S/PV.277 Security Council
▶ This meeting at a glance
7
Speeches
0
Countries
2
Resolutions
Resolutions:
S/RES/43(1948),
S/RES/44(1948)
Topics
General statements and positions
Security Council deliberations
General debate rhetoric
War and military aggression
UN membership and Cold War
Arab political groupings
The agenda was adopted.
Vote:
S/RES/43(1948)
Recorded Vote
✓ 11
✗ 0
0 abs.
Before we begin the consideration of the items on the agenda, l should like.to express the appreciation of the Security -:::::ev: able~d pamstakmgman-
There are a number of matters on the agenda of the Security Council, sorne of which can be discussed at a later date and sorne of a very pressing nature, such as the India-Pakistan, Palestine and Czechos1ovakia questions. In regard to the Czechoslovakia question, the Security Council is scheduled to have a meeting on 6 April. In regard to the India-Pakistan dispute, if it is the pleasure of the Security Council, 1 shall continue the conversations that were being carried on by the President with the delegations of India and Pakistan, with the co-operation of the previous Presidents of the Security Council, that is, the representatives of Canada, Belgium and China, and also, as it may appear advisable, of sorne other representatives on the Council. 1 propose to have a preliIninary conversation with the delegations of India and Pakistan separately in arder to get their reaction ta the draft which was distributed by Mr. Tsiang,under date of 30 March. Mter that, 1 propose to discuss the . matter jointly with the two delegations with .the co-operation, as 1 have already said, of the former Presidents of the Security Council who have been participating in these discussions, my expectation being that we shall be able to subniit some kind of conclusion ta the Security Council next week. .
4. Coniinuation of the discussion on the Palestine question
The, PRESIDENT: As regards Palestine, we have today the reports submitted by the Palestine Commission and the proposals [documents S/704 and S/705] that we began ta discuss at the 275th meeting. Before we adjourn the meeting, 1 shaIl put it ta the Security Council as to how we shall . proceed with that matter after a decision has . been taken on the two proposais which are under consideration.
.At the invitatian of the President, Mr. Lisicky, Chairman of the 'United Nations Palestine Commission, Mr. Fawzi, the representative of Egypt, and Mt. Shertok, the representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, took their places at the Security Council table. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): .1 would like ta state that on this 'question the position of the Argentine delegation isthesame today as it was previously. Circumstances ,havè made it so.
In spite of our reservations, we were prepared to support the solution adopted. But the Assembly's recommendatiûn has not found a favourable response in the Secùrity Council. Of the four permanent members who were prepared to participate~ two seemed to be in complete agreement. The Couneil pas;,~::l the Assembly's recommendation to them i:I.lld, as is generally known, they met on three or four occasions to discuss a soluti.cn that could be submitted to the Council for approval. One of them again suggested the advisability of bringing the two. hostile commllnities together. That is precisely the Argentine vicw.
But, nnfortunately, the attempt at conciliation failed and the great Powers t.hat had been in agreement, ceased to be so. Meanwhile, time is passing; the remaining period is growing shorter and no self-respecting Member' of the United Nations can favour chaùs. Consequently, we are obliged to return to our original position, not favouring one side or the other.
If it is true that there are Powers which desire confusion in order ta infiltrate into Palestine and obtain political advantages, we declare that we cannot support them in this. If it is true that there are Powers interested in dominating the 'Middle E2.st for econ<;>mic reasons, we dec1are that such interests are foreign to us and we hope that they will pursue their activities in a lawful manner and L'l conformity with the principlès of the Charter.
But we again ask the Arabs and the Jews to reach agreemént; they will gain nothmg by killing each other. In order to reach this agreement both communities must show more understand-
The Assembly"s ;recommendation will not be nullified by theCoUncil's approval of the United States proposal. The Argentine delegation will vote for this proposal.
Before conchuling 1 wish to quote the words of President Peron: "We have always stood beside suffering nations and we reaffirm the past and present acts of solidarity at this critical time in the world, when discord and confusion seem likely to become the general rple in international lif " e.
We thererore urge that the Arabs and the Jews seek an agreement~in their own 'interest and in the interests of world peace.
Mr.. NISOT (Belgium) (tra1Zslated from French): For_my part, this is how 1 se~ the situation at the present stage. By its resolution. of 29 November/ the General Assembly requested. the Council to·take the necessary steps for the implementation of the Phu of Partition. The Council considered this request and on 5 March [263rd meeting]; voted to reject the United States proposaI that the' Council should comply with the General Assembly's request.
. générale .tion dont je ne méconnais pas l'importance.
In so doing, the Council acted within the limits Df its powers. Indeed, it wasunder nb obligatioA to comply with the. General Assem.:. bly's request. Moreover, the Assembly was aware that the Council was fTee to accept or reject its 'request; it knew that, under the Charter, the Council was entitled to come to its own inde- , pendent conclusions. The CounçU would be guilty of grave negligence, however, if it failed to inform the General Assembly of the· action it had taken on the Assembly's request, and if it did not immediately convoke the Assembly and thus enable it to deal with the situation.. , No doubt it has been objected that the General Assembly itseH migq.t have as ;much difficulty astheCouncilin finding a solution to thisproblem. .1 am.not unmindfulof the importance of thisobjeètion, but 1 think that tl$ consideration
l would add that the convoking of the General Assembly would not prevent the Council from considering, in the meantime, a!')y substantive proposais which it might be fi a poi.- tion to submit tothe General Assembl}.
l shall, therefore, vote in favour of the United States draft proposal to convoke a special session of the General Assembly. . The United States delegation submitted another pmpcsalfor a truce between the parties concerned. There is no need for me to explain the reasons which prompt me to vote for this proposaI as weIl. At this point the system of sirrLUltaneous interpretation was introduced.
Mr. SHERTOK (Jewish Ag'el1(~y for Palestine) : The.Jewîsh Agency for Palestine is grateful for the opportunity to comment on the two resolutions submitted by the representative of the United States to the 275th meeting of the Security Council on 30 March 1948.
The first of these resolutions [document 8/704] provides for a conclusion of a truce between the Aral:} and Jewish communities of Palestine under the auspices of the Secarity 1 Council in consultation with the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee. In its final paragraph the draft resolution proposes that the Security Council should "call upon Arab and Jewish armed groups in Palestine to cease acts of violence". Before definmg the views of the Jewish Agency and the Jewish people of Palestine on the cQnclusion of a truce, l feel bound te com.Inent uponthe setting in which the United States draft resolution seeks to present the problem of restoring peace in Palestine. l fear that this setting distorts the picture in two vital respects. It conveys the impression, urst, that the armed conflict now raging in Palestine lS a purely local affair, affectingonly the population of Pà.lestine, .Tewish and Arab; and second, that the fighting has broken out as 'a result of both sides h~ving . fallen upon one another, sd that both art now equaily guilty, or, at least, that it is impossible ·or immaterial to determine which is the attacker and which the attacked.
Because of these misleading implicati9ns, the resolution itself becomes a wrong starting point fol' the quest for peace, for you cannot attack
l wish that it were easier to ascribe this omis" sion ta mere inadvertence which the Security Council, by virtue of its primary duty to "suppress acts of aggression", will hasten to correct, for rarely in the modern history of international relations can an act of aggression have occurred in a manner more blatant, more scornful of conceaIment, or more exultantly arrogant.
The campaign of aggressive violence was launched amidst clamorous proclamations by the heads of Arab Governments of their intention to use force against the Jews of Palestine and again any agencies of the United Nations which might proceed to carry out their lawful duties in implementing the General Assembly's resolution.
