S/PV.2707 Security Council
▶ This meeting at a glance
2
Speeches
0
Countries
0
Resolutions
Topics
Israeli–Palestinian conflict
General debate rhetoric
War and military aggression
Syrian conflict and attacks
General statements and positions
The Security Council will
now resume its consideration of the item on its agenda.
T:le first speaker is the representative af Israel. I invite him to take a
place at the Council table and to make his sta temont.
Mr. WETANYAHJ (Israel): First, I wish to oongratulate you, Sir, on your
assumption of the presidency of the 3ecurity Comcil. In the time that you have
held the post, we have already witnessed your excellent performance. I extend my
congratulations also to your predecessor for an equally skilful performame.
The 3ecur ity Council is now debating the future of the united Watiars Interim
Force in Lsbanm (UWIFIL) in the light of the &mretary-Generalgs report. There is
al80 already a draft resoluticm that has been presented, or circulated, based on
that report. I regret to say that the report is unbalanced, that it distorts the
true picture of the present situatiar in Gouth Lebanar. Having said that, I must
add that the report suffers fruro a major omissiarr it does not fully present
Israel’s position or our assessaxmt of the situation in 3outh Lebahan - a positian
and an assessment that we have s&ted repeatedly both in private and in public.
They are in mntraet to, for example, paragraph 21 in the report, which gwtes
Syria as blaming Israel for and as being the source of the current prableUS.
Wsturally, we have a different view of who is to blame. If for no other reasm
than simple fairness, this view should have been ‘jresented as well in the report.
IJow, what is the thrust, the gist, of the report? What does it really say?
mat it says, essentially, is thisx GWIPIL is attedted because Israel maintains a
security acme along it9 border with Lebancm; if Israel were to dismantle the
security zme and if UWIFIL were to deploy down to the interhatiaaal border, the
attacks would stop or - I think this is the implicatiar - they would be
significantly curbed.
I suggest that we e-mine these aeeumpticms. What is the Source of the
present crisis in whi& UWIFIL finds itself? mere are mat of the recent attacks
Coming from? Who is behind them? We knw where they are not coming from. They
are not coming from moderate Shii tee in Sarth kbanan. Cwervhelmingly, they are
uxning from and originating from one sour-: the Shiite terrorist arganizatim
(Mr. Netanyahu, Israel)
Nay, the next question is this; hho stands behind this so-called “Party of
God., this organizatial whase name we first heard when it assumed responsibility -
that is putting it ta, mildly; I should say &en it boasted of its responsibility -
for murdering lmer ican and French pea--keepers in Beirut, for bombing the Unitad
States ErPbassy, for kidnapping and executing the innocent nationals of half a &z&en
COuntties, many of them represented around this table. Du I really have to spell
it out? Doe5 anyane here have any doubts as to who finances, OTgBniaeSr equip,
inspires and mOtivetee this group? The address is in Tehran. But that is not the
arly address% there is another one, nearer to us) that secand address is in the
Elrha jet in Palaae - the Presidential Pals03 - in Damascus.
I want to ask each representative here a simple question% how was this
pernicious offspring of the Rhomini revolutim intrOdxed into Iabanaan in the
first place? Heabollah was imgorted into the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon as a
co-producticxi of Iran and Syria. Its first mission wae to act as a sub-aontractor
for Syria. Syria ‘8 strategic aim in Lebanon at the time was to drive out the
multinatiaral foece, the peace-keepers, from &hut, and Hezbollah was to serve -
and indeed did serve - as a spearhead for that effort, in the attecks that I have
amntioned. bleedless to say, Iran wa6 an enthusiastic partner in this perfidy.
But Besbollab had fran the start a wider and larger-range mission. That
Pi65im ~88 to turn Lebanon into a Khomeini-style l Islamic mplblic”. One of
Be&bollah*s leaders, sheikh nohaimmd Yazkar, has sumarized it maet SuCCinCtl-Jr I
think. Be eaid in Baalbek on 2 September - only recently%
“The cmly decisions we respect are thase of the sword and blaod. We will
create a new Islamic Lebanan. We believe only in the leadership of Khomeini
and we will carry out all his commmds’.
(Hr. Netanyahu, Israel)
For that to happen, the firet - I would say the central - pmition that has to
be dominated is naturally Beirut. But here we come to a pmadox: Tho ob jeCtiVe8
of Syria and Iran began to olash at that point. The presence of Sezbollah in and
atom3 the Beirut area became too close for Syrian comfort. That was one of the
reason8 why Bamaacw felt compelled to reintroduce its soldiers into the Lebanese
Capital.
So the WSStim then aroeet What do you do with fIeabollah’) And the solution
was very simple: Wlet you do with Hezbollah is to divert its efforts, its
attentiar and its energies to an arena in Lebanar where the interest8 of Iran and
Syria do not so readily clash - and that arena ie, of course, Swth Lebanon.
Thus Heabollah shifted its attacks to the south. Particularly, it has been
directing these attfwks against MJIFIL. This is, of course, perfectly in 1 ine 4th
KhOIWini’8 plicy of driving out from Ubmas, what he calls all .alien. forces -
and &at he means, first of all, is all Western forces - a8 a prelude to the
establishment of an felamic Republic.
While tiedmllah attack6 the Western presence aa a whole, it has targeted the
French more than others. I do not think that I have to spell it out, but Iran haa
may axe8 tu grind, not all of them relating to Lebmm; many of them relate to
France. Wlen it comes to the broader animoeity to France, aeabollah ‘8 clergy fully
conform to Iran’o policy. I csould refer trD the issue of 22 August 1966 of the
Lebanae magazine Wattan al Arabi, in &ich two of Hezbollah's leading cletgymenr
Sheik Sas6an Trad and Sheik Waeserallhah, ace quoted as calling for "revenge.
against Pranoe and as citing special religious dispensation permitting the killing
Of Prenchmn at every opportunity. The French of omrse are the largeet contingent
in UWKFXL. If they are attacked, if they are weakened, if they can be driven out*
the odds are - at least in the View of Kezbolleh - that the whole force would
collapse, that they could bring about the canpleta collapse and withdrawal fif
any caee, tkiecentralpoint ievery uleart UMFPiL*e precise &ploylPent is
absolutely irrehvant to that djeetive. Anyone who claim8 otherwise either is
misinformed or has anulterfar rPotive.
