S/PV.296 Security Council

1 shouId like ta inform you, as 1 did at the last meeting, of a telegram, dated 16 May, which 1 have received from the French Consu! in Jerusalem. It reads as follows: "1 have protested with no avaiI ta the Jewish Agency against the attacks on the ConsuIate General from Jewish posts which have been carried out since midday on 14 May. "The purpose of these attacks appears to be ta hamper our observation which had ascer- We shall now continue the consideration of the draft res?lution submitted by the United States delegation [document 8/749J. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): My Government has every sympathy with the abjects of the United States draft resolution. I am sure that we al! wish ta remedy, by the best possible methods, the present grave situation in Palestine and ta attain finally, if we may, a just and lasting solution of this bafHing problem. In regard to the actual form of the draft resolution, my Government has instructedme ta make several points. In the first place, it has, in particular, grave doubts about the wisdom and expediency of invoking Article 39 of the Charter at this stage. Article 39, it is true, provides that: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. . ." . I may be wrong, but I think that in all other passages in the Charter where peace and security ax:e mentioned, these words are qualified by the adjective "international", which ,does not figure in the fust part of this Article 39. Certainly, that adjective does appear in the cases of Articles 33, 34 and 37. I believe that the omission of the ward "international", in the first part of AJ:!:icle 39, may be due ta an oversight. This belief is strengthened by the fact that that same Article 39 goes on to prescribe what may he done "ta maintain or restore international peace and security". If that is sa, what the Security Council has to do, under this Article, is to determine that there is a threat ta, or a breach of, international peace and security.· I leave for later consideration the questiqn of "aggreesion". Let me be legalistic for a moment. The question of what is the actual juridical status of Palestine has already been raised in the Security Couneil. The Mandate has been terminated, and there are those who maintain that Palestine, as a whole, thereby attains to independence. There are others who, I believe, on the strength Most of these steps which l have recapitulated have not been taken, and the proclamation of the Jewish State is a unilateral act and is not based strictly on acts of the United Nations Palestine Commission-this quite apart from the fact that the proclamation was actuully issued while Palestine was still under the Mandate. What, then, is the status of the geographical entity known as Palestine? Leaving out of account aggressive action or actions involving the use of armed force, there would probably be nothing ID law to prevent action of a peaceful character directed ta the setting up of a government or governments in Palestine, even if this were done with the hc1p of another State or States, provided that, in doing this, such States were net acting in a manner which wa13 inconsistent with any General Assembly resolution by which they could be regarded as bound. This would mean that, if the Jews claimed to set up aState covering the Jewish areas as defined by the resolution of the General Assembly, and on the other hand the Arabs claimed to set up aState covering the whole of Palestine, there would be nothin.g legally to choose between those daims. 1 used the phrase just now, "leaving out of account aggressive action or actions involving the use of armed force." That brings us to the question of whether there has been an "act of aggression" in the words of Article 39. And that, in turn, confronts us wi'ch aIl the old difficulties involved in the search for a definition of 'the aggressor, which my Government has ah'V'ays thought to be difiïcult if not dangerous. Who began it? If our attention is focussed, now, on ce~taill moves by Arab States, what do we thmk of the Jewish attack on Jaffa-ta mention only one incident? For the reasons which 1 have sketched, my Government could not agree to the invacation of Article 39 of the Charter. JuridicaIly, my In any event, we should not a.ttempt to reach any far-reaching conclusions e..xcept on the basis of detailed information from competent· and impartial observers such as we do not now possess. Moreover, to invoke Article 39launches us on Chapter VII, with all its consequences. A certain sequence of events might bring us to a point, under that Chapter, where we have ta take action with forces which we do not yet possess. 1 will not complicate this discussion with a dis· quisition of the reasons which have ldt us disarmed, or attempt to apportion the blame. Suffice it to say that in present circumstances we should be rather rash, in the opinion of my' Government, to commit ourselves to a road of which we cannat see! the end. But let us come to the substance of the United Statçs resolution-the constructive part. The United States Government now proposes that, in' addition, we should take sorne step ta meet the situation which exists at this moment. My Government would he happy to join in such, an effort. The United States deJegation suggests that the Security Council should "order aU Governments and authoritien ta ceasê and desist from any hostile military action and to tha,t end issue a cease-fire and stand-fast order to their military and para-military forces." My Government would think