S/PV.287 Security Council

As was agreed at our last meeting [286th meeting], the first point to be dealt with is the selection of the two additional members of the Commission provided for in the resolution adopted at that meeting [document S/726]. Mr. PARODI (France) (translated trom French): If no one wishes to speak before me, l should like to say a ward on the composition of this Commission. You have just reminded us, Mr. Preside'J.t, that we have to appoint the two members who are to serve on it. l propose that we ask the representativc of Belgium and you yourself, Mr. President, to agree to your respective delegations' taking part in the work of the Commission. In our study of t.he question bef0re the Council, a particularly effective contribution has been made by the delegations of Beîgium and Colombia. l therefore think it natural to call on them and ask them to accept this task. Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (translated trom French): 1 will refer the matter to my Govemment. However, 1 fear that it will have great difficulty in giving its consent. The fact is that, at the present time, Belgium has only a cornparatively limited staff available, because it is taking part in the implementation of the recent European pacts.

1 feel highly honoured by the complimentary :remarks which have been made by the representatives of France and Canada concerning the nomination of Belgium and Colombia to form part of this Conp,ni!':lsion, and 1shall be very glad to transmit these remarks to my Government with the request that the invitation of the Security Council should be accepted provided the necessary personnel to undertake this heavy responsibilit)r can be found. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): 1 associate myself with the words of the Canadian representative in support of the proposal made by the representative of France. We have not forgotten the work So conscientiously and ably performed by Ambassador van Langenhove, nor the great value of the collaboration given ta the Council by Mr. L6pez, the . ex-President of Colombia. Consequently, 1think that the proposaI that Belgium and Colombia should be nrembers of the Commission was a very wise one; my reason for adding these remarks to what has already been said is the hope that they may influence the Governments of Belgium and Colombia, sa that these nominations may take effect.

The Security Council will now vote on the proposaI to add Belgium and Colombia to the Commission. A vote was taken by a show of hands. and the proposaI was adopted by 7 votes in favour with 4 abstentions. Votes for: Argentina Canada China France Syrk United Kingdom United States of America Abstentions: Belgium Colombia Ukrainian Soviet So,cialist Republic Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

.In connexion with the India-Pakistan question, we have three more Mr. VELLODI (India): The only thing 1 wish to say is that on Wednesday last [286th meeting] theSecurity Council passed a resolution concerning Jammu and Kashmir, an.d both delegations were requested by the President to commlL"1icate that resolution to our respective Govemments. May 1 suggest that, before the Security Council decides what it should do with regard to the further steps it should take in connexion with Junagadh, it might await the reactions of the Govemments regardingk-the resolutlon that has already been passed? Sir Mohammed ZAFRULLAH KHAN (Pakistan): The two matters are quite distinct from each other, although, of course, they have many features in common. . Both matters have been pending for a very long time. As the Security Council is aware, we were eager that the matter of Junagadh should be taken up as quickly as possible. Obviously, of course, the Security Council could deal only with one question at the time, and it preferred to conclude the consideration of the question of Jammu and Kashmir before taking up the question of Junagadh. While the Indian delegation was away in Delhi, the Securi.ty Council filled in part of the time i11 hearing both sides on the question of Junagadh. The matter is now ripe for settlement alcing whatever lines might be decided Thus, keeping the matter pending for a long time is causingserious prejudice in many respects. l should, therefore, very respectfully submit that the question of the reaction of the Indian Government ta the Kashmir resolution is scarce1y relevant to the speed with which the Security Council ought to setde the other matters that are pending before it. l submit that the Security Council should attempt, at its earliest convenience, l1aving regard to its other pre-occupations and duties, ta setde this matter by whatever procedure appeals ta it as being the most feasible. Mr. VELLODI (India,: l do not wish to take up too much of the Security Council's time, but what the representative of PakiStan said about the differences between the two cases is not very clcar to me. With the President's permission, l shall read out the last few sentences of the speech delivered by the representative of P;::k-::tn on 8 March 1948 [264th meeting], on the subject of Junagadh. This is what he said: . l'affaire "Our subrnission is that the Security Council is concerned with the question of principle. If, irrespective of the history of the matter, the principle is today accepted by the two Dominions that, in arder ta put an end ta the disputes between them over these two States, the question of the accession of each shall be decided by means of a plebiscite, then, in the name of all that is fair al1d just, let the plebiscite in each ease be free and unfettercd. Let there be a. complete removal of every suspicion that the plebiscite may have been brought about in such a way that the scales were weighted in the favour of one or other Dominion, or in favour of one community as opposed ta the other communities. That is th.e crux of the matter, both with regard ta Junagadh and with regard to Kashmir." That being so, the Security Council did resolve on Wednesday, 21 April 1948 [286th meeting], ta rec( rL1mend certain steps to the two Governm~nts which it thought ought to be carried out Wlth regard ta the conduct of the plebiscite in Kashmir. In the case of Junagadh also, it has suggested that the accession to. one or the other of the two Dominions would have to be setded by means of a plebiscite. A plebiscite has already been held, but if the Security Counc.i1 desires that another plebiscite should be held, under suitable ~uspices, international or otherwise, India has stated that it would be quite prepared to agree ta such a plebiscite. , Th~t is why l suggested that before the Secunty Council proceeds with this question of Junagadh, it might wait and see wh~t the reac-

If no ather representative wishes ta speak, l take it'that the Sec~rity Cauneil agrees with the remarks made by the representative of the United Kingdom, and 1 shauld'like ta add that the very words and the sense of the remarks made by the representatives of India and Pakistan are a hopeful indication that the reeommendations of the Seeurity Council may prove &<:ceptable ta them not only as a fair and just method of finding a solution ta the s:tuation in Jammu and Kashmir, but also as a basis for the setdement of the other question, that of Junagadh. Under the eireumstanees, it seems ta me that the Seeurity Council can confidendy expect that it would not have ta lose any time in proceeding with these other matters. Once the Security Cauneil has attained the beginning af an agreement, things will be easier and they will proceed more quickly. 1 am, therefore, glad ta aceept that suggestion, and 1 have the impression, as 1 have said, that 1 shall have the privilege of seeing the two Governments beginning ta work together in finding a solution to their disputes in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council. Sir Mohammed ZAFRULLAH KHAN (Pakistan): 1 take it that the Security Cauncil has acceptedthe President's suggestion and, as the

