S/PV.272 Security Council

The neit meeting of the ~Council,:onthe Palçstine'question, will bê :held 00 Wednesday, ·24 •March ,1948, at 10.30 am. . , The meeting roseat 6 p.m. 'TWO HUNJ)RED' ÂND sEvENTY-SECOND'.,mÊTlNG Held at Lakê Sllccêss, New York, .on Monday,22 Ivf:arch 1248, ot2.30 p.m. President: :M:r~T~ F. TSIANG (China). Present': Thê.representative 'of the following ,«»mtries:.' ,,Argentina, Belgium; "Canad~ China, 1~ Adoption of the agenda. 2. Letter <lated 12 March 1948 fri'lli the permanent representative of rntile to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (document S/694). 30. Adoption of the agendn 31. C»nfinuation of the discussion of the Ietter from the permanent representative of ChUe re!ative to the events in Cze-- choslovakia Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated trom Span- ish): The Chilean representati.ve has proposed inviting the ex-representative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations to explam the reasons underlying the attitude, of which we are all aware, and the circumstances which gave rise to the complaint submitted by the Government of Chile. 1 support this request so that it can. be submitted in accordance with the Council's rules of pro- cedure. It has been Argentina's traditional policy to respect the internaI organization of other coun- tries. Nore ar we deviating from this position now in asking that thenecessary steps be taken to clear up this matter. On the contrary, we think this will help to bring about a frank cliscussion and an improvement in the relations between the "great Powers in this international crisis. In view of the reaction of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1 think it would be best ...J clarify the situation so that any misunderstanding that may have arisen can be entirely dispelled. My country has maintained normal diplomatic relations both with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with Czechoslovaki~' and, of course, we enjoy the most amicable relations with our 'neighbours beyond the Andes. The Chilean denunciation, which was. designed to c1arify the facts, is based on certain .doubts entertained by our good neighbour as aresult of other events which occurred in thatRepublic a short time ago. . • Wehave no reason to pre-judge the issue. If the Council's deliberations showthat. the fears harbourèd by Chiie are not justified~ the. repre- sentative of theUSSR may be surethat ;weshall statl~ments against their own people. 1 therefore object most strongly to the Argen- tine proposaI. Mr. GROMYIW ~Union of Soviet SociaIist Republies) (translated trom Russian) : My atti- tude to the proposaI to invite the former Czeehoslovak represe.'ltative to the United Nations to appear here is governed by the general attitude of the USSR delegation ta this whole qùestion, which ha~ been artificially dragged before the Seeurlty Couneil by the Oovemment of Chile and by those who in aotual fact stand behind thatGovemment. We consider that it would he a mistake to give the former Czeehoslovak l'epresentative to the United Nations the opporttmity of appearing before the SecurityCouncil to make his com- pleteIy unfounded andslanderous statements against his oWil people and his own country. Sucb assertions and .statements should not only not be encouraged; they should on the contrary he condemned by the Security COWlcil, whenev0r and by whomsoever they are made. 1 thererore protest· most energetically ~gainst the proposai of Chile, Argentina and Clmada to sition A vote was talcen by dlow. of hands, and the proposai was adopted by 9 votes in favaur and 2 against. Vates for. Argentina, BelgiUDl, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Syria, United King4om, United States of America. Votes against: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re- public, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Chine, Etats-Unis d'Ukraine, soviétiques. place Mr. PAPANEK : Permit me, mst of aU, to thank the President and the members ûf the ~~u..rity C{)Qncil for permitting me to present the case of CLechol:llovakia for consideration. 1 admit that when 1 presented my letter ta the Secretary-Gene- raI on 10 March last [document S/696] 1 had hopes ofbeing allowed tQ do SOt Although 1 requested no one to sponsor free Czechoslovakia's cause, the initiative taken by the Government of Chile and lis permanent representative to the United Nations, Mr. Santa Cruz, was an act for which my people and l, personally, are and shall he gratetul aIways. moi que m'avoir situation ~ue, général, S/696], cet exposé. de patronner l'initiative par Nations mon serons la par dont époque, Bénès formulée le me ,faire sant. gratitude rité, l'Argentine position Secrétaire de communiste Dans généraux, d'Etat la il·est Nine years ago, almost to the day, the case of Czechoslovakia, occupied by force by Germany, was brougbt to the attention of the League of Nations. At that time the protest made· by Presi- dent Benes was cursorlly dismissed as one presen- ted by a prlvate individual. Today. the Security Cauncil ot the Unit~ Natiop$ ··is giving me the opportunity of a hearing. 1 am grateful fol' it, and 1wish now to express my appreciation aIso to the representatives of Argentina and Canada for sup- pomng the proposai that 1 should be heard. In my Ietterof 10 March 1948 add.ressed tu fue Secretary-GenetaI 1 requested the Security Cauneil to investigate the Cominunist coup in Czechoslovakia. In that letter 1 ;wrote only gene- rally of what had taken place and briefiy of how it aiIected established Czechoslovak institutions and the Czechoslovak people during the fir days of the usu~rs' rule. ~ ord,! ta understand the &ituation, it .is necessary to retrace eventswhichfomhadowed present developments. The difiiculties with which the Czechoslovak people had tocope du,ring the For centuries the Czechoslovak people had fought in the very 'forefront with the most pro- gressive and most developed nations of Europe. They fought as advanèe guards-and 1 use the term advisedly-for freedom, humanity, demo- cmcy, and social justice. .. Truth will prevail" was always their motto and it remained un- chaIiged for the founder of the Czechoslovak Republic, Thomas G. Masaryk, as it had been for Jan Hus more than 500 years ago. This struggle is in reality Czechoslovakia's own political tradition. guarded by.·every great personage of its history, by a11 of Czechoslovakia's political leaders. The Czechoslovak Constitution. which the liberated and democratic nation adopted for itself in 1920. wasbased on these ideals of freedom and justice. Moreover. it was a living. practical and sound constitution until brute force sus- pended it in 1938. Presiçlent Benes hadj tberefore, every right to say,in bis speech to the Congress of the United States in 1943. that when victorv in the war was achieved, the Czechoslovak nation wo~ld again reconstmct its &ge-old homeland ouicldy and successfully, and that it would remain faithful. as it had always remained faithful thIoughout the course of its long, impellin~, yet gIorious history; to the democratic way of life, the principles of spiritual and religious freedom,and the ideaJs of peace·and international co-operation for peace. It mav wellbe asked why 1 speak of this. 1 speak of it because 1 affirm that a tradition .of Czechoslovak national 'historycannot change ovemight.I· declare that the spirit ofa nation, annealed· through the centuries, cannot .be changedbeyond recogmtionin the space of a few hours, days or weeks. That such a change tookplace- and. it seems itdid-was not due to a change of the spirit and will of the people, as it is claimed, but due ta. the violeJ;1ce of a USSR- su;pported . Communist minority,~d was a fissure in the structure of internation~ peace. This~ Godgrant, IshalIprove to the rep~e~ten,ta­ tives on the SeCUlityCouncil. .• The process direct~d ,towards'the destruction of Çzechoslov;tk deIllQCracy started long beforethe çmis oflas~ February. Looking back now, it. is clear that..the Soviet Comnumist..plan .was laid béforethe war ~e tQ its end. It is .clear that every . move the C0mniUnists· made since they began th~;rso-ca11ed co-operatiOn withPresident Bènes anJthe Ilon-Commullist~elements of the c0un.try ·.'W'~s a ·step toward the··everltual ·destmc,;, tiOilbf'thedeDlQCfaticway of'liféas far as .