S/PV.285 Security Council

1 had intended first to give the members of the CO''incïl an opportunity to make their remarks on Ae draft proposai before asking the representatives of India and Pakistan to speak, but 1 shall he quite glad to ask them to make their remarks now, if they so desire. The system of simultaneous interprètation was adopted at this point. Mr. GoPALASWAMI AYVANGAR (India): 1 desire at the outset ta render thanks on my own behalf and on that of my delegation and my Government to the President and bis predeces- , sors in the presidential chair for the time, labour and trouble they all have given to a study and understanding of the problem 'which we brcught to the notice of the Security Couneil [document 8/628]. YOUf approach has been objective throughout, and you have drawn unstintingly upon your diplomatie güts and experience for helping the disputant countries to reach an amicable settlement here· at Lake Success, if possible. If.that settlement has not yet :finally been reached, the responsibility for the failure cannat be attached.to any one of the four Presidents personally. India is grateful to them an for the consideration, cOUItesy and .1lelp shovm throughout the debates in the Security Council, as weIl as in the private consultations. India is a peace-loving nation, and is determined always to act, botll in nationaI and international afi'airs, so as to live up to that description of a Member of the United Nations. Its faith in the principles, ideals and hopes that inspire the Charter, partieularly in that part of it which relates to the peaceful settlement of international disputes, is sincere and wholehearted. It will continue to be so unless and until it is shattered by the eompelling logic of faets arising from the actual functioning of the· organs of the United Nations over a continuous period and in respect of a number of·cases. 1 For final amended vCl'lÏon as adopted at the 2à6th meeting, sec dooument 8/726. We have been at this question fOl" nearly four months. Towards the end of our debates in t..?te fust phase-comprising the dark days Dot only of January but of the carly part of February-I felt that the trend of opinion in the Security Council on what we regarded as fUllda..'llentals wàs such that, if it had then been allowed to crystallize itself into a resolution, the result would have been an impasse. 1 therefore asked for and, after some hesitation, obtained~ a temporary interruption of the consideration of t!le . question by the Security Council. The adjoumment not only gave me and my delegation the opportunity we bad1y wanted for a peiSonal discussion with our Govermnent, but, as subsequent indications have shown, it also enabled members of the Security Council to study the prohlem afresh and at leisure dt,lring the intervaI, and to review their previous reactions to its different aspects. The result was that when we resumed the discussion in March the prospects seemed distinctly more hoperut In apprising the Security Council of the results of my consultations with my Government, 1 said, on 10 March [266th meeting], that our stand on fundamentals would continue to he the same as before my departure for India. 1 stressed, however, our readiness to consider any suggestions for ensuring ta the maximum degree possible the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite, and 1 indicated that this should bequite possible without affecting our stand on fundamentals. Between 10 March and 18 March, Mr. Tsiang, who was then President of the· Security Council, held informaI consultatiol13 with the delegations of the two parties, as well as-I have reason to believe--with the representatives of two or three other deiegations of Security Council members. The outcome of these consultations was thé draft resolution which Mr. Tsiang placed before the Security Council for consideration on 18 March [document 8/699]. He explained its principal features in a speech which was followed by a short debate [269th meeting]. The Security Council then adjourned and the question was placed on the agenda again only a month later. The interval has been employed in further informaI consultations and consequent successive revisions of Mr. Tsiang's draft, th..; last of which is the one now under consideration. If 1 may permit mys~lf to say so, Mr. Tsiang's draft resolution of 18 March was a valiant attempt at a just compromIse, embodied in draft articles of settlement to be accepted by both parties. It broke away courageously from the The cardinal features of this scheme were the following. First, Pakistan should ~ffectively cease giving help in men, material, bases and transit to invaders and rebels in Jammu and Kashmir. Secondly, India, while reducing the strength of its army in Jammu and Kashmir after the fighting had ceàsed, was to retain there a minùnum number of troops which would be sufficient for defence, as weil as for supporting the civil power. There was to he no provision for any other army. Thirdly, the Interim Government. of Jammu and K~hmir was to include representatives of major political parti.es. Fourthly, separate plebiscite machinery was to be set up as a formal branch of the Jammu and Kashmir Government; while deriving its authority from that Government, the plebiscite machinery was to be administered by a director and a number of deputies nominated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and functioning with the 1l1aximum of independence. This schemeexhibited a happy combination of healthy features. 1t avoided any unnecessary or improper encroachment by outside authorities on the sovereign pO\vers exercisable in the State by the Jammu and Kashmir Government and by the Government of India within their respective constitutional spheres. It respected constitutional proprieties in the relations which, in a federal structure, should subsist between the Government of India and the Government of a State which had acceded to India. Above ail, in the arrangements it contemplated it gave due recognition to the obvious requirements of administrative workability. It is a matter of profound disappointment and regret to us that, in the subsequent conferences held informally by the President with his colleagues of the Security Council-including the representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom-Mr. Tsiang's scheme has been.twisted out of shape in essential particulars. The approach has been altered in important respects. Practically every amendment of substance to the 18 March resolution which has been made by way of alteration or addition is, from our point of view, a definite worsening of our position, and constitutes a breach-in sorne cases, a violent one-in our fundamentals. The scheme of 18 March has thus been 50 attenuated in the draft resolution presently bef?re Perhaps the most unsatisfacîory feature of the draft resolution now before the Security Conncil is the seant consideration given in it to the issue on which we invoked the jurisdiction of the Security Council under the Charter, the issue the satisfactory handling of which by the Security Council is essential for avoiding the threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. Sanguinary fighting has been in progress in the tern\tories of the Jammu and Kashmir State for six months now between the Indian army and the State forces on the one side, and armed tribesmen and other Pakista.."li nationals, together with the local rebels against the State Government, on the other. It is India's case that the fighters·against constituted authority in the State derive all manner of help--men, arms, amrnunition, other supplies, motor and other transport, bases of operation, transît facilities, gasoline-from or through Pakistan territory, and that the Pakistan Government has directly or indirectly allowed aU this assistance to be given, and h~ done nothing of an active nature to stop it or to prevent thi.. invasion of Jammu and Kashmir State from and th.rough Pakistan. The number of tribesmen and other fighters fror ~ the outside has ron iuto many thousands for several months. The number of tribesmen alone is estimated even now at over 20,000, and àccounts for haH the strength of the enemy, the other haIf being composed of Pakistani nationaIs and local insurgents; Apart from the accounts of eye-witnesses, the geographical and physical factors compel the conclusion that armed hordes of outsiderB of this magnitude These conditions contain the potentialities of an armed conflict breaking out any day between the two Dominions; and inasmuch as Pakistan's active, com?lieity, or even its pa..~ive acquiescenc,e, in this affair is an unfriendly act whose continuance might precipitate a war, even in circumstances in which India might be acti,'lg lcgitimately in dealing with those who raid the . State, we sought the intervention of the Security CouDcil. The threat of war is by no means diminished. Its Înlmm.ence is as great now as it was at· the end of December last. During the last few days, military operations have intensified as the result of the advance of the Indian Army in its campaign for recapturing areas now under the control of the raiders and expelling ~em from the State. This advance is making the tribesmen, in their defeat, more brutal in their treatment of the local civilian population. Much against my inclinations, '1 wish here to r.efer to what happened in a place called Rajaori within the last few days. Yesterday, 1 had the ,mique honour of receiving a cabled message f,;om the head of the Azad Kashmir Government. That message reads as follows: "Rajaori, a town in Jammu Province, captured by Indian Arroy. Indian Army resorting to atrocities unknown to the ciVI1ized world. Four thousand Muslim ch'ilians put to df~ath mercilessly in the surrounding area in R~jaori Town and Rajaori itself. "Eyes of the people put out to victimize and terrorize them. One hundred thousand people driven out of these an~as in two days. They have been rendered homeless and are without food, exposed ta death and destruction." The Security Council must come ta sorne ,.judgment as to the veracity of the details sent ta me in this telegram by the head of the Azad Kashmir Government. Fortimately, 1 have in my possession reports which had reached me previous to my receipt of this particular telegram. 1 shall first read to the Security Council a few extracts from the account of a special correspondent of a leading newspaper in Delhi, The Hindustan Times, who happened tovisit Rajaori after "This is a story of a death town of horrible and ghastly tragedy, which the advancing Indian troops, in spite of their best efforts, have been unablè to prevent ~nd of which they are mere helpless spectators. Here is the sequence. First, the raiders and their officers order the town inhabitants to collect în the public square togei:her with all their movable belongings and cattle. Then the raiders take charge of all cattle and drive the animais into the bills. N~xt the Muslim inhabitants are ordered to separate ôemselves ,from non-Muslims. As soon as this is done, the Muslinlls are ordered to fiee into the jJlterior 1 along a particular route taking their movable belongings with them in 'bullock carts, and the non-Muslims are ordered to forro themselves h"lto a line. Then there begins a systematic massacre of ail the males except those be~ween the ages of, 25 and 30 who are healthy and strong. These are for.aed into a slave-labour gang' and ordered to dig new positions for the raiders in the nearby hills and regions. The women and theirbelongings are distributed by the tribesmen betwecn themselves. "No accurate estimate of the numbers o~ people massacred in cold blood at Rajaori by the retreating tribesmen is yet possible, but there can be no question that it has been a massacre on a major seate. One or two people who have now managed to make their way into the Inclian lines declare the town had a population weIl over 5,000 a week ago. 1 have just been talking with Khurla Bux, a fOl ',.;r resident of Rajaori, who has managed to escape from the clutches of the raiders, and he declares that the people in the area wantnothing more than to get rid of the raiders. "Indian Army troops found the streets littered with bodies. Horror-stricken people told them how1 on the night before our entering the village; the raiders turned their fury on the unarmed population and indulged in the wildest excesses of barbarie cruelty~-Large sections of people were killed, houses were burned and women were abdueted. In Rajaori it has not yet been possible to make an exact estimate of damage and atrocities c~mmitted by retreating raiders. But three big plts full of bodies-.wmch remind us of the weIl in Palestine-now have been located 011 the out;. skirts of the town. In addition to wholesale ~assacre of Indian nationals, the raiders, accord- ' mg to local reports, have abducted 700 women from here." . Further on the dispatch states: "According to reports reaching here, large numbers of motor vehicles, apparently bringing supplies and ammunition, have been pouring Perhaps l could convey greater conviction to the Security Cauncil if 1 read two official reports addressed to me. One, from the Defence Ministry in New Delhi, dated 15 April, states: "Reports received from Rajaori state that raiders, on retreating, adopted a scorched earth policy leavin5 houses burning in their wake. Report aIso states that the tribal element massacred local Hindus as well as Muslims during their retreat, and the numbers of such dead are heavy. Three large pits, approximately fifty yards square, full of dead bodies have been discovered just north of Rajaori. LocaIs who fled to the hills wren massacres started are straggling in now 50 shaken by their suffering that interrogation is difficult.', 1 shall read aIso an extract from a later telegram dated 16 April, addressed to me by the Prime Minister of India: "The raiders indulged in large-scale massacre of the civilian population and abduction of women and wholesale destruction of property. In fact, their behaviour in Rajaori before they were compelled by our troops to evacuate was even worse than the behavicur of the raiders in Baramula. You may point out to the Security Council that you find it difficult to understand how to deal with such creatures on any known level." 