(HP. Netanyahu, Iareel)
(Mr. Netanyahu, Israel)
I just got on the wire a concurring view from two ulited Nations offiClal8.
One is a senior United Nations official speaking an conditfar of anonymity who
said, in Reuter d today., that “the attacks in south Lebanon were carried out by an
ad hoc alliance between the Shifte !4oslem l&xbollah group, backed by Iran, and
radical factions in the Syrian-backed Amal organizatian’. The er actually chose
to be quoted by name - Major Dag Ieraand of Norway, spokesman for the United
Nations Interim Force in @banan (UWIFIL). He said that, in his view, there Wm a
clear link between the terrorist bombings in France and the rash of attacks against
Ftench pea--keepers in south Lebanar. Se told reporters: *ALI the attacks aewar
to be aimed at removing the French presence from febancn.g
In addition to the expulsion of Westerners, lieabollah pursues another
objective in south Lebanar quite separate from the one I have described. It views
the area as a forward staging ground for carrying out a holy war against the VerY
existence of the State of Israel. I could give a great many SOWOBS on this, but I
shall cite arly one. Sheikb Fadlallah - everyane here recognises his name - is a
leading figure in Hezbollah. On 4 July in An Wahar he said the followings
“we are not fighting Israel because it ocoupieo the south of ~&anon, but
be-use it occupies Palestine and presenti a danger to Islam and to Arabdom.”
Wow in this particular goal, in this particular thrust, Eezbollah eliminates
any conflict between Iran and Syria. Of course Syria has had a long-standing
tradition of raging war by proxy, for excimple, by using terrorists based in Lebanon
to attack various enemies war Id wide. Now whsn it conms to Syria% war against
Israel, CC its atticks against Israel , south Lebanon is for Syria the pre-eminent
staging ground for proxy terror attacks against us.
So the interesting question is, given that the sponsors agree, how does
Gzbollah view UNIFIL in this antext of the holy war againat Israel? Well, by its
own statements it very clearly sees UNIFXL as an obstacle to this canpign agaimt
Israel. It is another force that stands in the way of direct attacks against the
north of the country - and the leaders of Beshollah say this openly. A few weeks I
agO - on 2E August - they sssemhled in Baalhek with the attendance, significantly,
of the Iranian Ambassador to Syria, and they issued the following declaration:
We categorically reject the structure of resolution 425 (1978) by the
Security Council. It gives the right of security arrangements to the Zionist
enemy. We shall fight UNIFIL, which blocks our military effort against
Iarael.~
Another quote is by Abdel Moussa Mahane, another Shiite leader, in the Voice
of Lebanon of 15 September:
*The presence of UNIFIL in south Lebanon serves the interests of Israel and
its intelligence agencies..
Also from the Voice of Lebanon on the same day, Sheikh Mahet Hammoud is quoted
as follows:
*In south Lebanon there is a UNIFIL unit with 25 dogs trained to sniff out
explosiveo. This means that the unit does not defend u8 but, on the contrary,
it acte in the interests of Israel. UNIFIL should not stay in south Lebanon.*
There are many other sources saying the same thing: UWIPIL has to goa it hae
to go because it defends Israel - Israel ptopeo, the State of Israel helow the
international boundary.
So what better evidence can there be to demonstrate the true goals of
Wesbollah? And I askt Can anyone here seriously argue that UNIPIL’s precise
deployment makes the slightest difference to these people? Well, actually, I would
argue that. I would argue exactly that. I would argue that, since Aezbollah
totally reject6 resolution 425 (1978) , since it sees UNIPIL a8 a buffer, a5 a
defender, egainet the State of Ierael, then we can aak: How would it view UNIPIL
were it to deploy down to the international border? And this is the recommendation
(Hr. Netanyahu, Israel)
floating around Uris’ table that will probably be presented formally. HOW would
Eleabollah - the people who are making these attacks - view uNIFPL if it were to
follow the rwuinmendations made Pn this Council?
1 think we can take them at their word. They will see UNIFIL on that fence as
if physically defending Israel itself, and the attacks would not recede. They
would iMensifyt they would dranratically increase% they would make the present
situation, as unfortunate and tragic as it is, pale by cunparisan.
So what I have been arguing up to now is that it is not the security zone
rhich has aaused the attacke against UNIFIL, and it is not the deployment of the
Ebroe southwards to the bar&r that will prevent them.
That is not saying emugh, because the consequences of following the
r~mtttendatiare in %e report and the other reoomBwh&aw that have &en
dieawsed and will be discussed here are far more eevere, wen more eevere that the
attacks on IEsfpfL. I think we have to aek what would happen in the south if the
present arrangement in the security zme were to be abandoned. aat would happen
are more hostilities, more bloodshed, more suffering - on both sides of the
border. The basic problem in Lebanon has alwaye been the sbsence of a central
authority that ie able to prevent lawleseness and terror. This terror is the came
terror Mat spilled aver from the horrific civil war in Beirut in 1975 and 1976 to
south tibancn - the epil1-ove.r that preceded the establishment of UNIFIL by years.
In fact, it was the accumulation of eu& terrorist ettacke that canpelled us to act
in south Lebanon in 1978 in order to roll back the terrorist wave.
It was this Council that at that time requested thet Israel withdraw its
focoes. i@ did and UNIFIL was established. Hy colleague, Iblbassackx Blum, who is
here, remembers that day. So the problem dates back to that period. *at happened
was that we got out, and UNIFIL got in and so did the terror iete. Led by the PLO
they quickly returned and built up a tremendous infrastructure. They did this
(Ht. Netanyahu, Israel)
because there was no Lebanese Govixnnent capable of blocking them; and they were
unhampered by UNIFIL, deopite its best intentions and despite ite many sacrificea.
