S/PV.288 Security Council

We will dispense with the French translation. Mr. PARODI (France) (translated trom French): It is very late, and 1 shall forego the French interpretation of the statement made by the representative of the Ukraine in order to take time, without unduly delaying the proceedings of tIle Security Council, to comment once again on his remarks. , 1 do not really like particularly the type of historieal palemics in which the representative of the Ukraine has been, indulging for the past month. Moreover, 1 thought that that discussion had been c1osed, for two meetings have since been held at which the representative of the Ukraine did not feel the need to revert to what had heen said on 31 March [276th meeting]. However, since he is reverting to the subject after a month of rl"llection, 1feel once again that 1 owe him a reply. 1 shall again be very brief. The Ukrainian representative has taken great pains and has done extensive historical research. His efforts seem rather futile; they have resulted merely in revealing the well-known historical fact that France did not entêr the war in 1938, at the time of Munich. 1 do not think that' the Ukrainia..~representative has added rnuch to that simple facto On this point, the Ukrainian representative contends that we miscalculated and that we were actually in a better position ta wage war in 1938 than we were in 1939. That is a statement of opinion which may be defensible. However, the reproach which he has levelled against my country has no beanng 'Whatsoever on the matter. The issue is not ta determine whether we miscalculated; it is rather ta determine whether he bas any right to reproach us for failure in our duty. My previous answer to him still holds. While w;e did not enter the war in 1938 because we felt that we were not prepared, we did declare war a year later, in entirely similar c..ircumstances, and the only reproach he is eütided ta make is that we delayed action for a year. That was not the most important point in my previous reply ta the Ukrainian representative. 1 recalled other factors which he has failed to mention..1 said that, even if we admitted that we were wrong ta take out insurance by delaying . our entry into the war for one year, it seemed ta me that the USSR had taken: out very different insurance: not only had it delayed entering the war at that time;·it had concluded a treaty with Hitler and partitioned Poland. 1 may have misunderstood the English interpretation, but 1 do not think that the Ukrainian representative has answered that in the course of his lengthy reID~"ks. If 1 failed ta understand the English, 1 should not have foregone the French interpretation and 1 shall have ta ask for it ta be given. 1 have oot undertaken such extensive research as the Ukrainian representative, but 1 should like ta add the foHowing to my previous remarks on the m~tter. If 1 have understood him correcdy, and 1 am not sure that 1 am quoting him exactly, as 1 did not have the Frenchinterpretation, my Uk;rainian colleague· bas just said that the Government of the USSR was the only one which protested at a given moment-I do not remember just when -against the events which had taken place in Czechoslovakia. 1 simply want ta add this: on 15 December 1939, the Foreign Minister of the USSR informed the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Zvenek. Fierlinger, that the USSR would no, longer recognize him as the official representative of his country, thathe must terminate bis functions andevacuate the Czechoslovak legation from Moscow by 1January, that , is, within two weeks. Mr. Fierlinger did, in fact leave Moscow afew days later and, upon orders 1 think that was aIl 1 had to say and l do not wish to take any more of the Council's time to recall historieal facts. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated trom Spanish): These historieal reminiscences are very interesting, but thcy should not make us forget that we have business on hand. As it seems that there are no further speakers on the list, 1 wowd request that in accordance with the last pan of rule 38, a vote be taken upon the proposal made 'by the representative of Chile-at which of our previous meetings 1 do not remember [281st meeting]-regarding the necessity or advisability of appointing a sub·committee of the Council, which l propose should consist of three members, to coUect relevant information on this case. Let us finally try to finish with· this question of Czechoslovakia! That is the suggestion 1 wished to make. Mr. GROMYKG (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): 1 do not propose to speak at length, since the position of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has already been made clear on several occasions during the course of the debate 01;1 this question. l wi..sh to say o!'ly a few words L.'1 co:nne.~on ,.yith the explanation which the representative of France has sought to give this meeting. In the debate, reference has been made not only to France and the United Kingdom, butalso ta the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 1 tao, therefore, am obliged to give some explanation and to say a few words to the meeting. The representative of France, Mr. Parodi, and, as usual, thè representative of the United Kingdom, do not like it when the USSR representatives speak of the years 1938 and 1939, and they show special aversion to any reference tQ those pre-war years which caU up memories of events in Czechoslovakia at that time.