1 leave the Security Council to choose between the facts or the allegations sent to me by the head of the Azad.Kashmir Government and the account which 1 have received from my own Govemment, as weIl as the account which 1 have read by a newspap,~rman. With reference to the last observation of my Prime Minister in his telegram, 1 would only say that wild animaIs in human shape recognize none of the restraints which civilization imposes on human conduct, even in war. Perhaps sorne might be tempted to say: even civilized nations, for example Germany, did not recognize them during the Second World War; why expect tribesmen to avoid such exhibitiüns aItogether? But the real question for our purpose here is this: is Pakistan not blamewü;thy in letting these fiends loose on the imlocent MusJirn and non- Muslirn population of Kashmir? pne looks in vain in the draft resolution under consideration for even a mere mention of Pakistan's dereliction of duty in this regard. It does not apF.:ar even in the preamble; the somewhat anaemic reference Indeed, this might be the impression which a person unacquainted with the facts might obtain from what was said even by my distinguishecl friend from the United Kingdom. His words were as follows: "Third, the draft resolution imposes a heavy duty on Pakistan in he1ping ta stop the fighting and to prevent its breaking out again [284th meeting]:' 1 am sure that the representative of the United Kingdom, fully acquainted as he is with the facts, did not intend the possible implication of bis words, name1y, that the duty ta be undertaken by Pakistan is a creation for the first time of tbis resolution. 1 have stressed this international obligation in the debates we have previously had, anù l should like, on this occasion, to refer only to one statement of.that obligation made before the General Assembly of the United Nations by no less a persan than Secretary of State Marshall of the United States. In his ad. dress to the General Assembly on 17 September 1947, speaking on the Greek que~"ion, he said: "The extent or effectiveness of such assistance to the Greek guerrillas is not the point at issue here. It is a universally accepted principle of international law that for one nation to arm or otherwise assist rebellious forces against another Government is a hostile and aggressive act. Not only has this principle been upheld in a number of famous cases in international Iaw, but it has aIso found expression in international agreements. The majority of the members of the Security Council have recorded·their support of this prÎI),cipl~ by their actioJ:} in this case." If, as the Security Council and the Generq} Assembly have already agreed in the Greek case, That Government has made no attempt since that r~iiolution"ta prevent any intrusion ~to the ~ta.t.. of QUeb cle=al~ and any furnishmg of material aid to those fighting in the State". On the other hand, bases for the raiders still exist in Pakistan. The establishment on Pakistan territory of a factory for the manufacture of certain arms and ammunition ta he supplied to the raiders and rebels, has recentIy come to our notice. Men in large numbers and material in large quantities pass daily through Pakistan into Jammu and Kashmir; they are transpOlted in hundreds of lorries. Two hundred shells from three howitzers were recentIy fired into Poonch Town from a neighbouring hill. No howitzers have been lost by the Indian Army and howitzers do not grow on trees near Poonch or anywhere eise in the Jammu and Kashmir State. A responsible officer of OUIS, possessing facllities for obtaining local information in Pakistan, reported to us some time aga as follows: "A mountain battery of the Pakistan Government, in civilian dress, has been sent to the front. It consists of some 1,300 pe~onne1, out of which about 600 have been sent to Now.shera front via Bhimber and 700 to Poonch front via Palandh ·" n. - This battery has be'en observed in action by our troops at one of these fronts. 1 would not weary the Security Council by giving further details of this description. Should not this continuing breach of an obvious international obligation, and the a--:tive sustenance and encouragement it gives to :the continuance and intensification of the fighting in the State, find mention. somewhere in the resolution? The Security Council cannot refrain from doing so on the grounds that it does not have to pass upon any issue of fact, or that this resolution is not an award. The Security Council did not neglect to do so in the case of Greece. The General Assembly, followmg the majority opinion of the Security Council's Commission of Investigation, said in paragraph 3 of its resolution 109(II) that the Commission. had found: ce••• that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had given assistance and support to the guerrillas fighting ,against the Greek Government.,,1 "Refrain from bringing and !from assisting and encouraging the entry intCl Palestine of anned bands and fighting persOImel, groups and individuals, whatever their origin [document 8/1'23]." Why is it that the sponsors have omitted from the revised draft resolution, sub-paragraph 1(b), the following words which were in the draft res~ lution of 18 March 1948 and in all the re-drafts of it prior to that of 30 March? The words are: ". . . by denying transit through, and the use of any bases iri, Pakistan territory . . . [docu~ ment 8/699]." The substance of a similar directive appears in the resolution on Greece. 1 know that an amendment, irnporting a similar specifie direc~ tive to offending parties into the Palestine truce resolution, which was submitted by the USSR representative, was turned clown by the Security Council. 1 wonder if this indicates a change of policy on the part of the Se:curity Couneil, commencing with the final draft in our case, which had been prepared earlier than the day on which the truce resolution was considered? It has been argued that the words "to prevent" will aIso cover all these cases. But may 1 suggest that the original words were probably omitted because they might imply a remote reference to past delinquency? "To prevent''> again 1 take it, is something more positive tha."l "to discourage". In Pakistan's answer to our complaint, the following words occur: cc••• the Pakistan Government have continuçd to do all in their power to discourage the tribal movement by aIl means short of war [document S/646].'; Even this milk-and-water policy is said to hav~ caused bitter resentment throughout Pakistan, but despite a very serious risk of largeseale internaI disturbances, the .Pakistan Gov- ~rnment daim that they have not deviated from lt. Can the use of the.words "to prevent", 'in the revised draft resolution nowbefore the Sec~rity Couneil, be interpreted as a cIear comnutment on the part of Pakistan that if it L'i unable, by peaceful means, to prevent the movement of tribesmen and others into Jammu and K~hmir for fighting, it will use armed force agamst them for disc.harging the obligation ~nder sub-paragraph 1(b) of the draft resolutlOn? Dnless this commitment is unequivocal, the undertaking "to prevenC is not of any practical value. 1 am not interested in obtaining from the This cold-shouldering of our main complaint has hurt us, our Government, and my nation deeply. India brought before the Security Council a plain, simple, stl'aightforward, factually fool-proof issue, and the action that we suggested the Security Council should take was inescapable. The Security Council has not escaped it either, after all this delay. Instead of taking that action earlier, India's complaint was placed in cold storage for nearly four months, four months of continued bloodshed and economic min. And ai: the end of it aU we are exhorted, in appealing language, to agree to a resolution niggardly in its recognition of the merits of the matter, vague and indefinite in the wording of the action to be taken by Pakistan. And in the interpretation of that language the Security Council has gone even further and been apologetic to Pakistan for reminding it of its duty. India cannot, in honour, agree to this treatment of its case. The attempt, at the sacrifice of reason and justice, to establish for the Security Cauncil a reputation for holding the scales even between the two disputing parties, has led the sponsors of this revised draft resolution to juxtapose India with Pakistan in a context which tars us with the same brush and makes us ·look likl; coaccused. Notable illustrations of this are the second paragraph of the preamble of the revised draft resolution, which places us both on a par for doing the "utmost to bring about a cessation of all fighting"; sub-paragraph 2(a), which enjoins that our forces should start withdrawal simultaneously with the withdrawal of the tribal anc~ other raiders; paragraph 5, which suggests that the Commission may find it neces- These are not provisions which we can-with any sense of self-respect, or any regard for our dignity as an independent nation and a sovereign . Government-honourably accept. The Security Couneil can hold the scales .even between two disputants so long as the dispute is in the stage of investigation. It cannot always do so, without offence to truth and fairness, when it has to take a decision, to suggest measures for action, or even to state its opinion. The transition between these two stages is a matter of passing from mere courtesy and avoidance of prejudgment to one of justice and fairness on the merits of the case. 1 would now proceed to re·;'~"\T briefly sorne of the detailed provisions of the draft resolution presently under consideration. By way of anticipating a possible daim from the other side, 1 desire to say a few words on the question of accession. In three places in the draft resolution, there occur the words, "whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan." The contention has been advanced that the accession is for a temporary period and a limited purpose, and when that period elapses and that purpose has been served, it ceases to be operative. We, on our side, repudiate this daim. The accession which took place on 26 October 1947 was both legal and lawful. It has been followed up by India in the discharge of all the obligations that her acceptance of the accession has imposed upon her. She bas saved the Jammu and Kashmir State from disintegration. She is now resisting those who are attacking that in. tegrity even today. She is protecting the State's large population from the unfriendly attentions of raiders from outside. The accession therefore subsists today and will subsist; even after the fighting ceases and peace and order have been restored. It will subsist until the plebiscite cornes to be taken and the plebiscite goes against India. Until then, Pakistan has no constitutional position in Jammu and Kashmir; and we therefore put it forward as one of our fundamental contentions that, in regard to the arrangements which we make for !he plebiscite under international auspices, there IS no case for allowing the intervention of Pakistan at any stage. We are willing to give aIl tlie gu~rantees and safeguards which would satisfy an mternational body like this Security Council, , but those safeguards cannot introduce into the .- There are vague implications here and there in the draft resolution that it does not contemplate this development. It Js necessary for us to make it perfectly cleu that, after the fighting ceaSf,S and peace and order are restored, the accession will still continue; India's 'obligations 'Will still continue, both for defence and the maintenance of law and order, until the plebiscite comes to be taken. Next, 1 wish to say a few words on the question of the Interim Govemment now functioning in the State of Janpnu and Kashmir. This is deàlt with in paragraph 6 of the draft resolution, which reads as foUows: "The Government of India should undeltake to ensure that the Government of the State invite the major political groups to designate responsible representatives ~o share equitably and fully in the conduct of the administration at the Ministerial level, while the plebiscite is being prepared and carried out." The Government of India is unable to agree to this paragraph as it stands. It contemplates a coalition govemment in which aU major political groups will find equitable and full representation, and this representation will be by persons who are to be designated by the political group.'l themselves. Coalition govemments of this type are all right when there is sorne major political issue, like war, on which aU politic~ parties are agreed as to the action to be taken. Such govemments would work mischief if they were br~ught into existence at a time when the major political issue before the countrY is one on which thase groups violently cliffer. To think of a coalition govemment in such circumstànces is to invite a paralysis of the Kashmir administration during the period that is in contemplation. We have had bitter experience in India of the working of such coalition governments. Neither wc nor .Kashmir would like to repeat that experience in Kashmir. We, however, are The selection of representatives of other politicaI groups must, both under thl~ constitution under which the State is now working and on reasonable grounds, be left to the Prime Minister of the State, and in order to demonstrate to the Security Council that the present Prime Minister of that State is aIl-out for implementing the spirit of the undertaking which we have already given in this respect, 1 should like to read a m~age which he has sent to me about the policy which he is pursuing, a message which he has given me discretion to use in any manner 1 like. 1 think it is appropriate that 1 should read that message to the Security Council. It is as follows: "1 stand by my assurance that the Ministry should be broad-based. The condition, however, is that only those elements èàn be taken in the Ministry who are not enemies of the State or in sympathy with raiders whose main objective is to turn this land destitute. 