S/PV.282 Security Council

As the Security Council will recaIl, when the resolution of 1 April 1948 [document 8/714] regarding the truce in Palestine was adopted [277th meeting], the President was instructed to discuss the possible terms of the tmce with the accredited representatives of the two parties. 1 met with them on two occasions, as 1 have alreany informed the Security Council at our info '.nai meetings. The first of these meetings consisted of a preliminary conversation intended to ascertain the general attitude of the two representatives in connexion with the truce proposaIs. 1 believe 1 need not explain at any great length how strictly .that attitude comorInS to the one which the accredited representatives of the two parties took in the Security Council when the announcement was made that they would be invited to participate in discussions. They were both very firm in their position and a.pparently determined to support it in every possible way though, of course, they showed every willingness to meet, as far as possible, the wishes of the Security Council. At our second meeting, 1 trierl, unsuccessfully, to move them out of that position into a new one that we had in mind. 1 explained that the truce was not, as the Press had intimated, a prerequisite of the trusteeship plan or, to that efIect, of any special plan, since it had been understood distinctly that the General Assembly would be entirely free to discuss any proposaIs which might be submitted for its consideration. Therefore, the primary pU1:pose of the truce was also to ensure that the General Assembly would be free to deliberate without any untoward pressure of anarchy· or adverse circumstances in Palestine, but with aIl the necessary time to reach a satisfactory conclusion, fl'ee from the objections that had been raised against the resolution of 29 November [No. 181 (II)] on the ground that several aspects of the question had not been given due consideration, As 1 informed the members of the Security Council, at one of their informaI meetings at the offices of the United States delegation where they were discussing the trusteeship proposaI that the United States delegation had in mind for Palestine, that second meeting with the representatives of the two parties led me to believe that it was fruitless to continue those conversa- 1 felt that this method was not only the best and shortest way ta hring about a truce, but that it was aIso the most satisfactory method of drawing up a resolution which might command the un,animous approval of the members of the Security Council. The result of those conversations is expressed in this draft resolution which has been circulated to the members of the Security Council [dotUOment S/722J; 1 hope it will not only command the unanimous support of the Securit"f Council but will pave the way for the tnice. ' In this connexion, 1 should like ta repeat publicly what 1 said yesterday at our informai meeting: l very much regret that due ta an involuntary oversight on the part of the ,Colombian delegation-which was probably minesome delegations were not clearly notified re· garding the rime at which we were meeting the day before yesterday ta discuss the terms of this draft resolution. However, they had the opportunity of discussing it yesterday. It is my earnest hope that the Security Council will soon be able to reach a decision on this matter, after having discussed not only those terros aIready incorporated in the draft resolution but aIso a new paragraph which has been considered necessary and which we agreed to discuss hère today; this new paragraph refers to a commission which would have the task of assisting the mandatory Power in supervising the truce. As we have approached the day of the presentation of this proposaI, the impression has grown in my mind that, contrary to what has been said, we can look forward confidently to the possibility of an early truce. It is only natural that the parties should try to clarify certain points but, aIl in aIl, 1 feel that both will realize that this tentative draft resolution represents a very sincere effort to bring about a stândstill in the present conditions in Palestine during the short time that we think will be necessary for the General Assembly to give further and conclusive consideration to this matter. This draft resolution" ~3 1 said, is the result of the conversations with other members of the Sec~.Irity Council, anq. 1 wish to take the opportumty of thanking them again for the confidence they have shown in me and for the very necessary advice that they have given me throughollt Having given this brief explanation, 1 shall close by saying that if it is the wish of the Se- C! city Council, 1 shall be honoured to submit this draft resolution as a proposal of the Colomhian delegation, although the Colombian delegation has contributed only a smaU share of the work. 1 notice that in the brief statement 1 have made, 1 omitted two important points which l want to add. The first omission is not to have mentioned the Chinese de1egation, whose cooperation has been extremely valuable not only on the Palestine question, but also in other matters with which 1 have been concerned a;; President of the Security Council, and in particular the India-Pakistan question, in which the efforts of Dr. Tsiang have been 50 effective anà fruitful. 1 aIso forgot ta mention that 1 was very gratified to have been in touch with the representatives of the United Kingdom which is the maudatory Power, and to receive their advicewhich we all thought would be advisable; one ''', of the reasons why 1 feel we can hopefully look to:wards the issue of the negotiations is the cooperative attitude that the United Kingdom Government representatives have shown in this connexion. General McNAUGHTON (Canada): On behaU of the Canadian de1egation, 1 should like to say that 1 give my full support to the resolution regarding a truce in Palestine, which the President !las presented to the Security Council in the name of the Colombian de1egation. This text is the product of co--operative efforts, under the devoted leadership of the President, on the part of a number of delegations. It was the sole desire of all who took part in the discussions to which the President has referred to find a fair and equitable basis on which there might be an immediate cessation Qf acts of violence in Palestine; this being definitely without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned. In other words, we have tried to work out an effective standstill as an interim arrangement. Pe~haps 1 may be permitted to recaU what 1 said to the Security Council on a previous occasion: "Surely the realization 'must be growing upor" both communities in Palestine that· the present·course of violence and inflexible resistance against each other can only bring chaos and· mutual destruction." These words are even In supporting this resolution, 1 express the hope that those ta whom it js addressed will immediately take the required action ta prevent a further deterioration in the situation in the Holy Land, while the General Assembly gives fwther consideration to what should be done to bring arder and peace in that country on the basis of justice to both communities. