S/PV.291 Security Council

I thought it advisable to convene the Security le Council for' a meeting which, in my opinion, dans should be short. In effect, I promised the Chairtout man of the First Committee of the Gemiral de Assembly, Mr. Tsiang, that this me-eting would rale, he brief. serait I think it is necessary to inform the Security Council of two telegrams [documents S/741 and 1sance 8/742] received from the Truce Commission grammes 1 caIl upon the Assistant Secretary-General ta read these two te1egrams. Ml'. SOBOLEV (Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Security Council Affails): The first telegram [document S/741J, dated 9 May 1948, and addressed to the President of the Security CounciI, reads: "FoIlowing an agreement between Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab League, and General CunnirJr:ham, the Arabs have accepted ta ceaPl; fir( today at noon in whole Jerusalem, on conditions that the Jews also abstain from firing. The Commission this mom- .ing has been invited by Cunningham to meet him; the latter has informed the Commission of bis negotiations with Azzam Pasha for the conclusion of a truce over the whole city of Jerusalem. Cunningham up to this point has not yet seen the representatives of the Jewish Agency regarding t.his proposed truce.: He will only meet them tomorrow. Mterwards Cunningham has asked the Commission if it was ready to ensure control of Jewish traffic between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, as weil as the entry to the Old City. The Commission, after study of the question, has answered this aftemoon that it was ready in principle to ensure such control but that it could only give a final answer when it will knoW the terms of the possible truce agreement. Such control should necessitate urgent sending of personnel bythe United Nations eatiillated at first sight at about fifty control officers. The Truce Commission Principal Secretary is in direct contact with the Secretary-General about this question. On tl1e other hand, according to General Cunningham, Azzam Pasha would prefer that the control should be' ensured by the Delegate of the Intemation~l Committee of Red Cross. The Truce Commission therefore thinks it important the opinion of the Security Council urgently. (Signed) JEAN NmUWENHUYS, Chairman" The second telegram [document S/742J which is dated 10 May 1948, and addressed to the President of the Security Council, reads: "This aftemoon the High Commissioner called the Security Council Truce Commission for Palestine. He told them that the Jewish Agency had not answered bis invitation to come this moming to take cognizance of the conditions of truce established in agreement with Azzam Pasha. Sir Alan Cunningham then asked the Commission if it considered that the fact of entrusting the fate of Jerusalem to the Interna- tionaIOommittee of the Red Cross constituted "He pointed out that, if the High Commis- .oner could bring the Arabs to negotiate with the Commission, it would seem to him very possible to reach sorne agreement. The latt ~r at the same time would try to convfuce the Jews. He underlined that it seemed indeed very likely that the Jews would he more ready to negotiate V/ith the Commission than with the Mandatory Govemment and the Commission had a greater possibility, as organ of the United Nations, to exercise pressure on the Jews. EventuaIly Neu- ville pointed out ib.at if the Red Cross proposal were adopted and if it did not prove efficient in a few days' time, as he thought would be the case, the English would nut be there any longer, the fighting would again start, and it would be indeed difficult for the Commission to take up its mission. The delegate from France strongly emphasized the importance of the loss of time six days before the Mandate would end. The High Commissioner answered that he would, uutil 15 May, have authority and the power to take the decision that would seem best ta him. "At the request of the United States delegate he added the plan was only in draft form at this point and it still needed the 'fin~ touch' and agreed to by the Jews. In reference to the Arabs, Sir Alan thought he· could rely on their agree- ment. The Commission added that, in accord- ance with comments that have been made by a representative of the Jewish Agency, the latter had sent two representatives to tue High Com- missioner but that Sir Alan did not want to see them because they were not members of the Zionist Executive. Those members were aIl in Tel Aviv at thetime.