that the same end could be achieved by a somewhat different formula, which would be to "caU upon àll parties concerned in Palestine to abstain from acts of armed force agafust each other." It seems to my Government--and that was expressed very clearly recently by the Colonial Secretary in the First Committee of the General Assembly [136th meetingJ-that the best that we could hope for was to begin in a modest way and try for a truce, first perhaps in Jerusalem, in the hope that it might be extended eventually to the whole country, in order to assist efforts at mediation with a view to arriving at a solûtion of the whole il1tractable problem. We will still do everything in our power to help along those lines. The Security Couneil Truce Commission should be backed in every way; we should do our utmost ta get a Mediator to Palestine in accordance with the General Assembly resolu- A stand-f<:t8t order, though obviously attractive at first sight, is a lîlore ambitious proposaI. How are we to establish the exact pre.sent location of' the opposing forces? That would probably involve the estaHishing of a line or lines; and we know the difficulties envolved in such a proposal. How are we to supervise the observance of the stand-fast order even if it ,vere -accepted? What method cau be employed for pronouncing on the daims that one side has disregarded it, or on the counter-daims that, on the contrary,it is the oilier side that has done so? Instead of trying to heal the breach at the centre, we might only be increasing the irritation at the peripht.:y. Apart from the changes ~'!h '!:! l have ab:eady indicated, my Government would like to see induded in the r-esolution ~ome provision for a thorough study of the present juridical status of Palestine. By this, of course, my Government does not mean that action .on the other parts of the resolution should be delayed. Further, my Government 1:hitl1i..s that there should bé included an exhortation to the five permanent members, who form the Comrm.ttee of the General Assembly charged to appoint a Mediator, to make aU speetI with this appointment under the resolution of the General Assembly, and a call to aU parties concerned to give the Mediator, when appointed, the utmost assistance. Finally, as the Security Co1.Û1cil Truce Cornntission isattempting to bring about and maintain à cease-fire and atruce in Jcrusaltm, which v'ould 11'ot necessarily depend on'whàt is done in the rest of Palestine in relation to the main problem, my GovernInent would welcome the inSertion of a passagé in thisresolution which would give support to the Commission in that endeavour. . With the permission of the President, Ishall read the text of the redraft of the amendment as we should like to see it, embodying the suggestions which 1 have had the honour to make. This draft reads as follows' [document 8/755]: h 1 See Official Rlrcords of the second special session of tl8 e General Assembly, Supplement No. 2, l'esolutipn 6 (S/U). ' "Calls upon the Truce Commission and upon all parties concerned to give the highest priority to the negotiation and maintenance of a truce in the City of Jerusalem; "Directs the Truce Comniission established by the Security Council by its resolution of 23 April 19482 to report to the Security Council on the compliance with the two preceding paragraphs of this rcsolutioll. "Requests the Committee appointed by the GeDeral Assembly on 14 May to proceed as expeditiously as possible with the appointment of a United Nations Mediator for Palestine, and. calIs upon aIl parties conc~rned to avail themselves of his good offices in order to seek a solution by mediation." Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): The United States cannot assent to the United Kmgdom's proposed amendment to the United States draft resolution. The amendment is very simiIar to the United St1.tes resolution in some of its terms, but the main chatacteristic of the amendment is claimed to be essential1y different from the United States resolution. The sponsor of this amendment claims that the purpose of this amendment is to transfee the case from Chapter. VII of the Charter into Chapter VI. l am going to discuss this matter very briefly on the basis of that claim, though l must confess that on the very cursory examination which l have made of it, the amendment contains language which will be found in Chapter VII. But assuming that the amendment would transfer this case from Chapter VII of the: Charter into Chapter VI, then l am opposed to it for the following, reasons ~ First of aIl, the Security Uouncil has a duty that is laid down in Chapter VII, and which we daim it cannot evade or avoid. The facts being perlectly dear, graphically described as a condition of warfare, haw can the Securiti Council avoid this duty prescribed by Article 39 of the Charter? 1 ask: ,haw can that be when another very significant word was substituted for it; namely, the word "any"? !'Any" includes "international" and 1nc:.ldes aIl other kinds of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression. 