1 am entirely at the disposai of the representatives of the two Governments to discuss the matter with them separately in a preliminary way at the moment they wish to do so, and l shaIl try to get them together as saon as 1 hear that they are re~dy to proceed ta a joint meeting. Sir Mohammed ZAFRULLAH KHAN (Pakistan.) : So far as we are concemed, we could be at the President's disposal at any hour tomorrow morning that he might designate. . Mr. Mo' K. Vellodi, representative al India, and Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, representative of Pakistan, withdrew from the Council table. . 35. Continuation of the discussi~n on the Palest;ne quesiion Mr: AUSTIN (United States of Amèrièa): 1 think .that the reasons for the request by the United States ta have this item placed on today's agenda are probably fresh in the memory of ail the persons who are interested in tt-ô Palestine question and who are at this table. But, briefly reViewed, they are, first that the events in Pales- tine sinee the Security Council passed its trnce resolution a week ago [283rd meeting] give very little encouragement that truce conditions are bdng çomplied with; and, second, that it is vitaIly important for the Security Council to hear di- rectly, now if possible, from the representatives of the ·Jewish Agency, the Arab Highcr Com- mittee, and the mandatory Power, on the specifie ~teps which they have taken respec.tive1y in the nnplementation of the truée. Therefore,in tlie name of the United States delegation, 1 should ~e ,to ask the' representatives of the Jewish Agency, the Arab Higher Committec, and thP. mandatory Power, to indicate what steps th(;y have taken in that respect. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): In reply to the question which has just been put by the representative of the United States, 1 shall give y()U such information as 1 can to indi- cate what steps have been' taken by British 1 "You have just had read to you the text of the resolution passed at the Security Council of the United Nations on 1 April. 1 feel it my duty, as head of the Government in Palestine, per- sonally to convey to the peoples of Palestine this resolution, which is of the highest importance. ln doing sa, 1 would invite your attention to the fact that it was passed unanimously and without a single dissèp.ting vote from any of the eleven member States of the Council. "Further negotiations in the matter of the truce are still in the hands of the Security Council. 1 can, however, ask in the strongest possible terms, in conformity with the third para- graph of the resolution 'wüich calls upon the Jewish and Arab armed groups in Palestine to cease acts of violence forthwith, that the dispu- tants should cease fire at once. . "The case of Palestine is now to be reviewed by the United Nations. Those who might wish to continue with the policy of violence in face of the United Nations demand should think weIl of the damage which such action might do to their case in the deliberations to take place shortly. Furthermore, 1 would ask them to con- sider fully what possible good can come from the continuance of violence at this time when the future remains obscure and there is still the chance of peace. "Already many innocent lives have been lost, and much that has been achieved in the progress of many years has been destroyed. Would it not be wise to halt this process until at least it is seen what the future holds? "The tenus of the United Nations resolution calling for violence to cease forthwith are specific and categorical. The unanimity of the Security Council constitutes al) expression of the opinion of the world through au Organization on which the hopes oi those who earnestly desire peace in the world are centred. It is the duty of every- one who aspires to cb 'Ïlization to sustain the influence of this international body. That was broadcast by the High Commis- sioner, the local representative of the United Kingdom Government, whose sole desire, we were told this morning2 is ta create disorder and disturba.'1ce in Palestine. 1 think the broadcast speaks for itself. Since then, we have received a further mes- sage from the High Commissioner which says that he has issued the text of the tmce resolution -that is ta say, the truce resolution aï last Saturday-under a personal communiqué and message. Thus, the High Commissioner has dene bis utmost ta get negotiations going between the parties. But 1 am sarry ta have ta tell the Security Council that in a m~sage which 1 have received from the High Commissioner, which was sent off yesterday, he points out that it is almost impos- sible ta carry on any îorm aî direct negotiations, locally. That is due ta the fact that the responsi- ble heads of the respective agencies are here, and it is difficult ta get in touch with anyone ID Palestine, particularly on the Arab side. There are Jewish authorities in Tel Aviv. On the other hand, communications of all kinds, in Palestine, have deteriorated ta a point where it is extremely difficult ta conduct effective negotiations there. , The High Commissioner has therefore ex- pressed the hope that everything possible may be done here with the responsible heads of the two agencies. And, of course, 1 need hardly say that if it is possible ta bring them together in any way and ta promote negotiations with them and between them, the United Kingdom delegation would give any possible assistance that it could; if it were thought that that assistance would be heIpfuI. Perhaps 1 ought ta give the Security qpuncil, at this stage, sorne informàtion whiéh my delega- tion: has received since the Colonial Secretarv addressed the First Committee of the special sd- sion this morning [seedocument AjC.ljSR.123]. This relates ta the situation in' Haifa. The in- formation is ta this effect: ·that during the past week there has been a tendency for armed Arabs to infiltrate into Haïfa, and there were continu- ous Arab attacks on Jews during the four days The United Kingdom military authorities, neverthcless, intervened to bring hostilities tp an end as soon as these reached major proportions. British troops fired on the Jewish mortars with which the Arab population were being born- barded. The commanding officer of the Cold- stream Guards was wounded while assisting the Arabs to evacuate a hospital. Two other British officers were wounded while supervising the evacuation of the Arabs by sea. Meanwhile, the officer commanding did every- thing possible ta stop the fighting, by means of negotiation, and he himself presided at two meet- ings in an endeavour ta arrange a truce. Up to an carly hour this morning, the casualty list in Haifa was as follows: on the Jewish side, four- teen killed and forty woundedj on the Arab side, one hundred killed and one hundred wounded. The message goes on to say: "We do not yet know how many women and children are included in these figures, but it would seem that reports of the massacre in Haifa are exaggerated. The dimensions of the Arab evacuation of the City have aIso been overstated. There was already a tendency, before the ~vents of the past few days, for the Arab citizens to leave Haifa. The fighting has, of course, inte..'1si- fied this proccss, but the figures qucted b the Press are a considerable exaggeration." That shows, as the Security Conncil already expected, that the truce has not yet begun ta be reaEzed. From what 1 said earlier, the Security Council will have learnt of the difficul- ties which the High Commissioner has encoun- tered locally in trying to get negotiations going in order to have a truce established anà ob- servedj and the Security Council will, 1 am sure, consider what 1 suggl3ted regarding the possi- bility of opening negotiations here, perhaps under the supervision and regis of the President. 