In the main, these telegrams contain information relating to events that are already two or three days old, although developments are of such a nature that the situation changes every twenty-four hours. However, l thought it ad- This telegrarn deals with a certain stage of the truce negotiations. The Commission had been asked ta state whether it could ensure some measure of control over Jewish traffie between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. As you have seen, the Commission replied in the affirmative, stating it was ready toensure this.control but that this would necessitate the immediate dispatch. by the United Nations of a certain am01int of staff, estimated at fust glance at about fifty control officers. . On the other hand, the same telegram suggested another solution, namely, that this control should be ensured by the de1egate of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Commission sought the opinion of the Security Council on this question. The possible dispatch of control officers raises two questions: .whether we arp. in a position to meet such a request, and whether this would be the best solution in the present circumstances. With th.e permission of the Security Council, 1 shall ask the Secre1:ary-General to indicate to what extent it would be possible for the United Nationsto sendsuch control officers. After that, we shalldiscuss what reply 1 should send to the TruceCommission.

Itis technically possIble to send fifty control officers; we can recroit those officers, and we can discuss later how to equip thein and how best to send them. However, 1 shallneed at least L~rée or four daysperhaps even six or seven-before preparations can be completed. 1 do liot wish to commit myself definitely as to the time required, but to send fifty control officers to Palestine .without full agreement between the Jèws and the Arabs would be, in my opinion, tao dangero"tls. 1 cannot take the responsibility for those fifty control officers unless-it·is quite clear to the whole world that they are going at the request, and with the full support, of both parties in Palestine. Mr. TARASENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated tram Russian): May 1 ask a question: from whom does the proposai to establish control of the road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and of the convoys passing along that road emanate?From what official body or responsiblç person does that proposaI come?

The telegram which has been read provides an Mr. TARASENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated tram Russian): If l have understood correctly, the British High Commissioner is the initiator and author of this proposal.

It was the High Cùmmissioner who asked the Commission whether it would be prepared to assume control. Then the Commission, consider- .ing the practical steps it could take in this respect, asked us whether control officers. could eventually be sent. Mr. TARASENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated tram Russian) : Have you any infonnation regarding the attitude of the two parties-that is, the Araos and the Jewsto·t."1.is proposal? How far is it acceptable to boû,. parties? Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated tram Russian): It is stated in. the telegram that the Commission raised this . question in reply to an inquiry by the High Commissioner, i.e., the British High Commissioner in Palestine. Therefore, the British were the first to raise this question. It is stated Î1i the telegrar.1 that· the Commission on being approached by General Cunningham has agreed in principle on undertaking such control. Hence it was the, British who raised this question. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Unite.d Kingdom) : l think it is clear that what happened was that the High Commissioner reached the conclusion that this control would be a vital element in any truce agreement and, therefore, addressed this inquiry to the Truce Commission. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated tram Russian): l take it that it has now been made clear that it was the Briti~h who raised the question of assigning certain police functions to the Truce Commission.. The PRESIDENT' (translated tram French): Personally, l do not view the question in the same way as the represe.ntative of the USSR. The negotiations for a truce in Jerusalem raised the question of traffic control, which required the intervention of a completely lleutral and impartial body, and the British High Commissioner asked the Commission whether it would be prepared to help in this connexion. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): 1 am only trying to clarify the situation. At the same time 1 do not quite understand why it is still not clear to you, Mr. President, especially after the explanations given by the representative of the United Kingdom. The question of the formation of some kind of police detachment was raised by the Conurissioll after the same question had been raised before the COIlh-nÎssion by the High Commissioner of Palestine, i.e., the question was raised by the British, as was stated here by Sir Alexander Cadogan. Where is the obscurity? It seems to me that after those explanations it should be clear to the President aIso, as to who raised this question. 1 repeat: 1 am only eIarifying the situation. We are not yet discussing the substance of this proposal or stating our positions.