· We fully understand why the French and British representatives dislike allusions to 1938-1939 in connexion with Cze.choslovakia. The dislike of such allusions is not confined to the representatives of those countries on the Security Council, but is shared by the Governments of those countries and by the present-day ruling circles there, be- -cause those ruling circles are essentially the same as those which once betrayed Czechoslovakia to Hitlerite Germany. . It would be too much to expect the representatives of those countries to get up in the Security Council and declare: "Yes, in point of fact, the rllling circles of France and the United Kingdom, c:ncouraged by the United States of The representative of France said that the representative of the UkraÏnÎan SSR might reproach France with having made faIse calculations, with ha'ling failed ta see things as they were, and with the fact that in 1939 France was in a less favourable position as regards Germany than in 1938, but that no one could blame F'rance for having failed in its duty, 1 repeat: no one could blame France for having failed in its duty. We, however, do reproach Fr~nce for the fact that it failed in ils dutY and did not fulfil the obligations which it had undertaken in respect of Czechoslovakia. If the French representative took the trouble to read through certain historical documents in the French Foreign Office he would be convinced of the truth of the accus~tion that Fr~ce, together with a number of other countries, betrayed Czechoslovak interests and the Czechoslovak people. That is proved by irrefutable documents and historical facts which cannot be denieèl by either the French or the United Kingdom representatives, however much they might like to do so. It is not necessary to go ta the Foreign Office in Moscow for such historical data and documents, for these are aIso to be found in Paris, London and ·Washington. Let the representative of France-and 1 give the same advice to the representative of the United Kingdom-read what is s~d on this subject in the. memoirs of Winston Churchill, who certainly knows something about the question and who may be accused of anything you will, except of being sympathetic towards the USSR. Let them read the relevant part of those memoirs and they will see that France and the United Kingdom betraycd Czechoslovakia in the same callous manner. The Ukrainian representative referred to an ultimatum which the British and French delivered to Benes before CzechOfllovakia was handed over to Hitler on a platter. Can that .ultimatum be a.lgnt dse but historical fact when it is remembered that the Czechs were told that, if they aècepted help from the USSR, war would result against theUS8R-or, as it was then said, against bolshevism-and that France and the United Kingdom would he bound ta take part in the holy crusade against the USSR? It is probably true that at that time French diplomacy, trying to outwit British diplomacy, delivered an -ultimatum çral1y and not in writhïg. In a11 this matter, highly tr-a1."led, experienced British diplomats were not a match for the French; the United Kingdom submitted wrltten documents and the contents of these documents are known. .1 have no doubt that they are to be found in the French Foreign Office, in the British Foreign Who is to blame for all this? The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics? No. France and England are to blame. However disagreeable it May b~ to Iisten to historical facts, the facts still remain. And even if the representatives of France and the United Kingdom have no documents in their possession at present, they are still faced with the tacts. Facts CaJ."'1Ilot be destroyed-if 'driven from the mind, they still exist and have a habit of returning. Mr. PARODI (France) (translated from French): 1 wish to comment on oruy one point L.'1 the remarks of the representative of the USSR. If 1 understood him correctly, he said that we did not like to hear the representative of the Ukrainian SSR and himself refer to the period froin 1938 to 1939. That is not quite true. Rather, we feel that they are the last persons liere entitled ta recall the events of that period, which is not quite the same thing.. 1 want to assure the USSR representative that if my country had made a pact with Hitlerite Gerrnany-which, of course, would have been impossible hecause France is a democracy and public opinion would not have allowed such'a move-I should certainly find it very unpleasant to he' reminded of it. If 1 .were the representative of the USSR, 1 . would probably refrain from comment on that point, as have the representatives of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR in this and previous meetings. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): 1 do not know what the :ruliÎ1g of the President would be, but 1 must say that 1 should think that this historie discussion, which has been of considerable Înterest during the last three or four meetings, has very little bearing on the case under examination by the Security Council. 1 do not mind the representativeof the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics referring to 1938 and 1939.1 am oruy surprised that he addsthe latter year. 1 have been reading with great interest the As we say in our country, "Two blacks don't màke a white". 1 consider that all the time of the Security Council has been very nearly wasted in this historical discussion. 1 should think that the Security Council ought to try to close that .discussion and get on to something practica1. There is only one reservation 1 should make, if the President will allow me, that is that the representative of the Ukraine has evidently heen using the interim betweeD. meetings of the Security Council, as some representative said, for historical r~earch. He went into a go04 deal.of detail. He quoted documents. Some of them were very unfamiliar to me and 1 reserve the right "myse1f, to conduct a little historical research and, if 1 find that the documents were incorrectly quoted, of course 1 shall res~r;ê my right at a later meeting to come back to that subject and give the proper version.

