S/PV.300 Security Council

1 do not think the circumstances have changed since this question was first raised [272nd meeting], so 1 see no need to discuss it again. 1 shall therefore calI for a vote on whether the Security Council Wishes ta hear Mr. Papanek. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of 'Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): 1 abject categorically ta the invitation of the former Czechoslovak representative ta the United Nations, who has been removed by the Czechoslovak Government from the post hé formerly held. We know this man and we know what purpose is being pursued·in inviting him. ·to the Security Council table. That purpose is to enable him ta make slanderous statements of the kind which he and the Chïlean representative have already made ta the Security Council. . tions For these reasons, the USSR delegation abjects to this traitor ta the Czechoslovak people taking any part whatever in our discussion of the Czechoslovak question. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chïle) (translated trom Spanish): 1 do not think it necessary to repeat the arguments for hearing Mr. Papanek that were presented here sorne .time ago [272nd meeting]. The Security Council already accepted them on th;>1: occasion and, in any. case, the representativ,- of the USRR has, today, only repeated what he then said in opposition. But 1 wish ta add a new argument: the representative of the USSR has announced that he will oppose any kind of investigation; in that case, let the Council at least have the evidence Mr. Papanek offers to submit. With regard to the USSR representativeas description of my statements as "slanderous", l shall not take him up on that point at present but 1 would like to point out that if there weie no obstacles in the way to an investigation of the events in Czechosloyakia, it would be quite easy to, prove whether we have been slanderous or whether it ishe who is lying., This would not, of course, be possible, owing ta the attitude of the USSR delegation. The PRESIDENT (translated trom French): 1shall put the question to the vote. Votes against: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Union of Soviet' Socialist Republics Abstention: Argentina Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). (translated trom Russian): 1 voted against the invitation. . Mr. TARA8ENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from Russian): 1 also' voted against the invitation. Mr. MUNOZ (Argentina): J should like to explain very briefly the abstention of my de1ega- ~on on the vote which has just been taken. The Security Couneil has under consideration a draft resolution presented by the representative of Chile, by the terms of which the Security Council would appoint a committee to receive testimony from various persons and information connected with the problem which the Seeurity Couneil is now considering. In the view of my de1egation, aceording to the roles of procedure, the vote on the draft resolution as requestedby the de1egation of Argentina at the 288th meeting should have been taken before this qu~stion which the Security Council has now decided was ever examined. Therefore, my delegatiûn abstained from voting, but it did so for consiéletations which are different from those expressed by the representatives of the USSR and the Ukrainian' SSR. Mr. EL-KHOURI (Syria): ln order to explain my vote in favour of inviting Mr. Papanek to speak, Iwish to state that 1 voted as 1 did because the Security Council is seeking information. ln view of the fact that the Security Council is attempting to secure information, and since Mr. Papanek is the individual who maypossibly have certain information, 1 thought that under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure there was no harm in hearing him. Howev".) this does not necessarily mean that the members of the Security Council will believe or take into consideration everything that he says. Ml'. PAPANEK (translated tram French): Ml'. President, allow me ta thank you and the mem- bers of the Security Council for giving me this opportunity to represent here the interests of Czechoslovakia and its people, who cannot be represented officially. Mr. Papanek continued his rerharks in Eng- lish, as follows: 1 have been following the discussion in the S'ecurity Council regarding the coup d j état in Czechoslovakia last February-catried out by a mïnority of the USSR-since 17 March. 1 have followed the course of the discussion with great anxiety because it affects my people and, 1 am convinced, that the peace of Europe and the peace of the world will be great1y influenced by the decisions taken here. .de 'noncés ici, l'URSS voyage. rieur, 1 have given serious consideration to all that has been said during the severa:! meetings of the Security Council when the Czechoslovak case has been on the agenda6• 1 am loathe to express my opinion of sorne of the speeches uttered here, and yet 1 feel that 1 cannot allow them to pass unnoticed. 1 have listened to and read the speeches made by the representatives of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, and 1 have failed to find any refutation of the statements 1 made either in my letter of 10 March, addressed to the Secretary- Genera:! [document 8/696], or in my speech to the Security Council on 22 March [272nd meet- ing]. 1 have founq only two references to anyof my statements, one [in the 273rd meeting] con- cerning officia:! quotations from the speech of the Minister of Foreign Trade, Gregor, and the representative of the USSR chose to prefer the second revised official version; the other in which he describes Ml'. Zorin's programme in Prague ln arder to explain.why he was not received by' Ml'. Benes [281st meeting]. He did not explain why Ml'. Zorin's visit was not announced until two hours before he arrived in Prague, nor did he explain satisfactorily why he came ta Prague at aU. If he came to control the deliveries of grain, as was later announced, why did he come uninvited, as he was, by the Foreign Minister, by the Ministers of Foreign Trade, Food or Transportation, or without an invitation from the Cabinet as a whole? In any case, the grain was bought and paid for. It would seem logical, therefore, that a The Security Council was told by the repre- sentative of the USSR [281st meeting] of Mr. Zorin's visits to the non-communist Ministers, Masaryk, Majer, and Pietor, two of whom ceased to be Cabinet members