S/PV.281 Security Council

Monday, April 12, 1948 — Session 3, Meeting 281 — New York — UN Document ↗ OCR ✓ 5 unattributed speechs
This meeting at a glance
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General statements and positions General debate rhetoric War and military aggression Security Council deliberations UN membership and Cold War Arab political groupings

The agenda was adopted.

15, Continuation of the discussion of the letter from the permanent representa- tive of Chile relative to the event in Czechoslovakia

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Santa Cruz, representative of Chile, took his place at the Security Council table.
The President unattributed #141914
We have received a letter from the representative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations [document S/718]. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) (translated from Spanish): At the c1os~ of my statement at the meeting held on 31 March [276th meeting], l suggested that the Security Council might perhaps consider it necessary to appoint a subsidiary body to hear and examine the proofs or evidence which the permanent representative of Czeëho- The text of the draft resolution is as follows: "Whereas the attention of the Security Couneil has been drawn by a Member of the United Nations, in accordance with Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter, to the situation in Czechoslovakia wh;ch may endanger international peace and security; and the Security Council has been asked to investigate this situation; and "Whereas during the debate which took place in the Council the existence of further testimonial and documentary evidence with regard to this situation has been announced; "Whereas the Security Council considers it advisable that such further testimonial and documentary evidence should be heard, "Therefore, to this end, and without prejudice of any decisions which may be taken in accordance with Article 34 of the Charter, "Resolves to appoint a sub-committee of ... members and instructs this sub-committee to re- ceive or to hear such evidence, statements and testimonies and to report to the Security Council at the earliest possible time." Since l am not a member of the Council and have only been invited to take part in its deliber- ations, l did not, of course, think it was fitting tor me to give any detailed suggestions regarding the 'composition of this sub-committee. That is a matter which will have to be decided in accord- 'ance with the views of the Council on the subject. . l therefore submit this draftresolution, in the hope that some member of the Council, in accordance with the rules of procedure, will ask for it to be put to the vote. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- publics) (translated from. Russian): In my speech of 23 March [273rd meetingJ l had an opportunity to express my views regarding the Chîlean letter [document 8/694J, as weIl as re- garding the statement of the representative of that country and the statements of certain re- presentatives on the Security Council, in particu- lar that of the representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Alexander Cadogan. The USSR delegation is 'convinced that the purpose of the authors of the Chilean letter has nothing in common with the genuine concern for the main- tenance of international peace. This is evident both from the letter itself and from the state- The original Chilean letter, the supplementary statements of the Chilean representative and the statements of those who support Chile in this adventure are amazing by their utter futility. Indeed, what do an these statements and speeches represent and what are their contents? They are a mere repetition of aIl the absurd assertions contained in the Chilean ietter ta the Security Council. That letter, in its turn, repeats all the ridiculpus assertions of,the formel' Czecho- slovak representative to the United Nations, who has been removed by the Czechoslovak Govern- ment from the post he formerly occupied. It appears that the Chileans cite with fervour the statement of this Czechoslovak renegade; the 'representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France cite the statements of the Chileans; and all the others who have decided ' to joïn this and-Soviet Union choir, which is led by the United States, cite and relish the state- ments of the United States and United Kingdom representatives on the Security Cauncil, although it is obvious that all these statements are without any foundation. None of the participants in this choir has been able to express a single original idea. The whole,bunch of them repeat news- paper tittle-tattle about the Soviet Union and the situation in Czechoslovakia. As we know; the foremosti place in aU thes~ statements is given to the unfounded assertions that the' changes which have taken place in the composition of the Czechoslovak Government, changes'which oruy the Czechoslovak people are entitled to make,. have been brought about as a :es~,I1t of interference !~y the USSR. Moreover, lt 18 particularly alleged that the Soviet Union had threatened to use force against Czechoslo- vakia and that Deputy Foreign: Minister Zorin of the USSR, who visited Prague, had exercised pressure upon the political situation in Czecno- slovakia in the direction desired by the USSR. Both these assertions, like all the other asser- tions, are downright fiction. It is not accidentaI, therefore, that no facts have been brought for- ward to confirm these statements. Indeed, they could n?t be brought forward, because no such facts eXlSted nor do any exist. ~n~erfered in the internai a.4fairs of Czechoslo- vakia through Mr. Zorin; it is aIso slanderous. It is clear to everyone that the mere fact of the presence of one or several officiaIs. in a foreign country at the time this country is in the process ofresolving such matters as the composition of its Government, is of no significance in itseH and cann.ot constitute a basis fOf such an assertion. ~ As we know, there are always representatives ofany one of the great Powers in those countries with which these Powers maintain active eco- nomic or political relations. The same applies to the small nations which always have represen- tatives in the territories of the great Powers with which they maintain active relations. The facts show that thdse States which actually interfere in .the 'internal affairs of other countries prefer toexercise economic and pol'itical pressure on such countries by meaIl-s of many other levers. As a typical example we may take, for instance, Italy where we shall fail perhaps to find an offi- cial United States representative specially and openly sent for the purpose of interference, but where this interference is practised systematically, every day, every hour, nor do the offi,ciai circles of the United States make any secret of the facto occ~ion of that important jubilee. On 27 February, the social-democrat news- paper Pravo Lidu and a number of other news- papers published a communique on the meetings which had taken place during several days and in which Mr. Zorin, the USSR Trade Repre. sel~tative in Prague, Mr. Bakulin, and represen- tatIves of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Supplies and Ministry of Transport participated, and on the decisions adopted at these meetings for the purpose of expediting grain deliveries, and esoecially the timely deliveries of wheat for sowiIÎg purposes. The published communique gave figures with regard to grain deliveries, which, on 26 February, amounted to 325,036 tons, t~at is to say 50 per cent more than the amount scheduled for de- livery by May 1948. After the completion of his mission, which was carried out in Prague together with the appropri- ate members of the Ozechoslovak Government, Mr. Zorin returned to Moscow on 28 February. The facts which l have mentioned concerning the stay of the Deputy Foreign Minister of the The statement of the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Cadogan, that Mr. Zorin had not been received by President Benes in spite of bis request, is also at variance with the truth. That statement has nothing in corom.on with what actually took place. In rea:lity, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, whose arrival in Prague was connected with economic matters, did ~ot make any request for a meeting with Mr. B~nes; and, natura1'ly, he could not receivc any refusal from the President of Czechoslovakia. That is how the matter stands with regard to the fabrications circulated by the GOïTt:ïlments of the United States, the United Kingdom and Chile concerning the presence of Mr. Zorin, the official USSR representative ID the capital of Czechoslovakia. 1 hope that all those who really desire to un- derstand .this question and who do not deliber- ately repeat the mendacious reports circulated by the Chi'leans and repeated by the Americans and British, will realize that the arguments brought forward by the authors of the Chilean letter and their advocateshave no foundation w~atever and are, as 1 have ah'eady pointed out, a libel on the So~riet Union and Czecho- slovakia. What then remains of the assertion of the Chileans & Co. regarding al1eged Soviet interfer- ence in the internaI affairs of Czechoslovakia? There remains nothing but groundless statements unsubstantiated by any facts whatsoever. The statements are calculated to mislead honest people, who are anxious to .distinguish truth from ~Iander, but who do nota:lways find it easy to do so on 'account of the flood of slanderous re- ports about the USSR, Czechoslovakia and other countries of Emltern Europe that are being spread in millions of newspapers and magazines and over the radio, with the encouragement of the official circles of a number of States, among which the United States is playing first fiddle in this connexion. Equally groundiess is the assertion put for- ward by the members of this chorus that the ln my statement before the Security Council on 23 March [273rd meeting] 1 already pointed , out the reason why the Czechoslovak question had been brought up in the Security Council. 