These statements were swiftly translated into action. Armed forces were recruited under the direction of the Governments of Arab States. They were equipped and financed from the' resources of those Governments. Their command... ers were appointed by ministers and officiaIs of . Arab States under the chairmanship of one of their heads, namely, the President of the Syrian Republic. They have been dispatched across the frontiers with arms and mechanized transport, in successive and open acts of frontier violation. They have launched àttacks on peaceful Jewish villages and organized riots and bloodsh~d among the urban population. They have fastened their effective military control upon large areas of the country. As the Security Council deliberates week after week, in Palestine those Arab armed forces are moving into battle positions on what is still the territory of the 'British Mandate, perfecting their organization and peri" odically breaking'out into attacks upon the lew" ish population in preparation and training. for the major assault whereby they hope ta intimidate the United Nations into final submission and to impose a settlement of the Palestine question by force.
It is the presence of these foreign Arab forces on the soil of Palestine and the preparation for further incursions which constitute the main threat to law and order in Palestine today. But for these invasions :ro.n neighbouring States, the situation in Palestine would hardly have raised a, problem which could not be quickly re5oIved; and the implementation of the plan
The United Kingdom Government has made . public further authentic information on this subject through ofijcial statements -in the House of Commons. 1 believe that thè United Kingdom representative here present will agree with me, if, basing myself on official United IGngdom figures, 1 would e'.itimate the total strength of these invading forces at approxirnate1y 7,500. From the same United Kingdom sources it can be deduced that these men come well armed and equipped, uniformed and organized in military formation.
The Mandatory Power, which has abdicated its responsibility as the guardian of the frontiers of Palestine and re1egated itself to the l'ole of a mere recorder oftheir violations, does not seem ta have registered the direct responsibility of Arab Governments for aU these invasions, save as regards an incursion from Syria on 21. January 1948 against which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom lodged a protest of sorts with the Government of the Syrian Republic and with the Kingdom of Transjordan. The protesti was ignored, no fuI'- ther action was taken by the United Kingdom, and incursions from Syria continued and hecame more open.
But we need not resort to the good offices of the Mandatory Power to provide evidence that Arab Governments have organized these invasions. The evidence is more direct and authentic. It cornes from those Governments themse1ves. It is revealed in recruiting regulations issued by the Syrian Minister of Defence; in photographs of the Syrian Prime' Minister supervisingthe training of troops for war in Palestine at Qatana Barracks in Syria;.in the action of the Egyptian Government in aUotting militarybarracks at Hilmiyeh and He1wan for the same purposc; in the assignment by the Egyptian Government of budgetary allocations for operations in Palestine; in the announcement of the Lebanese Prime Minister on 25 February of bis Government's intention to supply Palestine with arms, money
The evidence of these aggressive invasions and of the respoI\SÏbility of the Arab Governments for them is tao voluminous for me ta recite here. l therefore beg leave ta submit, as written information, under rule 39 of the provisional rules ofprocedure of the Security Council, two memà- randa on the subject with annexes. The Security Council should at least not fail ta record this notorious aggression, even if it proves unable ta suppress it.
This campaign of aggression l'aises two questions which are relevant, in my submission, ta the first of the United States resolutions [document SI704]. First, there is a fundamental point of principIe. Is it legitimate for Member States ta use force against a settlement adopted by the General Assembly? The, representatives of Arab States in their statements before the Security Council have tried to evade the issue by arguing that Member States are under no obligation ta comply with a resolution of the General Assembly. Not to comply is one tlring. Openly and actively to defy is quite another. So much for the aggressor States. #
A more serious question arises in relation to the Security Council itself. 1s it proper for the Security Council, having received conclusive evidence of aggression actually committed, to take no steps at all to suppress, nay, not even ta conderon-nor even to record--that aggression? Is it a just interpretation of the Security Council's function in this question that it should obey the demand of the aggressor at pistol-point, ~nd advocate a revision of a GeneralAssembly resolution for no other reason tha-n that the resolution is assailed by armed force? Does the United Nations seek in the case of Palestine a settlement on the basis of equity and mutual adjustment, or is it merely in pursuit of a settlement against which the Arabs' will graciously condescend not ta use force? lt would be. presumptuous on my part to elabqrate the point that the principle involved in these questions transcends ,.even the grave episode which is under discussion and affects the .very foundations of international order.
It is aIl the more.inadmissible for the Security Coùncil to take no action against the patent external aggression which is in progress in view of the fact that there is general, agreement on the requirements of the Charter in this matter. Thus, on 24 February 1948, the representativeof the United States on the· Security Council took a
But on that very day of 24 February, as though in direct response to Ambassador Austin's words, the Mandatory Power reported to the permanent members of the Security Council that "between 500 and 1,000 Iraqis, Lebanese, Syrians, Egyptians, and Transjordanians entered Samariaand Galilee across the Jordan and the Lebanese frontier." Again, the representative of France declared in the Security Council: "It is quite inadmissible that any Member State of the United Nations in a territory which is not its own, should by armed force oppose the efforts of other Members of 'the United Nations to implement a resolution of the General As~ sembly. Such action goes much further than mere abstention from participation in implementation which the Charter allows. We are faced here with open rev9lt ~hich is not authorized by the Charter and which is dearly contrary to the Charter." [262nd meeting] .
These examplary words were spoken on 5 March. Yet on that day of 5 Mar~h, according to British official sources, the notorious protégé of Adolf Hitler, Fawzi Al-Kawukji, entered Palestine with his headquarters troops to assume command of the so-called Yarmuk form:ation. He was acting in conformity with the dec~~on taken at a meeting which took place in Damascus on 5 February, under the chairman'ship of the President of the Syrian Republic, when, according to a·first-h~rJ.d report by the Damascus correspondent of che Cairo daily Al-MasTi: 0
"General Ismail Safwat was appointed commander-in-chief of the Arab Liberation Army, General Tâha Pasha Al-Hashimi was nominated inspector of the Liberation Armies, and Fawzi Al-Kawukji was entrusted with the command of the Al-Yàrmuk formation." It is always °a diverting experience·to contrast the learned speechet. of the Syrian representative here,.replete with quotations. from the Charter and protestations of loyalty to the ideal~ of peace, with the quite different asr~ct of affairs at Damascus. As amember of the Security Council, Syria is onè of those States on which the Members of the United ~ations have conferrëd "primary responsibility for the 'maintenance of international peaceand security". It is aIl very weIl for the. Syrian representative on the Security Council to make here the ,bold
If the Security Council sees aggression going IOn before its very eyes and proceeds to fulfil the main objective of that aggression by recommending a revision of the General Assembly's resolution, the consequences for world peace must indeed be grave. These consequences entail a very heavy responsibility for the leading world Power which sponsors the present resolution.