1 should like to point out that ldid not say the situation did not seem clear to me. The point on which 1 must send a replyprovided that subsequent developments have not rendered the telegram and the request it con~ tains pointless--eoncerns the participation of International Red Cross delegates. With your permission, 1 think we might now· consider this question in brief fashion. . 1 should like to make a suggestion to facilitate this discussion. 1 think my reply should state that the Commission should avail itself of the assistance of Red Cross representatives if it deems it to be both practicahle and usefuI. 1 think it should be understood in that case thu the Commission would retain control of the truce negotiations as a whole, and that the Red Cross representatives would assist the Commission in the furtherance of that aim. 1 put this suggestion to you. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): 1 presume from the telegram sent on 9 May, that the High Commissioner first had a conversation with an Arab representative on the truce principles and how they were ta be achieved. We may be sure that in this conversation the matter of the control of traffic between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem was t.aken up by them and discussed fully. 1 be1ieve that one of the essential conditions to establishinga truce and full entry into the whole of Jerusalem from both sides should he that this traffic should be controlled. 1 am sure that the However, this traffic control is one condition for having this truce supported by the agreement of both parties, as Sir Alexander Cadogan has just stated. The High Commissioner asked the Truce Commission if it had the means to fulfi1 . this condition or not. It was natural for him to have asked that question. Then the Commission in its tum put the question to the Security Council, because it represents the Security COllncil, and it made two proposaIs: either that these control officers be nominated by the Security CouncU or that the task be given ta the International Committee of the·Red Cross which is there. l do not see anything which is not natural and normal in the procedure of this matter. The only thing that would attract my a.ttention to this matter is this: at the beginning this Truce Commission was active and diligent. 1t sent two or three telegrams in one day. 1t was constituted to work on the truce negotiations and the execution implementation of the truce, but l do not see that the members of the Commission have sent any other telegrams telling us what has been going on in Palestine since the previous telegrams which they sent. Have they mentioned anytPh...g about the refugees who left their homes an~ went abroad-refugees who, according to the Jewish Agency report, number about 200,000? What is the Commission doing? 1s the truce being worked on there, and are any negotiations being carried on for a truce over the remainder of Palestine? This Commission was not appointed only for Jerusalem; it has to work throughout the whole of Palestine. The membérs have given us no information about what is going on, about what kind of outrages and aggressions have been committed since their Commission was established. l cannot see why they do not carry out this job and at least inform the Security Council, as it was established·in their terms of reference that they were constituted to supervise what is going on and to keep the Security Council informed. 1 see that they have given us no information, unless the information has been sent but not distributed to us. They took no notice of these outrages and terrors which are being committed there continuously. Mr. TSIANG (China) : It seems to me that the question of whether the control of traffic be . undertaken br pe=nnel !ronl the International The problem, of course, is that of the agreement of the two parties. Without that agreement, the International Red Cross or our control officers would not be able to go far to ensure the tmce. 1 would suggest that the President reply to our Commission on the foUowing lines: "The aid of the InternGitional Red Cross is to he welcomed. The agreement of the two parties should be secured." As to how we can secure that agreement, l have nothing to say. It may be it would be more convenient to secure that agreement here by sounding out the two parties, or, for practical reasons, it may be that such agreement can be better secured in Palestine. But that is the essential thing to do. Whether that control be camed out by fifty control officers of the Security Coun- 1 par cil or by the International Red Cross, 1 suggest, is a secondary consideration at present. Mr. TARA8ENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated trom Russian): 1 should like to clarify th.e foUowing question. We have been speaking aU the time about the control of convoys passing along the road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. What is the position with'regard to other roads connecting Jerusalem with other districts in Palestine? In aU probability, convoys pass along those roads too. ls control to be es- . tablished over those roads as weIl, or not? MI'. AUSTIN (United States of America): This particular.point, like many others, depends upon agreement between the parties. 