S/PV.298 Security Council

1 have no more speakers on my list, and 1 suggest, therefore, that we adjourn the meeting now and meet again this afternoon at 3 p.m. inscrit la après-midi TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY-EIGHTH MEETING Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 20 May 1948, at 3 p.m. President: Ml'. A. PAROOI (France). Present: The representatives of the following countries: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, . Colombia, France, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet So- cialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Re- publics, United Kingdom, United States of America. .Argentine, France, d'Ukraine, soviétiques, rique. 63. Continuation of the discussion on the Palestine question 63. General McNAUGHTON (Canada): The issue now before the Security Council is a grave one, and 1 agree that the Security Council should take prompt measures to meet this most serious duit vant d'accord So far, the Security Council has sought to bring an end to the hostilities in the Holy Land by way of a truee, a standstill agreement and negotiatiàns through the Truce Commission , whirch has been set up by the Security Council as :a body of conciliation. It is now proposed, in the draft resolution submitted by the representa- tive of the United States [document S/749] that the Security Council should issue an order to all concerned in Palestine to desist from any hostile military action. This is a serious step for the Security Council to contemplate. If this procedure is adopted, it means that the Security Council would now be taking action under Chapter VII of the Char- ter: in other words, the Security Council might he attempting to proceed by way of coercion instead of the procedures of pacific settlement which we have followed heretofore. The order proposed in the Qraft resolution of the United States, if .adopted, must, of course, be regarded as mandatory upon those to whom it is addressed; and it is to be hoped that such an order would indeed be obeyed, for any neglect in obedience, for any reason, would be defiance of the Charter. The grave question therefore arises: what shall the Security Council do if .the or.der is rejected and defied by one or the other of Ôe parties, or by both? 'The Charter envisages, in Chapter VII, various coercive measures which it would be within the discretion of the Security Council to impose in order to give effect to its decision. But we all know that any action under Chapter VII requires the concurring votes of all the per- manent members in order to enable the Security Council to reach a decision. 1 therefore submit that, before the Secu·rity Council embarks upon a course of action under Chapter VII, it is im- perative that consl,1ltation should take place be- tween the permanent members of the Security Council, with aview to establishing a basis of agreement, which at present is apparently non- existent, as to what conseçutive steps might follow, in the way of diplomatie, economic or even military pressure, if an order of the Se- curit,! Council to cease military action in Pales- tLue were not obeyed. In that way, the Security ln the meantime, the Security Council has before it a proposaI by the representative of the United Kingdom [document 8/755] to amend the United State~ draft resolution. This pro- posaI, like the one submitted by the Unit~d States representative, would calI upon aU parties ta cease hostile military action; but, unlike the prçposal ~f the United States represe~ta~ive, this United Kingdom proposal, as 1 see lt, 18 a con- tirmation of the efforts of the Security Council ta provide an opportunity to both parties ta arrive at a just and lasting settlement in Pales- tine by means of negotiation. It does not involve measures of coercion by the Security Council. 1 therefore think that it proposes .a useful step which we should take now. However, whether the Security Council pro- ceeds on the basis of the approach proposed in the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the United States or continues along the lines suggested by the delegation of the United King- dom, surely it must be realized that, in the end, only a negotiated settlement will lead ta a just and lasting peace in Palestine. It is for that reason that 1 continue ta lay the greatest em- phasis on the full organization of the Truce Commission and on the appointment of a Mediator, as called for by the resolution of the General Assembly.2

1 have no more speakers on my list, and unless someone wants ta speak, 1 shall now out1ine the point of view of the delegation of FRANCE. 1 shaU begin by recalling a few facts. In pursuance of the task it had undertaken at the outset of the session of the General Assembly, the French delegation had tried, a few days agolast week in fact-to secure the adoption of positive measures [document A/C.l/8C.lO/l/ Rev.2] for the protection of the city of Jerusalem, ta isolate that city from the conflict and ta make it a starting point from which peace might be extended ta the whole of Palestine. Our endeavours have not been successful; they have failed, and they failed finaUy last Friday at the [141st] meeting of the First Committee and subsequent1y at the [135th] meeting of the General Assembly itself. It has been argued m: the First Committee -that same Friday, 1 think-that the measures we regarded as effective, and which we advocated together with the United States, might 1 shall now deal with the situation as it confronts us. First of aIl, 1 should like to give my personal opinion on the advisability of examining the legal aspect of the Palestine question 'at the present stage. 1 feel that the question facing u~ is so doubtful in law that if the Security Council·: were to embark upon this subject it might riever emerge from such a debate. What is the character of the territory of Palestine, now? What we know for certain is that this. territory has been under a League of Nations Mandate and that the Mandatory Power has now withdrawn therefrom. 