within the next few days; but he failed to mention the all-night conference. with communist leaders Gottwald, Slansky, Kopecky, Zapotocky, Smrkovsky and Nosek, and he omitted mentioning the important conference with his confidant, Fierlinger, who, after being .dismissed from the chairmanship of the Social Democratie Party in November, said that he would be back in four months' time, and 50 he was; and with General Rejcin, another confidant of Moscow. Here is a comment made by Mr. l'orin after he had seèn the non-communist Ministers, to whom he had spoken of matters other than grain. "1 do not understand the attitude of the resigning Ministers or of Benes, ,who opposed the people's will. The Soviet Union fully backs the energetic policy of the Czechoslovak Gommunist Party." The comparatively little space devoted, in the . speeches made by the repr~entatives of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, to the February coup in Czechoslovakia, in relation to the numer- ous pages of attack on the other members of the Security Council, reflects their opinion of the Security Council in effectively coping with the case of Czechoslovakia as against a possibility of using it as a forum from which to spread their communist theses and to attack western democracies. Much time has been devoted in discussing Munich and the events which followed it, with- out drawing a parallel between the significance of the "friends, who had once cttt up the, living body of Czechoslovakia," to use the words of the representative of the USSR [273rd meeting], and the annexation, in 1945, ofthe eastem part of Czechoslovakia-Carpatho-Russia and a part of Slovakia-by the USSR. 1t Hitler intended to use the strategie position of Czechoslovakia as a springboard for conquests èastward, in its exterision ta the south and to the 1 have it on no less an authority than Mr. VIado Clementis, the Communist Foreign Min- ister of Czechoslovakia, that twelve thousand Slovaks were also deported to the USSR from Eastern S~ovakia, and that most difficult and repeated negotiations were needed to enable sorne of them to return. 1 am positive that these twelve thousand ~d not go te the USSR to seek the asylum which. was mentioned with such pride by the UkraWan representative on 29 April [288th me~ting]. The repeated assertions of the representatives of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR: that the com- rnunist coup in Czechoslovakia was purely an internaI affair fails to ring true, in view of the fact that on 24 February, the Rudé Pravo, the Prague communist official newspaper, devoted one quarter of page one to an article from the Moscow Pravda, heacllined, "The Soviet View of the Government Crisis ID Czechoslovakia," which makes it quite c1ear that the USSR does back Gottwald. On page three of the same issue, a three column headline quotes Gottwald as follows: "Beginning today we are attaching ourselves to the USSR more strongly than ever before." On 23 February, the R-udé Pravo issued a , special edition devoted to reprints from the Moscow papers. Thus, on a Monday, when no newspapers are usually published in Prague, what was of special significance, the Rudé Pravo published leading articles from the Moscow papers, supporting the coup d'état of the com- munists and assuring them that the two hundred million inhabitants of the USSR stood behind the Czechoslovak people in its fight for a true· peoples' democracy. 1 did not at this time, intend to mention our relations with the USSR, but since such marked references to "bosses" were brought up [273rd and 281st meetings], 1 feel that 1 have to meIi- . tian sorne of our experiences. As an example of the bossing that members of the Czechoslovak delegation had ta endure, 1 should like to cite the following: . et ln San Francisco, at the United Nations Con- ference on International Organization, the day after the opening of' the Conference, Mr. Molotov' demanded that Jan Masaryk should propose that the Polish Lublin Government he invited to the Conference. Mr. Masaryk did not r;fuse, but promised ta do 50 at the opportune tirne. Mr.Molotov was impatient and finally AU the Members of the United Nations were aware of the fact that Czechoslovakia desired to remain a member of the EcoIiOmic and Social Council, where it felt it had a real contribution to make, and that it did not desire to beLJme a member of the Security Council. The USSR was opposed to our remaining on the Economie and Social Council, and 80 we did not remaÏn. The Czechoslovak delegation had instructions from Prague not to seek membership in the Security Council. The USSR sponsored the Ukrainiai{'SSR, but when it seemed clear that there was no possibility of it being elected, Mr. Zorin and Mr. Gromyko came to see Mr. Masaryk, who was ill in bed in his hote!, and told him, in the presence of Ambassador Slâvik, that Cz<.:choslovakia must be a candidate for membership in the Security Council. Mr. Masaryk reluctantly agreed to it, against the standing instructions of his own Government. This was on a Sunday. On the Monday, MT. Gromyko discussed this question with the delt. gations of other Powers and, thereupon, Mr. Vyshinsky informed the Czechoslovak delegation that it was impossible for Czechos1ovakia to be a candidate" for the Security Council: When we ,asked the reason for this sudden reversaI, we were told that since Czechoslovakia was aIso to be the candidate sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom, the USSR could not support us. We were told to inform the members of the "Generai Assembly that we did not wish to be- co~e a membcr of the Security Council but that the Ukrainian SSR should be elected; at the same time,Mr. Vyshinsky ordered Mr. Masaryk to make a statement in the plenary meeting7, before the elections, which many of you will remember, that Czechoslovakia was not a candi- date for any of the organ8 of the United Nations. When the General Assembly decided thatthe next regular session should be held in Europe, Mr. Masaryk and 1 agreed; to do everything in Ml'. Masaryk waited until his return to Prague to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations that for technical reasons it was not possible to consider Czechosloyakia as a place at whichthe next session of the General Assembly might be held. However, we succeeded, at least, in having the Secretary-General of the United Nations invited to Prague-and he was there barely one month before the coup d'état. The Czechoslovak delegation desired to par- ticipate in the preparatory work of the Interim Committee and, later, in the Interim Committee itself. It was forced by Ml'. Vyshinksy to make a statement against it, contrary to its own wishces, before it received any instructions from Prague8• It was forced to speak on matters that did not concern Czechoslovakia directly; such as Korea. Members of commissions and sub-commissions were constantly in difficulties because they did not wish to follow USSR representatives entirely. 