1 can see no way for the Security Council to act here without assuming such an agreement; that is, if we preferred to send fifty control officers appointed by the Secretary-General, it would be on the assumption that that would be acceptable to the parties. The acceptance would be a condition precedent to those men going there. On the other hand, should we decide that it is convenient to accept the services of the International Red Cross, that, too, would be on the condition precedent that it be acceptable to both parties. Going on from there, it seems to me that a rational view of this matter involves th". frllowing point: ·in the second telegram, the one dated 10 May 1948, there occurs the following message: The question has arisen here of assigning police functions to the Truce Commission, of assigning sorne kind of a police detachment to that Commission and of entrusting mat detachment with the task of controiling transport between Jerusalem and other towns in Palestine. As is known, no such functions of a purely police character were assigned to the "';ommission, and we in the Security Council cannot now decide that a Commission specially created for another purposc shoulè undertake police control and functions of a purely police character. Perhaps, someone is proposing the creation of a police force for the two or three days remaining until the expiration of the Mandate, after which, as is known, two independent States are to exist in Pa~estine-a Jewish and an Arab State. Let us be told plainly then that the police force is ta be created for those two or three days. It is obvious that such a proposaI would not be realistic and.would give us nothing. A further question has arisen regarding the telegram of 10 May from the Chairman of the Truce Commission. It is the question of bringing in the International Red Cross in connexion with Com...~ission. The tele~am st~ted that S~;Alan Cunnmgham, the Bntish High COIIlIIllSSloner for Palestine, asked the Commission-and here again you see that the initiative comes from the British, but that is not the point-what it theught of the possibility of entrusting the fate of Jerusalem to the Red Cross. The Commission has reached no decision on this m~tter and has submittedno proposal to the Secunty Council. Moreover, it appears from the telegram that differences of opinion have arisen within the Commission in this cOlmexion. The French representative on the Commission, unlike the representative of France on the Security Council, considers that a discussion of the question of bringing in the Red Cross would only mean a loss of time and that the Commission should devote its efforts to establishing agreement between Jews and Arabs. The representative of the United States, has spoken in support of a non-eristent proposal. l'hat means that the representative of the United States himself has taken the initiative in proposing that the fate of Jeru,,>alem be entrusted ta the Red Cross. The question arises: on what basis is it proposed ta transfer to the Red Cross the administration of Jerusalem? Where is the resolution on which the Security Council could base such an action? Is there perhaps a resolution of the General Assembly determilling the futtlfe of Palestine? There is no such resoiütion. There is the resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, under which two independent States-Jewish and Arab-are to be created in Palestine, and Jews and Arabs accordingly are ta be the masters in their own State. As you know, the United Nations Palestine Commission ·was created for that purpose, a Commission which still exists, which han not been dissolved and which is entrusted with certain functions which it must carry out. There is no mention of the Red Cross in that resolution. statuts crer. humanitaire; le organisation. pays? personne. faire En You know that the Red Cross haL its own statutes and regulations on which it bases its actions. There are certain tasks which the Red Cross hasset itself in the past, to which it sets itself today and ta which it evidendy will ·continue to set itself ID the future. Those tasks are fundamentally of a humanitarian character, corresponding ta the established traditions of the Red Cross and, as 1 have already stated, to the definite statutes and regulations of that organization. But who has ever entrusted the administration of any city or country ta the Red Cross? No one could ever have conceived such an idea. And yet we have before us a proposaI to make the Red Cross master of Jerusalem. Needless to 1 The regime in Jerusalem must be established in confonnity with the decision already taken: it i~ necessary to elaborate and approve the statute, and aIso to administer Jerusalem in accordance with the statute elaborated on the basis of the General Assemblv's resolution of 29 November 1947. . The case is different when the matter concerns a tempora."] measure adopted by the Security Council with regard to a truce between Jews and Arabs. That was a special measure which was to be carried out by the Security Council. But it is being carried out badly, and everybody who was willing to acknowledge it knew in advance that the Security Council's resolutions reg~rding a truce would be ignored because they were not intended to be fulfilled. Will not the resolution to entrust the city of Jerusalem ta the Red Cross also be ignored? Of course the interested parties cannot agree with that decision either, because it is incompatible with the resolution adopted with regard to Palestine as a whole and ta Jerusalem in particular. 