The fact is that they were able to do this, and these relentless attacks that
issued from thiv infrastructure - by land, by sea and even by air - eventualli
forced ut3 to act again, in 1982. By 1982, if you had been an Ieraell citizen
living along that border, your children would not have been able to go to echool
and you would have been living literally utierground, in shelters. I do not think
anyone here would have recoglnized any semblance of what anyone of ue would call
normal life along our side of the border, not to mention the euffering of Lebanese
civilian8 on the other side.
SO we had to at, and we destroyed that terrorist infraetructure. In
January 1985, in accordance with a government decision, we withdrew our forces from
Lebanon and set up the exieting eacurity arrangements what has been the effect of
theee security arrangement8 on south Lebanon ae a whole - not on UNIPIL but on
eauth Lebanon? I do not mean the Israeli side of the border, which I have just
visited, which ie safe, where norms1 life has been resumed and where one simply
cannot recognire what used to go on there before. I mean the Lebaneee eide of the
border. As paradoxical as it eounde, given the chaoe raging everyhere else in
Lebanon - the ping-pong of car bombs in Beirut every week or 80 and the other
killing8 that go on - South Lebanon is now relatively the safe& place in Lebanon.
Over the past few months - the sununer monthe - we have had an influx of 30,000
peq>le, many of them Shiitee, Lehaneee civilians casing to the south.
(Mr. Wetanyahu, Israel]
Now that these incidents have oocurred, the Council and the lecretariat have
been pressing us to abandon the measures that we have set up that have guasanteed
this relative tranquillity. In the past year they said, why do $ou not take a
small risk? Try it in a limited area and let us see what happens. So we did.
In July 1985 we agreed that UWIFIL wculd assume control of a small area of
three villages in the security zone - Jmei-Jmei, Majdal Sulum and Shakra - but on
one basic condition: that UNIFIL should see to it that that area did noi: become a
launching ground for attacks against us. I regret to say that that condition was
not fulfilled. The Shakra triangle has beoome the most active base for terrorist
attacks against Israel. We have seen there a sharp rise in rocket-firing and
ground and other types of attack. This is what we can expect across the entire
international border if we follow the present recommendations. That area would
immediately fill up with Xeebollah - and, I think I can safely predict, PLO - once
ve dismantled the security zone.
What would happen is that south Lebanon and the north of Israel would again
face an intolerable situation. And, as alwayye happens with an intolerable
situation, terrible violence wculd once again be unleashed - something that no one
here, least of all Israel, deeires.
We are not going to lend cur hand to that calamity. We shall continue to do
what is necessary to protect the lives and safety of our citizens. That is our
goal, our only goel, vis-b-vi8 Lebanon. We are prepared to work with any party in
Lebanon that ie genuinely interested in securing peace for that area.
UWIPIL, too, has tried tc assist in the attainment of this objective. It has
euffared painful casualties in the process. Although we did not request UNIPIL’s
(Mr. Netanyahu, Israel)
establishment, everyone in Israel shares the grief of the bereaved families and
their Governments. However, we cannOt, aqd must not, expect UNIFIL to defend
Israel. That was never and cannot be uNIFIL*e purpose.
The decision regarding UWIFILBs future, therefore, does not rest with ue; it
ie clearly the responeibility of the Security Council. But, ae the Council debates
this auestion, it cannot be deflected by abstract proposals, however politically
convenient they may be. It must be guided by reality; it must be guided by the
facts on the ground as they really are. And Borne of the suggestions and prop0oals
that haQe been made here remiti me of somebody who throws a dart at random and then
PrOCeedS to paint the bull’s eye around the dart. Well, the dart should be aimed
elsewhere; the dart should be aimed at Rezbollah.
I do not think that the fear of continued terrorism, or perhaps another
palitical agenda, should deflect ue from our main task, and the Council’s main task
is to place Rezbollah and its patrons in the dock, They should be here; they
shwld be accused. Israel ie not reeponsible for the present violence in south
Lebanon. The authors of the varioue report6 know that very well, ae do the member6
of the Council, many of whom have freely admitted it in private conversation.
What Israel expects of this Council la clear-cut, explicit condemnation of
WezbOllah an8 its Syrian and Iranian pattono - unambiguous and unqualified
condemnation. Blaming Israel instead,, asking it to dismantle the only viable
defence against these fanatic killers , would be more than an injusticei it would
be cowering before terroriem and eneuring its expaneion.
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Of Israel for the kind words he addressed to me.
The next speaker is the representative of Le&3non, on whom I now Call-
Mr. FARIIDURY (&ban-) (interpretatiar from Arabic): I?br eight and a
half years Lebanon has made it clear that it Supports the thited Nations Interimi
Foroe in Lebanon (UNTIL) and has called ~1 the members of this Council
individually and collectively to shoulder their responsibility and enable UNfFfL to
carry Out its uabdate under Security Couocil rasolutians 425 (1978) and
426 (1978). Lebancn has always affirmed and cmtinuea to affirm thet ccWeter
unaonditicnal and immediate Israeli withdrawal is the only oolutim to the
explosive Situation in the south.
The latest report of the Secretary4%tnoral haa resulted from the grave
situatiar feted by the internatiaral yorae. The report is ccmpletely in accordance
With IdbanQles psiticm and viewpoint. My delegatich appreciates the continued
serious efforts msde by the secretary-General and his assistants aimed at enswing
the full impleuentatim of the relevant resolutims of the Council.
ISrael's cartinwd iuttansigmcS and insistence on occupying a Part of
Lebana’s territory not arly threaten the Safety of the internatimal Force but
ak0 i&i future and that of the south, as well 88 the pe8ce and Security Of the
whole regiar . The attacks launched ageinet the international 80rQ8, from whatever
quartet they emanate, have always been very strcngly ccudemed by Lebm~nr which
continu:se to con&an thea~.
LSbahan coneietently affirms ita concern for the mrce@S safety, its desire
fcr ib presehce and its appreciationof the Por~'aleaders and personnel.