~, Unexpected difficulties arose when the Cze~ choslovak: Government was preparing to take over the administration of the easternmost part of Czechoslovakia-that it to say, Carpath~ Russia':""-after its liberation. A Czechoslovak delegation was sent by the London Govel':nment to Carpatho-Russia and arrived there on 28 October 1944, soon after the army of the USSR had liberated it. The USSR Inilitary command made it impossible for this delegation from .the first moment to get in 'touch with the ,population, ·although there was no doubt whatsoever that Carpatho-Russià was legally an integral part of the Czechoslovak: Republic. Russian officers of the NKVD began to orga~ nize meetings of Carpatho-Russians on 5 Novem- ber 1944 in order to pressure them into accepting ·the inclusion of Carpatho-Russia into thl~ USSR. . One of the tasks of the Czechoslovalc: delega- tion was to organize military recruitment in that area, to execute the orders of the Czechoslovak Govemment in London, and to issue orders of mobilization for the Czechoslovak Army. However, the Army of the USSR in the meantime . had a1ready begun a drive for recruiting Car- patho-Russians into the USSR Army, which made it impossible for the military representatives attached to the Czechoslovak delegation to issue the orders of mobilization. They aiTested .the Czechoslovak officers whose task it was to carry out mobilization orders, and the Commander of the particular USSR Army- Commissar Mechlis-declared that the Czecho- ·slovak Government delegation and the military ·command of the Czechoslovak Army were acting '1lgainst the' interests of the USSR. The USSR military did not allow them to get in touch with the Carpatho-Russian population and the Car~ patho-Russian National Council, and prevented the Czechoslovak: delegation from moving fi ~ly ·in the Hea. On 11 November 1944, the USSR military organs arrived for the meeting of the Nation~l Committeesand did not permit the Czechoslovak delegation to attend fuis meeting. They forcibly disbanded the NationalCommittees, which were ·formed spontaneously and were linquestionably in favour of keeping Carpatho-Russia in the Cze- 'choslovak: Republic. Members af such committees were expelled to Russia, and every trackof them was lost.· By such measures, and with the direct interven~ tian of the military orgaLtr> of the USSR Army, ha· lUlI>t!"""'&"oi_ ~.ru 1;11111111 1!licun 1111 li Il.lI t P~esident Eduard Benes and certain members of the Gôvemment were asked to go to Moscow before retuming home to Prague.' The question was debatèd for .a long timP. whether to go and .try to reach an agreement with the Communist group 100. by Klement Gottwald and Zdenek Fierlinger, supported by the Government of the USSR, or to refuse to go and risk the creati.on·of a new govemment there, which would exclude the London Govemment completelyas had happened in the case of governmentsof other countries that nad been establishedin London during the war. Since our people had had ties of friendsbip with the Russian people for centuri,es andhad faith in their big Slav brother, the Govemment felt thàt the friençlship. of the people at home for the Russians bound them to go. Upon .'the arrivaI of the' London Govemment group in Moscow, its basicprogramme for post- war Czechoslovakia was. shattered. The so-called Kosice Programme was hastily imposed bythe Communists, who threatened that unless that programme' was acceptt(d, the London Govem- .ment would nevet be permitted to retum to Czechoslovakia: At the time, Zdenek Fierlinger said that if the demands of the Moscow group were not'acceded to, .. the trains would not run ,. to takethem home. Tt is true that President Benes remained .in office and that Premier Stalin repeated the assurances he gave President Benes in 1943,. when the Treaty of Friendsbip was signed, that 'Czechoslovakia would be free to conduct itsinternal affairs in its own way while its 'foreign policy adhered to that of the USSR. In the composition of the. new .Government, Zdenek Fierlinger was forcedupon it as Prime Minister, while Klement Gottwald and Viliam Siroky, both Çommunists, were,' Vice-Premiers. .Allvital departmental posts-interior (police), ·educationfinformation, social welfareand agri- culture-'-were' tâten over .by Communists. The .post'of national defence· wasgiven .to General Ludvik Svoboda, who.was supposedly· without political affiliation, but·who wasa USSR-made herocommatiderof the Czechoslovak Army units in the USSR, and who owes a11 to both the Com- munists and the USSR. Jan .Masaryk remained ·as Foreign Minister, but . wasgivenanurider~secretary who was a .Communist from bis youth, Vladimir Clementis. At .that time they' did not, dare ta eliminate President Benes, for they~erenotcertain oftheir rl;"lception 'atnoftlewithout hm. 1 have if from President ]3enesbimself thatforquite sorne time, and espéciallyinKosice,armed Russian soldiers kept him incommunicâdo. However, USSR, Ambassador Valerian .A. Zorin" who accompanied the returning Govem- ment from Moscow, insisted in a note that the Government of the USSR demanded the elimina- tion of aIl leaders of the Czech National CouncU because they were unreliable. General Kutelvasr, who was in charge of the military revoIt in Prague against the Nm.ls, was removed. Professor Prazak, Chairman of the Council. was questioned by the NK.VD, and pracficaIly the entire Presidium of the Council was reÏnoved. No reconstruction of the Kosice Government took place. ,While President' Denes was held incommuni- cado in Kosice, Jan Masaryk, in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, was subjected to great pressure, and to threats from Mr. Molotov, who led the delegation of the USSR at the Conference, that the latter would break relations with Masaryk if he refused to do bis bidding. In order to keep the friendship of the USSR it was aIso necessary to make serious sacrifices in ,the economic field. Unlike the allied armies of the western Powers, the Red Army insisted upon having aIl its expenses paid by the Czechoslovak Govemment, and so they were paid. The eccne- mic abuse of the little ally continued even after '- the direct consequences of war had beensettled. Negotiations on tradè agreements were carried out under tremendous pressure, and very often commitments were made by the Czechoslovak 'delegations whose fuJfilm.ent'was either impossible or unquestionably to the detriment of the country. One such commitment with which the Govern- ment was confronted was the tàkingovèr of the radium mines in J achymov by the USSR, the control of which Wàs promised to them by the over-generous Zdenek Fierlinger wiiliout 'the knowledge of ms Govemment. Later the Govem- ment was forced 'to give its formal ratification to the deal, and since that time no Czechoslovak authority has been allowed to enter the mines or to receive any information copcerning them. The armed guards around the mines wear Czecho- slovak uniforms, but are of foreign nationality. In Karlovy Vary, close to the borders of Germany where the United States and USSR zones adjoint there àre several hotels, restricted to the exclusive In February of this·· year, whiIe np announce- ment or publicity was given it, there was a similar planned movement of troops across the~erritory of Czechoslovakia, of which 1 shall speak later. Czechoslovakia'spost-war economic recon- struction was notan easy task. Every effort was made·to re-establish its former comparativelyhigh standard of living asquickly as possible, and therefore, when the announcement of the Marshân Plan was made, great importance and hope foraidwere atached to it. On 7 July 1947, the CzechoslovakGovernment decided .unanimously and announced formally that Czechoslovakia would participate in the Paris Conference with· the rest, of the invited countries. At that time a Polish Govemment deleglltion was in Prague, led by the Foreign Minister, Zigmunt Modzelewski, and together the Poles and the Czechoslovaks decided to accept the invitation to Paris. The Poles were to .announcetheir acceptance upon their retum to Warsaw. This acceptance was never announced. On 9 Julv 1947, Prime Minister Gottwald, Minister for Foreign Affairs Masaryk, and Minis- ter of Justice Drtina were invited to Moscow. Premier Stalin himself .gave·· orders to.Prime Minister .Gottwald that the Czechoslovak Cabinet 'must reverse its decision by unanimous vote within the limited time of a few hours. Prime·Minister Gottwaldcontacted the acting Prime Ministerin 'Prague and asked .. him to convenean extraordinary.meeting .of the Cabinet for that purpose. Mr.