1 consider that we have no grounds whatever for adopting the United States representatives proposaI, if it can be called a proposal-it is not clear to me whether it is a proposal or a wish. The Red Cross is not a branch cf the Security Council. It is a separate international organization, with its own speeial tasks and functions. The Truce Commission is a subsidiary organ or, rather to be exact, in a certain sense is a branch of the Security Couneil, and the Council has the right and every reason to give it appropriate'instructions. But the Red Cross has nothing whatever to do with the matter. If -any questions arise in connexion with a defir-.Jte situation that has developed in a particular region, country or town, the Red Cross fulfiIs its functions as 1 have already pointed out, in accordance with its statutes and regulations. It seems ta me that a proposaI of this kind to bring in the Red Cross in the administration of the city of Jerusalem-and not only to bring in the Red Cross but aIso to transfer to it the administration of the city-will not stand up to any criticism and O'lTInot be adopted. 1 will conclude \\ith what 1 said in the beginning. 1 consider that our meeting today is amless. Wc have no proposais, and we are even without any information. Today is 12 May, and the last telegrams we received are dated 10 May. Obviousiy those telegrams reHect the situation The PRESII)ENT (translated trom French): Before ca11ing upon the representatives of Canada and Syria to speak, 1 shalI venture to make a few observations in the hope of avoiding confusion in our discussion. We have two te1egrams before Ull. The second deals in particuIar with the question brought forward by the USSR representative which is that of general action by the International Red Cross ta ~ume responsibility for the fate of Jerusalem. The Commission has not asked us ta comment on this point and has limited itself to keeping us informed of the trend of events. It is oruy in the first te1egram that a specifie question has been put and it was because 1 felt a r~ply was needed that 1 consulted the Security Council. This question aIso relates ta Red Cross action, but of a much more limited character. What is asked is whether the Commission Can consider entrusting the Red Cross with the special question of traffic control, if that is still a question at issue at the prevailing stage of the truce negotiations. It is on this very 1iIDited point that 1 must give an answer to the Commission. General McNAUGHTON (Canada·): 1 should like ta make two brief observations on the matters reported to the Security Council this morning. The question of police powers in reference to the Truce Commission in Palestine has been raised speci:fically by the representatives of the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR. 1 shouId like to point out that the control officers referred to in the Truce Commission's telegram would not be police officers in the ordinary sense of the word. Their function would· be to regulate traffic in accordance with whatever agreement may have been arrived at between the parties under the auspices of.the Truce Commission. The traffic controlofficers would not depend upon force or police power, as we understand it, ta carry out their funetions. Their activities would have to rest upon agreement between the parties if in fact they were ta function at all. The representative of the USSR has implied .that sorne proposal is under consideration whereby the governance of Jef!lSalem might be transferred to the International Red Cross. 1 should point out that time is a very essential factor in aU the arrangements that have ta be made and it is quite probable, as Mr. Gromyko has said, that the telegrams which were read to us this morning are a1ready very far out of date. 1 would say that the suggestion in regard to the raising of fifty control officers here in New York is too far away in tÎme and space ta be practical and 1 do not think it should be undertaken, because 1 think the Commission, if it is ta be useful, must use the facilities that it can bring under its control, l'ight on the spot. 1 would say again that, in the Truce Commission, the Security Council has established a responsible group as its representatives on the spot, and it is their dutY to do whatever is practicaUy possible ta carry out the intention of the Security Council, which the Council expressed in its resolution. It is absoluteIy essential that the Security Council should fully support this Commission in aU respects and that it should confinn a,.t once, 1 think, to the Commission that the Council weIcomes it8 taking the initiative in aU matters which are appropllate to its mandate. 1 would say, further, that in our next communication to •the Commission, we should say with what arixiety we are following the situation and that we hope they will keep us as fully and as promptly infonned as it may be possible for them to do. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria):" 1 submitted sorne questions at the beginning of this meeting about the matter of the truce which was decided upqn by the Security Council. It was expected that the Truce Commission, the High Commissioner a..id the Mandatory Power would take iJnmediate steps to negotiate with the parties and persuade them to establish that truce over the whole of Palestine. Until noW the Security Council has heard nothing as to what happened at these negotiations, and what the attitude of the Jews and Arabs was during those conversations and negotiations with respect to achieving that truce and implementingit. We know nothing about that. This infonnation is essential because the Security Council is now seized with the question of Palestine and the question of the truce. The Security Council is dèaling with no other problem except the question of the truce, upon which matter it adopted a resolution. There is another point which 1 should like to mention. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has repeatedly mentioned a certain thesis and doctrine. He mentions the fact that resolution 181 (II ) of the General Assembly of 29 November last stands and must be implemented. He has stated that both parties have the right to establish an independent State and administer their country. The representative of the USSR has repeated this several times, and 1 have been repeating the contrary and sayingthat the recommendations of the General Assembly do not grant rights to anyone; they are only recommendations and cannot be enforced, and no party would be in the right if it claimed that right as a result of such recommendations of the General Assembly. We have repeatedly said that the Arab States reject these recommendations, do not agree with them, and oppose them with aIl the means they have. The Arab States have repeatedly" opposed these recommendations because they feel that any party who tried to implemen! them, or use them as a basis of right, would be in the wrong, would be acting as an aggre...~or, and should be opposed and dealt with accordingly. The representative of the USSR has never denied the principle that a recommendation of the General Assembly does not create a right. Justice ought to be established in difIerent w~.ys. Since the recommendations of the General Assembly have been rejected by the parties concerned, they do not stand; there is behind them no force or power on which to rely in taking action in this matter. 1 should like to have this question clarified in some way. However, the Security Council is not in a position now to discuss this matter or take a decision on it. The matter was referred to the General Assembly. But since the representative of the USSR has repeated this thesis here in the Security Council, 1 am obliged also to repeat what our stand is on this subject.

The representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine has asked for permission to speak. 1 shall permit him to do so but hope that he will be very brief. . We should like to make it clear that We are taking no position whatever on the questions of the control of the road, the form of control, and all other details, because of the fact that we are very much in the dark regarding the negotiations which have been proceeding in Palestine. l note, incidentally, that in the telegram of 9 May, it is stated thaï the members of the l'mce Commission were not yet informed of the terms of the possible truce agreement on 9 May. Cer- . tainly, we have had no information since then. .Sorne of the questions which have been raised here, such as the question regarding the possible control of other roads, are not without interest, and at least they he1p ta point out the fact that there is a lack of information regarding the tenns of the possible truce and the difficulty of dealing with such terms from here. l should like ta point out that there has becn increasing difficulty as regards communications with Palestine. We have been trying ta overcome that difficulty, to sorne extent, by establishing personal contact with our representatives in Palestine. We feel, therefore, that all details of a possible truce must be dealt with and negotiated on the spot. l should like to add, with your permission, just one word regarding our general attitude on the subject. l should like ta point out that in the Trusteeship'Council and elsewhere we have been very receptive, time and again, ta various proposaIs having in view the stabilization of the situation in the city of Jerusalem. We have been receptive to one proposaI after another, and it is certainly not our fault that greater progress has not yet been made. In the telegrams which are before us, reference has been made ta the desire of the High Commissioner in Jerusalem ta confer with the representatives of the Jewish Agency. l should like ta clear up any possible misunderstanding on that score. The representatives of the Jewish Agency have always been glad ta confer with the High Commi'3sioner. 'Iwo members of the Jewish Agency saw him as recently as 6 May, just a few days before this telegram. Subsequently, when the High Commissioner conferred with representatives of the Arabs and then desired ta submit whatever proposaIs emerged from this discussion ta the Jewish Agency, the Jewish Agency requested sorne of its highest officiaIs in Jerusalem ta meet the- High Commissioner. But, according ta this telegrarn, he was unwilling ta receive them and wished ta see members of the Zionist Executive who at that time were in Tel Aviv. l should like ta point out what ought ta be known ta aIl, that it is not a simple matter in these days to proceed from Tel Aviv ta 1 refrain, in view of the President's admonition, from making any response at this time ta sorne of the observations which have been made by the representative of Syria œgarding the general question. May l, however, most earnestly request the President and the members of the