S/PV.299 Security Council

1 have also received several telegrams regarding the questions sent to the Arab States and the Jewish authorities [document 8/753]. The reply from Transjordan is in a document [8/760] that has been distributed to you. It is a refusal to answer. , The telegrams 1 have received from the Gov~ ernments of Syrla, Iraq and Lebanon inform me that the representatives of those three countries here will submit their replies. The Egyptian representative told me, at the beginning of this meeting, that he would very shortly be in a pôsition to issue bis Government's answer. 1 have also just received a letter from the Consul- General of Iraq, stating that a representative of bis country is now on the way from Washington to New York to place himself at the Council's disposaI in order to submit the reply referred to in one of the telegrams 1 have just mentioned. Mr. EBAN (Jewish Agency for Palestine): 1 merely wish to inform the President and the member-s of the Security Council that the Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government of Israel has sent answers to the questions which were sent to him two days ago and has authorized me to transmit those answers to the Security Council at an early moment together with relevant comments. JamaI Bey HUSSEINI (Arab Iiigher·Committee): When it was decided on Tuesday 18 May '[295th meeting], that these questions should be sent to the authorities concerned, we were under the impression that the Secretariat was going to .~end the questions. It was not until the next afternoon that we discovered that the Secretariat depended upon us to send the tèlegramand it .was only then that we sent it. Because of this unintentional mistake, the replies from the Arab Higher Committee have not been received. However, we are expecting to receive them soon. The PRE-SIDENT (translated /rom French): l have a third communication to make to the Security Council, as follows. The permanent members of the Councilmet yesterday, as you know, after the meeting, and they decided to appoint Count Bernadotte as Mediator, in pursuance of -the General Assembly's resolution.1 1 may add that when tbis decision was taken, we had only. received one acceptance,. that of Mr. TSIANG (China): In connexion with the appointment of Count Bernadotte as tpe United Nations M~diator in Palestine, 1 wish to place onrecord a one sentence statement. 1 hope that the Government of Sweden will consider it wise to postpone the recognition {lf the Jewish State in Palestine at least until Count Bernadotte will liave had time to establish a reputation for impartiality and thereby win the confidence of both communities ID. Palestine. . The PRESIDENT (translated trom French): We shall resume our work where we left off yesterday evening [298th mqeting]. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): 1 do not intend to make a long speech since the USSR position,with regard to the Palèstine question has been stated repeatedly by USSR representatives both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council. 1 have aIso already had the Dpportunity to define my attitude towards the UnitedStates draft resolution [document 8;749]. There is therefore no need for me to repeat myself, at least so far as the fundamental position ofthe USSR is concerned. leurs ces tible actuelle la partage pas de déclaration . We have stated repeatedly thatthe General Assembly resolution of 29 November 19472 was il ,just decision cor'responding to the interest of both the peoples of Palestine-the Jews and the Araps--and that the resolution should therefore be implemented. Our conviction has been strengthened as a result of the second special session of the General Assembly, which rejected alI'proposaIs aimed at the-repeal or weakening of 'the decision to partition Palestine into two separate States. In the course of our discussions, especially at the last meeting of the .8ecurity Council [298th, meeting], certain representatives spoke aS if the General Assembly resolution on the partition of Palestine into two States was no longer in existence. Needless to say, such statements do not correspond to the truth and do not help towards the. solution of the Palestine problem and the normalization of the present situation in .Palestine. In view of such statements, it must be pointed . out that the General Assembly resolution does not need to be confirmed by the Security Council in order to implement the decision to partition Palestine into two States. 1 point this out because ~he representatives of certain States in We are aware, it is true, that as a result of the discussion of this questlon in the Security Couneil, and especially lit the second special session of thE General Assembly, sorne of the Governments have adopted a position which is not in accordanc<. with the General Assemblv's decision. The on1y conclusion to be drawn fr~m. this-as is shown by the facts-is that this resolution .is mere1y encountering difficulties with regard to its implementation: n( i:hing more. The reso11.l.tion remains in force and retains its full "alidity; only its implementation is being hampered. This applies above all to the Arab State which should have been created side. by side with the Jewish State in Pa1estine in accordance with the General Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947. As regards the Jewish State, its existence is already a fad; whether or not anyone likes that State, it is actua1ly there; that part of the General Assembly's resolution has already been carried out. Not only does, that State