Iebanm consiStently affirms ite gretituuda to all the troop-contributing States for
the nable sacrifices made by the respective contingents.
Council to reaffirm their support for mIFIL and acbpt all the measures neceesarY
(Mr. Fakhoury, Lebancn)
tro ensure its safety ma enable it to ccrry out its mandate. ubenon reiterates
its full wm33s tocontribute,withitl.~elimi~of its capacity, to the
achievement of these vitally important objectives.
we have grat confidence in the Council and its ability to overcOme Israeli
&fiance to *ioh daily expression is given by Israeli officials through their
refusal to withdrew froar the south, their oppasitim to the deployment of
fnternatiaral forces up to the internatimally reaognized boundaries, their
insbtence cm holding QI tr;p the smalled security zme and thein support for the
sti-called south Lebanon army.
(Hr. Fakhoury, Lebanon)
Tha lateet, oxptmrion of this defiance wee given yesterday by the Israeli
Defence Minister, Mr. Yitrhak Rabin, after a Cabinet meeting. According to the
latest information available to usI transmitted today by Agence France Presser
the Israeli army has consolidated ito military positions in the eastern part of the
security zone with 12 175 mm field guns deployed in the town of Eben es Saq, 1 km
frCim the headquarter6 of the Norwegian contingent. A nuxber of Ieraeli soldiers
have taken up position in the area of Jezain , north of the security zone, for the
first time since the Israeli withdrawal tram that area in 1985.
Lebanon rejects any attempts to justify the continued Israeli occupation of a
part of Lebanese territory and its eupport for puppet militia. Lebanon warns that
this Israeli chsllenge is extWnely dangerous, for it can only he met by Lebanese
determination to liberate the laud, since that is a national duty. It is a sacred
right exercised by the Lebsnese people, in - with the other peoples that have
reoieted occupation and made sacrifices for their territorial intqrity and
eecur ity.
My delegation, while ineieting on the need for the adoption of the report of
the secretary-General to enlure the safety of the United Nations Interim Force in
Lebsnon and of effective measures to enable it to fulfil its mandate, calls upon
all members to tske today a unanimoue decision so thct they may not individually or
collectively bear the reeponsibility for the failure of this most important
peace-keeping opemation. Such failure crould have a negative effecon the prestige
of the United Nations and of the security Council in particular. The price of such
failure would be paid by Lebanon with its sovereignty and the people of Lebanon
would pay that price with their security and safety.
(Mr. Fakhoury, Lebanon)
The tragedy has lastea for too long; the sacrifices have been too many and too
great. It is high time for the people of Lebanon to return to a life of freedom,
dignity, security and peace.
The PRESIDENl’ (interpretation from Russian): I shoulil like to inform
membera of the Council that I have received a letter from the Permanent
Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the Unitetl Nations, dated
22 September 1986, which reads as follows:
*I have the honour to reauest that, awing the Council’s discus&on of
the item presently on its agenda, the Security Council extena an invitation
Untkir rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, to His Excellency
Hr. Clovie Maksoud, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the
United Nations.*
This letter will be circulatecl as a document of the Security Council under the
SymiXBl s/1eos0. If I hear no objection, I shall take it thet the Council agrees to
extend an invitation to Mr. Msksoud Wder rule 39 of its provisional rules of
procedure.
Since there is no objection, it is so decided.
I invite Hr. Hakeoud to take a place at the Council table and to make his
statement.
Mr. MAKSDUD: Mr. President, I should like to express my deep
appreciation amI thanks to you and, through you, to the Council for having extenBef.3
the invitation to me.
f should like to say at the outset that we wish to associate ourselves with
the congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council,
and, needleBti to cay, what has been Said about the strength of the friendship and
Co-operation that exist between your c) ‘aat country and our Arab netiOn.
(Hr. Haksoud) ,
I take this opportunity also to extend our deep condolences and regret to the
various ambees of t&e United Nations Interim Force in L&anon (UNIFIL) who have
fallen victim in recent days to assaults that we consider to be illegal.
The issue of the south of Lebanon assumes particular importance at this time,
and it is perhaps a good amen amidst this tragedy to find the Security Council
trying to focus, as the report of the Secretary-General has indicated, on what is
really rendering the situation in south Lebanon unstable and volatile aud the
country open to further victhieation.
Israel decided long ago that the south of Lebanon was an arena for the
settling of big accounts in a small area. Therefore, throughout the south of
Lebanon end the so-called security zone, it wants to create a situation in which
the central authority of Lebanon is unable to exercise sovereignty over its aOn
territory.
Purtheemoee, at a time when Lebanon, through its various parties, is taking
genuine ateps towards national reconciliation, we in the League of Arab States
believe that those steps would be further reinforced and consolidated if the
Government of Lebanon were able to deploy its authority and its army with the
aesitatanae of UFJIPIL in the south of Lebanon, because that uould oanetitute a
leveesge for enhancing the chances am3 opportunities of national reconciliation.
What is it that Israel intends to do in this area? We have heard Israeli
delegations often stating that Israel withdrew in 1978. I put these questions
before the member8 of the Security Council. Did Israel withdraw after ita invasion
in 19783 Did Israel allow UWIFIL to be deployed and to carry out its mandate fully
in 19783 .Did Israel not hand looal authority to a group of rebels under the
leadership of Saad Aaddad in order to keep the central Government of Lebanon off
balance and unable to exercise its authority in part of its territory? Did it not
provide logistical support, financial support, political support, informational
support and intelligence support to the rebellious militias that acted as
mercenariee for the Israeli Army in South Lebanon?
Did Ierael withdraw in 1985 as we have just heard? Did it withdraw, or did it
provide logistical support, military support, intelligence, information and
financial eupport to the taama rebellioue militias defying the authority of the
Lebanese Government, under the pretext of a continued security zone? Is it not
time we looked into this means whereby Israel maintain8 in the couth of Lebanon
continuous control, directly and vicarioutaly? I ask that because fsrael has no
intention of total withdrawal, because the accounts it wants to settle in South
Lebanon, as I have said, are many. Principally, it wants to undermine a8 often a8
poeeible the credibility and effectiveness of united Nations resolutions and
mechanisms.