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): 1 have asked for the personal privilege of thanking the President, so that the record might show how much the United States appreciates the intelligentand vigorous leadership that he has exercised, in an informaI way, as President of the Security Couneil. 1 believe that he has not oruy succeeded in the great endeavour which he has undertaken, but that he has accomplished something of a general nature which is of very great value to the United Narions. We a.re a new Organization; our Charter is not infallible. But we have to progress through experience and leam how to do things and do them effectively and with enough speed to enable us not ta lose our pbjective on account of long delays caused by formal difficulties. What the President of the Security Council has done sets a precedent which, in my judgment, might weIl be followed in the practice of the Security Council. This task of seeing the parties and undertaking ta be the peacemaker between them is not the oruy difficult problem that the President helped to solve by his service. Eleven countries are represented at this table. At the beginning of a discussion, there are eleven different views. Sometimes the differences are so forceful that·if we were ta undertake ta compose those differences here, in a formaI debate, it would take many days.Sometimes such discussions run into weeks. We have leamed from the example given ta ~s by the President of the Security Council, th~l.t ID an atmosphere of informality and friendship, and with the understanding that men may candidly express views which they may change within five minutes, we are able ta make progress that otherwise would be iinpossib1e. Therefore, the other great functions of this deliberative body, namely, the reaching of as much agreemenL as may reasonably he expected in a body o.f eleven men bearing these heavy responsibilities, were indeed promoted by this service on !he p~ of the President,; The accomplishment Itself 18 very great. 1 thirik that we have 'leamed from practice, not only in the c.ase of Palestine 'büt aIso in the other seriousquestions which have come bef6re 1 should like ta comment on these proposals. The main objective, of course, is ta bring tranquillity in a country tom by violence. This plan of a truce shall be operative only for a short period. At the present cime and until 15 May, the constituted authority in Palestine is the United Kingdom which is acting under a mandate c::lrJerred upon it by the League of Nations. No other authority can lawfulIy bear arms or conduct organized or disorganized warfare. The United Nations cannot enter that scene with military forces without receivmg an invitation, a caU 101' help, by the mandatory Power, based on the proposition that conditions there threaten the peace of the worId. It is only under those conditions that the Security Council could enter Palestine with armed forces-if it had t~em-and undertake the suppression of these breaches of the law which prevail in Palestine. ' Therefore, in paragraph 1 of this drait resolution, the Security Council only âppeals to the persans and organizations to which this draft resolutiàn is addressed, to those who are opposed to each other in Palestine and who are con-- ducting hostilities which in certain cases amount ta massacre. The persons an4 organizations in Palestine ta whom this resolution is addressed will react ta this call not under the penalty of the application of the law or the application of force by the United Nations, but under a much more serious and more impQrtant sanction. AlI peace-Ioving people, all peoplè who have a sense of religious duty toward humanity, are con':' cerneà in the obedience of the persons called upon in this truce. More than that, aIl other people who c::j.n affect the performance of the terms of this truce are called upon to encourage, abet and help the parties who are directly called upon ta carry out the terms of the truce; and aIl parties are inhibited and forbidden morally to do anything that would cause a breac;h of this truce. Certainly, any organ or agency of the United Nations is c3.lIed upon not ta participate in any way in encouraging th~ parties here addressed ta break this truce. There will be worldwide moral conderimation of a breach of this truceby the parties, or of any encouragement toward a breach of the truce by those who are Îlot parties, whether they be Member States of 1 need not read all the various provisions. 1 think the representatives on the Security Council are familiar with them. In circumstances such as these, when the Security Council does not find t4at there exists a threat to international peace, before taking such action as is proposed here, the Security Council is acting under that part of the Charter which caUs for an attempt to find a solution by agreement. The theory of the truce and of any such action that may be taken by the General A'lsembly with respect to the successor government is that those conditions will be maintained in Palestine in which reasonable men can come together with calmness and deliberation and work out, in a brotherly spirit and by ag~eeme~t, a solution of the political question. Nelther In the truce nor in any proposal known to the United States which is to be presented ta the General Assembly, is there any attempt to shape or mould the ultimate solution of the political question. We n1Ïght say that the adop- ~o~ of t~ truce or another equally good one 18•m the mterest. of peace in, the world, that it will save the massacre of womèn, children and venerable people, and will save mankind from This is one of our primary duties, and 1 think we ought to adopt this draft resolution as promptly as we cano 1 am not undertaking unduly to speed up discussion or to prevent anybody else from· taking part in the discussion, but 1 think that the element of time is important because of the events which we can read in the Press...The violence in Palestine increases, and therefore we should act as promptly as we possibly can. The United States gives :,ts support to this draft resolution. Mr. SHERTOK (Jewish Agency for Palestine): In the noble sentiments which they have so sincerely and so eloquently expressed, the representatives who have just spoken have referred to the main subject of peace and tranquillity ir.. a rather abstract manner. What we have before us is not merely an appeal by the Security Council to the parties concemed to desist from violence. What we have before us is a draft resolution which goes into the details of the proposed temporary arrangement and :ormulates the various provisions in a fairly precise manner. 