e.xist, but it has already been recognized by a number of countries. Furthermore, the new Jewish 3tate has already applied for membership in the United Nations. Evidently, we shall soon have to consider the application of the Provisional Oovernment of the Jewish State and take an appropriate decision. At the present stage of the discussion of the Palestine question by the Secutity Council, the USSR delegaticn adopts a consistent position in accordance with the decision ;::,!ready taken by the United Nations, unlike the position of certain other States which light heartedly shilly-shally in the Palestine question or adop~ a position in direct contl'adiction to the General Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947. That is my first comment. My second comment is the following. Ît has. been established in the course of our discussions in the Security Council that we all agree that the situation in Palestine is abnormal and that military operations are taking place there between Jews and Arabs and that eight countries-all the Arab States and the new Jewi':ih State-are involved in those operations in one way or another. That fact alone deserves our serious attention. "Determin~s that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace and a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter." , If the Security Council fails to agret to that . statement, it can only he as a result of an insufficiently responsive attitude towards the present situation in Pa.lestine and an under-estimation of its significance. It is very difficult not to agree that the military operations in Palestine, in which eight States, the majority of which are Members of the United Nàtions, are more or less involved, constitutes a threat to peace. clause, la tine difficile lequd en façon sont Unies~ leur tuent du Palestir.e, Certes, de . auxquelles It couId be argued that those military operations are not on such a scaIe as to constitute a serions 1;hreat. Certainly the degree of seriousness of the situation in Palestine can be argued, but that is another matter. It is true that mili- .tary operations may vary in scale. There are military operations in which hundreds of thousands of men take part and athers in which tens of. thousands, or only thotlsands, are involved. Nevertheless, in viewof the potential significance of the events now unfolding in Palestine, the . USSR delegation is of the opinion that the Security Council would act correctly if it determined that a threa t +-0 international peace exiw~d in connexion with "':""e events in Palestine, d'ho~nmes, cipent milliersde tion rité la potentielle Palestine d'exprimer adoptée palestinienne; surpris tains .troupes militaires de pays. The USSR Government has repeatecllY pointed ont through its repreSentatives lin the tes General L<:<:embly and in the Security Council , l'Assemblée that the US5R sympathizes with the desire of qu'il the peoples of the Near East, including the Arab par pecples, to achieve full independence and free peuples th.emselves from foreign influence. Sympathy inclépendance Wlth any movement of national liberation from étrangère. foreign influence~, iTiduding sympathy with the libération legitimate desires of the Arab peoples, is one of efforts the expreSsions of the fundamental policy of the obtenir Union of Soviet.Socialist Republics, which stands for sovereignty' and independence of aIl nations, large and smaIl. The US:SR. delegation cannot but express surprise at tht position adopted by the kab States in the Palestine question, and particularly at the fact that those States-or some of them, at l~ast -have resorted to such action as sending their troops into Palestine and carrying out military operations aimed at the suppression of the national libet'ation movement in Palestine. In connexion with the discussion of the Palestine question at the last special session of the General Assembly, it is impossible to refrain from speaking about the United Kingdom's position in this matter. You know that two days ag" one of the official spokesmen of the United Kingdom Government in London made a statement, which is still valid since no one has contradicted it. According to that statement, the United Kingdom intends to give aid to Transjordan-including military' aid to the so-called Arab Legion bperating in the territory of Palestine at the present time-unless the United Nations adopts a decision recognizing that the actions of the Arab States in Palestine are illegal. Thus, t~e United Kingdom has officially declared that it has given aid to Transjordanincluding military aid to t.~e Arab Legion-and that it is doing so now and intends to do so in future, until the United Nations decides that the actions of the Arab States in Palestine are illegal. On the other hand, when the situation in Palestine is discussed by the United Nations, the United Kingdom opposes the adoption of measures to put an end to the military operations in Palestine. While spokesm::::: of the British Government in London announce that aid to Transjordan can be stopped if the United Nations decides that Transjordan, together with bther Arab States, is acting illegally in Palestine, the United Kingdom representative on the Security Council, where the situation in Palestine is under discussion, objects to the adoption of any measures designed to put an end to military operations in Palestine. The. United Kingdom representative's statement that the United Kingdom delegation does not share the opinion that a threat to peace exists in Palestine, ~s sheer casuistry which reminds us of