1 would cla.im that that word was substituted with great care and w'ith full understanding of its importance, so that the f,ecurïty CounciJ, having found "any threat to the peace", might be able ta proceed to the inquiry with respect ta the éJ.pplication of remedies, or a prevention of that further step of e:xtension of the conflagration into a breach of international peace, for this Article further says "and shall make recommendations. . ."; then we strike something astonishing-the dbtinctive "or"- "or decide what measure shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security". This is a great responsibility. This is where a change occurs in the Charter. From being a quasi-judicial body, the Security Council becornes political andexec'ltive. The Council is no longer lhnited to recommendations, but calI announce decisions and ordertheir implementation. Ta answer this call for the performance of.a duty and to give the necessary orders, that, really, is the purpose of the United States resolution. Up to the present time, the Security Council has repeated1y tried to act' under Chapter VI alone, and it has failed to obtain the necessary results. ' l am aW'are that, in the remarks which 1 am about to make, 1 shaH be repeating what is weIl known ta every rnernber of the Security Council. Nevertheless, 1 shaH do so for the sake of ~Inphasis and in order to refresh our minds with respect ta the exact terms of the actions we have heretofore taken. On. 5 March 1948 [2f?3rd meeting], the Secunty Council adopted a resolution of which the last paragraph reads as follows: "Appeals to all Governments and peoples, particularly in and around Palestine, to take aIl possible action to prevent or reduce such dis- "Calls upon all persans and organizations in Palestine and especially upon the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency to take immediately, without prejudice to their rights, c1aims, or position:5, and as a contribution to the well-being and permanent interests of Palestine, the following measures: . " (a) Cease aU activities of a military or paramilitary nature, as well as acts of violence, terrorism and sabotage; "(b) Refrain from bringing and from assistmg and encouraging the entry into Palestine of armed bands and fighting personnel, groups and individuals, whatever their origin; " (c) Refrain from importing Of acquiring or assisting or encouraging the importation or acquisition of weapons and war materials; "(d) Refrain, pending further consideration of th~ future gov~rnment of Palestine by the General Assembly, from any political activity which might prejudice the rights, daims; or positions of either community; "(e) Co-operate with the Mandatory Authorities for the effective maintenance of law and order and of essential services, particularly those reIating to transportation, communications, health, and food' and water supplies; ~'(f) Refrain from any action which will endanger the safety of the Holy Places in Palestine and from any action' which would interfere with ?"ccess to aIl shrines and sanctuaries for the purpose of worship by those who have an estab- Iished right to visit and worship at them" [document S/723]. At its meeting of 23 April 1948 [287th meeting], the Security Council referred expressly . to the resolution from which 1 have just read. It did so in another resolution readwJg, in part, as follows: "Referring to its resolutiotl of 17' April 1948 calling upon all parties concerned to comply with ::pecific terms for a truce in Palestine, UThe Security Council UEstablishes a Truce Commission for Palestine composed cf representatives of those members of the· Security Council which have career consular officers in Jerusalem, noting, however, that the representative of Syria has indicated., that bis Government isnot prepared to serve on We do not have to determine, as suggested by the representative of thè United Kingdom, who is the aggressor, who is at iauJ!, if both parties are at fault, or which one is more at fault than the other. But as the g'.lardians of the peace of the world, it is our primary duty to find out, under Article 39, whether there exists any threat to the peace. That is the limit, the boundary, of the duty which the resolution offered by the United States delegation asks the Security Council to perform. Let me read it. "The Security Council "Taking into consideration that previous resolutions of the Security Council in respect to Palestine have not been complied with and that military operations are taking place in Palestine; "Determines that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace and a breach of the peace within the meaning, of Article 39 of the Charter; "Orders all G:overnments and authorities to cease and ~esist from any hostile military action and to that end issue a cease-fire and stand-fast order to their military and para-military forces to become effective within thirty-six hours after the adoption of this resolution; "Directs the Truce Commission established by the Security Council by its resolution of 23 April 19483 to report to the Security Council on the compliance with these orders." That .s the questionpresented by, the Vnit~d States resolution to which an amendment is being offered in the nature of a substitute. 1 maIre no particular poitlt of the parliamentary statu!:! of the amendment. Do not misunderstand me. 1 am not raising a parliamentary issue. 1 ~ant to face tIiis right on its merits. 