1 tru~t, therefore, that 1 may be excused if 1 take up sorne of the rime of the Security Council in inviting its attention to Lt;e specifie and concrete points at issue which arise o}lt of the particular formulation of the provision regarding the truce in Palestine, which the Security Council, as 1 understand, is about to vote upon. 1 would emphasize, in justification, that the points wmch 1 have in mind affect in a most vital manner very important interests which may have far-reaching significance. The question of a truce in Pale..."tine was raised il1. the Security Council as part of a general proposaI ta set aside the plan adopted by the General Assembly for the future govemment of Palestine, and to substitute for it an entirely different solution of the Palestine problem which the Je-wish Agency found utterly unacceptable. Actually, the resolution calling for a truce was adopted by the Security Council in conjunction with a decision ta convene a special session of the General Assembly for the pUIpose of undertaking a revision of the plan. . Thus, the tmce proposaI, from its very inceptian, appea:'ed ta load the dice very heavily against Jewish interests. Moreover, the wording of the resolution regarding the truce, by referrhlg merely to a truce between the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine, ignored the major aspect of the present disturbed condition The resolution of the Security Couneil called upon Arab and Jewish groups in Palestine ta cease acts of violence. It addressed no admonition ta the neighbouring Arab States ta discontinue the recruiting, training and arming of military contingents on their territories for armed intervention in Palestine, and the actual sending of s~lC-.h forces across their frontiers into Palestine. According to rf"liable press reports, as the first instalment of a new wave of invasion, further large-scale incursions of anned units and further importation of war materials from the neighbouring countries into Palestine took place only within the last two or three days. Neverthe1ess, the Jewish Agency declared itself willing to enter into a truce arrangement so that an end might be put to the bloodshed and destruction. which is now ravaging the life of Palestine and claiming a mounting toll of victims. In its readiness ta contribute its full share ta the immediate restoration of peace in Palestine, the Jewish Agency was concemed with safeguarding two main objectives: First, that the truce should be an effective one and that it should not serve as a mere cover and protp ~tion for the preparation of further aggression. Second, that the conclusion and observance of the truce should not jeopardize legitimate, long-term Jewish interests and should not prejudge the main issue which is now at stake. Accordingly, on 4 April 1948, the executive of the Jewish Agency in Palestine adopted the 0 following resolution regarding the truce proposal: "The Jewish Agency welcomes the efforts of the Security Council to produce a cessation of hostilities in Palestine and to prevent a continuation of bloodshed in the future. The Jews of Palestine were forced ta defend themselves against the series of attacks launched against them by the Arabs since 1 December 1947. Responsibility for the situation in Palestine falls ~so ,upon the mandatory Power, which, despite Jts duties and its public declarations, failed to prese:ve law and arder, failed to prevent the ~vaslOn of Palestine by organized Arab guerrilla bands from neighbouring States, provided arms ta Arab States which have been sending these guerrilla bands into Palestine and suffered these foreign invaders to establish themselves in military camps in Palestine, to disrupt com- "The Agency will gladly agree ta a mllitary truce which will put an effective and immediate end to aIl acts of violence, re-establish ·freedom of movement throughout the land on all roads and highways, restore free access ta the Holy Places, withdraw aIl foreign troops and guerrillas, remove all units of the Transjordan Arab Legion to Transjordan, and prevent the incursion of such foreign forces and armed bands into Palestine in the future. To make such a truce effective, provision must be made for an international commission to supervise its execution. The Jewish Agency cannot rely in this respect upon the British authorities. CClt must be c1early understood that such a military truce shall not impede Jewish immigration and shall not affect preparations how in progress to assure essential public services, and for the establishment of an autonomous government in the area bf the Jewish state immediately after the termination of the Mandate on 15 May." This remains the attitude of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. The Jewish Agency was subsequently honoured by an invitation from the President of the Security Council to attend a conference with a view to discussing the terms of the truce. There was ooly one brie! formaI meeting, attended by representatives of both the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine, after which the President of the Sewrity Council held a series of informal talks with the representatives of these two bodies separately. In reply to the President's question as to the conditions under which we would be prepared to conc1ude a truce, we defined our attitude in the following terms: Had the aggression against the Jews been confined to the Arabs of Palestine, we would have b~en ready for a truce, unconditionally. IIi actual fact, in that eventuality, the question of a formal truce and of negotiations in that respect with our participation need not have arisen at aIl, as it would have been enough for the Arabs to cease fire, in order ta produce an immediate cessation of aIl armed reaction against th~m ou the part of the Jews. But the military situation in Palestine has been completely transformed by the invasion of the country from outside. The very presence on the soil of Palestine of foreign armed forces is a permanent act of aggression against the Jews. UolesB these forces are removed and further armed incursions prevented, the truce would be a godsend ta the aggressor, for under its cover Therefore, we have to put forward as the essential conditions of the truce-as we stated to the President of the Security Council-that the armed units which have been brought into Palestine from outside should be withdrawn and that no further incursions should be tolerated. This, in brief, is our position as explained by us to the President of the Security Council. . 