Security Council ta bear in mind that the Security Couneil is seized not only of the limited question of the truce in the city of ~~rusalem and, for that matter, of the truce for Palestine, but of the general question of security, and of the threat ta the peace and of the threats of invasion of the country. These threats are repeated constantly, and further evidence concerning them appears daily in the Press. These matters have been submitted by 1,1S orally and in writing, and we would respectfuUy submit thàt this question must remain a permanent question on the agenda of the, Security Couneil for sa long as the threat of invasion and the threat to the peace of the country continues, as evidently it does. . , Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated trom Spanish): It would be as weIl ta return to the purpose of this meeting. The President called us together for the specifie purpose of reading ta us two telegrams and askfug our opinion on how he should answer them. That is the sole purpose of this meeting. Any general debate or statements ,on the question at issue between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine can only obscure the one point under discussion. 1 believe that we aIl fear-and sorne of us are convinced':"'-that as soon as the British Mandate is terminated the strife in Palestine will become even more violent. It is truethat nobody had suggested sending fifty traffic control officers from here; but 1 want ta state now that, if it is proposed, 1 shall oppose snch a measure, because - 1 feel that we -cannot expose fifty persons ta the bulle~ of the Jews and the Arabs. That is my position with regard ta the possible necessity of sending out officiaIs ta control the roads leading ta Jerusalem; 1 am against such action. Having stated these views regarding the fifty so-called policemen-who would be nothing more than traffic controllers-and the kind of .assistance that could be given by the Red Cross, 1 should like to refer to the President's reply to these telegrams, which is the specifie purpose of our meeting. In that respect 1 am ,in complete agreement with the proposai made by the representative of Canada. 1 think that the President should reply to that effect, because the Commission must use all available means to secure the truce; it must use all the means available there, at the place of conflict, for it is ohvious that there is no time to do anything from Lake Success or New York that 'would be effective in Palestine. Incidentally, the President might indicate in his reply, the Security Council's opinion on the suggestion made in passing with regard to the possibility of sending officiais to control the roads leading to Jerusalem and the acceptance of the services of the Red Cross, should the need arise. These are my views on the reply that the President of the Security Council should send to the Truce Commission. Mr. TARASENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from Russian): Nevertheless, l'should like to ask you, Mr. President, to tell us whether you have any information concerning other roads connecting Jerusalem \':ith other regions of Palestine and with neighbouring countries-roads used by convoys carrying food, and, in all probability, weapons also, for one side or the other. If there are such ioads being so used, do the High Commissioner's proposals extend ta them also or not?

1 have no reply ta give to the Ukrainian representative other than that which is contained in the te1egrams themse1ves, with regard to the traffic between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and access ta the Old City.• The representative of the Arab Higher Committee has asked for permission ta speak. As in the case of the Jewish Agency representative, 1 shalI request him ta be brief. Later, in the Trusteeship Council, we made it quite clear that we had no objection to having a truce in the whole municipal area of Jerusalem, but the Jewish Agency brought up the pOL.'1t that the roads converging on Jerusalem should also be included in the truce. We have made it clear that this is practically impossible because,. as long as the truce does not cover the whole of Palestine, it is not conceivable that traffic to Jerusalem should be open when it has to pass through other parts of Palestine in which there is no truce. We are now being asked to give our opinion with regard to certain traffic control officers to be appointed for Palestine. If it is true,. as 1 understood from the telegra.'TIs which have been read, ~that the Righ Comn1ÏSsioner has already approached the Arabs in Palestine and that they have. agreeà to such a suggestion, then the Security Council has my agreement. However, 1 should like to say that in my opinion there will always be objection to having any armed men coming into Palestine through the agency of the United Nations. If there is a necessity for sending control officers, 1 believe it would ·be much more effective if they were to be unarmed International Red Cross representatives. The people in Palestine would not consider such representatives as coming with any political arrièrepensée, but as coming to help them in the reguiation of certain functions for the good of all concerned. The P~ESIDENT .ctranslated trom French): It is rather difficult to draw a conclusion from this meeting, which has gO:rle on much longer than 1 would have wished.