1 must here differ slightly, but only very slightly, from the explanation given ta the Security Council by the representative of the United Kingdom. 1 say l "differ ... only very slightly" because Sir Alexander Cadogan did admit that there is sorne difference in this regard between the Executive of the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committeej that is to say, a Mr. SHERTOK (representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine): 1 am quite prepared to reply to the President's question to the best of my limited ability. 1 say "limited ability", be- cause, in this matter of truce negotiations, 1 act as delegate of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. 1 should like to add that it is perfectIy true that travel conditions between Tel Aviv, where most of tIle members of the Executive are to be found today, and Jerusalem are difficult, and sometimes even e."<tremely ditIicult. Nevertheless, there is a permanent office-in fact, the head- quarters-of our organization in Jersusalem, and senior officers of the Executive are always avail- able ta' His Excellency the High Commissioner and to other officials of the Pale~tine Govern- ment, civil and military. 1 should also like to point out that, according ta our information, the Chairman of the Execu- tivc, Mr. Ben Gurion, went from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in a convoy which was attacked on the way but managed to beat off that attack successfully and reach its destination WitIlout I()!'t.<;e.<;~ tW(l or three days ago. For aW l kl'lOW, therefore, Mr. Ben Gurion may still be in Jeru- salem, and he is certainly available to His Excel- lency the High Commissioner. 1 come now to the substance of my reply ta the question put by the President. Immediately upon the conclusion of that memorable meeting of the Security Council which lasted into the small hours of the morning [283rd meeting], we communicated the results of the proceedings to the Executive in Jerusalem and inquired what the attitude of the Executive would be. 1 should like to recall that 1 reported ta the Security Council on the attitude of the Jewish Agency in the matter and specified the conditions under which the Executive of the Jewish Agency would be prepared to recommend the observance of a truce to the Jewish population and, as far as it lay in its power, to enjoin upon it the observancc of the terms of a truce [282nd meeting]. Not aIl of those"conditions were included in the reso- lution which was finally adopted by the Security Council. Nevertheless, we inquired of our col- leagues in Palestine what their attitude would be in the light of the resolution as adopted. That was done on 16 April. On 19 April, the Execu- tive replied by cable, indicating that on ~ J April -though this was not specifically mentioned in the cable, 1 assume this was in response to the appeal frc!U the High Commissioner which Sir Alexander O~dogan has Just read in full to the Security Council-Mr. Ben Gurion informed the Jamal Bey HUSSEINI (Arab Higher Commit- tee): The President will remember that, last Saturday [283rd meeting), after he had discussed the provisions of the truce as submitted by his delegation to the Security Council, 1 stated quite clearly that if these provisions were ta be imple- mented in their letter and spirit-and 1 remem- ber that 1 used the very words of Mr. Austin, that if the situation is ta be frozen politically and militarily-then we generally accepted the terms of the truce. On Monday, we were formally handed the terms of the truce as passed by the Security Council, and we instantly forwarded them to the Arab Higher Committee. According to my in- formation, the Arab Higher Committee has given orders that "if the other side agrees to these terms, then we will have to agree" and that, as a precaution, they have issued instructions that no large-scale fighting should be initiated on the Arab side. As a matter of fact, no big attack has been made by the Arabs. Yet, in the middle of the week, the Jews carried a large-scale offensive on the small community of Tiberias to the point where the people ofTiberias were obliged to leave the place. It may be-I am not' sure about this, but 1 take the words of the High Commissioner, as we have heard them from the representative of the United Kingdom-that, Haïfa being very bad1y situated, being overlooked by Mount Carmel and Hadar Carmel which are both in the Jewish section, and the Arab section heing mostly on the plain and along the sea shore, probably the Arabs did send certain men as a precaution ta defend the people of the port in case of an- other attack like that on Tiberias. On the part of the Jewish Agency, there was no sign of any de- sire to stop fighting. Our version of the events in Haïfa is quite dif- ferent from what we have heard from the repre- sentativc of the United Kingdom. This is our version: British troops suddenly left Haîfa and moved into the port area, without giving any indication of their movements to the people of the town, sa that precautions might be taken against any sudden attack. Suddenly-I am told . only a quarter of an hour after the British troops left the town-the Jews brought several big caterpillar tanks, which so far they had never used, into the town. Certainly, big caterpillar tanks cannot be put into the pockets of the Jews arriving from the sea as legal or illegal immi- grants. These big tanks must have been i:aken from the British army. When these big .nks swept into the town, there was certainly a good deal of confusion, and the Jews were able to occupy the main positions in the town. After several hours, the Arab population found that it was no use their fightin~ with the weapons they had, and so they decided to leave the town. Women and children proceeded in the direction of Acre. . We have never concealed the fact that we began the fighting. Wc began it because we were always under the impression, as we are now, that we we!"e fighting in self-defence. We therefore believe that we are quite justified. However, if the whole situation is to be reviewed and if the wrong is to be made right, then we should be the first to accept a truce. Ml'. AUSTIN (United States of America): The reports to which we have just listened confirm the impression of the United States delegation that further action is needed. It seems to my. delegation that, in addition to the reports which So that {>ur own agency may make a prompt report, the United States delegationis about to propose that a truce commission be established immediately. It seems to me that the most prompt, the most effective and the simplest way of accomplishing this, purpose is to establish a truce commission consisting of the representatives of those members of the Security Council, with the exception of Syria, which have consulates in Jerusalem. One advantage of such a commission-that is, a commission constituted accorcijng to the draft resolution which l hope to propose-is that its principals could work in Palestine and their assistants in New York; and expeditious hand- ling of this business could be achieved through their collaboration in New York and in Palestine at the same time. l wish to assure the President that the United States is quite agreeable to the suggestion which has been made in the Security Council that the President should, if he sees fit, take on such a responsibility and burden here in New York in addition to aIl his other important