1t should be observed that the two stipulations which we have made are purely military in character. They are concerned with the very nature of the truce and intended to ensure that the truce s'hould be a real truce and not a sham. We have put fOl'Ward no political conditions in connexion with the truce. We ·gathered, however, from questions put to us by the President of the Security Council, that political conditions had been put forward by the other side. These conditions we had to resist. In the light of th,ese general observations, l now propose, with the permission of the President, to deal in sorne detail with the provisions regarding L'le truce included in the draft which was communicated to us yesterday and which is now before the Security Council. As a first general observation, l would point out that the scheme of the truce here outlined is founded on the assumption that the present mandatory Administration in Palestine would discharge its functions under the Mandate to preserve law and order. Quite apart from the question of whether the present Mandatory can be relied upon to do so in view of its recent record, it is clear that the truce arrangement proposed is thus, by its very terms, limited in its . aux duration to the very short period which remains. between now and 15 May, on which date, according to the mandatory Government's decision which it announced to be irrevocable, the Mandate is to he terminated. 1t is on this definite assumption that we now discuss the truce proposaIs. . l now address myself to the preamble of the draft resolution. Its third recital states: "that the Unit~d Kingdom Government, so long as it remams the mandatory Power, is responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in Palestine and should continue to.take aIl steps to that end". We must, with aIl due respect to the Security Council, take exception not merely to the word "continue" which implies that the mandatory The recent record of the mandatory Administration makes it impossible for us ta repose any trust in it in that regard, and we would consider it as nothing short of calamitous if, in the light of that record, it were ili.us fOm1ally assured of full international support for whatever, in its own wisdom, it might do or leave undone. Therefore, we would respectfully urge that the recital should be limited ta the recognition of the fact that the mandatory Power is responsible for the maintenance of peace and arder while the Mandate lasts, and that the remaining part of the recital after the word "Palestine" should be deleted. ln regard to paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a), 1 would observe that the requirement that all activities of a miIitàry or para-military nature should cease is far too wide ta be practicable. It may be interpreted as involving the disconLnuation of all normal defence arrangements without which the Jewish population of Palestine would be seized by a feeling of insecurity which would be inimical to any truce. The Jewish Agency would therèfore propose that the clause should read: "cease all acts of violence, terrorism and sab?tage". A point of fundamental importance aris!".s in connexion with sub-paragraph (b), which contains the most important and most welcome injunction against the bringing into Palestine of armed bands or individuals from outside. With the injunction so formulated, 1 need hardly say, we are heartily in agreement, but what we cannot· accept is that it should be extended to incIude "individuals ... capable of bearing arms", as this would affect Jewish immigration. We cannot possibly agree that Jewish immigrants into Palestine, whatever their age group or physieal condition, should be put on the same footing with those elements that are now being sent into Palestine in violation of its land frontiers with the deliberate purpose of upsetting the peace of the country and committing acts of aggression against the Jews and against the authority of thé United Nations. These people have. not a vestige of any legal or political right ta be in Palestine. They come there with .the avowed abject of breaking the law and dist\Urbing the peace. By contrast, Jewish immigrants come to Palestine by virtue of an intemationally recognized right. Ilalestine is their home in which they come to live. T.he equation of these two categories is untenable. We would urge that the words Coming to sub-paragraph (c), 1 would point out that as worded, it goes much too far and in a most sweeping manner. It may be interpreted as imposing, during the truce period, a woiid embargo on the acquisition of arms for future Jewish defence, while leaving it free to the Arab States to accumulate any quantities of arms they May be able to purchase, even during the truce period, for future fighting in Palestine. We therefore urge that this sub-paragraph should read, "refrain from importing weapons and war matenals", and that all reference to acquisition should be deleted. A point of a most far-reaching significance arises in connexion with sub-paragraph (d). Here each party is called upon to "Refrain, pending further consideration of·the future government of Palestine by the General Assembly, from any political activity which might prejudice the rights, daims, or positions of either communîty." The mere introduction of a political subject into the question of a military truce is liable to vitiate the issue, and we would urge that this whole sub-paragraph be de1eted. Should the deletion of the sub-paragraph not commend itself to the Security Council, we would urge that it should he amended in the following manner: to begin with, the term "political activity" seems to us to be inappropriate; it is too loose and might be interpreted to refer to any meeting, any public address, any artide in the Press, any resolution. We would suggest the substitution of the word "action" for the words "political activity". Further, the question of prejudicing daims does net arise at aIl. My daim can be prejudiced oruy if 1 myself renounce or compromise it. It cannot possibly he prejudiced by whatever the other party does. We suggest, therefore, that the word "daims" should be deleted altogether. But the main difficulty arises in connexion with the ward "rights". The position, in sa far as rights are concemed, cannat be left in its present vague form, liable to be interpreted at will. The Arab community May daim, as its right, the spreading of its dominion over the whole of Palestine and the subjugation of the Jewish community. Can the Jews be expected to refrain from any action which might prejudice that alleged right which they categorically deny and whose exercise would affect the very roots of their existence? An objective, internationally recognized criterion is here imperative. We therefore suggest that the sub-paragraph should he amended ta read: . purement ,proposons "R~fr~ïn . . . from an):" action which might prejudice the rights or position of either community.under the Mandate and the resolution of .the .General Assembly.'