· Masaryk, present in Moscow, wasinformed by Mr. Gottwald of this w.m· events only after the order had been relayedto Prague. The. absence of several non- Communist members of the .. Cabinet facilitated . thereversal. .. . . This cancellation was ann.ounced on 10 July 1947. The accompanying note explained that Befoi:e taking up the developPlents of last month, 1 should like tQ. ,mention btiefly that .a similar coup was attempteo a few months earlier, that is, in November 1947. At that time the Com- munists bullt up a case against the Slovak Demo- cratic Party in an effort to prove thatthis party's leaders were accomplices in an attempt to dèstroy the Republic. They did their best to outlaw that important party arid· replace its members in the Government by members of CommuilÏst-con- trolled trade unions and partisans controlled by Communists. In this way the Communists would have gained complete control. in the_Cabinet. That attempt -failed," however, and' this defeat was Îollowed aImost immediatly by another set-back which very radically reduced their power in the Cabinet and in Parliament. The Social Democratie Party, which under the leadership of ZétenekFierlinger was until then. very subservient to the Communists, tumed away from them and ousted Fierlinger as Chairman. On that very day the Communists must have realizeJ that their chances to secure :tbeir supre~ macy in Czechoslovakia by constitutional and parliamentary methods were definitely lost. From that day, too, .the tension and dread increased unill the fateful days of February. Nesek,refusa muniste de -la aux ce dpnnèrent rent mûri s'était mêmes plus rales inévitables, plusieurs mois, plus qu'il ne déclaration coup 1 'shallnot take up the SecuritY Council's time in describing how the Conimunist coup .was ~ffected. Ithappened so. recently 'that it is still vividly remembered. The facts are known.The entire so-called crisis began when the Communist :Mfuistèr ofthè Interior, Vaclav Nesek, refusec;i to comply with the .decision of the Council' of Ministets .to review and change the policy of appointing . only Commuilist party members to thé highest positions iJ1 the police of Prague. Ministersof the other political parties could not accept this. unconstitutional step and forthis reàson handed in their resignations. The Commu- Iiisis. seized upon this pretext for the realization of th~ir long;..premeditated plans and instructions. It is certain that; if this opportunity'had not . presented itself to the Communists in February, it would have bj;:enmade a little later, butcertainly b.efore the general elections which were to be held in May. It was inevitable for the following reasons: Premier Gottwald proclaimed several months ago that the Communists· would get more than 51per cent of the votes.Since·it was then evident that the'COmnIunïsts would not receive sllch a number of. votes, Gottwald inferred·that the putsch was aIready planned and prepated. Vaclav Kopecky, Minister of Informatlûn, speaking in It has often been said during these past several v ~eks in. Czechoslovakia that the coup il; the expression of.the will of the people. 1 affirm that. the peopl~ who took part in the strikes and: dem()nstrations for the unconstitutional demands' of Premier Gottwald. were not. only misled~ ,but, actUallY forced to participate. They were the same so-called Czechoslovak people who, under similar terror during the German occupation, demonstra-pression ted against President Bebes when the traitor Meravec .spoke. It is a well-established faet, ·and anyinvestigating committee can prove beyond the shadow of a doubt,·that anyone who did not parti- cipate in the Communîst-ordered strike, set' simultaneously for .thenooiJ. hoU!' an over the country, lost bis or her job. immediately -and expects further punishmellt. . Participation in the parades or demonstratîons was alsocompulsory, and witnesses, here in the United States now, can attest to the fact that high officials an4 typists alike wept as they were forced to march under the Soviet flags. The truly spon- taneous expI:essions of the people who'gathered' to protest the coup, of which there were more than were reported in the newspapers, were immediately suppressed; the people were silertced and dispersed by armed police. The channels of. information, the press and radio were immediately putin tb~_handsof the Communists, and no one but a Communist could broadcast-not even the President of the Republic. even' though. ,it was announced not once but several times, that he would speak. 1 know thathe prepared one speech which the controlling powers refused to let him broadcast. 1 know that hé recorded two other speeches, which were also unacceptable to the Communists and were kept from the public. It li; aImost superftuous toadd that the public pronouncements of aIl non-Communist parties. ) . The coup d'état in Czechoslovakia, planned and executed though it was Gottwalcl. Fierlinger and others, cannot be interpreted as a purely internal matter. The Communist Party effected its coup, as innumerable pictures prove, under Soviet as weIl as Czechoslovak flags; with Stalin's p,ictl1res; with the emblem of the Soviet revolu- tion, the hariunerand sickle; and with the Russian anthem in use together with t'.1e Czechoslovak. The Communist Party a1ways uses.them in f ny action of·force. But when it wished to gain t.J.e votes of the Czechoslovak people in the free and secret election, it used only Czechoslovak emblem and symbols, openly and hypocrltically. If we read President Benes; memoirs, published in December last, we see that even as far back as December 1943, the Czechoslovak Communists in Moscow forced the President to accept various principles, such as the establishment of national or action committees to determine wbïch political parties.would be petmitted to be established and which couldnever again be permitted-basic principles which were in contradiction to the Czechoslc -1c political tradition and the Consti- tution, and ID complete harmony with the Soviet . doctrine. AlI economic and political institutions, newly introduced, have their pattern in sunilar institutions of the USSR. Freedom of. expression, of the press and of assembly and protection of fundamental human rights no longer exist. Czechoslovakia today hasa policerule, a ter- roristic police rule. No one is permitt~ .even to. think in any way other than that which is·ordered, and this inc1udes scientists, professors, musicians, actors, and artists.r{or is all this directing and channeling . Paphazard~ It, is ditecting patterned exactly. in the· USSR way, without· considera- tion for tradition,fôr histor)t, oreven·for practi- cality or the interests of the CzechÇ')slovak people. The •present Ministet o.f Foreign Affairs Clementis specifically said that· the·. whole foreign . ,. WouJd a purely internai change in Czechoslo- Wllia DeCeSSitate thisslave-like imitation of the œstl pattmt? 1 ~ that a1l this is evidence that Czecho- SkJatia wu subject 10 the indirect aggression of die USSR and.the victim of political .infiltration, Ac :S8IDè iDdirectaggressionwhich Mr. Molotov, i&. 1939, recognized as equa1ly dangeroi1s as diœct .agressi~.when, during negotiations for _ aDiance with the United Kingdomand France, 1Ie wmte tl1at the proposed treaty would apply .. iD: the c;ase of direet or indirect aggressioll,.,that is 10 ~y, an internaI. coup tlétat or a political dJange favourabIe to the aggressor ". làtliisconnexion, too, 1 CaJlcite a passage with â simiIarœference conceming politiCal infiltration. 'The fermer Secretary of State. of the United ~1~ RBymes,·on page 306 of bis book, ~ Fnm1cly,says the following; -TJae Owter of the United Nations pledges • JIanbeJs to .refrainfmm the threat or the use CJf fotœ apinst.the territorW .~ntegrity orthe pciiIicat~ce of any5tate. The definition is _ restricted to armed invasiono It cano mean ClOI:IÎ:iua, pœssuœ or subterfuge, such as politica1 iaIiiIIaâon.ft . • ,. la acJditim to this ùidireçtaggressîon and' p4tira1iDfi1trationof theYSSR.,thètè are severa! ...... ofifs direct intervention in Czechoslovak .-.a: Jast monaL," . ft is aiSfom:nj thatoftièiaIvisitsoflllembers of afaœip GoVernmentareofficià1lYannounœd il iIIIaDce 10 the·~nsibl~··heads .