· 1 summoned the Couneil because, as the Argentine representative pointed out earlier, it seemed necessary to draw its attention to the telegrams which had been received. As a matter of fact, 1 could have confined myself to communicating the contents of the telegrams to the members of the Council for their information if one of them had not required a reply and, consequently, a preliminary exchange of views. It appears rather difficult to conclude this exchange of views. Perhaps the Council could authorize me to send the Commission a telegram along the following lines: If the question of traffic control is still un· settled-I do not know what the situation is today because it chunges so frequently-we have no objection to the Commission taking advan- The Security Council just now heard from the representative of the Arab Higher Committee that, if the truce is not established over aU Palestine, the question which the Security Council is discussing todai would be useless. There must be a truce in the entire country; one'cannot make a truce fOf one route and leave another route without a truce. Sa 1 think it is essential ta have an inlmediate reply from the Commission about the truce, for the supervision of which the Commission was established. That Commission was not created for the truce only in Jerusalem, but fer all Palestine. What has happened ta that? ls it working? Is it cancelled? Has the Commission given up negotiatioIl8 in despair or defeat? Does it not know what to do? The Security Council must know something about it. 1 think that, if the President would mention something to that efIect, it would be helpful. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated tram Russian): If' it is ....agreeable 10 the other representalives on the Security Council, it seems ta me that today we 1 should like ta dtaw the attention of the representative of Canada t6 one passage in the telegram, which states: "Sir Alan CumÙllgham asked the Commission if it considered that the fact of entrusting the fate of Jerusalem to the International Committee of the Red Cross constituted an obstacle to its own mission." That is precisely the question raised by the Commission, and not the question of entrusting the control of roads and transport to the Red Cross. What is now happening? The Commission did not place before us the question of the possibility of inviting the Red Cross to control transport, yet a proposal is being made here in that sense. It seems to me that there are no grounds for the adoption of such a proposal. 1 cannot agree to it aIso on the following considerations of principle: the Red Cross has its own duties and functions and a weIl-defined statute and regulatiollS, and they do not state anywhere that the Red Cross should perform control functions sÏm.üar to those which are being proposed here. At the same time 1 will answer the observation made by the representative of Canada that the telegram does not deal at all with the question of creatîng a police force, but merely .touches upon the question of establishing a control group. But a force of anned men is concerned. It is specifical1y stated here that the force shoiIld have fiie-anns. It seems ta me that it is dearlya question of esta'..':llishing a police force to he entrusted '[-vith the control of tJ."ansport. General McNAUGHTON (Canada); l' am entircly in agreement with_the representative of the USSR that we should have more information. The purpose of my intervention was to attempt ta obtain the information. 1 sought also to impress on the Truce Commission the fact that it has certain duties and powers ta carry them out in Palestine, and that the initiative rests on the CoIIlIllÏssion to carry out those duties. In regard to thestat.~ment of entrusting the fate of Jerusalem ta the Intemational Committee of the Red Cross and the reference the representative of the USSR has made ta the use of the Red Cross on road contrd, 1 said nothing specifically about the use of the Red -Cross in that capacity. My remark was of a ~uch more l think that is a correct and proper statement. If there are facilities of the Red Cross available which are appropriate, in this emergency it would be wrong ta deny the Truce Commission the right ta use them. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Soci."list Republif,5) (translated trom Ru.s;ian): 1 should like ta draw the attention of the representative of Canada, and of other representatives on the Security Couneil, ta ,the fact that 1 have no objection to the Commission co-operating with the Red Cross if it is a question of the Red Cross fulfilling its ordinary humanitarian functions in conformity with its statutes and regulations. If, however~ it is intended to assign ta the Red Cross any adnùnistrative or control fiInctians which it has no right ta assume, then 1 cannot agree ta such a proposaI.

1 think 1 may draft my reply along the following lines: we leave the Commissii:m large discretionary powers as ta the advisability of taking advantage of the various kinds of assistance available locally, and as ta the choice of matters for which such assistance can be really useful. This is in accordance with the observations put forward by the Canadian representative. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): 1 have explained my position with' regard to the functions of the Red Cross. As 1 understand it, this is co-operation between the Comnùssion and the Red Cross.

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