~ It cannat be a moot pomt m an organ of the Unîted Nations that, pending further consideration of the future government of Palestine by the General Assembly, With regard to sub-paragraph (e), 1 must state that the mandatory Administration, by its own record, and by what we would describe as its sins of omission and commission, about both of which enough has been said in our previous statements to the Security Council, has forfeited its title to Jewish co-operation. Nevertheless, in the interests of preservation of life, we would be prepared to co-operate with the various organs of the present Palestine Government in certain spheres where we would regard co-operation as necessary and warranted; but there can be no question of our pledging general co-operation to the British Administration of Palestip.e which has so mariifestly disregarded and even acted contrary to its most basic responsibilities. Sub.;.paragraph (f) seeks to secure the safety of the Holy Places. We submit that this is not sufficient. What has to be secured is also free access to aIl shrines and sanctuaries for those who have an established right to visit and worship at them. It is not enough, for instance, to lay down that the Wailing Wall must not be blûwn up. Free access to the Wailing Wall must be guaranteed for the Jews, in accordance with the immemorial practice which has been internationaIly sanctioned. 1 now come to paragraph 2. Despite the unquestionable default of the British mandatory administration in the maintenance of law and order and its particularly lamentable and most alarming failure ta prevent the invasion of Palestine by armed forces from outside, this paragraph proposes to charge that administration with the duty of supervising the execution of the tmce provisions. The Jewish Agency cannot possibly agree that the mandatory Administration is impartial in the present conflict and can properly be entrusted with this highly responsible task which requires complete objectivity. 1 note that a further paragraph will be submitted to the Security Council in regard to the, setting up of sorne organ, but in the ignorance of that additional provision and in the light of the draft before me, 1 must say that if the draft is leit in its present form and no authoritative United Nations organ is set up to superVise and ensure the observance of the tmce, we would consider that no adequate· provic;ion at all has been made in this regard. Paragraph 3 seeks ta prevent further infiltrationinto Palestine ofarmed forces from outside. What 1 said in regard to the expression ln conclusion, 1 would take the opportunity of emphasizing again that foreign invasion is the crux of the whole difficulty, and the fact that the mandatory Government has allowed it ta proceed unchecked mars its record more than anything eIse. Thè Security Council has not so far deemed fit to place on record in clear and unequivocal terms the responsibility of either. the Arab Governments or the Government of the United Kingdom for the present intolerable situation which has been created by this continued process of invasion. No doubt encouraged by such inaction of the Security Council, the Governments of the Arab League, Members of the United Nations, are now reliably reported to be preparing plans for the occupation of the .whole area of Palestine by their· armies which would cross its frontiers from north, east and south immediately after the termination of the United Kingdom Mandate. To face this issue squarely is, 1 submit, the most urgent duty of the Security Council. . Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated tram ~panish): Unfortunatelv we are not using the sillmltaneous interpretation system, which would have saved time, and l presume that there will be o~her speakers, althoqgh there are none on the list at the moment. Nevertheless, 1 wish ta say to the Council now that in the opinion of the delegation of Argentina this proposaI should be approve~, rejected, or amended at this very me.etmg, Wlthout further delay. . That is all 1 have to say, for the moment, on the question of procedure. Mr. EL-KHoURI (Syria): Although 1 have not received instructions from my Government on the text of the draft resolution which is before us, owing ta the short time elapsed since yesterday evening, 1 could not refrain from expressing my views on th~ proposal. In the first place, 1 gready appreciate the sincere efforts .?Dade by the President of the Security Council and the members'of the Council in formulating this text which 1 believe may be the only one that can be construed under the present circumstances. The Syrian delegation will be delighted to see law and order reign in Palestine and the terms of the truce loyally . respected by bath parties. In principle 1 do not disapprove of the terms of this resolution, but 1 wish ta stress once again the fact that my delegation wishes to make reservations conceming the importance of stopping all political activities, especially as regards the implementation of the Partition Plan and the introduction of new foreign elements into Palestine. . It is stated that order in Palestine is being disturbed. We should ask whythe United"Kingdom does not preserve law and order in Palestine as long as the mandatory Power is responsible for that. 1 have heard many observations on this point on the part of the Jewish Agency repeated here not only once, but several times.. Let the Security Council ask them or let them 1 consider that the desired tmce cannot be realized if these two conditions are Vl.olated in any way. With regard to the foreigners who are now in Palestine and who are being asked to leave, 1 should like to refer to a spf;cial situation existing in Palestine, with partic.ular reference to Jewish fighters. 1 would ask how many of the tens of thousands of Jews who are bearing arms and fighting in Palestine are Palestinian citizeIÏS? 