1 pointed out what were the real plans of the United States Government with regard to Czechoslovakia. These plans have nothing in .common with the task of maintaining interna- tional peace and security or with a real concern for Czechoslovakia. On the contrary, they are directed against Czechoslovakia and its people, because their aim was to liquidate the Czecho- slovak Repub1ic and to convert Czechoslovakia into a vassal of the United States. In order to carry out its plans, the United States Government endeavoured ta utilize to the utmost possible extent the reactionary venal poli- ticians within Czechoslovakia and, with the he1p of these people, to deal a mortal blow to the Czechoslovak Republic. Long before the gov- emmental crisis in Czechoslovakia, the United States Government and its representatives sug- gested to the right-wing reactionary Czechoslo- vak parties the necessity of openinl?' an offensive against the Czechoslovak Government in order to secure more favourable positions at the forth- coming parliamentary elections in .Czechoslo- vakia.. Mr. SteinhaI'dt, the United States Ambassa'dor ta Czechoslovakia, worked in this ~rection. Other means were also used ta this .end. The Prague newspapers, Svobodné Slovo and Lidova Demokracie, which until recently' had emphasized their closeness to influential Ameri- can circles, stated on 11 February 1948 that Mr. Steinhardt, having received instructions from Washington, would endeavour ta interfere active1y in the internaI policy of Czechoslovakia, and that the Czechoslovak right-wing parties ex- pected ta be victorious at the forthcoming parlia- ;mentary e'lections with the support, above all, of the United States. As we see, these newspapers made a rather frank statement which by itself, even if there had been no other facts, put the Czechoslovak people on its guard against the internaI traitors through whom the ruling circles of the United States were acting in Czecho- slovakia. It was precisely these intrigues with regard to Czechoslovakia by the United States Govern- ment and its agents inside Czechoslovakia th2.t ied, as you are aware, to the crisis in the Czecho~ slovak Government, which was organized by the Czechoslovak reactionaries deliberately and on orders from outside. This is borne out by aIl the facts relating to their scheming of this crisis and ta the events which followed it. It is known that on 13 February the represen- tatives of the National Socialist Party, the People's Party and the Sl/)vak Democrats de- manded at a meeting of the Czechoslovak Gov- ernment that changes should he made in the leadership of the national security corps with a view to creating conditions for the seizure of that corDS. This fact alone showed that the reac- tiOliaries were becoming more and more brazen in their methods without even concealing the fact that they wished to do away with the Republic and to establish a reactionary regime in Czecho- slovakia, converting that country into a puppet State which the United States would command at its discretion. At a meeting of the Czechoslovak Government on 17 February, the representatives of the same right-wing parties stated that they would not further discuss any issues until exp~anations had ceen given for the failure to carry out the afore- mentioned demand. Thus, by 17 Februal-Y, the right-wing parties had actually brought about a governmental crisis, attempting to create in the country a favourable political situation for the accomplish- ment of their plans for the liquidation of the Republic. Let us see how the United States was acting at that time. Could it be that the United States endeavoured to remain aloo! from the events in Czechoslovakia? Could it be that it did not at- tempt, at least open'ly, to interfere in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia or to exercir~ rressure u,pon the political situation in that country in its own interests? This was certainly not the case. Not ooly the Czechûslovak reactionaries,but also The United States Ambassador, Mr. Stein- hardt, arrived in Prague on 19 February. On the same day he received the Czechoslovak Press correspondents and told them, in order to influence Czechoslovak public opinion, that he still hoped the Czechoslovak Govemment would "reconsider its decision and would participate directIy in the European Recovery Plan". He added that the people of the United States were following events in Czechoslovakia with the greatest interest. Thus, at a time when the govemmental crisis brought about by Czechoslovak reactionaries had not yet been settIed, the United States Govern- ment, through its Ambassador in Prague, openly raised the question of the reconsideration by Czechoslovakia of its decision on the so-called Marshall Plan, which is designed to enslave European countries, and to turn them into a political and economic appendage of the United States in the interests of American monopolies. This public statement of the United States Ambassador made it clear to aIl the reactionary elements in Czechoslovakia that the United States of America was interested in a reversaI of the domestic and foreign policy of Czechoslo- vakia with a view to its inclusion in the Marshall Plan, and that the reactionary elements belong- . ing to the right-wing groups could count on United States support in their activities. This statement of the United States Ambassador could not be interpreted by the reactionaries in any other way, especially if we take into considera- tion the circumstanc'es in which the statement wasmade. On 20 February, as though in answer to this statement of Mr. Steinhardt, representatives of the three right-wing parties handed in their resignations, thereby attempting to break up the Czechoslovak National Front Government and impose on Czechoslovakia a new political course on the eve of the elections. Thus, the United States Government, through its Ambassador in Prague, gave the signal to internaI reaction. In response to this signai, as we see, there followed immediate action on the part of those who were waiting for it. It should be added that simultaneously the military commissions of the National Socialist Party were forming armed detachments of their members and preparing for an armed seizure of the Prague B.roadcasting Station and other gov- ernment offices. As you" know, the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior published, on 24 Feb:cu- ary, an official communique on that subject, which no one denied, because it corresponded to the facts. These facts completely refute the stories about an aUeged communist coup. At the same time, they show how the United States, the United Kmgdom and sorne other Governments support- ing the Anglo-American position in this question, are attempting to mislead the public opinion in theil' countries by concealing the fact that the changes in the Czechoslovak Government were brought about by constitutional means. .They are hiding the truth from the people, repeating fairy-tales about a communist coup. Neediess to say, -they thereby encourage the dissemination of lies about Czechoslovakia and the USSR in con- nexion with the discussion of this question by the Security Council. Obviously, the United States -and the United Kingdom have to resort to such methods in order to warm up in every way the hostile campaign initiated by them against the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.. The campaign against the new Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union is sure evidence of the fact that the plans of -international reaction have sufIered a complete defeatas a result of the firm . resistance of the Czechoslovakian peopI:, who succeeded in rapidly overcoming the national political crisis and in unmasking internaI reaction supported by the reactionary forces of the West- êrn bloc and the United States of America. This campaign also revea'1s the true aims of certain foreign circles in their attempts to bring about-a reactionary coup in Czechoslovakia last February. These aims are evident. They are to prevent the strengthening of democ:racy _in Czechoslovakia, to break down the independent policy of the CzechosloVak Government, which refused to put Czechoslovakia-under the yoke of American. credits, that were being imposed upon her on absolutely unacceptable terms, and to allow. Czechoslovakia to. be used for the purpcae of splitting. the dem9cratic countries of Eastern Europe, to which the. Czechoslovak people -is_ bound by firm and lasting ties. Inhrief, these Nobody, of course, doubts that the Chïlean Government started the campaign in the Security Council against democratic Czechoslovakia in obedience to instructions from Washington. Naturally we did not expect the representative of the United States to announce in the Security Oouncil the real plans of the United States Gov- ernment with regard to Czechoslovakia. On the contrary, as was to have been expected, the pur- pose of their statements was to divert the atten- tion of the people of the United States from the attempts of the American reactionaries to inter- fere in Czechoslovakia's internai affairs, to bring about and exploit, for t.