1 should not be supposed to include in my Ministry persons who directIy or indirectIy are a party to wholesale destruction of our villages and towns, abduction and rape' of women, loot and plunder, which have been going on in the name of the so-called Liberation Movement. This, however, does not mean that 1 should not include those who have ideological differences with the National Conference, and would like to support accession to Pakistan. As a matter of fact, 1have in my Ministry today, Colonel Pir Mohammed Khan, who is a member of the Working Committee of the Muslim Conference, and President of the Anjuman-I-Islam, Jammu." We are, therefore, strongly opposed to paragraph 6. 1 have a few words to say about the provisions relating to the Indian Army. References ta it are ta be found in paragraphs 2, 5 and 9 of the draft resolution. It was a matter of sorne surprise to me that Mr. Noe1-Baker repeatedly referred to the Indian Army in Kashmir as an army of occupation [284th meeting]. That Army is there in pur-suance of legitimate duties cast upon it by the constitutional position which India holds in Kashmir. Ta describe it as an army of mere occupation is doing less than justice not only ta that Army, but to the Govern- ~ent of India, if 1 may take the liberty of saymgso. There are four different kinds of armed forces referred to in this draft resolution. First, in subparagraph 2(a), the Indian Army is referred to. Paragraph 3 refers to State forces. Paragraph In the draft resolution before us, this constitutes one of the major deteriorations from the draft resolution for which Mr. Tsiang made himseH responsible on 18 March last. A great deal was sâid by him on 17 April [284th meeting] ta reconcile us te this deterioration. His argument was, in efiect, th~t if the arrangements provided in the draft resolution are carried out, the chances of external aggression will become nil; the need for the Indian Army operating in Kashmir for purposes of defence against.that aggression will not be felt. He proceeded to say that even if such a need arose, there was, 1 believe under Article 51 of the Charter, an indefeasible right for individual and collective self-defence conceded to every Member of the United Nations. Did he suggest that, under those circumstances, if there was such external aggression, the Indian Army could march into the State for the purpose of preventing it? If sa, why is it that the draft resolution did not recognize that fact in sa many words, when it took the trouble of mentioning the question of maintenance of law and arder? Assum- . ing that that were possible, would it not be more in accord with the obligations of the federal Government in a frontier unit that it should maintain on the borders of that unit portions of the army sufficient in strength for repelling possible invasions of that territory? Are we asking for anything illegitimate or unreasonable when we say that the minimum strength should be sufficient, not only for law and order, but for defence aIso?) We shall not be willing to abdicate our paramount duty of defending Jammu and Kashmir so long as the accession lasts. It is on this ground that, in regard to sub-paragraph 2(a), we find ourselves unable to give our agreement. Then, there are other parts of this paragraph whiêh are somewhat difficult ta understand. It speaks of "base areas" and "forward areas". "Forward" with reference to what? It will be a matter for conflicting interpretations later on. 1 rather .think that that section of the paragraph which relates ta "base" and "forward" areas has been lifted out of sorne other scheme which was more 'comprehensive than the one which has With regard to the State forces, the relevant paragraph is number 3. It says: "The Govemment of India should agree that until such time as the plebiscite administration referred to below finds it necessarv ta exercise the powers of direction and superviSion over the State forces and police provided for in para~ graph 8 they will be held in areas to be agrxd upon with the Plebiscite Administrator." This paragraph refers not only to the State forces but to the police as well, and it refers to a period prior to the Plebiscite Administration's feeling the need for directing and supervising these forces and the police. It is somewhat difficult for an administrator of sorne experience like myse1f to understand why this is necessary during the period prior to the plebiScite. The police are referred to. The police are ali over the State; they are engaged every day in the maintenance of law and arder. Why should the Plebiscite Administrator prior to the plebiscite have the right to place a veto upon the disposition of the police in the interests of the maintenance of law and arder? Apart from this, 1 should like to point out to the Security Council that bath the State forces and police are govemed essentially by discipline. If discipline has to be enforced, there must be anity of control. You cannat divide control, direction, or supervision, for that matter, in the case of disciplinary personnel of this type, between two sets of authorities. The suggestion in paragraph 3, to my mind, is an administrative enormity. Then, paragraph 4 speaks of "... personnel recruited locally ..." 1 take it that this refers to additional police that may be required. There is no harm in recrui$g from local personnel whatever additional police may be required, but the mischief is in paragraph 5 which says: "If these local forces . . ."-1 take it these words refer to the forces raised under paragraph 4-"should be found to be inadequate, the Com- 'mission, subject ta the agreement of both the Govemment of India and the Government of Pakistan, should arrange for the use of such forces of either Dominion as it deems effective for the purpose of pacification." ." . ~acification is an act having reference to local CltIzens of Kashrnir. The task of pacification is essendally one which should be shouldered by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. It has 1 should Iike to refer to the paragraphs regarding the plebiscite administration. Our objections to this pa."t cf the re.'iolution concem paragraph 8, which vests the direction and supervision of State forces and .police in the Plebiscite Administrator, even though "for that purpose only"; sub-paragraph 10(c), which gives the Plebiscite Administrator the right to ask for the creation of special magistrates and to nominate persons to those offices; and last, but by no means least, sub-paragraph 10(e), which permits the Plebiscite Administrator to communicate with the Government of Pakistan or with the representative of that Government with the Commission. The· Plebiscite Administrator is, as 1 have said, an officer of the State, and it is against all ideas of both political substance and administrative propriety that such an officer should be given the liberty of communicating directIy with an outside Govemment on a matter for which bis own Government is the sole responsible authority. 1 do not wish to go further into the details of the resolution. 1 would urge only that India's conduct in this case has been absplutely correct from beginning to end. It has been correct legally; it has been correct constitutionally; it has been correct, as weIl, in high-principled, ethical statesmanship. As the draft resolution nowstands, India definitely has to express her strong opposition to it. If, however, the drait resolution is carried, inspite of our objections and opposition, it will be for my Government to decide its course of action in the circumstances so createéL 11:. will be for my Govemment to decide its course of action regardingthe stoppage of the fighting in Kashmir as soon as p0ssible, and the holding of a plebiscite thereafter. . The moving and eloquent appeal which the representative of the United Kingdom made on 17 April [284th meeting] caused a temporary stir in my emotions. T~e.procedural flexibilities to which the representative of the United States drew our attention at the same meeting gave rise to certain hesitations in my mind. 1 have, however, sinee had the opportunity to read and study both speeches in cold type. Thatstudy has not, 1 regret to 'say, inclined me toward any revision of my attitude to the draft resolution before us. We can only hope that our search for such other·pacific methods will not prove ta be barren and that we shall not be driven irr~istibly ta the arbitrament of armed conflict between the two Dominions. Sir Mohammed ZAFRULLAH KHAN (Pakistan): As 1 listened ta the very able exposition that Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar has just concluded making ta the Security Council, 1 wished that 1 possessed in a similar degree the gift of placing before the Council matters, palatable and unpalatable, in such e1oquent, and particularly 'such polished, language. 1 apologize in advance for the fact that my approach tn the consideration of the resolution now before the Security Council will be more direct than his, and may, 1 fear, aIso be more rugged1y expressed. The f'.mdamental question before the Security Council has been this: with respect to the Kashmir dispute, the parties are agreed that ~he question of the accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan is to be determined by means of a free and impartial plebiscite. The problem with which the members 01':1e Council have been struggling during the past few weeks is to determine and propound the essential conditions for such a plebiscite. 1 freely and sincerely associate myself with the opening words of Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, iil which he has paid a generous and handsorne tribute ta the labours of the Security Council as a whole, and more particularly ta the labours of the President for the current month and the Presidents of the Security Council since the month of January, and ta the other representatives who have been associated with them in finding a solation to that question. The ~elegation of Pakistan, as much as thé delegation of India, fully appreciates, and is duly grateful for, the labour and care that have been As far as 1 am concemed, 1 was 50 much indulged in that respect by the Security Council that 1 fear that, on sorne occasions, 1 expressed myself at wearisome length. Therefore, when the CouncL. found itself in a position to be able to propound-its own views on this matter in respect of the lines on which its settlement should depend, which appeared to it to be fair and proper, there could have been no feeling in the minds of the members of the Security Council that they had not been supplied with sufficient data or that light hadnot been thrown to their satisfaction on the various aspects of this problem. At a certain stage, the Security Council gave expression to the principles on which the settlement of this question should he based, and perhaps it might be of some worth and advantage, even at this late stage, to remind members of the Security Council of the view that they took on the fundamentals of this question and to request them once more to consider whether or not, in its more important aspects, the draft resolution now before the Security Council embodies those principles. It is true that parties that are contesting against each other will always be apt to take partial views on the question. 1 am not, therefore, inviting the' members of the Security Council to consider, as 1 fear the representative of India has done, to what extent they have or have not complied with his request or my request. That b beside ~e point. At this stage, after the debate on this question which has contillued for more than three months, 1 venture to invite the Security Council to consider whether the solution that the Council has finally embodied in this draft resolution satisfies the tests which those very members who were parties to the resolution laid down, themselves, as crucial to the matter. That may surely be regarded as an impartial approach to the matter. In this connexiûn 1 would first invite the attention of the Security Council to certain very weighty and valuable observations made by the representative of the United States on 24 January 1948. The representative said: ". . . with respect to the media and methods of creating those conditions, arrange an interim government that is recognized as free from the amen of brimstone, as nearly impartial and perfect as two great countries Iike India and Pakistan can make it; in which the rest of the world will have confidence as being fair [235th meeting]." That is one of the passages. At the same meeting the representative of Canada said: ". . . sa that a basis of agreement may be reached to tem1Înate the fighting, to afford security to the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir . Mter the representative of France had spoken, the representative of Syria added ta what he had said by stating that not oruy should foreign troops be removed, but the tribesmen aIso must withdraw. The representative of France further explained his point of view in these words: "From my viewpoint, the ward 'troops' means not oruy regular troops but aIso irregular troops; that is, both troops under the command of a State authority and tribal forces not recognizing allegiance to any State." Obviously the representative of France meant a Government and not aState. There is a distinction in India between a Princely State and the Dominion of India or the Dominion of Pakistan. Later, on 29 January, the representative of the United States of America said: "The other question of a fair plebiscite will also natunilly involve a consideration of the form and substance of the administration of the Government leading up to and during the period of the plebiscite. 