1 believe that a great percentage of them-more than half or perhaps sixty per cent -are not Palestinian citizens. If they and also the approximate one per cent of Arabs who have infiltrated themselves into Palestine are to be considered as foreigners, then both groups should be asked to leave the country, especially since a great manyof the Jews who are bearing arms and fighting in Palestine are terrorists and since the greatest mischief is being done by them. AIl the wO!"ld knows what t.xplosives the Jews have discharged in Palestine and now they are complaining that the United Kingdom has not been serving their fantastic dreams and aspirations of continuing immigration so as to flood the Near East with these newcomers who are strangers and foreigners to Palestine. The infiltration of a few Arabs into Palestine was referred to as being a foreign invasion, but as 1 have explained in the Security Council more than once, it must be understood that the real .invasion of Palestine was initiated by the Zionist programme. They collected a large number of foreigners who were weIl trained and armed to invade Palestme. This is the foreign invasion, not the few Arabs who recentIy infiltrated into Palestine. .programme ~hy does the Jewish Agency not consider thelr infiltration and their invasion of Palestine as out of order, lawless, and against any moral !aw or principle in history? Now they are attackm~ the A.rabs, asking why the Arabs in Syria are bemg tramed there. Are the Jews not trained aIl the world over? At one of the meetings of the res s'en pourquoi des l'entraînement M. séance seigne technique tine, a~ hoc Committee in the past, Mr. Shertok hunself declared that Jewish children aIl over t~e world are being taught. the crafts of Palestine, how to emigrate to Palestine and how to capture Palestine. He said this in one of his speeches in the ad hoc Committee. They are It is only the Palestinian people which is fighting and it has declared on more than one occasion that it would never accept the Partition Plan. If 1 were in favour of this draft résolution, 1 would rely on certain parts of it such as sub. paragraph (c): "Refrain from importing or acquiringor assisting orencollraging the importation or acquisition of weapons and war materials" and sub-paragraph (b): "Refrain from bringing into Palestine armed bands or in~ dividuals, whatever their origin, armed or capable of bearing arms and from assisting or encouraging the entry into Palestine of such armed bands and individuals." 1 also. rely on sub-paragraph (d): "Refrain, pending further consideration of the future government of Palestine by the General Assembly, from any political activity which might prejudice the rights, claims or positions of either community." These are the essential points, and if they are. not accepted by the Jewish Agency, all the work will be futile. If 1 approve this draft resolution, it is with the understanding that the political activities mentioned in sub-paragr;;tph (d) mean that any implementation of the Partition Plan is to be stopped definitely. OtherWise, there can be no way to stop it and the Arabs of Paltstine would not accept it. As it is stated here, there would be no h"'TImi. gration at all during this truce period; any sort of L'llmigration would be stopped. 1 say there is . no legal immigration of any sort. We know that in the past, the U~ted Kingdom, which is the sole judge to consider whether further immi-. gration to Palestiné is possible, issued its White Paper in 1939, in which the United Kingdom Government stated that its obligationto establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine was already fulfilled, that the absorptive capacity of Palestine was terminated, and that only 75,000 Jews could be admitted to Palestine during the following five years at the rate of 15,000 per. annum. This quota arrangement was terminated in 1945~ After that, according to the White Paper which was confirmed and adopted by a great majority in the two 'British Houses of Parliament, the United Kingdom wanted'to stop immigration. - The joint .Committee submitted i13 report a few Plonths later; but, as 1 have stated, with pressure from the Zionists on O'le side and pressure from the United States on the other, this quota of inmngration has continued illegally up to the present th-ne. The Arabs have been protooting against this incessantly, and they have stated that this should not continue forever, since it was understucrl thal; this imnllgration was to continue only until such time as the Cummittee of Enquiry had submitted its report. However, it has continued up to the present time, although we consider it as illegal immigr~tion since it is against the decision of the United Kingdom. .sous 1 say~and 1 insist on this point-that the only authority or Power which may admit inm1Ï- gration to Palestine is the United Kingdom, as is stated in the Mandate itself. It is stated in Article VI of the Mandate, that the United Kingdom would facilitc..~e Jewish immigration into Palestine, on the condition that such immigration did not in any way prejudice the rights and the position of the other sections of the Arabs in Palestine. The United Kingdom considered, in 1939, that an] further immigration would prejudice the position of the Arabs. Even the limited immigration which contlliues at the present time prejudices the position of the Arabs. By "position" 1 mean the proportional majority of the inhabitants, and the civil and political rights of both parties. If individuals are added to one party by means of immigration, it means that the position of the other party is being prejudiced. That is quite clear, and the United Kingdom made its decision to stop immigration in 1939, because it felt that arr)' furth(;f immigration would be illegal and would be against its obligations under the terros of the Mandate. We do ,not see now how the,members of the Security Council can imagine that a tiny country like Palestine can continue to receive inm1Ï- grants and refugees fr()m all over the world. We do not understand that. More than one-half of the Jews of Palèstine are not Palestinian citizeus; they are foreigners. They came there with arms in order to fight, and,they are continuing to fight. They have committed an those outrageous acts. . For t11Ïs reason, we hope that the draft r,esolution for a truce, if it is accepted by both parties, 1 The "Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry on P~Iestin~" visited the Holy Land in 1945 and suf:-~. mItted Us report in 1946. If, as 1 have heard today, the Jews reject this draft resolution in its present form and demand modifications which will discard all our principles and the aims which were intended by those who have taken the trouble of formulating this draft resolution, thereby making things just the contrary ta what they were intended ta be, then it is useless to continue. However, 1 wish ta support the draft resolution on the understanding of the interpretation 1 have given, and with the reservations regarding the paragraphs which 1 have mentioned. Mahmoud Bey FAWZI (Egypt): Because of the late hour, 1 shall say oruy a few words, but 1 hope that the stress 1 want ta put on the points with which 1 shall deal will not be measured by the brevity of my statement. ln principle and in a general way-and in spite of certain objections that 1 have ta it-the draft resolution oJlOW before the Security Council is certain1y weIl intended and conceived for the re-establishment of peace and the stopping of bloodshed in Palestine. At the same time, we .must have not oruy a resolution but also a resolve, a determined resolve by all for peace. We mm.i: have real peace, and in allloyalty we must work for it and abide by it. No one should defile peace and use it merely as a breathing space to prepare for more strife and more bloodshed. The least 1 can say of the statement we have heard from the spokesman of the Jewish é.gency is that it does not augur weIl for peace. 