~eir oWn expansionist purposes, an internal political crisis in Czecho- s10vakia and to procure through reactionary and mercenary Czechoslovak groups, such changes in the composition' of t.he Czechoslovak Governu ' ment, as wou:ld facilitate the conversion of Czechoslovakia into an obedient tool of the ex- pansionist policy of the United States. These plans were upset by the Czechoslovak people themse1ves. They know the meaning of the democracy which United States militarists are attempting to set up in certain European countries. They are witnessing the tragic ex- ample of Greece, which is being tumed, before the eyes of the whole world, into a United States military-political base and, economical1y, into aI). American colony exploited by American capital with all the resulting consequ.ences for the people of Greece. . Throughout the campaign, attempts have been made to refer to the late Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Afi'airs, Mr. Masaryk, although his whole conduct during the Governmental crisis and afterwards gives no justification for these references. On 4 March Mr. Masaryk addressed the officers of the Ministry of NationaI Defence and publicly stated, in dealing with recent events in Czechdslovakia, that the Government was enter- ing a new era. Mr. Masaryk said: "My credo in that tense moment was dear; when the situation became tense, 1 did not hesi- tate fOi a moment in deciding my place. 1 am with the people, with the Czechs and Slovaks whom 1 love. It distresses me to hear that sorne people are preparing to organize a resistance movement. A resistance movement against Hitler -:-that 1 agree with-but a resistance movement against one's own brothers-never!" ........... "The Czechs are profound1y democratic and will remain so. The people themselves have now had their say. The changes in our conception of democracy are considerable. But Czechoslovakia has always been able to solve its domestic problems independently; it has done so now and will do so in the future. 1have always been with the people and will remain with them now." When asked how the governmenta:l crisis occurred, Mr. Masaryk replied: "We had sorne people who thought it was possible to govern without the communists and even against them. 1 have always ;t1"ongly opposed that argument. The crisis was brought about by the resignation of the ministers of three of the parties forming the National Front. To- day we have a new National Front. We must co-operate with it. The Government was formed in a constitutional way and will govern demo- cratically in accordailce with the Constitution." Such was Mr. Masaryk's position which the Czechoslovak and international reactionaries are now trying in vain to misrepresent. That posi- tion has nothing in common \\'ith what the enemies of the Czechoslovak people are trying to ascribe to Mr. Masaryk.Mr. Masaryk was with the people, he was by their side during the Czechoslovak governmental crisis, as he publicly declared before the whole world. Would it not be better, therefore, to abandol1l the attempt to justify the absurd Americ;;n, British and Chilean assertions by referring to Mr. Masaryk? . 1 have already pointed out that a certain regularity ~an be observed in the dissemination ~f slanderous information regarding the USSR, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Such irJormation, misrepresenting the actual state of affairs, is disseminated most illtensively when the United States and the United Kingdom are actually interfering in the crudest manner in the internaI affairs of other countries before the eyes of the whole world. We know that such inter- ference on the part of the United States of America has become an everyday phenomenon. Many people have become so atcustomed to this state of affairs that they have ceased to wonder at it. The Soviet Union, however, which upholds aild defends the sovereign independence of small nations and peoples, cannat join those who are willing to regard the interference of sorne States in the domestic affairs of others as a normal The delegation of the USSR considers it neces- sa.']' to point this out again, because the authors of the Chilean letter, and those who support it, are attempting to make these insinuations the ,centre of attention in the discussion of all this truiy non-existent Czechoslovak question. The same applies to the assertion that the USSR has violated its treaty of friend8hip, mutuaI assistance and post-war co-operation with Czechoslovakia. This statement is absolute1y un- founded, as are all the other statements of the Chîlean slanderers. The Soviet Union has always been and will continuè to be true to its inter- national obligations, including its obligations under treaties entered into with the Eastern European co~ntries. It is not for the Chilean Government or the representatives of any other country ta judge whether a treaty between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia has been violated or not. This can only be judged by the countries 'by which such a treaty has been conduded; namely, only by the Governments and peoples of those coun- tries. The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia do not need any self-styled arbiters and will not allow anyone to deal with the question of their obliga- tions under the above, or any other treaties or 1 agreements between them. The Chïlean representative, in his statement of . 17 March last, deplored the fact that the right of private property in Czechoslovakia had re- centIy been "violated". That was the word used. He did not explain, however, what he meant by violation of the right of private property. One assumes that he had in mind certain economic measures that are being carried out by Czecho- slQvakia in the field of industry, agriculture, and other branches of the national economy. We all know that the nationalization of indus- trial enterprises, or even of some branches of economy, is being carried out not only in Czecho- slovakia but in other European countries and even, to some extent, in the United Kingdom. The peoples of those countries, inducling the people of Czechoslo~7a.kia, regard such measures as their own achievement, since their fulfilment is in the interests of the people and of the A number of countries have realized the neces- sity of carrying out. democratic reforms not only in the political field but in the economic field as well. The Eastern European countries, including 'Czechosiovakia, are in many respects setting an example to other countries and pèoples in the 'solution of these impurtant problems. ' People who. deplore the so-called "violation" of the right to private property in Czechoslo- vakia, though they Ihay not suspect it, give them- selves away completely. They makè no secret of the fact that they are the enemies of thesl: dem0- cratic '.reforins ànd defend the selfish interests of small groups of fimincial and ·industriàl circlès and land oWners, thereby revealing thernselves as the deadly enemies of democratic national reforms, which are as nècessary as the air they breathe ta the people of riiany countriès of the würld." They thereby êxpose themselves as the faithful servànts of· the capitalistic monopolies, which are terrified as they observe the démo- cratic reforms 'carried oùtin a number of Euro- peancountries.. The people of Czechoslovakia as weIl as theise Of other Eastern European coùntriès in .,,:hich suchrèforms are being carriéd out, partictrlarly ln théeconoœic sphere, âre makÏng and Will con- tinue to make their own decisions regarding such questions, and have no need of advice from the Americàns or the British or anyone else. The decision of such questions lies within the internaI competence of each State and cannot be an object of foreign interfercmce. . The Chïlean representativk: did not fail to refer to'the well-known statement made by the United States of America, the UIiited Kirigdom and the French Governments in connexion with the change in- the composition of Czechoslovak Gov- ernment.· His reference to that statement was ()bviously made in order to show that his Gov- ernment's wishes were infull agreement with the position of the three aforementioned Govern- ments. But we had no doubt about that even before. The very fact of this question being brought befor.e the Security Council' shows that thiS step fits into the framework of the UIiited ,States' expansionist policy in Europe. Is it necessary to speakabout·the. absolrtte in~ admissibility, in' this field, of' any .forèign inter- vention in the ,internal affairs of Czechqslovakia; whethêr such intervention emana.tes frorti separ- ate countries or groups of countrieS, or frointhe Security Council,' '.which. a .partiçûlar gr~)lp of c6uiltries is attemptiIig to ùse fls its blind instru- ment, .for .purposes wliich havé riothiflg in o But what democratic tradition does the United States representative. refer to? What criterion does he use in estimating the degree of democ- racy of the social system in any pa~ticu1ar country? . ~ , In speaking on this subject, the United States representative obviously proceeds from the idea . that a democratic system should necessarily copy tlie '''dem~)Cratic'' methods of the Anglo-Saxon '·cQuntries. Many American and British politi- cians including diplomats dp not hesitate to say so. Blinded by their own, propaganda regarding the "advantages" of the Anglo-Saxon type of democracy over any other type of social system, , they are unwilling or unable to understand all : the advantages of the new type of democracy in ànumber,of countries of Eastern Europe. Their political horizon is limited