1 feel that all the members of the Security Council have had ample opportunity to present their historical and other views, . and in accordance with the request of the representaûve of Argentina, 1 intend to put the resolution ta a vote. Mr. NISOT (Belgium) (translated trom French): 1 should like to justify my vote. The Belgili.'1 delegation attaches great importance to respecting the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 4, of tlie Charter, which it considers one of the basic principles of the United Nations Organï- zation. That is why it feels that the allegations made by the Chïlean delegation require serious consideration. They are serious charges. But the more serious the charge, the more important it becomes to determine whether it is fully justified.. , The. draft resolution before us in no way prejudices the·substantive solution of the problem. It entails no judgment on substance; its purpose is merely to elucidate the facts which are sufficiently well-known to the Council. Any position which the Security Council may take must be conditioned by that elucidation of facts, particularly in determining whether the Council is competent to dealwith the matter. 1 shaU therefore vote in favour oi the resolution sub- Initted by the Chïlean delegation. The PRESIDENT: We shall now proceed to the vote. The Assistant Secretary-General will read thetext. . "Whereas, during the debate which took place in the Couneil, the existence of further testimonial and doeumentary evidence in regard to such situation has been announeed; "Wh.neas the Seeurity Couneil considers it advisable that such further testimonial and docun:.entary evidence should be heard, . "Therefore, to this end and without prejudice to any decisions which may be taken in accordance with j:\rticle 34 of the Charter, "The Security Council resalves to appoint a sub-conurdttee of three members and instructs this sub-committee to receive or ta hear such evidence, :~tatements and testimonies, and to report to the Security Council at the earliest possible time." , ·Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chïle) (translated fnm Spanish) : Mr. President, in the original proposal , submitted by the Chilean de1egation [281st meeting], 1 left open the number of members of this sub-committee because 1 considered that it was for the Security Council to determine thenumber. Three is the number proposed by the representative of Argentina, and should notbe considered as part of the Chilean proposal. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): 1 consider that this draft resolution is not of a J!rDccdural nature, but concerns the &ubstance of the question. The' voting procedure to 'be followed should, therefore, be that which applies to draft resolutions concerned witi· -uatters of substance. Possibly the representative of Belgium hol~ another opinion and he·is entided to do so, but 1 venture to disagree with bis interpretation. As there is a divergence of opinion among us on this matter, 1 propose that we should first decide whether or not this is a procedural matter. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): In the opinion of the United States, the draft resolution before the Security Council to establish a sub-committee is clearly a procedural decision. It is a decision undet Affide 29 of the Charter, . not under Chapter VI. The Charter contains a clear indication that this type of matter is procedural. Article 29 is one of the five articles in the portion of Chapter V of the Charter entitled "Procedure." Consequently, under the language We should aIso note that the Four-Power Statement' itself recognizes the establishment of a subsidiary organ as a procedural decision. Part l, paragraph 2 of the statement provides: "For example, under the Yalta formula a procedural vote will govern the decisions made under the entire Section D of Chapter VI."- This section of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal is equivalent to Articles 28 to 32 inclusive of the Charter and of course inc1udes Article 29- "This means that the Côuncil will, by a vote of any seven of its members, . . . establish such bodies or agencies as it may deem riecessary for the performance of its ftinctions." It is quite obvious that this express provisi?n in Part 1 of the Four-Power Statement was mtended to cover a situation such as is now before us. If· it does not caver this situation it has no meaning whatever. 