(if" depart- __ abd 10 thé. Chief of$tate•.'llte~~puty Forâ&a :MiDister ..of .•the .VSSR~ VâIe,l'Ï~Zo1Ï11' ~m Pnguein· tbeJnitfst . 0fthepolitièa1 cùis. ail 19 Fébruary 1948, WiUIout the advmce boIrJédJ!Je of ~'Il.;_. "6:...:·.d__ · f··'I::' .. ., AJ:I:". J ... ~~'~"'üIWI\Ç.I;O.rorelgrtnualr$,an Vasayi, andthe'President,:E(fuardBeneS.Whell ...jRsaIce. ÏDPragt.1e w~.mâdeknown,two lNMm for it weregiv~n.:'the-mst,thàt'hecame to CoI.ttrOlthe distri1?lJtiQil.ofwlieatan4fodder s1tïpPeIlIs from thci'§:~~; and the second, that .. came 10. pàrticlpàte.iD.a'ç<>nfèrenœof the .. Awniation for·Czechoslov~Soviet·FriendshiF two.1IIliPf.J ~for tl1e visit ..of··a.DepUty ~ Minîster. The trutb,however, is thathe ~~:fina1.. approVal.,~Dthè· Communists ~f9dim:t.the aetiœof theqo_Ullist.chiefs. Be c,.4'o.ed with an ConimU1iîs~ ...Jinlsters ..and ~ FJC!:dinget. There are WÏtttessesto prove tIIiI,..iD Gcrmany,and cm theirwayto:Paris. 1 On 24 February 1948;-Fresident Eduard Benes bimded Premier Gottwald his answer to the demands of the Communist Party as a solution of the political crisis. It was contained in a letter for the Presidium of the Central Executive Com- mittee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. This letter, in translation, reads as follows : Il On February 21, 1948, you sent me a letter in which you informed me of your position on the solution of the' Govemment orisis and requested me to identify myself with if. .. Permit me to formulate IllY position. 1 fully fliel the weight of the responsibility in this fateful period of our national and State life. From the, tirst moment of this crisis, 1 have been thinking of the situation, of. itow it developed, and of its ' correlation with world events and developments. 1am tryingto see clearly, ,not only the immediate situation, but the reasons which led to it and the results which this or that decision can have. politique résolue mentaire. considère dans même accepté fait ne .. 1 am well aware of the powerful forcès by Which the present situation ,was brought about. In considering the situation quietly, objeétively, dis- passionately, in a matter-of-fact way~ 1 feel that the COIinnOll Will of the Most varied groups of our citizenry that have tumed to me is the will for peace and quiet, for order and discipline, for discipline voluntarily imposed, for a progressive aIld a truly, socialistic life. .. How càn we attainthis aim? You know my sincere democratic profession of faith. 1 cannot but remain faithful to it even in this moment, for aemocracy, according ta my conviction, is the only reIiable and lasting basis for a decent and respected humaIt life. l insist on, a parliamentary democracy, on a parliamentary Government, as the conditions of democrRcy. 1 say that 1 am very fanilliar with the necessary social and economic content. 1 founded mypolitical work on these p1Îilciples and ,1 cannot take any other action without self-betrayal. Il Our ., present cnslS of demacracy can be settled only in a democratic and parliamentary way. 1 do not ignore your demands. However, 1 . co~ider all our po1itical parties combined ina national front as the bearers ôf political respon- sibility. ,AU of ,us accepted'the prin.ciples of a national front, ,and thishas proved itself until the recent cr.iiis arose. For Die, the cmis has' nôt disproved" the· prineiple itself. 1 am convinced Il Personally, as 1 have aIready stated, it is clear to me that the Premier will be the President of the strongest party, Klement Gottwald. •~ Finally, from the fiU:tual. side, it is clear for me that socia1ism is a way of life which the preponderant part of our nation desires. Besides, 1 be1ieve that a definite measure of freedom and harmony is compatible with social- ism. Tho~e are the indispensable principles 6Î our entire national existence. The nation has struggled fOf freedom almost incessantly in its entire history. History has shown us, too, where discord leads. 1 urgently ask YOTd, therefore: Let us consider trlese facts and let us make themthe foundatio1.l of our negotiations. Let us aU together begin lljtain to agree on future lasting co-e>pera- tion, and let us not allo'.;( the prolongation of the division of the nation into two qaJtl'relînb halves. 1 helie".oe thatareasonable agreement is possible because it is indispensably necessary." . Can any thirtking persan believe that President Benes could agree to the new Gov"Ctnment under Klement Gottwald without the greatest pressure, withoutdure$s, without the threat of the use of Îorcw? Can J'resident Benes, who studied demo- èmcy aIl his life, who worked for democracy, tnuqht demooracy, went into e~ilç for democracy and devoted' his ~ife to democracy, ~hatïge over ni~ht '1 COU~G President Benes countenance the kindof rule of a terrorizing mass, a rule by fe>rce, "'Vhich is a travestv of all legality Md all law. in Cr.echoslovakia '1 Could he benr to read the con- trolled Czechoslovak press whïeh lists innumerable names of people who Me in prison, who are under surveiliance and investigation '1 Could he give even taçit approval to the violation of the m1icl~s .of our Oonstitution and laws whieh protect consti- tutional rights? Could he permit some of his old· estand oostfricnds-co-workers in exile, his colla- borators·who spent years in concentraûon camps, at the bands of the Gennans, because of that collaboration-and Czechoslovak citizens gene- rally, to he dismissed from their positions, robbed ofthtir property, jailed williout renson and put before special so-called courts '1 1 oategorically reject any suggestion that Pre.. sident BeDes Î$ a free man. 1 reject any pos~ibility that he approved the new Qôttwaldreginte or that Presid~nt said he was going to resign. 1 likewise reject categorically the supposition that the late Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Masal1k, spoke the words he did durlng his 1ast days except under the greatest pressure and duress. He could not IÎ'l.ake a move without the two special guards assigned to him after the coup. For mY8elf, 1 cannot accept the official explana~ tion of bis death as suicide. r know that he planned to leave Czechoslovakia and begin to work aIl over afUÜ11 for a free Czechoslovakia. The difficulties with which Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk had to cope in order to satisfy the USSR in iu most elastic interpretati'Ons of the Treaty of Friendsbip of 1943, and at the same time not do irreparable harm. to bis own country, weighed more heavily upon mm, especially since last September when an ummccessful attempt was made on his life. Two other Cabinet members, Drtina and Zenkl, received packages identical with Mr. Masaryk's, which were bombs intended ta kill the recipients. Fortunately, a11 three were discovere~ before they could explode. In the investigation which fo11owed, it was found by the Ministry of Justice that it· was a Communist plot to kill the three most popular democratic leaders of Czechoslovakia. The inves~ ti~ation further proved that a Communist Il\.ember of Parliament, Sosnar-Honzak, also connected with this' group, had a' cache of arms and ammu~ nition. In view of these proven facts, Sosnar- Honzak had to resign as a member of Parliament. There was evidence also that the NKVD of the USSR was involved in the whole affair. Mr. Drtina, who was then the Minister of Justice responsible for this investigation, was found on the sidewalk in front of hishome in a critical condition shortly after the Communists took over. The bfficial explanation given was that it was the result of attempted suicide. Jan Masaryk was the second official suicide. Zenkl remains. These are the facts. 1"have witnesses to sub- stantiate them. 1 have more facts. In my original letter to the Secretary~General of the United Nations, 1 mentioned the fact that fue coup was successfully made because of the use of the threat of military force of the USSR, in readiness on the northwestern boundaries of Czechoslovakia. 