1 assume, though 1 do not admit it, that the ad?ption of the amendment offered by the United Kingdorn would have a different effect than the adoption of the resolution offe.red by the United States; it would, take us out of Chapter VII and into Chapter VI and it would avoid that finding of ::ny threat to the pea.ce. The reason. why we, as a Security Council of the United Nations, art: confronted with a resolution that takesus into. Chapter VII is that we Mr. VAN LANmmHoVE (Belgium) (translated from French): The resolution proposed by the United States delegation contains a number of points which do not appear to raise any great difficulties. These points are as follows: (1) The acknowledgment of the fact that the previous resolutions of the Security Council have not been complied with and that military operations are taking place in Palestine; (2) The provision that aIl parties shall end hostilities within thirty-six hours; (3) Instructions to be given tothe Truce Commission to report to the Council on the subject. The second paragraph of the United States resolution, hov"ever, states that "... the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace and li breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter". The parties are called upon, by means of an injunction, to cease hm:tilities. The United States resolution thus invokes Chapter VII of the Charter, which provides for the application of measures <;Jf coer(;~·;:'n. The Belgian delegation, on the contrary, thinks that we must keep within the framework of Chapter VI of tne Charter, which deals with the pacifie settlement of disputes. Despite his great authority, the United States representative has not shaken our conviction in this respect. We think that the Council should' pursue the mediatory action laid down by its resolution of 23 April [document 8/727] and by the recent General Assembly resolution of 14 May.4 Rence the Belgian delegation would prefer a resolution on the lines of the text amended or revised by the United Kingdom delegation, not based on Chapter VII, but on Chapter VI of the Charter, and this for the following reasons: A resolution such as 1 have in mind, and such as was proposed by the United Kingdom representative, would be in harmony with the spirit of the conclusions reached by the General l have no intention of passing judgment at the pr~sent time on the actions of the Egyptian and Transjordan Governments. l win merely point out that the communications which they have addressed to the Security Council are not in themselves sufficient to justify the application to those States of Article 39 of the Charter. l have just mentioned the line of conduct followed by the Security Council hitherto. Should it, ir1 the present circumstances, depart from that course and set aside the reasons which have deterred it from envisaging the appJication of the measures of coercion provided by Chapter VII of the Charter? l shall not dwell upon the considerations which have been put forward with reference to the confusion regarding the legal position. That confusion results chiefly from the fact that none of the parties has complied with the General Assembly resolution-not even the party whicJJ. now invokes its a~thority. More pressing reasons, which have been referred to by the United Kingdom representa- . tive, lead us to the conclusion that the legal position is uncertain,. and that the:re are serious doubts as to the possibility of issuing an injunction under Chapter VII, as contemplated by the United States draft. 1 have just said that l will not dwell upon these Iegal considerations. In t.h.e opinion of the Belgia11 delegation, other considerations are more ~p(;ltant at present; they co! ~rn the supreme mte'fCsts of pet"!-ce and of our Organization. 1t would be rash for the Security Council solenmly to affirm 'the existence of a breach of th~ pe.ace, and to call upon the parties to cemply Wlth Its decisions, without having weighed all the consequences. Without undue pessimism, it There remains the possibility of the use of armed force in accordance with Article 106 of the Charter. Is it not obvious, however, that the mistrust which unfortunat<':!y exists here among the permanent members of the Security Council renders that possibility completely illusory? The position would certainly be entire1y different if, as was hoped by the authors of the Charter, harmony did exist among the Great Powers, aud if the Security Council had at its disposal the armed forces provided for by Article 43 of the Charter; but that state of ?ffairs is further off than ever. In these circumstances, rioes not wisdom bid us recognize that the relations between the Great Powers, the permanent members of the Security Council, are not such as to admit of effective application of the measures of coercion laid down in Chapter VII of the Charter? Without expressly saying so, the' Council has acted on that assumption up to the present. Of aU the possible solutions, th,e WOlcit would ·be to ntter threats whicn we would not carry out. The results would be disastI'ous for the authority of our Organization, and as regards Palestine in particular we should oruy have impeded the achievement of'that friendly settlement which alone, in the long run, can ensure tranquillity in a region of such essential importance for world peace. . . MI'. EBAN 'Jewish Agency for Palestine): The draft resolution of the United States calling for the determination of a threat to the peace and ~ order of cease-fire faces the Security Council and aIl parties to this discussion with. a grave but inescapable responsibility, for this discussion on whet.'le:r a threat ta the peace exists is proceeding against the background of an actual war. In the course .of yesterday afternoon's discussion [295th meeting], the representatives of Colombia and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic correctly pointed out that the Security Council is in an unusual position with i'fspect to its task of determining the existence of a threa~ Pal~tine". du· roi leS contre muniqués décrivent, tions en'train publié reconnaissance les "Nos des D'après matin, centrale de il coups nemi s'est retranché . Nos hauteurs'dominant la force d'exonérer certains .bilités qu'à termes tions, con~ucting. 