1 might add that as from last February, no Czechoslovak Minister or Ambassador can be named or sent to any country, without first being approved by Moscow. Those at their posts, such as in Washington, must report daily to the USSR Ambassador. Screening in the army is being carried out on orders from the USSR. 1 did not request to be heard today on1y to take issue with what has been said here by the representatives of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR. It is plain to anyone who heard or read their speeches that both one and the other have .contradicted themselves. 1 do have, however, Inore facts to strengthen the statements 1 origi- na:lly made, which 1 should like to make known. . to the members of the Security Council. On 22 March [272nd meeting] 1 rderred briefly to the attempt on the lives of the three most popular non-communist Cabinet members, Jan Masaryk, Petr Zenkl and Prokop Drtina. 1 should like 11:0 fill in details that have been definitely established by the Ministry of Justice. They are as follows. The wooden boxes in which the bombs were to be sent were ordered not by an individual, but by the secretariat of the Communist Party in Olomouc, on the directives from the communist headquarters in Prague. These boxes were made by a communist cabinet maker in the vil- lage of Krcman, near Olomouè. The commuIiist Member of Parliament, Jura Sosnar, personally Mr. Krajina can also testify that NKVD members who were stationed in several Czecho- slovak cities since ·1945, were assigned to district commands of the secret State police on 23 Febru- ary .1948. We know that twenty-three members of the Soviet MVDIO, which in Czechoslovakia are still called NKVD, are living in the Hote! Flora in Prague XII, while sixteen are in the Gra.rod Hotel Steiner in Prague II. Sorne of them are attached to the military intelligen,ce and the rest are employed in training investigators of the secret police. He had reports that on 23 and 24 February, there was great activity of Soviet troops the other side of the. Czechoslovak- Austrian border and the Czechoslovak-German border, in Saxony. Special manœuvres were taking place in adjacent districts and Soviet troops were being moved nearer to the Czecho- slovak frontiers. S,everal weeks before the côup, reports were received from the eastern part of the country that civilians were being ordered to vacate many houses in Carpatho-Russia which were being taken over by Soviet army units. These reports were brought by sorne who had to leave their homes and who escaped into Czechosiovakia. 1 spoke about Karlovy Vary and the presence of the Soviet military there. 1 aiso spoke of the exploitation and control by the Soviets of the uranium rhÏnes in Jachymov. It has now been possible to Ïearn from the chief of police of Karlovy Vary, Captain Bohumil Valtr, who is now in Germany and ready to testify, the. details of the interference, not only of the special Soviet agents at both places, in the organization of the Czechoslovak secret police, but also of the regu- lar general staff of the army of the USSR and on the part of a special intelligence bureau, hav- ing its headquarters in the Hotel Imperial. In connexion with the participation of the Deputy Foreign Minister Zooo in the February des que, nistes vaquie essayant sentants démocrates Les tèrêt tav exécutif slovaque, déclara textuellement: n'est per Soltesz, crates se intervenir" "On 19 February 1948, Mr. Zorin said to one member of the· Czech Government that the Czech communists would not give in in the gov- emmental crisis. "On 23 February 1948, the communists in Slovakia started a crisis in Bratislava when they tried to drive the democratic representatives of the Slovak Executive from their offiC;es. The communists expressly made reference to the in· terest of the USSR. The Chairman of this Slovak Executive, communist Dr. Gustav Husak, said expressly: 'Zotin did not come to Czecho- slovakia to mix the wheat.' Another communist Dr. Josef Soltesz, a former Minister, said: 'If the democrats will not give in there is a Russian army standing at the Czechoslovak frontiers ready to intervene.' " Mr. Lettrich is in the United States and ready to testify to these facts. On 28 March, Premier Gottwald, in speaking of Czechoslovakia's position since the coup . d'état, stated among other things: "On the inter- national front we have been on the Stettin- Trieste line. This was the only place where this line was not strong. Today this gap is closed." On the other hand, can anyone doubt that the prêt par1aD;t puis le Stettin-Trieste. ligne close." coup renforcer l'URSS? politique Gottwald Strbské-Pleso, de délégation Strbské-Pleso adjoints. ils nant membres co~munistcoup was not essential to the strength- enmg of the Stettin-Trieste line of the USSR? Was it then for pure1y domestic reasons that Gottwald and his staff went to Strbské Pleso, in the Tatra Mountains near the Polish border in the first part of February? At the same time a Russian military de1egatiop. went from Poland to Strbské Pleso and met Gottwald and llis staff. ~or four days andnights they worked together m a villa belonging to. the Government. Greàt numbers of the national security police were alerted. At these conferences, all arrangements for the coup d'état and the eventual military This so-callednew People's Democracy has been introduced to a new kind of terrorization· at the hands of the action committees-an institu- tion imported from the USSR by the com- munists, which sometimes orders the vacation of an apartment, or a house, a farm, a mill, a factory, a small hote!, or â law office on the spur of the moment, without any legal grounds for doing so.· This same new People's Democ- racy which promsied so much to the workers of Czechoslovakia has now forced, for example, the miners of Northe.rn Bohemia ~o give up "volun- tarily" fourteen days' vacation, and the workers of the Kolban Danek factory in Prague "volun- tarily" voted a nine-hour day and a six-day' week; that is a fifty-four hour week-all at the instance of the local action committees. 