1 had this information about the threat of the use of militaur force which was addressed t\;) the President, from .sources 1 cannot publicly.divulge npw because. it would endanger Many lives in Czechoslovakia. However, 1 would ask theSecurity Counciltohear President Benes himself attest t9 the fact .which forced him to There are ether press reports of the moveme!1t of USSR troops at that time. The world press ~ its pictures brought vi~ible 1?roof 'of the partic!pa- tionof the USSR military m the demonstrations in Pràgue during the crisis.. Furthermore, USSR officersparticipated in the arrests of non-Com,.. munist political' leaders. Agents of the USSR worked in the Ministry of Interior, which controIs the police and security troops. USSR agents were alsoamong the armed. militia in the streets of Prague. Witnesses to these facts ,are now in Germany or on their way to Paris ·and London. They have cabled me their WiUingness to testify to these facts. Terror has already been unleashed in its fcll fury in Czechoslovakia, and it will be greater than in the countries of East!i'rn Europe, because it will bè allthe more difficult, if not impossible, for atruly democratic people tp becôme accus- tomed to slavery. ' . It is because of this terror' that more and more , 1 affirm thal the situation in Czechoslovakia, and'its continuedexistence, is a threat to interna- tionàl peace andsecurity, referred to in Article 34 of the Chartt:r. . The existence of tyranny and oppression any- where is' a threat topeace, but particularly in that part of Europe where East meets West and whele conflicts have begun timè and again. Peop~e are fieeing from, their ~omes, among them some of the best representatlves of Czechoslo- vakia's political, economic and cultural leadership, bûtamottg them,, toO; dangero\ls' àgents of the newtertoristicPrague regim'e. . The successftd coup in, Czechoslova1Qa has given new impetusto Communist forces aIl over the \\Torld, but pm;ticûlatty' :in.,~~urope. This can ·only tead to' violence;·anti-·eon6ict. -. . , . That the Czèchoslovak'situation is more than 'a pur~Iy'Ü1teïmal affair. is eyident from the i~int official prptesü of ~e .United States, the· Um~d Kingdo~im{i 'Frmié~i to ~~~overmnent ~ ,PragiJe, f~Jji ~çrellcés. to il.m .' th~ • pub~c speeches ofM. Bidault, theForelgnM1Dlsterof But these protests and tl~ upsurge of public opinion against the coup from aIl parts of the world, gratifying though they may be, are not positive action ,to· remedy Czechoslovakia's situa- tion and to prevent similar developments in other countries. It is not enough to express regret over the death of freedom in Czechoslovakia. The aggressor, sure of bis strength, after allowing time for consolidating bis newly acquired position, cannot long refrain frllm taking another step forward on the path of aggression. The success of the Communist coup in Cze- choslovakia was only a few hours old when it became e'lJident that the plans for world revolu- tion and domination included more than the Slavic peoples alone. The Yugoslav General Maslaric, who aIso happened to be in Prague with the USSR General Gundarov during the crisis, said in part on 26 February 1948, at the initial meeting of the executive board of the Ali-Slav Committee: .. No one denies that the world is divide.d into two camps. The imperialistic camp is led by the United States with the help of the United King- dom and France, and the democraticcamp is led by the USSR, the Slav and non-Slav lands of peoples' democracy, and includes aU other .oppressed nations which, are struggling for their 1'pwn freedom and independence. To the demo- (cratic camp also belong the American workers ~i who are fighting against the lowering of their material standard of living, the American farmers who are fighting againstthe extraordinary cheap- ening of their produce, the American Negroes who are fighting for the same rights that other American citizens enjoy; in addition, the British, French and Italian workers and peasants WllO are .having a difficult struggle for their very existence. The democratic camp alsoinc1udes the Greek, .lndian, Malayan and Chinese.people. The demo- cratic camp is an immense power, while the imperialistic .camp is made.up of a group of imperiaIists from valious capitalistic States under the leadership of the American financial magnates of Wall Street" . General Maslaric.rejected as useless the attacks gf the West against the new Slavic movement, saying that it has nothingin common.either with racism or with the old Pan-Slavism. According to him, .the chief task of this new Slavmovement :s the strengthening of the democratic camp, the struggle against the Truman Doctrine' and t4e I\1arshall Plan. ln the final meeting of the All-Slav Committee on 28 February in Prague, USSR delegate Polevoj read a resolutionin which,among oth,er things, he said: .. The complicated intematiQ.llal. situation de- mands even greater efforts of the All-Slav 'Com- mittee and the National Slav Committees to -include, in their work, the widest classes of working people of our lands. The conferencetakes note .with specialgratification of the establisllment 1 am aware of the gravity of tbe:~situation and fuIly cognizant of the seriousness of my action. 1 acted in the best interests of. the people of Czechoslovakia as 1 saw them. 1 felt bound by a promise 1 gave to my chief, Jan Masaryk, before he left the United States last November, in which 1 gave my 'Yord to carry on, without waiting, after heèould no longer do so. - 1 have given all my ad11lt life to work for my country. 1 fought for its independence in the First Worid War. 1 was called a traitor and con- demned by local Austro-Hungarian authorities then. i worked élosely withPresident Benes for Czechoslovakia's li~,;ration during the Second World War~ 1 was called a traitor and condemned by the puppet Tiso regime a second tinte. My letter requestillg the investigation of the coup in Czechoslovakia by the Security Council res11lted in my being condemnedcHS a traitor for the third tL'D.e ; thistime, however, the condemna- tion came not from home, but from a responsible high official of a foreign country. From the day of the signing of the United Nations Declaration on 1 January 1942, 1 have worked for the purposes and'principles of the United Nations with all my energy aiJ.d complete devotion, not only as an individuaI, but as a representative of Czechoslovakia. My efforts are know to all of you. 1 declare solemnly that the success of the Unitéd Nations was my purpose in life, forpeace means progress for my people and security for my'country. 1 declare that 1sincerely andbonestly tried in every way ta bring about understanding -and agreem~nt in·all the sessions of thevarious , organs of the United Nations 1 attended. Let my record .~peak. 1 believed that Czechoslovakia as a Mêmber of the United Nations w011ld be able to conduct its dairs as . an independent nation. 1 admit my doubtsincreased during the past severai months. Nor was 1 alOne in doubting. On page 364 of his memoirs publishegm December 1947, President Benesaddea~a foot:' note to· a passage concerning the Treaty of .Friendship, Mutual. AssistanceandPost-War Co-operation with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. That footnote in translation readsas follows: Il Was 1 wrong in my judgment and expectations ?Only the future itself can answer trampl~d or is now in peril. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : 1 am sure that aIl members of the Security Council will wish to study and examine very carefully the statement to which we have just listened, and 1 reserve my right, at a later time of course, to comment on it. In 'the meantime, with the per- mission of the President, 1 should like to put some general considerations to the Secu.rity Coun- cil in order to set this question which is before us against its true background as it presents itself to me and to my Government. The representative of a Member of the United Nations, Chile, has requested, so far as 1 know in due and proper from, that the Security Conncil investigate bis Govemment's aIlegation based on the charges brought by the former permanent representative of Czechoslovakia, whilehe still occupied that official position, to the effect that the political independence of Czechoslovakia has been violated by the threat of the use of force by another Meinber of the United Nations, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. When we discussed the inclusion of this ques- tion in the agenda of the Securlty Council, .the representative of the USSR said that thes~charges are-and these are bis words-" pure inven- tion-", Il pure slander ", Il absolutely unfounded .t, .. absolute absurdity ". So wehave charge and counter-charge, and.it must be the. duty of the Security .Counoil to endeavoUf to arrive at the truth. That, in matters of this kind, is of course not easy. Ex ltypothesi, a GoverDJllent that wished to intérfere in the internalaffairs of another State Would, having regard to various provisions of the Charter, have to be careful to cover up its tracks. It would ·not nowadays, in the nature of things, 1 proceed openly, though 1 would. interject at this Mtr ~1 --------~-- __...2.!