'Thus, an Egyptl<ill communiqué issued on 18 May speaks of "reconnaissance patroIs making deep' penetrations into areas held by the enemy." The communiqué goes on: "Our planes this morning made a successful air raid on military objectives southeast of Tel Aviv." From the news reaching us this morning, those "military objectives" were the central bus station of that city. Last night the Defence Minister of Iraq published a communiqué in which he said: "Our artillery scored many direct hits on the fortresl in which the enemy is now entrenéhed, causing severe damage. Our forces aIso control plaées dominating Gesher"-(a Jewish village within the area assigned ta Israel under the'terms of the November resolution). . Auned force, then, is obviously being used, and there seems little purpose in attempting to exonerate GoverIiments from responsibilities which they candidly admit. It rerilaiIls, in our view,only for the Security Coun~il to consider whether the use of arméd force, which on this occasion is more than adequately determined, may be regarded as legitimate under the terms of the Charter. . c The Charter of the United Natk. is most explicit in distinguishing betwen the legitimate and the illegitimate use of armed force. According to .its provisions, for example, Egypt or Transjordan, l:l.S a Member State, is entitled to use its armed forces only for two categories of action. The first is in the event of.an attack being made upon thosecountries which they resist in self-defence, and in that cormexion the represen~ativc of Belgium has appropriately quotèd ArtIc\e 51. But to assess the relevance of that Article tothis situation, it may be appropriate d~fence nor ot collective international action, it is receiving a frank confession of aggrcssion. The representative of Egypt persists· in attempting to justify his Government's action by reference to a picruresque metaphor about a neighbour's house being in Harnes. We can search the pages of·this Charter in vain for any single word which entitles the armed forces of Egypt, or of any other State, to burst into adjoining territory in the role of a self-appointed fire extinguisher. If Member States could arrogate ta themselves the right to express their neighbourly feelings in this way, the international scene could be reduced to anarchy and the Charter to derision. It is furthermore apparent that the Egyptian forces propose to put out this fire by pouring oil upon it. Indeed, it is difficult not to feel a sense of intellectual. affront when we compare the soothing speeches of the Egyptian representative here, with the facts of the situation in the Nell' East. At the 292nd meeting of the Secur.ty Couneil held on 15 May, the representative .Jf Egypt said: "We are not going there to kill anyone or destroy any.thing. We are bent on the re-establishment and the maintenance of peace. ;. Anyone who does not attack will not be attacked." The Security Council has ample ~"Yidence upon which to judge whether Egyptian forces have killed anyone or destroyed anything. One hundred civilian casualties in the peaceful city .duquel Is it not reasonable to require that these efforts of the Egyptian Government to avoid molesting "anyone or anything" might include an effort ta keep their planes at home, in the territory ta which they belong, and beyond which they hllve not the faintest shadow of :right to operate at aU? The members of the Security Council do not have to take their memories back further than one decade to recall the previous occasion on which the aeria! bombardment of peaceful cities was described as' an attempt to restore order. Since this use of armed force constitutes a violation of the Charter, it is almost irrelevant ta examine the justifications which are invoked on its behalf. In a' political controversy a breach of the Charter does not become justified merely by strong convictions. Whether the legal c0i1tentians advanced by the Syrian or Egyptian representatives are correct or faIse, they cannot entitle those States or any other States te use armed force outside the strict limitations of the Charter. It may be worthwhile, however, to pass a brief comment on their legal justification, since this has already been the subject of comment this morning. We are told that the termination of the Mandate involves the immediate·independence of Palestine. Nobody will question that statement. However the Arab representatives go OIt asserting that the only form which that independence can legally take is the establishment of a unitary Arab State with a Jewish minority. This is a completely arbitrary and unilateral view, unsupported by a single word in the Palestine Mandate, and refuted by precedent alrcaày. . Palestine The whole Palestine question throughout these many long years, has been, in essence, nothing but a controversy about the legitimate form of independence to succeed the Mandate in Palestine. And it is not an unresolved controversy. The United Nations is not neutral in this matter, for the Maudatory Power recognized the General Assembly as the only tribunal authorized t') give judgment on this controversy. That judgment has been given. Should the independence of Palestine take the form of a unitary State with the Jews as a Ininority under Arab domination? This unitary Arab solution was considered, examined and ~' . .emPh.a.tiCall.y rejected by the General Assembly, last November, in its Ad Hoc Committee, by a .In conformity with the principles