What is this security rone? Security from whom and security for whom? When
the Defence Minister, Mr. Rabin, says that he arrogates to himself the right to
extend the security zone to parts further to the north of that zone, is this not
saying that Iecael is arrogating to itself ex cathdra the right to defy the United
Uations, the right to further occupatton, the right to extend further its
authority, under the pretext of a so-called security zone?
(Mr. Hakeoud)
Israel aid not withdraw. farad ha8 disabled the United Nation8 force8 in the
Carrying out of the mandate8 of this Council in 1978 and in 1986. Israel, in order
to deflect the attention of this Council, in oraer to buy more time to consolidate
further it8 occupation, its defiance aud its contempt, is saying that the report of
the Secretary-General is aunbalancedm. what is a balanced report? Doea a balanced
report give a position eguidietant between what is right and what is wrong? Is a
balanced report an attempt to factor in the view of one who violate8 the mendate of
the Security Council that he ha8 an equal right to that of the victim of
aggression? The use of the term Qnbalanced * is an attempt to thwart the
international community~8 ability to focus on the real issue !.n the south of
Lebanon.
We have heard a harangue against Rezhollah. In 1978 there was no Reebollah,
but there was an Israeli ocaupation in eouthern Lebanon. In 1985 Israel did not
withdraw. That made it inevitable that the population of southern Lebanon woula
rise up an8 rpcrke the Israeli occupation costly. That is the prescription for
legitimate reeietance. However, legitimate resistance a-0 not at all, in any
circumstmaee, warrant killing UNIPIL elements. That Is why the Government of
Lebanon and all the Arab League members have condemned such wanton killing. On the
other hand, as we all know, the mainstream of resistance to Israeli occupation
complements and supports the role , the objectives and the mandate of UIJIFIL.
The security Council at this particular munent ie called upon to reuder its
resolutions implementable, to make it costly for anyhody who defies the united
Nation8 resolution8 and mandates, because, without making it costly, without a
penalty for violating the Security Council resolutions, defiance will become built
in, as it is built into the behaviour pattern and the policies of Israel toward6
southern Lebanon.
(Mt. Haksoud)
ba for the various accuaationa about Heobollah, lran and Syria, all them are
rhetorical statemfmte intended to deflect attention from the real caueal factors
which the report of the Secretary-General has focused on and pinpointed.
Our position is this. Where does the mandate of the Security Council teat?
F&w can it be carried out? Sow can we enable the central authority of Lebanon to
retrieve the Bovereignty of Lebanon amI to carry out ite international and national
coxoitments? The obstruction of the mandate of UNIPIL and the obStrUCtiOn of
LebamPs ability to carry out its national ati international responsibilities on
its intetnatioual border@ met be attributed squarely to Israel’8 buflt-in defiance
of the mandate of the Security Council and to fstael*s contempt for its resolutions
alril mral imperative.
At this moment when Lebanon, ae I stated earlier, is beginning to recover from
the tragic decay it has been experiencing, at a tima when Lebanon is retrieving its
national unity, when the dialogue among the varioue parties is achieving certain
palatable re8ult6, when the world ie coneoious of the trauma that Lebanese feel -
at thie particular moment we look upon URIPIL as one of the great leverages that
oould help this prtxeoo of national cohesion to be achieved expeditiously.
(Mr. Hakaoud)
Yet, as we have seen since 1978, security zones are a prescription for
reckleseneas, and that is why the diecurreiox and debate on the future of UNIFIL at
this particular moment is of utmost priority - not only for the sake of Lebanon,
for the retrieval of United NatiOaWI credibility, for the effectiveness of its
mandate and for the future of Lebanon, but also to a very large extent for the
future of stability and peace in the region aa a whole.
The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Rusaian)r I thank Mr. Makmud for the
kind words he addreeeed to me.
Sir Yohn l%OMSON (united Ringdom): Mr. President, your country and mine
do not Bee eye to eye on every guestion, but I kmow that we share a great respect
for the authority of the Security Council and a determination to uphold it, and I
know that you will use alA your many skills end talents to do that. I congratulate
you on becoming President.
We all have had, over a long period, much experience of the skill, wit and
legal ebilitiea of your predeoe8eor, who was a moat effective President of this
Council.
I had no intention of epeaking when I came into the Chmher thie afternoon,
and I do 810 extemporaneously. Before I come to the msin guestion I wish to raise
and perhape to answer, I would like to cay something thet I m sure is in the
hearts of moat and perhaps all people here and exptees our deep condolence8 to the
French and Irish delegation8 , and very particularly to the families of those
gallant soldiers who have been killed in eouthern Lebanon.
I vant to go on and expreee praise for those countries which have contributed
troops to UNIPIL. They have been ill-treated, they have been ill-pai8, and they
have not received the credit due to them. They are in a very difficult position,
and we should not forget, as we today debate am3 talk glibly of UPUPIL as though ft
was an abstract body, that it ie in fact compooed of something like 7,000 men,
(Sir John Thomson, Wnited Kingdom)
and those men and their families must be vary anxious today.
As I have said, I speak unptemaditated, and in doing so I reserve my right to
intervene again later in thie debate.
I speak because I am stiiiulated to do so by the question raised by the
Ambaesadoc of Israel: is the precise geographical position of WNIPIL relevant? I
hope I quote approximately correctly. Well, I think the answer to that question
depends rather on what you are applying it to. It 8eems to me, at the risk of
being mistaken or forgetful, that there are four facts that we are facing. one ire
that the &en of UNIFIL are being attacked and killed today, and as far as we can
tell, an8 we believe this to be the truth, they are not being attacked by Israelis
erd not being killed by Israelie# the second fsct is that Israel is illegslly
occupying part of southern Lebanon; the third is that the Government of Lebsnon
doe8 not have effective authority in the areas and the fourth, which may affect
people there lese than it does us, but it is nevertheless important for us, is that
in consequence of thi8 situation the Security Council’s decision, its reputation
and the effectivenese of the whole United Nation8 peace-keeping operation is called
into auestion. Indeed I think the situation is Serious enough to cay that it is in
danger.