runctions; but our draft resolution is drawn up with the idea that while the assistants would be in New York, the principals on this commission would be in Palestine. Ai ûne of the informal meetings of the Security Council, l made a proposition similar tOI the one l am about to make here, but questions were raised at that meeting with regard to our pro- posal which seemed sufficient to cause us not to press such a proposition, and we did not. Sinl:e then the representative of Syrïa, at the last meet- ing of the Security Council, on this subject [283rd meeting], indicated that his Government would not consider it appropriate to participate in such a commission. Since this action by the representative of Syria removes, l believe, any reasonable objection to the proposal, l now wish to renew it forma1ly and l should like to intro- duce it in the following form: "Referring to its resolution of 17 April 1948 calling upon all parties concerned to comply with specifie terms for a. truce in Pales~ne in order to put an end to acts of organized criminal violence committed both by Arabs and by Jews in Palestine, "The Security Council "Establishes a truce commission for Palestine crRequests the Commission to report ta the President of the Security Council, within forty-eight hours, rf;garding its activities and the development of the situation, and sub- sequently to keep the Security Cauncil currently informed with respect thereto. "The Commission, its members, their assistants and its personnel, shall be entitled to travel, separate1y or together, wherever the Commission deems necessary to carry out its tasks. "The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall furnish the Commission with such personnel and assistance as it may require, taking into account the special urgency of the situation with respect to Palestine." 1 move the adoption of this draft resolution. Mr. PARODI (France) (translated trom French): 1 support the resolution submittcd by the United States representative. Moreover, at the time of the meeting that continued until rather late [283rd meeting], l, personally, was sorry that we dropped from our resolution the proposed provision to appoint a commission to assist in the implementation of the truce and to keep us informed regarding such implementation. 1 think the course of events now makes it necessary to have Tecourse to the organ then contemplated. The resolution now submitted to us c1early defines the task we expect this commission to perform. This task is both to keep us informed and to assist in the implementation of the truce, either by approaching the parties in order to give them a better understanding of it or to urge them to implement it, or by advising us on the possible redrafting of our resolution. As regards the composition of this commission, it would certainly be wise to use the services of men on the spot; first, because they obviously have a practical knowledge of the country and the problem, and also because they are the only persons to whom we can turn if we wish to set up a body within a very short time. 1 have ooly two rather slight reservations to make regarding the text submitted by the United States de1egation. My first reservation concerns the mana.er in which the composition of the commission is described. At our meeting last Friday [283rd meeting], 1 believe that the Syrian representative was the first to propose that we avail ourselves of the consuls serving at Jerusalem; at that time he pobted out that in order to facilîtate negotia- My second observation concerns "i:he time limit of twenty-four hours within which the new organ has tf 1 report to us. 1 find this period rather short; even if we telegraph as soon as possible, and even if the telegrams were to reach this body this evening or tomorrow morning, the members of the commission will have to meet; then they will have a Sunday before them. 1 will not insist on this point if the United States delegation does not share my concern; but the period prop9sed seems to me rather short. Subject to these two comments, 1 support the proposed text. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): 1 asked to speak in order ta say the same thing which the repre- sentative of France has said. 1 thank him for the diplomatie language and the i.llternational cour- tesy which he knows so weIl how to use. 1should like ta remind the representative of the United States that when 1 proposed this plan [283rd meeting], 1 did sa exactly in that way. 1 propose that the Security Council should propose that the commission be composed of the consular repre- sentatives of the United States, France and Belgium in Jerusalem, those who are there. Thus, it is not necessary to mention the exclusion of Syria so openly and sa bluntly; nobody would accept that. If it were don.e in that way, 1 should not accept it. But even if Syria were included, 1 would withdraw and say: We do not want to be included. The United Kingdom representative has just told us that the British authorities in Palestine sent a communication to both the Jews and the ...<\.rabs informing them of the Security Council's resolution calling for a, truce. But was a com- munication enough? The United Kingdom as mandatory Power should have taken effective steps to ensure the implementation of the truce. Ras this been done? No, the facts point to the contrary. At the Security Council's last meeting devoted to this question [283rd meeting], the United Kingdom representative, SirAlexander-Cadogan, said plainly and unequivocally that units of the Arab Legion would be withdrawn from Pales- tine. The following day we heard as clear and unequivocal a statement to the effect that addi- tional forees of the Arab Legion would be moved into Palestine. In this connexion, 1 should like to ask Sir Alexander Cadogan, the representative of the United Kingdom, what we are ta believt; his official statement, made on behalf of the United Kingdom Government, or the contradictory statement and actions of the King of Trans- jordan who is in the pay of the British, and who cannot take a step or make a political move without their permission? You have here two distinct and contradictory statements: first the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom Government in the Security Council, that in order to facilitate the fulfilment of the truce resolution, the forces of the Arab Legion will be withdrawn from Palestine. Second, the report received the following day contradicting the first statement; this second declaration was made by a persan who is under control of the United Kingdom Government in political, mili- tary and other respects. The game is hard ta understand. Does not this fact show that the United Kingdom am} certain other (}overnments have littleregard fOf tI~è Security Council's deci- sions and discussions concerning a truce and that Does not the fact that tb.e United Stàtes rep- resentative insisted on the inclusion in the. truce resolution of such points as the one regarding a political truce, indicate that the Government of the United States of America, while raising the question of a truce, had aIready decided to do everything in its power to wreck it? What has the United States done to secure a real truce? The United States representative has now again raised the question of a truce not for the purpose of securing a truce, but in Drder to have yet another resolution to use in his own political interests, in the interests of the Govern- ment of the United ~tates, which have no relation to an actual and real truce. The United States Government apparently wants yet another resolution so that it can then say that it is obvious that all the measures which are being taken, even those for a temporary truce, are of no