approved by the General Assembly, the State of Israel has arisen and now exists. Therefore, the ends of these Arab operations do nothing to justify their means. Arab arms .are being used to hold up the Chapter to violation, in support of ambitions which have been judged and found inadmissible by the highestcourt of international opinion. The 'Seeurity Couneil may thus be in a position ta appraise the sen~e of those speeches which described the establishment of Israel as an aet of rebellion. There is a rebellion here, but the rebels are those who defy international judgment and not those who carry out the principles of that judgment. I stress this today because we have heard the assertion of the United Kingdom this afternoon thata claim ta set ui? a. State on the bàsis of a principle rejectedby the General Assembly, and a claim, ta set up a State on the basis of a principle approved by the General Assembly, are equivalent, so thât there would be no$ing legally to ehoose between them. ~tead of aecepting thi'3 new principle, we prefer to rely on the st~_tement of Mr. Creech Jones on 11 DeGember, 1947, when, in announcing his Government's acceptance of the General Assembly's decision, he described it as a decision of the court·of international opinion, and urged aU parties to show it the greatest respect. At this point, out of respect for the representative of China, I should like to make abrief comment on his statement of 15 May [292nd meeting] to the effect that the proclamation of the Provisional Government of Israel was in some way contrary ta a resolution passed by the Security Couneil with reference to a truce. The resolution adopted by the Security Council on 17 April [document 8/723] never became the basis of an agreement but, in any case, if we l'ead its terms, it is cIear that the proclamation by the State of Israel of its own'independence, Once Palestine was faced with a vacuum of legal and actual authority then by the very laws of .political nature, those· who wished f'Ji' an orderly lie had to fill that vacuum; and the only question was whether the gap was to be filled in accordance with the principles of a unitary Palestine, which the General Assembly had rejected, or in accordance with the prind.. pIes of partition, wmch the General Assembly had approved. The text of the resolution of 17 April caUs upon the parties to refrain from political activitiea of this character "pending further consideration by the General Assembly of the futllre government of Palestine." But the General Assembly, several d:'!.ys befQre 15 May, ha:d ceased to corisider any measures to affect the future government of Palesti.:te, and was, at that time, èonc"'nling itself exc1usive!y with the final stages of theo.~~pointment of a Mcdia~or. For these reasons, as well as on general grounds, we would hope that the representative of China might reconsiderhis view that "no Government, organization or person·can, on the one hand, recûgnize the Jewish State, and, on the other hand, say to the. Arabs stop fighting" [292nd meeting]. In our understanding, there lests a permanent and absolutely unconditional duty .upon the .Security Councilto say "stop fighting." Those who will not unconditionally say "stop nghting" are implicitly saying "let.1ighting proceed." It is for'this reason~b.at the Jews of the State of Israel have always believed and stated that an unconditional cease-fire is ,the only possible starting point in the quest for peace. We retain that view now because we believe that no member of the Security Council on wmch the United Nations has conferred "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" would wish, by any action or omission, !o take the responsibmty of saying "let the fightmg proceed." One comment in conclusion; In his telegram to the Security Council [document 8/746], the Itis our view that the Security Council would nothave gane too far if, on the basis of available evidence, it determined not merely a breach of the peace, but also an. act of aggression. Now the fact that contending forces are intermingled in· different parts of the previously mandated territory of Palestine makes it difficult but not impossible to discover and determine who the aggressor is. Many States whose representatives are seated around the Security Council table were. invaded by outside' forces not long ago. In resisting and counteracting thoseinvasions, their forces found themselves, for a time, in 'the territory from which the aggression was launched-territory in wmch tlïey c1aimed no jurisdiction.But no man in his senses ever. clairned-that these operations, though offensive in the tactical sense, constituted aggression, for they were part of an essentially defensive design. Thê modern world recognizes only one eriterion of aggression, and that is the criterian of initiative: W!lO started the fighting? Who started the fighting inside Palestine? Who started the fighting from outside Palestine? Happily, on these questions, we have two authoritative . informants. Addressing the. Security Council on 16 April [283rd meeting], the representative of the Arab Higher çommittee, Jamal Bey HUrlSeini, said: "The representative of the Jewish Agency told us yeBterday that they were not attackers, not aggressors, that the Arabs had begun the fight, and that once the Arabs had stopped shooting, they would stop shooting also.. As a matter of fact, we do not deny this facto . . Wè told the whole world . . . that we were going to fight ..." As for the initiative of fighting from outside Palestine, we have before uS