1 admit that it takes two sides ta make a fight; but a one-sided truce, in such a case as the one we have before us, would mean invasion by one side and the subjugation of the other. This is not at aIl in line or in hannony with the spirit of the draft resolution before the Security Council at the present time. We have said before that the re-establishment of arder in Palestine should not mere1y be a prelude ta partition or to any sort of injustice. At least, on behalf of the Security Council, several members have said that it would be intended to be a standstill, and that it should not prejudice any side. . Without completely subscribing to thîs sta~" ment, 1 say that it would not serve the purposes of peace ta have a so-called trucé in arder ta allow one side ta carry on, and to prepare itself for action against the very resolution which the Security Couneil is now supposed ta adopt. In this connexion, 1 cannot neglect mentioning cer- The United Nations Palestine Commission is continuing to act as if nothing at aIl had happened during the last mûnths in the Security Counci!, in sa far as Palestine is concerned. Perhaps it thinks that, literally, its action is correct. But anyone who so wishes can see clearly that it is acth'1g diametrically and flagrantly against any degree of logic, against any harmony with what is being done here and against the real intention behind the convening of another session of the General Assembly. Moreover, there are the formal repeated and defiant declarations.of the Zionists that they intend to establish or have aIready established, their so-called state. This cannot serve the purposes of peace either. 1 shall not go into the details of the draft resolution which is before the Security Council. The representative of Syria has done that to a very large degree. 1 shall merely repeat that if it i~ real peace and not a camouflage for something eIse, not a preparation for anything contradictory to peace, if it is real peace, we are, as we always have been, still for it. Mr. LISICKY (Chaimlan of the United Nations Palestine Commission): In view of the r~marks which were just made by the representat~ve of Egypt regarding the activity of the PaIestine Commission over which 1 have the houour to preside, 1 only wish to draw the attention of the Security Council to a resolution which the Palestine Commission adopted on 2 April 1948 and which reads as follows [document A/AC. 21/15]: "Having received a mandate from the Gen- eral Assembly to carry out the recommendations contained in the resolution on the future Gov- 1 nues ern.rnent of Palestine approved on 29 November 1947; f "Having received no guidance or instructions rom the Security Council concerning the 1 directive 1. To continue its work, bearing in mind the rcsolutions adopted by the Security Council, in the understanding that aIl of its decisions will be subject to such final action on the future gov- ernment of Palestine as may be taken by the special session of the. General Assembly con- vening on 16 April ..." 1 think that the text of this resolution of the Palestine Commission gives a satisfactory answer to what has been said by the representative of Egypt.· Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (translated tram French): 1 propose that we vote. Mr. TARAsENKo (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (translated tram Russian): The draft resolution, which is under discussion today, WaJ submitted only yeSterday and, obviously, we have not had enough time to study it thoroughly. Furthermore, the representative of the Jewish Agency has intrbduced a whole series of amend- ments which aIso require attentive consideratiC'n. ln these circUInstances, 1 propose that this meeting of the Security Council should be ad- journed for at least twenty-follr hours, so that, after a careful study of the draft resolution and the amendrnents proposed by the Jewish Agency representative, 1 may be in a position ta take part in the debate on that document and to ex- press a definite opinion on it. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): 1 should like to say a few words onJy with .regard ta the rules of procedure. 1 believe that the Jewish Agency was invited to the Security Council under rule 39 of the rules of procedure, sîmply to give informa- tion when asked to do so. 1 believe that those who are invited under rule 39 of the rules of procedure are not to sub- mit proposaIs or amendments of any kind; they may simply give advice or information when asked to do so. Only States Members which are invîted to participate may submit proposaIs or resolutions and these may be supported by one of the members of the Security Council. 1 think that rule 39 of the rules of procedure is applic- able in this case and 1 hope it will be respected. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): If wc adjoum now the question naturally arises as to when we shaIl meet. The amendments that have be;,;n suggested by the representative of the Jewish Agency have aIl been considered, per- haps not in the exact language that he has pro- posed; but t..~e principles that are contained in his amendments have all been considered in the drafting process that the Security Council has performed. It is very strange that sorne of them are almost in the same language of one of the drafts we considered. Nevertheless, they should be studied again rèspectfully; 1 think it would be most unfortunate if we were to act hastily. Therefore, the only problem' that we have confronting us, under the circumstances, is the problem of time. Let me ask what the other representatives on the Security Council think of the feasibility of taking a recess now and com- ing back after dinner tonight at eight 0'dock and 'resuming the consideration of these pro- po~aIs at that time. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- publics) (translated trom Russian): The draft resolution in question reached us at five 0'dock yest'erday evening and, as has already been stated during this meeting, the representative of the Jewish Agency has submitted a number of amendments, to it. Whether or not the Jewish Agency representative is entitled to introduce amendments to the draft resolution is an open question. The fact, however, remains that amendments have been proposed and they deserve consideration. As we have not had enough time to study either the draft resolution as a whole or the amendments to it, 1 have not been able to con- suit my Govemment on this question. Therefore, 1 propose that we should postpone taking a decision on the draft resolution until the next meeting of the Security Council which could be . qui ~eld after a recess of twenty-four or forty-eight hauts, but which should not be called for to- night.