1 know of no text, rule or precedent defining the status of a territory which has been, but no longer is, under a Mandate. The League of Nations, which had established the Mandate, no longer exists, and the extent to which the United Na- ~tions lias inherited the obligations of the League' ·of Nations is also a doubtful and controversial question. Moreover, from a United Nations viewpoint, the question as to where we now stand, after aIl the debates we have devoted to this problem, is no less doubtful. When discussing the application of the resolution of November last," the Security Council recoiled from implementation measures lest they rnight lead to an outbreak of hostilities~ We have tried by various means to find such a solution as might have prevented hostilities, but have found none, and hostilities have now broken out. We are now emerging from a second or rather the third session of the Assembly devoted to this subjt:ct with a series of documents admitting of any amount of arguments enabling it to be maintained that we are still bound by the November resolution or, contrariwise, that this resolution is suspended or inapplicable. On aIl these P9ints and from .whatever angle we consider the legal aspect of the Palestine question, we may run the risk of coming to this: even if we succeed in distinguishing between the legal and the political points of view~no easy cette pour décisive vant blème être qu'on sur blée Frankly speaking, 1 do not think that the setclement of the problem facing us can be decisively afIected, at least for the time being, by such an analysis of the legal situation. Indeed, the problem is one of peace or war, and 1 think that it should be considered on its own merits, irrespective of the positions adopted regarding the status of Palestine or the General Assembly resolution of November 1947. deux ment du celui texte pitre longation de que à acte We have now before us two 'resolutions which ale fundamentally different, in the sense that one is based upon Chapter VII of the Charter and the other on Chapter VI. If we refer to the Charter, we see that Chapter VI deals with disputes the continuance of which is likely ta endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, whereas Chapter VII contemplates action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. ne ne menace, invite laisse que la maintenant rompue, plus pas rue, considérer du Charte? les de Personally, in view of the terms of the Charter, I do not think I have the right not to note that there now exists a threat to the peace. This is what we are asked to do by the United States draft resolution which does not mention the word "aggression". As a matter of fact, hostilities are taking place in Palestine, peace is not only threatened but already broken and the situation may become even more serious in the future; 1 do not think that on reading his newspaper, the man in the street, anywhere in the world, could have any doubt about these facts. Do these facts come under Chapter 'VI or Chapter VII of the Charter? Personally, I think the answer is quite clear: when the provisions of the Charter mention peace, they refer to international peace. ' velopper entre tine une menace tilités ensuite, des de contribué encore constater la armées leurs qui When fighting began in Palestine, we did not ~onsider it to be a threat to the peace because 1t was a struggle between two sections of the Palestine population taking place inside one and the same country. When these operations then spread and when armed bands and irregulal' troops came from the outside and led hostilities ta spread, we still did not consider that we had ta note the existence of a threat to the peace or a breach of international peace. But the moment the regular forcés of several countries cro~sed their frontiers and entered a territory WhlCh, whatever its status, was not their own, t~e moment fighting continued in these conditions and became more serious, we clearly had ta deal with the question of international peace .A very serious objection has been raised ta the Security Council acting under the terms of Chapter VII. It/has been voiced most forcibly by tJte Belgian representative, in particular [296th meeting] and his argument is this: if we adopt Chapter VII as a basis for our proceedings, we do not know exactly where we shall end; we may have to take serious measures which will worsen the situation instead of improving it; we mây start treading a path which will lead us to failure because we do not have adequate means of enforcement at our disposal. 1 recognize fully the gravity of the situation and of the responsibility we shall have to take upon ourselves, and 1 fully agree that the Security Council would be failing in its duty if it did not proceed with the utmost caution. . . But unless 1 misunderstand the terms of the Charter, we cannot, under Article 39, refuse to note the existence of a threat ta the peace when such a threat exists. On the contriry, 1 think that the Security Council has wide dis- èretionary powers regarding the choice of measures for dealing with such an eventuality. It goes without saying that the Security Council has full powers to decide on the measures which mayhave ta be taken. 1 thil1k that in certain circumstances it would be perfectly within our right to consider that, although there is a threat ta the peace or a breach of the peace, it would be preferable-from the point of view of the interests entrusted to us-to take no executory measure. However, this question only arises at a later stage of our proceedings. It is true that if we note that a threat to peace exists, but fail to take action accordingly, we ron the risk of being misunderstood and of cômpromising the authority of the United Nations. 1 think, however, that if such a situation arose tomorrow, we should meet with greater understanding-provided we explained our motives -than if, in the face of a clear and flagrant threat to peace, we failed to take the first stcp prescribed by the Charter by recognizing the true state of affairs. " The other draft resolution before us, that sub- .mitted by the United Kingdom, invokes Chapter VI of the Charter and is a sequel to the efforts of mediation and conciliation already undertaken by the Security Council. In this connexion, We have two instruments of action at our disposaI-the Truce Commission and the Mediator whom the Assembly has decided to appoint. As far as the latter is concemed, it is absohtely necessary that we should now r roceed to his appointment. 