NowI if I apply the queetion raised by the Ambassador of Israel to these four
facte, I find different answere. To the firet, the question whether WNIPIL’S
praciee geographical situation ie relevant to the attack8 presently being carried
out on WNIPIL, the anewer is, I think, leaving aside a lot of history we have
heard, in present terma l non. I think WNIPIL would be being attacked by the people
who are attacking it largely irrespective of its exact geographical location. That
ie not to say that there are not cau8es for the situation that haa arisen. But if
we are looking at the situation today , I do not think the attacks would have bean
(Sir John Thomson, united Kingdom)
But when we come to the firet of the next three facts, Israel*6 illegal
oocupation of part of southern Lebanon, it is of course very relevant. And I do
not think the Israeli Ambassador really addressed that point. when we come to
whether the Government of Lebanon has or has not - and I think it has not -
effective authority in South Lebanon, it is again relevant, though not wholly
. relevanti it is not the only reason why the Government of Lebanon doea not have
effective authority. Ana when we come to the fourth fact, the danger to the
Security Council’s authority and the future of United Nations peace-keeping, I
think it is relevant again.
So it is a question that is susceptible of different answers. And3 this
suggests to me that there is no one answer to the difficult situation that we face
in southern Lebanon, and by We” I mean this Council. We cannot find just one
thing to do which will suddenly transform the whole situation and restore it to
what we would wish it to br, and I have in mind primarily reeolution 425 (1978),
the fi:st operative paragraph of which calls for “strict respect for the
territorial integrity, sovereignty am3 political independence of Lebanon within its
internationally recognised boundaries.’
(Sir John Thomson, United Kingdom)
That, surely, ie the heart of the matter. That, surely, io what the Security
Council has called for. That, surely, is,what the Council wishes to reaffirm and
to bring shout, if possible. But I think it is not only one action that haa to he
taken to produce this; it is not only one capital but many that will have to act.
Therefore, I would say that it ihl necessary for the government of Israel to
act aa called for in resolution 425 (1978); but that ie not the only action that is
neceesary in order to give effect to operative paragraph 1 of that resolution.
I think that the Security Council will have to face up to the very sad fact
that we are confronting an extremely complicated oituation. I do not know quite
what we are going to do about it. But three statements have been made here this
afternoon that have all had force , that have all provoked thgught. It is against
that background that I found atyeelf being provoked into making this spontaneous
etatement. I repeat that I reserve the right to make another one.
The PRRSICBWf (interpretation from Russian): 1 thank the representative
of the united Kingdom for the kind words he addressed to me.
The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic wiehee to speak in exerciee of
the right of reply. f invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make
hie statement.
Mr. AL-ATASSI (Syrian Arab Republic) (interpretation from Arabic):
Before exercising my tight of reply, I wish to extend to you, Sir, the
repreeentative of the great Soviet Union, my delegation’s friendlieet
congratulation6 on your sasumption of the presidency of the Security Council for
this month. Your great COLIntry, of which the Syrian Arab Republic ia proud to be a
friend, has proved through its international political conduct that it alwaY
stands by the ~8~8~s of peoples struggling for their freedom and independence.
Your country’8 relations with other States are baeecl on mutual respect, arKI it
(Mr. Al-Ataesi, Syrian Arab Republic)
deals with them on a footing of equality. !4y delegation has complete confidence
that you will guide the Council’s work with wisdom, objectivity and sincerity.
I muat also take this opportunity of expressing our great appreciation to your
pre%ecessor in the Chair for the skilful way in which he guided the Councilgs work
last month.
Now, what I had expected all along has happened. Indeed, my delegation had
not intended to speak on a question that is within the competence of the Government
of Lebanon, which, in accordance with Security Council resolution 425 (1978), is to
extend its authority over the territory occupied by Israel.
Moreover, since the Security Council is meeting to consider the mandate of the
united Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIPIL), I had not intended to speak. The
repreeentative of Lebanon hae given a detailed account of the ongoing evente in
South Lebanon and has described the Israelis’ daily brutality against Lebaneee.
That should have spared me the need to speak.
But earlier in this meeting we heard a statement that wae based on a
distortion of facte and on fabricatione. ft was made by the Zioniet repreeentative
in his attempt to divert the attention of the members of the Council from the main
question - in conformity with his usual practice. That has made it necessary for
us to make a statement in reply to his fabrications.
At the outset, on behalf of my delegation I extend our sincere condolences to
the families of the French and Irish soldier8 who have been the victims of
treachery while, as the representative o'l France said the other day, they were
carrying out peace-keeping dutiee under the flag of the United Nations.
I wish alao to express our great appreciat!on to the Secretary-General and his
assistants - in particular, HK. Goulding and Mr. Aid? for the efforts they are
(Hr. Al-Atassi, Syrian Arab Republic)
making in dealing with the crisis confronting UNIFIL in South Lebanon, and for the
objective report they have auhinftted to us following the recent vfsrt to the area
by Mr. Goulding.
It is only natural and logical that this report is not to the satisfaction of
the Israeli representative, who in his statement described it a.8 %nbalanced*. It
certainly is not to the satisfaction of his Government either, because in it
accusations are explicitly levelled at Israel for its responsibility for what is
happening kn South Lebanon a@ a result of the perpetuation of Israel’s occupation,
in contravention of the letter and spirit of Security Council resolution 425 (1978).
We heard the representative of Israel today calling into question the report
of the Seotetary-GenePal and expressing doubts about its accuracy and credibility.
The truth is that our objectives claeh with those of the Israeli forces of
invasion. That is where the clash is - not with the objectives of any other party.