In normal circumstances 1 shou~d have been very pleased ta adjoum the meetll~g if 1 had an intimation that some represe~tatives on the Security Council desired th~ adJo~rnment but in view of the great urgency o.f thlS matter, 1 have decided ta put this questIon to the vote. • We all realize that we should take the decision not onl~ before the General Assembly takes this matter III hand, but aIso before it is too late to put the truce into .effect. 1 very much regr~t sorne of the remarks that have been made in the 1 have already stated that 1 was hopeful of the result of this meeting and of the truce itse1f, and 1 am still very hopeful because 1 believe that the remarks made here this afternoon show that this draft resolution will stand examination as a happy medium between the conflicting points of view or, if not as a happy medium, as the best terms which, in the circumstances, can be suggested to both parties, in order to reach the position the Security Council is striving for. Today, we all have to admit that in accordance with our precedents and the importance of the matter, and in view of the reasoning that has been adduced, it will be weIl for the Security Council to allow the represeIitatives a little more time before the vote is taken. . 1 therefore very respectfully make the foIlowing suggestion. It is that we should complete our discussion of the draft resolution tonight by dis· cussing paragraph 4, which is still missing, and that we should then put to the vote the question of adjoulTI.ment. The representatives on the Security Council will then be able to make their decision and indicate what 'is their pleasure either in adjourning or continuing the discussion today or tonight. If the Security Council decides to adjourn, 1 am p~rfecdy willing to meet again either .tonight or tomorrow night; however, 1 believe that, in any case, we should not meet later than tomorrow night. 1 take it that the Security Couneil is agreeable to proceed with the discussion of paragraph 4. 1 should like to know if any member of the Security Council has any suggestions to make. Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (translated from French): Is there a draft of paragraph 4? We do not have it before us.

We had agreed yesterday that aIl the members would naturally be free to make suggestions today. Ml'. NISOT (Belgium) (translated frorn French): 1 propose that there should be no paragraph 4.

1 want to take the liberty of making a suggestion, namely, that paragraph 4 should read as follows: Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): 1 do not agree with the text which the President has proposed, namely, that members should be appointed from the Secretariat. 1 prefer the text which was before the Security Council yesterday.

AlI the representatives on the Security Council of course, have the privilege of expressing their views on this matter and to vote acC'ordingly when the matter is put to a vote. HOViever, at the present time, the Security Coundl will vote on the motion of adjournment. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : When is it contemplated that the Security Council should meet again on this subject?

Tomorrow night at 8 p.m. or at 9 p.m. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): If the General Assembly does not meet tomorrow afternoon, we shall be free to hold our meeting in the afternoon instead of at night.

1 suggested that we should meet tomorrow evening in order to meet the wishes of the representatives of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, who requested an adjournment of twenty-four hours to consider this matter. The Security Council will now vote on the adjoumment of the meeting. A vote was taken by a show of hands and the proposal for adjournment was adopted by 8 votes to one with 2 abstentions. Votes for: Belgium China Colombia France Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Union of Soviet Socialist Republics United Kingdom United States of America Votes against: Canada Abstentions: Argentina Syria Th~ PRESIDENT: The Security Council will hold Its next meeting on 16 April 1948, at 9 p.rn., at Lake Success. .16 Egypt-Egypte Librairie "La d'Egypte" 9 Sh. Adly Pasha CAIRO Australia-Amtralie H. A. Goddard Pty. Ltd. 255a George Str~et SYDNEY, N. S. W. Belgium-Belgique Agence et Messageries 'de la Presse, S. A. 14-22 rue du Persil BRUXELLES Finland-Finlande Akateeminen 2, Keskuskatu HELSINKI France Editions A. 'Pedone 13, rue Souffiot PARIS, Ve Bolivia-Bolivie Librerla Cientffica y Literaria Avenida 16 de Julio, 216 Casilla 972 LA PAZ Greece--Grèce "Eleftheroudakis" Librairie internationale Place de la ATHÈNES Canada The Ryerson Press 299 Queen Street West TORONTO Guatemala José Goubaud Goubaud & Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. GUATEMALA Haiti-Haïti Max Bouchereau Librairie "A Boîte postale PORT-AU-PRINCE Chile-Chili Edmundo Pizarro Merced 846 SANTIAGO China-Chine The Commercial Press Ltd. 211 Honan Road SHANGHAI Costa Rica-Costa-Rica Trejos Hermanos Apartado 1313 SAN JOSÉ India-Inde Oxford Book & Co. Scindia House NEW DELHI Cuba La Casa Belga René de Smedt O'Reilly 455 LA HABANA Iran Bongahe Piaderow 731 Shah Avenue TEHERAN Iraq-Irak Mackenzie & The Bookshop BAGHDAD Czechoslovakia Tchécoslovaquie F. Topie" Narodni Trida 9 PRAHA 1 Lebanon-Lilian Librairiè universelle BEYROUTH Denmark-Danemark Einar Munskgaard Norregade 6 KJOBENHAVN Luxembourg Librairie J. Schummer Place Guillaume LUXEMBOURG Dominican Republic République Dominicaine Libreria Dominicana Calle Mercedes No. 49 Apartado 656 CIUDAD TRUJILLO Netherlands-Pays-Bas N. V. Martinus Lange Voorhout S'GRAVENHAGE