To recapitulate, the United States draft resolution tears the problem out of its context and treats the conflict in complete isolation from the question as to who upholds ar.'!d who defies the United Nations authority; it ignores the gravest , feature of the Palestine crisis, which is aggression from outside; it flies in the face of facts by diagnosing the crisis as the result of a mere local communal clash; by implication, it exonerates the aggressor States of all guilt; without even attempting to deal with the invasion of Palestine by foreign forces,. it misses the target by urging a local truce as a remedy. ,
."infiltration en
In brief, the resolution perpetrates a triple optical illusion: first, it arbitrarily. separates the conflict from its international setting; second, it artificially, reduces its scope; third, it wantonly creates .n' position of faIse equality between the Jews and the Arabs. In presenting the resolution,the representative of the United States, quoting from his earlier report, in arder ta balance the 'l,Mieven scales conjures up an iInaginary "infiltràtion into Palestine . . . by sea, of groups ... with the purpose of taking part in violence". [270th meeting]
It is against this background that it is my duty ta set before the Security Council the attitude of the Jewish Agency and of the Jewisb population of Palestine towards the proposais for a truce. That attitude was expressed in a letter which 1 had the honour ta address on 17 March ta the Secretary-General in response to a question put ta us by the United States delegation in the course of the consultations held by the permanent members of the Security Council. The letter reads as follows: "1 have the honour, on behaIf of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, to submit the following reply to the question addressed to the Jewish Agency as to whether,it would be prepared to enter into the necessary agreements to bring about an effective truce in Palestine:
"1. It must be emphasized that in so fl';U' as the term 'truce' implies a conflict between two belligerents, it does not accurately fit the facts of the present situation, in which, on the one hand, an attempt is being made by the Arab States and the Arabs of Palestine to alter by force a settlement approved by the General As· sembly of the United Nations, while the Jewish community has been ciefending itself and the decision of the United Nations which it has loyally accepted. "2. Subsequent to the adoption of the resolution of the General Assembly, of 29 November, on the future government of Palestine, the Jewish population in Palestine has been subjected to attacks by Arab forces, including armed bands from outside' the country which, as the United Nations Palestine Commission has reported to the Security Council, are attempting to alter the resolu,tion of the General Assembly by force.
"3. The Jewish people has in no case resorted to aggression against the Arab people, nor does it seek conflict with them. At the same time, the Jews of Palestine have been obliged to take measures to protect themselves from attack and to uphold their rights under the United Nations resolution.
"4. The moment that Arab aggression ceases, Jewish armed reaction will also terminate. There must, of course, be a dear understanding, that the cessation of Arab aggression will aIso indude the stoppage of preparations for future aggres· sion, the evacuation of foreign forces and the prevention of further incursions of armed bailds into Palestine.
"5. It is assumed that any arrangement for a truce will be carried out within the framework of the implementation of the resolution of the
1 now draw particular attention to paragraph four of our letter in which the Jewish Agency stipulates "the' evacuation of foreign forces and the prevention of further incurûons of armed bands into Palestine" as indispensable conditions of any truce. There is noreality in "a truce be- 'tween the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine" [document 81704] when the Ar2'h community is merely a subsidiary agent of aggression, while the Jewish community has no other interest but to defend itself and move forward to the fulfilment of an authorized international programme, and when the source of aggression lies outside the control of both partiès , and flourishes unhindered in the very centre of the country.
The Jews of Palestine can attach no validity ta any assurance of peaceful intentions on the part of the Arabs so long as these foreign forces remain on Palestine soil, where they have no right of access,' no jurisdiction and no internationally valid purpose to pursue.
We believe that we are justified in claiming their expulsion and that the fulfilment of this daim is both practical and necessary. No people anywhere in the world will voluntarilysign a truce with invading forces converging upon it and poised to strike. This would riot be a truce; !t would be a capitulation.
Moreover, the armed formations concerned are easily identifiable. The :report of that memorable Damascus meeting of 5 February, to which 1 have already referred, goes on td say:
The location of the main formations of these foreign invaders can easily be found. Thus, on 16 March, the batde order of Fawzi Al-Kawukji's troops was, according to our information at that date, roughly as follows: the First Yarmuk regiment of Syrian troops at Jaba village between Nablus and Jenin, commanded, by a Syrian officer, Mohammed Safa; the Second Yarmuk regiment of Syrian troops at J en~, under Hashem Mohammed, an Iraqi; the Al-Hussein Regiment at Attil village, commanded by Abdul Wahhab, an Iraqi; the Al-Hasan Regiment at Tubas village, commanded by Mahmud Al-Hindi, an Iraqi; an Iraqi contingent at Ras ui-Ain, near the source of the Jerusalem water supply; an Egyptian contingent at Gaza; a Bosnian-Moslem contingent at Lydda.
The authority supervising the truce shouId not have much difficulty in locating any of these large units, though sorne individuals may be fOJmd to have merged with the general population. It is clear from t.."le above quoted report of the Damascus meeting, and from other local evidence, that foreign commanders responsible to Damascus are in control of all Arab military operating under the orders of the Mufti, has that city alone the Arab Higher Committee, operating under the orders of the Mufti, has been awarded qualified freedom. Its role, according to a statement issued on Good Friday, is to organize force against any attempts to est?blish Jerusalem as an international city he1d by the United Nations in trust for mankind.
It would thus be quite unrealistic to negotiate a truce with the Arab Higher Committee for any area except Jerusalem, where alone this local Palestinian body has sorne jurisdiction. So far as Jerusalem is concerned, the Jewish Agency has already stated that it is prepared to negotiate a truce with the body which it recognizes as responsible for the disorders there.
1 would also draw attention to the first paragraph of the letterquoted which explains the inapplicability of the term "truce" to the situation now existing Îll Pâlestine. The parties confronting each. other are the Jews defending a lawful international decision, and the Arabs, both inside and outside Palestine, who are, in the words of the United Nations Palestine Com-
. In para:g~aph 5 of our letter of 17 March we stipulate that the proposed truce shall not hampernor delay the implementation of the General Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947. It is obvious that 'to delay the implementation of that resolution would be no neutral act in the spirit of a truce,. but a concession, under pressure of violence, to the main' objectives of the attacking party. It is necessary to make this point clear since a situation may arise in which one of the parties m~es the; truce conditional on the suspension of the General Assembly's resolution, while the othèr makes it conditional on the maintenance of that resolution. It should go without saying that there.can be no equation between the upholding of an international instrument and its violation. The Security Council, as an organ of the United Nations, can hardly take any other view.
On 5 March the representative of France said in the Sec-urity Council: "If its 'validity"-that is, the validity of the _General Assembly's recommendation-"and its bincling charaçter on certain States can be questioned, there can be no-discussion as to its applicationto and ici hinding character upon all the organs ·bf the United Nations, including, of course, the Security Council."· [262nd meeting] We fully share this conception of the binding 'character of the resolution and of th~ Security Council's lack of competence to set it aside. It is'unreasonable to require one of the parties to the} truce to sacrifice its rights in law in order that .the other party, having won its aim, may desist from the violence by which it was achieved.
Dr. Chaim We~mann, universally acknowledged as the greatest Jewish leader of our generation, stated last week in this connexion: ' . . . . , "There haS been a soleron judgment by the ·authorized tribunaL The duty of conciliation iS
I would refer only to one overriëling question which should be cleared up, I submit, before this resolution is voted upon. The maintenance of a truce requrres an authority to supervise its observance by both parties, if and when they have agreed·to its terms. This authority must also have power to take actidn against any violation of the truce by one of the signataries. Its particular function in Palestine must be to watch over the frontiers and prevent their violation. It seems to us that it would not be realistic to pursue this matter far without an assurance that such a supervisory authority is available. The United States can hardly be unaware that the issue of enforcement cannot be shirked in relation to the Palestine problem, not even in the maintenance of a truce.
, \
Finaily, I should like ta urge, on the basis of these submissians, that the resolution may be amended to conform with the realities of the situation, the domin;l.nt fact of which is foreign aggression. As has been pointed out, the draft in its present form is based on the illusion of an internal conflict, and if it is accepted as setting the line of a truce negotiation, it may prejudice the end it has in view, namely, the restoration of peace in Palestine and the eli..rnin.ation of violence as a factor affecting international policy.
I come now to the second resolution submitted by the' representative of the United States [document SI705]. It is proposed that,the General Assembly be convoked once again in special session "to consider further the question of the future government of Palestine". There:is a curious, if not ironic, coincidence attached to this proposaI. It is debated here today exactly one year, less one day, since the same request was originally presented by the United Kingdom. It is phrased in language which is almost identical. A word has been added. That word is "further". olThis may, or may not, represent progress.