1 do not desire to say any more about this, because 1 do not want to g~t into a discussion of detail [237th meeting]." . loyal riode My esteemed friend, the representative of tht: United Kingdom, stated on the same day: Royaume-Uni, "Ever since the first speeches were made on this subject in India and PakiStan months ago, 1 have been cons.ideri.ng what signn'1cance could be attached to the phrase 'under the auspices of the United Nations'. The more 1 think about it, the more convinced 1 am that that phrase must imply not oruy that the plebiscite must be fair in itself, but that it must seem fair to all concerned; not only that in fact justice shall be assured, as 1 am certain it would be assured by the sole action of any one Government at this table if it had a free hana, but that it must seem fair to both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, to all the members of the Security Council, to all the Members of the United Nations and, 1 add-and 1 think this is the crucial point in stopping the fighting, premier l'Inde chis l'expression Unies". que seulement même, les être le geant aussi des aux sécurité, On 4 February, the representative of the United States of America said: "How is it possible to induce the tribesmen to retire from Jammu and Kashmir without "'arfare and without driving them out? That is the only way it can be done, unless the tribesmen are satisfied that there is to be a fair plebiscite assured through an interim government that is in fact, and that has the appearance of being, non.-partisan. Only by that method could one hope to have that retirement on a peaceful basis [240t!l meeting]." The representative of the United States went on to state: "The interim government need not exist for a long rime. It need exist for only such rime as is necessary to set up the machinery for the holding of a fair plebiscite. Mter the plebiscite, what then? That interim govemment will be funetus 0fficio,. it will have completed its job and it will have no more authority. There are many such institutions in government and they are especially important in international affaim. Of course, we would not be interested in this matter if it were pure1y a domestic affair." The next day, the representative of the United Kingdom stated: "What the Security Couneil does must seem fair to these two parties. Jt must also seem fair to the Government of Pakistan, to the insurgents, to the tribesinen, to the Government of India, to the other inhabitants of Jammu ~d Kashmir, and to the outside world. That is why 1 arrived at the same conclusion as the other membel'$ of the Security Couneil who stated that impartial, interim administrative arrangements must he made [241st meeting]." On 5 February, the President, as representative of Canada, submitted to the Security Coun- . cil whàt was first described as a private memorandum, and which subsequendy, at the request of the representative of Colombia, became a draft resolution. 1 shall draw attention ta only two paragraphs of that resolution,as representing the views of the President on this question. Paragraph D states: "That an interim administration which will command the full confidence and respect of the people of the Jammu and KashmiI- State is essential to the attainment of the aims and purposes of this resolution [document S/671]." ln paragr.~ph 2 of this draft resolution, it is stated: "In this connexion, the Commission shaH seek ta ensure co-operation between the military forces of Indiaand Pakistan with a view ta bringing about an immediate cessation of fighting in the Jammu and Kashmir State and ta maintain arder and security until the question of accession shall have been determined by the plebiscite." In other words, he made two recommendations. The first was that an impartial interim adininistration in Jammu and Kashmir was essential, and the second that the practical method of securing both the withdrawal of the tribesmen and the restoration and maintenance of law and arder during the. ppriod while the plebiscite was being orgarnzed andheld was for the commission ta seek the co·operation of the military forces of India and Pakis~an. These are the twa main matters on which difference persists between the representative of the Gov· emment of India and the representative of the Government of Pakistan. On 10 February, the representative of Canada presented ta the Security Council, of which he was then the President, a draft resolution dated 6 February. He explained that the draft pro· posals which had been submitted ta the parties ". . . represented an effort, pursuant ta the mandate of the Security Council, ta produce a comprehensive framework of principles based upon suggestions made by members of the Security Council, withir.. which the discussion of detailed specifie proposaIs might usefullyproceed [243rd meeting]." That is to say, the draft resolution was not the work of the representative of Canada,alone -as President of the Security Council for the· month of February-or of the representatives of Canada and of Belgium alone, but it represented views expressed by members of the Security Council during meetings of that body. 1 wish now ta draw the attention of the Security Council ta certain extracts from this other resolution [document 8/667] which bear upon the question which i~ now mainly the one which divides the two parties. It says: cc(a) Acts of violence and hostility must end; . cc ( b) The withdrawal and continued ex~ clusion of all irregular forces and armed individual-; who have entered Jammu and Kashmir from outside must be brought about, each party using ta that end all the influence at its disposal; U (d) Regular armed forces must be withdrawn as soon as the re-establishment of law and order permits U ; and U(f) The conditions necessary for a free and fair plebiscite on the question of whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall accede to India or to Pakistan, including an interim administration which will command the confidence and respect of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, must be established.u Both the President then in office, General Mc- Naughton, and the President for the previous month, Mr. van Langenhove, who had acted as Rapporteur, requested members of the Security Council to say whether the articles embodied in this resolution did or did not represent the views to which they had hitherto gjven expression. The representative of Argentina, who now has the honour to be President of the special session of the General Assembly, stated on 10 February: "1 think that this draft resolution does sum up' the opinions expressed by the members of the Security Council in our debate on this question, and 1 wish to give my approval to it." He went on to say, later: "In summary, 1 approve the draft resolution submitted by the President, which was drafted in consultation with Mr. van Langenhove, the representative of Belblum [243rd meeting]." The representative of France stated, on the same day: "Like the representative of Argentina, 1 wish to thank the President and the Rapporteur for the work that they have done in order to bring together the various views which have been expressed here in this connexion and to facilitate our study of this question. U Other representatives expressed themselves as follows: The representative of Syria: "It is in full conformity and harmony with the views.expressed by the members of the Security Council during the last meetings." The representative of the United Kingdom: "The representatives of Argentina, Syria, and, Ü 1 understood him, France, have answered this question affirmatively. They think that this draft resolution does sum up the views of the Security Council as they have been expressed in our Later in the same meeting, the representative of the United Kingdom was pleased ta state: "1 have come to the conclusion that while, of course, the statement of the President is not more than an ouiline, nevertheless it is a faithful translation into broad principles of the way in which the Security Council thinks-that we ought to proceed towards a settlement of the çlifficult, dangerous and immensely important question of Kashmir." The representative of the United States: "Our view, as indicated thus far by' trends of opinion, must be clear. l think that there is no confusion at all about the fact that the trend of our opinion, which is not yet'in the form of a resolution, is towards a pacific settlement of this ptatter-an arrangement with terms of such character that they command the respect and the confidence of the parties to the dispute. As l have said, there seems to he no other way of . bringing peace to that part of the world than this specific method of agreement between the parties, which involves such management and such control of the plebiscite-to which both parties have assented-as to ensure that everyone interested will know that it is free, fair and just." , Later, he added: "1 want to say that l fear my own position here has been m.isunderstood. When l spoke about an interim government, l only envisaged . that much control of the machinery of government as is necessary for the limited time and purpose of holding a fair plebiscite ... My own position does not relate to the future government. l can think of many ways in which that situation might be handled without the least derogatiçn of the present Interim Govermnent's life or powers, except for that special purpose; . and that is a purpose which l believe both parties desire and which all the world wauld be glad to see pursued." the 1 On 11 February, the representative of United Kingdom said: "Our problem in the Security Council is to make aIl parties, including Pakistan and the Kashmiris now fighting against the Indian Army -whom the Indian representative admitted to be parties the other day-regard the plebiscite as fair [244th meeting]!' . On the same day the representative of Argentina pl'esented his views to the Security Cauncil under nine heads, of which l shaH read the third and fifth, which are as follows: "... fifth, that the cause of the p~ellt w&r is the rebellion of the Kas1mùr people against their ruler, and the only remedy is to look to the will of these people [245th meeting]." That cOllcluded the first part of the deliberations of the Security Council, the part which was devoted to determining and propounding not what either party thought but wha;t the Se~~rity Council thought were the essential conditions for the holding of a fair and impa:rtial plebiscite. And, if one might 50 put it, up to then, one could almost see the process that was working behind the discussions iu the Security Council and behind the resolutions that from time to time took shape. At that stage, the Indian delegation felt it necessary to go back to India to hold persona! consultations with its Government.· Thereupon, if one might be forgiven for saying so, the matter went underground; that is to say, one was no longer conscious of what was happening. One had to depend upon scraps of information that appeared iu the Press from time to time, to which one did not know how much value to attach. The Security Council will forgive me if 1 give expression to the feeliug that subsequent events have shown that these indications iu the Press were not sa unfounded as one had, iu one's iunocence and simplicity,. imagined at the time. They indeed gave a very accurate reflection of what was goÙlg on behiud the scenes. If that ~ so, it would appear that at least some of the members of the Security Council seemed to have realized during that iuterval, with a sense of sharp surprise, that the Sccurity Council had for once let itself slip into a position nf fairness and impartiality between two contending parties which might help to restore to the Unitet! Nations a !raction of the prestige that it was so rapidly losing iu the eyes of the worM. They therefore beat a hasty retreat from a position so unfamiliar and embarrassing and fraught ·with the possibility of such undesired consequences. The first positive indications of this change came to my notice on 3 March 1948, commünicated to me from a quarter that need not be further particularized. They outllned quite clearly the shape of the draft resolution now before the Security Council. A significant summary appeared in the Indian Press on 8 March 1948. At this stage, 1 draw the attention of the Security Council to a clipping from -The Statesman of New Delhi of "The Council v.rill acknowledge that there was sorne justification in the Indian complaint thàt Kashmir raiders were obtaining aid in Pakistan, though not necessa.ruy by direct Government assistance. On this point, the Council was considered likeIy ta request the Pakistan Government ta use its best efforts ta stop alleged ill~gal activity in its territory or by its nationals. "The disputed problem of an ·interim administration for Kashmir during the plebiscite might, according ta the same sources, be solved by broadening the present administration under Sheikh Abdullah on a wider political basis. "On the question of Indian troops in Kashmir, it was understood that the new line of the Council's approach might be ta consent ta their presence but, at the same time, ta ensure that their activities were of a pureIy military character and did not include police duties. "It was beIieved that there was no crystallized resolution in view and that discussion in the Council might produce substantial changes." That was a remarkably accurate sunmiary of what has subsequently come ta the surface. The draft resolution is now before the Security Council in its final shape. As the representative of China explained, his first draft resolution of 18 March 1948 [document S/699] underwent certain modifications, and it emerged in the shape of his draft resolution of 30 March 1948. The draft resolution now before the Security Council is, with some slight modific3:tions, substantially the draft resohüion of 30 March 191:8. This draft resolution, as was bound to happen, in many respects takes a view, makes a recommendation or suggests a course of action that may not, in its entirety or in some aspects, be acceptable ta one party or the other. That surely cannat be a grievance against a resolution which seeks ta resolve a dispute in which the parties have held the points of view that the Government of India and the Govemment of Pakistan hold wit~ regard to Kashmir. Those two basic principles have been materially, if not altogether, departed from. But as 1 have said, it is due ta the eminence, ability, experience, and the standing of the authors of this draft resolution, and ta the labours that they have