1 cannot take time to describe aIl the charac- teristics of the new People's Democracy in Czechoslovakia. 1 can tell you, however, that fifteen thousand men, women and children have aIready fled from Czechoslovakia, bare-handed, leaving their homes, their loved ones and their <:ountry, so as' to seek a new life in freedom, swelling the numbers of those who had already fled from Eastern European countriés. None have gone to seek that freedom in :~astern Europe. The Cominform, at its opening meeting Ü1 - ---warsaw, in September 1947, disciplined the Czechoslovak communists for their weakness and brdered them.·to take measures to seize power. und~r those conditions they would lose the elec- tians they are even now planning; therefore, they have decided on having only one list of candi- dates in order to assure the outcome of the elec- tian. The Cominform will then be satisfied and , perhaps it will even praise them. In addition to the terrorization, in so far as the jobs and the personal life of the people are concerned, there is another method of terroriza- tion that is being used constantly. This weapon is the use of the threat that the western democ- racies want to make war 'and will use the Germans as shock troops against Czechoslovakia and that the Germans' revenge 'Yill be terrible in view of the fact that tlley were expelled from the country. Therefore, in arder to save itself, there is no alternative save to accept the support of the USSR. Far-reaching though the effects of the com- munist coup are within Czechoslovakia itself, the effects of the seizure of the reins of Government have had an important international conse- quence. The peace of Europe has been endan- gered. It is. indicated by the fact that the Western European countries have since con- cluded a defensive alliance against further agres- sion of the USSR. Agreement on the European Recovery ~rogramme has been reached. The indications of the increased international tension are manifold. It is evident in the inci- dents of Berlin and Vienna. It Was evident during the Inter-American Conference at Bogota, as it was in the Italian elections. There is no evidence, notwithstanding thé proposaIs which have been coming from Moscow during the last few days, of any decrease in international ten- . .'. sion, to say nôthing of actual progress in arriving at international agreement and co-operation. 1have brought additional facts to those that 1 have presented to the Security Council previ- ously. None of my statements have been dis- proved. The communist coup in Czechoslovakia was engineered by a Czechoslovak communist minority, trained in the USSR with the support of USSR officiaIs, and was successful because of the threat of the use of USSR armed forces in readiness on the Czechoslovak borders and the threat of liquidation of hundreds of important non-communist friends di. the President. 1 have ~co8uggested that Dr. Lettrich, Dr. Krajina and. Captain Valtr be heard. 1 should like to add the following who were in thé midst of the govern- ment crisis: Mr. Blazej Villln, Member of Parliament, Secretary-General of the Social Democratie Party; Mr. Ivo Duchâcek, Member of Parliainent, Populist Catholic Party, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee; General Emanuel Moravec; Dr. Jaroslav Drâbek; . Mr. Antonin Jaildâcek. . All of them are in this country, or in ,London, Paris or in Germany. 1 earnestly request the Security Council to give the case of Czechoslovakia the fullest con- sideration. If no action is taken, the people of Czechoslovakia and the worId, who desire peace~ who see that the United Nations is a forum for discussions that result in no action, will· despair. The PREE!IDENT (translated tram French): Thank you, Mr. Papanek. We now have to take a decision on the draft resolution sub- mitted at the last meeting on the Czechoslovak question. [288th meeting] Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated tram Russian): BefOTe a ,vote is taken on the resolution, 1 would like to say a few words, mainly about the last statement of the former Czechoslovak representative to the United Nations, who has been removed from his post by the Czechoslovak Government. 1 wish to explain a few points. If 1 do so, it is not because 1 have any hope of convincing those who have dragged the Czechoslovak question before the Security Council, for 1 am certain that no arguments, however convincing, could change their position; in dealing with the Czechoslovak question, they are guided by their own consider- ations which have nothing tado with the defence of the interests of the Ozechoslovak people and the cause of peace and security. When those who dragged the Czechoslovak case before the Security Council deal with that question, they 1 have decideci to make a few explanatory remarks oilly because they may be of help to those who want to understand these questions, butfind it difficult to do so because of the inaccu- rate and slanderous reports on the USSR, which distort the facts and which are being dissemi- nated every day and every hour by thousands of newspapers and publications, over the radio· and, l regr~t tq say, aIso at the very table of the Security Council. The fermer Czechoslovak representative has again cited a nJ.lmber of facts invented by him- self, repeating as a rule, what he had aIready said before. He pointed out that the Soviet Press had published articles and statements expressing sympathy with the new democratic ~re guided by their own selfish considerations. o~ events in Czechoslovaki~, and on the new democratic regime established by the Czecho- ,'slovak people. ques communistes, pour tions It has been pointed out-as a reproach to certain democratic circles in. Czechoslovakia, and the Czechoslovak communists i,n particular- .that they stress the need for friendly relations ,between Czechoslovakia and the USSR. But anyone who wishes to urtderstand this matter cail distinguish between truth and falsehood, between truth and slander, and realize that the Czecho- slovak people have always wished to have friendly relations with the USSR and have never concealed the facto There were certai.n groups and politÎGalleaders in Czechoslovakia who looked to the West and were prepared to betray and sell the interests of their people to t..