Our objective ie well knownr to preserve the territorial integrity,
sovereignty and independence of Lebanon. We have expressed thie objective in our
Statement COndeEIning the attack8 against the United Nations Force. On the other
hand, the objective of occupation can only be destruction, murder and violation of
indtqendence and sovereignty.
In this connection, I wieh to read out the following statement by an official
Syrian source in regard to the assassination of the French military attach6 in
Beirut:
“The Government of Syria heard with the greatest distress and Borrow the
news of the assassinatfon of the French military attache in Beirut. It
(Hr. Al-Ataeei, Syrian Arab Republic)
condemno this a& and Aailar acts against the United Nation8 Force,
particularly the French contingent thereof. It denounces such attacks and any
further ones againat the French, in view of Prance’s balanced position on the
Crieie in the Middle Eaat and the Arab-Israeli conflict?.
It is not eurprising that the accused ehould try to divert attention from
proven accusations against him by levelling accusationa against other parties that
have nothing whatever to do with them.
(Mr. Al-Ateasi, Syrian Arab rcepllblic)
That is &at the representative of Israel did today when he tried TV spread
fabrications and trulaped-up charges agaiuet my muntry. I need not clarify what is
already clear in the 6ecretary-(ieneralgs report to the effect that what is
heRwning in south Lebanar is the result of the continued Israeli occupation of
Lebanese territory in ccntraveutian of Security Council resolution 425 (1SWr
which ~ell6 for Israel’s withdrawal to the internationally remgnized border.
Royever, I should like to instil the following facts in the mind of the
representative of Israel. The heroism and sacrifices witnessed by south Lebancm
are an expression of the will and deterdnation of that people tc yut an end to
Israeli cccupaticn. These heroic acts and sacrifices have coummnded the admiration
and s88iStance of the pmples of the world, including the people of my COUneY t
which is bcmd to the Iebaneee pople with the unity of destiny and the unity of
struggle against a cammn enemy. also, if the Israeli representative and his
GOVernabmt of terrolcism and murder believe that the esteblishamt of a securi~
2tme on Lebanese territory and the recruitment of plppets and mercenaries, such as
EWldad and Iahad, may protect the northern border of their amntry, they are badly
mistaken. Past experience h8e proped the cantracy , and resistance tc occupation
bmw3 no border8. Bllrther, levelling false accusations against other States and
other parties is an injustice to the heroic resistance waged in south LebanO%
The 8oluticn is clear: full and cmnplete withdraual of Israeli foroee from
all Lehaneee territory up to ths internaticmally reaogniaed bordet and deployment
Of IINIFIL in Lebanm up to that border, where, the Rxcs can play the role
oriyineiiy esiGi*trri ti it, t'rat G,E cI&tGLiiiq .-L----L1--, --- en.4 Ponr,r4+v. LLI Lub IMa c.u.0. pusa- -.- ------ -~ -
That ie fhe solution, It is not the scluticn I propose but the one that ib otcrted
by the Secretary-General in hia report, which did not aatiefy the representative Of
Israel.
(Mr. Al-Ataesi, Syrian Arab i&public)
The refererrce to my comtry by the representative of Israel fe proven false by
the Secretary-General% repout. Alla* me to qmte paragraph 21, which, as he
indicated a while ago, ‘did not satisfy himt
“The Syrian Government also expressed unequivocal support for resolutiar
425 (1978) and for IJNIFIL. Syrian leaders atttibuted the blame for the
current stste of affairs to IBrael’s refusal t0 withdraw its forces. They t00
urged that the Security Council should assume its responsibilities in this
matter. They repeated their support for the position of thare in Lebanon who
had expressed their determinatin that, if Israel aithdrew its fOKCeS and
diemantled the ‘security zone’ , there should be no return to the aituaticn
that had existed in the area before 1982.” (S/18349, Wa. 21)
Having ewmined the clear report of tbe Secretary-General, my delegation is
convinced that the Security Couhcil should, after holding Ituael fully accountable
for tie continued detetioratim in the Eecurfty eituaticn in south Lebanan, cax!pel
Israel fo withdraw up to the international border in such a marmet as to space
thelStiUQglbQ people of the 6Outh murder and destruction and LlNfFIL the dangers
besetting it as a result of the cartinued occupation of the south by Israel. We
are al80 fully amvinced that the action of the Council will not be thwarted, as it
has in the pas&t by the zlhited States erercising ite right of vet0 with reQerd to
eVeCythinQ regarding IEKad in the Council. Once more, let us give the United
States of America another opportunity to expiate its past sins and heed the will of
the hternationel community represented in the council.
We call upor, the Council to force Israel, the occupying Power in mu th
Lebanon, fully to implement resolution 425 (1978) and withdraw its forces beyond
the internationally reabgnited border.
I thank the representative
of the Syrian Arab F&public for the kind words he addressed to ~~30
The representative of Israel has asked to apsak. I invite him to take a place
at the Council table and tc make his statement.
Hr. NRTANYAIBJ (Israel): The reasm why we are meeting today and not in
January is because something has happened in the field that has prompted the
CoUWil’s amvening naY. In January, the Council has to wet to consider the
larger questions relating to UNIFIL - the question of its mandate, the question of
the next prolargatian of its mandate, and so an.
The rearm we are here tcday is because there are attacks cm the ground now -
accelerated attacks, a small war that is being waged against URIPIL, directly
targeting URIPIL, especially ite French ccmtingent. And the reason we are
addressing this issue today is becauee we have to address it. I tried to point out
&at everybody here knows, that these attack8 are coming frorP a particular source
with a t;articuhr agends that does not~‘address itself to the specifics and the
calibrations and the details of the manhate, but to it8 very existence and the very
existence of UNIPIL.
There was only cne speaker - our cnlbeague from the United Rlngdom - who in a
ecber canmplaticm addressed this question amcng the other questions he raised.
If we wish to discuss the immediatie crbis, we have to focus on the immediate
pcblem, and the immediate problem etene fran BeabOilaho
(Mr. Netanyahu, Israel)
Since other matters have been raised here, I should like to addeese them
quickly.