1 intend to ask the permanent members of the Security Council to be so good as to gather for a short meeting at the end of the present meeting in order to' discuss again the appointment of a Mediator. As regards the Truce Commission, We are aware through the telegrams which we received this morning [297th meeting] of the difficult position in which it finds. itself. 1 am of the opinion that we should thlnk of widening its field of action by placing more men and greater facilities at its disposaI.. It is a qt:::stion which "Ne should examine with care, so as to increase the effectiveness of the Commission's work and .to give it possibilities of action which, at present, it does not possess. If we confine ourselves to that, 1 do not think that we shall have made a substantial addition to the resolutions already taken and which we . know ta have been insufficient. If, on the other hand, we adopt at least part of the V nited States draft resolution which notes that there is a threat ta peace-and here 1 will make a point which 1 did not stress before: the V nited States resolution makes no reference to aggression, it does not name an aggrer:;....~ and therefore avoids all the involved and l'f,)blematic discussion which would arise in that connexion-if, 1 repeat, the United States resolution were adopted as being within the framework of Chapter VII, 1 feel sure that the Mediator, the Truce Com-. mission and any other bodies which we may appoint in future would be better equipped to receive due attention from the parties concemed, which so far we have failed to receive. In the telegrams read ta you this moming, the Truce Commission inbrmed us, through its Chainnan, that it believed it had exhausted aIl possibilities of action.based on its prerogatives an~ on decisions already adopted by the Secunty Council. Those telegrams indicate that, failing stronger pressure on the two parties concemed, the Commission will be unable to achieve further results. To sum up, I for my part do not feel that I can fail to acknowledge that there is a threat to peace and a breach of the peace when the facts are as clear as they are in the present case. I note that the United States resolution does not try to solve the problematic question of who is the aggressor ïn this case. 1 note that if we follow its line we shall in no way stultify the efforts of negotiation and mediation which must be made. I believe that by doing so, we should, on the contrary, be granting to those who are continuing their efforts to reconcile the two parties on our behalf the authority without which those efforts can evidently no longer be effective. In the light of these considerations, I shall vote in favour of the resolution submitted by the United States of America. I would like to add, however, that I thiJ?k that the part of the resolution which stipulates that the parties must issue a cease-fire order within thirty-six hours might perhaps be modified. I reserve the right to make further observa· tions on this point if, in the light of the discussion, it appears advisable to do so. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): This morning the Security Couneil heard the statement of the representative of the Arab Higher Comrilittee, in which he stated that the Arab Higher Committee, as we know, represents the' majority of the inhabitants of Palestine. The second point he made was that Palestine is a member of the Arab League. The Arab States, which have established their League in the area, which is in conformity with the original arrangement as provided for in Article 52 of the Charter, have alwaY!l considered Palestine as one of their members. The third point made by the representative of the Arab Higher Committee was that, after the termination of the Mandate, the majority of the population of Palestine found itself with the difficulty of facing a rebellious minority, and it asked its allies to come to its aid in order to clear up the confusion. That confusion was preventing it from exercising its independence, which was its right after the termination of the Mandate, and was preventing it from exercising its right of self-determination. Under these eircumstances when you have the intervention of certain allies to help the majority, in a given country, to suppress a rebellion of a minority within that country, I do not see how any action can be taken unèer Article 39 of the Charter. I wish to state here thal. since its establishment the Security Council has been seized with Another dispute conceming Indonesia occurred last year: and no such resolution was adopted. The Security Couneil was satisfied with a cease-fire order and mediation, and constituted a .Commission in Indonesia" tü supervise the cease-fire order and the mediation and to keep the Security Council informed. In both of these disputes in Indonesia the casualties were in the tens of thousands. They were much more serious than the case of PaÏestine which isnow before the Security Council. In those cases the Security Council never took action under Chapter VII of the Charter. Another case with which the Security Couneil was seized was the Greek question, in 1946, and it was submitted, l believe, by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: In this matter, another Government was accused of having armed forces in Greece. The Security Council rejected this claim on the ground that the foreign troops in Greece were there at the request of the Greek Government for the purpose of helping it to suppress a rebellious minority which was trying to overthrow the Greek Government. The matter was dismissed without the Security Council having adopted any resolution to the effect that there was a threat to or a breach of the peace." That action was correct. The majority of the people of Greece had called upon their allies to help them suppress a state of disorder which existed in their country. In that they were fuliy correct. That is similar to what is now going on in Palestine. A second case conceming Greece was submitted to the Security Council last year: The ~ecurity Council considered the matter for a long time. At the end, it never adopted