by Wall Street conceptions of democracy. They'look at' the social conditions and social relations taking shape in· a number of European couritries through the spectacles of the salesmen of the financial-industrial monopolies of the United, States, who would trample on the freedom arid , independence of any country or peopie for the ' sake of obtaining profits, and, of course, they alwayshide bëhind hypocritical statements that they are doing this on behalf of the defence of democracy. Are we not riow witnessing how the most ex- pansionist and aggressive plans, and riot oruy pla:ns but actions, bf influential American circ1es are being cbncealed behind demagogic state- ments about defending democracy and freedom? These Pharisees give their own meaning to the words "democracy" and "freedom", whidi have nothing in common with that democracy and freedom for which the peoples of the many coun~ tries which experienced the Second World War and enemy occupation are striving for, and in the achievement of which they have already made considerable progress. We do notoverIook the fact that among these politicians there are some who understand what is meant by the democracy of which they speak and the freedom which they preach. But as the servants of their true masters--,-the capitalist , monopolies-they are forced to obey orders. In order to cope with, their tasks, they naturally have to juggle with phrases about deino"cracy and free~om and lecture ot:he~ on ç1emocracy', although m fact they' have nothing tà tea:ch. Suçh are th~ teac~ers who appear on tlie st~ge in ConneXIOn ~l~. the discussio~ of the Czechô- ~~~tion;.and who daim thàt they' are Apparently, realizing the clumsiness with which the whole of this Chilean affair has been . concocted, and that there are no facts, nor can there be any, to support the so-called, "charges" against. the USSR and Czechoslovakia, those who staged all this comedy in connexion with the Czechoslovak question are now trying to lay, 50 to speak, a foundation under the whoh rotten edifice of lies and slander directed against the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe which are friendly to it. Such attempts could he detected in the first 'statement of the repre- sentative of the United K.ingdom dtiring the dis- cussion of the question whether' the Chilean letter should be included in the agenda or not. Even then it was plain that attempts were being made to widen the question in order to spread aIl kinds of fables not oruy concerning the USSR and Czechoslovakia, but also about sorne other countries of Eastern Europe. In the course of the discussion, the representative.s of sorne other countries followed the United Kingdom repre- sentative's example. The representative of China may be included among them. la vienne TI un What did the representative of China tell us nere? Did he perhaps point out any fact that might confirm the truth of the Chilean fables? No, he did not. Instead, he began a lengthy dis- sertiltion on the meaning of free enterprise and a classless society. 1 consider It useless to enter The same applies to the comparison which the Chïnese representative has drawn between the situation in Czechoslovakia and that in Man- churia. It is hard to say what idea was in the mind of the Chinese representative when he de- cided to find an analogy between the two cases. Apparently, in order to understand it, we must read between the lines of bis statement. That is a difficult art, but never mind; circumstances sometiInes compel us to learn it. However; it is not clear how the Czechoslovak question or Czechoslovakia itself, or the Soviet Union cornes .into the matter or why this comparison was necessary. 1 should not be surprised if, following the Chïnese representative'~ example, sorne other member complained to the Security Council that he had a severe headache, ihat there was a definite connexion between bis headache and the events in Czechoslovakia, that the headache was caused, in the long run, by the activities of tlie Czechoslovak Communist Party, and that the Soviet Union was involved in it. No more convincing are the Chine!le repre- sentative's remarks about the French Revolution of 1789 and the great Socialist Revolution in the USSR. He stated that the Socialist Revolution in the Soviet Union would have been a good thing if it had not destroyed the fruits of the French Revolution. Apparently, it was necessary for the Chinese representative to "theorize" in this way, so that he could draw a parallel be- tween the situation in Czechoslovakia and that in the Soviet Union, where a socialist society has been bullt in the sight of the whole world and to which, as to a hright beacon, the eyes of all the peoples of the world are turned. He also needed this comparison in order to establish what might be called a l~heoretical" basis for the defence of a reactionary social system in certain. States, a system abhorrent to the peoples of those countries. Naturally, it proved impossible to establish any such basis. The result was only an untidy heap of historical facts and events, which shows the helplessness of those who support the "argu- ments" of tlie Chileans. ments liens. As 1 have already pointed out, the Govern- de certains Etats cherchent à de Conseil non Tchécoslovaquie,. autres ~ents .of certain States. are trying to use the ?iscusslon of.the so-called Czechoslovak question m the Secunty Council as an excuse for attacks not only against the Soviet Union and Czecho- slovakia, but aIso against other countries of East- ern Europe. This tendency has found expression \. We need not doubt that the peoples of those' countries are carryîng out their reforms and will èontinue to do so despite the howls with wlùch such changes are met in the United States of .America and sorne other Western countries. 1have already had the opportunity to express my attitude towards the demand, so ardently de- pended by the representative of thè United States for an investigation in connexion with the asser- , tionscontained in the Chïlean letter concerning alleged Soviet interference in the internal affairs of' Czechoslovakia. If 1 now touch upon this question again, it is because that demand ~ apparently the basic issue for those who have brought this question before the Security Council. Not only the Chilean, but aIso the United States and United Kingdom representatives have spoken here of their desire to make an investi- gation. They have been in a hurry to reveal their secret thoughts. They must have an investi- gation quickly, they must have one at all costs. We need not doubt that they have already pre- pared the "results" of snch an investigation, and possibly even the drafts of the appropriate reso- lutions..(The fact that the Chïlean representa- tive submitted a draft resolution at the present meeting of the Security Council goes to confirm what 1 have said.) AlI they want is to go on talking about an investigation. They want, so to say; to "prepare" public opinion, to use'to the full the prescribed quota of slander against the USSR and Czechoslovakia. In other words, they want to prepare the ground for submitting to the Council sorne kind of ridiculous resolution on investigation. In order to mislead public opinion, they are trying to substantiate the demand for an investi- gation by referring to Article 34 of the United Nations Charter. However, it must be clear to anyone who has any understanding of the Char- ' ter that Article 34 is absolutely inapplicable to this case. The Article provides for the investiga- tion of any situation which might lead ta international friction or give TIse ta a dispute. Mor~over, the investigation itself, açcording ta ·this Article of the Charter, must be auned at ,determining whether the continuance of the .exi§ting situation is likely to endanger the main- _If those who submit such proposaIs were in the slightest degree guided by common sense, they would surely1 understand that not dozens, but hundreds and thousands of people can testify against the Governments of their own countries. Is it difficult to find Canadians who would be willing at any time to give evidence against the Government of Canada, Americans willing to give evidence against the Government of the United States, Englishmen willing to give evi-' dence against the Government of Great Britain or Syrians willing to give evidence against. the Government of Syria? And yet no one has so far proposed to summon to the Security Council, for the discussion of any question concerning those countries, private persons opposed to the Government of one or the other of them. Those who propose such a course in connexion with Czechoslovakia would obviously be indig- nant, if anyone put forward a proposaI that per- sons opposed, say, to the Canadian Government or the Government of the United States ShOlÙd be summoned for hearing in the appropriate commission of the United Nations Organiiation. Nevertheless they find it normal to submit such proposa:ls, insulting as they are to the Czecho- slovak people, in connexion with the discussion 1 am not pointing out aU this in order to con- vince the authors and the inspirers of the Chilean letter. 1 think tbat it would be aImost useless to do that, since they are guided neither by facts nor by logic. 1 am p"linting it out in order to help tliose who have no preconceived opinion, and who wish to be impartial and objective in appraising the real facts and the situation. 