One may assume that this resolution, like the truce proposal,emanated·from the consultations of the permanent members of the Sectirity Counl'information combent" réalisation par 'une ou du arabes. de niser à blée, été propagande quelles l'unanimité contre ser étrangères déjà.
tion~ For the sake of the record and for the information of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, 1 would, with the permission of the President, read the text of th~e proposais made on 12 March 1948. They were as follows: "1. To assume the responsibilities assigned to it"-the Security Councîl-"in the General Assembly's' plan for implementation. "2; To determine any attempt to alter by force the Assembly's resolution as a 'threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression'.
"3.To determine that a threat to the peace does exist.in view of actions by certain Arab Governments. "4. To calI upon Arab Member States to stop recruiting and organizing armed forces to resistthe Assembly's resolution, and to withdraw .their nationalS already sent for this Purp9se.
"5. To calI upon Arab States to stop their warlike .propaganda and incitement contrary to theunanimous resolution of the Assembly against warmongering (12 October 1947).2
"6. To call upon the Mandatory -Power to prevent the entry of unauthorized foreign forces and to expel thosealready in Palestine.
"7. To Ïnstruct the Palestine Commissionto proceed with all speed with all phases of implemehtation, with special priority to the establishment of Provisional Councils of Government and the organization and equipment of militias.
pOUT diligence résolution de l'Assemblée générale, en s'attachant par nement milices
Threats of violence against implementation re-echoed in the course of the discussions in the General Assembly and in the ad hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question. They resounded until the very last moment before the voting The General Assembly ano?ted its historie decision ID the teeth of these threats. If it had inte:nded to retreat and drop the Plan of Partition when confronted by an attempt to resist it by force; what was the meaning of the express and emphatic provisions included in the resolution regarding the duties of the Security Council ta take specific action if faced with such an attempt? Yet the fact that the General Assembly did not set peaceful implementation as a prerequisite by no means signifies that the implementation of the Plan could not be carried out peacefully.
What is undeniable is that the peacdul implementation of the Plan must inevitably have been gravely jeopardized, as it has indeed been jeopardized, by the absence of an adequate force ta back it up. But since when has the building ll-P and maintenance of an armed force to buttress peace, national or international, become morally opprobrious or politically unacceptable? History abounds with instances, of which the most tragic is the position of the democracies in 1939, when lack of force in defence of peace became the direct cause of war.
What. has happèned in so far as the Plan of Partition in Palestine is concerned? A special international force to ensu,re its implementation was not provided. The foirce which is in Palestine today by virtue of an iirJ.ternational dispensa-
.armes d'appliquer le moyen
As to other Governments, the United States has instituted an indiscrimînate embargo on the exportation of arms to the Middle East, denying arms to the hard-pressed Jews in the same measure as to'the Arab aggressors. Certain other Governments are repolted ta be selling arms to the Arabs. The Arabs have seven States; the Jews have none. The Security Council has taken no action either to provide a force in support of the Plan or, at least, to arm those defending it and themselves.
The sordid record of how every proposed step of the Palestine Commission has been impeded and obstructed is too weIl known to need repetition. To sum it up, the will to irnplement the Plan peacefully was not forthcomi:.o lu the absence of that will, theway to implementation has not been found.
Yet, despitc all chicanery and indifference, the stream of life has proved irresistible. What is inherent in the 'lature of things and in the logic of developments is forcing it way through. Partition and the establishment of a Jewish State are
ties, obstacles.
Trusteeship means denial, or at least postponement, of independence. We believe that we are ripe for independence. So are the Arabs. We challenge anyone ta prove that we are note We have passed, in fact, the threshold of statehood. We refuse to be thrown back.
The United States Govemment cannot fail to be aware that the idea of trusteeship for Palestine has been thoroughly discussed by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine and rejected by that body. Here is what UNSCOP had to say in its unanimous recommendation II: S
" (a) Although sharply divided by political issues, the peoples of Palestine are sufficiently advanced to govern themselves independently.
"(b) The Arab and Jewish peoples, after morethan a quarter of a century of tutelage under the Mandate, both seek a means of effective expression for their national aspirations.
" (c) It is highly unlikely that any arrangement which wOllld fail to envisage independence at a reasonably early date would :find the slightest welcome among either Arabs or Jews."
UNSCOP also p"ointed 'out in. its comment ta the unanimous recommendatiol1 IlIs that a transitional period "would in alllikelihood onlyselve
But the United States Governmènt, through its Chief Executive, has declared that partition still remained the ultimate goal of its Palestine policy, and that the proposed temporary trusteeship was designed merely ta pave the way for its peaceful achievement. One looks in vain for consistent reasoning ta explain this c:ieviation from the original programme. If the reason for abandoning partition as an immediate objective isarmed opposition, why should that opposition not apply ta a trusteeship, the oruy purpose of which is to serve as an intermediary stage toward partition in the future? If the Security Council capitulates to violence, why should not violence press its advantage further? Does not aggression feed on appeasement? If, on the other hand, what is meant by ",eventualu partition is something quite difIerent from what was resolvetl on 29 November 1947, how can the Jews be expected to submit now to a course calculated eventually to lead to their undoing?
Moreover, we note that it is proposed ta force a trusteeship upon a country ripe for independence, without any assurance that a trustee Le; available, that means of enforcement can be supplied, that any section of the population will cooperate, that the General Assembly will approve an agreement, or that a working regime can be established by 15 May.
The charted course of the implementation of partition is ta be replaced by a leap mto the perilous unknOWll. At the 274th meeting of the Security Council, the representatives of France and Canada stated that it would. be necessary for them ta have more specific knowledge of what was actually involved in the trusteeship proposal before they could commit their Govcrnments to support a reconsideration of the Palestine question based on the trusteeship idea. It is, therefore, surprising that not a single one of the crucial and intricate questions raised by trusteeship has been elucidated so far by the United States delegation.
The second draft resolution still invites the Security Council ta set out on a course with no clear destination and no milestones on the way.
1t is not tao late ta return ta the path clearly traced by the General Assembly's resolution. 'l'hat path represents the product of eight months of continuous constructive international thinking. The reversaI of the process can lead only
In conclusion, l beg leave to call the attention of the Security Council to one specifie problem of a most critical urgency, a problem which has a direct bearing on the question of a truce. l refer tQ the situation in Jerusalem and to the responsibilities of the United Nations for the immunity, peace and welfare of that Holy City and its environs.
Under the plan adopted by the General Assembly, a Special International Regime under the United Nations Trusteeship Council was decreed for Jerusalem. The .exclusion, from the Jewish State, of Jerusalem with its unique historie associations for the Jewish people and with the central place it oecupies in its tradition and modern life, was a most painful sacrifice. Eloquent appeals were made to the Jewish Agency during the General Assembly session by the representatives of Pcwers, great and smaIl, to realize the transcendent importance of Jerusalem to the entire civilized world and to let the City's universal associations take precedence over its predominantly Jewish character.
In deference to an overwhelming concensus of world opinion, the Jewish Agency accepted the idea of an international regime for Jerusalem. Since then, the Jewish Agency has co-operated actively with the Trusteeship Council in helping to formulate a statute for Jerusalem, as provided for in the General Assembly resolution.
In thus subordinating Jewish claims to the fervently expressed interest c;>f the Christian world, the Jewish Agency confidently expected that the United Nations would take aIl the steps necessary to secure the objectives which aroused such strong and widespread support in the General Assemhly. It is tragic. to reGord what has, in fact, happened.