a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter. Action taken by the Sf:curity Council was always taken under Chapter VI of the Charter, "Pacific Settlements of Disputes." The last case in that connexion of which the TheSeeurity Couneil did .not consider that there was any threat to the peace or a breach of the peace. If a breach of the peace·were to be considered as such when disorderll took place in a country, and if a fo;teign State and ally entering a country to assist the majority, at its request, were to be considered as constituting a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace, it should also be so considered in the cases of Kashrnir, Greece, and Indonesia, which cases occurred about the end' of 1946. However, it was not done then. The precerIènts which we now have before us in the history of the Security Council do not justify that any such decision should be taken now, or that it should be proposed now by the United. States draft proposal, as supported and. advocated now by the representative of France. 1 do not wish to say anything about the mem· bers of the Security Council who are nonpermanent members, as they change {rom time to time, but permanent members like France, which assisted h, aIl these cases in the past, should not argue in favour of or advocate such a proposaI, as did the French representative in his last statement. 1 do not think that the adoption of such a resolution determining the existence of a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace in Palestine would help, as he supposes, to br1I1g about a peaceful solution for the future. 1 presume just the contrary. If such a resolution were ta be passed, perhaps it would be adding gasoline to the fire. It would cause sorne people to despair and to takes action themselves.. 1 believe that it would be a waste of time to do it in that way. It would have no useful purpose at aIl in calming the country, establishing order there, and leading to a solution of the problem. Mediation which is proposed and decided by the General Assembly if it is conducted and dealt with carefully and wisely, may perhaps lead to sorne good results by convincing the parties who are contesting-namely the majority and the minority in Palestine-to come to sorne ferms for a regime or government in Palestine which would assure and guarantee the legitimate rights ançl aspirations of both sides. This is the only way ta do it and not by tlrreats, by force, nor by anything of that nature which will not lead to the result and the goal we are aiming at. Mr. LOPEZ (Colombia): The case we have under consideration is so extremely important and is commanding such wide attention that 1 find it only too natural that aIl the members of The few remarks that 1 am going to make are connected with what Ml'. Austin yesterday very properly called "the condition of fact" [296th meeting], that condition of fact to which the President called the attention of the Security Council wiili great pertinence. Before 1 say anything on that, 1 should like to review very briefly the position of the Colombian delegation and the position of the case from the point of view of t..he United Nations, as we see it. Our own. position can be very briefly stated as follows. We did not vote for partition; we abstained from supporti,ng partition, not because we were opposed to partition as a matter of principle, or because we were for or against any of the two parties involved in this matter. We thought that the resolution of 29 November was a hasty resolution, and we said so. It was our belief that what the General Assembly had to adopt was a good resolution and not a hasty one. We then very timidly suggested l1 that the General Assembly might do weIl to give further consideration to some aspects of the problem, particularly to those problems regarding which the Arab States complained that they had not been given due time to present and debate. If 1 remember rightly, one of our contentions was that the resolution did not represent the majority opinion of the General Assembly, and that according to the debates in the Political and Security Committee and in the ad hoc Committee, and according to the votes taken on the different proposaIs, it had then appeared to he a minority proposaI; we argued that, in our opinion, it would remain a minority proposa}, no matter what pressure might be brought to bear for the pUlpose of securing the additional votes, in order to get the necessary two-thirds majority for the adoption of the resolution. As it has developed, the partition proposaI has not been able to command the backing or the deep support that would 10gicaJ.1y seem to follow from the fact that it has been adopted by the GeneraI Assembly with the necessary two-thirds votes. At every new stage we find the same condition of affairs: the partition proposaI does not command sufficient strength or backing so as to commend itself to very generaI approval. 1 am notdiscussing its merits, but just making 1 shall not indulge in a discussion of what happened in the Security Council, because that, of course, aIl the members of the Security Council know as well as 1 do. The fact-'and this is what we might calI a hard and stubbom factis that the Security Council referred the matter back to the General Assembly for further consideration [document S/714]. While the matter was being considered by the Security Council, my delegation pointed out that none of the assumptions on which the resolution was based had tumed out to be well founded in facto They wcre not well founded, and they proved nol. to he. . The matter therefore went back to the General Assembly for reconsideration at a special session, which has just c1osed, and again the General Assembly did nothing of a constructive nature. It did not specifically confirm the resolution; it did not abrogate or invalidaté the reso- 'luti.on. Apparently, it was satisfied to suspend the Palestine Commission, which had previously been appointed by the General Assembly to carry out the resolution. Before 1 proceed to the questiop of the Mediator, l should like to say that, in all the legal discussions of this question, 1 have greatly missed any opinion on what seems to me to be a very relevant point: What happens now to the resolution of 29 November 1947? What is its standing now? It seems to me that one of the first things that we have to determine is whether, as some people seem to imply, it is true that, because it was not implemented, the responsibility of the United Natlons stopped there. l doubt very much whether that is sO. 1 doubt that there is any anaiogy between the PalestÏnian question and, let us say, the Indonesian problem. By the very act of adopÜng the resolution of 29 November 1947, thl;. United Nations took upon itself the responsibility for setting in motion aIl the present event~ in Palestme. 