telegrams from the Egyptian Foreign Minister, the Secretary- General of the Arab League and the King of Transjordan avowing their initiative in this matter and seeking to justify it. We do not criticise the resoJ:.:tion for confining itself to the question of a breach of the peace and for not prejudging the question of 'aggression. Speed makes it essential that com~ plex question of determination might be postponed. But 'I onl.y mentï9n this point of aggression to show that this resolution presented by the United States does not, by any means, overstate' the case. The only specifie point 1 would make on that resolution is the necessitJ for the cease-fire to be immediate, and not ·t~') That is aU we ~ave to sayat this stage. We cannot think that it iS only the peace of Israel which is at issue today. The future of the Charter of the United Nations is aIso at issue, the Charter whose most vital provisions relating to th\:; use of armed force are being most qpenly and flagrantly viokted. Today, as so often in history's inscrutable constancy, the cause. of Israelis 1inked with a wider universal ideal. We feel that the new State of Israel and the authority of the United Nations are associated in a common opportunity, but als.o in a common danger. Le par sement tâche, ganisation Conseil plissement 'de laissera pas gation , possibles: paix situation L'autre paix hostile . jours Unies' paix pure croyons peut impliquant présentes, Pour des moyens des Membres. vigueur encore sacrifices une partage poursui,vre répondre Mr. TSIANG (China): The broad purpose of the draft resolutio~ introduced by the delegation of the United States is th,,: reostoratipn of peace in Palestine. It is a noble purpose, ar i one . wlùch is also the raison d'être of the United Nations in general and of the Security Couneil in particular. In the accomplishniènt of that purpose, my delegation has not been found and will not be found to lag one step, or even a half step, behind any other delegation. In connexion with the situation in Palestine, my delegation ean envisage two kinds of peace. ~ne kind is simple peace-peace ",ithout. prejudice.· te> the rights, daims and legal.position of the two parties concerned. The other type of pea~e. which we can envisage is peace with partitIon. . . My delegation has never taken an anti-partition ~ttitude. We have, however, always urged . the DluLed Nations to promote peace-simple ~eace-above everything eIse. We think that· a sunple peace is a more just peace. We aIso think that a simple peace is an casier achievement than a peace with partition. 1 know very well that, under the present cir- ~umstances in Palestine, peace will not come of ~tself. A simple peace would require means of unplementation, which.might entail considerable sacrifice.c; on the part.of Member States. But 1 cont~nd that a peace with partition would req,u:re even greater means of implementation, Whlcu lIught entail greater sacrifices in .blood and money. . As 1 have s.aid, 1 think that a simple peace is a ~ore just peace. A peace with partition is not so Just. Before 1 proceed wlth that argument, h?wever, 1 should like to answer the :representative of the Jewis1,l Agency. 1 did not say that In this connexion, 1 must make another remark. During the last two or three months, 1 have recûved many letters from my Jewish friends. Some have put this question to me: "What wrong have the Jews done to China?" ûiliers have reminded me that, in China's long struggle against the Japanese aggressor, Jews aIl over the world lent their support to the cause of China. Still other Jewish friends have reminded me that, in the great sufferings due to natura! disaster in China, Jews in this country, as weIl as Jews elsewhere, have contributed liberally to relief in China. 1 acknowledge those facts. We Chinese are not a forgetful people. The things of which these Jewish friends have reminded me are true. We remember them. But we cannot repay one friend with the interest and rights of another group of friends. 1 should aIse like to say in this connexion that we have not sought and we have not been offered oil' concessions or strategic bases in the Middle East. 1 would add that 1 do not approve of aIl that the Arab League and the Arab States have done in this connexion. Having made these preliminary remarks, let me proceed to elaborate upon the fact that to my mind a simple peace is the more just peace and that a peace with partition is not so just. We have befo:'e us the cablegram dated 15 May 1948 (dr;rument 8/747) addressed to the Secretary-General by the Foreign Secretary of the Provisional Government of Israel. In that document we find this sentence:, ". . . 'We members of national council representing Jewish people in Palestine and Zionist mùvement, met together in solemn assembly today, day of termination of British Mandate for Palestine, by virtue of natural and historie right of Jewish people and of resolution of General Assembly hereby proclaim establishment of Jewish State in Palestine to be called Israel." 'There are three dahn,: "ln ~..,hich the establishment of a separate State is based: one, natural rights; two, historie rights; and three, the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 , N'Jvember. Let me discuss the first ciaim which'is that of m..lural right. 1 do not deny that the JeWll have some natura! right. 1 would, howev~r, caU the attention of the Security Cauncil to the fact The second daim is that of historie right. 