The Mandatory Power has allowed the control of the ûld City of Jerusalem to slip into the hands of armed Arab bands, and has taken no effective action to prevent the approaches to the City from being likewise dominated by Arab forces. Commande.'rs appointed by the Arab Higher Committee-that is to say, the Mu~ti now control access to the gates of the Holy City and to the Holy Places. The Arab Higher Committee has recently announced its determination to use force againstany attempt to establish Jeru-
As thé Mandate now draws to an end, instead of coming under an international regime which would maintain the civilized standards of its government, Jerusalem seems about to faIl, as most of its Holy Places have aIready fallen, into the clutches of the most fanatical and impious elements in the country. One of the two henchmen of the Mufti, now in command, Sheikh Yasin Bakri, has boasted in public of his prowess in sniping at Jewish funeral parties on their way to the haIlowed cemetery on ' the Mount of Olives. He has been photographed by Cairo newspapers in the act of directing fire from the walls of the Haram enclosure, the socaIled Mosqué of Omar. When we see other photographs of this person, photographs which have been submitted to the Security Council, receiving courtesy visits from the British Area Commander of Jerusalem, we are forced to assume that he is considered in sorne quarters as a suitabIe custodian of the holy sites. He has proclaimed another success: for the first time since Roman days, Jewish worshippers are now foreibly prevented from having access to the Wailing WaIl, the greatest sanctuary of the Jew- ·00 faith.
Another agent of the Mufti, now in a position of command, Abdul Kader Al-Husseini, has a notoricius record for his murderous activities durmg the 1936 rebellion, and for his pro-Nazi collaboration during the war. He is now engaged in plans for cutting off the City's water supply . and for requcing its Jewish population to starvation.
1 said that the Jews yielded to the international verdict. .They did not yield in favour of Sheikh Bakri .or' in favour of Abdul Kader Al-Husseini. If the international regime is not promptly instituted and effectiv,èly enforced, it will soon become a matter of elementary self- . preservation for the Jews to dotheir utmostmaybe theirdesperate utmost-even alone and
1 unaided, to save Jerusalem from a monstrous tyranny. Bilt'in such a case, the City would be- ,come a battlefield. It may, indeed,become a shambles. We éonsider thaf'the United Nations
The system of c~nsecutive interpretation Wa3 1'esumed at this point.
As two wrongs cannot make a right, 1 shall not indulge in the sort of language and invective which the representative of the Jewish Agency·· has seen fit to use regarding the Egyptian Government and other Arab Governments. 1 have said before that the Arab States have not taken part·in the conflict in Palestine. 1 still say so. If the spokesman of the Jewish Agency delves intq all available newspape'rs and tells us stories which officially we do not know, that is his own choice and responsibility. When, exceptionally, he goes to official records, and when he quotes the reports of the representative or representatives of the United Kingdom, he chooses to quote only those parts in which mêntion has been made ofArab infiltrations into Palestine; He chooses to forget to quote the part summing up the result 0f a British investigation into the matter, upon the basis ·o~ which the daim that is the Arabs who are the attackers and the Jews who are the attacked, could not be substantiated or borne out.·
Mr. FAWZI .(Egypt): The Security Council has before it, among other ma'tters,· the two draft resolutions presented to the Council by the representative of the United States. 1 beg leave to·limit myself now mostly to the mst of these draft resolutions and to postpone untillater what 1 may have to say further concerning the second draft resolution. 1 beg leave alsQ, for the moment at least, to limit myself to a few words ln connexion with what we heard from today's spokesman of the Jewish Agency.
, .At long last 1 ':find something on which 1 :readily agree with the spokesman' of the JeWish
Now 1 go back ta the story of Arab incursions into Palestine. May 1 ask, just for argument's sake, whether the leaders of Zionism would be willing ta have a most ca,reful search made in Palestine and indiscriminately ta exclude from that unfortunate land everyone who went there without legal authority? 1 shall be waiting for the answer, and 1 am afraid 1 shall be waiting in vain. While, when participation by Arab States in the conRiet in Palestine is spoken of, 1 most emphatically deny it, 1 would simply mention that the pieture would have been completely different had the Arab States really taken part in that conRict.
The Arab States are not the mightiest of the mighty, but indeed what is going on in Palestine does not indicate an any way that t~e Arab States are actually taking part in that conRiet. 1 want, parallel ta this, ta point out another consideration with respect ta Egypt and the other Arab States. 1 want, with the President's permission, ta point out the fact that, with all the provocation and with all the excitement in and around Palestine, the Jews have not been molested in Arab States around Palestine. We have many thousands of them living in Egypt, .in Iraq, and in other Arab countries. They have until now been living most safely, and, if necessary, 1myself would claim this item ta our credit. 1 shall not add many words ta a subject whieh is bath near and dear ta our hearts and painful ta us. Since olden times and very particularly in recent times, Arab lands have been probably the greaiest and the securest haven for the persecuted among the Jews. 1 am not going ta in· dulge, at this time, in anything approaching sentimental,ism nor ta comment extensively on the largely lost virtue of gratitude. Instead, 1 shall simply add; in connexion withwhat we have heard today from the spokesman of the Jewish
Ag~ncy, a few words relating ta the legal part, if we may call it such, of what he told us.
1 say "a few words" because the position of my delegation in regard ta the Charter, ta the authority of the General Assembly and of the Security Council under the Charter, and ta the obligation of Member States under the Charter, is based on solid law. It cannat crumble at the first breezenor ~venàt the first storm or ahy storm thatwill come upon it. It is a position' based, up ta this very minute, on what we believe . ta be fairness, logic, and the background of the incel'tion of the Charter, and it'cannat crumble
1 wi'Ùl ta return ta the first draft resolution presenteà by the representative of the United States. If, contrary ta our bellef, the truce were ta be interpreted and applied to mean the use .of armed force ta keep the peace during the partition of Palestine, then each and every one of the Arabs is opposed ta it. On the other hand, if it is arder that is meant, then indeed the Arabs are all for it.
ln this connexion 1 feel impelled ta point out certain facts which are in flagrant contradiction to any order in Palestine. For example, the Palestine Commission continues to work on the partition programme. It is not for me to discuss the merits of what, formally speaking, the Palestine Commission is bound to do or is relieved from doing in the light of its terms of reference and the new developments. But it is sufficiently clear that there is increasingly a discordance between what the Palestine Commission is doing and what is being said or done almost everywhere else in and around the United Nations.
1 wish always to be able to believe that no Member of the United Nations and no friend of the United Nations desires to see this Organization fall below par in its activities, nor to hecome like the famous village band whose members supposedly play together while, in fact, each of them plays a different piece. Such discordance must be corrected in time, and 1 believe now is the time.
Unfortunately, the continued work of the Palestine Commission on the Plan of Pa,rtition is not all that blocks the road back to order in Palestine. In this regard 1 must point to certai,n activities-which are only a part of the activities-of the Jewish Agency.
The document addressed on 24 March 1948 to the Secretary-General by the distinguished non-American spokesman of the Jewish Agency, and ol;"ally repeated on the same day [274th meeting] before the Security Council by the distinguished Uniteà States citizen and Zionist spokesman of the Jewish Agency, indicates that the Jewish Agency is still int«::,nt, no matter what the circumstances are and no matter what the requirements of peace,.law and order may be, ta go on with its plan for implementing and effecting what it calls a decision of the General Assembly and what we calI a !;ecommendationan unfortunate recommendation-of the Genèral Assembly. This is not all, and it is very unfortUIiate that it is not aIl.
ln fairness, l' must recognîze and state for the record that the United States Government has rightly decided to a1low no visas for such rècrtiits. This will mean no visas for Palestine, but who knows that these recruits will not obtain visas for other places and ,from those places infiltrate into Palestine?
1 know, that time is precious and 1 shall not speak very much longer. 1 orny wish to remind the Security Council and all concerned that since mention was made of the worÇi "partition" we have seen nothing but strife, trouble, agony and bloodshed in Palestine.