1 say that it is aImast useless to try to convince ilie authors of the Chilean letter. In saying this, 1 base myselî on the fact that they are not inter- ested in cstablishing the real facts or in revealing the truth to public opinion, but in the very opposite-the conceaIment of truth and the spreading of lies. That this conclusion is correct is borne out, in particular, by the Chilean repre- sentative's statcment that, in his opinion, the Security·Council could carry out an investigation of the situation in Czechoslovakia even from Lake Success. (Why trouble to find sorne other place?) Only because they have no respect for their own people and their own country can these people make such statements. ln his speech of 17 March [268th meeting] the Chîlean representative quoted a statement al- leged to have been made by Mr. Gregor, a mem- ber of the present Czechoslovak Cabinet. The statement was quoted for the purpose of proving that member of the Government of Czechoslo· vakia had to sorne extent almost confirmed the Chïlean "charges" against the USSR regarding the alleged Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. 1 have a:1ready pointed ! out that this is a fabrication. It was concocted lIa by certairl Americans in order to mislead naive . people. This fact is now known to everyone. It is, however, characteristic that the United States Press, which spread this fabrication, has not con- They are prepared to carry out an investiga- tion of the situation in Czechoslovakia (it is not known what situation) apparently, from the delegates' loungé at Lake Success. 1 shaU not he surprised if the Chilean representative expresses the wish to investigate the situation in Czechoslo- vakia by sending a commission of the Security Council to Santiago, the capital of Chile. Does this not show that the people who brought the question before the Security Council have got themselves in a muddle, do not know what to do with the question, and have reached the Pillars of Hercules in absurdity? si~ered it possible to publish the remarks of the representative of the USSR ~xposing this fa.ise report of a statement made by Mr. Gregor, who This is yet another instance of the methods to whil'h those responsible for bringing the Czecho- slovéÙ~ question before the Security Council are resorting. But it aIso exposes their true intentions and he1ps those who wish to get to the bottom of this question, and to separate the truth from the lies, to do so. T. le Chïlean representative's reference to the te1eg. am sent by Mr. Benes, the President of Czechos1ovakia, to the League of Nations on ·16 March 1939 has an ironical ring. As we know, that telegram expresses a protest against the Munich betrayaI of Czechoslovakia by the Westem powers. It voiced the protest of the Czechos1ovak people who had been stabbed in the back by the Westem Powers, which sacrlflced Czechoslovakia to the fascist aggressor, and tried, at her expense, to get Hitlerite Germany to direct its aggression eastwards, against the Soviet Union. The reference to Mr. Benes' telegram, wd the contents of the te1egram itself, are the on1y parts of the Chïlean representative's state- ment that are worthy of attention. But that tele- gram is an indictment of the instigators of the Chïlean adventure and of the Westem Powers who sacrificed Czechoslovakia to Hitlerite Ger- many. All this goes to prove that neither the authors of the document under discussion, nor the former representative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations, nor their American and British advo- cates have been and :are still unable to submit any facts or arguments W'orthy of attention in support of their ground1ess and ridiculous de- mands. On the contrary, everything they have said in their statements and speeches confirms the justness of the Soviet Union's position. The course of the discussion of the Czechoslo- vak question in the Security Council leaves no doubt that this question was introduced am- ficia1ly in order to use the discussion for the pcr- pose of stirring up a hostile campaign against the USSR, and that the question of the composition of the Czechoslovak Government is a purely in- ternaI affair to be decided on1y by the Czecho- slovak people exercising its sovereign rights in its own country. Mr. PARODI (France) (translated trom French): In view of the hour, and the length and nature of the address we have just heard from Mr. Gromyko, my B~lgian colleague and 1 ar~ prepared to waive a French interpretation of this speech, and to wait for the translation which ) us. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): 1shall detain the Security Council only for a few minutes in arder ta correct certain misstatements which hàve fallen from the lips of the representa- tive of the USSR in the speech which he made today and in a speech he made on a previous occasion [273rd meeting]. 1 shall change the course and tlie tone of today's discussion by re- stticting myself to plain and prosaic. facts and by stating them with moderation. Mr. Gromyko has devoted hims~lf at length ta a quotation made in one of the opening meet- ings devoted to this question [268th meeting], a quotation which had been reported by the New York Press to have emanated from a speech of a minister of the present Czechoslovak Govem- ment who was reported ta have said: : "We must thank our Slav allies and mainly the Soviet Union for the {act that we succeeded in defeating reactlon." . At the Security Council meeting which took plàce on· 23 Match [273rd meeting], Mr. Gro- myko said: "This quotation ... was taken from the pages of sorne corrupt American newspapers which have chosen as their profession the dissemina- tion of slander against the Soviet Union..."1 He further went on ta say: "1 hope the representative of the United King- dom will agree with me that, in repeating a newspaper fabrication, he has followed the same course which is followed by the above-mentioned Press. In other words, he repeats the fabrications in trying ta sell them for truth."1 Agai.'l today, Mr. Gromyko has said that "these-what he called-fable.s about the threat of the USSR ta use force agaLllSt Czechoslo- vakia . . . were taken from newspapers which have chosen as their profession the spread of slanderous and provocative information about the USSR. AIl are weIl aware of this. Never- theless, the representative of the United States, the representative of the United Kingdom and some other representatives are not fastidious about the source in drawing up an extra dose of slander."2 fables, Tchécoslovaquie viennent de informations sait Etats-Unis min:!; si ment 1 The representative of the United Kingdom was quot- ing the English interpretation of the speech of the USSR , representative found in document SjP.V; 273, the official translation of which will be found in the Offi- cial Records of the Securiti Council, Third Yem'.. No. 38. en figure traduction. est iéc'u'rité, . entirely agree with the representative of the U~SR that it is undesirable to build a case on newspaper c1ippings taken at random. 1 have 'had occasion in the past ta deprecate that prac- tice myself. But 1 was not guilty of that on this occasion. 1 told the Security Council, when 1 referred ta this quotation of Ministçr Gregor, that 1 nad a8certained that this version corres- ponded with the fust report issued by the ofijcial Czechoslovak Press agency. Later, the agency issued a correction from which this passage was deleted. Wheil on thl" {ollowing day Mr. Gromyko made his speech in which hè denounced these- what he called-"press fa.brications", 1 naturany took the trouble of verifying my information, and having consulted the United Kingdom Embassy in Prague, 1 r~ceived the following telegram irom them: "We have in our possession one of the actual documents issued by the official Czechoslovak Press' agency, containing the fust report of Gregor's speech translated into English. The passage in question reads as follows: 'Czechoslo- vakia has, thanks to her Slav allies and particu- larly the Soviet Union, managed to overthrow reaction and overcome her difficulties. Czecho- slovak people now have no fear of famine or even of any considerable lowering of rations', Minister Gregor pomted out. "According to the corrected version issued â few hours later, Minister Gregor actually said: 'We have managed ta overcome the obstacles and to defeat reaction. Thanks to our allies and particularly the Soviet Union, our people need not now be afraid of starvation.''' Referring to the speech two days later, the Czechoslovak news agency made out that the erroneous version which had been accepted by the foreign Press was based on an omission of a full stop. !t i5 not for us to say which of these versions is cOriect, the first one or the second. Perhaps we s~all,never know. But 1 think that if they examme these two texts which 1 have read, the !'epresentatives On the Security Council willfind î?at they cannot be so easily reconciled by the snnple expedient 'of the omission of the full stop. Mr. Gromyko said: "Not only the representative of Chile, but aIso the United States and United Kingdomrepre- sentatives spoke here of their desire to make an investigation."5 There again, 1 cannot find any statement of that sort in my speech. 1 did not ask for an investigation: That is not to say that 1 think that the case should be dropped or that no fur- ther inquiry should be made. The discussion, as far as it has gone, has gone far enough to show me that there is a great deal that wants in- vestigation. Mention has aIso been made of evidence and witnesses who can enlighten the Security Council on what has actually happened. 1 certainly do think that the Security Council should seek and adopt some method of testing very carefully and examining very thoroughly any evidence that may be submitted to it.