the statements of United Kingdom representatives in the League of Nations. The United Kingdom Government does not agree that military operations involving the participation of eight States constitutc a threat to peace. It even goes so far asto give its own interpreta;, tion-or rather, misinterpretation-of Article 39 of the Charter, in order to create uncertainty The United Kingdom representative has, of course, failed to prove his case. Apparently, he did not even set out to prove the correctness of bis position or, in any case, he did not count on being succéssful in convincing the Security 'Council of its validity. His aim was rather to ereate uncertainty as to whether the position in Palestine constituted a threat to peace and thereby to prevent the Security Council from adopting any decisionsdesigned to put an end to military operations there. Meanwhile, British officers commanding the Arab Legion which is conducting military operations in Palestine, are carrying out the United Kingdom's Palestine policy by force of arms. Everyone realizes that Transjordan and King Abdullah, who has recently been portrayed almost as a sort of modern Near Eastern Caesar, would not have been able to act so freely if the United Kingdom had not given him open help. Moreover, it is a matter not only of open help but, as l have aIready pointed out, of direct participàtion by the United Kingdom through its military command in. the events now taking place in the territory of Palestine. The views expressed here by the United Kingdom representative have also been expressed in general by the Belgian representative and, in part, by the Argentine representative. The He1gian representative has stated that he cannot agree that the situation in Palestine constitutes a.threat to peace, because the facts at his disposal are not sufficient. The fact that the Security Council has, at least of late, been receiving almost daily information from the States taking part in the events in Palestine regarding their aggressive actions or intentions, is appar~ ently not sufficient for t.he . .;presentative of Belgium. Perhaps it would be worthwhile if the Security Council equipped an aeroplane, put the representative of Helgium (and the United Kingdom representative) intd it and sent them off to Palestine. Let them see with their own eyes that .military operations are taking place there, that towns are being bombed from the air, that there are killed and wounded, that, according to the latest information l have received, military operations instead of diminishing are on the increase. Such a journey might perhaps'help to clarify the .situation in that country for the -representatives of the United K-Îngdom and Belgium, and possibly, too, for the Chinese representative, whose statements have also dearly shown that he underestimates the gravity of the situation in Palestine. There has been mention of the United Nations Mediator, and one might have imagined from the way certain representatives on the Security Council spoke of him, that practieally aU hopes of regulating the Palestine situation were centred on the Mediator. In the opinion of the USSR delegation, the Security Couneil would be deceiving itself· if it plaeed all its hopes on the Mediator alone. His powers and rights are no greater than those of the existing Truce Commission· previously created by the Security Cauncil. Yet.that Commission has proved to be absolutely powerless and has been unable to prevent, or subsequently to check, military operations in Palestine. 1 win not go into an anlysis of the situation which existed when the propos<il to create a Truce Commission was under considel"ation. The USSR delegation pointed out at the~ime that the creation of the Commision WM not calculated to bring about an improvement of the situation in Palestine. That proved to be the case. 1 will not dwell at length on that theme. 1 merely wish to state the faet that the Security Council's Truce Commission has proved to be absolutely powerl~s to improve the situation in Palestine «?r to achieve even a temporary cessation of military operations. What guaran'.':ee have we that the Mediatora person who has been apointed by the Five Power Committee in accordance with the General Assembly resolution'---will achieve greater success in this :matter and bring about the cessation of military operations in Palestine? Anyhow, we have no guarantee that he will be successful; and, even if he should meet with any sv.ccess, the Security Couneil cannot refrain from taking action on the present situation in Palestine. It cannot remain idle in the expeetation that the Mediatormay be able to do something. The information which we have reeently received from the Truce Commission has clearly shown that what matters is not the Commission or the persons appointed to deal with the problems of mediation or a truce. What matters is the Security Couneil itself, the men sitting around this table. If we adopt good 1 do not know how the Governments of the Arab States would react if the Security Council adopted a resolution calling upon those States to cease military operations. 1 do not know how sllch a resolution would be received by the Governments of the Arab States taking part in the military operations. But 1 do know that it will be·impossible for them to disregard such a resolution, especially when it is adopted while military operations are actually taking place. 