devoted ta the framing of it, as $ey viewed it, with the sole desire and single-minded purpose of building a structure which might help peacefully ta resolve this dispute-it is due ta all these factors that the provisions of the draft resolution should be examined with care on their merits to see how far it is likely to achieve the purpose for which it is designed. Ta begin with, it will strike anyone who studies the draft resolution, even cursorily, that in its main aspects it is aIl one-sided. It has been contended, on behalf of the Indian delegation, that it is not one-sided enough. "But then, one appreciates their position. Their position is that the whole trouble in Kashmir should be resolved on the baslli thatthe accession of the State of Jammu and Kash1nir ta India is legal andconstitutional; that the fighting which is going on in Kashmir has no justification or validity; that it is an attempt by outsiders ta disturb the peace, arder and tranquilIity of the Statej that Pakistan ought even ta undertake military action at its own borders and frontiers to stop the tribesmen from coming into Kashmir, and that once that objective has been achieved, the military occupation of the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the civil administration of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be taken over by the Government of India; the Government of India would then, in consultation with the Security Council and under its auspices, carry out a plebiscite. Of course, if that is the correct approach ta the problem, the delegation of India is right in stating that Pakistan has nothing to do with the matter except ta arrange for the withdrawal of the tribesmen by persuasion or by sueh other action as may be necessary, and ta ensure that their infiltration'back into the State is out of the question, and that the rest must be left ta The essence of the matter is this-and there is no escape from it-the question of the accession of Kashmir ta India or to Pakistan is a question which is equally vital to both Dominions, and they are equally vitally interested in its result. That being so, the position cannot be equitably maintained that, by virtue of what happened on 26 and 27 October, the legality of which has been from the very beginning persistently questioned by Pakistan, India alone is concerned with this matter. If both Dominions are vitally interested and if fair conditions have ta bé brought about in Kashmir-which should nÇlt result in any. prejudice to either party's position-and if, from that point of view, the draft resolution is studied, it will be found ta be aU too one-sided. One test that 1 venture to submit is the following: if what Pakistan submits should be brought about were acceded to, would it weigh the plebiscite in favour of Pakistan in any respect? If what is insisted upon on behalf of India were accepted, agreed to and persisted in, would it or would it not weigh the plebiscite in favour of India? That, 1 venture ta submit, is a fair enough test. Would the withdrawal of Indian troops from Kashmir-provided law and order were to be re-established and çould be maintained with the help of local arrangements or with the help of neutral military troops-put any pressure or have any chance ta put pressure upon any of the voters inside Kashmir to vote for accession ta Pakistan? Would it stop anyone who wanted to vote for accession to India from voting in that way? Obviously not. Would the setting up of an impartial administration in Kashmir put pressure on anyone ta vote for accession ta Pakistan? Would it stop anyone from voting for accession ta India if he wanted ta do so? These two matters are the crux of the whole question. The position of Pakistan with regard ta them is ta bring about a fair and impartial state of affairs in which no one would be influenced in one direction or the other. The continued presence of the armed forces of India in the State of Jammu and Kashmir would either, under the safeguards contained in the draft resolution, not affect the plebiscite, or Can anyone contend that the setting up of a truly impartial administration would force or influence anyone to vote in favour of Pakistan who would otherwise not wish to vote that wa~', or would it stop anyone from voting for Ir..dia who desired to vote for India? My contention is that on these two ct;ntral crucial matters on which -differences still persist, Pakistan is asking only for an impartial field, from which all suspicion of favouritism from one side or the other will he removed. The things upon which India insists, whatever may be the reason advanced for themconstitutional, legal, the re1ationship between the State and the Federation-are among those which, .in our view, would work prejudicially against Pakistan and in favour of India. At the very best it may be hoped that they would not, but if they do at aIl, those factors will influence the plebiscite in only one direction; there is no possibility of their ïnfluencing it in the other. It is from this point of view that 1 desire the Security Council to approach the consideration of the draft resolution, and to consider whether it efi'ective1y meets the situation. It obviously does not proceed along the lines which the Security Council itself earlier propounded. That much is not only conceded but has been stressed by the representative of India, 50 it is not a matter of dispute.· Last Saturday afternoon at the 284th meeting, in a. very powedn1 and moving speech, the representative of Chin". explained the safeguards embodied in the resolution. His explanation was fair; 1 am not disputing it, 50 far as it went. But, in the tirst place, he himseH said that inhis experience-and 1 am afraid that 1 have not even a fraction of that experience-no international plebiscite had been hedged around by 50 many saf.eguards as this proposed plebiscite. Why is that? Why has the Security Council been But why mere1y minimize as far as possible? This is a matter which has been in dispute between the two Dominions from the very beginning. On 8 November, the Prime Minister of India, in that te1egram which 1 have often quoted ta the Security Council and from which 1 need not read again this afternoon, made this declaration: that, as saon as law and order had been restored, Indian troops would he withdrawn fc'TI. Kaslunir. It h&.:s subsequently been stated here by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar: "Yes, but conditions have changed." In what respect? On 8 November, the State of Kashmir was in turmoil. That turmoil, it is true, has more or less continued. But what new factor has arisen which today necessitates that, after fighting has ceased and law and order have been restored, the troops of the Government of India should remain? The representative of India says: "Oh, it is because we are responsible for the defence of Kashmir under the terms of accession." Were they not responsible for the defence of Kashmir on 8 November under the terms of accession? Has tha.t liability, that obligation, that duty, been impose.d upon the Government of India since that time? They were quite conscious of their obligations under the instrument of accession when they made that offer, and today that airer is not being adhered ta. It V'qs stated in that very telegram that MF. Jinnah. the Governor-General of Pakistan, ha.d pointee:t out to Lord Mountbatten that there was no chance of holding a fair plebiscite under the present administration of Kashmir. For the purposes of.the plebiscite, that point was not disputed. The Prime Minister of India may have fe1t that tao rnuch stress was being laid upon that point, but he did not attempt ta argue that it was not valid. His reply was that the remedy was to hold the plebiscite under the authority of the United Nations. What the authority of the United Nations means has been interpreted by the representatîve of the United Kingdom before !he Security Council, and 1 have read out bis mterpretation. We are asking for no more; throughout, we have asked for no more. What ~e are asking for would establish the absolute nnpartiality and fairness of the plebiscite. So far as Sheikh Abdullah is concerned, he appeared before the Security Council, which was able to make an estimate as to how far that gentleman was impartial in this question. Since then, he has made many other pronouncements after returning to India and after the Maharajah proceeded to appoint him Prime Minister. 1 shall not weary the Security Council with too many citations, but 1 should like to draw the attention of the Security Council to what was said by The Statesman of New Delhi in its issue of 25 March. Under the heading "Rash Remarks", this editorial comment wa~ made: "Reports from impartial sources reaching this sub-continent suggest that Sheikh Abdullah, during the Indian delegation's first· New York stay to argue their case about Kashmir, proved rather an embarrassment ta bis colleagues. His remarks were sometimes noticeably injudicious ... "Apparently undeterred, however, the Sheikh, back in this country, has continued to make statements which, if· reported to New York, may embarrass his colleagues anew. So unqua1ified is the anti-Pakistan sentiment revealed, and so extreme the lailguage c10thing it, that unbiased folk, reading what he has saidand it has been said often and at length-must wonder more deeply whether a plebiscite in Kashmir under bis administration could be fairly run." That is the statement of an impartial news-. paper issued from New Delhi, the capital of the Government of India, a newspaper known for not taking extreme views. What Sheikh Abdullah has done, since he became Prime Minister, to show his impartiality in this matter may be gathered, to sorne extent, from what appeared in The Times of London of 13 April 1948. It says, in the course of an article: "The locai administration ..."-aIl new men -"chosen by Sheikh Abdullah are vociferously anti-Pakistan and the people, by nature excitable and easily malleable, have reacted accordingly." C'est pondant dépêche Abba.s, qui cette They are not the only ones who have found that out. That, again, is the conclusion of the special correspondent of The Times. We have received information, in the form of a telegram, setting out a statement of Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas, who is president of the Muslim Conference and has recently been released from gaol, saying: "Since his ascendancy to power, Sheikh Abdullah has clapped into jail about three thou- Abdullah sand Muslim Conference workers. Almost ail militants gazetted officers ..."-this refers to the civil tous service; it does not refer to the military-"under ministration state service, suspected of pro-Pakistan leanings, ffiilitaire have either been jailed or discharged from the Pakistan service. The administration has banned listening leurs to Radio Pakistan." d'écouter l aJll. certain that this kind of measure brings to the minds of the representatives on the Serappellent curity Council comparable pictures of what celles happened in certain countries of Europe sorne nées, years ago. It is suggested that this gentleman at bable the head of the Kashmir Government will magcées nanimously invite sorne representation in his remanié, Ministry from: other political groups, in order to ment fulfil the conditions laid down in paragraph 6 vernement of the revised draft resolution under considerad'inviter tion by the Security Council. It has even been tiques said that Sheikh Abdullah has authorized Mr. taines Gopalaswami Ayyangar, if he 50 chooses, to reaurait veal to the Security Council that Sheikh Abde dullah has already chosen a colleague from Abdullah among the ranks of the Muslim Conference. membres Let me invite the attention of the Security Council, first, to the policy of Sheikh Abdullah à in these rnatters. It is reported in The Hindustan politique Times, a semi-official organ of the Government 'journal of India, published from New Delhi, in its issue du of 7 March 1948-therefore, the authority of velle the statement is beyond doubt-under the headcette ing "Kashrnir Will Live and Die with India", a in an article on a statement by Sheikh Abdullah, 1 1948, that ct déclaration cet "The Kashmir National Conference was not onIy complete1y non-.:ommunal, but also did not suffer from ideokJ~cal differences. Socialists, Communists, Nationalists and others, ail work pas pas logique. et groupe a des communautés, vertu envers toge~er, ~o single group .dominating its policy. In his cabmet tao, he proposed to include people of aIl parties and communities, but they would he chosen according to only one criterion, their loyalty to the National Conference and their country." "There was no question of releasing all Muslim Conference workers. Those who were likely to act as the fifth columnists of a. foreigll State would remain in gaol, but if his Government was satisfied that any one of them would remain loyal to his own COUIltry, he would be let out." No explanation or comment is necessary. The meaning is perfectly obvious. The foreign state is Pakistan. He who is in favour of accession to Pakistan will remain in gaol. He who will give assurance that he will work f(\r accession to India will be let out. A claim has been made that Sh~ikh Abdullah has already very generously taken one gentleman from the Muslim Conference into bis cabinet. In the first place, ü he has done so, it was subject to that condition. That gentleman must have given assurances of bis loyalty to the National Conference. Therefore, he says he is to be a Muslim Conference member, but it 80 happens thC1.t this telegram from Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas, to which 1 have already invited reference, says: uThe gentleman in question had been expelled from the Muslim Conference three years aga." True, at one time he was a member of the Muslim CorJerence; and ü that makes him a representative of the Muslim Conference, much more so is Sheikh Abdullah himself a representative of the Muslim Conference, because he started bis political career in KashmiI as a member" of the Muslim Conferente. The only time that he was ever elected to the legislatu.:re of Kashmir was on the Muslim Conference ticket, from which he has subsequently departed: but that does not make him today a representative of the Muslim Conference. However, that is the kind of representation that he proposes to give and has given to other parties. 