"The Security Council
The President unattributed #141915
If there are no further speakers, 1 shall declare the discussion on the resolution submitted by the representative of Chile closed. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): 1 wish to make a parliamentary inquiry. 1 did not understand the ruling of the President. 1 understood hirn to say that he had closed the discussion on the resolution; is that correct? • The representative of the United Kingdom was quot· iDg from the interpretation of the speech of the USSR l'epresentative, the translation of wqich will be found on page 6. Ml'. AUSTIN (United States of America): If the resolution has been presented by anybody, 1 should like to speak. 1 am not quite clear on the parliamentary situation. Has this resolution been offered in the Security Counci1?
The President unattributed #141916
It has been submitted for disc~\SSion. Now, in order that it might be put to the .'9te-if it is so desired--one of the representatives of the SeCJ~ity Council shouId ask .to have it put to et vote, in accordance with ruIe 38 of the ruIes of procedure. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): Before the resolution is put ta a vote, 1 wish to add something to what 1 have already said relating to the cause for action by the Security Council. The Security Couneil has been considering the serious charges made before it against both the USSR and the present Czechoslovak Government with respect to the events that have taken place in Czechoslovakia. It is charged that the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, legally constituted by the parliamentary election of May 1946, has been undermined by a communist minority which was encouraged and given promise of help by representatives of the ruIers of the USSR. It is said that the communist coup was successfuI orny because of the violence of a Soviet supported communist minority, because of the participation of Soviet representatives and the threat of military force of the Soviet Union in readiness near the boundaries of Czechoslovakia. This constitutes a serious part of the charge: Soviet officiaIs and military representatives are alleged to have taken part in meetings and demonstrations in Prague during the crisis. It was further alleged that Soviet officers participated in the arrest of non-communist politicalleade~; that Soviet agents worked in the Ministry of Interior which controIs the police and the se:' curity troops, and that Soviet agents were aIso among the armed militia in the streets of Prague. Allegations were made that Czechoslovakia was subject to indirect aggression and political infiltration which led to the subversion of the parliamentary regime and to the establishment of a terroristic police ruIe. It is further charged that the political independence of ·Czechoslovakia, a Member of the United Nations, has been violated by a threat of use of force on the part of anotherMember of the United Nations, the Union' of Soviet' peut graphe l'Organisation venir ment Mais serions Etat dont compromise. maintien l'Europe vaquie, conclu Staline, sident tions sont fondées, empêcher gnages prétend l'Union soviétique, un It has been argued that these charges cannot be considered by the Security Council because of the provisiQn contained in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter providing that the United Nations cannot intervene in matten: which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of aState. However, the charges are based on the allegation of an illegal intervention by one State in the internal affairs of another State, leading to the impairment of its·. political independence. Moreover, the restoration and maintenance of democratic institutions in liberated Europe, inc1uding Czechoslovakia, was the subject of an international Agreement concluded at Yalta by Marshal Stalin, Prime Minister Churchill an~ President Roosevelt in February 1945. Consequently, if the charges are true, Article 2, paragraph 7, clearly could not be a ,bar to Security Council jurisdiction over this question. The taking of evidence is the way to settle whether or not the charges are a premeditated quota of slander, as charged by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In the charges before us, we are faced with an account of armed forces moving across the frontier from one State to another in pursuance of an aggressive purpose. In the case of a "use of force", the problem of evidence for all practical purposes would not ·arise. However, the charges before us are that a '~threat of force" was used. The Security Council must determine whether "threat of force" was used or sorne other form of pressure or illegal interference was applied. AlI the facts in this case are not readily apparent and cannot be alleged in advance, but the seriousness of the allegations already made is such that the Security Council is bound ta make every effort to "get at the facts". parlent pas tière s'agissait est toute illégale. tions sécurité The Chïlean Government, which brought the Czechoslovak question before the Security Council originally, requested }the Security Council ta conduct an investigation. A proposal has now been submitted by the Chilean Government for the creation of a sub-committee to hear wit.. nesses and report to the Security Council on th('~ nature of their testimony.. We believe that this might be a convenient method which would make it easier for the Security Council to understand the Czechoslovak situation. Indeed, at the risk of being called a cynic by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, l assert that the United States will be behind this proposition if it is made here ih the Security Council. L:: tive procéder tenant procéder prendre le socialist~s sécurité, Nhat were the events that led up to the death of the Foreign Minister of that country, Mr. la Certain facts on the developments in Czechoslovakia itself are a matter of common know- .ledge. They have not been reviewed in detail here, and they ought to be so reviewed. They constitute the framework of internal developments against which the charges of external interference ought to be considered. For example, the Czechoslovak Government crisis was precipitated by the' unwillingness of Premier Gottwald and the communist ministers to respect two majority decisions of the Cabinet ~this is not newspaper gossip-with reference to the administration of the police power under the communist Ministry of Interior. The latter was making arbitrary appointments of police officials in a process of extending communist control. The twelve non-communist ministers resigned in protest as an appropriate parliamentary response to a refusal by a Cabinet minority to abide by the wish of the Cabinet majority. The communists seized upon this as an occasion for breaking the opposition, discrediting its. leaders and taking over full control of the Govemment. Is this an extra dose of slander? If so, it is a mighty good reason for hearing this testimony. How was it possible for this minority party to overthrow successfully the elected Govemment of Czechoslovakia and establish, in efi'ect, a police regime? At the time of the crisis the Communist Party was already in control of the security police, the State broadcasting apparatus, and it had also secured important influence in the armed forces. This control arose as a result of a series of circumstances, beginning with the signing of a friendship treaty between Czechoslovakia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 12 December 1943. This was an expression of a desire on the part of the Czechoslovak Government to maintain close relations with the USSR in the genuine belief that Czechoslovakia, when liberated from German occupation, would be able to continue its democratic form of government and institutions without intervention from its powerful neighbour. This treaty, in fact, inclUded a clause stipulating non-intervention by either of the Parties in the other's domestic Now, 1 ask you: Are these allegations based . on newspaper reports or are they based on solemn conventions? At the same time, the Czechoslovak leaders declared their willingness to include representarives of the Com..