~e detriment of the relations between Czechoslovakia and the USSR. These people have failed; they have met with a down- faIl, as have those who were at the back of these mercenary groups and politicians in Czech'Jslovakia, 'hatching plans and plotting to convert that country into a satellite and a blind instrument of United States,expansionist policy in Europe. The Czechoslovak communists, nay, the entire Czechoslovak people, take pride in the fact that the friendship between Czechoslûvakia and t"'.e Soviet Umon is not becoming weaker 1?ut li iJrowing ever strollger, in spite of aIl past- and present attempts to thwart th,e desire of the Czecl:ioslovak people to strellgtnell the ties of iriendship with their great eastern lleighbour. The former Czechoslovak representative to the United Nations has referred to certain incidents which are said to have occurred during the last regular session of the General Assembly; he has tried thereby to' cast a shadow on the conduct of the USSR delegation with regard to Czecho- slovakia, particularly in connexion with the ques- tion of Czechoslovakia's election to the Economic and Social Council and'to the SecurifyCouncil. It is suggested that the Soviet Union did not support Czechoslovakia's desire to remain in the Economie and Social Council, and that the l say this not only as the USSR representative on the Security Council but as the delegate who took a direct part in the work of the last session of the General Assembly, .and in the negotiations which took place on these questions betweenthe USSR and Czechoslovak delegations. The ques- tion we had to settle wasthis:' who, from an ::>ng the group of Eastern European countries, was to sit on the Economie and Social Council? You know that geographical, regional factors have to be taken into consideration when deciding on the composition of United Nations organs, and par- ticularly of such organs as the Economil; and Social Council and the Security Council. Everyone recognizes this as perfectly normal. Indeed, it follows from the lJnited Nations Char- ter which lays down that with regard to the. composition and election of particular members ~o the Security.Council due r~gard shall be paid, among other things, to the geographical factor. It is natural, therefore, that delega#ons should negotiate among themselves during the work of a General Assembly in order to reach agreement on this question,· with a view to removing diffi- culties in the election of any particular country to these organs of the United Nations. Moreover, the USSR delegation, like the other Eastern European delegaticns, had to negotiate with other delegations on this question with a view to reaching an agreement so as to avoid misunderstandings in regard to the nomination and election of appropriate candidates. The ":o;me was done by aIl other de!!~gatiOlL, inc1ueting those of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Latin American ccuntries, the E~tern Eur- opeancountries, the Asiatic countries and other Statesc . The delegation of the USSR and many other .delegations held conversations on th1s question with a view ta reaching agreement regarding the nomination and elf'ction of candidates to the Security Counèil and the Economie and Social Council. Moreover, even before the open- The Czechoslovak delegation had agreed from the very beginning that Poland should be elected to the Economic and Social Council instead of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak delegation had never expressed any dissatisfaction w-ith the possible election of Poland to the Council. More- OVe!, in justification of my assertion that the statement you have heard at this meeting is a mendacious one, 1 must say straight out that the Czechoslovak delegation declared in the very first negotiations on this question that it agreed to the e1ection of Poland to the Economic and Social Council. Nor were there any misunder- standings, either among the delegations of the Eastern European countries, which negotiated arnong themselves on this question, or with other delegations. The same applies to the e1ection of a non- permanent member from among the Eastern .European States to the Security Council. The Czechoslovak delegation and the Czechoslovak Government did not put forward its candidature and did not dema..Tld to be elected. In particlliar, my conversations with the former Czechoslovak. Foreign Minister, Mr. Masaryk, confirmed the fact that the Czechoslovak delegation and Mr. Masaryk, as Minister for Foreign Aff<>.irs, ,1;d not even raise the question of Czechoslovakia's elec- tion to the Security Council. Consequently" Czechoslovakia had no reaSon to criticize th..' Soviet delegation and the USSR, nor did it m'lke any criticism in connexion with the electioi.o. of an additional me'i.J.ber to the Secùrity Council from among the Eastern European countriès. 1 thought it necessary togive this explanation in order to show how false are the methods ased by all these peoplewhom you pick up'in the street and drag into' the Security Councilin arder to give a further hearing. to slanderous allegéitions about.the USSR. 1 shaIl confine myself ta pointing out, as both the Czechoslovak delegation and the ussa. re- presentative on the Security Council have already stated repeatedly, that Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin's task during his short stay in Prague, thé Czechoslovak capital, was to help to speed up the delivery of Soviet gr,ain to Czechoslovakia in fulfilment of an agreement concluded between the two countries. Zorin dealt with purely eco- DOmiC questions. For that purpose and solely for that purpose, he had consultations with the appropriate members of the Czechoslovak Gov- ernment which were· reported in official state- ments published in Czechoslovakia; these state- ments are unqoubtedly known at present not onIy to aIl members of the Security Council but to ail who wish to understand the real situation. The aIlegations that there was interlerence by the USSR in the internaI affairs of Czecho- slovakia-whether through Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin or by any other means-are thoroughly mendacious and not in accordance with the facts. We have heard, today, for the second time, that Soviet officers could be seen accasionaIly in one of the Czechoslovak watering places. AIthough Soviet officers could be encountered occasionally in Karlovi Vari, the number of United States officers a,t that watering plaœ was said to be many rimes greater. So far the representative of the Soviet Union has not availed himseIf of this fact to draw the conclusion that the mere pre- sence of United States Qfficers at a Czechoslovak . watering place was evidence that interferentl:e in Cze'choslovakia's internaI affairs was taking place thro~gh these officers. The United States inter- fered ~d is still interfering, but in other ways .and by different means. 