1 do not deny the historie right. When 1 consider the historie connexion of the Jewish people with Palestine, 1 often say to myself that 1 wish the Arabs would see the political wisdom of conceding an independent Jewish State. 1 say the "political wisdom", not the right because if we look at the history of Palestine, we find that it is a.TI undeniable fact that the Arabs have been there continuously for more than a thousand years. How can we allow one historie right to cancel another historie right? The third claim is based on the resolution 181 (II) of the General Assembly. As a matter of principle, 1 wish we could amend the Charter sa that resolutions of the General Assembly would be binding on aIl the parties concerned. But that is not the legal situation today. Furthermore, in regard to this particular resolution, 1 have honestly failed to find any Charter basis for it. 1 cannot find any part of the Charter which justifies the United Nations in ordering the partition :lf any country or territory. 1 do not say that these claims are unfounded. My contention is that these claims are not com- ·plete. They are in conflict with other daims which we have to consider. In such a confusion of law and history, it seems to me that we are not justified in imposing partition on Palestine. Therefore, for these reasons 1 have always considered that a simple peace in Palestine is a more just objective than a peace with partition. My delegation regrets that it cannat support the United States draft resolution. That resolution differs from ail the previous proposals of the'United States delegation both in this Council and in the special session of the General As3embly. It differs in two respects. Unless 1 misunderstand its implications this resolution caIls for peace with partition. If 1 should be wrong in my interpretation, 1 should welcome a correction. But as 1 understand the draft resolution, it calls for a peace with partition. In all the previous resolutions there have been clauses or articles pointing out that a cessation ?f hostilities or a truce would be without prejud- Ice to the rights, daims, or legal positions of the ~arti~ concerned. This is particularly emphaslzed in the latest' version of that idea which was contained in the truce proposaI which -the head of the United States delegation communicated ta the President of the Security Council on 13 "During the period of the truce, and without prejudice ta the future governmental structure of Palestine, existing Arab and Jewish authcrities shall function as temporary truce regimes in the areas in which such authorities now exercise control and shaH afford full and equal rights ta all inhabitants in such areas." And in article 6 which says: "During the period of the truce, and without prejudice ta the future governmental structure of Palestine, no steps shall be taken by Arab or Jewish authorities ta proclaim a sovereign State in a part or all of Palestine or ta seek international recognition therefore." That is the conception of a simple peace. In this resolution we have the contrary idea of peace with partition. This resolution would require implementation. It will not implemer.t itself. If force should be used, no matter what we say in words, that f~rce, that expedition would be an expedition for partiti.on. We would not be trying to maintain a simple peace per se. We would be trying ta e:!lforce partition. That is my first and most important objection ta this draft resolution. This draft resolution differs from all previous resolutions inasmuch as this is the first time we are urged to proceed under Chapter VII. AlI our previous efforts have been confined ta the provisions of Chapter VI. 1 shall not engage in a discussion of the technical or judical questions involved; in that respect 1 would simply state that I am more inclined ta adopt the views advanced here by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Belgium' unless and until the International Court of Justice decides otherwise. If we had an a.uthoritive decision on that point, I should certainly accept it. It is my understanding that when the ward "peace" is used in any international dûcument it means international peace. In our handling of this grave problem, the friends of the United Nations have been legitimately concerned about the prestige of the, future of the United Nations. Those friends have called for strong and speedy action. They want a Security Council order or resolution with what they calI "'teeth" in it. If I had to choose between a weak United Nations and a strong United Nations, of course like everybody eIse, I should choose a strong United Nations. H, however, I had to choose between a just United "No document issued. The truce articles were distributed private1y to members of the Security Count'il. However, human choices are never so simple. The real choice may be between a strong and unjust United Nations and a weak and just United Nations. That choice is a hard choice. 1 hope 1 shan not have to face it, but if 1 were to be! faced withthat choice, 1 should choose the weak but just United Nations. We shall not enhance the prestige of this great Organization, even if it is backed by the might of the mightiest nations, unless our decisions are just.

Unless there is any objection, 1 propose that the 'Council should adjoum the meeting now. Mr. Austin, the United States representative, asked , me if he could be free by 5.30 p.m. ln order to lose no time, we might meet again tomorrow at 10.30 a.m. The representative of Canada has been good enough to postpone the meeting of the Commission for Conventional Armaments which had been arranged fol' that time.