parts Iran for an indefinite period. 2. The. Iranian Gbvernment to. recognize internal autonomy of Azerbaijan. In the event ofthe Iranian Government's acquiescence in tbis request, the USSR Government offered to take steps to arrange that: Ca) The Prime Minister of Azerbaijan, inlation· to .the central Government, would bear the designation of Governor General; (b) Azerbaijan ~ouldhave no Ministry War or Ministry of Foreign Affairs; (c) Thirty per cent of Azerbaijanrevenue _cwould .be paid td the Iranian central Govern- . mem· Cd) AlI correspondence withthe cen~ralGovernment would be in Persiân. Ayant portaient ne avec conformes, des ran, Ministre verbalement sincèrement amicales moins rités dissuader de maintenir leurs les négociations autorités Entre temps, le le retrait la communiqué d'une' entrevue, de sion partir l'URSS !'Iran, notamment Semnan,situées dans quant les nues tion soit Meanwhile the deadline for thè withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran, name1y, 2 March, was athand. On 1 MardI an official communiqué was announced over the Moscow radio to the effect that on 25 February Mr. Ghavam, Prime Minister of Iran, was notified in the course of conversation of the following decision of the USSR Governmént: that .,beginning .2 March, sorne USSR troops would be withdrawn from those districts of Iran where the situation was relatively quiet, name1y,' from the Mesheà, Sharud and Samnan districts in the eastern part of Iran; as to the USSRforces in other arèas of Iran, they would remain there until the situation had been clarified. Le médiatement l'URSS The Iranian Prime Minister at once lodged the following protest with the USSR government: "Monsieur "To the People's Commissar: "Dans 1946, annonçait avait . "A Tass Agency communiqué was published m the newspaper Izvestia No. 53/8969, of 2 March 1946, stating that the Govemment of the USSR had decided to withdraw its forces from Khurasan, Sharud .and Samnan as from 2 March 1946. trG~pes roud "En troupes d'autres que "In connexion with this communiqué it is stated that the USSR forœs will remain in other parts of northern Iran until the situation has been clarified. . "In view of the'above official communiqué, 1 have the honour to bring to' your notice the fact tbat in pursuance ta the Tri-Partite Treaty concluded at Teheran between Iran, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United King- "En j'ai fait clu Royaume-Uni de du tionnelle. ~om on 29 January 1942, the evacuation of AI- ~ed forces from Iran is definitely and unconditlOnally fixed for 2 March 1946. F,l See o.ffi7ialRecords of the Securîty Councîl, First Year, Irst SerIes, Supplement No. l, Annex 2b, page 43. 1 Voir les Première nexe SecondIy~ he objected to the statement that discussions would be continued with the new USSR Ambassado!' who was shortly leaving Teheran; he suggested instead a statement to effect that it was hoped that the appointment the new Ambassador would be conducive to promotion of friendly relationS. The resolution of the Security Council, dated 3D January 1946, which refers the matter to two parties for settlement by direct negoti:ation, "requests the partiesto inform the·Council of any results achieved in such negotiations". 1 regret t() inform the Council that to my knowledge positive results have been achieved. 1 am stmcted by the Govemmentof Iran to refer dispute to the Counci1 for decision in accordance with the powers and duties of the Council. Mr. BYRNES (United States of Am.erica): respectfully suggest that the Iranian representative might he instructed· at· this time to confine bis remarks, in accordance with the action of the Council, ta the question of postponem.erit, as proposaI reads, rather than to go into' detail. What he said related rather to the substance the matter. Mr. ALA. (Iran): 1 consider that this is necessary so that 1 can give my c()nc1usionsregarding .the question of postponement. This is all data Mr. BYRNES (United States of America): 1 realize that it is difficult for ahyone ta draw a very c1ear line, but 1 think. that the representative of Iran, familiar as he is wtih the action of the Council here this afternoon, shouldconcentrate upon the question of postponement as far as possible. If he would as far as possible direct bis remarks to that point, 1 think he could do it.