If it is said that what is happening in Palestine today is mere1y or mostly the work of the surrounding Arab States, 1 should orny point out a reminder of what happened in Palestine, among the Palestinians themselves, from 1936 until 1939, just because a mere beginning of an attempt at partition was made.
In reading and listening to what the leaders of Zionism want us to believe, 1 have a small warning for everybody, including myself. We must all be careful, when we hear again the faIse prophecies of militant political Zionism promising us that "everything will be smooth and quiet if orny you let us extort a part of the lands and the country belonging to the Arabs, if you let us
~et up a State, a bridgehead for things to come".
1 do not want'to close without repeating that, if what is meant by the draft resolution presented by the representative of the United States is the re-establishment of order in Palestine, 1 sincerely believe-and 1 state it here for the record-that we, the Arabs, each and every one of us, are aUforit.
Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): l have asked the President's leave to speak orny in order that 1 may give a short statement in regard to the manner in which, 1 shall vote on the two draft resolutions which have been submitted to the Security Council by the representative of. the United States. In regard to the first draft resolution, which deaIs .with the truce, 1 would recall that my Government have always favoured the adoption of aU possible measures to brLTlg disorder to an
In regard to the second draft resolution, 1 would say this: My Government cannot depart
~rom their neutral position, and they therefore still pass no judgment on the solution which the General Assembly originally worked out in November last. In view, however, of the intense disturbances which have taken place in, Palestine and the failure, as we see it, Of the General Assembly, when it came to its original decision, to realize that this situation may arise; and in view of the apparent desire on the part of the Security Council that the General Assembly should be given an opportunity to review its decision in the light of events, 1 have been authorized to cast my vote in favour of giving the General Assembly this opportunity, and 1 shaH. vote, aIso, in favour of that resolution.
Ml'. EL-KHOURI (Syrîa): 1 think itwould be - appropriate, at the present stage, ta express the attitude of my delegation concerning the two draft resolutions which are now before us for discussion. ~' As to the resolution referring the matteragain to the General Assembly and convoking a special session, 1 say that this would coincide with our attitude in the past in :he General Assembly, in the Security Council, and in all the organs of the United Nations. We have alw!1YS opposéd the partition plan. Referring the matter again to the General Assembly will provide another chance for reminding the delegations of the General Assembly of the blunder which was committed in the pasto For this reason, 1 am ready to cast my vote in favour of this draft resolution.
As to the resolution concerning tryingto establish a truce in Palestine, 1 should state that the Syrian Government and people, as weIl as' all the other Arabs in the Near East, are more desirous than any othe:ç people or nation to see peace and security reign in Palestihe. They themselves, especially the Arabs of Palestine, are suffering in the present situation of disorder in , Palestine. NoArab would like this situation to continue, but, at the same time, they wish a truce and peace to reign in Palestine with justice.
ln this matter of the truce, 1 am inciined in the present situation to reserve the attitude of my delegation until the two parties concerned in this matter meet with the Security Council and substantiate what the basis and conditions of this truce will be. I-have just heard the representative of the Jewish Agency say that it would never agree to any truce if it impeded or inter- Jered with the time-table of th~implementation of the Plan of Partition. .1 know that the views of the Arabs of Palestine are just the contrary. They say, "We will agree to a truce if it is not used as a screen to shield the activities for the continuation of the implementation of the Plan of Partition."
The Arabs have never tried to keep it secret that they oppose the Plan of Partition, and they will never agree to it. They have said that Harly and squarely on every occasion, and they still do not retreat from this position, nor has their attitude changed in any respect. For this reason, as 1 have said, 1 reserve the attitude of my delegation at the present time on the draft resolution in order to see what are the conditions under which the truce will be concluded. 1 would prefer that the truce be made on the basis of establishing a complete stand-still a,.greement that would be serviceable and useful, but if it is not on that condition and that bas~, it would be useless to discuss the matter. 1 believe this should be the situation when this resolution is adopted. The Arabs of Palestine will certainly have their representative, and he will speak in the name of his country.
As to the statements which you have heard today from the representative of the Jewish Agency-his severe accusations against the Arab States and especially Syria, and his statement that they are interfering with partition and upholding and supporting the Arabs in Palestine in different ways-I have made solemn statements in the past that Arab States, including Syria, did not take any part in the actual encounters in Palestine.
That accusation cannot be made so long as there are volunteers infiltrating into Palestine from all the frontiers around that area, frontiers which are practically open. It cannot be interpreted that the Arab States are responsible for that. They are not doing anything, and these statements which were quoted from the press or from other reports cannot be. taken as a good basis on which the Security Council can pass resoh.itions.. They may be called warmongering
The spokesman for the Jewish Agency accused the Security Council of not preparing an adequate force to go with the Palestine Commission in order to help the implementation of the Plan of Partition, but the Security Council, .as was weIl stated here, has its functions weIl defined in the Charter.-It cannot, on the application of one person or another, go astray and take steps which are not justified by the provisions of the Charter to which-and to which oruy-we are bo.und.
The Jewish Agency spokesman also complains that the Arabs have seven Stq.tes while the Jews do not have any State. This is'a statement which has been made repeatedly on different occasions. l say\ that, in that respect, there. is .ne Jew in all the'world who has no State dr who is stateless. Every Jew has his nationality. The Jews of the United States are United States citizens; the Jews of the USSR are citizens of the USSR; the Jews of France are French citizens; the Jews of the United Kingdom are United Kingdom subjects. What does he mean when he says that the Jews have no State? What religion has a State? Not oruy the Jews have none; the Quakers have no State; the Methodists have·no State; the Episcopalians have no State; the Presbyterians have no State. What religions have States? Has any religion a right to claim aState and have aspirations for a sovereign State? This is absurd, and a precedent could be created here which would make religion a nationality and encourage other religions to claim States wherever they are found. This is a situation which is exorbitant and extraordinary. Judaism is a religion, and people must enjoy all the privileges of freedom of worship and freedom of access to all the Holy Places.
Mr. Shertok stated that the Arabs are fiot good custodians of the shrines and the Holy Places. They have been custariians for thirteen centuries now, and not a single Holy Place has been defiled nor has any sacrilege been committed. They have protected the Holy Places very carefully and correctly during aIl that time, and, since the ~yzantine Empire left Palestine, neither the Jewish shrines, the Moslem shrines nor the Christian shrines have been affected in any way. They have been weIl protected, and access to the country a1ways has been available and continues to remain so.
If, as a religion, the Jews want to establish a State in Palestine, that is something which is extraordinary and· which we cannot admit. The Arabs would not allow the establishment of q.'
'Although there are Holy Places located in Jerusalem, 1 feel that the people of Jerusalem are not holy. They are not ta be given special consideration and special privileges, nor are they ta be deprived of the rights of democracy and selfdetermination which are enjoyed by aIl the peopIes of other democratic countries. The shrines and Holy Places may be protected and given aIl the necessary safeguards, but the people should be left their freedom and liberty in arder ta determine their fate and their future adI'1inistra- .... tian in the way in which they wish, just as any democratic country would confer privileges and rights upon its population.