avail; that only one course remains: trusteship. This is a political preparation for the attempt to gain such a decision on trusteeship or to struggle fo!" it. sim~lement poùr intérêts Gouvernement n'ont authentique Etats-Unis cherche manifestement une ensuite: prend même reste donc qui la sentée ce relative triste . de What does the United States resolution actu- ally propose? The establishment of a consular commission. It is assumed that this will be the next serious step towards implementing the Security Council's truce resolution. We have already had the sad experience of such a consular commission in Indonesia. They say that bad examples are infectious. To entrust the imple- mentation of the truce resolution to a consular commission which, incidentally, would be com- posed of a limited number of the member States of the Security Council who aIl share the same view on the question, would mean turning it in advance into a lifeless, dead resolution that is not destined to be carried out in practice. Therefore, this step is not an expression of the United States Government's concern to bring about a truce, but only the next "manœuvre" in the mobiliza- tion of aIl resources in order to prepare for the adoption of the United States proposaI for a Palestine trusteeship, and thereby to wreck the resolution of the .Iast General Assembly for the partition of Palestine. This is the only possible interpretation. It is high time, indeed; that we implemented the truce resolution. But we are very far from doing so, mainly because all the deciding coun- tries-the United Kingdom as mandatory Power (Ll1d the United States, which has revealed defi- nite interests in this part of the Near East-are Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (translated trom French): 1 ask the United States representative whether, in the second paragraph of bis resolu~ tion, he could not replace the words: "to assist the Security Council in bringi.'1g about the implementation of the resolution" by the follow- ing: "to assist the Security Council in supervis- ing the implementation, by the parties, of the resolution."

Does the representative of the USSR wish to speak? Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): 1 am prepared to yield the Hoor to Mr. Austin. 1 shall speak later. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): 1 thank the representative of the USSR for bis courtesy, and'! accept it. AIl 1 wish to do is to accept the proposal made by the representative of Belgium. Therefore, 1 strike out the words "bringing about" and substitute for them are word "supervising"; and 1 insert after the word "'impl.ementation" the three words "by the parties". Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): 1yielded my turn to the representative of the United States in the hope that perhaps he might define with greater detailthe attitude of the United States on the question of a truce. Unfortunately, however, he confined hin1Self to a relatively brief statement which, in my opinion, could not help to clarify thé situa.tion in Palestine. What is the position today with regard to the Palestine question? The position, which becomes ever more complicated, is that both resolutions adopted by the Security Council in connexion with the truce, are being ignored by those who bear and must continue to bear, the responsibility for the strife in Palestine between the Jews and Arabs. 1 feel that· the representatives of some countries, although they talk of a truce and of the importance of a trl1ce, really underestimate the gravity of the situation and, in any case, lose their gift of eloquenœ "1 al.lY reference to the causes of the actual situation in Palestine. The qu~stion arises as ta why both resolutions of the Security Council are being ignored. They are being jgn9red because they both have grave defe,cts; but their defects have nothing to do with You will recalI that, in the resolution adopted during the night of 16 April [document S/723], there is not one single proposal calculated to ease things in Palestine. The USSR delegation then came forward with two proposaIs. The first was to require the withdrawal from Palestine of armed groups which had entered that country from outside with the intention of resisting by force of arms the General Assembly's resolution on partition, while the second proposal was that, as a minimum requirement, the Security Council should order the stoppage of any further entry of such groups into Palestine. For alI those who realIy desire a truce in Palestine, these proposaIs and, in 3llY case, the second one must be regarded as a minimum which the Security Council should accept. How is it possible to arrange a truce, so long as armed groups and formations which have entered the country for the special purpose of waging war for the disruption of the United Nations' Plan of Partition of Palestine remain in Palestine, the more so when those who are responsible for this situation make no secret of their intentions but avow them openly? The decision ta calI a truce thus fell ta the ground because the proposaIs submitted by the United States were defective; they had no bite in them and sa they engendered toothless resolutions. The idea of a truce was good, but the. resolutions were ill-conceived and ineffective; therefore, they are being ignored by those who ought ta implement them. And what, if you plea'le, is the situation today? The fighting in Palestine is not dying down, but is continuing to spread. If we but follow the official communications received in the Council from the representatives of the Jewish Agency, the Arab Higher Committee, and from sorne of the Arab States, we cannat fail ta see that the fighting between Jews and Arabs tends to become more and more intensive. Jews and Arabs are paying with their blood for the inability of the Security Council to take more or less effective steps to ensure a return ta normal conditions hl. Palestine. True, the situation .in,Palestine is exceedingly grave, but it is aIso true that that situation has Involuntarlly many ask themselves also whether the poliey of certain Governments and, above aIl, that of the United States on the Palestine question a.re not to be explained by the fact that the existing situation in Palestine may well help the United States to obtain greater support in the General Assembly in putting through the new trusteeship plan. It is no mere coincidence that the United States delegation is already saying that these new proposaIs are ùesigned to put an end to the exceptional situation in Palestine. It is to be supposed that after a given meeting of the Security Council and, in any event, after the adoption of the next resolution the United States delegation will say to the General Assembly: "Now, you see, the Security Council has adopted yet another resolution, but nOthing will come of it as it aIso will be ignored. Therefore, let us have your speedy approval of the United States' proposals for a trusteeship for Palestine." There is no need to be a prophet in order to foreteIl that this will be the main theme of the United States representatives in the coming debate in the General Assembly. They have already embarked on this line of reasoning and argument. And as l have said Jews and Ara.bs are paying for it with their blood and lives. In this case, too, the representative of the United Kingdom may, perhaps, say that the arguments ofthe USSR representative are mere propaganda. He likes to repeat this assertion. My statements are but a record of actual happenings in Palestine and of the policy conducted by sorne Governments and more especially by that of the United States in their endeavour ta thrust upon the United Nations their own plans for Palestine which correspond to