-nunist Party in a new Cabinet, although it had never before participated in any Czechoslovak Government. They show~d more than goodwill to co-operate with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and wïth the communists. In the negotiations that took place among Czechoslovak leaders in Moscow, in 1945, with regard to the formation of a new Cabinet, the communists managed ta secure the keyposts of the Ministries of the Interior, Information, Agriculture and Education. In addition, the communists had a strong hold in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Under- Secretary of State and in the Ministry of National Defence, which was headed by General Ludvig Svoboda, a professional soldier who, in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, had led the first Czechoslovak brigade, and whose pro- Soviet sentiments are well known. Now, 1 ask you: Are these Herculean piles of nonsense? As a rule, according ta the Czechoslovak parliamentary practice, these key positions went ta the party that received the greatest number of votes in the elections. We can ouly specula:te concerning the basis on which the communists obtained them during the Moscow discussions. The control of key posts in the Government placed the comml.lnists, during the period immediately following the Czechoslovak Iiberation, in a dominant position entirely out of proportion ta their popular support. Through the Ministry of the Interior, they controlled the police, which they soon reorganized into the National Security Corps, which is constituted on the Soviet model. The Ministry of Information gave them control over the us~ of mass media of communication for propaganda purposes, and the Ministry of Agriculture placed them in a position ta compel allegiance from agricultural workers and small peasants. . Moreover, it will be recalled that, at the time of Iiberation from the German occupation, fourfifths of the country was occupied by troops of the USSR and remained occupied in that way . for the following eight months. The communists had given sufficient evidence before the recent seizure of power that they would not tolerate any political opposition, which they identified as treason to the State. This was brought out at the time of the coup, by the immediate formation of action committees, the sudden appearance of a well disciplined and fully armed factory militia in Prague, and the swift and ruthless purge of the non-communist leaders. These steps reveal a high degree of preparation, a high degree of organization, for seizure of power. It is a patt~rn designed to usurp the control of aState. We should ascertain to what extent outside assistance contributed to this thorough preparation. It shows how impossible it is for those who believe in government through democratic processes and parliamentary methods to co-operate in good faith with the communists. At the time of the coup, the tension in Czechoslovakia was heightened by reports of Soviet intervention and of the presence of a large number of Soviet agents in the country. It was at this time-precisely at this time, and under these conditions-that Soviet Deputy Foreign Ministe~ Zorin arrived in Prague. Shortly thereafter, during the crisis, there appeared on the streets of Prague special heavily armed police shock regiments. These regiments, under the command of the Communist Minister of the Interior, were called out to patrol the streets and to search thé headquarters of opposition parties. Great nuuAbers of alTiled factdry. militia also appeared in . Prague, marching in military formation, wearing red arm bands and carrying the Soviet flag. AU the indications of the birth of a police 1 state were there: complete seizure of control 1 over broadcasting facilities, elimination of non- 'radiodiffusion, élimination communist newspaper editors, suppression of a number of non-communist periodicals and the imposition of complete censorship. Since the putsch, no true opposition publications exist in Czechoslovakia. Virtually all journalists hitherto critical of the communists have been purged. A largenumber of journalists have been expelled from the Association of Czechoslovak Journalists, among them Lev Sychrava, representative of the Are thesecharges fabrications or slanders? Then take the testimony of the men who were available and who know whether or not they are slanderous. AlI non-communist parties were purged, and a nuinber of non-communist functionaries were arrested. Action committees were formed and given full administrative control over the duly constituted organs of the Republic. There was no existing basis in Czechoslovak law for any such act. Yet, according to reports available here, very little overt opposition to the communist coup was apparent. How are we to understand that the majority of the Czechoslovak people, known for their traditional adherence to democratic majority rule, acquiesced to the communist minority? Could it be that the coup OCCUITcd because over the shoulder of the minority glared the face of a foreign Power? Is it not significant that the min.ority was led by individuals who were indoctrinated by a foreign Power? There are men of universally respected reputations who have for years been a part of Czechoslovak political life and who have now found it necessary for a second time in ten years to Hee from their homeland. They were present during tbe crisis andcan perhaps shed sorne light on the question of how it was that totalitarian police state methods were substituted for traditional . Czech democratic procedure wi!hout any significant overt expression of protest on the part of the Czechoslovak people. As has been pointed out in the Security Council discussions, the Czechoslovak story assumes added significance when compared with the developments that have taken place throughout Eastern and Central Europe. In Hungary, Bulgaria, Roumania and Poland, while details varied, the· general pattern was the same. Like Czechoslovakia, all these countries had been occupied by the armies of the Soviet Union. The chief steps were the acquisition by the communists of key posts in the Cabinet, control of the police, control of the armies, control of the media of mass information, and finally control or subversion of the judiciary. In none of these countries did the communists enjoy sufficient popular support to warrant their commanding position in the Governments. In such countries where truly free elections were held, they received as littIe as seventeen per cent of the total vote, and the largest vote they received was thirty-eight per cent. <There is a striking uniformity in the techniques applied by the communists in their fight Let us think of the trial of the Bulgarian peasant leader, Petkov, the trial of Maniu in Roumania, the arrest of the popular peasant leader, Kovacs in Hungary, the trials of opposition leaders in Poland and, finally, in Czechoslovakia, the charges of conspiracy against Vladimir Krajina, one of the outstanding underground leaders in the resistan.ce against the Germans. Are these mendacious stories? Let us find out. The remarkably similar methods lead, of course, to remarkably similar results. In aIl five COUIitries we are now confronted with regimes unquestionably and totally controlled by the Communist Parties. The policie~ of these regimes would seem to follow without deviation the interests of the USSR. As was the case previously in the other four countries, the new Czechoslovak regime has now cast aside the entire substance of parliamentary practice. All effective opposition leaders were removed, the opposition journalists deprived of their freedom to write, and the traditiçmal autonorny of the six hundred year-old Charles University of Prague was brutally violated by the dismissal of its duly elected head, followed by a purge of a substantial number of its professors. The uniforrnity and the smooth operation of the pattern raises the logical question whether or n.ot there is co-ordination from a central point for the implementation of this pattern. Ts it not significant that the top communists in Hungary, such as Deputy Prime Minister Rakosi, economic czar Vas, and Foreign Minister Pauker in Rou" mania; Prime Minister Dimitrov and Foreign Minister Kolarov of Bulgaria, and the entire leadership of Czechoslovakia, including Premier Gottwald, Cabinet Ministers Fierlinger, Kopecky Najedly and the Secretarv-General of the Com~ munist Party, Slansky, l;ave aIl spent years of active work in Moscow and have been in close association with both the USSR communist leaders as wel1 as the communist leaders in other countries, and that sorne of them have even become citizens of the USSR? To complete the similarity of the patterns found in al1 those countries, is it a coincidence that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky What is the significance of the fact that after the Czechoslovak Government had