The Ambaesadore of Syria am! Lebanon - perhaps we shall hear from the
Ambaarador of Libya a8 well - and Ambaeeador Makaoud spoke loftily of the Qentral
authority of Lebanon* and “the sovereignty of Lebanon that is being violatedw.
what central authority? What sovereignty?
I ehould like to ask a simple guestion about south Lebanon. When was the last
time that the Preeidont of Lebanon visited the south of Lebanon? How many times in
the past few years haa the Minister in the Lebanese Cabinet responsible for the
&outh visited couth Lebanon? Where ie that authority dieplayed? Ie it displayed
in the Bekaa Valley, where there are Iranians and Syrians? f should ask our Syrian
colleague how many Syrianet 2S,OOO or 35,0007 I lose count; it fluctuate6 daily.
Same 25,000 Syrian troop6 occupy the country? Is it in Tripoli, which is virtually
a wholly-ouned Syrian port3 Ia that where the authority and sovereignty of Lebanon
can be found? Or perhape along any other port along Lebanon’s coastline? Every
one of theee porte ie controlled by a different sect. They are little - I do not
want to call them republics - enclaves, controlled by aeparete eecte which exerciee
effective control over those areas, including an outlet to the sea.
Perhap we can find the aUthOtitY and sovereignty of Lebanon in Beirut and its
cspi ta1 . X truly regret to cay that ie the laet place one can find it. One cannot
find them there because that city ie divided, not juet in two major sector6
battling and warring with one another, but in many other eectore within eectors -
sects fighting eecte, tribe against tribe, faction againet faction. Pt is very
difficult to point out a flingle place in Lebanon, let alone the capital or part of
it, where the osteneible central authority exercisea that autimrity; it eimply Wee
not exist.
(Mr. Netanyahu, Israel)
I said that a minute ago with regret, because thut is the source of our
problems. It is not our activities in the south that have led to the loss of
Lebanese authority; it is the absence , the total absence, of such authority that
has led to our activities. It is exactly the opposite. Those problems cannot be
solved until the problem of Beirut and sans sort of central authority can be
established.
I listened carefully to Ambassador Thomson's statement in which he said “We do
not know what the solution fs to the the larger problem". Frankly, I do not know
what the solution is either, because we cannot solve the Lebanese puasle. We
cannot put together Lebanon that fought a civil war 10 years ago in which it killed
a large percentage of its citiaens. We cannot create something that is not there.
It is up to the Lebanese to do it. It would be uaeful, of cour8er if the Syrians
withdrew and teecinded that fond embrace that has led them on many occasions to
state their intention to have Lebanon fully annexed into the Syrian domain.
I think that, ultimately, those questions are beyond the Council's purview,
beaause they will be decided on the ground, in Lebanon itself.
In the absence of that central authority, there is a simple fact about Lebanon
whioh I have mentioned. There are many factione amd many militias - that iS
Lebanon. We can talk from now to eternity about a Central Government in Beirut8
however, owing to its absence , that void is filled by local militias. Yes, we
operate with one of those militias; yes, we assist them. But they assist
themselves: they do so and risk their lives , not hecause they want to protect
Israel, but because they want to prevent the return of terror to the south - and
that is the most legitimate activity by any Lebanese that I can see in the cauldron
of cheoe that exists today in Lebanon.
(Mr. Nntanyahu, Israel)
If! we are to hsve a serioue discussion about both the pteaent crisis and point
towards a larger discussion that may or may nr\t occur iu January - it may occur
before that - it simply will sot do to repeat the old statements about
resolution 425 (1978), about Israeli dismantling of the security zone, and others
as a kind of magical incantation which, if endlessly repeated, will somehow affect
in any measure the true sources of this proMe% It is viewed as a panacea, but it
will solve nothing. It will, I am afraid, create a new ohaoe with which we are not
even familiar today.
The PRRSIPEW (interpretation from Russian)4 I call on the
representative of Lebanon in exerciee of the right of reply.
Mr. PAKCKRJRY (Lebanon) (interpretation from Atabic)r It eeems that the
memory of the representative of Israel is very short. The President of the
Republic of Lebanon visited the south last year immdiately after the liberation of
Sidon from Israeli occupation. Be was warmly and popularly received there by all
tha parties. I want to remihd the A&aeeador of Israel of that. Hany minietere
aleo visited the south laet year and this year.
The second point raieed by that representative relates to attacks again& the
United Nation6 Interim Boroe in Lebanon (UNIML). It ie true that eince 11 August
UNIFIL hae been the target of attacks, which we haye condemned and still condemn.
Rowever, theee attacke are wt the firm of their kind. The international forces
numbering 130 who have fallen are not all victim of the attacks starting on
11 August last. In the paet attack8 have been launched by the Israeli Army,
Ieraeli agent8 and the *called South Lebanon Army. It seem3 that the Ieraeli
Ambassador forgot the abduction of 30 soldiere of the Pinnieh contingent not 80
long ago by Israeli agents in Lebanon.
Flow is it he forget6 what the Israeli Aemy did when it invaded Lebanon in 1982
and violated reqtone under UNIPXL? The answer to that question is well known.
(Mr. Fakhoury, Lebanon)
The third point we went back to is the question of Lebanese authority in the
south. Who is responsible for the absence of Lebanese authority in the soul-h? Is
it not Israel With has occup2ed the south? Last year, did not the Lebanese
Ciovernmnt send a contingent of the Iebrmeae army, to be deployed In Kawkaba, which
camm mder attack by Israel and the agents of Ierael-
I simply wanted to recall thcee p&Ois. Some members of the Council would not
think that aat the -assador of Israel said was true - not 100 per cent, not even
1 per oent.
The PRESILSNT (interpretation from Russian): There are no further
sgeakers inscribed in my list for this meeting.
The date for the next meting of the Security Council to consid8r the item cn
the agenda, will be determined during consultitions anmg meubere of the Counc%l.
The meeting rcee at 6 p l m.
▶ Cite this page
UN Project. “S/PV.2707.” UN Project, https://un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-2707/. Accessed .