1 have already had occasion to spea~ of these means. Such attempts have not yet been abandoned. Needle~s to say, these and aIl other similar . references to the presence of Soviet officers in Czechoslovak territory are without any founda- tion whatever-and the same applies to aU attempts to prove that the Soviet Union either has interfered or is interfering in Czechoslovakia's internalaffairs. As 1 have already s21.id, 1 reject the utterly' slanderous aIlegation that the events in Czecho- slovakia were in any way influenced by the pre- sence of Soviet occupation troops in ce~ain In conclusion, 1 would once again draw the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the Czechoslovak question has been dragged before the Council and brought up for discussion ~ order to add fuel to the fire and to swell the flood of slander which has been poured out of late with regard to the USSR by certain organs of the Press and also from some offida~ sources in the United States, the United Kingdom and' several other countries. This question has been dragged before the Security Coundl in order to mislead world public opinion-and pa,rticularly public opinion in the United States--with regard to the real meaning of the events which have taken place in Czechoslovakia and concerning the real situation in that country; This question has been raised in the Security Council in order to conceal from public opinion the real attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Czechoslo- vakia, particularly on the part of the United 1States. 1 have already draWn attention i. my previous statements to certains fl.cts which do not leave the slightest doubt that the ruling circles of the United States have brazenly interfered in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, mainly through venal Czechoslovak politicians, in an attempt to break the independent policy of the Czechoslovak Government, to split·the Eastern European countries, the countries of the new democracy, to detach Czechoslovakia from the Eastern European countries in general and the Soviet Union in particular, and to drive a wedge betwee'n Czechoslovakia and the USSR, to which Czechoslovakia is linked by close ties of friend-. ship and mutual undèrstanding. . quie We can now draw a number of conclusions as a result of the discussion of the Czechoslovak ' question in the Security Council. 1 think many will agree with me-though not all will say so openly-that the instigaton> of. this discussion have failed in their venture; that they have revealed their impotence; and that public opinion on the whole has realized the sOl'did purposes for which this question has been dragged. before the Security Council. . It is perfectly obvious to those who really wish ta understand the present sihlation in Czecho- slovakia that the USSR neither had any con- 'nexion nor is in any way connected with the events which have taken place.in Czechoslovakia, h~ve taken place in the life of a. number of European countries, inc1u~g Czechoslovakia. Those who try tofind the reasons for these ,changes in the foreign poliey of the Soviet-Union are mere1y trying to hoodwink their own people and to distract their attention from the'real culprits. Interference in the internal affairs of some European countries-and not oilly European countries-is coming, as we know, mainly from the United States. In this policy, the United States is being followed voluntarily or involun- tarily by the ruling circ1es of some other countries, particularly the United Kingdom. It is in that directior~ that the real reasons for interferènce in" the internal affairs of other countries are to be found. 'The USSR has always stood for the main- tenance and defence of the sovereignty of all States,. great and small; it has maintained and continues, to maintain the principles of the United Nations;. it has fought and 'will continue to fight consistently against all attempts to inter- fere' in the internaI affairs of other countries, inc1uding Czechoslovakia. The discussion of the Czechoslovak question in the Security Council .cannot be interpreted otheIWÎs'e than as an at- tempt to interfere in Czec1lOslovakia's internal affairs. If the resolution which was' put forward by the Chilean representative and imme- diately supported by the '. representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and several other countries is adopted, it cannot be inter- preted otherwise than as' ~ erude attempt to interfere in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs. For this reason the delegation of the Soviet Union categorically opposes the .adoption of this or any similar resolution.

We will now take a vote on the draft resolution submitted at the last meeting on the. Czechoslovak question [288th meeting]. This resolu- "10:. provides for the appointment of a sub-comnnttee ,to receive and hear evidence. It has been submitted by the Chilean de1egation and' taken up in accordance with the rule3 of procedure, by the ~gentine'representa!ive. 11 As you will remember, at that meeting, a procedural discussion took place as to howthe vote on this resolution should be treated: whether it Two courses are now open to me: either to ask you to vote at once on the draft resolution, considering only later on how the vote taken should be interpreted, or to ask you to decide in advance, before the vote is taken, how thl. President would have to interpret it. 1 propose to ask you to follow the second procedure and to decide first hc.w the vote is to he interpreted; we shall then proceed to vote. 1 shaU therefore ask you to vote first on the foUowing question: is, the vote on the draft resolution to be considered as a procedural vote? 'Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated tram Russian): 1 agree that we should first settle the preliminary question as to whether or not this is a pr0cedural resolution. If there are still any objectioIl& to my contention that this is a non-procedural resolution, 1 agree, that that preliminary question should be settled first.