indicated its readiness to participate in the Marshall Plan, this decision was reversed following a telephone call to Pngue from Moscow, where the Czechoslovak Prime Minister and Foreign Minister had been summoned? Is it not significant that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, as weil as the communisî parties of other European countries, including all the cpuntries .of Eastern Europe, joined with the Communist Party of the USSR in the Cominform in October 1947? Is this an extra dose of slander? The leading role of the -Communist Party of the. USSR in the Cominform is a matter of common knowledge. Is it aIso not significant that shortly thereafter the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia became more aggressive? AU of these circumstances lead to the basic qUe&âon: Has the Government of Czechoslovakia been subverted with the assistance, direct or indirect, of an outside Power? Has a threat of the use of force or other pressure or interference by an outside Power been directed against the political indepelldence of Czechoslovakia? li the answer is in the affirmative, then we are confronted with a situation which very definitely is outside the scope of Article 2, pruagraph 7 of the Charter and which concerns the Security CQlhlCil. We have heard many contradictory statements in the course of this discussion. The Security Council ought to ascertain the truth. It should neither condemn nor approve blindly. This was a consideration in my previous proposaI [273rd and 278th meetings] that the Security Council should invite the representative of· the new Czechoslovak Government ta the table. This invitation has no.{ been rejected. Why? The rejection is based on the thr.sis that this case comes under Article 2~ paragraph 7. This, as 1 have·pointed out, is a matter for determinatiolt by the Security Council. The llew Czechoslovak regime and the USSR are attemptin~ to deci.de that question for the Security Couneil and to dictate a unilateral and prejudiced opinion. on this point to the Security Couneil. This is a high-handed and arbitrary way of behaving wmch would be surprising had it not come from these regimes. Thisrefusal to participate does not give me a feeling of confidence that all is weIl. If theseregimes had a clear conscience about these events, surely they would. eagerly seize t1:J.e opportunity of presenting thèir side of the case to th~ Security Council. They would ~ot oppose We have aIso now been told that there is a group of men outside Czechoslovakia who were leaders in the political life of that country prior to the coup. The l'epresentative of ChUe has suggested the creation by the Security Council of a sub-committee to hear the story of these leaders who were in Czechoslovakia when the coup occurred and who presumably should'have fust-hand knowledge of the events taking place at that time and of those wmch led ta the coup. My Govemment feels the Security Council would not bedischarging its obligation.<; fully if it did not hear these people. It feels that the creation of a sub-conunittee to receive snch testimony, to obtain other available information and ta report back to the full Council is a convenient, speedy and feasible procedure.. We feel that the sub-committee should consist of representatives of :live States of the Security Council. In our view the terme; of reference should be simple. The sub-committee should he authorized to hear the testimony of these .:Jzech political leaders and to report on this testimony to the Security Council, as stated in the resolution. My Government feels that it is essential that such information should be obtained in order t1:lat the Security Council may be in a better position to decide what further steps should be taken in this matter, if any. 1 would add that we would not consider the activity of.such a sub-committee to be in any way an investigation. The proposal befor~ us has ~e full support of my Government.
The President unattributed #141917
1 had expected that the Security Council would be able to vote on this draft resolution today, but in view of the fact that 1 still have four speakers on my list--one of them has intimated that he will make a rather lengthy statement,and two others have signified their willingness to speak on another occasion- 1 propose that the Security. Council should now adjoum. Before doing 50,1 should like to recognize the representative of the USSR who wishes to make a slight correction. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Re~ publics) (translated from Russian): 1 have pointed out that there ,.are no grounds whatever for· the assertion that Mr. Zorin, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, asked Mr. Benes for an audience during his visit to Prague and that the President of Czechoslovakia did not l'eceive him. ~:.v.~::e:.ri~cr:m .,. t.:.in ..dr:.. . il.:mz.c:w:e:: J!Qi.r~t~~+\~~ ,' ...~." '" .' 1 must, however, draw attention to the fact that it W~ not the United Kingdom representative but tii.e United States representative who, repeating, 'as usuaI, the unfounded statements of the former representative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations, referred to this matter in bis statement of 23 March, which 1 have before me. Thf~ United Kingdom representative was nanled owing to a misunderstanding caused by a mistake in the interpretation. As for Sir Alexander Cadogan's attempt to justify himself in connexion with L.~e second paJ:t of m'Y statement referrhlg to a speef.h made by Gregor, one of the members of the Government of Cz~choslovakia, 1 see that Sir ,.Alexander still does not wish to admit that thel'p. are two versions of Gregur's speech, one genuine, and the other fictitious; the first, an officiaI version published by the appropriate organs in Czechoslovakia, the second, a faIse version publisheci in the American Press aIld quoted hitherto in the Security Council. For some reason it continues to bequoted even now, while the genuine official version of the speech is either disregarded or omitted aItogether. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): 1 thought 1 had made it clear, in reading a tele- "gram which 1 had received from the United Kingdom Embassy in Prague, that both versions were put out by the same officiaI Czech Press agency. 1 said that 1 do not know which is true.
The President unattributed #141920
1 am unable to sayat the present time when the Security Council will be able to meet again on this question, inasmuch as the special session of· the General Assembly is beginning on Friday and an attempt isbeing made to bring the Palestine question and the India-Pakistanquestion before the Security Council prior to the opening of the special ses:' sion. For the time being, therefore, the question as to when the Security Council will meet again on the Czechoslovak question will he left open. The meeting rose at 6.17 p.m. Egypt--Egytte Librairie "La d'Egypte" 9 Sh. Adly Pasha CAIRO Finland--Finlande Akateeminen 2, Keskuskatu HELSINKI Australia--Amtralie H. A. Goddard Pty. Ltd. 255a George Street SYDNEY, N. S. W. BeIgi~--Belgique Agence et Messageries de la Prp.sse, S. A. 14-22 rue du Persil BRUXELLES France Editions A. Pedone 13, rue Souffiot PARIS, Va Bolivia--Bolivie Libreria Cièntifica y Literaria Avenida 16 de Julio, 216 Casilla 972 LA PAZ Cireece---(;rèce "Eleftheroudakis" Librairie internationale Place de la ATHÈNES Canada The Ryerson Press 299 Queen Street West TORONTO Ciuatemala José Goubaud Goubaud & Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. GUATEMALA Chile-Chili Edmundo Pizarro Merced 846 SANTIAGO Haiti--Haïti Max Bouchereau Librairie "A Boîte postale . PORT-AU-PRINCE China--Chine The Commercial Press Ltd. 211 Honan Road SHANGHAI Costa Rica--Costa-Rica Trejos Hermanos Apartado 1313 SAN JOSÉ India-Inde Oxford Book & Co. Scindia House NEW DELHI Cuba La Casa Belga Rer.é de Smedt O'Reilly 455 LA HABANA Iran Bongahe Piaderow 731 Shah Avenue TEHERAN Iraq--Irak Mackenzie & The Bookshop BAGHDAD Czechoslovakia Tchécoslovaquie F. Topie Narodni Trida 9 PRAHA 1 Lebanon--Liban Denmat::': ~.. Danemark Librairie universelle Einar Munskgaard BEYROUTH N6rregade 6 Luxembourg KJOBENHAVN Librairie J. Schummer Dominican Republic LPIUXEaceMGBUlo'lulaRumG République Dominicaine Libreria Dominicana Netherlands-Pays-Bas Calle Mercedes No. 49 N. V. Martinus Apartado 656 Lange Voorhout . CIUDAD TRUJILLO S'GRAVENHAGE
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UN Project. “S/PV.281.” UN Project, https://un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-281/. Accessed .