'See Documents of the Unit"d NatioJ!s Conference on International OrganlZation, San Francisco, 1945, volume 11, page 711. The d{;cision in that c·ase was either a decision under Article 29 of the Charter or under Article 34 of the Charter. If it was under Article 34, the United Kingdom should not have voted. If .it was under Article 29, 'the matter was procedural and it was therefore legitimate for the United Kingdom to vote. The decision to allow the United Kingdom to vote was clearly a decision that a motion to set up a sub-committee is procedural in nature, not substantive. It is a c1ear precedent for the issue b~fore us. We believe that it is beyond question that the motion before us is a procedural matter and should he determined by the votes of any seven members of the Security Council. , 1 a See Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, volume 11, page 711. This means that there is disagreement between us on this point. 1 am not interested in how the resolution will be styled or how the committee will be named by ~qse who desire to establish it and to carry out investigations, but l am concerned with the substance of the question of the proposed committee and the activities which it will have to undertake in virtùe of the resolution if it is adopted. ln view of the disagreemeIit which has arisèn, we should follow the procedure adopted on several occasions in the pasto We should follow the San Francisco Declaration of the Five Powers, to which I. have already referred. The last paragraph cf that Declaraûon reads as fol· lows-'1 quote: "In this case"-and this refers to L~e position described in previous paragraphs which, for the time being, 1 will 19nore, quoting on1y the last paragraph~ whlch is in direct relation to the question under discussion-"it will be unlikely that there will arise in the future any matters of great importance on which a decision will have to be made as to whether' a procedural vote would apply. Should, however,' sucha matter, arise"-and such a question has in fact ar:isen-"the decision regarding the preliminary question as ta whether or not such a matter is procedural must be taken by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, ,inc1uding' the concurring votes of the permanent members." 1 repeat: ccincluding the concurring votes of the permunent members". That is the voting pJ:ocedure. This Declaration --and there is no need for me 'to remmd you of it-is in itself an obligation binding on the part of United States of America; the United Kingdom: China, France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This obligation we have accepted, we still accept it and we cannot but abideby it in the future. It is a part of the" general obligations accepted by these countries in connexion with the drafting and ratification of the Charter. Since there is disagreement between us on this question; let us follow the procedure which 1 have outllned-aprocedure which wc have followed so far and which we are obliged to follow in such drcumstances. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): 1 wish to comment on whether this matter is a substantive or proced.ural one. The staternent of the representative of the Soviet Union was correct in that this agreement in San Francisco did take place in ·See Doc"m~nts 0lthe Unitlld Nations Conference on International OrganlZation, San Francisco, 1945, volume 11, page 714. ' , In this case, having regard for common sense and the conduet of business of the (Security COlmcil, 1 consider that the constitution of subcommittees for the purpose of studying, factfinding and reporting on a matter ta the Security Council is a procedural matter. 1 cannot imagine that it is otherwise. It is not a decision on substance. In the past, 1 have said' that, if .we make this study through a sub-committee, it will give us the opportunity either ta dismiss the case altogether, in that it is out of our competence or that it is not well-founded and nothing has be~n proved, or ta take other measures. This is the conduct of business which makes it ohligatory for the Security Council to take such steps. Therefore, l hope that no obstruction will be based on this point. It would then be a precedent for other matters, and the ,work of the Security Council would become more an.d more complicated. 1 consider this matter a:. a procedural one, and 1 shall vote in ,favûur of its being treated as such. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chïle) (translated {rom Spanish): Mr. President, after hearing the comments of the representatives of the United States and of Syria, it seems to me quite clear that tbis is a question of procedure, and 1 am going to add a few remarks. 