1 do not know how contentious that statement may appear to be. It may be a very rough contention. But the fact is-and this seems to me to be another hard and stubbom fact-that the General Assembly agreed to the termination of the British Mandate. The United Kingdom decided when it would terminate the Mancar une - juridiques - suivre convenait Nations retirer disposition Palestine, rien mêmes. That is another very hard and stubborn fact, because one of the questions that we have to consider-regardless, 1 might almost say, of what the legal position is-is whether we can proeeed on the assumption that it was perfectly proper fo.r the Uni~ed Nati~ns to .allow the United Kingdom to get out oi Palestme and to make no provision for the future government of Palestine, simply by the assumption that, if nothing were done, the situation would take care of itself. mêmes gées. conditions guerre, déclarant en actuellement et, ou nous rien ments The situation could not take care of itself and did not take care of itself. On the contrary, we have drifted into the present condition of warfare, and l do not believe that 1 am too bold in saying that we knowingly drifted into that situation. Nothing that is happening in Palestine has come as a surprise to anyone-least of all, to the General Assembly or the Security Council. For a whole year, we have known what was going to happen. Nothing new, nothing unexpected, is happening. As far as the position of the Arab States is coneerned, 1 remember very weIl, that, before the close of the regular session of the General Assembly in 1947, they publicly announced to the General Assembly that they did not accept the. resolution and that they were going to fight ta the last man before accepting partition.'" Ever sinee, every Arab State has repeatedly declared what it was going to do-and now they are telling us that t11ey are doing what they announced ail along that they were going to do; There is, then, no surprise. The situation that exists today hc:s developed with the full knowledge, almost Wlth the consent, of the Security Council. rappelle session 1947, l'Assemblée résolution 'jusqu'au le annoncé à sont avaient rien prévaut pée au dire ~t the last [135th] meeting of its recent special sesslOn, the General Assembly provided for the appointment of a Mediator to be agreed upon by the five permanent members of the Security Council. That was decidéd almost a full week récente rale d'un bres ~go. To all intents. and purposes, the Mediator l:ie y a déré 18 supposed to be the joint representative of the Security Council and the General Assembly in Two or three days ago, the President told me not to be pessimistic. 1 am generally more optimistic than the President. But, on tbis occasion on which 1 have been more pessimistic, facts a:gain seem to be coming to my support. The Mediator has not been appointed. 1 suppose there are very good reasons for not havlng appointed the Mediator, but what 1 wish to say is that it would be very bad if, instead of having the . Mediator appointed with the necessary speed, we should be given, tomorrow or the day after, or the following day, or the following week, very good additional reasons for not having appointed him. Ail this is happening while the trouble that existed at first has now actually developed in Palestine. Originally the native groups in Palestine-the Arabs and the Jews-only took the preliminary steps for fighting; now there is a much broader situation in which the neighbouring States are involved. 1 need not repeat all the efforts that have beenmade in order to bring .about a truce in Palestine because it would be unnecessarily consuming the time of the Security Council. While 1 was President of the Security Council, last month, it was my privilege to talk to the representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee, in formaI and infomial discussions, for che purpose of bringing about a resolution regardirig a truce. The best .thing we could do was to produce a series of resolutions calling for a truce, which, according to the two resolutions we are now discussing, have not been complied with. ln the General Assembly, we also abstained from voting, in favour of the appointment of the Mediator; and when the matter of the appointment of the Consular Commission in Palestine was brought up, we also refrained from voting. Every other day 1 have brought up before the Security Council the matter of the TruceCommission, not because 1 intend to be unnecessarily critical of the Truce Commission, and much less ofany of its m~mbers-I do :not know any of them, and 1 have no reason to say anything that may displease them or that may seem derogatory of their ability-but as a member of the Security Council, 1 believe it is my coup d'insistance. lutions sion été fonctionne sécurité. 