United States interests as they are understood by certain leading circles in that country today. It is very doubtful whether the people of the United States have acquired any benefit from the political game played by their Government in connexion with Palestine. It is still more doubtful that this game is to the advantage of the United Kingdom, France and sorne other Governments which trudge along in the wake of the United States in this matter. In arder ta make the resolutions of the Securîtv Council effective, it is now proposed ta set up 'a consular commission. In this connexion, 1 wish to add to the remarks of my Ukrainian colleague. What is this consular commission? Who will form part of it? Its membership will only include consular representatives of the United States, FraÎlce and Belgium. Out of "modesty" or for other reasons, Syria did not consider it advisable to belong to it, and there remain only three candidate countries, namely: the United States, France and Belgium. Now, the attitude of these three Powers stood out clearly in the case of Indonesia when their policy was ta force on the lndonesian Republic a one-sided agreement designed to crush the Indonesian national movement for freedom. le fera Syrie 1 donc que trois que imposé qui en facile la tâche qui ces libéral, de du ont commission tine. qui, tie adoptée,' elle These are three colonial Pm.vers which are expected ta bring arder to Palestine. It is easy to imagine what sort of order they will bring. In Palestine, where colonial conditions now virtually exist, arder will be brought by these colonial Powers in whose interest it is ta perpetuate colonial conditions. Can any sort of objective, progressive policy in favour of the Palestine population really be expected from these three Powers? Of course not! It is not astonishing that Ml'. Parodi felt sorne embarrassment at the fact that the United States resolution boldly proposed that only Governments with consular representatives in Palestine should be represented on the commission. It is symptomatic that such etnbarrassment was felt even by the representative of France who, when questions of a colonial nature are under discussion, is not distinguished for his moderate views. The adoption of this resolution, which must be regarded as a tactical manœuvre, would cel'- 1 do not want the United States representative and others to imagine from my words that the Union of Soviet &ocialiat Republics is asking for membership on the commission. That is not at all the case. 1 merely take note of the fact that the United States proposal for a commission is a logical sequence of the United States Government's attitude towards the Palestine question and a step designed to allow it to take over the whole question, including control over the truce. The United States already has a finger in the Palestine pie and now wants to put both hands into it. This is what is called justice and an objective approach in the interests of the Palestine population, although of course it is nothing of the kind. Here is no justice, no objective approach, no regard for the popula.tion of Palestine, but only a policy designed to protect the interest of one or two States as they are understood by certain groups in those States. The USSR delegation considers that it would be possible to settle the question of a truce only if an end were put to the machinations, open and secret, which are now being conducted daily and hourIy in connexion with the consideration of the Palestine question. These machinations creep into private conversations between Government reprr'sentatives and even during meetings of the Security Council. This fact certainly does not of course militate in favour of an equitable solution of the truce question. The delegation of the Soviet Union was and continues to be in favour of a truce in Palestine, but such truce must be founded on an equitable basis. Those who are responsible for the present situation must be called to order. Meanwhile, the Security Council is acting like a toothless infant only able to swallow United States resalutions, themselves inept and ineffective. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): 1 do not intend to de1iver a speech. 1 simply wish to assure the representative of the Ukrainian SSR that King Abdullah is neither a puppet nor a vassal of the United Kingdom. The representative of the Ukrainian SSR has proved that himself in stating that King Abdullah is making statements contrary and -ÎJ."'l opposition to the statement of the United Kingdom while he knows full weIl that General McNAUGHTON (Canada): 1 wish to support the proposal for a truce commission for Palestine which is contained in the ciraft resolution submitted by the United States with the changes of wording which have been indicated by the representative of France and as amended by the representative of Belgium. UP to date, conflicting reports, charges and counter-charges have been made by the parties. This is perhaps inevitable on account of their different points of view, and certainly this does not provide a sound basis on which the Security Council can proceed in future. Thus it is important that we should have before us information received from a body created by the Security Council itself for that purpose. We must have agents whq are available to undertake this task at once, who are impartial, and who are already fully aware of the complicated situation in Palestine. AlI these considerations are fully satisfied by the draft resolution submitted by the representative of the United States. 1 should like to make one further observation, and that is that the remarks made by the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in reference to the confused and belated information at present available to the Security Council add force and urgency to the adoption of this draft resolution. Mr. MALIK (Lebanon): 1 have a simple remark to make about the preamble of the draft resolution submitted by the representative of the United States. It speaks of "organized criminal violence committed both by Arabs and by Jews in Palestine". In order to create the best possible atmosphere under which this truce could operate, 1 {ail to see what advantage is gained by the words "both by Arabs and by Jews". 1 would therefore suggest that that phrase be omitted and that the preamble should only read: ". . . acts of organized criminal violence cornmitted in Palestine." 1 am quite sure that while the Arabs and the Jews do not agree on many points, they would both agree on the omission of their names from the preamble. Mr. SHERTOK (Jewish Agency for Palestine) : 1 have a few points to make and 1 hope to be able to deal with each of them very briefiy. First, 1 have a few purely factual observations on the statement made here by the representative of the Arab Higher Committee.