1 drafted the resolution i'l question in such a way that it 'could easily be seen that it did not raise a question of substance, and in submitting the case of Czechoslovakia to this Council 1 said that as we ourselve~ had no direct sources of information, we wished to suggest to the Council various means of collecting evidence; one of these was ta hear Mr. Papanek, the repréSentative of Czechoslovakia. We subsequently added that it would be advisable to hear witnesses whom he offered to produce, so that they might aIso 8uhstantiate his grave assertions. 1 did not wish to request that these witnesses should speak befo:re the Council itself, as Mr. Papanek had done, because that would have taken up much of its time; this was my only reason for proposing the appointment of a sub-committee to hear the statements. The representative of the USSR has openly 1 ~ounced that he will apply biS veto; that is to say, he will make use of the privilege granted to him by the Charter, and state that this is a question of substance: that what is white is black. If he takes this decision it is his own affair. It will be one more proof of the ingenuousness dis:' played at San Francisco by the representatives of the small nations when they approved the unanimity rule in the Security Coundl for certain questions of importance.. For 1 have already said, and so have several other representatives, that we gave then a real vote of confidence to the great Powers, inasmuch as this provision impaired the principle of the legal equality of nations. If the representative of the USSR adopts the attitude he has announced, the Council will again witness the open abuse of the confidènce shown by the small nations at San Francisco. And besides being an abuse of confidence, this attitude is pointless. We never thought that we should really get the Security Council to take measures regarding Czechoslovakia against the wishes of the USSR, for we weIl knew ~at in that case M:r. Gromyko could use bis veto. Our only desire was that certain facts should appear in the official records of the United Nations, in order to prave that we came here to speak the truth. These facts will remain in the official proceedings of the United Nations; theyarealready in the records. Thus, besides being an àbuse of confidence, as 1 havesaid, this attitude is pointless. 1 reserve the right, in case the situation arises, to request the Security Council to take other . measures on this matter. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics now bases his position on Part II, paragr~ph 2 of the Four-Power Statement at San Francisco of 9 June 1945," and requires a vote on the question of whether or not this matter is procedural. He seeks thereby to veto the indication of the Charter that the matter is procedural. Part II, paragraph 2 of the Four- • See Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Orgamzation. San Francisco. 1945, volume· 11, page 714. As 1 have pointed out, the Charter itself contains a clear indication that this type of matter is procedural. The express provisions of Part 1 of the Four-Power Statement are to the same effect. It is quite obvious that it would be a misuse of the Four-Power Statement to J:esort to the preliminary deternùDation under Part II, paragraph 2 for th~ express purpose of evading 'the provisions of Part 1 of the same statement. To hold otherwise is to make ridiculous Part 1. AIso, the effect of such a' contention is to minimize the area governed by prôcedural votes under Article 27, paragraph 2 of the Charter. This section of the Charter has no meaning ifit is possible for a permanent member of the Security Council to prevent utilization of the voting procedure contemplated in this connexion on any question without regard to the usua! meaning of the word "proceduraI", and without regard to the clear indications in the Charter of those matters which were intended to be proceduraI. Under such an interpretation, Article 27, paragraph 2 might just as weIl have been omitted. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated trom spanish): It is a pity that 1 have to speak 3.t such a late hour, when the historical dissertations must certainly have tired our good interpreters. Good sense has been mentioned and indeed, this is merely a matter of good sense. It is obvious that we are deaIing with a question of procedure, and 1 cannot understand what rea- . sons the USSR representative can have had for pr.esenting.the matter otherwise. It is public knowledge that 1 think, speak, write, and work by every means at my disposai against the veto, and an excellent opportunity is now offered to me to speak again against this provision of the Charter. If the Security Council were to accept the view that the question under discussion is one of substance and not of procedure, the unfitting and unjustifiable nature of the privilege granted to the five great Powers would really be clearly shown. Not only would the. inconsistency with legaI principles be apparent, but also the inconsÎ&tency with good sense. With regard to good sense,to which the representative of Syriareferred a few moments ago and to which 1 refer now, 1 would like to point out that good sense, Iike common sense, is apt to he the least common of an senses. sens, mainten?.i.lt, bon du But even on the assumption that we should take account of the statement in question, which I haverepeated1y studied and can well remember, I would like to point out, not only because of what the United States representative has said with regard to Part Il, paragraph 1, to the effect that the Charter cleady establishes when a qu~­ tion, is pl'ocedural and when it is substantial, that although Part I, paragraph 5, of the statement reads: "To illustrate: in ordering an 'investigation, the Council has to consider whether the investigation ... might not further aggravate the situation", in.thi& case there is no question, of. deciding on an investigation. It is obvious, therefore, that even in the light of this statement the question we are now considering is one of procedure. The Charter, which is the only document :hat binds us, and which we have formally sworn to respect and enforce, aIso clearly established in Article 27, paragraph 2, how a vote is to be taken on a question of procedure such as we are now considering. It has been mentiOl:ied during the discussion~ I believe by the United States repw:~ntative, that Article 29 empowers the Council to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary . .for the performance of its functions. What l-;as not been said is that there is no. lack of argum.entswhen th~re is a desire to argue; and there has beenJack of a speaker to maintain that this. Article refers only to the committees of the Seeurity Council, snch as the Committee on the Admission of New Members, the Committee of Experts, etc. If that were the case, 1 might well " See Documtmfsoj the United Nations Conference on International Organlzation, San Francisco, 1945, volume 11,pages·71l-714. But 1 am not going to make such a proposaI, for we are members of an organ of the United Nations, and the world is watching us; such a proposal would be a farce which 1, for my part, cannot entertain. 1 will confine myse1f to stating that just as the Security Council set up the Committee of Experts, so it can appoint three of its members to collect infonnation on the Czecho- ,slovak case which has been brought before the Council before we begin to discuss the case itse1f, to give it due consideration or to adopt a resolution regarding it. 1 must add that the Charter offers us an interpretation that may ha.ve been overlooked by the distinguished representa.tivè of the USSR for all 1 know, but which. 1 consider conclusive. The Cha.T1:er is a single document, and the legal interpretation of all such documents of public law must be made in accordance with known and predetermined rules, one of which is the coordination of the varions provisions. In the Security Council, there is no established procedure for settling any doubt as to whether a question is proceduraI or not; but in the General Assembly there is such procedure. Indeed, Article 18 of the Charter states that when the General Assembly is in doubt as to whether a question is important or not (a majority of two-thirds being required in the former case and a simple majority in the latter) the decision shall be made by a simple majority. This is good sense, for otherwise, if a two-thirds majority were necessary even to decide whether a question is important or not, the Assembly would never reach a decision in these cases. Now Article 18 is a part of the Charter, even though it is not mentioned in the statement of the four great Powers. It is a part of the legaI document that binds aIl States Members of the United Nations. Consequently, 1 maintain that if there is any doubt as ~o whether paragraph 2 or' paragraph 3 of Article 27 is applicable, the majority required to settle that doubt is only any seven votes, so that there ma)' be some conformity between the provisions governing the Security Council and these governing the General Assembly. These are my reasoIl§ for urging that in this case we are dealing with a question of procedure, and for asking the representative of the USSR not to maintain his attitude, which might really lead to serious difficulties. 