~ The Security Council will be advised to ask for proof in support of the allegations that have been. made. 1 do J;lot pretend that l, so ·far as 1 am concerned, possess absolute proof. 1 do not know-I have no means of knowing-what passed at any interviews which Mr. Zorin, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, may have had in Prague during the period of the crisis. 1 do not know-we are not allowed to know-the details of the interview, of which 1 have only seen photo- graphs, which took place betwen President Benes and Prime Minister Gottwald; nor can 1 know what. arguments the latter used to induce the ,President to accept demmLci that were notoriously repugnant to him. Presicl'.;:nt Benes could give us these, but since the recent coup d'état, he does .not appear tohave bad any facilities for publicity. We cannot, 1 think, expect to get such direct evidence. But that does not relieve us -of the resporisibility of trying to form an estimate of the likeUhood of the truth of these charges. Bland and bare denials are not, in this case, very eonvincing. We cannot be blind to what ha,s been happening under our eyes during the past few years. Country after country on the confines of the USSR has succumbed to, the rule of a ruthless Co~unist minority. The events of 1939 to 1941, the succession of violent changes of attitude toward the war made by Communist Parties in evcry country in the w,prld, proved that these parties took their orders from .Moscow. ''Fl1e circUmstances and the technique are ,!1lways the same. " 0 Everyone remembers Mr. Vyshinsky's visit to Bucharest when by means of-to say the least-- unorthodox methods he fastenedthe' GrozaGov- emment on Romania, ,leading finally to the enforced abdication of KiIlg •Michael, who had played _a not,able part in bringing Romania into tbe.war on the side of-the Allies. In other countries we have seen the same prQCess of a highly' organized minority seizing power, purging aIl the elements opposed to it, smothering aIl •democratic rule, suppre~sing all' normal liberties ,and establishing a police state on auniform mode}, What happenedthislast month . in Czechoslovakia had happenedbefore in Rô-. mania, Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary and -Poland. In aIl thesecountries,in breach of soleron intet- national pledges made at Yalta that free and deIllocratic institutions would be established, aIl the. parties but the Communist were 'graduaIly or suddemy-wiped' out. ln a number,of. these coun- tries,Russiantroopshadbeen in occupation In USSR-occupied Bulgaria, the Communists aIso began by taking office in a coalition domi- nated by the Agrarian Party. Mr. Dimitrov and his small but highly organized group, importecl from Russia, then elbowed out the legititnate representatives of Bulgarian democracy until they were able to take po~ openly. Opinion, in my country at least, was horrified not long thereafter by the judicial murder. in Bulgaria of a great resistance leader, the Socialist Petkov. . In Hungary the Communist technique was not only to install their men in key positions in the State but, under tbe wing of the Red Arroy, to .penetrate other parties from within. The Social Democratic Party has been brought by intimida.., tion and trickery to fuse with the Communists in spite of objectioD;s by the representatives directly eleoted by the working class on the party exe- cutive. When fre Smallholders Party refusèd to give way, the USSRHigh Comllland stepped in to arrest Kovacs, the Secretary-General. Hungary is now completely under CoffirilUnist control, though only last autuinn 80 percent o~ the electorate voted against,Communism. That is the process that we have seen, at ~ork in country after country, and th..e latest example is the coup d'état in Czechoslovakia which bears the regular hallmark. Of çourse, it might. be said that all these events were the outcome of spon- !aneous movements in the countries in question, whose inhabitants became progressively convinced of the blessings of living under a totalitarian regime administered by 'a ruthless niinoiity. Umortunately, these upheav'als generally seemed to coincide with the visit ,to the country concerned of a high USSR fwictionary froID Moscow. This coincidence of itselfmust .aroUse oùr sùspicions~ though 1 certainly would not suggest' that the Communists maintain' their close' contact with Moscow through such ovè~f visits à1one. Com- munist intrigue and penetration, plainly supported from abroad, are always at work underground.'In t~e case of Czechoslovakia, vve have thestatemerit of the new MiniS'ter of Foreign Trade, which was quoted at our last [268th] meeting on this ques- tion and again today, to theeffèct that .. We must thank, our Slav Allies, and riiainly the 'Union of Soviet Socialist Rèpublics,for the fact that we succeeded in .:.. dèfeating reaction ". 1 have since ascertainedthat this version corresponded with the fitst report issued by the officialCzeeh Press .Agency. Latet the Agency issued a correction from which ibis passage was fleletep. , , .... The latest coup in Czechoslovakia was handled according to typical Communist technique. It is a matter of pÙblic knowledge that Communist parties take 'their orders from Moscow and, according to the Cominform declaration of Octa- ber last, their actlvities .in certain European countries,' of which Czechoslovakia ie: one, ate co-ordinated by theCominfclrm,of the which USSR is the originator and the moving spirit. The conference of theCommunist .parties of various countries·.which met in.Polandin September last decided on the creation of an Information Bu- reau, .the tasks of. the Bureau being defined' as Il organizing the ~xchange of experience among the .parties. and, iftbe necessity arises, co- ordinating their activity on the -hasis Clf mutual agreement." jleDeral e1ecti""than il had 'receivedin'thélast~9.1I4entrer .For can it be believed that the Czech people would willingly have suppressed the democratic freedoms to- wbich, ever since their liberatj':,n from the Austrian Empire, they had attached such value? Can it be believed that a gallant nation ,like the Czeah~who made such·a magni- ficent resistance to the Nazis, and whose airmen played so greal; a part in the Battle of Britain- can it he believed that such a people would giV6 up their democratic rights unless some threat of overwhelming force had been brought against them? And can we doubt that, li the Czech people had freely accepted this change, their great national leaders, President Benes and Jan Masa- ryk, would have told the nation why $e change had been required, would have asked them to accept it, would have played a major part in ensuring that the nation as a whole genuinely agreed to what was done? Yet, what action did President Benes and Mr. Masaryk take to keep the nation united in support of the changes that were made? Jan Masaryk made his last desperate sacrifice ; he gave his life to prove to all the world that this change had been forced upon his nation. President Benes has so far made no declaration to bis people' or to the world, and, meanwhile the propaganda of the new Czechoslovak Govem- ment tries to persuade the people that the Western Powers have come out in their true calours as the. enemies of Czechoslovakïa. Notlling, of course, could he further from the truth,and I am. convinced th~t this crisis· has done nothing to lessen the feeling of friendship entertained by the British people for the people of Czechoslo- vakia. It is, of.course, ~the usual techniqu~ of stirring up international' hatreff which we have seen employed in other countries of Eastern Europe and, above all, in the USSR itself. o believe, therefore, that if a Member of the iaterpretatiOJ.lSOftheJelll~Œ 'of. the representa.;, tiveoftltc ~~ ~()Viet:~~'!'stRepublic, . , .. '. :.:', ,,'); '~. .. .'