,1 would' like to add that the procedure 1 have chosen, in this case, shall not constitute any kind of precedent, and will .leave future Presidents entirely free to choose, in other cases, between this course and the other one that 1 mentioned a few minutes ago. ' 1 shall therefore put the foUowing question to the vote: is the vote on the draft resolution to be considered as a vote on a question of procedure? Mr. MUNoz (Argentina): Mr. President, 1 am not opposed to the procedure you have suggested, but before you put the question to a vote 1 should like to know whether this vote which is. to ascertain whethet the question is one of procedure or of substance is subject to the veto of one or more of the five permanent members,of the Security Council. The PRES~ENT (translated tram French): 1 think that in order to put the question as clearly as possible, it might be better to vote first on whether it is procedural or not, after which 1 will give a ruling on the vote. If you then disagree, you may challenge my decision. , Mr. GROMYKO (Union of So~et Socialist Republics) (translated tram Russian): The representative of Argentina seems' to have forgotten the discussion we have already had in the 'Mr. MUNOZ (Argentina): 1 have not forgotten what the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repuhlics has toldus before. Perhaps he has forgotten what my delegation has said before. '1 thînk the point at issue is that we disagree on the interpretation of the Flve-Power Declaration at San Frandsco. We do not attach to it a binding effect on my delegation. Therefore, 1 would think that the question of deciding whether the point is one. of procedure or one of substance does not come under the veto privilege. But 1 do not wattt to embarrass the'position o( 'the President in the voting, and therefore 1 will abide by hîs ruling. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : 1 am quite prepared to follow the procedure proposed by the President,if it is thought to be the best one, but since the representative of the USSR has just now referred to thé San Fr~n' cisco Declaration, and quoted the last paragraph, which states that the decision regarding the preliminary question as to whether or not such a matter·is procedural must be taken by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent members, 1 wish to say that my Government adheres' to the San Francisco Declaration, but it adheres to allof it~ not only to, bits of it. It seems to my GovernlI1ent that it is impossible to take one part of the San Francisco Declaration to càncel .àrrother part. There is a passage in chapier l, paragraph 2, which states: "For example, under the Yalta formula a' procedural vote will govern the decisions made under the entire section D of chapter VI. This means that the Council will, by a vote of any seven of its members, adopt or alter its rules of procequre; . . • establish such bodk" or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance f · f' " o lts unctions;,'" If a stl:b-committee set up to examine documents and to hear evidence is not a body or agency which the Security 'Council may deem necessary, 1 do not know what is: It seems to me a· clear case of that, and 1 should have thought that there would be no necessity. to vote at all. If the President wish~ to proceed in that wa,y, 1 have no objection, although 1 do not admit that this paragraph 2 of chapter 1 can be rendered absolutely null and void by what 1 "It is not to be assumed, however, that the permanent mem.bers, any more than the nonpermanent members, would use their 'veto' power wilfully to obstruct the operation of the Council." 'Here, again, it seems to me, this is an excellent example. General McNAUGHTON (Canada): 1 hold the view 'that the resolution submitted by the representative of Argentina on behalf .of Chile is strictly a procedural matter. As has already been stated in'this d~bate, Artic1e29' of the Charter is specific on the question of setting up a' sub-committee of the Seeurtiy Council to aid the Council in examining the case. Article 29 reads: "The Security Council mayestablish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions." This Article, which cornes·under a sub-division of Chapter V entitled "Procedure", provides for precisely the kind o( procedure proposed in the resolution submitted by the representative of Chile. If any additional argument is required to this clear provision of the Charter, an important precedent to the Security Council, in a similar situation, has already been q~oted by the representative of the United, States when, at a previous meeting, he cited the bCorfu case [288th meeting]. On that occasion, the Security Council'agreed on a resolution to set up a comrr..i.ttee of the Council, and this decision was deemed to be a procedural decision. , Reference has been made by the representative of' the United Kingdom, and also by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to the Four-Power Declaration made at San Francisco on 7 June 1945. In the view of the Canadian delegation, tbis document was of importance for the purpose of c1arifying the view of the sponsoring Governments at the San Francisco Conference. In fact, as has been pointed ou~ a number of times, it was on the clear undertaking on the part of the sponsoring Governments that they would IlOt use· their veto' "wilfully to obstruct the operation of the Council", that the ?ther Members of the United Nations acquiesced m. the voting procedure proposed, which other- WIse would have been far from satisfactory to , them. "It is not to be assumed, however, that the permanent members any more than the nonpermanent members will use their veto power wilfully to obstruct the operation of the Counil " c . Unfortunately, this portion of the Declaration has been more honoured by one of the permanent members of the:: Security Council in the breach than in the .observance. Where one portion of this Declaration has been. violated as in this particular case, .the validity of the document as a whole is certainly brought into question. The representative of the Argentine gave us a ,timely reminder at our last meeting on this question [2R8th meeting] that fifty-three Members of the United Nations are not bound in any sense by the provisions of the Four-Power Declaration and for its part the Canadian Government cer· tainly does not· consider itseJf bound by this Declaration. . 