1 prefer not to pry into the future, as was done, if 1 am not mistaken, by the rèpresentative of Canada when he said [298th meeting] : "How would the Arab States receive such a decision if it were adopted? What would be the position of the Security Council, if the Arab States disregarded such a decision?" . The value of such questionS is, at the present stage of the discussion, largely academic. The Security Council must base its action on the fact that the situation in Pal':Stine compels it to adopt an effective decisi(~>n in order to put an end to military operations and thereby to create more normal conditions for the impIementation of the resolution already adopted by the United Nations. 1have already pointeli out that, in the opinion of the USSR delegation, the United States draft resolution could form· a basis for the adoption of ' an appropriate decision by the Security Council. The USSR delegation still holds that opinion, and those members of the Council who have criticized the United States resolution have been unable to prove that the adoption of that reso- Iution would not be justified. As regards th~ United Kingdom draft resolution [document 8/755], we cOI)Sider it to be in- 'adequate, and its adoption would not bring, about an improvement in Palestine or help to normalize the situation there, although some of the paragraphs of that resolution may not be objectionab!e in themselves. These are the remarks which 1 wished to make in addition to the stl\tement which 1 made when the 'Palestine qu"ion .was discussed in the Security Council aÎter the second special session of the General AssembJy. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): In spite of the former discussions and resolutions adopted bythe curity Council with regard to the plan of It was previously dedded that the Security Council is not entitled to participate in, or to take any action for, the implementation of the plan of partition. Now the representative of the USSR repeats this point and requests the Security Council to take drastic stepl:l to implement the plan of partition, a plan which is outside the competence of theSecurity Council to implement. Even the General Assembly~to whose resolution references are constantly made and whose resolution the Security Council is urged to adopt and make compulsory on the States-has oabandoned the resolution of 29 November last. If it did not say openly and clearly that that plan isnow abandoned, it did so tacitly, and this was clear in the resolution of 14 May4' in which the General Assembly decided that agreement between the parties must be obtained for an adjustment' of theo,future situatiol'l in Palestine. That mèans clearly that the future situa- , tion, or the future government of Palestine which was reconimended in the partition plan, is no longer valid. in the mind of the General Assembly. The General Assembly has taken another direction. It has taken a new path in this connexion. Furthermore, there was a Commission of five States appointed by the General Assembly to implement the partition plan. This Commission of five States was dismissed, not suspended. It was relieve~ of its responsi,biliti,e,s by the resolution5. of the General Assembly at its second special session. So who is charged with tht. implementation of the resolution of November 1 last? Nothing could be doné in regard to that resolution except through that Commission, and the General Assembly itself dismissed that Com- 1 mission. That means that the General Assembly does not intend to further or to insist upon implementation of th\~ partition plan. Instead, a new plan will be formed. According to the partition plan, which has been quoted several times, the Security Council was to interfere only at the request of the Pales':' tine Commission. Nothing in, the partition plan gave the Security Council authority to act except at the request of the Commission. The Commission fio longer exists. Howcan the Security Council proceed with the implementation of the partition plan when the General Assembly itself has abandoned that plan and has adopted a new 1 do not wish to repeat what 1 have said several times in reply to the remarks of the representative of th~ USSR in regard to the resolution of the General Assembly and the extent to which it should be obeyed. This matter is clear to everyone. 1 do not want to go into it again. 1 should like to refer again to a point which 1mentioned yesterday in regard to Article 52 of the Charter and the intervention of the Arab League in the Palestine question. 1 should like to stress this point. The Arab League was formed and the protocol was written in 1944. The protocol was signed on the same day on which the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were signed, that is, 7 October 1944. It was finally constituted on 22 March 1945, about three months before the -Charter of the United Nations was signed in San Francisco. In San Francisco, the pact of the Arab League was submitted to,the United Nations for registration and recognition. In the pact of the Arab League, Palestine was considered an associate member of the League, although at that time it was under mandate and could not exercise any independent authority. However, the Arab League considered that Palestine had been recognized as independent by the Covenant of the League of Nations, and we were waiting for the Mandate to be terminated so that Palestine would be able to exercise its independent authority. Nevertheless, Paiestine has been a member of the Arab League . since its constitution and continues to be a member of that League. As 1 have said before, at the termination of the Mandate, Palestine was to become inde- - pendent, and in that case the people