<blique . '. Mr~ TABASENKO'(UkrainianSoviet SOcialistM. ""l;~)Jtr4hSla~4from:RusSian): Far beit f:toiD meio:exaggcraiethrt:role.andsigniftcanceof CiIe<in l'aiSingt1iïsqU'tstion. Thereeanbeno deubt dlatthcChileanGovemment itself hasno ideawliat·exactlyitfNânfSand~wliat is tobe; pined;by this·step.Nbt,ùoI~.intend todweU on the œildish'slaiuler<tlmetthe so..called factsand èoDclusio.mofJ.mieh-14'person:asthe formerCzc:. daos1ovak,tepi'esentaltivc;to"tlIe'United.Nations, WholIe~1reaelieqi:f().JlibiSown,pebplccan hardly - ,fJem fomuto"ff""""V<i""-.oiJlY in l!Jb - - ... l"'~Y'~in-:~ Il is Willi2ID Bu11itt, the former Unitèd States Amb~:;sador to Moscow and Paris... The writer aIso gave facts demonstrating the connexions of the conspirators with the United Europe move- ment and its leader, Wmston Churchill. The conspirators had similar connexions. with impor- tant leaders of the British Labour Party. Il When the date· of the London Ccmerence between the United Kingdom, the United States and France on the German question.was decided," writes this journalist, .. fQreign and home reac- tionary circles agr~ed·that the coup in Czecho- .slovakia must be underlaken before the end ,of the· Conference. These reactionary circles feared that the Czechs and Slovaks wouId be deeply disquieted by the OJnference, which would faci- litate the rebirth of the German threat, and that that would wéaken the. influence of the Czecho- slovak Nationalist Socialist Party, which openly supported the insurrectionary plans.of the reac- tion." André Simon continues : Il Circles close to Bullitt declared that the Gottwald Government would fall even before the Trizonia discussions were ended. In the seCond half of February strong rumours began to circulate in Washington, Paris and London that the Gottwald Govemment was about to fall. One Latin Americar œplomat ~ Prague," continues André Simon, •.•/a'i informèd by ms Ministry of Foreign Affairs that high circles in Washington were interested- in Gott;. wald's fWl <and in the establishment of an ann- Communlst regime,in Czechoslovakia.·' At the last m~ment,·however, the plans of the domestic and foreign conspirators were upset. Ii is no secret that the Communist Party of Czechoslo- vakia played. adecisive and ·leading role in· the wreckingoftheseplans.Thatwas bound to arottse stoms ofangerand to call forth torrents of slanderagamst that Parly fromall those who were bacmg.andorganizing· the Czechoslovak conspï.ratOrs aild ·hadplacedtheirhopes,in them. The United Stâtes and.the United Kingdom are making great efforts to 'createamilitary, blocaf Wèstem '.'European States, ..directed'chiefty against tJw';'USSR. an.cl· the othetdemocratic .States of Eastern. Europë••.Tn these'plansanJmportant .par~ was.given to Czc:choslovakia. It was assumed'that the'coùppreparedby the reactionaries ofCzêcho': slovaki~ woulci'bê spccessfuLand thatthereafter ~ech.oslovakia would beincorporatedinthe anti" Soviefbloc.OWîng to'thetimely'discovery ofthis plottheplanstoidrawCzechoslovakia' intothe anti-SovietWesternEuropeànbloc .failed, and faileddecisively;,It.isno~surprising,th~refore, ,that theanger'and~di$appointmentotthe·al.1tho:\,s;of,thi~ plan·know no'b()und~"":f\ll tlJatremail:lc<Uor.th.em was>to vent,their 'anger. and disappomtnient, tq at~emptto.slanderthQse~esponsible;f()rdestrQying ~ir plans. Inthesecircunistanf,eswhynottryJo 1 In this connexionsometbing should be said about the so-ealled flconomic assistance to be granted by the United States to the Western European· countries. Mue::~ has been said and a great dea! of ink bas been spilt with the object of representing that assistance as the height of disinterestedness and an example of the extra- ordinary altruism of the United States. We are assured at every tum that this assistance has no political aim and that no political demands directIy or indirectly threatening their State sovereignty are made on the countries receiving United States ecanomic assistance. Words and facts, however, are two different things. The plan of assistance has not yet come into force-and who knows when it will 1-yet the western Euro- pean countries are already being compelled to settIe accounts. That was to be expected. The report of thePresident's Committee on Foreign Aid said:' .. The interest of the United States in Europe, however, cannot be measured solely in economic terms. It is also stl:'at~gic and political." . nous serait français . Thus thisis not a case of pure, altruismon the. part of the United States, Ï11tended only to ,help a neigbbour in distress as,quicklyas ,possible. Thèfacts are quite different. If we are ta speak of United Statesaltruism it May not beout of place to tecall a statement recently,. made in Il French'newspaper : <._,. DollardiploIt!acy has, set Jtselfthe, task ,of bleeding~whîtetheeconomy of the Western Euro- pean countries, so' tbatWh~n t&ishas been enlire;, ly destroyed, that is when>stand~dsof'livil1g have been reduced to a miniinum,tIlose countries will becomea sphere of exploitation. It wilLthen bepossiblewith the aid of ,politiéal power'to . gn~tablalilc occIdentale:. truite, auront rontdevenir alors gra~t intervention by a foreign Power in the intemal affairs of another State, an intervention in favour of traitors and hangmen against the people? Unlt~d States politicians. very frequently make statements intended to convince the world that the United State desires only to save Greece front economic chaos; but they pass ov~r in silèn~e the fact that this èhaos is the outcome of British and American overiordship in Greece. How can it be otherwise, when the overwhelming majority of United States deliveries consist of armaments intended for the destruction of the Oreek people? No wonder that in these circumstances the eco- nomic situation of Greece today is many times worse than it was at the moment of ilie departure of the Genilans. Thus, .for eXample, mining production in May 1947 amounted to 13 per cent of the pre-war Jevel, metal production 25 per cent, cement 'and building materials 32 pgr cent, and butter and margarine 15 per cent. . It is not without interest to compare these figures with some others testifying to the econo- mic rehabilitation of Czechoslovakia, the govem- lIlent of which is headed by representatives of that Communist Party which reactionary circles in the United States accuse of every mortal sin. At the end of 1947 industrial production ex- ceeded thç 1937 level Qy 10 per cent as, a whole, and by 40. per cent in rome br~ches of industry. The prodQcts of Cz~hoslovakianindustry stream ioto many counmes. In exchange for these pro- duets those counmes send Czechoslovakia raw materials for her industry and goods for her population. What an amazing contrast ! Tt is not surprising lbat Greece is now choking in the gril' of .inftati9n. U~employment has reached record figures. 'l'he people are hungry.• Bardly anywhere eIse in the wodd can t)1e poverty which now emts in Greec:e be Witnessed. Such .is the outcome of United Kîngdomand United 'State$ inte~ention in the internaI affail's The aim of the United States is to destroy Ita.. 1 lian industry, and tlte Italiall Govemment has fallen in with this plan'. In these circumstances why are the instigators of the Chilean letter not anxious to raise in the Security COUDcil the ques- tion of United States interference in the intemai affairs of Italy? At the moment Italy is preparing for elections to its legislative institutions.Thes~ elections are to 'take place on 18 April. Certain United States circles makeno secret of their fear of the possi,. bility of an electorat victory for the left-wing parties, i.e. for the parties which protectthe interests of the Italian people ratherthan of Wall Street. Certain governments are taking a series of measures designed to eliminate th~ possibility of undesirable electoral results in Italy. . Thus the United States magazine Business Week. an organ of well-informed and infiuentiàl business circles,published an« article early in Marchon the fQrthcoming elections '10 the Italian Parliament. This article states that .. Ita1y is American territory; here the United States seized tbeinitîative last .yearwithDe "Gasperi,'souster countrie~ and peoples ! ~era1l tbis itis no wonder the Italian press has announced that the United Statesisthinking ofdispatchingtoltaly,on the eve of the election, 30~OOO .macbine-guns. and 200,000 rifles, with· a view to preventing any disorderS which. might possibly occur., What Pbariseeism; wbat records of bypocrisy ,are being acbieved by those Ameri- cans who screamnow of'Soviet influence and Soviet interference in the domestic affairs of Cze- cboslovakia. ,while at the same time, ,heeding nothing and' no one, they transform one.coulitry ~fter aIl0tberintothëir protectorate !There can benQ doubt tbat the raisingof the Czechoslovak question in *eSecurity Council iSDne. of the Many, preparl\~ons being made for the Italian elections. It iS'an,attempt to influence the .course of'the elec~ons'in ttaly by a htiê·and crymspired by .