1 think 1 have said enough to show that 1share the view of those who maintain that the Four- Power Declaration is certainly not applicable in the case before us. As the proposaI to establish a sub-coinmittee, as suggested in the resolution of the representative of Chile, was clearly under Article 29 of $e Charter, there is no doubt in my mind that this matter should be deemed procedural and should be decided by an affirmative vote of any seven members. Perhaps, as an additional argument, 1 might refer the attention of the permanent membersas has also been done by the representative of the United Kingdom-to the provisions of Article 103 which states that: "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the' Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any otherintemational agreement, their obligations und~r the pres(~nt Charter shall prevail'." If the }four-Power. ])er.;l~ra,!ion,.is re~ardc~d.by the p!.;rmanent members as in sorne sèiIse Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated tram Russian): Paragraph 2 of the San Francisco Fjve:-Power Declaration mpUfates that decisions conc~rning the estaô1îsl1'="' ment of subsidiary organs of the Security Council can-Jîé tiiKen br a~edund vole. -But p~.IW.. _4- of the same Declaration stipulates tllat aIl); ,<k~ion conceming an investigatlOn, not tcrmerttion decisions which should or many De -taÎœn after an investigation, relates to non-procedural matters and as such can oruy be taken by a vote of seven members, including the five concurring votes of the permanent members. The organ envisaged in the Chïlean resolution is said to_come under paragrap~ 2 of the San Francisco Declaration. The delegation of the S,gyiet..lJil!on does not agree wi~ It is an organ for tlie purposë of mvesfigâtion and everyone realizes that this is so. Consequently, a decision regarding the establishment of such an organ must be taken by a non-procedural vote. It appears that sorne members of the Council consider such a decision to be a procedural one. The delegation oi the Soviet Union, on the other hand, considers it to be a non-E!:Qcedural one. In these circums~ce;~ be giiidèd by th~_~~J" lli!:!tl~E~ of the San Francisco Declaration which stlpulates that in case of a divergence _of views on _tl1<l.~~ârf<ïuest!9ii; anaflIrniâtiVëdêêiSiôîïëan be taken-oiilYi1'ihe votes ôf·tliëpërnianent-memb.ë'rSconcüf:=-=- -SfAîëXâiîdê;' 'Câdog~iî:-';:y;th;:r wc should consider the San Francis~o Declaration as a whole . and not base ourselves on sorne paragraphs oruy. It is precisely because the delegation of the Soviet Union considers the San Francisco Declaration as a whole that it maintains that the decision must be taken in accordance with the last paragfaph of that Declaration and that this will be the only right and lawful approach to the solution of the _problem. Since there is a divergence of opinion as to whether or not the resolution is a procedural one, we-must be guided by the last paragraph of the Declaration. SÎJ;' Alexander. Cadogan considers this resolution to be a procedural matter. 1 consider that it is not a procedural matter. The answer will be given by the results of a vote in acordance with the last paragraph of the San Francisco Declara.tion. The Canadianrepresentative has cited as an example the setting up of a sub-committee The Canadian representative has quoted a provision in the Five Power Declaration declaring that pennanent members should not abuse their right. But perhaps we differ in our approach to the question whether this or that permanent member of the Security Council is abusing bis right. Perhaps the Canadian representative considers that the USSR delegation is abusing this r~ght. But we cannot share t1:}.at view. We consider that in rejecting all attempts to interfere in Czechoslovakia's internaI affairs, we are defending the perfecdy legitimate rights and interests of the people of Czechoslovakia and of the Czechoslovak State. The Canadian representative attempts to prove that the San Francisco Five Power Declaration can be regarded as an international agreement and that the obligations assumed under it must, according to the Charter, take a secondary place in comparison with the obligations under the Charter. Wé cannot agree with tbis interpretation because it is wrong and erroneous. The San ,Francisco Declarationdeals precisely with the interpretation of the Charter. It is not an agreement under which the Five Powers have assumed obligations in addition to those assumed under the Charter. The Declaration is an interpretation of the provisions of the Charter. It would therefore be altogether unjusth'iable to set the obligations assumed under the Five Power Declaration against those assumed under the Charter.

1 feel that 1 have not conducted the meeting very weIl, and 1 apologize. Contrary to the Colombian representative's criticism the othér day, 1 have been too optimistic. 1 did think that we might he able to finish considering, this afternoon, a question on which it seemed to me, 1 must confess, that everything had already been said. But 1have four more speakers on my list, and in. these circumstances, 1 w'onder whether 1 should first adjoum the meeting. That is a very unsatisfactory course, as the period that must elapse before the next meeting will only serve to increase the subtlety of the arguments advanced. Nevertheless, 1feel that in view of the late hour it would he better to adjoum. Ml'. MUNoz (Argentina): 1 am not opposed to the idea of adjoumment, but, if the President will permit, 1 should like to clarify a point which is not connected with the vote which is being discussed. 1 should like to c1arify the fact that the draft resolution which is before us was presented by the Govemment of Chile in its sovereign capacity asa Member of the United Nations and as a Member which has been invited to attend meetings of the Security Council. The intervention of the Argentine delegation in this connexion was in accordance with the last part of rule 38 of the rules of procedure which says that such proposaIs "may be put to a vote only at the request of a representative on the Security Council." . Unies

~he Ukrainian representative has asked permis- SIon to speak; but if we decide to adjourn, 1 shall ask him to be good enough to reserve his comments for another meeting. Ml'. GROMYKO (Union of Scniet Socialist Rep~blics) (translated trom fiw-iian): Are there still many speakers on the list and fol' how long do they wish to speak. Perhaps they OIUY wish to say a few words. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translatëd {'rom Russian): Perhaps the speakers coultÏ .be asked for how long they inténd to speak. Perhaps they will only speak for a few niiIiutes. The PRESID~NT·(translatëd. trom French): suggèst that wc riow adjourn. If Y9U do not agrée ta that proposal 1 shall put it ta the vote. Mr. AUSTIN (Uüited States of America): tequest that the PrêSident put my name on bis lista 1 do not know whether 1 shall Wàllt to speak when the fourth speaker on the President's list hâs spokëii but 1 âssure you 1 have somethiIlg more to say. . Mr. Mu~oz (Argentma): If we adjoum, when will.we meet i\gain?

intend to èall a niée~g of the Coriricil tom.orrow morriing, .to take. up .the PaléStine question âgain and, if possiblé, we will rt'siJrile the discussion of tb~ Czéèhoslovak question on Monday or Tuesday. 1 say "if pOSsiblé" béèallSe the Palestine .questio~ is thé morê Urgent. The Couneil deeided, by '7 votes; to adjourn.

'I:~e. Councilwill meet tomorrow, .Saturday, 22 :M:ay at '0.30 a.m.. ta continue consideration of thé Palestine queStion. . The meeÛng rose at ~jiJ p.m.