1 shall now draw the attention of the Security Council to certain features of the revised draft resolution. What is Pakistan required to do under this draft resolution? ln this connexion, 1 shall refer to sub~paragraph 1(b), although this logically should have been sub-paragraph 1(a). It was at one tinte sub-paragraph 1(a), but it has subsequently again become sub. paragraph 1(b), although it obviously cornes first. This sub-paragraph reads as follows: ClTo make known to all concerned that the measures indicated in this and the following paragraphs provide full freedom to all subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste, or party, to express their views and to vote on the question of the accession (if the State, and that therefore they should co-operate in the maintenance of peace and order." tie doive loin était intéressés rent sans Si que être, ment aussi pouvoir pour assurer le maintien l'ordre vaincu à entière en assurance 1 quite realize that the Pakistan Government, as a party to this dispute, must go further, is bound to go further, and should undertake this obligation if it were true and honest: to state ta those people that the following paragraphs provide full freedom to all subjects of the State, regardless of this, that, and the other. If the Pakistan Government is convinced that the articles amount to what they claim, the Government will certainly undertake that obligation, not only discharging it to the full, but doing whatever is possible to bring about the maintenance of peace and order. But so long as it is not satisfied that the following paragraphs provide full freedom to all subjects of the Stlt.e-this, that and the other-then it cannot surely in honesty be expected to give that assurance to the people who are fighting. se Sub-paragraph 1(a) of the revised draft resù- lution reads as follows: "To secure the withdrawal {rom the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not nonnally resident therein ,,,ho have entered the State for the P'lrpOSes of fightmg ..." The Security Council has agreed that the only thing that could persuade these people even ta agree to the withdrawal would be an assurance which would satisfy them on the matters set out in sub-paragraph 1(b). If it did not satisfy them, then it would be no use for Pakistan ta make any effort in the direction of subparagraph 1(a) . Let us assume for one moment that the rest of the resolution was satisfactory, that the rest of the resolution did embody proposals which would give full freedom to everyone concerned with regard to the plebiscite and other matters. Even t..lten, how could Pakistan in practice discharge this obligation that is laid down in subparagraph 1(a) without sorne further authority being invested in Pakistan? 1 shall immediately proceed te explain what 1 mean. , There ar,e among the representatives sitting lU the Security Council eminent men with direct, a;nd ~thers with indirect, experience of military SItuations. Surely, they are able to appreciate fu,Uy :the situation that is required to be déalt Wlth m Kashmir where fighting is taking place, . s~ far as the cessation of the fighting and the wlthdrawal of the tribesmen are concerned. In the first place, it is absolutely ,'~ential for . the }?urpooe of bringing about a stoppage of the fightmg-as set out in the pt:eamble "that India Jammu ressortissants normalement tré moyen évacuation sur ne santes, d'appliquer lution tions tière questions. même l'alinéa ment ment Conseil ont, rience pouvoir s'agit les hostilités posé Pakistan The people who havebeen fighting are not ta be shot down; they <:.re not to be victimized they must be permitted to proceed peacefully back to their homes-those who are Kashmir nationaIs-and those who do not be10ng there, out of the Statc; and then, when they are withdrawing, they shal1 not commit any act of violence 01' persecution of the population. Thus, obviously, this matter requires two aspects ta be deaIt with; first, sorne machinery -not that 1 mean that this machinery is to be set up in this resolution, but it must be contemplated-which will bring about an arrangement for the cessation of the fighting, and can settle the points of that arrangement. Secondly, sorne machinery must be set up which will see to it that that arrangement is put into force, that is to say, which will supervise the putting into force of the arrangement for the cessation of fighting; for instance, will supervise the withdrawal of tribesmen. Two telegrams have bee.'1 read by the representative of India as to the atrocities alleged on both sides, one from the Azad Kashmir peoplè and one, a summary of what n<ls appeared in The Hindustan Times. It is a horrible state of affairs, irrespective of the faet whether the truth lieS on one side or the oilier; or whether it lies between the two; whether it is non-Muslims who have been butchered and massacred and have been expe1led from their homes, or whether it is Muslims whose eyes have been gouged out and who have been massacred. . With a horrible state of affairs such as that, with that kind of people fighting each other, when a cessation is brought about t.l}ere sure1y must be supervision, especiaIly on the side of the tribesmen, who are an irregu~ar force owing al1egiance to no one. It is absolutely inescapable that military force must be available in the areas under the control of the Azad Kashmir Govemment ta supervise the putting into effect of the cessation of fighting and the withdrawaI of tribesmen. lndia says "Our rorces will do it." When that statement is anaIysed, what does it come to? What does it amount to? It amounts to this: Pakistan is called upon to exercise its influence to do whatever it can ta ask these people to stop fighting the forces of India, and the forces of !ndia thereupon are to march into their terri. tory, ta occupy it militarily and to expel these people. Is that the solution that the Security .Council is putting forward? If not, then it is "When it is established ta the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the Council's resolution of 20 January that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that· arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective ..." Somebody hé/.s got to settle these arrangements between the two sides, and somebody has got ta supervise their becoming effective. The Commission cannot get satisfaction until the matter is being properly carried out 'in an orderly manner. That is one defect in the resolution, th...t it cloes not provide for that contingency. Then, the representative of India has raised one or two matters with regard to clarification, and 1 agree with him. If these paragraphs, these articles, contain something which ta one party might mean X, and ta the other party might mean Y, and X and Y are opposed ta each other, it will not lead to a settlement. It willlead to further disputes. Therefore, to the extent ta which the meaning can be made clear, the meaning should be made c1ear, and the articles should not contain conundrums ta be solved subsequently by somebody else. The r~presentative of India has asked for a clarification, and 1 join him in asking for a clarification of what is meant by "forward areas" aI!.d what is meant by "base areas". He has said that if "forward areas" are ta be confined to areas within the control of the Government of India at the moment, he rejects this proposaI. On the other hand, 1 desire ta submit rnost respectfully to the Security Council that if by "forward areas" i'> meant any areas within the areas at present under the control of the Azad Kashmir people, they certainly will not, under any circumstances, agree that they should lay down their arms and that the Indian a;rmy should march forward and occupy their areas. Therefore, sorne· kind of definition of "forward area" and "base area" must be made sa that the parties will realize what is meant by these terms. Whoever was responsible for drafting this must have had something in his mind that ought to he made clear. .X .proposition. sous se Certain changes have,been made in paraparagraphe résolution et rendre grap~ 3. The representative of India said that nothmg had been done ta bring the resolution m?re in accord with their wishes and that everythmg that had been done worsened it from their point of view. So far as the changes in the draft .resolution, as it stood on 30 March, are con- Let me compare paragraph 3 as it stands in the present draft with paragraph 3 as it stood before. His main criticism is directed against paragraphs 4 and 5 read together. 1 dIso have fairly serious criticism to make of paragraphs and 5 read together. In the first place, if the local forces provided for in paragraph 4, and referred to in paragraph 5, should be found to be inadequate, as paragraph 5 postulates, the Commission is authorized to arrange for the use of such forces of either Dominion as it deems effective for the purpose of paciiication. But it makes this authority of the Commission subject to the agreement of both the Government of India and the Govemment of Pakistan. Exactly what does that mean? If the Co~ sion feels that in certain areas, for the purpose of the e.lfective re-establishment and maintenance of law and order, it would be best to use Pakistan troops and that the desired result would be achieved best in that way, it must ask for the agreement of the Govemment of India. If India refuses, what is to happen then? Or, put it the other way round-the converse case. The paragraph is open to that criticism. But there is aIso another one. Docs that paragraph mean what it says? Presumably it does. That is why it is there. If it does mean what it says, paragraphs 4 and 5 between them provide for the re-establishment and maintenance of law and order, and that being so, where is the necessity for paragraph 9? Paragraph 9 says: "The Government of India should at the request of the Plebiscite Administra6'n make available from the Indian forces such assistance as the Plebiscite Administration may require for the perfomJance of i18 functions." For the perfo.cmance of i18 functions the Plebiscite Administration may require assistance of many kinds. But the only assistance it could pœ- sibly require from armed forces would be assistance in the maintenance of law and order when the voters' registers and lis18 are being prepared, and for the maintenance of law and order "The Commission shalI place rot the disposai of the Plebiscite Administration such assistance as the Plebiscite Administration may require for the performance of its functions," or "such forces as the Plebiscite Administration may require for the performance of its functions." . The fact that paragraph 9 provides separately for the forces of Indla ta become available ta the plebiscite administration for a purpose which could only be the maintenance of law,and arder seems to suggest-it may not have been meant that way, but if it stays there it seems ta suggest -that paragraph 5 is not intended ta mean what it says. If it does mean what it says, paragraph 9 is not at all necessary. Under paragraph 9, aU the forces required for the direct purpose of preparing and holding the plebiscite are Indian forces. Why? If it is true that the two parties are equally and vitaUy interested in this matter, if it is admitted that the whole arrangement should be made fair and impartial, why are the forces ta be employed for the very direct purpose of preparing for and holding the plebiscite confined to the fotces ('>f the Government of India? Why? For the restoration and re-establishment and maintenance of law and order people from the local areas are to he employed. If more ~"\SÏ$tance is required, both parties are ta be called upon to contribute. But for tJte direct purpose of the plebiscite, the main abject of the whole arrangement, any forces that are required are to come only from one side and not from the other. Wh?t is the justification for that? Is that fair? Is thatimpartial? serait-il sont l'on doit préparation seules quoi la appartenant besoin appel le jet des troupes tion partiale? What is the kind of thing in actual practice tbat the plebiscite administration will have to control in respect of law and arder? A clash or clashes between the supporters of Pakistan and the supporters of India may be apprehended, and it may be thought that a knowledge of the fact that the security forces are there in proper arder will stop these clashes. But, if the people know that these forces will be drawn only from one side, that will be direct ÏIicitement and encouragement ta the supporters of that side to commit aggression against the supporters of the otherside, knowing that all the military forces for keeping .arder will be from one side. A cruel and pitiless experlence of that kind of thing has aIready been the fate of millions of people in maintien tration Un tisans être rité aidera population que gation partisans toutes les tenir partisans personnes We then proceed to paragraph 6 of the draft resolution, which, as the representative of India says, is crucial. It certainly is. Again, what does it mean? "The Government of India should undertake to ensure that the Government of this State invite the major political groups to designate responsible representatives te share equitably and fully in the conduct of the administration at the ministeriallevel, while the plebiscite is being prepared and carried out." If it means what it says or what it appears to mean, it may in actual practice provide what is necessary. But it is so framed that it may be .pulled one way by one side, or the other way by the other side. If it means that the major political groups-that is to say, the National Conference, etc.