In this respect, 1 wish ta repeat over and over again that the Arabs consider the idea of creating a foreign state within their region, with sovereign power in Palestine, as an act of aggression, and that those whoattempt ta carry out this act are aggressors against human rlghts and the rig:,:ts of the Arabs. Furthermore, the Arabs are ready ta oppose such an act. The Arabs of Palestine would prefer, as 1 said before, ta be exterminated rather than ta aIlow such an act of aggression ta go on within their country., This is a feeling which wei have never ,tried ta hide; it has been stated publidy on several occasions. '
Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): 1 have only a few words ta say. The pending matter is document S/704, that is ta say, the draft resolu'J.on intrClduced by the representative of the Ur.:ted States of America at the 275th meeting of the Security Council calling for a truce in Palestine, and 1 invite the Security Council ta return ta the subject. In sa doing 1 would just caIl attention ta the simple eternal truth that the objective of this resolution is :,' save human life. If there is any other oojective equal ta that 1 do not know what it is. AlI these long speeches and fuis repeated re-argumentation about legalistic daims,' about history, and about who is at fault and who more at fault, are as n...ithing compared ta that objective for which the Security Council has the primary responsibility-that is, to sàve human life.
uln the exerliÎse of its primary respC'nsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security . . ."-that is to say, it is acting under that provision and that responsibility-' "Notes with grave concern the increasing violence and disorder in Palestine and believes iliat it 1S of the utmost urgency that an immediate truce be effected in Palestine;
UCaUs uponthe Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee ta make representatives available ta the Security Council for the purpose of arranging a truce ..."-not for the purpose apparently indicated in the speeches which have been made here today but-"a truce between the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine; and emphasizes the heavy responsibility which would fall UpOR any party failing to observe such a truce; and
"Calls upon Arab and Jewish armed groups in Palestine ta cease acts of violence immediately."
This calls for a stand-still; this calls for a cessation of hostilities; this calls for the stopping of the slaughter, the civil disobedience, the' destruction of property and the anarchy which exists in a ~erritory that is under a mandate. Just remember that this is not a free territory. It dOe3 not belong to anybody. If you search out the title ta it, 1 think you will find that it has a legal position as a result of the war. This is a manda- ,tory property under a mandatory a~trator. Events are occurring there which are a shame ta humanity, and it is up to the Security Council, of all organizations in the world, to put a stop ta them. This resolution, if passed, would impose an obligation under the Charter upon every Member of the United Nations ta carry out the ded- "sion made in it. Our position would be somewhat different after the adoption of a resolution like this from what it is under a recom.rnendation made by the General Assembly.
There is no mystery about the word "truce'~. It requires two things above all others: one is the cessation of hostilities; the other is the cessat;on of provocation. And it is that part of the duty of the Security Council that is indicahd in the third paragiaph of the resolution which reads as f6llows:
UCaUs upon the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Hig-her Committee ta make representatives available to"tfiê Security Council for the purpose of arranging" a truce between the Arab. and Jewish communities of Palestine ..."
•1 understand that this Article was suggested at San Francisco by the Zionists in arder ta assure continued recognition of their national home in Palestine. But the text equaIly protects the rights.of Arabs ta maintain the. continuity of the unity of·Palestine in their civil and religious rights in the territory protected by the Mandate. I find that the following statement from the summary record of the tenth meeting of Committee 11/4, held on 24 May 1945 at San Francisco, was attributed to the United States representative, who said that this Article meant "that all rights, .whatever they may be, remain exactly the' same as they exist-that they are neither increased or diminished by the adoption of this Charter. Any change is left as a matter for subsequent agreements ..." With Palestine under a Mandatory Power, who has a right to use force there-anyboày but the Mandatory Authority? And if men, women and children ,are being slaughtered, are being blown up, and if public services are being diScontinued and ruined and ·the possibility of complete anarchy is being created, who has a right and who has an obligation there? :fu the first ,place, the Mandatory Powèr has come tous and said, in effect, "We are unable ta handle that. The condition is such that we cannat handle it." That is one of the reasons why we found, as a group of permanent members of the Security Council, that we could not implement the General Assembly resolution at this time by peaceful means. It was not because these 'people, on both sides, did nothave individually the characteristits that would make them competent for seH-government. They do have thatinteIIigence,. culture and high aim necessary to producé good 'government an}rwhere.
there~·-which we believe will exist until 15 May -so long as that responsibility is fixed, is settled on the United Kingdom, no other country or people has a right to use military force in Palestine. Until an agreement is entered into which transmits this responsibility from the United Kingdom to its successor, or until an agreement is made v.rïth the United Nations, the Security Council has the responsibility of trying to maintain order and peace in Palestine.
1 sincerely hope, therefore, that this resolution will be passed by a large majority.
1 have no more speakers on my list. Does any representative wish to speak l:!efore the Security Council proceeds to take a vote on the United States draft resolution?
No response was indicated. ne PRESIDENT: The Assistant Secretary- General in charge of Security Council Affairs will read the Unitl"'rl States draft resolution incorporated in document S/704.
Mr. SOBOLEV (Assistant Secretary-General) :
"The Security Council, "In the exercise of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, "Notes with grave concern the increasing violence and disorder in Palestine and believes that it is of the utmost urgency that an immediate truce be effected in Palestine; .
"CaUs upon the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee to make representatives available to the Security Council for the purpose of arranging 3. truce between the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine; ~md emphasizes the heavy responsibility wlllch would faIl upon any party failing ta observe such a truce; and "CaUs upon Arab and Jewish armed groups in Palestine to cease acts of violence immediately."
Mr. TARASSENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated trom Russian) :. 1 propose the deletion of the three words "with grave con- èem" from the beginning of the second paragraph. The secondparagraph would then read:
Ml'. AUSTIN (United States of America): We do note "with grave l:oncem"-I want that understood-but in order to gain one more vote, 1 am willing to give up those three words.
As there is no objection, the Security Council will now vote on the United States draft resolution, document 8/704, on the basis of deleting those three words "with grave concern". A vote was taken by show of hands, and the resolution was adopted unanimously.
The Security Council will now vote on the United States draft resolution incorporated in document S/705. 1 shall ask the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Security Council Affairs to read it.
Ml'. SOBOLEV (Assistant Secretary-General) :
"The Security Council, ttHavi1!-g received, on 9 Decerilber 1947, the. resolution of the General Assembly· concerning Palestine dated 29 November 1947, and .ttHaving taken note of the United Nations . Palestine Commission's First and Second Month- Îy Progress··Reports and First Special Report on the problem of security, and
A vote was taken by show of hands, and the 7esolution was adopted by 9 votes in favour, with 2 abstentions. Votes for: Argentina Belgium Canada China Colombia France Syria United Kingdom , United States of America Abstentions: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Before we adjourn the meeting, 1 should like to know what isthe pleasure of the Security Council as io what we should do next. There appear to be several questions on which we might profitably try to exchange views. The Palestine Commission has addressed itself to the Security Council asking for guidance in its task. So far, 'tl'1e Security Council has made no provision with regard to the question of the Palestine Commission. That is one very important point, because from the reports published by the' press it would appear that while the Sccurity Council' has just agreed to convoke a special session of the General Assembly. for the purpose of advising the; latter of the difficulties which the Security Councilis encountering, the Palestine Commission is going ahead with the implementation of the resolution of the General ASsembly. Also, the question of conciliation ariseS, which, to a rather large extent, involves the truce.
We might consider the advisability of appoint- ,ing a sub-committee to advance sorne of, the work and to consider if there are an)' recommendations that we should make to the General Assembly, and to meet thè representatives of the two parties to the truce that is contemplated. That is one suggestion.