of Palestine had the right to determine for themselves their form of government, in accordance with the views of the majority. But they were faced with . the armed insurrection of a minority wmch tried ta impose its position, against the wishes of the majority, by dividing Palestine. During the term of the Mandate, the Arabs of Palestine were not allowed to have arms. The Mandate was very unfair to them in that respeçt, since it'allowed the other party, the Jews, to acquire arms on a yery large scale. This was evident durmg the last two years 'of the Mandate in the kind of weapons the Jews used against the Mandatory Power itself. It has been evident in the kind of we'apons the Jews have been using since the aùoption of the resolution on partition and since the termination of the Mandate. As 1 have said, an armed minority rose up against the unarmed majority in the attempt to cnforee certain theories and aspirations which The- Arab League had to answer the request of the majority of the people of Palestine for aid in suppressing the armed insurrection which was, and which still is, going on. l'his insurrection was not an insignificant activity. Nearly 250,000 people were expelled fromtheir homes and had to findref~geoutside that land. Many massacres took place, and towns and villages were destroyèd. Palestine being a member of the Arab League, and. the Arab League constituting a regional arrangement, let us examine to what extent Article 52 of the Charter applies. ~aragraph 1 of Article 52 of the Charter reads as follows: "Nothing in_the present .Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies ~or dealing with such matters re1ating. to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that _such arrangements or agencies and their . activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations." The regional arrangements referred to in this part of the Article are precisely the kind of thing whichthe Arab States around, Palestine wished to establish when they" found that neither the .Security Council, nor thè United Nations as a whole-nor any other power-could· stop the atrocities which were going on, or subdue the insurrection. They w~re more qualified than anyone in any other part of the world to take part in, arid assume responsibility for, the restoring of order in 'their own area, especiaUy in view of the fact that the disorder in Palestine affected them very grave1y. What can be expected from the inhabitants of a country when they find 100,000 refugees- -oestitute persons expelled in a pitiful state'- comi~g into their land from across the borders of a neighbouring country? Such an event would disturb order in their country, not in far away States which do not experience such things. Those responsible for order are those in. the vicinity who enter into regional arrangements. The Article states furtller: "The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies bt'fore referring them to the Security Council." ~ethods and weapons used by the disturbing party. How can the Arabs around Palestine aèt in this matter? They have taken all kinds of peacefuI measures, advising the other party and requesting them to be peaceful, to form a constituent assembly and to come to a decision by a majority as is usual in democratic procedure. The Jews, however, would never accept these suggestions but wanted to establish a State for themselves, separated from the majority in the country and under conditions which were unacceptable to the Arabs. Thus the Arabs were obliged to meet the emergency in the way_in which it should be met. Paragraph 3 of Article 52 says: "The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements. . . ." r'should think the Security Council wouldbe grateful to the Arabs who have taken this' task upon themselves. The Security Council itself rnay be required to perform such a task, but in this case it has not done so. There are; of course, reasons for that. It is not only because there are no armed forces now available to the Security Council, but because this is considered to be a local dispute, and not an international dispute between two difIerent nations. In such a case, the Security Council is not supposed to interferé. But those Members of the United Nations entering ioto regional arrangements are cibliged to interfere on behalf of the United Nations, and in the name of peace and the security of the world. Turing'again to the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the United States [document S!l49], l note that its third paragraph reads as follows: "Orders aIl Governments and authorities to cease and desist from any hostile military action, and to thatend issue a cease-fire and stand-fast order to their military and para-military forces to become effective within thirty-six hours after the adoption of this resolution;" The last paragraph of the resolution reads: "Directs the Truce Commission established by the SecurityCouncil by its resolution of 23 April 1948 [document S/727] to report to the Security Council on the compliance with these orders." The Truce COI:mnission is simply to tell the Security Council whether or not the orders have ~ been complied with. Is that an action which wouId be expected after giving these orders to stop all hostilities? We know that this fighting is not being carried on for the sake of fighting~ The Arabs do not fight because they like to fight; there are reasons which éompel them to_fight. They are oblige.d to fight, as 'Ye have said~ because the situation in Palestine is unbearable for. the surrounding Arab world. The