1bring up this matter again, very respectfully, but very emphatically. Why? Because these two resolutions refer to the Mediator and to the 'j'ruce Commission-to the Mediator who has not been appointed and to the Truce Commission that is not functioning to the satisfaction of the Security Council. l'Assemblée la Nous ou cutons nommé, Commission tionnement rité. piétiner nous We now have a resolution of the General Assembly [resolution 181(II)], the validity of which is being debated here at great length. We do not know if it stands or if it does not stand; if it is applicable or if it is inapplicable. We are discussing the subject of a Mediator who has not been appointed, and we are referring these matters to a Truce Commission that is not functioning to the satisfaction of the Security Council. Therefore, 1 say: what is the use of continuing to tread along the same path that has proved to be so unfruitful until the present moment? encore résolutions, que présent, abouti échec établi que seil de tendre difficulté, dans That is not aIl; a more serious question arises. We have before us now two resolutions, and we are moving around the two resolutions because we are very mindful of the fact that what brought the former efforts of the Security Council to an impasse-not to mention a failure-is another hard and stubborn fact: that the five permanent members of the Security Council generally have failed to agree on any important question. Furthermore, at every moment and at each new step, we are confronted with the same difficulty. hypothèse permanents raient pas s'établir, ne alternative: ou blir quelque s'établir. née guerre j'estime nationale où nouvelle faute rer, Canada, Conseil tent tinuer celle-ci membres Our Organization was built upon the basis. and the assumption that there would be cooperation among the five permanent members of the Security Council. There is no such cooperation. Moreover, whenever there is any likelihood of such co-operation, somehow or other it does not work out. Therefore, it beçomes . a question of one of two alternatives: either there is no co-op'eration, or when there is the likelihood of co-operation, it is not fulfilled; it does not work but, or something îs done which causes a stoppage. In view of another factor that 1 have already mentioned-that we are moving into a war situation which can extend-I believe that one of the essential conditions of the maintenance of international peace is to know exactly where we stand. Before we embark on any new and serious step which may fail by default, we should make sure, as the representative of Canada suggested a few minutes ago, that the five permanent members of the Security Council can get together and agree to act together. There is no use in continuing with a situation such as this without the assumption that the permanent ?Iembers can get together and Lo-operate; and if they are not able to do so, the whole wor~d Before. discussing the draft resolutions, 1 should like to say something that impresses me as being very important. We have now what set:;ms to me a rather extraordinary case. For sorne time past, nations have gone to war without previous notification to the other party. It has been claimed that it was not in conformity with internationallaw to do so, but nevertheless that is the way It has been done. If previous notice was given, it was given at such a time and in such a way as not to give the other party time to make any preparations ta protect itself. But in this case we are returning to the old practice. When Egypt decided to intervene actively in Palestine, it duly notified the Security Council [document 8/743]. It cabled directly ta the President of the· Security Cauncil, saying: "We are going into Palestine with our army." When King Abdullah deeided ta go into Palestine, he duly 'notified the Security Council that he was moving his army into Palestine [document 8/748]. That has aIl been done in accordance with the best etiquette of war. There has been no sin of omission, nothing that is not in canformity with the niceties of international practice. AlI the members of the Security Council have copies of the cablegrams before them. 1 submit that these cablegrams are not olily notices to the Security Council that the Arab States are moving into Palestine, but something at least equally serious from our point of view. 1 contend that they are an invitation ta the Security Couneil to do its duty. 1 be1ieve that these notices were sent to the Security Council for several very definite purposes. One purpose was to see to it that the Security Council should have no excuse not to take adequate and prompt action. Perhaps 1 am wrong, but 1 believe that that is the obvious sense of these cablegrams. Whether or not they were inspired by the' slow way in which the Security Council generally moves is beside the point. What 1 do believe-and this is an optimistic assumption-;-is that the Arab States sent these notices .in order to ensure that the Security Council could act promptly. 1 believe it is the duty of the Security Council to act promptly. My optimis!Jl does not end there. 1 have listened very carefully to what the repreeentatives of the parties have said-more carefully than 1 listened to the legal arguments concerning the different Articles of the Charter. 1 have been greatly impressedby the telegram addressed by King Abdullah to the Secretary- General, in which King Abdullah says: "1 am nevertheless persuaded that the Jewish people as a whole desire to live in amity with the Arabs. Everything cries for intervention to haIt this butchery. We now declare our readiness to give the.Jews in Palestin.e full Arab nationality in· a umtary State, sharmg aIl that we share, while yet enjoying a special administration in particular areas. ~hu.s w!ll end the slaugh~er and the people WIll hve m peace and secunty forever." The last paragraph of the telegram, of course, refers to the opposing opinions as to how the State should be constituted. However, the important thing to bear in mind is that King Abdullah has very specifically toid the Security Council, in giving notice of the action he intellds to take, that "everything cries for intervention to haIt this butchery." Why, then, lose sa much time in arguing as ta things which have been established so clearly, so definite1y and so simply? envisagée i tre ne fait qu'il actes, cutés pour que, créée, sure mations en formations, moment de existe nous 1 do not know whether 1 am using too much time in repeating things that have a~ready been said or in making statements that will serve no useful purpose, but 1 should like to ask this: lof the case is as 1 have just described it, or is sub-' stantially similar to that, are we justified in leaving the matter of the appointment of the Mediator pending? ls the offict of Mediator, as was contemplated by the General Assembly, the most adequate organ of the Security Council to negotiate an understanding between the two parties-if that is what we are seeking? 