• These observations are three in number: First, 1 agree with him that tanks cannot be carried in people's pockets, but 1 am afraid that sometimes tanks are carried in people's imagina- Secondly, with regard to Tiberias, our information is that, at Tiberias, a local truce was concluded between the Jews and' the Arabs; it lasted for two or three weeks, That truce was then broken on the Arab side, not by local Arabs but by armed Arabs who came from the outside, whereupon the J~ws proceeded to counter-attack in arder ta drive those Arabs out of the town. Thirdly, with regard ta the evacuation of Tiberias, and the subject of evacuation generally, 1 should like to s~y that the policy is for Arabs ta be evacuated or to evacuate themselves from Jewish areas. The initiative in this regard has not been taken by the Jews; it is purely an Arab initiative. It is partly being taken by the people themselves, but also by Arab national authorities and the Arab commando 'The first case of evacuation occurred in an area where the Arabs were perfectly peaceful and where the relations between them and the Jews were undisturbed. This was in the eastern part of the Tel Aviv area and in the surrounding Jewish colonies. Those Arabs were not in any way molested, and yet they were ordered to evacuate. Then came the evacuation of Tiberias, and finally the evacuation of Haifa. We believe-and we have grounds for this belief-that this is a deliberate poliey aimed at representing us-or, rather, misrepresenting usas the aggressors, using this as a slogan ta stir up feeling in the Arab countries, ta move people ta volunteer and ta impel Governments ta intervene in the fighting in Palestine in arder, as it were, ta save the Arabs from the danger of being persecutcd and even exterminated by the Jews. There was no pressure whatsoever exerted by the Jews which would have forced the Arabs ta evacuate. My second point concerns the statement made by the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. 1 am very much indebted ta him for having raised the question of the Arab Legion, a subject which is a 'source of unceasing and growing concern ta the·Jewish Agency and ta the Jews of Palestine. Perhaps the main point is not that the King of Transjordan is in this or that position vis-à-vis the Government of the United Kingdom. In our opinion, the main point is that the Legion is being subsidized by the Government of the United Kingdom by virtue of the treaty whieh now obtains between the British Government and the Government of Transjordan. The Legion is entirely maintained by .that subsidy, and the Government of the United Kingdom has the prerogative of appointing the commander of the Legion and other high personnel among its officers. It was for this reasoll that, in a letter which we addressed the other day to the President of ~evertheless, 1 should like to make it cIear that we are sincerely anxious, under any set of circumstances, ta enhance the chances of the observance. of a real truce and to minimize the danger of i18 violation. Imbued as 1 am with that anxiety, 1 should like to address an appeal to the United States delegation, and my appeal is' primarily directed to the deletion of the word "criminal". 1 wauld prefer to have the resolution without that word, if the United States delegation would only consider it possible; 1 think that the omission of that word would not be any detriment to the resolution. 1 do not think it is for me to comment on the other parts of it, certainly not on the composition of the commission. We made it cIear, at the last meeting [283rd meeting], that we would not like to see the mandatory Power alone entrusted with the charge of supervising the fulfilment of the truce conditions. But it is not for us to comment On the other hand, we believe that we are entitled to draw attention to this phrase in the preamble as it is liable to create quite an unnecessary obstacle to the fulfilment of the truce conditions-other things being equal-an unnecessary obstacle in addition to those which already exist and which are inherent in the terms as accepted. 1 do not know what the resolution will lose if the preamble were to stop at the words "for a truce in Palestine". My suggestion is that it should read as follows: "Referring to its resolution of 17 April 1948 , calling upon all parties concemed to comply with specifie terms for a truce in Palestine, "The Security Council etc..." What iS a truce in Palestine, and what is happening'in Palestine? 1 think this has been c1early indicated in the resolution itself to the full satisfaction of the United States delegation, but not however to tlie full satisfaction of the Jewish Agency. 1 speak here for the Jews. It is not for me to speak for the Arab side. It is true that acts were committed in Palestine during the present fighting by certain Jewish groups, acts which were not condoned but which were expressly condemned, as acts of political folly and human depravity. 1 doubt whether the United States delegation means to confine the truce to the discontinuation merely of those acts. What they mean to stop is all violence that is taking place today in Palestine. 1 do not think that it is historically correct, 1 do not think it is morally right to ascribe all those activities as being "criminal". For that matter, in any struggle of liberation violence is used. The last war, for that matter, may be termed as "criminal". It depends on the motives with which a people who are fighting are imbued, the motives by which they are actuated. The Jews believe that they are actuated today by the highest motives of patriotism and by an instinct of natiônal self-preservation. The use of the word "criminal" is bound to be revolting to their sense of justice, and, as 1 said, it is li2ble to create quite a gratuitous obstaele to' the observance of the truce, if at all, as 1 believe the truce will be' observed. This word is not necessaryat aIl. It is contrary to the interests of the truce to brand and stigmatize the present Jewish fighters in Palestine as "criminals". Jamal Bey HUSSEINI (Arab Higher Committee): 1 only wanted to draw the attention of the Secùrity Council to the ,word ~'criminal". However, s41ce the speaker before me has re~ Iieved me of the task, 1 am simply' adding my Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): 1 am very glad to see the progress we are making toward ag..reement, agreement between the parties and agreement among ourselves around this table. 1 count it a great privilege and an uplifting experience to be associated with the gentlemen who represent their ·different countries around this table. 1 feel that 1 am receiving an education every day, and today in particular. 1 never professed ta know what is calledthe "diplomatic language", and 1 must say that in the form suggested here, the draft resolution sàunds much better than it did in the original draft wmch we presented. Of course, you all know the friendship existing between the representative of Syria and myself, and how much 1 depend upon him for his wisdom. The representatives all kno,,' that 1 would not offend him or his country in any way, if 1 could avoid it. Therefore, it gives me a great deal of pleasure to accept all the amenaments that have been proposed and to try ta meet this lack of diplomatie language with sorne different language. The representatives have before them an amended draft resolution. 1 am going to ask the Security Council ta de1ete sorne words in the preamble of the original draft resolution. 1 wish ta strike out the rest of the preamble after the word "Palestine" in the third line. That will take out all these offensive words. In passing, 1 must say that 1 always abhor a preamble; what is left here cannot do any harm. ln the original draft resolution, the representatives will please strike out the words "except Syria", and in lieu of them, so as ta keep the same meaning, insert the following language after the word "Jerusalem": cc••• noting, however, that the representative of Syria has indicated that·his Government is not prepared to serve on the commission." Thereupon, the next sentence would start ",ith the word "The" and would read: "The function of the commission shall be to assist the Security Council in supervising the implementation by the parties of the resolution of the Security Council of 17 April 191:8;" Ta meet the suggestion made: by the representative of France, 1 suggest that weuse the wording "four days" instead of "forty-eight hours". If that is satisfactory, this will be the flnaI amendment and the amended draft resolution will then read exactly as it appears in the reprint, excepting for the preamble.