Yes, 1 think under'the terms of the proposa! we have just adopted, the Council is to hear the Iraman representativc's point of view concerning the question of postponement requested by the USSR representative. Will the Iranian representative confine hinlself as far as possible to that phase of the question? . Mr. LANGE (Poland) :1 should like ta remark that a short time aga 1 directed the President's attention to the saIne point which the United Stâtes representative has just raised, bùt somehow the President did not react to my statement. 1 hope that in the future he will give more consideration to the smaller nations. Mr. ALA (Iran): It is very difficult for me. This is all a logical sequence. AIl that 1 have to tell you willlead to the lastpart, and if is most difficult to get ta the last part without having put you in possession of the proper points which 1 have. in mind. so that you can appreciate the reasons for which 1 woulJ suggest that there should be ne postponement. Now if you will allow me to continue, 1 shall present to you the relevant points. Mr. BVRNES (United States of America): 1 should not want to suggest how the representative of Iran shou!d present bis statemeI1t, but it might be helpful to him if 1 said that there are some things the Council would lite ta hear. First, is Mr. Hussein AJa, as the rC.î'_.;sentative of Iran, authorized to agree to-a postponement? Has there been any change in his instrucuons sinee he filed this matter? What are the dangers in the situation which cause him ta believe that it is essential to proceed immediately to a discussion thereon and which do not permit a postponement? He may conjure up some arguments of bis own. IIASSAN Pasha (Egypt): l was just going ta suggest thatif we·think the Iranian representative's e.''Cposé unsati.sfactoryor too long for us ta hear, any member of the Council could address certain questions to him; for instance, wh-;ther he agrees with the views of the USSEl representative concerning postponem.ent. If he does not, he could say why he does not and he could give .Mr. Au (Iran): 1 have no instructions from my Government to agree ta any 'postponement of the matter which 1 brought to the attention of the Council in myletter of 18 March addressed to the President of the Security Council. 1 shaIl read you the reasons why 1 am opposed to any postponement. 1 come now to the question whether delay would prejudice the rights of Iran in a manner inconsistent with the principles of the Charter. USSR troops are still in Iran. Iran has suffered and is at this moment suffering from interference in its internal affairs through the intervention USSR agents, officials and armed forces. Iran has recèived no definite and unconditional assurances that these troops will be removed from the whole of its territory by a given dat~. May 1 remind you that in the course of negoti~tionsthat have taken place, demands have been made upon Iran which are inconsistent with its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Such state of affairs is, as 1 havesaid, explosive. The matter, 1 repeat, is of great urgency. The .presence of foreign forces in any country COnstitlltes not only .an iniringement upon its sovereignty, but also a heavy burden the people and an interference in their daily life; it is equally an impediment to the exercise of the authority of the Government. We have had fûreign forces in Iran for over four years and you must realize how anxious we are to be rid them. If we were ta adopta procedure whereby Government would be required to submit written memorandum and reports to the Security Council, the settlement of this matter might indefinitely protracted. Moreover, the continued presence of USSR troops in Iran is a fact which does not need to be established by any documents. The seriousness with which the people aIl over the world, as well as the people of Iran, regard this state oi affairs is testimony to the fact that delay in the settlement of this dispute is a threat to world peace. A delay is requested by the country that has most to gain by delay. It is resisted by Iran because, by the same token, Iranhas most to lose. If it is the duty of the Cou..'1ci: consider'a matter that is likely to endanger international peace, it would seem to be the duty die Council not to delay the consideration such a matter.' For these reasons Iran views with gra.ve· concern .any delay in the consideration the Council of the m-erits of the case. Etant tant tions l'exposé avec intérêt. pas l'ajournement. reçu à le semble-t-il, le stationnées The statement made by the representative of Iran - ta which, as 1 said, 1 gave full attention - omitted a point which 1 think is crucial to the matter. It is the fact that the USSR troops in Iran are in process of being withdrawn. His statement contained one very brief sentence refe..rring to a newspaper report on that subject, the veracity of which he appeared to question. In view, therefore, of the fact that 1 have myself suffered great dir~~ulties in mmmunicatillg with my Government, .l wish to ask the Iranian representative a second question, namely, whether he has received any official information regarding fue withdrawal of troops from Iran. The representative of the USSR, in one of bis statements today, referred to an official interview given by the Prime Minister of Iran. If'1 rightly remember the words of the USSR representative, that interview allegedly contained the following points: ten~jt presse semblait donné cultés jt représentant tions officielles concernant déclarations d'une interview officielle Ministre termes il (a) That the Prime Minister .of Iran acknowledges ·the fact that USSR troops are being withdrawn; (b) That he does not want any outside pressure to be exerted on the relations between the Iranian Government and the Governme:nt or the USSR.. naît l'URSS s'exercer de 1am quoting now from memory, and we shall have to check with the record. The third question, therefore, which 1 wÏsh to put to the Iranian representative is whether vérifier tant déclarationsfaites ~e ~an confirm the truth of the USSR representatlve s statement. . These are the threequestions which 1 should like to have answered; and 1 think the answers would be very helpful in permitting us to make up our minds on the question of delay or postponement. . ' \ • HASSAN Pasha (Egypt): 1 wonder if our Polish ,.collea~e wouldagree to postponing this hearmg until tomorrow because of the hour and elles faire de glais): accepter The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m. TWENTYREIGHTH MEETING Held at Hunter Gollege, New York, on Friday, 29 March 1946, at 3 p.m. President: 1vfr. Quo Tai~chi (China). Present: The representatives of the following counmes: Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, United Kingdom, United States of America. 14. Provisional agenda (document S/22) 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. (a) Le~er dated 18 March 19'!6 from representative of Iran· addressed the Secretary-General, and letter dated 18 March 1946 from the representative of Iran addressed to the President the Security Couneil (document S/15).1 (b) Letter dated 19 March 1946 from representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Secretary-General (document S/16).z (c) Letter dated 20 March 1946 from representaJtive of the United States America addressed to the Secretary-General (document S/17).' (d) Letter dated 20 March 1946 from representative of Ixan addressed to Secretary-General (document S/18).4 15. Adoption of the agenda 16. Continuation of the" discussion on the Iranian question At the invitation of the President, Mr. Hussein Ala, repr.esentative of Iran, took his place at Security Gouncil table. The PRESIDENT: 1 believe, when we adjourned the day before y~terday, it was agreed that -Iranian representative be invited to reply to, the three questions addressed ta him by the Polish representative. Will he please do so? Mr. ALA (Iran): 1 believe the first qu.estion which Mr. Lange asked me wa'l to this effect: ~·Ibid.,· Annex2c. ·Ibid., Annex 2d.