-will beinvited to designate responsible representatives to have a full and equal share in the Council of Ministers, then, after all, "to share equitably andfully in the conduct of the After all, it must also be remembered that though some of us are fairly intimately familiar with the English language, it is not our mother tongue and, therefore, the simpler the language employed the more helpful will it be to those who may have to decide what the articles mean and whether they guarantee that freedom to the people of the State of Kashmir ~hich is predicated in sub-paragraph 1(a) as It was or subparagraph 1(b) as it is now. Then, sub-paragraph 10(c) has been objected to. Again, l have no doubt that my leamed friend, Mr. Ayyangar, has compared this as it now stands with the form it had in the draft of SO March. This, ta a considerable degree, has been watered down, and, having been watered down to that extent, the safeguard has been attenuated. There is no doubt that this is a valuable safeguard. One apprehendsthat it is intended to deal with such a state of affairs as when a man makes a speech and is prosecuted for sedition. The man says: "Look at my speech. Its burden is 'accession to Pakistan'. That is why l am being prosecuted." That kind of case should then be transferred to the special magistracy that was contemplated, but that has now been watered down in sub-paragraph 10(c). Apart from such a speech, a trumped-up charge may be brought against an active eamest worker of one side, who might say: "This has no foundation; it is due ta prejudice against me because l have consistently and throughout made no secret that l am a supporter of accession to Pakistan." If he makes good that statement, then they would say: "There might be something in it, and he had, better' be tried by impartial people". There are aIl sorts of occasions where the judicial machinery of the State is sought ta be made an engirte . of oppression in arder to help one side. That was broadly the abject of this safeguard-a valuable safeguard-but it has been considerably watered clown. Then there-is paragraph Il,which states: "The Government of India should undertake to. prevent and to give full support to the Admmistrator and his staff in preventing any threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue influence ..." This is very valuable. again., and the article goes on to state; . . ". . . the Government of India should publicly announce and f,hould cause the' Government ?f the State to announce this undertaking as an ··mtemational obligation binding on .all public Then it becomes academic. You are trusting too much·to the morai sense of the 'people, with regard to whose moral sense the whole of-fuis arrangement expresses doubt as to whether they have moral sense to that degree or not. Therefore, it ought to be supplemented by a provision that a contravention of this obligation shalI be punished in a certain manner, or that the plebiscite administrator will have the authority to deal with contraventions and to set down the law independendy and the procedure under which these contraventions are to be dealt with. Otherwise, you lay down the law, but put no sanctions behind it. Then, what about the threats, the coercion, and the intimidation that have already been employed? Obviously, these must be neutralized a.c; far as possible, at least in respect of dismissed government officials. Persons who have been dismissed since the question of accession to Pakistan or India became acute, and thase who have been dismissed from the public service merely because they were in favour of accession to one sicle or the other, must be restored to their official positions. That is the importan.t firt't step in creating confidence .in the minds of the people that a fair and impartial opportunity for recording their votes will be provided. J Persons who have been penalized for political activity-those who have been sent to gaol without trial, and even those who have been imprisoned after trial-must be.restored to liberty and freed from the effect of the penalties imposed upon. them. It is not enough that those who are still languishing in gaol should be restored to liberty. A man's house or property may have been sold in order to raise the amount of a fine imposed upon him for bis advocacy. of accession to Pakistan. There must be authority to settle that kind of thing. It must be part of sub-paragraph 14(b), which prO'Vides that there shall be no vi,ctimization. If there is to he no victimization, then past victimization must be neutralized. Paragraph 16 reads: "The· GoveUlments of India and Pakistan should each be invited to nominate a representative to he attached·to the Commission for such assistance as it may require in the perfonnance of its task." . . The status, functions and duties of these represent~tives must be set out 50 that they know where they stand vis-à-vis the Commission. Their right'3 ofaccess and advice to the Comnûssion, and their obligations, must he stated so that the . Coll1DlÎl!Sion can insist that they perform and discharge the obligations they have undertaken. The preamble and sub-paragraph 1(a) stand as they stcod in' the draft which the Security Council communicated to us before it was slightly further modified in these respects. But at the end of sub-paragraph 1(b ), as you will notice, a sentence has been added. It reads as follows: "The Government of Pakistan may, if it considers it necessary for the purpose of fulfilling this obligation, employ its armed forces in the State." That would meet the first contingency to which 1 drew attention-a settlement of the arrangements for the cesSation .of fighting and supervision of the withdrawal of the tribesmen. . Then, article l-A has been suggested for the purpose of bringing abCYllt an arrangement for the cessation of fighting. 1 am bound to point out, of course, that it is based upon the assumption that the Security Council does not desire that upon cessation of fighting, the anned forces of India shall march into the areas under the control of the Azad Government and occupy thern militarily. Therefore, it reads as follows: "isant -l'heure "The Governments of India and Pakistan shall instruct their military authorities in the State to co-operate with each other in concerting measures to bring about a cessation of figl1ting at the earliest possible date and the Government of India shall issue orders that from the appointed tirne and date of the cea5e-fire order Indian forces shall not advance further into the State." Then, in the fifth fine ofsub·paragraph 2(a) , instead of a plan "iri consultation with the Commission", we have suggested: "a plan approved by the Commission.for withdrawing their forces from Jammu and Kashmir .md reducing them progressive1y to the minimum strength, whkh together with the military forces of Pakistan, may be required by the Commission under article 5 for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order". .l'ordre That is obviously necessary htcause arti~le 5' contemplates that, in a certain cuntingency, the Comniissionmay draw upon the forces b)th of Pa,kistan and of India. " (i) Paldstan troops shall be stauoned in pre~ dominantly Muslim areas and -Indian or State troops in predominantly non~Muslim areas; "(ü) The presence of troops-Pakistan, Indian or Stat~ould not afford any intimidation or appearam:e of intimidation to the in~ habitants of the State;" Article 2-A(ü) is the s~e as sub-paragraph 2 (c) (i), which was deleted. "(ill) The number of troops to he stationed . within the State shall be the minimum. Any reserve shall be locatéd outside the State bound~ aries." Any reserve may he next ta the boundaries but we suggest th.·1 it should be outside the boundaries. There is a redraft of paragraph 5. Instead of making it contingent upon the agreement of the two Governments, article 5 reaàs as follows: "The Governments of India and Pakistan. shall make available to and place under the direction and control of thè Commission armed forces in such strength as the Commission may consider necessary for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of Jaw and arder." The decision is left ta the Commission and, under our scheme, any forces that go into the Srate of Jammu and Kashmir, whether PaKistan, Indian or State forces, shall he under the COnltilete control of the Commission. That will give ünity of control. To sllb-paragraph 10(b ), for the purpose of clarification, we have added the following at the end of the paragraph: ". . . which"-that is to say, the Government of the State-"shall for this purpose de1egate the necessary powers ta the Administrator General." That is on.!y a drafting arra.l1gement. It imports nothing new. Article 10(c) retains in the first p~i.rt the orig'.nal suggestion contained in the draft of 30 March: "The Administratof General, acting through an Assistant chosen by hi.1l as his Depilty from a panel of neutral jurists prepared by the President of the International.Court of Justice . . ." It retaini' that draft, but we donot consider it so essential that we insist that the draft must he ". . . may appoint special magistrates ta deal at any stage, ta the exclusion of jurisdiction of the ordinary c~ " pour à dinaires That phrase we insist upon. It was contained in the original draft and we think that it is an essential part of the safeguards. sait qu'elle Then there is a certain redrafting, namely: tions: ". . . wit.."I cases which in the opinion of the Deputy have a bearing upon the proper condùct of a free and impartial plebiscite or wmch might in any way influence the free expression of opinion conceming or the free exercise of the vote in L'le plebiscite." ral plébiscite sion droit If safeguards are necessary, it will he agreed that this phrasing will make the objective more assured than the present, as' 1 have said, watered-down version of it. naîtra rance je Article 10(d) states, in part: "The terros of service of the Administrator General shall be decided by the Secretary- General of the V nited Nations after consultation with the Governments of India and Pakistan." après l'Inde mandat The draft resolution refers only to the Government of India. le Article Il has, in the first part, two slight modifications. In addition to "intimidation, bribery" and instead of "undue influence" it states: "or pressure on the voters in the plebiscite, and shall pubIicly announce this undertaking as an international obligation hinding on all public authorities and officials and other persans in Jammu and Kashmir." This includes the provision that others besides officiaIs must not interfere in the plebiscite. We have then added L~e sentence: tie, "intimidation, fluence membre raient plébiscite, gement liant tionnaires Jammu que res, sion la "The Adrninistrator General shall prescribe the law and the procedure to deal with such offences and the punishment therefor." sures légales délits passibles." néa devra de pour male." paragraphe statut pas notre cune. There is a slight modification to sub-paragraph 14(a) which adds the provision that people who were expelled from the State will be provided, upon their return, "with aIl necessary facilities and assistance for their rehabilitatian" by the State Government. The important modificâtion is in paragraph 16. J.have already suLmitted that the status and working functions of the representatives are not set out, alid article 16 of my ciraft resolution seeks to do that. .We add to the paragraph as it now stands, the following: "The representatives shaIl advise the Commission in all matters arising out of or connected with its functions and shall be entitled to take part in the meetings and discussions of the Council but shaIl not have the right to vote." That is to say, the decision shaIl always be me decision of the Se.:urity Cauncil. Our :œ.eaning may be expressed in a different manner; we do not insist upon this phraseology. Our meaning is that the representatives shalI have complete liberty to represent the full claims of their Governments to the Commission. We aIso add the sentence: "The representatives shall be responsiiJle for the carrying out by their respective Governments of aIl obligàtions arising out of the present Articles of Settlement and shaIl have the power to cause to be fulfilled by the State Government aIl such obligations." This stateInent requires an explanation. Obviously, the Pakistan Government will have undertaken obligations under these articles. :lts representative will be prese."lt to be caIled upon at once by the Commission, which might wish to say, "We have received this information and your Government ought to do this in the discharge and fulfilment of its obligations." With regard to the Government of the State, if it is to be constituted under article 6, it will he . Govemment representing aIl the political groups in the State. Therefore, both the representative of the Government of India and b'1e representative of the Government of Pakistan must jointly undertake the obligation to see that their respective State Governments fulfil their obligations. The represéntative of the GovernInent of India may say: "We wamed you against coalition government. It is this minister who was taken from the Muslim Conference who is not doing his duty with regard to this. We cannot do anything with him. We are unable to do anything with this minister from the Azad Kashmir Government. We told you they were insurgents and rebels. You said they were to be taken into the Government. We would nottouch them with a pair of tongs." But then, .if this happens, thëre is the repiesentative of Pakistan who will say, "You !lave got to ensure that the obligations are fully discharged." In case a situation of this type does not occur, we say that our provision is an in~ surance that oughtto be induded in order to make the scheme workable. l'The Government of the State shall forthwit.l} be reconstituted sa as to give equal representation ta each major political group in the Stateviz., the National Conference, the Muslim Conference and the Azad Kashmir-which will each be invited ta designate an equal number of responsible representatives to constitute a Couneil of Ministers. This Council of Ministers may choose one of its menlbers to act as President, but in the allocation of portfolios it will be guided by the advice of the Commission." It may be the advice of the Commission; it may be the advice of the Administrator General. We do not care