We are happily moving towards the end of these deliberations, and 1 Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (translated trom French): l am sorry, Mr.President, but as far as Iam concerned l can only accept the text before us.

l should like to ask the representative of the United States whether it is his intention that his draft resolution should supersede paragraph 2 of the resolution adopted 17 April 1948. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): Paragraph 2 of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 17 April 1948 reads as fallows: "Requests the United Kingdom Government, for so long as it remains the mandatory Power, ta use its best efforts to bring all those concerned in Palestine to accept the measures set forth ~der paragraph 1 above and, subject to retaining the freedam of action of its own forces, to supervise the execution of these measures by all those concerned, and to keep the Security Council and the General Assembly currently informed on the situation in Palestine." It is not the purpose of the United States draft to supersede that request. The draft resolution as presently framed and before the Security Council is as follows: "Establishes a tI'Uce commission for Palestine composed of representatives of those members of the Security Council which have career consulaT officers in Jerusalem, noting however that the representative of Syria has indicated that his Government is not prepared to serve on the Commission. The function of this Commission shall be to assist the Security Council in supervising 'J.~ agreement. Unless the President finds thatthis paragraph is in conflict with the other resolution, we should prefer to adhere to the language of the amended draft resolution. Mr. PARODI (France) (translat~d trom French): Mr. President, 1have only a few words ta say regarding the second point of your'amendment, that concerning the relations of the commission with the mandatory Power. 1 quite understand the purpose of the amendment you propose; but it seems to me that if we accepted your amendment we should meet another difficulty. The purpose of your amendment is, 1 think, to prevent any appearance of the commission having a supervi'iory task, extending even to the mandatory Power. However, if we adopt your amendment, it seems to me, that we shall come up against the opposite disadvantage, namely, that the commission will appear to be subordinate to the mandatory Power; this seems to be a difficulty, especially as it will consist of consuls or consular officers. If we have to accept this interpretation, it will certainly give rise to difficulty. 1 also consider it advisable for the commission to be given powers lasting, if necessary, beyond 15 May. In practice, 1 do not think that there is any objection ta the text oi the United States resolution, as there will certainly be no difficulties between the mandatory Power and this consular commission. The consuls are weIl acquainted with the representatives of the mandatory Power and there is every possible reason why conditions should be entirely favourable. Consequently, for my part, and unless the United Kingdom representative sees any objection, 1 prefer the original text to the amendment that has been proposed. . Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated trom Spanish): If 1 may rely on the profundity of my knowledge of the English language, 1 might perhaps facilitate a compromise bctween the two resolutions by proposing that the word "confirming" be substituted for the words "referring to" 1 in the first line of the preamble. . First, l do not find that there is any contradiction, but 1 do find a very clear duplication. Secondly, the mandatory Power has appeared to be very je-.:1ous at all times of each and every one of its prerogatives, rights and duties in Palestine. In the case of the truce commission, 1 think we should have a commission which would not be connected with the mandatory Power in Palestine in any very clear way. In addition to that, 1 must say very frankly, almost as a matter of principle, that 1 am not very mucb. in favour of stating in a resolution like this that one of the members of the Security CounciI, which has a career consular officer in Jerusalem-and Syria happens to meet both requirements-has indicated that it is not prepared to serve. Ordinarily, 1 should have imagined that it would have been more in line with what îs usually done not to mention that fact, but, of course, 1 do not want to make a point of this. 1 shall simply refrain from accepting that text. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): If it would help the Council at all, 1 will at once recall that my delegation voted for the resolution of 17 April; my Government regards itself as bound by L~at, and is prepared .to vote for this tesolution in its amended form and would regard itself, of course, as equally bound by that. As far as 1 can see, there is no conflict between the two resoIutions. 1 regard one as supplementing the other. Indeed, 1 remember that when we discussed the resolution of i 7 April, originally, a paragraph 4 was proposed which failed to secure enough votes. .,It disappeared and left a gap. 1 regard this resolution as filling that gap. It is perfectly acceptable to my Government as it stalids. We should consider ou'rselves bound by bott of Them. T}1e PRESIDENT: We shall proceed to vote 011 the proposal. As no member of the Security Council wishes to have this reso~dion voted upon paragraph by paragraph, the Assistant Secretary- General will read the resolution. ~ Mr. SOBOLEV (Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Security Council Affairs) : The resolution [document 8/727] as amenn.ed, reads as follows: "Referring to its resolution of 17 April 1948, ca11iD.g upon all parties concerned to comply '\\oit" specifie terms for a truce in Palestine,

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