1 should like to make another point. It has been established, 1 believe, that the Truce Commission is not functioning efficientJy. Whether that has-as 1 believe it has-or has not a certain connexion with movements and actions and policies which have not yet been discussed and are beside the point at the' moment, the fact remains that, since the appointment of the Truce Commission, the Security Council has not been able to get information from that Commission as regularly as we had anticipated and as we should expect. Even if we had, my contention is that when that Çommission was appointed it was impossible to take account of the situation as it exists today. 1 respectfully submit that if we want to rnake a serious effort in the way of negotiating an understanding and setting up an organ which That is why, when 1 made a first casual remark on this situation, 1 ventured to suggest that it might be necessary to appoint a new Truce Commission with powers of mediation. When 1 first read the United States draft resolution, 1 advanced the idea, in view of what 1 havealready said, that sorne amendments might be necessary. Among other things, 1 believe that we should take notiêe, therein, of the fact that the Security Council has been notified by the Arab States that they were entering Palestine and were inviting its intervention. We have the documents concerned, and 1 am very much in favour of setting out the facts. There may be sorne other amendments, but 1 fully agree with the President that the. first thing to do is to determine that there is a clear threat to the peace here. How we will deal with it later is a different matter. The first thing to do, as 1 say, is to determine that there is a threat to the peace, about which, in my opinion, there cannot be any doubt in the mind of anyone. Whether we should apply Article 39 or sorne other Article of the Charter is an entirely different question. 1 believe 1 have clearly expressed the reason why-very much to my regret-I cannot see the advisability of supporting the amendments submitted by the United Kingdom delegation. They would lead us to repeat actions which we have already tried unsuccessfully, and to use instruments that have not proved their worth for the purpose toward which we are striving and which, 1 believe, willlead to an unnecessary de1ay in taking effective steps in this connexion. There are sorne other matters that have come to my mind while listening to the statements made here, but since 1 have no alternative proposaI to submit at the present time, 1 wish to summarize the position of the Colombian delegation as follows: If it cornes to a vote we shall abstain from supporting the United Kingdom proposaI, and we shall wait to see what amendments are introduced to the United States proposaI before deciding whether we can support it or whe,ther we shall have to abstain once more. We do not abstain systematically. We like to contribute our share in the work and responsibilities of the Se- Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated trom Spanish): It might seem paradoxical, but l have always considered the Palestine situation to be simple; perhaps it has that complex simplicity of certain problems which can be solved as soon as the factors involved are classified. But unfortunately there are always interests-legitimate or illegitimate-which confuse simple issues, and it seems to me that this has also been the case as regards Palestine. And now l should like to explain the facts as l see them. Mter the First World War, Palestine was to have gained independence, as the other former territories of the Ottoman Empire were beginning to do. For reasons which it is unnecessary to recall, that did not come to pas8, and the League of Nations granted a Mandate over Palestine to Great Britain. That 'Mandate came to an end, at the wish of the Mandatory Power, on the fifteenth of this month; there is no need to describe the events that took place during the period of the Mandate, for they are weIl known to everyone; nor is it necessary to point out the desire of the Jewish community to establish an independent State in Palestine. When the Mandatory Power informed the United Nations of the date on which it would .end the Mandate, the General Assembly adopted, with some difficulty, a resolution recommending the partition of the territory with a view to establishing i:wo independent State.s there, one Jewish and the other Arab. The resolution wa'> referred to the Security Council for implementation, the result being that the Council was unable ta reach agreement on the action to be taken, and in tum decided that the wisest course was ta refer the resolution back ta the General Assembly, sothat it might consider the question further and decide as it thought most appropri "'e. We all remember thé facts very clearly. '! '1-1e date of 15 May arrived; the Man-' date, the only legal authority in Palestine, came ta an end, and the special session of the General Assembly merely agreed, by a large majority, to appoint a Mediator. As l understand it, this is the present legal situation in Palestine: the British Mandate has ended and the United Nations, which, as l have said before, received the inheritance of the League of Nations without any inventory, has decided ta appoint a Mediator to maintain or restore peace. Indeed, representatives should not forget that the war in Palestine did. not start on the fifteenth of this month; it was in progress ?efore that date, more or less covertly, or it was fi more or less active preparation. Palèstine is a territory without a govemment and under Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant 1 am aware that a part of the population has already established aState to which it has given de facto authority; but from a legal point of view, Palestine has no government-it should establish one, as 1 say, by decision of the electorate; on the other hand, we have the United Nations resolution to appoint a Mediator. The Security Coundl is now trying to decide whether or not the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to, or a breach of, the peace. We know that a decision of that kind requires the agreement of the five permanent members. It is true that in addition to their agreement two votes by nOli-permanent members are aIso necessary, which means that if five non-permanent members decide