which it is. However, in arder to make the Council function, in order ta ensure that it does not fail at the very first stage of our dispute with regard to portfolios, sornebody should,have the authority to advise and his advice should be accepted. There is a further correction, ta which my attention has been drawn. In the middIe of article 16, there appear the words "entitled to take part in the meetings and discussions of the Council". Obviously the word "Commission" should be substituted for "Council". There are slight changes of phraseology in other places. However, nothing turns on them and 1 need not take up the time of the SeC'Urity Council in drawing attention to them. This is a clarification and, in sorne respects, a modification in accordance with the views that 1 have just submitted.ta the Security Oouncil. This draft carries out those views, and we :submit that it is fair and impartial. Three-quarters of the amendments ta which 1 have drawn attention mere1y carry out the object of the provisions which are already in the resolution, but make them quite clear and make them workable. The rest of the amendments are, to sorne extent, modifications. However, they follow logically, so far as the military position is concern:ed, from paragraph 5, and sa far as theadmirtistrative position is concemed, from paragraph 6-if those paragraphs mean what they appcar to mean. .taine ln conclusion, 1 wish ta submit that neither 1 nor my Government nor my delegation is un- ~onscious of the gravity of the isst..:es involved III this matter. That is indicated by the mere fact that 1 have now been attending upon the Security Council for more than three monthsprimarily, no doubt,. for my own purposes, and not with any thought that 1 am thereby putting the Security Couneil under any obligation in these matters-although, while 1 cannot claim the experience and the standing and the ability of my friend on the other side of the table, J have nevertheleM undertaken, however inade- On the other hand, the Government of Pakistan is entitled ta ex.pect that the Security Council, which is the organ of the United Nations primarily charged with tho safeguarding of international peace and security, in approaching these questions at the stage at which an attempt is being made ta settle them by agreement -no doubt from the point of view of a compromise which may meet the views of both sides -and at the stage at which the Security Council has charged itself with the duty of producing workable, fair, imparJal scheme, will make that scheme as impartial as any that the wit of man can devise, OT, ta borrow the phraseology employed by the representative of the United States, as "free from the smell of brimstone" as it can possibly be. True, the Security Council has ta be occupied mainly with the different aspects of each question that cames before it. But it certainly has higher duty ta perform also. It has ta build up its own prestige and the prestige of the United Nations on a moral and ethical basis. 1 am not suggesting, by any means, that every me1!1ber of the Security Council is not fully conscious.of that aspect of its obligations. But 1 do submit that even when other things are equal, the final decision ought ta be swayed by those considerations and, with all respect, 1 submit that other things arè not equal here. 1 venture to sublnit-and 1 shall respect this as my last point ta the Security Council-that what we have asked· for is aimed at bringing about a fair and impartial field for the holding of a plebiscite. What is insisted upon by the representative of India is bound ta affect the impartiality and faimess of the plebiscite. If it does affect it, it can affect it in only one direction and cannot possibly affect it in the other. 1 submit, therefore, that if the revised draft resc>lution under consideration by the Security Council can be clarified and expanded in the directions which 1 have subInitted, my Government will undertake ta discharge such obligations as are laid upon its shoulders ta the utmost, to more than the complete satisfaction of the Security Council,. the Commissiun and the Plebiscite AdIninistrator, and my Government will go ta whatever lengths may be necessary·ta give complete satisfàction in every respect. - Claims have bcen made by the delegation of India that India is a peace-Ioving.State. 1 do not dispute that. They have said that India is not· only willing but eager to discharge its obli- .gations under the Charter. 1 do not dispute that. Ml'. NOEL-BAKER (United Kingdom): In view of the statements to which the Security Council has listened this afternoon, 1 venture to think that the Council would do weIl to adjourn its proceedings now and to examine the effects of thôse statements before it discus~;:.)the matter further. 1 beg, therefore, to move adjoumment. l'anglais): Conseil qu'il nant déclarations de séance. .The PRESIDENT 0 1 would suggest that we meet again to disc\Uss this subject on Wednesday aftemoon. pose après-midi. Ml'. ARCE (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): We shall 1)oon have been discussing the Kashmir question for four months. We have heard from both parties the most· brilliant expositions of all the arguments in favour of their respective cases. gnol): discutons avons les nécessaires 1 think, therefor~, that the time has come for the Cauncil, in the·firm belief that Article 24 of the Charter' must be put into effect, to close the general debate on this question and to start to consider one by one the different paragraphs of the resolution which has been submitted to us. le dispositions se .général men, tion If this procedural motion which 1 am presenting is approved, it will in no way restrict the freedom of members of the Council to express their views on each of the paragraphs of the draft resolution. 1 do urge, however, that it is time we finished with the Kashmir question. tion ne du jugeraient graphes sincèrement que Cachemire. effet; séance chaine lution l'étude paragraphe, ral déclarations rieurs. 1 therefore make a formaI motion as stated. 1 am making it before the present meeting rises, so that when we meet again next Wednesday we shall be able to proceed at once to settle the question itself, examining the draft resolution paragraph by paragraph, without any further speeches of a general nature, which so often contain repetitions of arguments or statements that we have already heard in previous speeches. sais raient étudier tion les projet Paki'ltan. tant demain, mais soit déjà être

1 should have thought that t~e members of the Security Council might have wlShed to have a little time to consider not only the joint revised draft resolution that has been submitted for their consideration, but also 1;ae r~marks made thereon today by the repre.<;cntatlves of India and Pakistan. 1 should have thought, also, that it could not be considered to he allo:wmg too much time"to invite the Security CouncI1 to have another meeting the day after tO?!orroW; but, of course, if the Security Council ~lShes otherwise, and if it thinks we have already dlScussed this matter sufficiently to enable it to take a considered decision the dayafter tomor- Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): This joint resolution was presented by six members of the Security Council, who were later joined by a seventh member. That number already provides the required majority for passage of the resolution. 1 think that ït would probably facilitate the work of the Security Council if the necessary number of votes were secured outside the meetings of the Security Council, and a resolution then submitted by a number sufficient for passage of the resolution. But 1 am not sure to what extent this method would be convenient for the procedure of the Security Council, unless those who present the proposal composing the necèssary majority of seven votes were ta prefer to fall back on their resolution if they were ta hear something new. But it would become rather difficult for the other representatives who did not panicipate in the preparation of that resolution \:) persuade the authors of the joint resolution to modify their attitude and ta take a new position on the subject. However, according to the present dtuâtion, as the representative of Argentina has suggested, and as the President himself has just suggested, this matter may be taken care of on Wednesday, because the subject has aIready been studied by seven of the members who have already expressed their views in support of this resolution and, accordingly, we have to accept their decision, although 1 do not approve of the way in which the decision was taken.

It ~as not my intention or my desire-land 1 feel 1 can speak for the other members of the Security Couneil who submitted this resolution-to restrict or abridge in any way the privilege of the members of the Security Council to discuss every one of its provisions. On the contrary, 1 very expressly stated that 1 should have thought they would desire a little more time in which to discuss the draft resolution itself and the statements made by the representatives of India and Pakistan-not on'v because 1 am fully aware of the importance of the matter but also because 1 realize it is only by coincidence, due ta the method that we have been pursuing in these conversations, that this draft resolution has been introduced by six membèrs of the Security Council, which amotints practicalIy to the required majority for its accer/canee; none of us is presuming, in any way, that the Security Counr:il has to accept it without d~~ consideration. 1 belleve that 1 need not give the Security Council any assurance as to that. 1 believe they are sure that it is so, very definitely. 1 not mur wapted to place the matter in the light Now that the .matter has come up, 1 should like to say that 1 canD.>t follow very well, as 1 could not on a previous occasion, the point of , view taken by the representative of India fe- , garding the diligence of the Security Council in this connexion. WileIi he left for India, on bis own initiative, he gave us his opinion that the _Security Council was fiddling while Kashmir was buroing: 1 had to call bis attention ta the fact that most of the rime that we have spent in t.'lUs discussion has been spent listening to the statements of the representatives of the two parties; that is, giving them the opportunity to acquaint the Security Council, with their positions and with their points of view. Now he seems to wish to withdraw the very generous remarks he made about tbe Security Council in the early part of bis statement. At the end of bis statement he intimated that the Security Council had put this dispute in cold lotorage for four months. May l, on behalf of the Security Council, call his attention to the fact that immediately after his return from India we took the matter up again,and with the utmost dispatch. Due to the very painstaking efforts of the previous Presidents of the Security Council-I believe 1 might be justified in saying particula:rly those of Ml'. Tsiang-.,..within a very few days we had the first joint draft resolution, which was apparentIy substantially acceptable ta the Indian representative. Mter more or less careful and lengthy consideration of the points of view of the two parties, two more draft resolutions were produced before 1 became President of the Security Council on 1 April. . 1 r ""1ediately called on the parties for intervie\' " lirst separately and then jointIy with the previous Presidents of the Security Council. On 5 April, 1 had the remarks of the Jndian delegati~n on the latest draft which had been subffiltted on 30 March; on 7 April 1 had ·the remarks of the representative of Pakistan; two or thr~ days afterward we had a joint meeting in whlch we decided to bring our recommèndations to the Security Council-that would have been 9 or 10 April; on 14 April we produced this drait. resolution, which was revised on several OCCaslOBS and distributed to the other members of the Council.· l do not believe it cau be justly claimed that we have been going slowly in this matter, that ~e ha~e not been giving it aIl the cime and con- . Slderation required, that we have not been However, after hearing the stat~ments of the parties, a'nd considering that they merit very careful consideration and that we might want to consider the'matter a little further before coming to a decision, 1 proposed that we should meet on Wednesday. Not on my own initiative, but at .the instigation of another member of the Security Council, 1 asked the representatives if they wanted to close the general debate, not because 1 thou.ght that was the most de$"able thing to do but because 1 wanted to know the pleasure of the Council. Mr. ARCE (Argentina): 1 fully accept the President's suggestion to discuss my proposal next Wednesday~

1 shall put the matter to the vote of the Security Council as to whether to close the general deb!'l.te and do as the representative of Argentina has proposed. Mr. TSIANG (China): 1 would humbly suggest that we now flimply adjoum. As tothe procedure that we shall adopt on Wednesday" let us discuss that and vote on that when we nieet onWednesday. . Mr. NOEL-BAKER (United Kingdom): second.that proposal. •

The meeting is adjoumed "Ve shall Ineet again on Wednesday,at 3.30 p.m. The meeting rose at 6.55 p.m. China-Chine Haiti-Haïti Max Bouchereau The Commercial Press Ltd. "Librairie "A 211 Honan Road Boîte postale SHANGHAI PORT-AU-PRINCE Costa Rica-Costa-Rica India-Inde Trejos Hermanos Oxford Book & Apartado 1313 Co. SAN JOSÉ Scindia House NEW DELHI Cuba La Casa Belga Iran René de Smedt Bongahe riaderow 1 O'Reilly 455 731 Shah Avenue LA HABANA TEHERAN Czechoslovaki:2. Iraq-Irak T cbécoslovaquie Mackenzie & F. Topic The Bookshop Naroclni Trida 9 BAGHDAD PRAHA 1 Lebanon-Liban Denmark-Danemark Librairie unive:;:'selle Einar .Munskgaard BEYROUTH Norregade 6 Luxembourg KJOBENHAVN Librairie J. Schummer Dominican Republic Place Guillaume LUXEMBOURG République Dominicaine Netherlands-Pays-Bas Librena Dominicana Calle Mercedes No. 49 N. V. Martinus Apartado 656-,.' Lange Voorhout CIUDAD TRUJILLO S'GRAVENHAGE Printed in the U.S.A. Priee in the United States: 50 cents