~ti-Soviet slrander. . " " i~. 1 hav~,cited tWo countries onIy.Such examples . lIlight.be ,eften4~1i to .i~clude Many countriesof . Europe, .1\Sla and.i\tnenca; but 1 shall retum to tbat question (ID:. a future occasi,on.For .the momep.t 1 .wi11cont~nt myself by saying thàt Ui'lite(l Statesinterference in thedomestic àffairs of;0ther cOwitrieshas'beenerectedinto a kind of'.State .•doç~e'.1'heMonroe .Doctrine, .'in'.the ~ense '.in. whicb.i~w~s formerly understood; isnow .an.cie.nt ~ist()ryfi 't; ~e •J.\rgelltpte. ne",spaperEl .l...~der•. oflO,~~tch--,and., thlS ,lS not....aCom- !!t1.l!1!s~newspal'er,~utone, reftectin~,·the .. vie\Vs of'clfClesclosê, t0tbeGovernment__tells .what ·t1ieMonroeDoctriHe'basbec0n1~nowadays.. Thüs nevvspaper wa~ compelleÇl to declare withbit;. ternèssth~ttb~pred0minanceofforeign ..•capital' jn:tbecountries·.of Latin America .~·has •.created ditpculfdomçs.tic andforeignpolitièal problems for:the;çountnesofLatÏli'Àtnerica;:/fhe:éonces- lIio.ns systemhasfacedtliesè nations' witb.the fact ~f .intèrfèrencf3by largeiStâtes 'in,'theirdomestic affairs ".:Gdîngon'to: deal "with·.thtrInter- Americ~ super-State, the capital of which will be Washington n. It accuses the United States of creating aIl manner of inter-American agencies and attempting with their aid .. to ensure'capita- list domination and clear the way for the further- ance of the industrial, commercial and political interests of the United States n. It concludes that .. the economic, military and political rights in- volved in the creation of the proposed super- State are incompatible with the national sover- eignty of each of the republics of the New World ", l That is the presentreality of the Monroe Doc- trine, which was originally invoked to protect the countries of the American continent from inter- ference by the transatlantic countries, but which has in fact created a situation in which the United States is now able to swatlow the entire American continent. A great dea! of noise has been màde in the United States about, alleged intervention in the affairs of Czecholovakia; but as far as we are concerned it is more than obvious that aIl this hubbub was necessary to distract attention from the actual interferenèè"of thé United States in the domestic affairs of many countries of Europe, Asia and Mrica, and also of the countries of the American continent. Nowadays reactiona,ry cir- eles in the United States see a threat to their interests in any corner of the world where there exist States which refuse to' submit to their orders" where there is a State or a people which considers the principle of State and national sovereignty s8cred. The prevalent type of states- man or poJitician in the United States today is a gentleman such as, Mr. Dulles, according to whose poHtical philosophy aIl the difficulties and tnisfortunes of our times result from the existence of separate sovereign States"and such sovereignty must be ended, and ended as quickly as po.ssible. It must be noted that the Dulles theory merely provides a retrospecti,ve justification for estab- lished practice. Has· not this whole Chilean fabrication been concoct~d simply in order to concenl.the established practice of United States ~nterference in the domestic affairs' of many States of the world, and the policy of eXl?ansion now being pursued by the, United States? If dis- pleases the Government of the United. Statês that ~ .handful of,' crimintll'· conspirators has b~en eXj:'Jelled from the ,Gov'ernment of the .Czechoslo~ vak Republic. The Goyernment of the UJ;lited ~tates, considét:s .this a serions and .sufficient jus,. !ification, for calling Czecholovakia an undemo- cratic country. The' fact that the overwhelming majority of the population haveapproved the actions of their Government and expressed their confidè!1ceihit is of noaccount in. the eyes of the Govêmment' of ·the Unit~d States, which obstÏn:l1tely irisiststhat'theexîstingregime înCzê.:. choslovakia does ri:ot conform. to Atnerican stan'" dards of democracyand thatit shouldtherefore be debated in theSecurityCouncil. But what sort of dernocratièstnrtdards doesthe exceptional

The point of order raised·by the representative of Chile does not fall within therealm of rules of procedvll'e. It concems standards of speech in the Security Council. 1 sholl1d think that members themselves would wish to maintain at all times due dignity and decorum and due respect for each other personally, as weIl as for··· the member Govemments represented here. In my' opinion, the speech of the representative of me Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic did not faIl below the usual standards of language which we should like to tnaintain. Mr. Al\CE (Argentina) (translated trom Spanish) : 1 have no intention of dealing with the substance of this matter, but a point was raised a while ago which May be.of sorne mterest to us. Conceming the arrangement which the President has just adopted, 1 wish to point out that unless 1 am forcibly prevented from doing so under article 52 of the provisiol}al rules of procedure of the Security Couneil, 1 should like to ask the verbatim reporters to delete the' words .. unclean document" which were 'Used by the Ukrainian ,sSR representative. The .representative of Chile, who is seated with us at the Couneil, is a gentleman who came at OUi' invitation. We cannot take unfair advantage of the faet that he is not in a position to defend himself, since he does not enjoy the same ·rights as the members of the Council, as an excuse for insulting him or bis Govemment. The use of such words-and this is not the mst time such language has beenused-may lead sorne of the representatives to ask for the installation of a slop sink in this Council Chamber to flush out everything dirty and Ï11decent whenever it is necessary. 1 hope we shall not come tothis. 1 wish DOW tt) refer briefly to a timely allusion· made bytheUkrainian SSR representative toa certain item in an Argentine newspaper wbich he quoted. UDIess my memory is atfault, 1 might be able to say that· bis intentin this quotation is by no meanssp<>t1ess. ~< existe Buenos-Aires, cultés Car faut Mais pays et de rendre Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) (translated jrom Spanish) : 1 merely wish to express my gratitude for what the President has said and thank the representative of Argentina. Je l'explication cier sécurité mettent contre Conseil cerai ce It seems clear, in any caJe, that the Security Couneil is not in a position to protect the rights of its members against such insults. put of re·· spect to the Council and with regard for its digD.ity, 1 shaIl try nof to be drawn into the use of that kind of language. accoutumé que But 1 wish to make it clear that 1 am' not accustomed to' accepting insults either against myself or against. my country. . donné discussion de vue 25

IIi view of the lateness of the hour, Ipropose that we adjourn our discussion unill tomorrow aÉternoon. 1 -wish to announee thatthe meeting on the India-Pakistan question, originally scheduled for tomorrow aftern0on, is postponed ,to Thursday, 25' March 1948. .. The meeting rose a.t ,6.~0. p.m. DEUX TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY·THIRD MEETING Reid at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 23 March 1948, at 2.30 p.m. President: Mr. T. F. TSIANG (China). Argentine, France, d'Ukraine, soviétiques, . rique. Present : The representatives of the following countries: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Chin,a, Colombia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re~ public, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. 32. Provisional agenda (document SIAgenda 273) 1 2. L Adoption of the agenda. 2. Letter dated 12 March 1948, from the permanent .representative of Chile to the United Nations .'addressed to the ..Secretary-General (document S/694). .33. Adop6on of the agenda