to obstruct any decision by the Council, they can do so, even when the five permanent members agree. But that does not usually happen and, in my opinion, should oruy happen in exceptional cases. Hence the responsibility rests with the five States that are permanent members. Fortunately, it seems that three of them are in agreement on this question, and for that reason we·need not have too much fear that international peace will be endangered. Conseqtiently, in accordance with the resolution of the General Asscmbly, which chose peaceful adjustment by a Mediator rather than coercive measures, the Argentine delegation will not cast its vote in support of resolutions of a coel'cive character, but will vote in favour of any conciliation measure. Moreover, we feel that in this way we shall he respecting the right of the two million or more inhabitants to determine their own future. That, as 1 have stated it, will be the position of Argentina when a decision is taken on thf -, question.

1 should like to ensure that no misunderstanding existsjn connexion wîth the remarks just made by the representative of Colombia, and without in any way contradicting him 1 shocld like to clarify one or two points. As regards the appointment of a Mediator, we received only yesterday a J:ep!y from one of the two persons whom we had approached. Further, 1 }~ave already asked the permanent members of the Security Council to be so good as to gather n'ayons d'informations, ne ments, d'essayer, trer quelles négociations sent, Together with Mr. Lopez, 1 regret that we have not received more information from the Commission. As far -as 1 know, however, the reports have been few because the Commission has been busv trying to establish contact, in very difficult circ~mstances, with the two parties with which they have been asked to negotiate. In any case they are meeting and working on our behalf in increasingly dangerous conditions. Indeed, 1 have heard, with regard to the consulate of my own country, that a fifth member of its staff has been wounded. 1 think, therefore, thatwe owe a tribute to the couvage and devotian of the men now working for us in Jerusalem. 1 des reuses. le maintenant sul rendre ment ment J'ai l'intention je son un français a sécurité. nous très pour raisons .que derie mission reviennent Mr. LOPEZ (Colombia): 1 tried to make dear that 1 did not wish to he critical of the Truce Commission because 1 had no reason to be 80, particularly from a persona! point of view. 1 might have added a recognition of the services that have been rendered by the French member of the Commission, who at a1l rimes has furnished infonnation to the Security Council. As a matter of fact, the scanty infonnation that we have received has come from mm, and 1 am very glad to join in a tribute to his services. One of the reasons that 1 did not do so is that 1 know very weIl that a sense of comradeship very easily leads one to extend to the whole Commission the recognition which, in my opinion, should be given primarily to the French Consul. However, 1 do not like to comment on that aspect of the matter. 1 do not mean to make taires any comparisons. What 1 have been trying to l'intention get at, for 1 believe it is a constructive suggestion, plement is this: we. have not been able ta receive the je necessary in10rmation from the Commission, nr 1voir matter what the reasons are for not receiving it. Commission, 1 therefore wondered whether we could: really me continue to pile new responsibmties on the memnuer bers of the Commissi.on and whethel' it was wise de for us ta add new 1.asks to their duties when wc nable ~ere being told, every day, thàt they had such qu'on difficulty in perlorming the tasks aIready given, de ta them. 1 have one further ~int: The task that we ~ave in mind, the negotiating of an understandque mg between the Jews and the Arabs, is one that ca11s for men of higher standing in the world .hommçs o! political affairs, at adY rate men who stand hlgher in the official hierarchy of the nations Just another word before the Security Council leaves this matter: A new telegram has been distril;lUted to the members of the Security Council, received from Mr. McCabe, whois member of the secretariat of the Trucc Commis..<;ion. This telegram is confidential; therefore, 1 shall not refer to. its text. However, 1 wish to refer simply to the fact that we get information from individual menibers of the Truce Commission-particularly from the Frénch Consulalso from Mr. Azcârate, and from another member of the secretariat. The thought oecurs to me that we never seem to be àble to get information from the Truce Commission as such. Why, day after day, do we receive individual communications from different members of the Truce Commission, from the secretariat, or from someone el~e, but never from the Truce Commission itseli? There must be some reason for that. We have been told that the membersof the Truce Comnùssion are encounterlng great difficulty in communicating, that one of the members is' in Amman and another is somewhere else. Neverthe1ess, day after day we receive information, but it is nçver sent by the Truce Commission as such. . That is the remark 1 desired to make before we left this subject, because, presendy, when we. come to a discussion of·these proposaIs, 1 may find it necessary, much to my regret, to refer again to the way in which the Truce Co~- .sionis fun,ctioning. . The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The Colombian representative's attention has already been .drawn to the two te1egrams received by us this moming, which came this time from the Commission. 1 believe that they are the first of a long and regular series of reports. 1 would like to remind him also that one of the Truce Commission's membe~the :Qe1gian member-has beenabsent for some time, having gorie to Amman with the hope·of meeting Arab representatives there. i <lm nûw going to close the meeting. If the members am· agreed, we shall meet again at 10.30 a.m. tomorrow to resume the study oi the Palestine question. Therepresentative ofthe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in particular, has agreed to make a statement tomorto terminate. l' The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.