1 cannot desire the outbreak of another war in order to bring the great Powers into agreement; that would be contrary to the spirit of the Charter, to the spirit of my country and ta my own spirit. Since it is impossible to ask for a new war to bring the great Powers into agreement, 1 can orny request the representative of the USSR not to' put us in this position. If he refuses, my orny hope is to continue my campaign, which will notcease as long as 1 live, for the elimination from the Charter of the unwarranted and most dangerous privilege of the veto. pour serait à ne guerre reste pas consent que que de plivilège (traduit qu'on mon prolonger qu'à tions d'extrême sommes caractère. connaissent Il tribuer intérieur, autrès, à vote à d'aboutir nable, discutons quée. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : 1 wish to propose that we should at this point adjoum these proceedings. 1 do not think that the Security Council ought to sit indefinitely and late into the night on questions, urness there is îmmediate urgency touching upon them. 1 do not think that this problem before the Security Council is of immediate urgency. 1 think the members of the Security Gouncil know my personal views on this point. 1 took the liberty of circulating sorne months aga a suggestion for the rules of procedure, one of which was that, un1ess the Security Council voted otherwise, an , adjournment should be had at six o'dock in the evening. 1 am quite prepared to sit late if there is any chance of reaching a decision within a reasonable rime, but this question of procedure whi-;h we are now discussing is very complicated. connue. cussion remettre Président, -la This situation is not entire1y unfamiliar to us. Experience has shawn us that a discussion of this kind can go on for hours, and 1 thînk it might very well be postponed with advantage. 1 therefore wish, with the President's permission, to propose that the Security Council adjourn. ' Mr. NISOT (Be1gium) (translated trom Frenek): 1 second the motion. rité question

1 was going to say that 1 have kept the Security Council in session until this late hour in the expectation that it would be able to dispbse of this matter today, but, in view of the fact that 1 have still two speakers on my list ,and also that the work on this matter may conceivably require further debate, 1 propose, .urness 1 hear any remarks to the contrary, that the Security Council adjourn now until such a date as the new President may decide.

1 wish to thank very much the representative of the United States forhis complimentary remarks and the Security Co~n­ cil at large for the patience and kindness which the members have shown to me during the time of my Presidency, and 1 wish to announce, in accordance with the desire of the next President, that the Security Council will adjoum until Thursday, 6 May, at 3 p.m. The meeting rose at 8.25 p.m. , Edito~.SudaInericana Munoz Hermanos y S.A. Nueve de Octubre Alsina 500 CasiHa 10-24 BUENOS AmEs GUAYAQUIL AustraIia-Australie Egypt-EgyPte H. A. Goddard Pty. Ltd. Librairie "La 255& George Street d'Egypte" S"Y"DNEY, N. S. W. 9 Sh. Adly Pasha CAmO BeIgium-Belgiqtte Finland-:Pill~l.'/,1T4e Agence et Messageries de la Akateeminen Klijakauppa Presse, S. A. 2, Keskuskatu. 14-22 rue du Persil BRUXELLES HELSINKI Bolivia-Bolivie France Editions A. Pedone Librena Cientifica y 13, rue Soufflot Literaria PARIS, Va Avenida 16 de Julio, 216 Casilla 972 Greece--Grèce LA PAZ "Eleftheroudakis~> Librairie internationale Canada Place de ~a Constitution The Ryerson Press ATHÈNE~ 299 Queen Street West Guatemala TORONTO José Goubaud Chile-Chili Goubaud & Gia Edmundo Pjzarro Sucesor Merced 816 5a Av. Sur No. SANTIAGO GUATEMALA The Commercial Press Ltd. Max Bouchereau Librairie "A la 211 Honan Road Boite postale SHANGHAI PORT-Au-PIuNcE Costa Rica-Costa-llica India-Inde Trejos Hermanos Oxford Book & Stationery Apartado 1313 Co. SAN JOSÉ Scindia House Cuba NEW DELHI La· Casa Beîga Iran René de Smedt Bongahe Piaderow O'Reilly 455 731 Shah Avenue LA flABANA TEHERAN Czechoslovakia Iraq-Irak T çhécodovaquie Mackenzie & Mackenzie F. Topie The Bookshop Narodni Trida 9 BAGHDAD PRAHA 1 Lebanon-Liban Denmark-Danemark Librairie universelle Einar Munskgaard BEYROUTH Norregade 6 Luxembourg KJOBENHAVN Librairie J. Schummer Dominican Republic Place Guillaume LUXEMBOURG République DomillicaÎ118 Netherlands-Pays-Bas . Librena Dominieana Callé Mercedes No. 49 N. V. Martinus Apartado 656 Lange Voorhout CIUDAD TRUJILLO S'GRAVENHAGE