Another suggestion"Would be to have the Security Council go on with the discussions in full committee. And a thirdsuggestion might be or.,: approaching the system that has been followed in the India-Pakistan ques.tion. Therefore, before we decide as to when we should again meet,
Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria) : As to the first question which the President has raised-what guidance is to be given to the Palestine Commission -as far.as 1 myse1f am concerned, 1 have voted for.both proposaIs on the understanding that the author of these proposaIs, the representative of the United States, said, in the first place, that it 'woUJ.d be a stand-still agreement; and in the second place, he mentioned in his speech at the last meeting that no politi<;al activities should be undertaken towardS the implementation of the Plan of Partition and that instructions would be given to this effect. 1 so understood the matter, and at the 275th meeting of the Security Council on 30 March the representative of the United States repeated the Sal.le thing. It was on this basis, 1 think, that the Palestine Commission asked -the Security Council to provide them with an adequàte fo.rce in order to implement the' Plan of Partition..The Palestine Commission aIso stated that they .cannot proceed with the implementation of the Plan of Partition .without such an adequate international force, so 1 think it goes without saying that they will wait until they have the adequate international force. As long as the Se-. curity Council has not prepared a positive ariswer to their request, 1 think everything sh~uld be suspended until the General Asseinbly stIbmits new directives with regard to this matter.
General McNAUGHTON (Canada): The President has asked the opinion of the Security Council as to what the procedure should now be in view of the fact that the Council has just
pass~d two very important resolutions. As regards the first resolution, it séems to me that the courseis very clear, namely, that the President should meet with the representatives of the Jewish Agency -for Palestine 'and the Arab Higher Committeein order ta. discuss tbe substance of that resolution and to ~riiI.e: forward .' 'solIlespecific proposaIs for the consideration of the'Security Council. 1 think that in this matter wewould.beright. in entrusting that duty· and that,responsihility to the President of the Se-
It seems to me, therefore, that the Security . Council should meet again at the earliest practicable opportunity to heaf the specifie proposals which the representative of the United States has undertaken ta put before it. l believe that those are very important matters. Ii is absolutely imperative that the position of the Security Council and its conclusions on these important matters should be available for 16 April, on which date the Secretary-General has indicated he wiu have the General Assembly meet here. l th-erefore urge most strongly that the Presi- . dent should enter into consultation with the representative of the United States, and that, immediately Whe'l the representative of the United States is ready to place specifie proposaIs before it, the Security Council should meet to consider them.
Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): l endorse the propositions of the representative of Canada. The United States has, of course, been at work endeavouring ta formulate concrete ideas, but these are not yet ID finished form suitable for submission, and we should like very much to .consult· informally with our colleagues in the Security Couneil in·order to have their advice and suggestions. We should like all representatives on the Security Council to participat<- with us in the drafting of the terms of the trusteeship proposal, and it would be convenient to us if the President could hold over the next meeting until 6 April.
After the interpretation into French, Mr. Austin added the following remarks: l have been advised that it would probably be convenient for all the members of the Security Council to make a _fixed appointment for an in.. formaI study. If that meets with your approval -aIl of you-linvite you to come to my office on 5 April, when we" can meet informally on this matter.
Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Sociàlist Republics) (tranilated from Russian): ThiS raises anumber of questions with which l do not intend to deal. l 'Vant to say a few words, how-
If, in explaining bis draft resolution to call a truce and to convoke a special session of the General Assembly, the United States representative pointed out that all political activity in Palestine. (and he apparently had in mind not only Palestine) should stop-that is bis business. If anybody wishes to interpret that statement as meaning that the United States representative had in mind the cessation of the Palestine Commission's work as weIl, that concerns the member of the $ecurity Council who wishes ta put that parq,cular interpretation on the United States statement. l, however, cannot accept such an interpretation. We supported the resolution call- -ing for a truce on the understanding that the Palestine Commission would continue to act in accordance with the powers conferred upon it by the General Assembly resolution.,
Mr. PARODI (France) (translated trom ,French): The question referred t6 by the l,lresident raises a difficulty, namely, the problem of whether the Security Council is authorized to ask the Commission established by the General Assembly to cease its work.
As a mattèr of fact, 1 think that the Commission can be tr~ted to draw the necessary practical conclusions from the resolution we· have just adopted. Consequently, 1 think the Commission could continue that part of its activity which is in the nature of pure study and preparatory or theoretical work, and should, in my opinion, refrain from anything involving practical measures.
Such is my suggestion. 1 repeat, however, that" the United Nations Palestine Conimission should bepermîtted, to draw its own conclusions from our decis~ons. :
Mr. - ARCE (Argentina) 4 (translated trom Spanish): 1 think it is ohvious that the Security Council wouldhave no power to request the
1 am not giving this as a definite opinion, but 1 do make this suggestion in support of what has been said here to the effect that the Security Council should not intervene in the work of this Commission. In my view, if the General As- , sembly of the United Nations, which appointed this Commission, is ta meet within fifteen days, the progress of th~ Commission's work should be delayed during this period.
It seems to me that the Security Council has four different questions with which to deal. The first is the question of the truce. The representative of Canada has offered a suggestion as to how the question of the truce should be hand1ed. 1 have yet to hear whether it is the pleasure of the Security Council that the procedure suggested by the representative of Canada should be adopted.
I
The second question is the matter of the Palestine Commission, namely, whether or not any indications should be given to it. 1 had suggested that we should meet to discuss all of these matters without, however, indicating that we should tell the Palestine Commission anything specifically. Substantially 1 agree with what the representative of France has said. It seems perfectly'cIear that the resolution which the Security Council has just adopted should offer a clear indication to the Palestine Commission as ta how it should proceed. In other words, 1 believe that the Palestine Commission cannot fail to take due notice of the manner in which events are moving under the direction of the Security Council.
The third question is the matter of the recommendations of the Security Council to the General Assembly. 1 believe that it is within the discretion of every representative of the Security Council to submit proposaIs or recommendation!l if he so desires, and that it is entirely within the discretion of the representative of the United States to invite the other representatives on the Security Council to attend any informaI discussions concerning the resolutions and to receive any recommendations which theyIriay wish ta submit. Of course, that does not prevent or excIude any representative from submitting proposals or' recommendations dire~tly to the Security Council.
The representative of Syria has asked why. we cannot meet tomorrow afternoon instead of in the morning. If it is agreeable to the ~ecurity Council, 1 prefer to meet in the morning because 1 have arranged to leave for Cincinnati tomorrow afternoon to deliver an address on the United Nations, and.I shall not be back until Sunday morning.
Tc summarize, the Security Council can do either of two things. 1 am perfectly willing to go ahead as fast as the Security Council desires on the Palestine question and hold a closed meeting tomorrow morning. On the other hand, the matter can be left until next week.
Mr. TARASENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated trom Russian): 1 cannot quite understand what the Security Council would discuss were it to meet tomorrow, as there .is nothing to discuss. 1 think it would be better tb postpone the meeting until, say, Monday.
1 should like ta repeat that the Security Council has not yet settled how the conversations in regard to tl;1e truce should be conducted, and that is one of the things which 1 suppose could be profitably discussed tomorrow.
Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (translated trom French): 1 am also of the opinion ·that we should not be serving any use(ul purpose by meeting tomorrow. As far as 1 am concerned l' think that our next meeting should take place on Monday, 5 April. .
Thè PRESIDENT: 1 want ta make it clear to the Security Council that, so far as 1 am concerned, 1 am perfectly ready to go forward as fast as possible with these very urgent questions, but, as 1 have already intimated, it is more convenient for me to have a meeting of the Security Council next week. . .
I.should like to make this remark: inasnlUch as the United States de1egation is not yetready with .its proposaIs, and since we have not been 1 advised by, either .the Jewish Agency or the.Arab 1 HigherCommittee that their representatives are \ ready to begin the conversations on' the truce, l' wemight leaye the matter open and the Presi..
Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): First, l accept the suggestions of the President with reference to the procedure outlined. They seem to me to be reasonable. Second, l now invite all the members of the Security Council to come to my office at 2 Parke Aevenue on 5 April, at 2.30 p.m.) for the purpose of an informal conversation re1ating to proposais for a temporary trusteeship.
The meeting rose at 6.43 p.m.
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