Arabs cannot remain. silent when they see these, thjngs hàppening. They were forced to fight in spite of·themselves. They are willing to stop fighting. They do not care to fight, because itis their children who are being exposed to cleath; it is their blood whichis beingshed there, not the blood of nationals· of any foreign country distant from the scene. Why shouId they wish to fight? If we are going to ask them to stop fighting, we should give them somesatisfaction; we should give them some promise that we shall do certain things in order to correct or ameliorate the situation. Does the United States draft resolution mean that the Arabs should stop fighting so that the partition plan may be implemented and the Jewish Stale may be securely organized? If that is what is meant, it is futile, because that will not stop the fighting. The reason for all this fighting is the partition plan and the establishment of a Jewish State in Palesl:ine. The Arabs will never accept tha~. We foretoldthese resu1ts when we spoke on .previous· occasions before the General Assembly, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question and the Security Council. We said that the Arabs wouId fight partition, that they would not accept it, that· no recommendations would be complied with if Palestine were subjected to partition. Nobody believed those statements; they thought the Arabs were blufling. 1 am perhaps more famiIiar with conditions in the Near East than any' other representative on the Security Council. We know the place, we AIready, one-quarter of a million of those Arabs have been expelled from their homes, and many of them have been massacred. Their homes were looted, their be10ngings were taken away and they have now found refuge in the neighbouring countries. . Who is to redress that situation? Who would adjust the situation if the Arabs stop fighting? To whom is the duty to be left-a duty more sacred than a cease-fire-of restoring justice and the enjoyment of their rights to the rightful parties? No one is taking care of that duty. The Security Council never thought of that. Speeches are made about order and rights, and now any insignificant event is exaggerated here -by the widespread propagandà of the Zionists. They are exaggerating everything which would be useful for them, and they are suppressmg anything eIse which is not in their favour. We have full confidence that even if the people of New York are impressed by the pressure of such propaganda, the members of the Security Council and the representatives of the different States will not be so impressed. We have an Arabie proverb which says, "If you wish to be obeyed, make your demands achievable or acceptable." If the Security Council wishes its recommendations to be obeyed, it should· make them achievable, acceptable and just. Let the Security Council give assurances ta the Arabs to satisfy their anxieties.about the future of the Arabs in Palestine, and as. to the· future of Palestine. What is .going to be done with these refugees and with their demolished property? What is gomg ta be done aboùt the partition plan, which is still held to by the Jews of Palestine and aIso by sorne Members which have certain aspirations or views in that regard which we do not care to examine? However, we know that they are unjust. _ We would have been very glad and delighted ta see the delegation of the USSR and the delegation of the United States agree on sorne just :natter. It is deploraple to see them agree only ID one case, the only case brought before the Security Council and the United Nations which is unjust and immoral In other cases in which there. was justice, one party has neve:r agreed 'WÏth the other, and the two parties have a1ways been antagonistic. No other draft proposaI of The United States and the USSR agree only in this one case, the onIy unjust case which the Security Council has ever handIed. 1 appeal ta the wisdom and senSe of justice of the members of the Security Council;,and implore them not to aggravate the situation by adopting resdutions which cannot be implemented; which would force the other pàrty to reject them. If we' adopt such a resolution as the United, States delegation has presented, we should write at the end of it an order to reject'it. It is impossible to sleep on on a .barrel of gunpowder. The cause of the dispute mustbe removed; the disease must be dealt with at its source. It is not a matter of saying, "You must be quiet, boys; you must -stop". There are causes for this dispute which must be eliminated and dissipated before, such steps are taken. The PRESIDE~T (translated from French): As there is no objection, the discussion will be resumed this afternoon at 3 p.m. . . THREE HUNDREDTH MEETING Held at Lake Success, New York, / on Friday, 21 May 1948, at 3 p~m. President: Mr. A. PARODI (France). Present: The representatives of, the following countries: Argentlna, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, .France, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America. . 67. Provisional agenda (document S/Agenda 300) 1. Adoption of the agenda. "2. Letter datcd 12 March 1948 from the per- manent representative of Chile to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-Genera:l (document S/694). 3. The Palestine question. 68. Adoption of the agenda ,69. Continuation of the discussion of the leffer', from the permanent representa- tive of ChUe relative to the events in Czechoslovakia " At the invitation of the President, Mr. Santa Cruz, .representative of Chile, took his seat at the Security Council table.